(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86-00244R000200510008-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 11, 2002
• Sequence Number: 8
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved F4 feas 2002 02/19: CIA-RDP86-OO R0660r1UOl-wil1l require 2
e pro ec 70,000 cu
yd of concrete incorporating 180 niil-
lion lb, of rebars of which 33.8 million
lb are in the main platform foundation.
Structural steel exceeds 177,000 tons.
About'40,000 tons of marble will encase
the buildings.
In the beginning. The mall was con-
ceived in the early 1960s by Gov. Nel-
son A. Rockefeller (R) to serve two pur-
poses: consolidation of state agencies
and offices scattered throughout the
city and a start towards the rebuilding
of the inner city. Now, downtown Al-
bany is relatively barren. Several large
stores have left town. Entertainment is
largely limited to bars, and buildings
are in disrepair.
Except for two privately owned 20-
story buildings, known as the Twin
Towers, opposite the Capitol building,
no major building has'been erected in'
the downtown area since completion of
the Alfred E. Smith State Office Build-
a.z, r .ia tr a; A -, s a e
ing in 1928.
The mall was designed by six archi-
tect and engineering firms working un-
P-on u. I _W!' W;r,:,~w,~; W- C-0- der the overall direction of the New
I III I JJ5 IV6-i-~7 CAN I I %7I #VV NI %P !dm wv.~r York City architectural firm of Harri-
son & Abramowitz. According to State
plague government complex Comptroller Levitt, the buildings were
designed not only to provide office
space but also for beauty.
New York State's controversial 11- ter-mile-long building that will. house Levitt's report specifically leaves the
building legislative complex, the Al- the state motor vehicle agency and a judgment of beauty attained to history,
bany South Mall, is five and a half bowl-shaped meeting center. but it points out that the quality is ex-
years behind schedule after six years of The 11th building, the largest of the pensive in terms of cost per usable
construction and its estimated costs 'group, may not be immediately recog- square feet. For example, of the more
have m ed from 380 million to some- nized as a building in conventional than 9 million sa ft in the mallo only
thing in the neighborhood of $1 bit- terms. This is the five-level maim plat- 34% of the total area (about 3.2 million
lion or more without finance charges. form, 1,440 ft long and 500 ft wide, so ft) will be available for office a
Many explanations have been ad- that extends almost the full length o
vanced for the situation, but they are the project and connects all the other
all pretty well covered by a single sen- buildings.
tence found in an audit report made Actually 27 separate structures, the
recently by Arthur Levitt (D), state main platform provides a total of
comptroller. He says, "Too much con- 4,160,900 sq ft of floor space-almost
struction has been condensed into too half the space in the entire project.
Mort a time frame within too imite The platform's three lowest levels
amount of space." He also points tote house mechanical and storage areas
"monumental aesthetic nature of the and provide space for 3,300 cars. The
construction" as greatly affecting the fourth level is a concourse containing
cost of buildings. state offices, a bus terminal, cafeterias,
The South Mall project is being built exhibit areas and shops. The top level,
by the state's Office of General Services of nearly I million sq ft, will be a land-
(OGS) on a 98-acre tract in the heart of scaped plaza of fountains, pools. and
New York's capital city. The project walkways. This main platform will also
consists of 11 structures ranging in form a tunnel through which a four-
height from five to 44 stories. It will lane highway will pass.
provide 9.3 million scl ft of office, c_l- More than 2.5 million cu yd of mate-
tural, recreational and parking ?s ace in rial, mainly blue 'clay, was excavated
ve office ui t la tfie t as&MO2162111Q :6dARf .P86 00
ing, a court ouse, a cultural center that tons of steel sheeting was needed to re-
includes a museum and library, a quar- tain the walls. The structures are' sup- Man, high in air, is at plaza level.
 S ~c~ c l use laboratories court rooms,
i meeune rooms), Storage and ?c anz-
cal areas, cores andii-?ap2?pl2QMVyeptID00,U4R000200510008-1
areas will claim the remaining 66%.
foot is Stun the 44-story office build-
ing, $239 in the courthouse building,
and=-in the four 24-story office
buildings
according to Levitt.
,
Levitt's report says that by compari-
son, the square-foot cost of five office
buildings in the state office complex in
Albany, known as the State Campus,
built between 1963 and 1966, ranged
from $35 to $46 adjusted to 1970 dol-
lars.
Higher cost of financing. Speed even
affected the cost of financing the proj-
ect. The state constitution requires that
a referendum be held before capital
bonds can be sold. Rockefeller knew
this would take time and might well
end in defeat, so he took another route,
one that permits the state to acquire
property under a lease-purchase agree-
ment with the county.
It works this way: the state agrees to
become an agent of the county for the
purpose of building the mall, and the
legislature appropriates the necessary
funds to conduct operations (first in-
stance funds). The county meanwhile
sells bonds and, on a quarterly basis,
reimburses the state for first instance
expenditures. The state pays the county
an annual rental equal to the principal
and interest due on the bonds.
As of Dec. 31, 1970, the state had
paid $38,514,000 to the county for
rental. (The city has already received
$1.18 million as compensation for lost
for the mall.)
the property taken over
The structure that appears to be de-
fying gravity is one of four identical 20-
story office buildings that typify the
spirit of the Albany South Mall project.
Its projecting second floor is now 60
ft above grade, but will be only 18 ft
above the plaza level when the main
platform is completed.
The slab of the second floor is 6 ft
thick and prestressed to cantilever from
both the reinforced concrete core be-
hind and the pedestal below.
In plan, the structure is a trapezoid
125 ft long, 75 ft wide at the back and
40 ft wide at the front. The pedestal is
only 28 ft long, 14 ft wide at the back
and 6 ft wide at the front. The canti-
lever extends 40 ft at the front and a
constant 20 ft at each side.
The structure has a nonrigid steel
frame that carries only vertical loads
while transmitting all horizontal forces
In addition, the state also makes sup-
plemental payments to the county for
its cooperation on the basis of percen-
tage of the money borrowed. According
to an audit report, payments could ap-
proach $30 million.
When all debts are paid, the state
will then take title to the mall. In addi-
tion, the report states that because the
county has to pay higher interest rates
on its bonds than would the state, inter-
est costs will be about $44 million
higher, bringing total interest to.about
537 million.
The effect of the hurry-up program
Core supports high-rise.
to the core through floor diaphragms.
Like the other buildings in the mall,
the agency buildings are faced with
white marble. Ammann & Whitney,
New York City, was the structural engi-
neer. Harrison & Abramovitz, New
York City, was the architect.
on construction prices is even more pro-
nounced for several reasons. One is that
the program created a shortage of bid-
ders. Initially, competition was good,
but by late 1966 awards had saturated
the market. Subsequently, OGS found it
necessary to award major contracts to-
taling $217 million to single bidders or
the lowest of two bidders whose bid and
award prices exceeded estimates by a
total of $78 million.
Only one bid. The largest contract in
the project, that for the main platform
superstructure, was awarded to the only
bidder, Walsh-Corbetta, a combine of
Walsh Construction Co., and Corbetta
Construction Co., both New York City.
The price was $97.8 million, against a
1964 estimate of $76.4 million.
For the cultural center super-
structure, a single bidder, South Mall
Constructors, New York City id $78.7
million, although the estimate was
42.6-million. OGS negotiated the con-
tractor down to $64 million on a cost-
plus-fixed-fee contract with an option
to convert to a lump sum of $74.6 mil-
lion or $76.2 million depending on the
work done.
These two items are included in a
five-point explanation of $394 million
of the $450 million increase in costs
from 1964 to 1971. The remaining $56
million was not identified. The comp-
troller attributes $394 million to these
R j??J? io ` for low estimates,
i n or changes added, $33 mil-
lion to sole bidders whose prices ex-
 ceeded stag,, estimates, $13 million for
increased a ?chitcctuAybpT1 V, d,Ff'FWelease 20
(center) contrast with those of Capitol (left).
tors redress against losses sustained
but by of the work, extensive changes in the
when "the performance of all or any, general contractor for the state,
g
part of the work has been suspended, 1966 the volume of work in progress scope of the w o r k
delayed or interrupted for any ex- reached proportions that called for awards in the face of incomplete de-
th OGS had available. signs, and lengthy delay s cause y t ie
an
fees, $149 million for actual c M ms paid
and estimated, and $34 million for ad-
ditional costs for the main platform
foundation.
Of these items none has come in for
so much criticism as the extras granted
under an Equitable Adjustment Act
(EAA) passed by the state legislature in
1969.
This act, which applies only to the
South Mall project, grants the contrac-
traordinary and unreasonable period of
time by an act or omission of the state
not expressly or impliedly authorized
by the contract." Simply stated, this
means the state must assume some re-
sponsibility for delays in the work, for
changes in the plans and for the exten-
sion of time required to get a job done.
Contractors helped. Contractors have
been, and will probably continue to be,
the major beneficiaries of the EAA.
Three major settlements already
made under EAA represent about $100
million over the original contracts.
Fehlhaber-Horn, a joint venture of
Fehlhaber'Corp., New Rochelle, N. Y.,
and the Horn Construction Co., Mer-
rick, N. Y., received $27 million more
than the $37-million contract it won for
construction of the foundation of the
main platform. Moreover, it got that
+ ~?_~ ? ? _ _
April, with approval of the state, 7% ' been cnangeu scvcl aL L11111J d
short of completion. , time extensions and for increases in the the sequence of the work ha to be
Carlin-Atlas, a combine of P. J. Car- scope of the work. (Once it was reduced changed.
lin Construction Co. and Atlas Tile & at the insistence of the comptroller). Levitt cited the premature letting of
Marble Works, Inc., both of New Roch- Currently, Fuller's contract now runs to contracts before plans were completed
elle, will receive $37.6 million on what Dec. 31, 1975. So, under the existing as another source of delay. Plans for the
was a contract of $23.9 million for the contract, Fuller will receive $4.4 million main platform foundation were only
superstructure of the agency buildings. in fees for the period 1966 to 1975 and half complete when bids were taken
Walsh-Corbetta could receive up to expense payments of up to $20 million. and contracts awarded. The contract,
$149 million on a contract that started Levitt's report says that cost of con- scheduled for a 1968 completion, is not
out at $97.8 million for the main plat- struction supervision currently is esti- yet finished and the contractor received
form superstructure. The price includes mated at $26 million, which is 3.6% on a price adjustment partly on its claimed
a $9.75-million fee that can be in- a construction cost of $715 million. inability to realize the complexity of
creased to as much as $12 million if The Levitt report says the reasons for the job due to the lack of plans.
Walsh Corbetta can cut the costs to change are: unrealistic schedules nha es to set uo realistic starting andtcomapled-
o
$126 million.
The management contract of George
A. Fuller Co., New York City, which
does not come under EAA, has also been
adjusted to meet changing conditions.
Initially, the mall came under the ju-
risdiction of the State Department of
Public Works (DPW). Before major
more men
Rather than expand its own forces, -lack o working space.
OGS hired Fuller to manage construe- Much of the delay is attributed to
Lion of the superstructures. The con- the speed with which contracts were let.
tract called for payment of $5.25 mil- In November, 1965, officials said that
lion, $1.5 million as' a fee and the the state intended to let all contracts for
remaining $3.75 million for expenses. the mall before the end of 1966. Except
Until late 1968, there was, in effect, for the superstructures contracts for the
dual management of the job since OGS Legislative Building, the main platform
administered the foundation contracts. and the Cultural Center, the goal was
As the job bogged down, OGS decided met.
that a single management source would Too many people. As a result, by the
be most efficient, so in December, 1968, middle of 1968 about 2,000 employees
Fuller took over complete responsibility of 40 to 50 prime contractors and close
for the administration and supervision to 200 subcontractors were competing
of the entire project. for space and getting in each other's
Fuller's fee was set at $1.7 million way in the process.
and the allowance for reimbursable Hazardous conditions existed and of-
items set at $6.8 million to Sept. 1, ten men on the ground refused to work
1973. under those erecting the superstructure.
Since then, Fuller's fee and allow- As a result, a considerable amount of
1 d e at ni ht
n
work starteu, 11L) cvc1, aX? ? ?
of the DPW resu 4 oct~
to
GS
d
.
.
over
turne
At the start of the job, OGS acted as a Air intake has 68 ft dia. at base.
g
r reimbursable expenses has work at ground leve was o
es f
d
tion scneuuies. L..Clay~ ?li ? r-?-
form had what Levitt called a "ripple
effect." It created ever increasing delays
all down the line of subsequent sched-
uled starts.
Walsh-Corbetta was scheduled to
start work on the main platform super-
structure in April, 1968, but not until
004fflyg4nod- 9p9' was there sufficient
progress on the foundation to permit
even a limited start. Subsequent delays
 condemned brea contractors. butne labor
Long line of men set a rebar. Project calls Comp
for 180 million lb of reinforcing. any rule that men pick up brass iden- Extra long
tity tags (arrow) nearly caused a strike. practice
o a contractor to agree to la-
slowed progress , only that at the end Fit, ulwork ona the mall probably would strike forces
of December, 19 9700, only 10% of tbor's demands regardless of their merit
work was done. The original 1970 com- have stopped long ago.
pletion date has been moved to 1975. Surprisingly, one critic of EAA is Paul or justification.
Neither Levitt, Fuller nor the OGS Richards, managing director of the One example of this involved a so-
Al- called "Brass Strike." Each workman,
hold the contractors blameless. All General Building Contractors, Inc.,
three refer inadequate or ineffective pf the Associated General iCong uppos d to picks up a b assntag, which
supervision, inadequate labor force and chapter of returns as he leaves. The tag identi-
lack of coop of identi-
contraactorsctors. . ration on the part of some Richards vigorously opposed the leg- fies a man on the job and absence of the
contractors. Contract cancelled. Last year, OGS islative measure, contending that it tag from the shanty shows that its,
cancelled the $20.9-million tower su- could be "destructive of the principle of owner is on the job.
perstructure contract of Foster-Lipkins competitive bidding . . . would dis- Recently, the men decided that they
Corp., Great Neck, N. Y., after a long courage contractor cost-consciousness would not pick up the tags, threatening
o-
series complaints and
demand by expenditure of public funds and would pickup system. The contr ctore cod
ercomplai nts resulted in a dema y
the contractor for an additional pay- destroy collective bargaining by en- mised~almost immediately, t Nownr each f
f ---n with wa e e P up
l
~, illl $n, 73 . n 'c~,i r t ii]
mcili. W q i. v via uiiuC EAA.
The job started on schedule in April,
1966, with completion planned for Oc-
tober, 1968. State records indicate that
in October, 1968, work was only 54%
completed. The core, scheduled for
completion in September, 1967, was
finished in October, 1968. Perimeter
steel, scheduled for erection in 11
months, took 29 months. Now, officials
say the frame will be completed by July
of next year, but it will lack certain me-
l
i
. - __a
l installations.
e
ectr
c
h
side
Throughout the entire course of the ating engineers union. Lat
job the contractors claimed that faulty tends its workers should hold the nozzle from deferring work would be more throu design called for many 'Changes,
nt fla refueling equip- than lost
used for
and
when the ments ands the re awa d ng oflo nt acts
e
ume
arg
of merit. The
that the state's lack of coordination
inflated
more
even
at
onti
ll
r
d
25
ti
~
~stP
the work denied them access to the site project started in 1965 ~an
agree. Furthermore,
does
evitt
L
and delayed their, activities.
The state denied any errors in design
and charged that many of the changes
were the result of poor workmanship. It
also contends that the contractors made
improper and inadequate use of their
own men and those of the subcon-
tractors and failed to cooperate in solv-
ing problems.
On July 8, 1970, the state terminated
Foster's contract and turned to the con-
tractor's sureties for satisfaction. The
sureties in turn contracted for comple-
tion with Dic Concrete Corp., New
York City. Foster Lipkins is now suing
courag:ng .ac
~ o co .,. b men in his crew.
settlements."
Problems of labor. Richards' last Aside from outright strikes, some
point may be valid, but even before contractors claim lack of productivity is
enactment of EAA, contractors were in a a big factor in the high cost and slow
poor bargaining position with labor. progress of the mall. Others admit to
The tremendous demand for workers the lack of productivity, but say that it
apparently squelched fear of unem- is no worse than many other areas in
ployment, so the project has been pla- which they have worked.
gued by work stoppages. Suggested cures. Several times Levitt
One constant source of delays has and consultants, have suggested that a
'been a jurisdictional dispute between "thinning out" of work at the mall
costs.
cut
roblems an
educ
ld
d
e p
r
members of the teamsters and the oper- wou
Ps, long
- - -
stoppages last year alone. with' ui ai"- - V- --? -.
C h mall's problems on future jobs,
t e
the state for $18.A d For Re
leas 2
b
No one is happy about the EAA, but gg wi
1wrr, ?.._._ 7.A 1071
o
he makes several suggestions to the leg-
islature. One is that funds for office
building construction should be appro-
priated individually for each location
and for each building within a project
and that costs be fully examined and
justified.
Another suggestion is that the legisla-
ture consider permanent legislation to
cover problems of the type, which on
the mall required special legislation. He
ecifically mentions equitable adjust-
s
p
ments and the negotiation of single bids
;DDP86-00244ROOG2 b008-1