SOVIET MILITARY THEORETICAL JOURNAL VOYENNAYA MYSL', NO. 10, 1964

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090004-2
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• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 77
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 1999
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 20, 1965
• Content Type: TRANS

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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION
TRANSLATION
Number 914 20 May 1965
SOVIET MILITARY THEORETICAL JOURNAL VOYENNAYA MYSL', No 10, 1964
OFFICE OF CENTRAL. REFERENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E Street, N. W.
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P85100875 R000300090004-2
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FDD TRANSLATION:
SOVIET MILITARY THEORETICAL JOURNAL
VOYENNAYA MYSL'1, No 10, 1964
Table of Contents
Page
The Triumph of the Great October Concept (Not translated)
Certain Historic Trends in the development of Troop Con-
trol, by Maj Gen N. Komkov and Col P. Shemanskiy 1
The Laws of Armed Conflict are the Objective Basis of the
Leadership of Combat Operations, by Col M. Popov 16
Problems of Modern Combined-Arms Combat, by Cols M. Fedulov,
M. Shmelev, A. Sinyayev, and I. Lyutov 28
Calculating a March When Rubble and Obstacles Block March
Routes, by Col K. Lapshin and Lb Col Ye. Galitskiy 42
Increase the Role of Higher Military Educational Institu-
tions in Scientific Research, by Col V. Choporov 51
The 20th Anniversary of the Rumanian National Army (Not
translated)
The US Armed Forces Integrated Communications System, by
Col V. Golitsin, Col V. Orlov, and Lt Col V. Tselenkov 62
The Organization of Aviation Equipment Repair in Foreign
Armies, by Lt Gen A. Ageyev and Engr-Col G. Karlor (Not
translated)
Dialectics and Military Science, by Lt Col Ye. Rybkin
(Review of 1963 book -- Not translated)
Some Remarks on Pamphlets About Troop Education, by Lt Col
V. Trofimov (Not translated)
Notes on Source
_Vc...22.a_ma.x..._ysl' (Military Thought) is a monthly organ of the USSR
Ministry of Defense, printed by the ministry's Military Publishing House,
Moscow. This translation is from issue No 10, October 1964, which was
signed for the press 22 Oeptember 1964. Articles marked "not translated"
Appioatiaciforrlitebasse.619110e3/A9frCakeRDEMATre0876RWIMINUONIanat ion.
AppmffhfRINITIR8519?91ENCIN 9111f1RE
CPYRGHT
tas: ses?ses,
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by Maj Con N. KOMKOV and Col P. SHEMANSKIY
One of the greatest problems of modern military art is the need to
perfect the control of troops on all levels -- strategic, operational,
and tactical. For the solution of this problem it is very important to
consider constructively trends in the development of troop control related
to the changes occurring in the meano and methods of armed warfare. In
this article we shall discus certain of these historic trends.
in the era of smooth-bore weapons and small armies, the result of
operations, and even of an entire war, was sometimes decided by one or
two general engagements. Combat operations took place over a comparatively
small area. In the Battle of Borodino, for example, operations involved
a front of 8 kilometers and a depth of h. kiJometers. The organization
and disposition of forces on the battlefield was comparatively simple and
uniform. There were only three combat arms: infantry, cavalry, and
artillex , As a rule, there was a considerable Interval between the
approach, or march, and the start of the battle. There were no operations
in the modern sense.
These conditions were best met by an organization for the control
of troops under which the commander, or leader, handled questions on
both the strategic and tactical levels. He person aly prepared the plan
of battle or disposition in every detail, watched the developmant of
operation:;, coordinated the efforts of subordinate troops and, when
necessary, clarified in detail their assigned missions and sent fresh
troops into action from reserve forces. Orders and instructions to sub-
ordinate commanders were issued by the commander directly or through ordcr.I.
.'es, as well as by signals. The functions of the tactical elements wore
,iuired, above all, to exhibit personal bravery, to be able to summon
thci ,lbordinates intc hand-to-hand combat with the enemy or to storm
his pc ;ttions. Staffs, as organs of control, for a long time were non-
existun. At first they were established only under commanders in chief,
then, the beginning of the 19th century, under commanders of division
and reimental-level units. Their role in this period amounted to the
aud transmittal of instructions from military chiefs, and the
orgaa:za.tion of troop transfers and billeting. Operations support was
limited to the organization of reconnaissance and the securing and supply
of ammunition, food, and forage to the troops.
With the arrival of mass armies and the introduction of rifled
weapons and motor vehicles in combat forces, the character of combat
operations underwent great changes, graphically illustrated by the
events of "World War I, the 50th anniversary of the start of which is
being observed this year.
cont 'd
PYRGH
rrn or ng many
millions took part. Not only army, but also front, groups were established.
TTank, engineer, and chemical units at regimental level, and signal units
at regimental and company level, came into being. Ground troop operations
were supported by air forces. The defeat of a strong enemy, and certainly
the termination of the war, became impossible to achieve through one or
two general engagements. Battles and engagements took on a prolonged
character and the interval between the march and the start of action
was shortened. Ground troops operations took a definite form. The
operational structure, or combat formation, included several echelons and
other elements.
With these changes in the means and methods of armed conflict, the
number and complexity of problems regarding control sharply increased
at all command levels, the time available for resolving them decreased,
and the requirements for control increased, particularly with regard to
providing unwavering, uninterrupted control.
Under these conditions, personal control by the troop commander over
all aspects became impossible. The need became more apparent for a division
of functions and areas of responsibility among strategic, operational,
and tactical commands, and between command and staff. The great scale
and complexity of armed conflict required that the strategic command
concentrate chiefly on planning and determining the general coals of
operations and the war as a whole, on the distribution of personnel and
materiel and the coordination of operations of front obuyedineniya, and
on the organization of the supply of all necessary reserves to the combat
forces. For influencing the progress of the armed conflict it was
necessary to retain under the strategic command, in addition to general
reserves, a certain quantity of new types of combat materiel, principally
aircraft and tanks. However, the outcome of the fighting, as before,
was determined on the battlefield. Tactical determined operational,
and operational determined strategic successes.
With the strategic command beginning to deal chiefly with problems
relating to the supervision of the war as a whole, and combat
operations extending over great areas and becoming relatively independent,
the role of the operational and tactical commands in the organization
of operations increased considerably. Their sphere of activity expanded.
The role of staffs as organs of control also increased, particularly in
the organization of reconnaissance, the collection and analysis of
data on the situation, and the organization of stockpiling and supply,
antiair and antitank defense, and chemical defense. To ensure firm con-
trol of troops, control points were established, situated at a considerable
distance from the front line. For contact with the troops, the telephone,
telegraph and, later, radio began to be widely used. It was no longer
enough for tactical commanders to exhibit personal bravery and be able
to lead their subordinates in storming enemy positions. They now had
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o be able to evaluate the situation thoroughly and reach the correct
Tdecision independently, to demonstrate great initiative and energy in
its implemenbation, and to ensure and support close coordination among
the various combat arms (infantry, artillery, cavalry, tanks, etc.).
Under such conditions) the assignment of dispositions to subor-
dinates indicating in full detail where, with what, and how to proceed
leads to highly undesirable consequences and even defeat. The Russo-
Japanese War confirmed this vividly. The minutely detailed dispositions
devised by the main staff of the Russian army and assigned to the troops
as a rule did not conform to the situation developing at the front.
Moreover, subordinates were not authorized to change the scheme of
operations stipulated in the dispositions, with the result that they
seldom entered battle under favorable circumstances, and the objective
of the operation was not achieved. Reality repudiated the disposition
as a form of assignment of combat missions to subordinates, which
provided the most detailed description, often with several variants,
of the methods of execution. It was replaced by the directive, or combat
order, in which combat missions were indicated without instructions on
methods of execution. Conditions were thereby created in which subordinate
commanders would exhibit originality and independence in the fulfillment
of assigned missions, under the general centralized control of senior
command levels.
Great changes in the control o troops occurred during the Civil
War. It is particularly noteworthy, in our opinion, that the extremely
difficult situation in which the young Soviet republic found itself
required a fulther centralization of supervision of the armed struggle
in the strategic command, which decided such questions of troop control
as the coordination of the operations of several fronts, the organization
and accomplishment of the successive defeat of the enemy on the various
fronts of the war, and the employment of large mobile (cavalry) units,
which were the principal means for rapid shifting of effort from one
direction to another and for exploitation of a success. In the absence
of continuous fronts, a greatly increased role vent to operational and
tactical headquarters, which often had to make decisions with only
the most general information and understanding of the situation on
other sectors.
A tremendous, indeed inestimable, contribution to the organization
of troop supervision was made by V. I. Lenin. He taught that the founda-
tion of troop supervision on the part of strategic, operational, and
tactical commands must be bold thinking, decisive goals, dynamic combat
operations and maneuver, and the conduct primarily of offensive operations
directed to the complete, rapid defeat of the enemy. V% I. Lenin
provided a perfect example of the practical combination of political and
military leadership of the country and thc armed forces in wartime and
of the correct manner of work for all leadors, including commanders and
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staffs at all levels. The basic features of this manner are selfless
loyalty to the cause of communism and the socialist motherland, hatred
of the enemy, high idealism, party-mindedness, principle and organization
in work, correlation of theory and practice, constant contact with the
masses, faith in their strength, and a paternal concern for people. V.
I. Lenin demonstrated the ability to evaluate a situation thoroughly
and sensibly, to ascertain its principal elements, and to find the way
out of any difficult situation. Bold thinking, concrete supervision,
innovation, personal modesty, integrity, irreconcilability to shortcomings,
and high vigilance were his traits.
The theory and practice of troop control was also enhanced during
the years of peaceful development of the Soviet Armed Forces. Imaginatively
studying the experience of World War I and the Civil War and the rapid
development of all combat arms, particularly air, armored, and mechanized .
forces, our military thought, in the main, correctly foresaw the nature
of a future war and elaborated the theory for the conduct of operations
and battles in depth, as well as precepts on the supervision of the troops
involved. This was greatly furthered by the publication of a number of
theoretical works on problems of troop control by prominent Soviet
military leaders, particularly the works of M. V. Frunze, M. N. Tukhachev-
skiy, and B. M. Shaposhnikov. It is appropriate to note that in Lenin's
lifetime great significance was attached to the elaboration of scientific,
philosophical, political, legal and psychological principles of adminis-
tration, which promoted the development of supervision not only of the
national economy, but also of the troops. However, this important
branch of science was given inadequate attention during the Stalin \
personality cult.
According to the views formed by th: beginning of the Great Patriotic
War, the most important functions of strategic leadership were con-
sidered to be the preparation of plans for operations in d7.:I1Lh involving
the employment of all branches of the armed forces, the determination of
the directions of main effort for achieving the goals of the war, the
distribution of forces and materiel among the fronts, the organization
of coordination among them, and general support to operations and prepara-
tion of the theater of operations. A great role in the deciston of stra-
tegic questions was given to the front commands, inasmuch as fronts were
considered operational or strategic units. The role of army commanders
increased, particularly of shock armies, which were assigned very impor-
tant operational missions.
On the basis of experience in past wars and in anticipation of the
nature of a future war, it had been concluded that it was necessary to
keep under the control of the High Command large units of tank, 'cavalry,
and air forces as a means of decisively influencing the course of opera-
tions, and that reserves of materiel should be created.
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A properly defined role in the control of troops was asuiE;ncd to
T staffs, which were considered organs for supporting commanders with,
necessary information on the situation, assigning missions to subor-
dinates and controlling their fulfillment, aiding in the coordination
of operations and providing general support.
Along with the elaboration of theoretical principles, a certain
reorganization of organs of control was required. Here, the main purpose
was to ensure the most purposeful training of all branches of the armed
forces, combat arms, and special troops for war; planning of the war and
supervision of the troops involved, from the very outset, without radical
changes in control; close coordination between branches of the armed
fordes and combat arms, as well as more precise division of responsibilities
between staffs and chiefs of arms and services.
The most important advances in the theory and practice of troop
control occurred during the Great Patriotic War. The new features of
armed conflict in this war were the participation of great masses of
tanks and aircraft in operations, the employment of rocket artillery,
and the complete motorization of infantry. Combat operations took on a
more intense character, distinguished by. high maneuverability and fast
pace. Offensives were carried out against strong, deeply echeloned
defenses. Offensive operations were characterized by increased deter-
mination and unprecedented scale. For example, in the summer-autumn
campaign of 1944, the Soviet Army offensive extended over a front of
4,400 kilometers. The depth of forward movement of troops amounted. to
500-700 kilometers. The average daily rate of advance was 25-30 kilo-
meters, and in certain operations more.
The time required for the preparation of operations was significantly
reduced. In the third period of the war, no more that 6-8 days were
allocated for the preparation of most army offensive operations. A corps
commander received his combat assignment 5-7 days before the start of
the attack, a division commander 4-5 days, and a regimental commander
2-3 days.
Of course, under the conditions cited., troop control was concerned
with the need to fulfill, in a relatively short; time, a colossal .
number of extremely complex tasks involved in the preparation, execution,
and support of operations and the organization of coordination among
forces and weapons. The situation was further complicated in that
certain problems of control were completely new. Before the war, in
particular, there had been little research and exposition on such
problems as the control of troops during operations to repel an
enemy surprise attack and the committing of main forces under such
conditions, during the organization and conduct of operations by groups
of fronts, or auring a retreat, a mobile defense, or a shift from defen-
sive to offensixe.
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(cont'd
hese and other conditions required a new definition of the functions
and sphere of influence of strategic, operational, and tactical commands,
an improvement in the quality of training of command personnel, and
improvement of the organizational structure and methods of operation of
organs of control.
The nature of the war placed particularly great demands on the
strategic leadership. From the very beginning of the war an agency
was required which could ensure firm, flexible supervision of the country-
and the armed forces in the difficult situation. Such an organ of military-
political leadership was established by decision of the Central Committee
and the Soviet government -- the State Defense Committee. For direct
supervision of the armed forces the Stavka of the Supreme Command was
formed, headed by the chairman of the State Defense Committee, who was
at the same time the leader of the party and government, and Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces. In comparison with the past, this
arrangement of higher organs of control represented increased centraliza-
tion, or merger, of general governmental and military leadership and,
despite the known mistakes of Stalin, proved justified. It made possible
the conversion of the country into a unified fighting camp and the attain-
ment of victory over the enemy.
The principal working organ of the Stavka was the General Staff.
The most important functions of the Stavka and the General Stall in-
cluded the formulation of concepts of strategic operations, general
support for these operations, the organization and implementation of
coordinated action among branches of the armed forces and fronts, the
readying of reserves, the operational and strategic movement and
regrouping of troops, the supervision of combat forces during operations,
and the analysis of results of combat operations.
In addition, the Stavka and the General Staff were concretely
involved in matters of operational supervision. In the planning of
many operations the front headquarters were not only informed of the
concept and missions of the operation, but were instructed as to the
directions of main effort; the composition and missions of striking
forces, and their formations; the sequence in which tank armies, cavalry
and mechanized groups, and second echelon forces were to be committed;
the employment of air forces; the types of coordination between neighbor-
ing units and between branches of the armed forces; and supply and
equipment measures. On this basis the front headquarters planned operations
in detail and submitted their plans to the Stavka for approval. Some-
times the front commands, on their own initiative, submitted views
on forthcoming operations to the Stavka. To assist front headquarters
in the planning of operations and for organizing coordinated action be-
tween froLts? representatives of the Stavka were often detached to them
along wih small operational groups which then maintained control over
the progress of combat operations.
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The actual decision of questions of an operational nature by the
Stavka and the General Staff greatly cmplicated the organization of
front operations and necessitated, in the planning of them, over-all
consideration of the general strategic situation, the closest coordi-
nation of front operations, and the maximum employment of forces and
materiel on decisive sectors for simultaneous or consecutive defeat
of enemy groups.
The extremely complex character of the armed conflict and the
great scale of operations, conducted simultaneously or consecutively
along several axes, required that the strategic command, in order
to have a decisive influence on the progress of combat operations,
retain under its immediate disposition, in addition to the fronts,
large reserve units (tank, mechanized, cavalry and air crops, tank
and air armies, and even entire reserve fronts and substantial
artillery elements and special troops) as well as great materiel
reserves. During preparations for the summer-autumn campaign of
1943 the Stavka had in its control a specially created reserve
front, several separate combined-arms and tank armies, the fronts,
effected a favorable change in the correlation of forces and
materiel on selected sectors, ensured an intensification of effort
for exploitation of a success in an offensive or for repelling
enemy assaults on the defensive, imposed its will on the enemy
and achieved great strategic successes.
' Conditions relating to the organization and support of troop
control also changed at the -Pront and army command levels. The
volume and complexity of questions to be resolved here sharply
increased in comparison with the past, and the time available for
execution was reduced. The front and army commands were compelled
to exhibit unprecedented firmness and flexibility of control and
to ensure unbroken control. The chief functions of control were
planning, over-all preparation and support of operations, and the
supervision of forces during combat operations.
To ensure close coordination and massing of forces and materiel
participating in operations, and prompt reaction to changes in the
situation, the front commands retained decision-making authority
in a number of matters which previously were within the sphere of
army and even tactical elements of control. For example, they
frequently instructed armies not only as to the goals and missions
of operations and the composition of forces and materiel, but also
the directions of main effort, breakthrough sectors, operational
formations, and other matters.
(cont'd)
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Similar conditions prevailed in the work of army commands which,
in addition to their own immediate functions often were occupied
CPYRGHTwith questions relating to the organization of combat operations.
Rapid changes and abrupt development of the situation required
extremely efficient response during combat operations. For this
purpose the front commands retained in their own immediate disposition
f,he most :important weapons capable of enemy destruction over the
entire depth of his operational formation, such as air forces,
as well as the principal forces and materiel for exploitation of
a success, such as a tank army and tank, mechanized and cavalry corps.
Army commands formed artillery groups from the most powerful and
long-range systems allotted to the armies.
Particularly rigid centralization was observed in control by
front and army commands during the preparatory period of operations.
It was necessitated chiefly by the difficulties involved in a break-
through against enemy defenses. To a certain decree, it saved time
and, primarily, it ensured the concentration and coordination of
forces and materiel.
However, there often existed unwarranted centralization of con-
trol, which took the form of needless interference by front and
army commanders in the functions of subordinates . Whereas such
interference was justified to some extent at the beginning of the
war when command personnel in tactical elements had not had sufficient
combat experience, it became necessary, and even harmful, in the
later period when the combat skill of commanders at all levels had
considerably increased and the reduced time required for the prepa-
ration of operations and the sharp increase in maneuverability in
combat operations demanded great independence, initiative and
criginality from commanders and staffs of tactical elements,
particularly in the selection of methods for fulfillment of their
combat missions. In such conditions, interference in their functions
by operations-level commands adversely affected the results of
combat operations.
In view of all these circumstances, the Stavka in 1943 issued
a special directive by which senior chiefs were denied the authority
to interfere without cause in the functions of subordinates, to
control the troops "over their heads." These ins tructtons from the
Stavka played a very beneficial part in the achievement of success
in battles and operations. They made it possible to combine
centralization of control more closely with initiative and originality
in subordinates, and to ensure more complete success in combat
operations.
(cont'd)
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structure of control organs. The rapid development of all combat;
arms and special troops brought the need for the formation of
organs headed by the respective commanders or chiefs, in order to
ensure expert employment of new woapnno, branches of the armed
forces, combat arms and special troops and the uninterrupted
supply of materiel reserves and combat equipment to the troops.
The role of combined-arms staffs increased still further in
this connection, and their functions expanded. They wore responsible
for securing the closest harmony of all combat arms and special
troops, and control over their fulfillment of combat missions.
Along with the clarification of the functions of organs of
control, their practical methods of operation were developed.
Experience since the very beginning of the war had demanded,
along with the employment of communications equipment, the broad
application in administration of personal contact with subordinates
and an intensification of active organizational work by officers
and generals among the troops, directly on the scene. This made
it possible to examine thoroughly problems of troop, coordination,
to control the work of subordinates effectively, and to give them
the assistance required in the control of troops.
To accelerate the collection of data on the rapidly changing
situation, the assignment of missions to the troops and control of
their fulfillment, it became necessary to expand the practice of
sending staff officers wit'i communications on two levels down,
and to include subordinates in the net and monitor their con-
versation.
The proper organization of control posts was of great importance
in improving the control of troops. In the first months of the war,
field control of fronts and armies, as well as of soyedineniya, was
often concentrated at one point, not divided into echelons, and
was widely separated from the troops and lost touch with them. They
were often subjected to enemy scir and artillery attack and sustained
great losses. To correct these faults and ensure uninterrupted
contact with the troops, and to increase the viability and mobility
of control points, required their echelonment in depth. The first
echelon (command post) was situated as close as possible to the
6roops and provided direct control of combat operations, while
the second echelon consisted of the rear control post and waL
designated to control the rear area. Observation of the progress
of combat operations on main axes took on special ir..ortance in the
attainment of flexibility and effective control. Therefore, at all
levels up to the front, observation posts were organized, and sou-
times forward control posts. On secondary axes, awdliary control
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rm.; alialrnaLe locations for control post(' were (lino readied. ThL
ry],,:!ttien or control 'mato during an operation or battle wan usually
1):,' echelon. This extensive system of control posts justi-
fled Hself fully. It ennured uninterrupted control or the troops durin,
,-v;bal operations Involving maneuver, and reduced looses of personnel
oroois to enemy i,11.40 atAo.clul.
The resoluteness and intennity of combat operations brought;
owreaed importance Lo the moral and fighting qualities or command
p,I.:;01piel, their courage, self-control, and ability to %cep control
the troops and ensure their fulfillment of combat miunions in a
diffimlb situation. The acquisition of new combat equipment required
that ccimmanders and staffs have expert technical and general knowledm,
and that they be constantly replaced.
The foregoing brief analysis of the development of the theory
aud practice of troop control in pant wars es6ablishes Limy, with the
,eiailabitiLy of new weapons in the armed forces, the increase in intensi-
ty, scale and maneuver in operations, and the changed organizational
tructure of combat forces, a bEsie trend in this development has been
a continual increase in the volume'Of work demanded of commanders and
staffs at all levels, along with a simultaneous decrease In the time
available for its accomplishment. This inevitably complicated the
over-all conditions of troop control and brought new, increased require-
ments for firmness, flexibility, continuity, and efficiency. These
requirements found application in a continual review and definition
or the control functions of the various command levels, redistribution
of duties (but not responsibilities!) between commanders and staffs,
improvement of the organizational structure of control organs and their
methods and mode of operation, and the introduction of new technical
devic,es irr;o the control function.
OC special importance Was the merGer of the over-all governmental
and Lhe strateGie leadership, which ensured more correct and ?omplete
,,i)ft:ideration, in the supervision of the armed conflict, of the
milUary-political situation, internal conditions of the adversaries,
their economic and moral capabilities, the condition of the armed
Con,!c:;, and other conditions relating to the conduct of the war.
The role of the strategic command in the direct supervision of
11-ed warfare is continuously growing. Its functions are expanding
and extending increasingly into the respect to the planning, pre-
pnrion and support of operations. The resolution of such questions
is centralized in the commander in chief's headquarters to a Greater
.iegree as the scope of the opc:o.tion is more decisive and siGnificant
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unen'a'n a direct 'nf.uence on the progreuu of combat operation';, nexn
headquarturo are retaining under their own control increaning numbere
of the moot important weapon:; and muteriel renerven.
On the operational level of oupervicion, on the one hand, there
lo a tendency to decide the moot important queutiono of troop control,
particularly (pentium relating to training and oupport of see::ations,
in increaeingly clone contact with higher command level o. Cn the other
hand, there is a tendency to oepand eontrol functione into queutdpne
of tactisc. Thie is particularly apparent during the preparation of
an operation, when, au time permits, the operational cumnand deeideo
many questions relating to the organization of combat operatione.
During an operation it becomes necessary to extend great autonomy
to commander? of tactical elements, particularly in the choice of
metnodu of execution of assigned mieoionu. Strict centralisation of
control under such conditions may adversely affect the success of eombet
operatione.
As the power and range of weapons of destruction increase, the
headquarters, takes an increasing part in the direct control of them.
fhe employment of these weapons becomes the function not only of the
tactical command to which they usually were fully subordinated in
the past, but also of the operational and strategic command. Experience
in the employment of various weapons indicateu that the greater their
etri%ing power, the more must their control be centralized; and the
jrcater the range of the weapons, the higher must be the command leve
;It which their employment is centralized.
By employing the most important destructive weapons the operational
command ic capable of directly adhieving an operational success, without
the taetical successes which ordinarily preceded it in the past. For
eeami?le, during the Great Patriotic War massed air attacks were mae
to destroy counterattacking enemy forces, performing a mieeion which
..'as necessary to the success of the operation as a whole.
The importance of countering enemy weapons of destruction has
geovn continuously. An example is the part played in the accomplie-
meet 02 missions in operations of the last war by the countering of
air 2orcee. Special operations were even mounted to secure su]yremacy
in the air. The organization of euch countering efforts therefore
ta.:ee an increasing role in the control of troops.
It must be pointed out that success in troop control, particuherly
in the initial period of a war, depends increasingly on the degree to
which the theory and practice of troop contrcl developed before the war
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)
cunt:kJ App toyed! FdraRe1easep20001081019d OlAiRDP8/1T(0082,5R0a0300090004-2
cutabiinhed nyutem of control hao been touted by experience in train-
CPYRGI-M and mal,tc/itcn, and meets modern requirement:J.
WiJi the increased number of tasku performed by the camnandi the
r0t0 0C otaffo in the control or troopo lu continuounly increaning,
',he importance of providing technical equipment to control organo is
growing, and further diepernion of control posto and :*.Yrovement of
their mobiliti is taking place. The organization or control posts
in armorcd troops units (ooyedineniya L obuyedinenlya) has been
particularly instructive. These posts typically have had a small
personnel e-Iplement and great mobility.
These are some of the complicating trends in the historical
development of the theory and practice of troop control.
Under modern conditions, with the revolution in military affairs,
these trends logically must be given further development c.lia entension.
The availability to the armed forces of rocket and nuclear weapons,
Jet, engines, and electronic computers, and the complete motorization
and mechanization of troops, benides changing fundamentally the
nature of armed conflict, operations and battles, have increased
immeasurably the volume of troop control measures. It is sufficient
tO'note that, in addition to measures performed in the past, it also
includes such complex matters as organizing the employment of nuclear
weapons and ensuring rapid exploitation of nuclear strikes by com-
bined-arms units (soyedineniya I obuyedineniya) of the Ground troops;
organizing antimissile defenses and the protection of troops and rear
objectives against enemy weapons of mass destruction; predicting
radiological, chemical and bacteriological conditions; organizing the
movement of troops across areas of contamination and destruction, etc.
Reaching decisions and planning operations now involves analysis of
a great volume of data on the situation and performance of complex
calcalations.
Moreov2r, the time available for the preparation of operations,
particularly in the initial period or a war, is considerably reduced.
The so-called preparatory period of an operation as it was formerly
underctood in general can no longer exist. In the organization and
conduct of combat operations, many problems of troop control must
literally be solved on the move, in an extremely complex and quickly
changing situation. Moreover, al a result of nuclear strikes control
posts may be taken out of action in a short time and communications
oy;;tems broken.
(cont'd)
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CPYRGHT
?
AaprovtcluF39r804mARANIMPAM4-11MANCOURPPACIM9944ap1
and requirements for control are multiplying. Logically, all e; :1
trends will receive further development from now on. Without diseussiAll_;
this question in detail in this article, we shall point out only the
following conditions.
The decisive means of achieving the goals of modern war are rockLJ
and nuclear weapons, with the:;.r unlimited effective range and tre-
mendous destructive capabilities. This rewires maximum centralization
of control of the principal nuclear-rocket weapons in the Supreme
Command, particularly in the initial period of the war, for here and
only here is it possible to decide correctly and moot effectively
questions concerning the objectives of nuclear strikes, targets for
destruction, the power of warheads and moans for delivering them to
the targets, the type of explosive effect and the time for delivery
of strikes, and finally the issuing of orders or signal dispatches.
Only here can the authority be placed for "pressing the button" to
activate the principal weapons of war. The Supreme Command has thus
become not only a directing organ of supervision, but also the
immediate executor of the principal missions of the armed conflict.
The most important task of the General Staff in preparing for
a modern war is the detailed planning of the employment of nuclear
weapons by all branches of the armed forces.
The chief functions of the operational command have become the
organization of exploitation of atomic strikes delivered under the
plans of the Supreme Command, the employment of nuclear weapons of
operational and tactical types, as well as the control of separate
battles and engagements on a given axis or in a given area and their
coordination and support. The independence of tactical-level commanders
in the execution of assigred combat missions is increasing immeasuraby
Unnecessary interference in the functions of subordinates inevitably
leads to losses of time and to perfunctory decisions, and therefore
is detrimental to the fulfillment of combat missions. Also to be
considered is the fact that the sharp increase in the firepower of
units (soyedineniya) and improvement in the level of training of
command personnel on the tactical level greatly increase the possi-
bilities for creative initiative on their part in the execution of
combat missions.
The new conditions require that troop control posts be organized
in a new manner. Considering the constant threat of their destruction
by enemy atomic strikes and the dynamic character of combat operations,
they must have a small personnel complement and be highly mobile and
distributed over a great area. Each must be ready at any moment to
(contid)
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,,:;.IPCTA -1?61 ttq
m liGhu. ower J.CVC1 .111 Llc event
i tipoolAI are taken out of action. They must be provided with
Lhu laLest in technical equipment for mechanization and automation
of control processes, for only in this way can timely and adequately
effective employment of the principal weapons of destruction be
achieved.
Control organs themselves will be different. In many armies it
is considered that the existence of a great number of independent
control sections (chaoti, otdely) under one control organ contradicts
modern requirements, since such an organizational structure inevitably
produces excessive levels of control and parallelism in operations
and makes control organs unwieldy and immobile. Therefore a deter-
mined effort to improve the organization of control organs is under
way in some armies. The basic trend is to the formation of a single
staff, organized on the principle of a division of functions among
groups and centers which are small in strength and. equipped with
modern technical means of control. Thus, the role of the staff in
troop control is growing immeasurably.
More advanced working methods are also being sought for commanders
and staffs. Special attention is being given to achieving a sharp
increase in efficiency, primarily in the performance of such measures
as the collection and analysis of data on the situation, the making
of decisions and the assignment of missions to the troops.
High moral and fighting qualities in command personnel will have
a decisive effect for the achievement of victory under the new con-
ditions. It is readily seen that to maintain control of troops in
nuclear-rocket war, to overcome fear and prevent panic following the
first nuclear strikes and ensure fulfillment of combat missions, is
possible only on the part of officers and generals of high ideals,
who arc infinitely devoted to the homeland, courageous, resolute,
brave, strong-willed, composed, and sober-minded. Education of such
personnel in these qualities is therefore receiving primary attention.
Training requirements for command personnel have been raised.
Fnr skillful supervision of troops equipped with complex new materiel,
military leaders must have perfect knowledge of this equipment, in
addition to the general principles of military science, and must
know the fundamentals of physics, mathematics, chemistry, cybernetics,
and radioelectronics. The problem of the engineer training of
commanders is critical.
These, briefly set forth, are the trends in the development of
troop control under modern conditions.
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A further m4or nfluence on troop control will obviously be
exerted by proposals in foreign armiou for equipping troops with small,
superpowerful atomic and laser weapons, new rockets, and apace devices;
for the employment of complex evipment for automation of control
and artificial earth satellites for signal communication improvement
in the air-transportability of troops and control posts, and the equip-
ment of troops with new tanks, armored transports, and other combat
vehicles.
Al]. these devices will undoubtedly bring new changes in the
character of combat operations, with increased intensity, scale,
maneuver, and tempo. The number of control functions will increnu,.1
and the time available for their accomplishment will decrease.
Requirements for control and the level of trainik; of command
personnel will increase. It will be necessary to define the sphere
of control of strategic, operational and tactical commands, to organize
control posts in a new manner, and to improve the authorized structure
of control organs and their methods of operation.
Our task is to observe attentively the development of military
affairs, to give prompt attention to training results, and on this
basis to develop continuously the theory and practice of troop control,
which will promote the enhancement of the combat readiness of our
Armed Forces.
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Approved For RIVER00010Enj CETEMOFE52300300090004-2
BASIS OF THE LEADERSHIP OF COMBAT OPERATIONS
CPYRGHT
by Col. M. POPOV
The combat operations of the al7ed forces of opposing sides are sub-
ject to their own objective laws, which play a very real role in the pro-
gress and outcome of a war. The classics of Marxism-LerrInism frequently
spoke about the existence of specific laws of war. ..Engels) in the article)
"European War)" wrote: "Military movements on sea and on land are subject
not to the wishes and plans T diplomats, but to their own laws) which
cannot be violated without subjecting the whole expedition to dangee
Lenin, in the well-known work, "Counsels of a By-stander" called for "care-
ful consideration" of those "Special laws" to which armed insurrection as
a special form of political struggle is subject.
Just what are the objective laws of war? What is the relationship
between their operation and the conscious actions of people; how can the
laws of war be practically utilized by military leaders? These are the
most important questions which come to the fore in the study of the laws
of war) and, particularly, the laws of armed conflict, which constitute
the basic subject matter of Soviet military science.
The problems of the laws of wax is actively studied in Soviet mili-
tary literature on the basis of Marxist dialectics, which has found
expression in a number of substantial works and in numerous articles in
periodical literature. This makes it possible) based on what has already
been achieved) to proceed to some generalizations of the relationship of
the objective and subjective in armed conflict, of the operation of objec-
tive laws and the conscious, willful acts of officers and military leaders;
it is to this that this article is mainly devoted.
Under modern conditions, the state of war involves the whole popula- .
tion of the combatant state. War changes the nature of the production
processes of industry; to a great degree it subordinates to itself science
and art; it has a strong effect on the political and morale condition of
the population; it changes the established pattern of cons4tion; and it
brings into being a specific form of the social activity of people--
organized armed conflict. Therefore the laws of war are different from
other laws of social development. This, of course, does not mean that
during war the operation of all others ceases.
Wars arise as a consequence of economic and political contradictions
between classes and states, and those laws of the class-antagonistic
society, according to which these contradictions are formed and developed,
may be attributed with certain reservations to the laws of the orgin of
(Cont'd)
16
Ca develop-
ment of the capitalist countries in the stage of imperialism may serve
as an example of this: However, the system of laws of war is formed, by
those specific laws) inherent in this social phenomenon, which come into
being along with the war and continue to operate throughout its duration.
Marxist-Leninist philosophy has generalized the most important ..'.:.o-
tinguishing features of the laws of nature and social life. On this
basis it has worked out the concept of lard, which has a methodological
importance of all sciences, including military science. Lenin gives a
profound and accurate statement of the concept of law. In Philosophical
Notebooks he writes: "Law is relationship. ? ? the relationship with
essential realities and between such realities." This means that laws
are connections and relations in the phenomena of nature and society
wherein the connections and relations are the most important and essen-
tial. Laws are those connections and relations which inevitably under
certain conditions produce a certain result. The development of various
processes, both in nature and in social life) take place in conformity
with the operation of laws.
Proceeding from this, we may say that the laws of wax are the most
essential connections, relations and dependencies in its phenomena, in
the very essence of these phenomena. The operation of these laws
appeare as the objectivr basis, with relation to the actions of soldiers,
officers and generals, for the attainment of victory, both in the war
as a whole, and in individual engagements, battles and operations.
The laws of war, in our opinion, may be divided into two basic
groups, conforming to the difference between war as a whole, and armed
conflict. To the first of these belong the most esstential connections
and relations in the phenomena of war, the wry important dependence of
its progress and outcome on the economies of the warring states, their
social-political structure, the political condition and state of morale
of the population and. the army, the quantity and quality of their
weapons, the level of development of science, and certain other factors.
The founders of Marxism-Leninism revealed and thoroughly established.
the basis of this kind of dependence. Many works of our military
theoreticians are devoted to the study of these law. This group of
laws shows the relation betwen armed conflict and those social-poli-
tical, economic) and other conditions under which the war proceeds.
First among these laws is the very important inherent relationship
between the political content of the war and, the armed force employed.
in it, a relationship proceeding from the very essence of war as a
social phenomenom.
War in its essence is both politics and armed struggle. The well-
known thesis of Lenin states: "In application to wax, the basic position
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17 (Cont'd)
oiARPMetlitrPriffEtlicaSeZIPLYPengilVIAirleRMA7g92919Pc?099?Ager"
(3E1(name1y violent) 'means." (Collected Works, Vol. 21, p. 19)i). In this
definition distinctly apear two ideas, accurately corresponding to the
two basic aspects of the essence of war. The first is: war is an exten-
sion of politics; the second: war is armed force. As an extension of
politics, every war has its political content; as the use of force, war
is armed conflict.
The political content of war is its political basis and di:-Lction,
its social-political character in certain concrete historical conditions.
The political content ef a war is determined first of all by the following:
of the politics of what class or state is it an extension; in the name of
whose economic interests and for what social-political aims lb it being
waged; and to what historical results will victory or defeat of one side
or the other lead?
Armed struggle, the basic group of laws of which we will speak about
below, represents the totality of the military operations of the armed
forces of the opposing sides.
The political content of war and the armed, force in it are organically
interconnectedl inherently united ane indissoluble. War is the mutually
inter-permeating unity of political content and armed force. There can-
not be a war without armed force. But also there is no war without poli-
tical content. "War is politics through and through," wrote Lenin.
The inter-relationship of political content and armed force within
a single whole--war--brings with it interaction between them, a certain
kind of correlation between them. The polittcal content of war and the
armed force in it are of unequal importance, unequal status. Political
content is primary ,and dicisive; armed struggle is secondary and subor-
dinate, inasmuch as it is the means of politics.
The correlation between the political content of war, and armed
force as a specific form in which this content is expressed, is the
inherent, essential relationship of those aspects wh:Lch in their totality
constitute the essence of war, i.e., the most profound, inherent, essen-
tial relationship of the law of war. The essence of this law is expressed
in the fact that the political content of war exercises a decisive influ-
ence on the general character of the armed struggle, on the methods and
forms by which it is waged, and on the kinds of weapons used, In short,
the political content of the war determines the nature of the armed force
used in it.
The idea of this law is contained in a number of works of Lenin.
For example, in remarks on Clausewitz's book, On War, Lenin noted that
"the nature of the political goal" has a decisive influence on the
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18
e processes of
the armed conflict, from the biggest strategic operations down to parti-
cular battles and the actions of each soldier. This law constitues the
pivot around which revolves the operation of the other general laws of war
and the laws of armed struggle.
The decisive effect of the political content of a war on the nature
of the armed struggle is confirmed by the whole history of wars. Wars
which have arisen out of minor political cmItradictions and have not
been in pursuit of vital political goals have usually been carried on
indecisively and at a slow pace. On the other hand, wars for decisive
political goals have always been characterized by exceptionally intense
military operations. World War II may serve as ts, convincing example of
this; in its political content there were essential features which cor-
responded tc the different nature of the armed struggle in the West, and
on the Soviet-German front.
For example, in the initial period of the war, frIm September, 1939
to the spring of 1940, the allies did not carry on active military opera-
tions against the German-Fascist troops. And. that at a time when 115
Anglo-French divisions faced a total of 23 German divisions. Military
operations of the opposing sides were limited to sporadic exchanges of
fire and flights of reconnaissance planes. Things reached such an absurd
state that the French called this the "comic" or the "phony" war.
The strategy of the "phony" war was entirely determined at that time
by the political content of the war of England and France against Hitler's
Germany. The ruling circles of England and France still counted on d..;.rect-
ing the aggression of Fascist Germany to the East, against the Soviet
Union. The governments of England and France gave Hitler to understand
that he had complete freedom of action ta the East, but wuld meet with
resistance if he tried to start active military operations in the West.
But a completely different picture of military operations arose in
the war of Germany against the Soviet Union: on the Soviet-German front
there was no lull in the bitter fighting from the first to the last days
of the war; the armed struggle was exceptionally intense. This corres-
ponded to the poliical content of the war between a socialist country
and a fascist state.
Thus the general character of the armed struggle is directly depen-
ent on the political content of the war. The more decisive the politi-
cal goals that are pursued in the war, the sharper, the more intense and
bitter the armed struggle--this is one of the ways in which armed
struggle is subject to law, and represents a manifestation of a basic
law of war. Lenin particularly emphasized. this effect of law: "The
more deeply politir.:al war is: the more 'warlike' it is; the less deeply
political, the more 'political' it is." (Remarks on Clausewit's work,
poTh Fre461ftlisligtdaDA MOW, 9PC)A)RDP85T00875R000300090004-2
19 (contd.)
CPYRG
A p prgye6bAca edle etg.29 tiaE18.INMA.90 tpEggin9/9 qpiE,30
ofthe unleashing by the imperialists of a new war. In such a war,
ATabsolutely opposing political goals would be pursued. The sharpness
of the political contradictions, in combination with the special charac-
teristics of nuclear-rocket weapons, would produce military operations
of an exceptionally intense, fast-moving and decisive kind.
This law, to be considered a general law of war, is at the same
time a law of armed struggle, because it expresses the influence of
politics on armed force, and its effect permeates all the phenomena of
armed struggle.
Another essential relationship which exercises great influence
on the general character of the armed struggle and, on the concrete
methods of carrying it out is the connection between the methods of
exercising armed force, on the one hand, and the characteristics of
weapons, military equipment, and, means of communication and transport
on the other. Through armament economics exerts its influence on
armed conflict. Engles wrote: "Notheng so much depends on economic
conditions as the army and the navy. Armament, composition, organi-
zation, tactics and strategy depend primarily on the level of produc-
tion and means of communication and transport attained at a given time."
(Selected Military Works, Voyenizdat, 1956, p. 11)
In the era when the use of gunpowder was unknown, armed conflict
usually took place as engagements between comparatively small masses
of troops. The battle began with the use of metal weapons, but then
almost always developed into hand-to-hand fighting. The outcome of
the fight was decided by a stroke of a sword or thrust of a spear.
This was one of the laws of armed conflict of that period.
There was a complete revolution in waging armed conflict with the
appearance of firearms and wide-spread equipping of troops with them.
The firearm gradually replaced "cold steel." There arose a new law
of armed conflict: the course and outcome of the battle was decided
basically by the firepower of each side.
The appearance of nuclear-rocket weapons and the further develop-
ment of modern military eqipment and means of communication and trans-
port have produced completely new qualitative changes in the nature
of armed conflict, in the methods and forms by which it is carried
out. The most important features of nuclear-rocket weapons are its
great range, the high speed of movement to the target, and its
unprecedented destructive power. The use of nuclear-rocket weapons
will change the whole picture of armed conflict. Military operations
will become extraordinarily intensive, fast-moving and of brief
duration. Marshal R. Y4. Malinovskiy, Minister of Defense USSR, said
at the 22nd Party Congress: "In a future war, nuclear-rocket weapons
wi3i6EF6idd (ON'iliarlib0714(.4.69rEqPi=gi9PtiVIIGirt615tigh04,004g6004-2
20
(contld)
PYRGHT
Atm=mecca% FRE)isaletal21120/1111031)ClilefiCDRBSTBA8f 5R0048001/91000riltan-
tional weapons which has been reached, there will come into being a
new law of armed conflict: the course and outcome of the battle will
be decided by the blows of nuclear weapons. Final victory in the
armed conflict will be achieved by the combined efforts of all typos
of armed forces, with the strategic rocket troops playing the deci-
sive role.
All this shows convincingly ?nought that between the character-
istics of weapons and military equipment, on the one hand, and the nature
of the armed conflict, on the other, there exists a very eseential con-
nection, a relati,onshMp which can be reduced. to celaw. The decisive
influence of armaments on the nature and the methods of carrying out
of armed conflict is confirmed by the centuries-old history of ware,
and consequently is to be understood as universal and inevitable, which
provides the basis for considering this essential relationship as one
of the laws of war--the law of the dependence of the nature of the armed
conflict, and the methods by which, and forms in which, it is carried
out, on the characteristics of weapons and military eqUipment. From
this point of view, this law, among several others, appears as that
which decides the development and change of methods of waging war. The
afore-mentioned ways in which armed conflict conforms to law represent
nothing other than an expression and manifestation of this law in con-
crete historical conditions of u certain, which permits us to conclude
that the conformity ot law of armed conflict is not identical with its
laws, although it is inseparable from them.
The ways in which armed conflict conforms to law are the phenomena,
nrocesses and tendencies which are the most typical, repetitive, impor-
tant and characteristic of it. These are those phenomena in which is
clearly perceived their conformity to law, their subjection to the
operation of a law or laws. The conformity of armed struggle to law
is objective, since its basis is the operation of objective laws; in
this connection, study of the ways in which armed struggle conforms to
law is a way to the understanding of the laws themselves.
The two laws considered, of course, do not exhaust the fi 4 group
of laws of war, but they are, in our view, the most important.
The second group of laws, it seems to us, includes the law of
armed conflict itself. 1These are the laws of military operations on
a strategic, operational, and tactical scale, and, the laws of combat
operations of various kinds of troops and armed forces. It should be
emphasized that there is no aboslute boundary between the laws of war as
a whole and those of armed conflict. Each law of war is more or less
a law of armed conflict, and each law of armed conflict is more or less
a law of war as a whole. Still, there is a ddfference between to two.
We will try to expalin, at least in very general outlines, the laws
ipOietalifoarffsilegilifioa708/09 ? riA-RDP85T00875R000300090004-2
21
r d
OH ti genere nature 01r
. annc conflict and caune to twine certain
Hrethodn and forma of combat operations and thus influence the courne
and outcome of engagements and battlen. Howc.er, thin law ntill doer;
not, give a complete annwer to the question: on what depends, what
Setennines, victory by one nide or the other in armed conflict?
Every war its one or a combanation of several, atrategic campaigns)
con:listing usually of a number of operations, which in turn are broken
down ir o numerous battles and engagements. Each engagement, battle
and opertition haa certain bounds in time and space, taken place within
certain limits an an independent process. In any battle or operation
from each side there take part a certain ciumber of troops of a certain
kind. Although n great number of objective and subjective circumatancen
affect the course and outcome of every engagement) battle and operation)
of decisive importance in the quantitative and qualitative correlation
of the material and apiritual forces of he troops which participate
directly in a given action of armed conflict--that is, their combat
power.
The combat power of military units) large and small, in determined
not only by the quantity c mcnp weapons and military eqipment, but also
by their qualitative condition, the morale of the personnel) the combat
experience) level of military knowledge, and the military and technical
skill of the men and officers. Each of these is a relatively independent
factor, but none of them in of absolute, self-sufficing importance. All
of them are interrelated and supplement one another, and an a unified
whole make up the combat power of the unit) of whatever size. The influ-
ence of each of these factors on the development of engagements, battles
and operations--these arc law-governed relationships which manifest a
more general, essential relation in the processes of war- -thelaw of the
dependence of the course and outcome of armed conflict on the combat
power of the troops of the opposing sides.
The question may arise: in armed conflict as a whole) and in
individual battles, is only the strongest bound to win? No, not
necessarily, if by the strongest is simply meant the side which has
the iritial quantitative and qualitative superiority of forces. Although
armed conflict is indeed a process of measuring forces against each other,
this measurement is not mechanical. A battle in not a set of scales, on
which the side bearing the heavier load invariably shifts the balance
In its favor. A battle is the action of people, possessing consciousness
and will. They actively wage armed struggle; its course and outcome
primarily and mainly depend on their actions. The side having the greater
fighting power will indeed gain the victory if other factors do nbt enter
in. But if the command of this side relaxes its attention, permits mis-
takes, and makes incorrect decisions, then the battle may end in defeat
for it. The weaker side, by maneuvering its forces and material, may
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22
CPYRGH
ARkrtaftd Iterat5k1.%9 44MRPgra iiPkgrAIRM9PP%912R9P9rrV-2N,
-vposing
hint with greaer military skill, better organization, and greater fighting
power by the aggregate of its forces.
So fax as thu course and outcome of a battle or a campagn is object-
ively dependent on the relation between the combat power of the armed
forces of the opposing sides, each of them will try to secure for itself
superiority in this. History hap innumerable examples confirming thin.
For example, starting World War II, Germany rtlohed into Poland 57 divi-
sions and two brigades, 2,500 tanks, and 2,000 airpiancs. Poland wan
able to raise only 33 divisions, 771 planes and a small number of tanks
of obsolete design. Germany had almost double superiority in manpower
and many time the superiority in tankr.and planes. Therefore, despite
the heroic resistance of many units of the Polish army, Fascist Germany
in a short time defeated the Polish armed forces and seized the terri-
tory of Poland.
In a nuclear-rocket war, will the law of the dependence of the
course and outcome of engagements, battles and operations on relative
combat power of the opposing sides continue to operate? In our opinion
it will, because the attainment of success in battle in the nuclear war,
too, requires the securing of superiority of forces over the enemy. The
warring sides will each strive to surpass the other in the power of
nuclear strikes. The use of nuclear-rocket weapons will increase the
contradiction between tha tendency to concentrate troops and tie tendency
to disperse them. The first is called, for mainly by the law of the
dependence of the course and outcome of the battle on the relative com-
bat power of the troops, inasmuch as the attainment of superiority in
combat power over the enemy is provided in certain circumstances pri-
marily by the concentration of superior forces. The tendency toward
dispersal arises mainly from the danger of destruction of troops con-
centrated in a relatively small area by the nuclear weapons of the enemy.
In this connection, we may anticipate that the usual situation of
troops will be that of dispersal. In certain regions and in certain
directions troops will be concentrated, but within such limits of time
and space as not to become a suitable target for destruction by nuclear
weapons. During military operations, to carry out a certain strategic,
operational or tactical mission: troops may be forced to concentrate:
according to a previously wored-out plan and for the shortest possible
period.
From dispersal of armed forces to their concentration for carrying
on a battle, and from this back to dispersal again--this is one of the
features subject to law of nuclear-rocket war: connected with the oper-
ation of the law of the dependence of the course of armed conflict on
the relative combat power of the troops of the opposing sides.
(cont'd)
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PYRG
AppnateclifoodReteagiablito0 6,1 tiingriPORIPiPoWCIPIVARARR9D91,211/9CIAger
lawn of armed conflict.
-IT In wars of maneuver there is wide-spread occurrence of meeting engage-
mentr. They arise from various causes: in one case the opposing troops
encounter each other when both are conducting an offennivc, r.2 they come
Into contact when each is moving up from depth to meet the other and they
are forced to enter into battle directly from the march. In another case
a meeting engagement arisen from the attack of one side and the attempts
of the other to stop this attack by counter-attacks from depth. Sometimes
one of the opponents plans in advance on entering into a meeting engage-
ment and prepares for this accordingly. Forestalling the other side in
the deployment of troops and 'beginning combat operations in a meeting
engagement gives great advantage to the side which is able to accomplish
this. That is just how it was at the time fo the great tank meeting engage-
ment of World War II at Prokhorovka, 12 July 1943, and likewise in the
meeting engagement of the 3rd Guards Tank Army against the 2nd and 4th
Tank Armies of the enemy in the Kiev offensive operation of 1911-4, in that
of the 4th Tank Army with the tank group of the enemy in the VI:toy-Sande-
mir operation of 1944, and several others.
The same thing must be said of other forms of combat operations of
troops. In any battle, forstalling the enemy in the deployment of troops
and carrying out combat operations against the enemy is one of the very
important, and frequently the decisive factor for victory. This is con-
firmed by many generally-known operations of World War II. Inasmuch as
tirts relationship is constantly repeated and exercises a strong influence
on the course and outcome of various kinds of combat operations of troops,
it should be regarded as one of the laws of armed conflict. It may be
formulated as follows: In any engagement, battle or operation the rela-
tive advantage is gained by that of the opposing sides which is able to
deploy its troops and, begin combat operations ahead of the enemy. This
law constitutes the objective basis of the principle of surprise.
This law is manifested with any correlation of forces. Of course,
like other laws of armed conflict, it cannot be considered the only law
which provides for victory. The relativity of the advantage cbtained
means that the troops which have forstaLled the enemy in the deployment
of forces and initiation of combat operations will not necessarily have
absolute superiority of forces over the enemy; they will only gain a
certain addition to their potential combat power. Ubether this is
enough for the attainment of victory is another matter,
The law of the dependence of the course and outcome fo engagement,
battles and operations on forestalling the enemy in deployment of troops
and beginning combat operations, clearly manifested in World War II, will
play a great role in a nuclear-rocket war. The use of nuclear-rocket will
create favorable conditions for mutual penetration into the operational
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onmation end combat formations of troops, which will enevitably bring
about numerous meeting encounters: in which will participate not only
mechanized and tank troops, but olso helicopters, and paratroop chasti
and podrazdeleniya. The great number of meeting engagements and battles
and, possibly, meeting operations will have a substantial effect on the
course and. outcome of a war employing nuclear-rocket weapons) which will
increase the significance of this law in a future war.
Two important conclusions follow from the elucidation of the con-
tent of the laws of armed conflict. First) these laws represent the
usual, most frequently encountered, but, at the same time) exceptionally
important connections and relations in the combat operations of troops)
which go along with the extraordinary complexity and variety of the
manifestion of the laws of armed conflict in the unique conditions of '
each engagement, battle, and operation. From this arises also the com-
plexity of directing the combat operations of troops. Second) inasmuch
as armed conflict is a single, two-sided process, the laws of this pm-
cess distribute their effect equally on the troops of both the combatant
sides. However, the results of the operation of these laws, their mami-
festion in the form of certain law-governed factors, and the ways of
utilizing them may be for the two sides not only different, but even
directly opposite. This by no menas repudiates the special laws of
the development of the amred forces of states with different social-
political systems.
The process of armed conflict, subject to objective laws, does not
exclude freedom of decision and action by military commanders. In turn)
these actions of theirs appear as the result of recognized objective
necessity. Here the decisions of commanders and. the operations of
troops are not simply the consequence of subjection to laws. Military
commanders exercise an active effect on the direction, strength, and
circumstances of the operation of these laws. In this lied skill in
basing their actions on the Ivws of armed conflict.
How is this attained in prLotical combat operations? We know that
all social laws operate only with the existence of certain conditions.
The laws of armed conflict are no exception to this. They operate only
when the necessary conditions exist. If certain conditions are lacking,
the lacking, too, are the essential relations between them, i.e., the
laws of armed conflist. The conditions of armed conflict are objective
in nature. This means that they exist independently of the conscious-
ness of people, their will and desires. But it by no means follows
from this that officers and military commanders can have no influence
oa them. Lenin remarked: "The world does not satisfy man, and man by
his actions decides to change it." (Collected. Works, Vol 38, p. 205)
In wars of the remote past there existed comparatively limited
possibilities for changing the objective conditions of combat operations
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or tlo pc. As weapons and military equipment were developed and per-
fected, these possibilities correspondingly increased. The most recent
and obvious example of th.ia is the combat activities of our commanders
in World War II.
In the culminat!..ig campaign of the war it was proposed to launch
the main attack toward Berlin with the forces of the First and Second
Belorruscian and the Fris.t1 Ukrainian Front in the Ostrolenko-Krakow
sector, extending up to Goo km. Here the Germans had 37 infantry and.
11 tank andmotorized divisions, and 7 brigades. The presence of such
large forces in this direction was a serious obstacle to execution of
the conceived plan. In order to create more favorable possibilities
for the offensive in the direction of the main blow, the Soviet com-
mand decided to weaken the German-Fascist forces defending the cen-
tral sector of the Soviet-German front. Special operations were
undertaken for invasion of East Prussia and in the Budapest direc-
tion, thanks to which considerable forces of Germans were success-
fully diverted to the flanks of the strategic front. From October to
December 1944 the German command transferred 18 divisions and
several brigades from the central sector of the front to rein-
force the flanks. Thus was created, favorable objective conditions
for carrying out the planned strategic operation, meeting the
requirements of the law of the dependence of the course and out-
come of armed conflict on the relationship between the combat power
of the troops of the opposing sides. In January 1945 our troops
succeeded in breaking through the German defense in the direction
of the main blow, and, developing their gains in depth, by the end
of January had reached the Oder and seized a base of operations on
its left bank.
With the development of nuclear-rocket weapons, there has arisen
the possibility of a rapid and fundamental change in the conditions
of the conduct of war as a whole, as well as of individual engagements,
battles, and operations. Therefore, in case the imperialists unleash
a nuclear-rocket war, this form of the utilization of the laws of armed
conflict will find the widest application.
But this is not the only way for the opposing sides to use the
laws of armed conflict in their own interests. A change in the con-
ditions of the operation of the laws of armed conflict precedes this
operation and to a certain extent anticipates its result. Another
form of utilizing the laws of armed conflict is the deliberate choise
by military commanders of one of the many possibilities arising in
certain conditions of the combat operations of troops.
In the course of armed conflict, the officers and, military com-
manders evaluate the situation which has developed., elucidate the
trends of development of combat operations, and make decisions; that
is, they consciously select those alternatives the carrying out of
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(Con ..1; d)
P6
CPYRGHT
ApprtqndvEff 13440?@AMEN.Inda4-iggq?5.37.PCEPWROPTIMAn.
The essence of this process is that the possibilities, brought into be-
ing by the various laws of armed conflict, are constantly changing,
depending on change in conditions, on the operations of the opponents
and their troops. The decisions of officers and military commanders
must change accordingly.
In battle, commanders visually ascertain what kind of their ac-
tions are successful, and develop them in this direction, tryirg at
the same time to avoid such actions as are not successful and Which
make worse the situation of the troops entrusted to them. Thereby
they are groping for that direction in which their actions as troop-
leaders will most completely conform to the laws of armed conflict.
Armed conflict is a process wherein there constantly arises and
is resolved the contradiction between the objecu:Ive and the subjec-
tive, between the operation of laws and the conscious activity of
people. The typical forms of the resolution of this contradiction and
of the most characteristic conditions of armed conflict find their
expression in principles of military art. The principles of military
art have a "dual" nature. As an expression of objective necessity
they appear as obligatory norms which the commander must take into
account. As an expression of subjective principles, they grant the
commander freedom of creation and initiative within the limits of
the existing situation and practical possibilities of changes in
it. This means that the principles of military art are the embodi-
ment of the solution of the problem of necessity and freedom in
armed conflict. The principles of military art are the most general,
basic and guiding ideas concerning the methods of combat operations
of troops for the purpose of attaining success in armed conflict.
The dependence of the content of the principles of military art
on the laws of armed conflict is evidenced by the fact that these
laws have always been, and remain, the objective basis of the leader-
ship of the combat operations of troops. Only by means of deep and
comprehensive understanding of the laws of armed conflict, which in-
cludes knowledge of their essence, content, manifestation, nature
of operation, and forms of utilization in military operations, can
we achieve a real unity of military theory and combat practice.
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Approved Fof34913ffie0309/MAtialtgg Te8aR000300090004-2
cpyrogfft by Col M. FEDULOV
Urgent problems deserving careful Oonaideration, study, thorough
analysis, and broad discussion were presented in Maj Gen V. REZNICHENKO's
article (1/2,/sI,Lnaa_gyal_.', No 3, 1964).
That the author examined the conduct of combined-arins combat in
various conditions of a situation is commendable. AS a matter of fact,
in waging continuous combat operations for several days troops will have
to breakthrough the enemy's prepared and hastily assumed defense, force
numerous water barriers, pursue his retreating chastil.temporarily assume
the defense,, etc. The same podrazdeleniya and dhasti will perhaps have
to fight 'a battle both when nuclear weapons are reciprocally employed by
the sides and in some cases when they are ,not. Fighting .a battle. without
the employment of nuclear weapons may be a frequent otcurrence for troops
operating in' directions of secondary efforts and in theaters of military
operations.
In our opinion, the author correctly examined, all these problems as
a whole. Until now, as is known, questions on the organization and con-
duct of combat were examined with respect to one condition of a situation
-- for example, to the employment or non-employment of nuclear weapons by
the sides. There were, therefore, two sort of independent groups of
theoretical positions. We feel that the author's merit consists in that
he tried for the first time to bring to light both the general rules for
conducting combat operations in various conditions and their distinguishing
characteristics. We consider such an approach to the study of the prob-
lems under consideration most expedient. '
At the same time, however, we cannot agree completely with all the
author's statements. First of all, the statement that "unilateral employ-
ment of nuclear weapons is usually associated with definite miscalcula-
tions by the other side in the practical use of nuclear weapons" (page 21)
arouses objection. This is not quite so. Even with an ample supply
of nuclear ammunition each of the sides will try to use them in mass,
primarily on the axis of the main attack. For example, according to the
views of military specialists of the Federal Republic of Germany, on the
axis of the main attack it is advisable to create a zone of complete
destruction covering the entire region of disposition of the enemy group-
ing and extending to the derth of the line at the ultimate goal of the of-
fensive operation. (Wehrkunde, March 1959)
(cont'd)
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PYRGHT
pprove or e ease uuuiuwu
is s recomme e n or er o crea e e mos van age6Us condi-
tions for friendly troops to quickly rout the main enemy grouping. Such
a distribution of nuclear ammunition is probable when it is in short supply.
Since the nuclear weapons will not suffice for the entire axis
selected for the attack under this use, the command of a given side may
consciously procede on the basis that on the axes of secondary efforts
troops will resolve combat missions using only conventional weapons. If
necessary, nuclear weapons can always be employed here, too, in the
course of the battle.
Also, it should not be forgotten that the the present time the armies
of by no means all countries possess nuclear weapons.
Judging from the statements of foreign authors, as the article
pointed out, in the course of combat operations the employment of small-
scale nuclear weapons is possible. We are not inclined to belittle the
significance of this weapon at all or to disclaim in general the possibil-
ity of its use by the sides of modern combat. Actually, this weapon per-
mits destruction of the smallest, yet important targets located in the
immediate vininity of friendly troops, and significantly encourages the
troops to more successful fulfillment of their missions, both on offense
and in defense.
However, it seems to us that this weapon can not always be used in
combat, nor can it be used by all troops of the sides. These weapons at
one moment of the battle or another may prove to be unready -- for example,
if the already spent nuclear ammunition, etc. cannot be replenished in
good time.71
In this connection almost all the weapons capable of using small
caliber nuclear ammunition already present or coming into the armament
of the US Army can also use conventional ammunition.
The author correctly pointed out that the attack from the march is
considered the main method of offensive troop operations when nuclear
weapons are employed. But will this be the main method of troop opera-
tions when nuclear weapons are not employed? If discussing an attack
against an enemy who has hastily assumed the defense, the answer to this
question is affirmative.
As a rule, the hastily assumed defense was penetrated by troops attack-
ing from the march even dm'ing the last war, and this method will be even
more characteristic in modern conditions.
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(cont'd)
A...-. I I! 1.
r ? A! riii
HT As far as the prepared defense is concerned, overcoming it, depending
on the situation, can now be accomplished either from the march or after
limited preparation. Assumption of the offense from direct contact with
the enemy, as was previously done, must obviously be considered untypical.
This can be accomplished only in those cases when the troops have to tem-
porarily assume the defense in the course of the offense, and then, after
repulsing the enemy, resuine the attack. Moreover, it is possible that
assumption of the offense from the march will not succeed if the defense
has been inadequately neutralized, and the troops will have to organize
the attack tvain.
To negoAate the breakthrough of a prepared defense Without using
nuclear weapons requires the concentration of more artillery and support
aircraft, vowerful fire (artillery and aircraft) preparation, and support
and escort for the attacking troops. In the defense, in these conditions,
the role and significance of eounterpreparation and such types of fire as
rolling and standing barrage, convergent fire, etc. have apparently been
fully preserved.
Solutions to the problem of selecting the axis for the main attack
in the offense and for the concentration of manpower and equipment, about
which the article said nothing, will be varied, in our viewpoint, depend-
ing on the availability and use of nuclear weapons. When nuclear weapons
are employed, it is usually considered expedient to use them against
reinforced strong points, groupings of troops, and other important targets.
For example, The US press expresses the rather definite opinion than an
army equipped with nuclear warheads does not need to hunt out the enemy's
weak spot for an attack, but can strike directly on his main forces. Along
these same lines, it is recommended that the main efforts of combined-
arms soyedineniya and chasti (not necessarily superior) be concentrated for
maximum exploitation of the nuclear strikes.
When conducting an attack without the employment of nuclear weapons
the attacking force will obviously try to select tie axis of the main
attack in those regions which prove to be the weakest points in the
enemy's defense, since fewer weapons will be required to neutralize the
defense in this axis, and it will be easier to gain superiority in forces,
which, it must be assumed, will become a necessity in these conditions.
Variances in concentrating the main efforts of troops in the defense
are also inevitable. When nuclear weapons are employed. they are more
often concentrated in the depth of the defense, as is known. Take as
an example the mobile defense of the US Army which is recommended when
nuclear weapons are used. In this defense is considered expedient to
have only a minimum amount of manpower and equipment in the first echelon.
The greatest portion is concentrated in the depth of the defense. Together
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CRYRGI-
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T with this, modern viewpoints on the defense widely heralded in the pages
of the US military press completely repudiate the creation of strict lines
of resistance for holding terrain at any cost, as was done in the past.
(T. Mataksis and S. Goldberg, Pentomicheskaya diviziya (The Pentomic Divi-
sion), Foreign Literature Publishing House, 1959, page 211)
The author, in our opinion, correctly stated that based on possible
conditions for conducting combat operations and the availability of nu-
clear weapons the substance of the missions of troops may be widely varied.
But he did not elaborate on this in the article. Nuclear weapons permit
inflicting such destruction on the enemy that the attacking troops can
complete his rout by operating at high tempo and in great depth. The most
important mission of troops in the course of the offensive and the defen-
sive will be destruction of the enemy'.: nuclear weapons. With the use of
only conventional weapons, the possibilities of defeating the enemy will
become fewer and the depth of the missions of the troops, naturally, will
decrease. Destruction of the enemy lies completely on the podrazdeleniya
and chasti and their weapons.
In conclusion we would like to emphasize that in conducting combat
operations using only conventional weapons there is the constant possibil-
ity and threat of nuclear weapons being employed by the enemy. Therefore,
the readiness of troops to continue executing their missions under surprise
attack and to quickly exercise measures of defense is a constant require-
ment regardless Of the combat conditions.
Comment by Col M. SHMELEV and Col A. SIgYAYEV
In the article under discussion Maj Gen V. REZNICHENKO raised a
number of urgent questions associated with the solution of problems of
modern combined-arms combat. His recommendations on methods of destroy-
ing the enemy in battle arouse special interest. We fully agree with the
author that these methods will be varied each time, depending onthe
specific conditions for conducting the conducting the combat operations.
The most advantageous conditions for destroying the enemy, naturally,
will exist when the troops have nuclear weapons. However, the troops have
to be ready for action even when nuclear weapons are used by only one side
or are not used at all. In these conditions it will be necessary to search
for other methods of destroying the enemy. This will have an important
effect on the methods of conducting the battle as a whole.
Examining this question, however, the author for some reason or another
limited himself to the offensive alone a.nd almost entirely avoided the
defensive battle. Whereas in conditions of nuclear war, particularly on
a tp,ctical scale, the defense, as is known, is not always repudiated., it
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PYR
wil undoubtedly be used and conducted within the limits of podrazdeleniya,
Enrchasti, and soyedineniya, and in certain cases by part of the forces or by
all the forces of operational obuyedinenlya.
Both the defense and the offense are characterized by widely varied
conditions of organization and conduct, which the article discussed.
But it seems to us that the defending troops will more often have to fight
a battle with a limited supply or an evident shortage of nuclear weapons
or ammunition.
We feel that these conditions will occur far more often than will
complete lack of nuclear ammunition by one side, and. the author should
have taken them into account. For example, assumption of the defense when
the sides have a parity of nuclear weapons should not be ruled out in
general, but it should not be considered typical. This is explainecl, by
the fact that the availability .of an ample supply of nuclear weapons for
the troops, in any case no fewer than the enemy has, not only permits, but
urgently requires conducting decisive offensive actions, exploiting the
nuclear strikes.
Both sides cannot attack in the same axis simultaneously. Here either
the front will be stabilized for a certain length of time (which apparently
cannot be considered typical nowadays), or one side, inferior in the amount
of and the effectiveness of nuclear weapons, will have to cease the attack
and assume the deeense or even begin the withdrawal.
Hence, it is evident that defeat of the attacking troops by the
defending troops is very difficult. Destruction of the attacking troops'
nuclear weapons in order to deprive him of the superiority, thereby creat-
ing the most advantageous conditions for breaking up the attack being readied
or which has already begun, is undoubtedly the main thing.
Having a limited supply of, and in a number of cases a definite short-
age of nuclear weapons, the defending troops must use them particularly
economically, only on the most dangerous and reliably reconnoitered tar-
gets. In these conditions the necessity of bringing in nuclear weapons
from echelons and adjacent units to aid the defending troops has not been
ruled out.
Conventional or non-nuclear weapons, particularly artillery and tanks,
will be called upon to play the chief role in defeating the attacking force
in these conditions. The entire burden of the struggle against the attack-
ing enemy will lie on them. Support aircraft employing conventional ammu-
nition (taking into consideration the enemy's possession of a large number
of mobile targets) will acquire ? no less significant role.
(cont'd)
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CPYRGHT
AppraecloPWRefAse2\900A98/139?.1CPAIRDF457160t8715RWW36089(41044ctu'cci
of the struggle against enemy reconnaissance or against his means of
control and guidance in order to complicate his employment of nuclear
weapons in evey way. Thin applies particularly'to the defense battle,
when the attacking enemy will have a superiority in nuclear weapons. In
addWon, both the attacking and especially the defending troops must
widely use various camouflage measures and exploit the terrain's advan-
tageous characteristics for defense against enemy nuclear weapons.
While speaking about the defGnocl, in our opinion, it should be em-
phasized that the main efforts of the defending troops must be aimed at
the destruction of the attacking force, chiefly enemy tank chauti, caus-
ing him the greatest poseible losses not only by fire, but also by counter-
attacks following nuclear strikes.
Barriers are especially important In modern combat. Explosive mine
fields, as is known, played an important role in World War II. In modern
conditions of highly maneuvering combat txtions quick and skillful defen-
sive emplacement of engineering obstaclJo in the axis of the enemy attack,
for example, can be a very effective measure, particularly when the defend-
ing troops suffer losses from nuclear strikes of the attacking force in this
axis, causing gaps in their formations, and when shifting reserves here or
concentrating the necessary density of fire in a short period of time is
not possible. It is also necessary to set up engineering obstacles when
the attacking tank chasti are driving a wedge into the defense.
Just as before, in the course of the offensive, obstacles, when in-
stalled in good time, can play an important role on the axes of counter-
attacks and counterstrikes of the defending force. These obstacles will
be more effective if they are used in combination with all types of fire,
chiefly antitank fire and aircraft operations.
Also, in modern conditions it might be advantageous to delibcratcly
create zones of destruction and radioactive contamination of the terrain
by inflicting nuclear strikes on targets with ground explosions on the
axes of the enemy's most active operations. These, too, should be con-
sidered as barriers which might prove to be significantly more effective
than conventional mine fields.
According to the views of foreign authors, a new problem, the solu-
tion of which will hold a prominent place in modern combined-arms combat,
is the employment by each side of small-scale nuclear weapons and the
destruction of enemy weapons of this type. Small-scale nuclear we-pons
are considered one of the chief means of destruction within the limits of
combat. This weapon absolutely encourages heightened tempo in the attack
inasmuch as podrazdeleniya and chasti have the possibility of destroying
on a more operational scale the most important, including small-scale,
enemy targets located in the immediate vicinity without risk of destroying
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(cont'd)
PYRG
Approvedt,FAr Re1easten2O0108109itue1AuRDP815V0087540008010091300440
will hu Ublu to operate more successfully. In particular, they will be
able to exploit the nuclear strikes, advancing directly be;ind them in
approach march formations and even in march formation?.
HI-
An for the defense, employment of small-scale nuclear weapons in it,
particularly against attacking tank chosti and podrazdeleniya will undoubtedly
have a positive effect on the success of the defending troops' battle,
even when the httacking troops have a general superiority in nuclear
weapons.
Examining tho problems of modern combined-arms combat, the author
for some reason or other omitted ouch an important problem an the con-
duct of combat operations when the terrain has been seriously damaged and
hao a high level of radioactive contamination. Beyond doubt the radiation
situation, being a part of the overall combat situation, completely affects
the nature and methods of conducting both the offense and the defense,
Therefore, each aide will obviously try to analyze the radiation situation
and take it into consideration when determining the axes of operations of
podrazdeleniya and chasti, the sequence of suing nuclear and voncentional
weapons, etc. There is also a need to solve ouch new problems for modern
combat as negotiating or by-passing regions where the terrain is seriously
damaged and is radioactively contaminated, and also, an we already pointed
out, to specifically create such regions in the interests of the operations
of friendly troops.
It should be noted that if the methods of negotiating and by-passing
contaminated regions and troop operations on contaminated terrain have on
the whole been rather widely discussed in the military press recently,
then, in our viewpoint, the creation of damaged and contaminated terrain
has not yet been given enough attention. Also, in the course of a battle
conditions could so develop that these steps will prove to be profitable and
play an important role in achieving success. In the offensive, for example,
this might be used on those axes where the defending forces' lagre reserves
are being moved up, if for some reason or other it has not been possible
to rout them with nuclear weapons earlier; and in the defense on those axes
where the attacking force has concentrated its main efforts and it is very
difficult to repulse it withavsilable weapons. In all. types of combat,
contamination of regions of the terrain mignt be favorable -for covering the
flank of friendly forces, etc.
True, expending nuclear ammunition just to contaminate regions of the
terrain can hardly be recognized an the best way of using nuclear weapons.
Each side will evidently try to deliver nuclear strikes on de,inite enemy
targets while at the same time setting off a certain number of ground, explo
sions, thereby damaging and radioactively contaminating the regions in pass
ing. This must be done so that the contaminated terrain does not become an
obstacle for the operations of friendly troops.
pproveu ror ieiease L
con 'd
CPYRGHT
?
APPromosliahRifigegraA149.19etig9thg IttFtPlaielICWW5AiigNoRPRA99a aro
not quite understandable. In his opinion, the division of combat formationu
are into such elements as the first and second. echelon when the troops
operate on separate axes will no longer reflect the nature of the grouping
being formed. But, after all, it cannot be denied that even today in all
conditions first and second echelons might be present, and not only when
the sides do rot employ nuclear weapons in the battle, an the author asserted.
When there in no second echelon, regardless of whether or not nuclear weapons
are employed, a combined-arms reserve will be crated.
Consequently, the disposition of manpower and equipment in depth
according to echelons will apparently be maintained. even today. An far
an the distribution of manpower and equipment is concerned, this will in
fact be new when structuring combat formations. However, to contrast
it to echelonment of troops, as the author did is hardly correct.
As distinguished from the past, today the troops of sides, bothon
the offensive and the defensive, will operate not in a solid front, but
on axes by separate groupings, each of which, being a podrazdeleniye or
chant', can have first and second echelons, or in' place of the latter a
reserve, withiri the limits of the battle. A grouping of troops of a
higher echelon in this condition will have a first echelon operating on
several axes and a general second echelon or reserve. Thus, in our opinion,
echelonment of troops in modern combat is conceivable.
We also believe that the author was wrong in stating that all missions
of the second echelon can be assigned to the reserves when the combat for-
mation is structured into n single echelon. The second echelon and the
reserve are not one and the some. They differ chiefly in their functions
and the missions assigned to them and, based on this, in their strengths
and composition. If a given reserve has the missions of the second echelon,
and this could be, and the appropriate composition, then it will actually
be the second echelon, no matter what it is called. The crux is not in
the names of the elements of a combat formation, but in the nature of the
problem.
Examining the problem of increasing the tempo of the attack, the
author correctly spoke of the necessity of attaCking from the march, as
far as possible in approach march formations, and even in march formations
(exploiting the nuclear strikes), during which advancement of dhasti and
podrazdeleniya at maximum speeds is achieved. Unquestionably, the attack-
ing side will try to avoid the methodical attack in its primary sense and
will take all measures to avoid being drawn into combat by broadly maneuver-
ing on the battle field with fire, manpower and. equipment while exploiting
gaps and breaches in the combat formations of the defending forces, and, by
by-passing surviving centers of resistance, and, as fast as possible pene-
trate the depth and develop success at hightmmpos, exploiting their nuclear
and fire strikes.
19
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force sustains severe losses the possibility of emergency withdraval of
his troops has not been ruled out. In addition, the popaibility of eoliber-
ate withdrawal of troops in order to encounter the attacking force at pre-
viously prepared lines in the depth in an organized manner may have a place.
HT Since the employment of nuclear weapons will lead to more frequent
withdrawal of enemy troops than previously, pursuit will have an even
greater place in modern combat. It may often aria not only in the course
of the development of the offensive, but also in its very beginning as a
result of effectively delivered first nuclear strikes, and when the out-
come of the meeting engagement is unsucceasful for the enemy. We would
also like to point out that pursuit is modern combat (within the limits of
tactics) will acquire the characteristic of being conducted by tanks and
motorized rifle troops in combination with the employment of nuclear weapons.
Therefore, the mission of pursuing troops is not limited to destruction
of withdrawing enemy groupings, but will frequently envisage attainment of
the ultimate goal of the battle in the fastest possible time.
We feel it would have been advisable to give a greater place in the
article to problems of the organization and conduct of reconnaissance in
modern combat. The author limiAed himself to the requirements made on
reconnaissance in the interests of nuclear and fire destruction of the
enemy. But reconnaissance cannot be limited merely to disclosure of
enemy targets for destruction by nuclear and conventional weapons. It is
enough to say that a great significance will be played by radiation recon-
naissance, determination of the results of nuclear strikes inflicted on
the enemy, and disclosure of enemy plans, the operational directions of
his troops, etc. Also, conducting reconnaisance in the interests of each
branch of the service is necessary.
High maneuverability in modern combat demands skillful coordination
of reconnaissance efforts, distribution of missions between reconnaissance
resources in accordance with their capabilities and the nature of the
enemy target, and also continuous firm control of reconnaissance. It
should also be taken into consideration that reconnaissance manpower and
equipment can suffer significant losses, which is why augmentation of
reconnaissance in the course of the battle in one of another directions
is required. It is necessary to have a reserve in reconnaissance manpower
and equipment for this.
When the battle fs conducted without the employment of nuclear weapons
by the sides, reconnaissance will be organized and conducted first of all
In the interests of execution, of the missions of grounds forces podrazdeleniya
and chasti.
(cont'd)
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In conclusion we would like to turn attention to the independent
operations of podrazdeleniya, chasti, and soyedincniya when they are cut
off from other attacking troops. These operations in the past war were
conducted by mobile front and army troops and mobile forward detachments.
It seems to us that studying the positive experience of the operations of
these troops would be extremely useful. It should be considered in regard
to this that in modern combat, due to Ito high dynamics and inequiality of
development, these operations will apparently be even more frequent phenomena
and will occur in a more complex situation.
Comment of Col N. IMITIOV
Maj Gen V. REZNICHEINKO for the first time examined jointly the funda-
mental characteristics of preparing for and conducting combined-arms com-
bat when nuclear weapons are employed by one or both sides, and when they
are not used. This new view of the problem has caused a lively exchange
of opinions.
Some of the author's recommendations, however, were insufficiently
founded and not quite clearly stated, and therefore need to be elaborated,
particularly his statements on the most characteristic conditions of uni-
lateral employment of nuclear weapons in combat; the statement that if the
sides use small-scall nuclear weapons, the role of close combat increases;
the question of centralized and decentralized use of conventional fire
weapons; the question of the new principle of structuring combat forma-
tions; and the question of transferring the greater part of the work in
organizing cooperation "from the period of preparing for the battle to its
dynamics." A number of very important problems of modern combined-arms
combat were also omitted in the article. Some of these we would like to
examine briefly.
For example, it seems to us that merely one superficial mention of
surprise, as the author did, is not enough. The role of surprise in
modern warfare has grown so Ituch that it must be discussed as one of the
most important principles and conditions ensuring the attainment of suc-
cess in combat. Historical experience shows how important surprise is in
combat, making it possible 'to rout the opposing enemy grouping with equal
or even fewer forces.
Taking this into consideration, it can be assumed that today, too,
when fighting a battle even without the use of nuclear weapons the side'
which is suddenly subjected to severe, surprise fire pressure will in the
majority of cases sustain significant losses and may suffer defeat, despite
numerical superiority. This is explained by the fact that very often a
significant or even decisive materiel and morale superiority over the enemy
on the selected axis the seizure of the initiative, and the creation of
necessary preconditions for quickly routing the enemy is achieved by surprise
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thousppnetedapeilitelegse 2M10110/01AhlaRfaffrajni7a513014440996111(141200
strike or strikes when other conditions are equal permito getting the
.greateot results with the least expenditure of forces, means, and time.
But perhaps surprise acquires its greatest significance when the
battle is fought with nuclear-rocket means. Actually, in is possible to
have a sufficient amount of nuclear and rocket weapons, well-equipped and
trained podrazdeleniya, chapti, and soyedineniya with high morale and
still not achieve success due to the inability to prepare and launch sur-
prise combat operations. It will be even more difficult for those troops
who them:::elves are subjected to enemy surprise attacks.
Surprise is a most important requirement for all combat conditions,
the skillful execution of which is an indicator of the tactical skill of
commanders and staffs and the result of their strictly planned, creative,
carefully organized, and active work.
The attainment of surprise is by no means an individual and narrow
problem of tactics reduced to any one measure, for example -- to fore-
stalling the enemy, as the author concluded. Forestalling the enemy is
only one method of achieving surprise. Besides this, many other methods,
which to a significant degree encompass many factors of preparing for
and conducting a battle, can be used: for example, when the battle is
conducted in the most efficient and unexpectedly created (for the enemy)
grouping, and when the troops are completely.combat ready at a time when
the enemy troops are not yet fully combat ready. Various methods of
troop combat operations can also be used for the purpose of achieving
surprise: nuclear rocket strikes, swift separation of tank groupings,
maneuver by fire, employment of forward detachments and airborne landings,
etc. -- appropriate action against which the enemy can least of all count
on in a situation and it therefore will be dil:flcult for him to show or-
ganized opposition.
In our opinion the article should have devoted more attention to
the role of fire in modern combat and the necessity of carefully organ-
izing it.
There can hardly be any doubt that in modern conditions fire is the
most important aspect of destroying the enemy and achieving success
in combat as a whole. At the same time it is necessary to consider
the shnrp growth of fire power of chasti and podrazdeleniya. However,
the fire power of troops is only an objective possibility for achiev-
ing success in the course of a battle. The main thing consists of
the ability to organize the fire system most profitably and skill-
fully, foreseeing purposeful and flexible use of powerful and long
range fire weapons in combat.
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of all weapons, and creation of a single firing system as the most
important requirement in organizing not only the defense, as was
previously thought, but also the offense, meeting engagement, and
pursuit; that in: in organizing all conditions of combat operations.
Fire planning must comprise the main content of the commander's de-
cision. Solution of the problem of creating fire superiority over
the enemy depends chiefly on this, not just on the availability of
a great quantity of fire weapons.
In modern conditions, when the time factor has sharply risen
in importance, it is necessary to be able to organize fire in a very
short period of time: getting the broadest and. most flexible coor-
dination of all available weapons, a high continuous state of readi-
ness of them for a quick opening of fire: and maneuvering of fire
for destruction of targets arising again (usually mobile targets),
and also for destruction of the most important objectives without
preliminary adjustment fire. The special role of reconniassance,
without which it is impossible to deliver fire strikes effectively,
must be emphasized. Reconnaissance must provide timely acquisition
of the most reliable information on all exposed targets and objec-
tives.
The fire system in all cases must be organized so that the
commander can deliver surprise fire strikes and quickly concentrate
fire on any threatened axis in the course of the whole battle by
means of broad, quick, and flexible maneuvering of fire power.
In this connection it must be noted that the organization of fire
on a tactical scale is a whole complex of interrelated measures,
beginning with the formation of the grouping of manpower and equip-
ment and ending with the organization of their control.
When nuclear weapons are used, the fire of conventional weapons
must be closely combined with nuclear strikes. The organized fire
of conventional fire weapons will play an especially important role
when nuclear weapons are not employed, about which the author spoke.
For some reason or other the article made no mention of such an
important problem as combating enemy air attack weapons in the vari-
ous combat conditions. At first glance it might seem that if the
troops know haw to organize effective air defense in a situation
where nuclear weapons are used, then they could handle this problem
all the more so in a non-nuclear conflict. However, upon examing
this more carefully it is by no means true. Creating an air de-
fense system when nuclear weapons are not used requires accounting
for very important features in the use of air attack weapons. In
the first place, the primary, and perhaps the only means of enemy
air attack in the given conditions will be aircraft. In the second
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