SPEECH BY LT. GENERAL VERNON A. WALTERS BEFORE THE UNION LEAQUE CLUB CIA AND WORLD AFFAIRS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80R01731R002000120001-0
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
27
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 4, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 5, 1976
Content Type: 
SPEECH
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80R01731R002000120001-0.pdf970.63 KB
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Approved For Release 2003/01/30: CIA-RDP80R01731R002000120001-0 SPEECH by LT. GENERAL VERNON A. WALTERS before THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER OF FLORIT.)A CIA AND WORLD AFFAIRS Miami, Florida Approved For Release 2003/01/30: CIA-RDP80R01731R002000120001-0 Approved For Release 2003/01/30: CIA-RDP80R01731R002000120001-0 Ladies and Gentlemen: I am delighted to be here and to have an opportunity to talk to you a little bit about some- thing which most of my 35 years in Government have been specifically addressed to and that is, xiamely, the question of intelligence. I :think that one of the great questir,~ns that people ask all the time is: What is this intelligence about which people talk so much; what is it rind what does it mean to the United States. Well, intelligence is information on actions, capabilities, int~antions-- political, military, economic and financial-??of foreign countries that may have some impact on our l:i_ves. It may affect our living in some way. We have always set up a good intelligence service during our wars and we have almost always systematically destroyed :i.t as soon as the war was over. This time we waited a :Little longer because we had the Korean War and the Vietnamese War. Approved For Release 2003/01/30: CIA-RDP80R01731R002000120001-0 Approved For Release 2003/01/30: CIA-RDP80R01731R002000120001-0 In 1942 I was sent to the U.S- Army's Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie, Maryland. You know who the Commandant was? A British colonel! That was the state of American intelligence in August 1942. Now the last great investigation we had was in 1946 to ascertain what had happened at Pearl Harbor. And this uncovered the fact that various people in various parts of the U.S. Government had information which, had it all been brought together in one place, might have enabled us not to avoid Pearl Harbor but at least to minimize its effects. And so it was decided in 1947 by the Congress to create a central place, the Central Intelligence Agency, which would be the central repository or the place where all this intelligence would come in and be evaluated and passed on to the policymakers in the United States. We were created by the National Security Act of 1947 which set up the Defense Departmen-~; that is one of the reasons why our primary oversight committees in the Congress are the Armed Services Committees. Now, we were created obviously for the purpose of engaging in espionage. But you know that we .Nmericans have a certain pharisaical streak in our national character Approved For Release 2003/01/30: CIA-RDP80R01731R002000120001-0 Approved For Release 2003/01/30: CIA-RDP80R01731R002000120001-0 which says, "All of this is all right for the dirty old British, French, Russians and Germans, but we pure Americans don't do things like that." So what the law said was that the CIA would do "such other t~iings as the National Security Council might direct." Th~r.oughout our_ past in the United States we have had this thing about .ourselves that really the Founding Fathers wouldn't have liked all this stuff and would have wanted tp let it all hang out,-but this is just not historically correct. George Washington, for instance, organized three separate kidnapping attempts on Benedict Arnold. And I think we all know what he was going to do with him .when he got him. George Washington was one of the great users of intelligence in American history, and he had a very tough situation. Fie had a very small Army, facing a great world power and a very, very tough situation indeed. Now he wrote a letter to his chief of intelligence :~.n New Jersey, a Colonel Elias Dayton, and this is what he said literally: "The need for procuring good intelligence is so obvious that I have nothing further to add on this subject. All that remains for me is to tell you that these' matters must be kept .entirely secret. For lack of such secrecy i,hese Approved For Release 2003/01/30: CIA-RDP80R01731R002000120001-0 Approved For Release 2003/01L3~?; CIA-RDP80R01731R002000120001-0 enterprises, no matter how promising the outlook, generally fail. I am sir, your obedient servant, G. Washington." Now, one more little story about Washington. He spent the night in Connecticut at the home o:f a sympathizer, a Mr. Holcomb. In the morning when he was leaving., he got up on his horse and Mrs. Holcomb came out to say goodbye to him. She said, "And pray, General, where do you ride tonight?" He leaned down in the saddle and said, Madame, can you keep a secret?" And she said, ':'Of course."' He said, "So can I, Madame." He tipped his hat and rode off. So all this business that the Founding Fathers wanted us to tell everybody everything is just not historically accurate. Mr. Truman, in 1956, said, "It matters not to the United States whether its secrets become known through the action of spies or through publication. The damage to the United States in both cases is the same. An