SOVIET MILITARY THEORETICAL JOURNAL, NO. 8, 1964

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 112
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 1999
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 23, 1965
• Content Type: TRANS

,
APP.v. For '
TRA S NO 904 SOVI
V O'Y ENNAYk Y I,
9 7
965 7.1,,NS '-'190/' 9 4;
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION
TRANSLAT I ON
Number 904 23 April 1965
SOVIET MILITARY THEORETICAL JOURNAL
A/0
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CiA3RER1851108/T8R000300090003-3
Washington, D. C.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIR214611-W-31/MIR000300090003-3
?
101/IET MILITARY THEORETICAL JOURNAL
VOYENNAYA MYST, T , No 8, 19611
Table of Content?
Prwe
The Lesoons of the Beginning Period of the Great
Patriotic War, by Mar SU S. S. Biryuzov 1
Instilling Resolute Qualitieo in Soviet Commanders,
by Maj Gen A. Surchenko 33
Encirclement and Annihilation of Groupings of Defending
Troops, by Maj Gen B. Golovehiner 45
Certain Tendencies in the Development of Antiaircraft
and Antirocket Defense, by Cols I. Zheltikov and V.
Igolkin 53
Methods of Organizing and Conducting Military Science
Conferunces, by Col M. Kiryyan 66
Twenty Years of the Bulgarian People's Army, by Col Gen
D. Dzhurov, Minister of National Defense of Bulgaria 81
Self-Propelled Artillery of the Armies of the Capitalist
:Countries, by Col V. Zharov (Not translated)
To Fulfill All Requirements of Modern Military Theory and
Practice (A review of the journal Voyennyy Vestnik), by
Lt Col L. Saltykov 91
Myth and Reality in the "Crucial Decisions" of US Strategy,
by Col A. Koronenke (Not translated)
I.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
4
' Approved1tbfReleiagii2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
Voyennaya Mysl' (Military Thought) is a monthly organ of the USSR
Ministry of Defence, printed by the ministry's Military Publishing
House, Moscow. This translation is from issue No 8, August 1964, which
was signed for the press 23 July 1964. The articles, "relf-Propelled
Artillery of the Armies of the Capitalist Countries," by Col V.
ZHAROV, and "Myth and Reality in the 'Crucial Decisions' of US
Strategy," by Co]. A. KCRONENKO, are not considered of sufficient
interest to warrant dissemination.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
Approved For Release 2000/0NNLOAARDR6tMODIURIMAN
01? THE GREAT PRE110T1C WAR
CPYRGHT
by. Mar SU S. S. DIRYUZ0V
03-3
Approv
1 SepteMber 1964 marks 25 years from the day when German fascism
nurtured by world reaction plunged. mankind into the depth of a secon6
World War. This war, which lasted for six years, drew into its orb J.
almost all the countries of Europe, a majority or the states of Asia,
the Pacific am, Atlantic Ocean basins, and enveloped significant
African territory. More than 80 percent of the own l population par-
ticipated in it either directly or indirectly.
The war brought uncounted hardships to hundreds of millions. of
people, broughl: forth great human suffering and the destruction of
material and cultural values, and created difficulties for many gen-
erations of people. It took away almost 500 million human lives.
According to foreign economists, who are accustomed to evaluating
world events in money, wartime destruction in Europe totalled more
than 260 billion dollars. (Vtoraya mirovan voyna 1939-1945, World
War II, 1939-1945, Voyenizdat, 195), p 528) The war put a great strain
on the economies of all the warring states. Direct military expendi-
tures alone are valuated at 1,117 billion dollars. (Vtoraya mirovaya
voyna 1939-1945, World War II, 1939-1945, Voyenizdat, 1958, p 827).
As is known, World War II began between two groups of imperialist
countries pursuing irreconcilable political and economic contradictions
In their struggle for a new redivision of the world and spheres of
influence. The imperialists have more than once attempted to resolve
these contradictions at the expense of the USSR, the existance of which
they consider a major danger to themselves. On this occasion the
aggressors based their main goal at destroying the socialist state they
despised. The imperialists, however, miscalculated. World War II
ended with results unforeseen by them. Despite their calculations a
great and irrevocable wound was dealt the capitalist system itself.
The fascism of Hitler and Mussolini was buried under the clouds of war,
imperialist Japan suffered a crushing defeat, and a number of European
and Asian countries were separated from the capitalist system and formed,
together with the Soviet Union, a united and powerful socialist camp.
A component part and decisive event of World War II was the great
patriotic war of the Soviet people against facist Germany, its satellites
and imperialist Japan. Results of the struggle of the Soviet armed
forces had a determined influence on the entire course of World War II.
In the fight with the Hitlerite military machine the Soviet Union won a
universal and historic victory, defeating the most reactionary forces
of international imperialism. The Soviet people not only preserved the
ecilPialere?2100eOP.PeptigKiPgg iSbi3r8K4663060?b.6032-S o saved many
peoples op. the worldfrom ascist s Lavery.
1
App
roved Fo1c1N58ppa39010/Rg/01 :
e n 4-RDp85-1NT5R000000900H-3
no course o1 te great patrio?c
war was
held by its beginning period, which for a number of reasons was for
our motherland and its armed forces the most difficult and most strenu-
ous.
A study of the events of the beginning period of the great patri-
otic war and the lessons derived from this experience are of practical
significance even in modern conditions since the danger of war has
not diminished. Moreover, the peculiar political methods and particu-
larly the anti-Communist ideology widely employed by the imperialists
when preparing for World War II are in many respects being applied by
them at the present time to prepare for a new world war.
Several of the Lessons of the Preparedness of the Soviet Union to
Repel the Fascist Aggressor
The international situation in the years preceding the beginning
of the great patriotic war was characterized by an aggravation of the
common crisis of capitalism and increased imperialist aggression by
the facist states.
German imperialism, which suffered defeat in World War I, owing
to the direct political and financial aid of American, English, and
French monopolies succeeded in restoring and increasing its economic
power by the end of the 30's and with relative rapidity in arming its
army with new combat equipment. The ruling circles of the imperialist
powers attempted to unite all reactionary forces under the flag of
a crusade" against Communism. The role of the striking force was
assinged to fascist Germany, which by their calculations would crush
the Soviet Union.
The openly aggressive cry of the German militarist "Drang mach
Osten" fully responded to the aspirations of the ruling circles of
the West, the true intention of which was to destroy our country and
at the same time to weaken Germany in order to establish complete
rule in the world and to dictate its own conditions to everyone.
German occupation of the Rhineland and the Austrian anschluss
met no opposition from the governments..0fAtp, England,rand:France.
They granted Germany one concession after another. The high point in
the policies of the states in regard to small countries and to the
preparation for war against the Soviet Union was the "Munich Pact,"
as a result of which the Czechoslovakian Republic was hurled under
the feet of the fascist conquers.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
2
Approv
CPYRGH
?A For"KelikrrnAdiii$700 190200687406696?006? 4le advancing
threat el a world war. ' le Elov.e.- government constantly called upon
all peace-loving peoples to unite all their efforts and to create a
T united front of states for ouppresollig the aggressive aspirations of
German fascism. But the ruling circles of the West, blinded by hatred
for a socialist country, did not wish to undertake any concrete practi-
cal steps to restrain the aggressor.
The 1939 agreement between the governments of the USSR, England,
and France to elaborate joint measures for counteracting fascist
aggression is a vivid example of this. The Soviet government, true
to the principles of collective security, sought in the agreement the
acceptance of committments mutually guaranteeing the interests of all
the participants and the conclusion of an agreement betWeen them on
mutual aid. However, the English and French governments in the hope
of warding off an attack by Hitlerite Germany and directing it against
the Soviet Union did not agree to the conclusion of such an agreement
and virtually cut off the talks.
The Communist Party and the Soviet government even with such
unfavorable conditions did everything necessary and possible to save
our country, the only socialist state in the world, from the danger
hanging over it. In August 1939 they decided to conclude an non-
aggression pact with Germany, as suggested by the German government.
The conclusion of this pact was a great victory for Soviet foreign
pblicy and wrecked the provocative plans of the imperialist warmongers.
The Soviet people removed the immediate danger of their forming a
united imperialist coilition against the USSR and gained some time
for strengthening the defense capability of the country and were
saved from the danger of being drawn into a war in a situation most
dnfavorable for them.
The calculations of the imperialists of turning fascist Germany
against the Soviet Union had already proved to be wrong at this Stage.
Despite their hopes World War II began between capitalist states.
On 1 September 1939 fascist Germany attacked bourgeois-owned
Poland which could not withstand the blows of the German army. The
swift advance of the Hitlerite masses to the East created an immediate
threat to the Soviet Union from the West. On the decision of the govern-
ment Soviet troops in December 1939 entered the western Ukraine and
western Belorussia and, bringing to the people of these areas long
awaited freedom, they extended our state border to the west by 200 to
300 kilometers.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
pproyed FWARiarnow6q#15.wle*Op o o tatogaimottrft: and
irance diu nou, never- e ens, .One the
USSR. They tried to raise up against the Soviet Union the Baltic States
neighboring it. Anti-Soviet intrigues were spewed up in the Baltic
HT Staten and fascist Germany. But these attempts failed. In August 1940
Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania in accordance with the wills of the
peopleo of these states became a part of the USSR.
The war of bourgeois Finland against the USSR, provoked by the
imperialists at the end of 1939, soon ended in the defeat of Finland
and the signing of a peace agreement according to which the USSR
border in the area of Leningrad was extended to the nortl-west.
In the summer of 1940 the Soviet Union achieved the return by
Rumania of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina. Thus, the USSR border
was significantly extended to the West. Unfortunately, as we have
seen earlier, this new border was not prepared defensively and in the
fortified areas in the old border a majority of its armament had been
removed which was one of the reasons for the swift invasion of Hitler's
troops into Soviet territory.
Exploiting the lack of decisive actions by France and England,
the German facist troops in April 1940 easily occupied Denmark and
Norway. Subsequently, in May 1940 they broke through the defense
of the ally troops and occupied Holland, Belgium, and Northern France,
reached the coast of the English Channel, occupied Paris and forced
the French government to capitulate.
Intoxicated by easy victories in the West, Germany in the second
half of 1940 began immediate preparation for war against the USSR.
In the beginning of the war by facist Germany against the USSR
almost all European countries had either been defeated by it, incor-
porated into the anti-Soviet bloc, or held a friendly attitude of
"neutrality" towards Germany.
Only Great Britain, which was threatened with a loss of its
colonies and of its own independence, continued to carry out the war
against Germany. However, the German-fascist ruling circles con-
sidered that England did not represent a serieus danger to Germany and
would not interfere with the successful conduct of its war against
the Soviet Union.
As a result of the establishment of Hitler's rule in the European
countries and the carrying out of significant measures for strengthening
and further militarizing the economic base, aggression by racist Germany
was yet further expanded and strengthened. Germany could utilize the
material and human resources of the Western European countries which it
pprobed Foit*Ittedser200101418A39 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
4
Appro
PYRGHT
V
d For RIele.ise'20410fill8409thetALROP86010018714100080451190003e3 It was
almost completely mobilized, excellently equipped, and possessed the
experience for conducting combat operations.
An the threat of attack by fascist Germany grew the Communist
Party and Soviet government promoted much work to strengthen the
defense capability of our country.
In the five years preceding the war particular attention was
paid to the industrialization of the country. Heavy machine con-
struction, the largest field of industry, was established. Great
successes were achieved by the chemical industry and non-ferrous
metallurgy.
Long before the war the party emphasized the construction of
new enterprises in the Eastern areas of the USSR. In Siberia a
second coal and metallurgical base was established. Between the
Volga and. the Urals, in the Far North and Far East deposits of coal
and oil were extracted. New industrial centers arose along the
Volga) in Kazakhstan, in the Middle Asian republics, and in the
Transcaucasus.
This long-range policy of our party was fully justified. The
Industrial base, created in the Eastern USSR, was a powerful source
of supply for the Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic
War.
Along with industrialization socialist reorganization of agri-
culture played a great role in strengthening the defensive capability
of the country. As a result of the victory of the kolkhoz system
our agriculture became extremely strong and mechanized. In 1940
more than 500,000 tractors, approximately 200,000 combines, and
228,000 trucks worked in the fields of the country. The productivity
of agriculture increased. Owing to the work of the party and govern-
ment in strengthening this important area of the economy agriculture
proved itself able to withstand difficult experiences during the war
and to insure the supply of the army with food and industry with raw
materials.
As a result of the successes of socialist construction both in
the areas of industry as well as in agriculture, the Soviet Union in
a historically short time was transformed into a powerful industrial
and agricultural power.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
5
Consiaerina,;-
.c"1811FcguililfAsEibP; towooggiatigrig, Germany,
Yteoaden
the production capability of the defence industry. Allocations for
military needs were significantly increased, old military factories
were reconstructed and new ones built, their specializations were
carried out according to types of military equipment and a large part
of the means of production was renovated.
Because of its rate of growth in the pre-war years the gross out-
put of the defense industry significantly outstripped other areas of
industry. AB a result of this technical mastery the Soviet armed
forces grew quickly. Thus in 1939, in comparison with 1930, the
issue of tanks increased 43 times, aircraft 6.5 times, artillery 7
times, machine guns 5.5 times. Naval tonnage increased 2.3 times.
The mechanized power of the Soviet army was increased. In 1939 there
was already 13 mechanical horsepower for every soldier.
However, one must observe that several types of our combat equip-
ment in the armament of the army was antiquated. A lag was mainly
observed in the area of the production of certain types of aircraft,
tanks, and automatic weapons.
But thanks to the efforts of the Party this lag was overcome.
In a relatively short time our scientists, designers, and workers
created new types of rifle armament and drafted artillery systems
with high combat qualities. The army began to be equipped with
rocket weapons. Tanks T-34 and KV appeared, armed with powerful
armor, armament, and good practicability and maneuverability. Along
with the increase in the technical equipping of the armed forces
measures for significantly increasing their numbers were taken.
In the pre-war years changes also took place in the organization
of the armed forces. Measures were carried out to strengthen the
central apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Defense and new
military districts were established. Particular significance was
given to the harmonious development of the various arms.
The military operations carried out by the Soviet army in 1938-
1940 and also the first period of World Wax II showed that artillery
and mortars were very important for defeating live forces and combat
equipment of the enemy on the field of battle. Thus, the Soviet
command took steps to saturate the ground troops with them.
Before the beginning of the Great Patriotic War armored troops
were in the stage of reformation. The fact is that on the basis of
incorrect conclusions from the limited experience of the war in Spain
the mechanized corps established by us in the middle 1930's were dis-
-13r149A9R4 :brinitchi;AlfRAIAiffintatie?tiiinlii:igade*
Approve
?
CPYRGHT
FforReleasenniDet0809 :0CIAgROP6576067151ROOD30009000V3 tions in Poland
and France, which demonstrated the great importance of large armoured
soyedineniya, the Soviet command in July 1940 began to develop mecha-
nized corps and tank and motorized division. But there proved to be
little time to effect these measures. As a consequence of which a
majority of the soyedineniya were understaffed at the beginning of
the war.
Measures were taken to rearm Air Force units with new type of
aircraft (LAGG-3, MIG-3, 136-2, and others) which had begun to be put
into production on the eve of the wax. A number of new chasti were
established. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the war the plan to
rearm the Air Forces had not been completed.
Several airborne corps were formed in 1941. The establishment
of new special troops chasti and rear services chasti and installations
was begun.
In the Navy destroyer, submarine, and torpedo boat soyedineniya
were formed and basic soyedineniya were strengthened with new ships.
In all naval theaters systems for basing the fleet were established
and the construction of naval bases was carried out.
Therefore, owing to the efforts of the party and all the Soviet
people much work was being done on the eve of the war for preparing
our country and the armed forces to repel aggression. But for a
number of reasons measures in all these areas were not carried out to
completion. The Stalin personalty cult played a greatly negative
role in this.
Great harm to the combat capability of the armed forces was
caused by the unfounded repressions and extermination of a great
number of remarkable commanders and political workers, particularly
from the numbers of the leadership personnel. A whole series of
military districts, armies, corps, and divisions were, in the fullest
sense of the word, decapitated. To replace this loss in the beginning
of the war was, because of the lack of time, impossible and a signifi-
cant part of the military cadre who replaced the repressed commanders
and military leaders were inexperienced and unprepared to direct
troops in large scale battles. gams, Stalin's arbitraryness played
directly into tilt:: hands of the enemy.
The Stalin personality cult had an extremely negative influence
on the development of Soviet military thought in the prewar years.
The arbitrary rule and policy of dictation in questions of theory
impeded the mastery of the Leninist military and theoretical inheritance,
fettered the initiative of military scientists, and retarded the
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
A
PYRG
pr6VddjP/341941eis88n8FOrtfa-Rbflgliloilpirmo iss nd
_1T-quotations were substi-ute for creative rosea c . ?
theoretical questions. As a result many questions of theory and
practice were resolved without calculation of these changes which
had occurred in the means and methods of conducting war.
Thus, in spite of the fundamental changes which were introduced
by World War II in the content and character of the beginning period
of the war, we continued to censider it as that portion of time from
the beginning of military operations until the entry of the main mass
of the armed forces into the war. Thus, military operations were
conceived as comparatively limited in scale, chiefly as the operations
of troops in defense and battling for superiority in the air with the
simultaneous conduct of mobilization, concentration, and deployment
of the main forces. The course of the events in the first days of
World War II showed the error of this opinion.
Such aspects of combat operations as defense were insufficiently
understood. While recognizing its rightful place along with offensive
operations, our prewar theory considered that defense must be conducted
only in individual areas. Therefore questions of defense on a stra-
tegic scale were poorly developed. They were also insufficiently
developed in operational and tactical elements.
Major deficiencies were also permitted in the military engineer-
ing preparation of possible theaters of military operations. Thus,
the fortified regions located on the old state border between the
Soviet Union and the western dblasts were not improved and even dis-
mantled prior to the war without basis and obviously in error. During
this same time, the construction of fortified regions along the new
borders was essentially begun just at the beginning of the war.
It is known for certain that the well-known Soviet military
fortification specialist and engineer Lt Gen D. M. KARBYSHEV, who had
much c:tperience in the fortification of the southern borders of the
Soviet Republic, long before the beginning of the war repeatedly and
persistently sent requests to the People's Commissariat of Defense
concerning the construction of fortifications along the western border.
However, no one listened to his sensible voice. Several days before
the German invasion, Lt Gen D. M. KARBYSHEV was sent to the western
()blasts of the country and, of course, was unable to accomplish any-
thing. In the beginning of the war Dmitriy Mikhaylovich was badly
wounded and taken prisoner. He died a martyr's death from the terrible
tortures of the facists, a national hero.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
8
CPYRGHT
' Approved FoORtletieW12000081091POIAMOP861100137501003000.900.63013 or theaters
for military operation was the abnence oV rear defenolve boundarien at
opera' tonal depth. Tie carrying capacity of the railroadn wee innuf-
ficiont, especially in the western oblaute. The railroad junctions
remained in poorly developed condition and many linen had only uingle
tracke. Roadn too wore Lot aufficiently developed. All of thin made
the coneentlmtion and deployment of troops very difficult.
?
?
The increauin,; threat of an attack by Germany on the Soviet Union.
demanded that urgent measures be taken for the imnedinte preparation
of the Soviet Armed Forcen for the defense of the (Aube borders. How-
ever, for a variety of retieents and primarr.y because of inexcusable
miscalculationo by Stalin, the General St(Cf, and also the intelligence
Adminintration evaluating the military and etrategic situation which
had developed on the av.,. of the wax, the measures which more taken were
far from sufficient. In npite of the clear evidence that Germany was
preparing for aggreauion againot the USSR, Stalin believed that the
Soviet-Corm= pact; for nonagemmion guaranteed that Germany mould
not maize war on our country for at least a short while. Moreover he
and the Conceal Staff had ponitive data concerning the concentration
of German troop; alone our borders and their preparation for attack-
ing the Soviet Union. However, Stalin considered these data as pro-
vocative and that they supposedly would incite the Soviet government
to take retalictory steps which could have been used by the Germans
to break the pect of nonaggression. An a result of, those tragically
mistaken concleeions, our troops were not L;iven orders to increase
combat readiness. The Armed Forces continued at peacetime statue.
All important influence on the moahenine of attentiveness of the
Soviet people and their Armed Forces was rendered by the Tone announce-
ment, publIchoel In the Soviet press on 14 June 1964, which, in spite
of irrefutable facto, denied the posoibility of an attack by Germany
on the Soviet Union and explained that the eotives for the concentra-
tion of German reops on our borders was of no concern for the Soviet-
German relationship. This was an unexplainable and inadmissible act
of misinforming the Soviet people.
Much of the guilt for the insufficient preparation of the Soviet
Armed Forces for war lies on the former leaders of the People's Commis-
eariat for Defense and especially the General Staff who made many
mistakes in decisione concerning operational and mobilizational planning.
The incorrect evaluation of the content of the beginning period of
the coming war led to the conclusion that a decisive offensive by the
aggressor would be preceded by operations of limited character and that
therefore our troops could in the course of battle occupy their defensive
positions under the protection of comparatively small forces. It was
net_tain.intoCQW.D.(10aiipp.ipathall W.tc1 ? ?? Zetely
APProvq610t3rznitmeag'99un
cniy, twis-ve, 5,8diff. CRWARIT'o. aslave?
9
A
pprovedFAdr/IRMaidieilq160/08i0laiv OtAADP8531108.75174600300090008Mod in
evaluating the military and political situation; only border chasti
were located immediately at the border. The main troop force located
in the border districts was deployed in camps which were rather well
removed from the border. The deployment of troops in the border dis-
tricts was ouch that they could not rapidly be moved to certain
boundaries and necessary concentrations could not be developed.
According to the calculations of the General Staff, it would take
several days after the announcement of mobilization to bring the
troops of the border districts to a wartime footing.
The readiness of our air forces for war was also insufficient.
The construction of air fields in the western regions had not been
completed and there were few reserve air fields. Aviation chasti
were deployed densely on peacetime air fields which were known to
the enemy and an overwhelming majority of them were nor dispersed to
field air bases, which is one of the main reasons for the heavy losses
of our aviation in the first days of the war.
Also the antiaircraft artillery was not prepared to repulse the
aerial enemy. There was too little of it. Also, antiaircraft artillery
chasti and podrazdeleniya were not afforded sufficient manpower which
greatly decreased their capability for combating the aerial enemy.
The plans of the General Staff for protecting the national
boundary were delayed. This was one of the most important reasons
why the troops defending the border military districts were unable to
deploy to defensive boundaries according to stipulated plans.
The conclusion of a nonaggression pact between the USSR and
Japan in April 1941 made it possible in May to begin the transfer
of some soyedineniya from the internal regions of the country to
the western borders. However, the transfer, concentration, and deploy-
ment of these troops was carried out extremely slowly and with great
caution, again to avoid giving Germany cause for provocation.
Thus, when Germany attacked the Soviet Union a concentration of
forces large enough to repulse the sudden enemy invasion had not been
developed. The troops located near the border did not receive coMbat
orders to occupy defensive boundaries in time. The Soviet troops
were not given advance warning concerning the readiness of the enemy
to attack.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
10
CPYRGHT
' Appro
ved Fort#61baS4020MG81(09'0. GIAINDIPOST013105R01016300090M633Letai , 00 -
n g the obvious threat of attack by the German army, attempted to
bring their troops to complete combat readiness and to place them in
defennive boundaries and poeitions. However, Stalin, who personally
decided all important military question, each time forbid them to do
this in order not to provoke a conflict or war with the Germans.
On the eve of the treacherous attack by the German army, the
troops of the border military districts continued to live and study
in the conditions of peacetime. L. M. SANDALOV, who was chief-of-
staff of an army at that time, describes this very convincingly in
his book Perezhitoye (Experiences). "The evening of 21 June WOW an
ordinary Saturday evening for the troops and commanders of the 4th
Army. They rested, watched a play, or attended a movie or a preaea-
tation by a group of artists. Meanwhile in the other 4th Army, on
the other side of the Bug, they were preparing for destruction."
L. M. SANDALOV cites an extract from the 21 June 1941 memoirs of the
German general, GUDERIAN who, with the open cynicism of the bandit,
impatiently awaited the night of the attack and in no way expected
his death. He writes, "Careful observation of the Russians on 21 June
convinced me that they had no suspicion of our intentions. As was
seen from the observation post, the changing of the guard in the
courtyard of the Brest Fortress was accompanied by the sounds of an
orchestra. No Russian soldiers occupied the shore fortifications
along the Bug River."
Only on the night of 21 June, when all information irrefutably
pointed to the preparation of Germany to attack the USSR, did the
People's Conmdssariat of Defense give orders to immediately bring
the troops to combat readiness. These orders were greatly delayed
in reaching the troops and were in essence only a formal act, since
the time for their execution had actually already passed. In some
headquarters these orders were not even deciphered. By dawn our
garrisons, military camps, and airfields, where moored aircraft stood
row after row, were subjected to powerful surprise strikes by aircraft
and the fiery strikes of enemy artillery. The western boundaries of
our native land were enveloped in the flames of war.
Military Operations in the Beginning Period of World War II
Thus, having treacherously broken the nonaggression pact, fascist
Germany started a.war against the Soviet Union. The German command
sent 190 earlier mobilized and deployed divisions into our country,
using approximately 5,000 aircraft, over 3,700 tanks, and 50,000 guns
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
11
App
and mortars in their attacks. The enemy :Dagen thin war without carry-
rovW641.F4AMEIAPPAQ?/Q*CAMPFUND-R8UPANREADTPC4s . He
unleashed decisive attacks with large strike concentrations in three
etrategic areas, the northwest, the wont, and the southwest.
PYRGH
Our generation well remembers the first days and months of World
War II. It has been confirmed by documentation that the German
attacks were a surprise for the troops of our border military districts
who were caught by surprise and began combat operations in the most
difficult conditions. Many divisions were scattered: artillery
regiments were in artillery camps and on firing ranges, special chaati --
in training, and rifle noyedinenlya and chasti -- in permanent disposition
points or in camps.
The lack of a timely decision to bring the Soviet troops to com-
bat readiness and occupy proper regions and boundaries near the state
borders had extremely bad conoequences for us and essentially prede-
termined the major setbacks and defeats of the Soviet Army in the
beginning period of the war.
The sudden and large scale attacks delivered in the first hours
of the war by German aircraft and artillery against the troops of the
border districts followed by the attacks and invasion of large columns
of tanks made it impossible to organize the entry of troops into the
battle. Having been caught by surprise our troops, in spite of the
bravery and heriosm displayed by individuals, were not able to contain
the onslaught of the enemy armies. With heavy fighting and large losses
they began to retreat, many of them, being trapped by enemy encirclements.
With the concentration of large forces on the main axes of
attack, composed for the most part of motorized and armored troops
supported by powerful aviation forces, the enemy achieved a decisive
superiority in forces and means in these areas, seized the initiative,
delivered serious defeats to the troops of the border districts, and
managed to penetrate deeply into the USSR in the first days of the war.
The strategic concentrations of our ground troops, deployed in
the beginning of the war in the territory of the border districts,
were scattered. As the result of great losses, many soyedineniya
ceased to exist. The reserves which were brought up from the rear
and hastily thrown into battle were not able to stop the offensive of
the German troops. The rapid tempo of the enemy advance upset the
mobilization of material and personel in the border regions and pro-
hibited the evacuation of people and material into the depth of the
country. Since the enemy had seized much territory in the Western
regions of the USSR, our fighting army was deprived of huge supplies
of fuel, ammunition, and weapons.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
12
?
Appro
S.
CPYRGHT
vedForkileire(Z56061419614CciAMAitittealltio"ilrealMinSa2g troops and
subordinate [ de
marls priVeu commanuers and wa, u d?air levels, right
up to the General Staff and the Stavka of the High Command, of the
possibility of receiving trustworthy information concerning the situation
at the front and the condition of the troops. This caused major mis-
takes in guiding combat operations to be made by the General Staff and
front commanders. Thus, as a result of an incorrect evaluation of the
situation and the condition and capabilities of our troops, on the
evening of 22 June the People's Commlsoariat of Defense man ordered to
move the troops at the front to the attack in order to defeat the
attacking enemy forces and transfer combat operations to enemy territory.
Obviously this order could not be executed by the troops at the fronts
who, having suffered large losses in the first enemy attacks, were
scattered, isolated from each other, and retreating in small units.
Often orders for the withdrawal of our troops to advantegous natural
boundaries in the rear were not received by the units involved or were
received too late when the route for the withdrawal and sometimes the
boundary itself were already taken by the enemy.
As a resUlt of the retreat of Soviet troops from the border
regions, our naval bases were subjected to attacks by enemy ground
soyedineniya. Therefore from the first days of the war, the main
efforts of our Navy were not directed against the enemy's naval power,
but were instead used to defend their own bases and their evacuation
and also to protect the coastal flanits of ground troops obnyedineniya.
Thus, we waged armed combat in the beginning period of the war
under very difficult conditions. This combat was characterized both
by the lack of a stable continuous front and chiefly by the execution
of defensive and retreat operations which were, as a rule, accompanied
by large losses in the personnel and equipment and the extensive loss
of territory.
Having the strategic initiative, a great superiority in attack
forces, and absolute air superiority, the enemy could maneuver his
forces freely and due to the absence of a continuous front could
envelop the defenses of our soyedineniya and deyedineniya. After
the unsuccessful outcome of the border fighting, the Soviet command
had insufficient air, mechanized, and tank forces to cut off the
enemy's maneuvers and paralyze his attacking forces.
The conduct of a strategic defense in the beginning period of
the war was made even more difficult since the enemy by delivering
powerful attacks successfully breached our strategic front, enveloped
our flanks, and encircled Soviet troops. This is What happened at the
very beginning of the war in Belorussia and then in the Uman' and Kiev
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
13
App
CPYRGHT
App
roielf1Paraglati:266.8Thf?tr1C080relikiortioS6669W4335u3 to a
great degree the fault or Sta.7n, who, *n opt() of a warning concern-
ing the complete defeat threatening the Kiev forces and the request
by the Military Council of the Southwestern Front for the timely with-
drawal of the troops out of the bulge, refused to allow the retreat
which led to the grave defeat of the troops in this area.
There were major defects in the organization of defensive and
retreat operations. Au a rule defenses were organized hastily over
a wide front with uniform distribution of forces along the front.
The defense lacked necessary depth and had a linear character. The
almost complete absence of antitank weapons had an especially fatal
effect on the strength of the defense. Bottles filled with fuel oil
were often the only means available to be used against powerful tank
attacks in battalions and regiments. There were no antitank guns at
that time and the 44-millimeter shells used by our antitank artillery
were, ineffective. There was not enough field artillery or tank's. In
practice this defense was not able to withstand attacks from enemy
tank forces.
True, much work was done on the construction of defensive lines
in the rem: of the Soviet forces on the main axes of the German
offensive. However, they could not be used with full effectiveness.
The forces and means were not available at the fronts. Reserves moved
forward from the rear areas to the ,front lines were thrown into combat
in units as they arrived and were not effective in changing the
situation to our advantage.
There was an especially great lack of skill in the organization
and execution of retreat operations and troops were left completely
without any sort of support to be trapped. Some soyedineniya and
chasti retreated in a disordered fashion and a large amount of combat
equipment and heavy weapons were lost or destroyed due to the absence
of fuel for tractors and machines. It was impossible to find fuel at
the front lines. Encircled chasti were almost never given enough
support and usually operated at the uiscretion of their commanders.
All of this can be explained to a significant degree by the fact
that many chasti and soyedineniya commanders and commanders of operation-
al ob"yedineniya did not possess combat experience and skills in
directing troops, especially in operational elements, and thus did
not know how to organize defense and retreat operations correctly or
to break out of encirclements.
In the beginning of the war our troops were used in offensive
operations. However, they hdd serious deficiencies. A basic defect
was the unjustified haste with which the senior echelons attempted to
execute attacks. The lack of success in the majority of offensive
roved For RPIPASP 7nowoRin9 ? CIA-RI1PR5TOOR75R000300090003-3
Approv
CPYRGHT
ed Itbirtikelea0 MOW? )tlAk. 545151751AbOoS0009 dsgree the cori.
sequence oi their poor organization an the scanty of a rcraft and
antiaircraft artillery. The establiehed strike forces were not afforded
aufficient superiority in forces and means over the enemy. The
attacking forces were given little or no time for preparation. There-
fore tho goals of offenaive battles and operatione, as a rule, were
not achieved.
The consequences of the surprise attack by fascist Germany
were
grave for us. By the end of September the enemy had penetrated along
main axes 600-850 kilometers into our territory. The Soviet Union
lost a large portion of the Karelo-Finnish SSR and the Lenin gradskaya
Oblast, all of the Baltics and Beloruacia, a large portion of
Spolonskaya Oblast and many other oblaota in the western part of the
Runs Ian Federation, Moldavia, the rich agricultural and induntrial
regions of the right bank Ukraine, and part of the left bank Ukraine,
with their large populations. Important naval bases on the Baltic
Sea fell into the enemy's hands and the Black Sea Fleet was Paralyzed.
However, these difficult experiences did not break the coMbat
spirit of the Soviet Army nor shake the determination of our people
who rallied around the Communist Party with more solidarity. The
Party's titantic activity in organizing the repulsing of the enemy
at the front and preparing the military industry in the rear and its
impassioned revolutionary word strengthened the belief of the soviet
people in victory and led our Soviet Army to victory. In bitter
defensive battles our Armed Forces destroyed and exhausted the
enemy and imposed huge lesses in personnel and combat equipment on
him. As the enemy penetrated deeper into Soviet territory, the
resistance of our troops increased and the front was consolidated.
When new forces were brought up from the depth of the country
and placed into battle and better technical and combat means were
made available, the power of our counterattacks was increased as was
the tenr,!ity of chasti and soyedineniya in defense. Tqaa organization
of the preparation and execution of combat operations was corrected,
compan( uml line personnel gradually acquired combat experience, and
the control of troops was improved. All of this had a telling effect
on the results of operations carrted out by our troops in repulsing
enemy attacks. This is illustrated by the fact that the aver age daily
advance of the enemy at the end of September in comparison with the
first 20 days of the war was shortened from 20=30 =kilometers tte2-3
kilometers.
In bitter fighting on the approaches to Leningrad, Soviet troops
threw back all attempts by the enemy to seize this important
region. The enemy suffered especially heavy losses there. strategic
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
1
Ap
CPYRGHT
oved FoVRizileatt?200411980341SIALROP8ST00811R017/0301M9008_3ran out
off in time by the battle of Smolensk. On the right bank Ukraine
the Garman command also was unsuccessful in its attempts to destroy
the Soviet troops in order subsequently to quickly seize all of the
southern regions of the Soviet Union.
True, in the south of our country, the enemy enjoyed considerable
success, but he was successful here only by developing a large superi-
ority in forces by directing two army ob"yedineniya of the "Center"
army to the south.
Although the enemy did not achieve any of his established
strategic war goals on time, he continued to attack, he retained the
initiative, and the situation at the front continued to be complicated
at the end of September.
Due to the unsuccessful outcome of our combat operations On the
left bank Ukraine in September 1941 and the large-scale redeployment
of German troops conducted by the German command in the Moscow area,
very threatening situations developed in October in the zones of the
Western, Bryansk, and Southwestern fronts.
This time the Soviet High Command saw the threat to Moscow on
time and took measures to develop a solid defense on the approaches
to the capital of our native land and to reinforce the troops of
the fronts with new forces and means, including many new types of
combat equipment and weapons which were being made available by the
military industry in the depth of the country.
Due to the heroic efforts and the growing skill of the Soviet
troops, both offensives against Moscow undertaken by the enemy in
October and November were stopped. The enemy suffered serious losses
and exhausted basic reserves. An important role in stopping the
German advance on Moscow was played by the offensive operations carried
out by Soviet troops on the flanks of the active units of the Soviet-
German front, in the Tikhvin and Rostov areas, under the leadership of
Army Gen K. A. MERETSKOV, Mar SU S. K. TIMOSHENCKO, and Co]. Gen Ya. T.
CHMTLEVICHENKO which prevented the German command from reinforcing groups
of the "Center" army with groups from the "North" and "South" armies.
By stopping the German offensive against Moscow, the Soviet people
and their army showed their great strength by stopping the enemy and
inflicting heavy destruction on his forces under difficult conditions.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
16
pprov
CPYRGHT
ed ff/gi 01? 1,031.1180C140 ;
I ; .7f20Sii is
I 14 ? ? ' nd of D. D.
,6L6lejb. arlaVORO
GOLDIN, P. A. BELOV, and other' commanders inflicted serious looses in
manpower and equipment on the enemy, reduced his offensive capabilities,
and brought him to a halt on approaches close to Moscow. This was the
beginning of the turning point in the course of the war and of the
constantly increasing capabilities of the Soviet Army.
Situational turning points also developed in other decisive areas
of the Soviet-German front. In the second half of November at Tikhvin
and Rostov Soviet troops began to change over from defensive to offen-
sive operations. Almost simultaneously the German army lost the
initiative for offensive operations and for the first time in World
War II transferred to the defence under the influence of constantly
increasing strikes by the Soviet Armed. Forces.
The Soviet Armed Forces gradually seized the initiative from the
enemy and prepared to deliver a crushing attack against him.
The first successes achieved in stopping Hitler's aggressive
plans would not have been possible without the heroic labor of all
of the Soviet people tam gave their Armed Forces everything possible.
Due to the efforts of the Communist Party and Soviet government,
the national economy of our country was quickly transferred to a war
footing, supplies to troops operating at the front were improved,
and a large number of reserve chasti and soyedineniya were established.
Simultaneously with the increase in the number of soyedineniya in the
operational army, large reserves were established for the Headquarters
of tha High Command. The strength of the Soviet Army grew enormously.
By the beginning of DeceMber, the enemy had lost his superiority
in tanks and aircraft. New combat equipment, replacement units, and
new chasti and soyedineniya were made :available to the army and reserve
armies were engaged which were very important in changing the overall
relationship of forces on the Soviet-German front. However, the
numerical relationship between the forces was not all that was changed.
More and more Soviet tanks and aircraft which were qualitatively
superior to those of the Germans appeared on the battlefield. The
army was supplied with automatic and antitank guns at an increasing
rate. There was a qualitative change in the personnel of the Soviet
Armed Forces. Soviet soldiers had been hardened by intense battle,
chasti and soyedineniya were strengthened organizationally, and command
personnel accumulated much experience in controlling combat operations
in complex conditions.
All of this indicated that the period of strategic defense which
the Soviet Armed Forces were forced to assume in the beginning period
of the war had come to an end. The main enemy groups were exhausted
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 ? CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
17
Appro
vegt2v$80E20,o.togitbANEr
ass
lerTs:3 The primary
to the Armed
Forces had been achieved. Thus, the beginning period of the war was
over. The war began the next period of its development which was begun
by our Armed Forces turning to a counteroffensive and then to a general
strategic offensive.
The counteroffensive of the troops at Tikhvin and Rostov-on-Don
and the historic victory at Moscow were the precursors of the com-
plete destruction of the German horde. The Soviet Army seized the
strategic initiative from the hands of the enemy and developed con-
ditions for the subsequent deployment of offensive operations.
The defeat of the German troops at Moscow was a shining victory
for the Soviet Armed Forces and was recorded in history as a prominent
military event of World War U. It was the first major defeat of
the Germans and it shook the German military machine to its 'foundations.
The Soviet forces had done away with the propaganda developed by
Hitler concerning the invincibility of the German army.
In those days not only the plans for a lightning war, but all
the strategic plans of the German command collapsed. Hitler's
Germany was unavoidably faced with the necessity for carrying on a
protracted war.
The victory of the Soviet Armed Forces at Moscow had worldwide
historical importance. It inspired the people of the world to battle
for liberation from the fascist invaders and had an important influence
on subsequent stages of World War II. Many historical facts illustrate
this.
Thus, William. Foster, chairman of the Central Committee of the
US Communist Party, in giving his evaluation of the Victory gained
by the Soviet people in the winter of 1941-42, wrote prophetically;
"The wounds given to the fascist monster by the Red. Army saved the?
world from the threat of Hitler." The widest response to our victory
at Moscow came from the countries of Europe. Maurice Torez said,
"All of France celebrates the first victories of the Red Army and
the successes of the Soviet offensive in the winter of 1941-42 with
delight and enthusiasm,"
In January 1942 members of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party and other prominent persons and politicians of Germany published
an address to the German people in which they wrote, "We express our ?
deepest solidarity with the great Soviet people and our limitless de-
light with their heroic Red Army who with their honor and lives are
. ,
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
18
FprRehi4se2.01)0)08$0910CICAMIDP8M008715R00:08000190003bItrians. Being
conscious of our debt to our people, we will fulfill it until the end.
Until our last breath and without sparing our strength or our life,
we will struggle on the many great fronts of the people until Hitler's
tyranny is_eoppletely uestroyed and done away with. This address was
signed by B. Pik, W. Ulbricht, and others.
Many bourgeois personages who were hostile to the socialist order
of our country were forced to admit that the victory at Moscow had great
importance on the course of World War II. The intense battle on the
Soviet-German front drew into its orbit the main forces of fascist
Germany and essentially paralyzed the operations of the Wermacht in
all other theaters of World War II. Churchill wrote on this subject
"While the German armies carried on a mortal battle in the East, the
three (.2 an invasion of England decreased." In his evaluation of the
defeat of the Wemacht by the Soviet Army at Moscow, he confessed that
"the resistence of the Russians broke the backbone of the German
armies." In a telegram to the Soviet government, General de Gaulle
wrote, "By throwing its power against the aggressor, the USSR has now
given oppressed peolae certainty in their liberation. I have no doubts
that due to the heroism of the Soviet armiks the efforts of the allies
will be crowned with victory."
A brief analysis of the course of the military operations of the
Soviet Armed Forces in the summer and fall of 1941 allows certain con-
clusions to be drawn concerning the betinning period of World War II
to determine its duration and content.
Unfortunately, until now there has been no single interpretation
of the beginning period of World War II in our historic literature.
There are two points of view on this subject. The advocates of one
believe that the beginning period of the war was concluded with the
strategic deployment of the Armed Forces and with the engaging of the
reserve aLmies in the conflict, i.e., in the middle of July 1941.
Advocates of the other point of view say that the beginning period
of the war continued until the beginning of December 1941 when the
offensive of the German armies was stopped and conditions were developed
for the Soviet forces to turn to the counteroffensive.
It must be said that this debate is not an idle one. The correct
understanding and generalization of the experience of the most
important lessons of the beginning period of the past war permit us
to understand thoroughly the character of armed conflict in modern
conditions and with calculation of this experience to work out the
most expedient methods for preparing and conducting operations and
combat actions in the beginning period of a future war.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
CPYRGHT
Ap
Ap
)roved RthdRieletisth2000g98/09:401AGRDV60709875R000200090003-3
The advr,cates of the first, in our opinion, are defending a plan
which is long obsolete in which the basic content of the beginning
period of the war is considered the mobilization, concentration, and
deployment of the first strategic echelon of the armed forces. The
deployment and Conduct of military actions on a large scale are not
included in its content.
However, as is well known, World War II was begun by the armed
forces of fascist Germany which were mobilized and deployed at an
earlier date. This is how the attack by Hitler's aggressors was
carried out against the Soviet Union. Actually Stalin as the Supreme
Commander in Chief and our General Staff made both theoretical and
practical errors. A superficially shallow understanding of new phe-
nomena peculiar to the beginning period of World War II caused us to
make grave errors in preparing the Armed Forces and the country as
a whole for the war, in deploying groupinep of forces, organizing
defenses, and changing the national .nonomy to military production.
We can now state with complete certainly that events in the beginning
period of World War II would literally have had a different character
if our Armed Forces had been brought to combat readiness on time and
deployed in proper concentrations for conduting decisive combat
operations to stop the attacks of the aggressor.
Some people are inclined to relate the conclusion of the begin-
ning period of World War II to the end of July 1941 using indicators
such as the development of relative stability of the front in certain
areas as main criteria for determing the content and duration of this
period.
However, even if these criteria are found to be true, they can
hardly be oriented to the end of:July 1941. An analysis of the
course of combat operations shows that no serious shifts occurred in
combat operations at the front by the end of July or even by the
beginning of October. Not one continous or really stable front had
been developed in any strategic areas by this time. In spite of the
engagement of our strategic reserves,the correlation of forces had
still not been equalized.
Then what must be used as a basis for determining the content
duration of the beginning period of the war?
It seems to us that it would be most correct from the scientific
point of view to use the achievement of determined or, more precisely,
the most immediate strategic goals of the war as a basis for determining
'Toyed Poi- Rolimase 20n0/08/09 ? rIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003,3
on
CPYRGHT
? ApprovedfatoRleasie104068039 bC144tRaRgniaanSii00033100300ar3 When the
course of oventn on the Soviet-German front are evaluated from thin
Point; of view it iu not difficult to pm that the moot imrnediato
otrategic goalo of our Armed Forces had not been achieved by either
the 10th or the 30th of July 1941. The enemy wan continuing to attack
and he otill retained the initiative.
In the difficult conditions of the first days of the war when
the front of the Soviet :troops had been breached in many areas and
the rapid eastern advance of the enemy armies threatened the seizure
of the vital center of our country, the Soviet Supreme Conmand advanced
the following most immediate otrategic goal: to establish a strategic
defense to stop the enemy advance and at the name time to foil his
plane for a lightning war. All the dfforta of our country and Armed
Forces were directed toward the achievement of thin goal during the
Dimmer and fall of 1941. This goal van achieved only by the beginning
of December 1941 when our troops successfully stopped the enemy
advance.
The achievement of the most immediate strategic goal placed before
the Armed Forces by the Soviet Supreme Command and the thwarting of
the German plan for a lightning war in itself indicated the end of
the beginning period of the war and the transfer of the armed Conflict
to a new phase.
Thus, the basic content of the beginning period of World War II
woo the conduct of a forced strategic defense by the Soviet Armed
Forces which had the goal of destroying the attacking enemy forces
and developing conditions for seizing the strategic initiative.
Other simultaneous undertakings during this period included measures
for mobiliza,Aon, the establishment of new obuyedineniya and
soyedineniya, the concentration of reserves on the most important
areas, the evacuation of industry to the depth of the country, and
the transfer of the national economy to a wartime footing.
The relatively long duration
War II was the consequence of the
which we made prior to and during
before.
of the beginning period of World
many major mistakes and omissions
the war. These were spoken of
For the German army the main content of the beginning period of
the war was also the achievement of the most immediate strategic goals:
the defeat of the main forces of the Soviet Army in the Western party
of the Soviet Union and the occupation of Leningrad, Moscow, and Donets
Basin. It was not faced with the task of mobilizing and deploying its
main forces since this had been done before the beginning of the war.
The whole Germnn economy had becagglikeoiLitarY 12a,140-Thead of
ApprovtgluE9r Release 2000/08/09 : CAA-RID 514:000300090
App
CPYRGHT
Loved Fbr Ree t041120001/0891090: CPA- IVIPSSIONN?75Rb6043603900M0 begin-
ning period of World War 11 Allot be understood.
We have already discussed the reasons for our lack of success in
the beginning of the war. The disclosure and thorough analysis of
these reasons have groat practical importance for the correct determi-
nation of measures for the preparation of the Armed Forces and the whole
country for a future was which in contemplated by the aggressive forces
of the imperialist states against the USSR aud the other countries oi
the socialist fraternity. This in the main value of the lessons of
the pact for us.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
22
Appr
PYRG HT
Appr
nning Period
ed11,8,moasogiiis7t RilibioitiltobtAiktRibSereogbbtSstgi
World War II was concluded by the complete defeat of fascist Germany,
its satellites, and imperialist Japan. This victory has no equal in all
of world history, but the road to it was a long and difficult one.
For about 4 years the Soviet Armed Forces were forced to conduct
a difficult struggle against a stronger army which was evaluated by
Western military authorities as unbeatable. An incredible display of
moral and physical strength was required from all of our people.
It may be said with certainly that no other state would have been
able to withstand the unfavorable circumstance which was imposed on us
in the beginning period of the war. However, the Soviet Army was able
In these difficult conditions to preserve its combat capability and its
high moral and combat qualities not only to stop the enemy, but to give
him a crushing blow.
The defeat of the German forces at Moscow was followed by the
historically unparalleled defeat of the German army on the Volga. Then
with its attacks growing constantly stronger, the Soviet Army threw the
German invaders far to the West and completely liberated the occupied
area of our native land. In 1945 operations were carried on In the
territory of the Eastern European countries and the territory of the
aggressor himself to completely defeat the German forces, the Hitler's
Germany capitulated.
The victorious outcome of World War II signified the ruin of the
second invasion by imperialists on our native land. It meant the complete
failure of the wild plans of German fascism to win world supremacy.
As they celebrated victory over German fascism, the people of the
world hoped that Germany which had initiated 2 world wars would never
again become the breeding ground for militarism and aggression. East
Germany where the communist party, the party of the workers, is in power
came to stand firmly on the position of peace. However, most unforL- -
twaately, the development of West Germany took a different path. The
representatives of large capital which have seized power there are using
the tremendous aid of the US, England, and France to intensify the
preparation of West Germany for a new war by developing a spirit of
natiunal revenge. in every way possible. The reconstructed military
machine of West Germany is headed by Hitler's generals.
Much was changed in the years following World War II. In a short
time the Soviet Union rebuilt everything that was destroyed during the
war. New cities, mines, factories, plants, electric stations, etc.
ear 201eiggtinlf04*0144 2" 11 P ?nit** Soft ?1361:P3ILst camp went
witgral-May EiltArtlie' a Tia-The construction e a brilliant
23
Appro
PYRG HT
veituVIRaSigenthimo?909QTY/ii?NbP8T5hileBffoloSN become
much' more n ens? an 'cameos many mi ons o poop e o various
nationalities and political convictions. The chains of colonial
slavery are being broken and more and more new countries are entering
the family of free nations.
The forces which are guarding the peace under the leadership of the
world socialist system now have all necessary means to restrain the
imperialist instigators of war. Thus, a world war ceases to be fatally
inescapable.
Much has been changed in these years, but the essence of imperialism
and the desire for world supremacy have not been changed. The Communist
Party teaches and warns us that the soil for an aggressive war will re-
main as long as imperialism remains. Although World War II did not
strengthen the position of imperialism, but rather imposed irreparable
losses on the whole capitalist system, the ruling classes of the West
have not benefited from these lessons. In their brutal hatred of the
Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist camp, they are fe-
verishly preparing a third 'world war.
With the West German revenge seekers, American imperialism is now
the main pretender to world supremacy and the main force of aggression
and war. In preparing for the unleashing of a new war, they are copying
the same unsavory methods employed by Hitler's Germany in preparation
for World War II. Again under the pretense of defending against the
threat of communism, aggressive blocs are gathered together and en-
larged, the socialist countries are encircled by a multitude of military
bases, and a never-ceasing arms race is continued in the forms of de-
veloping, testing, and accumulating new types of military equipment,
especially stores of nuclear and rocket weapons.
The ruling circles of the Western powers have again given the West
German Army the role of a strike force in the struggle against the USSR
and the countries of the socialist camp. As they connive with the
sinister revenge-seeking plans of German imperialists in designing a
new war, they spare no effort to restore West German militarism. By
means of generous aid from the US, West Germany has already developed
the strongest army in all of the capitalist countries of Western Europe,
equipped with all types of modern military equipment. The monopolistic
circles in the US and their allies are attempting to place destructive
nuclear weapons in the hands of the German revenge seekers. Former
generals in Hitler's army, Including military criminals have not only
become commanders of the West German army, but occupy responsible posts
in nvro.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
24
Approved
CPYRGHT
?
ForRMdifsAl:DOOPIIMIFGPAIREA01857601876k0M001390.0023 leaders of the
aggressive imperialist bloc consider surprise attack as the basic means
for unleanhing n war against the countries of socialism in modern con-
ditions. The preparations for this sort of attack are being put to-
gether now in a process of general preparation for war which goes on
daily and hourly and penetrates the most Important realms of political,
economic, and military life of the main capitalist states.
Immediate preparations for a surprise attack are being implemented
by the leaders of the US-English coalition both in the development of a
material basis and in providing the proper conditions for such an
attack. Thus, large groupings of strategic attack forces and armed
forces are being stationed in theaters of military operations and large
supplies of material and technical means are being built up.
It has been learned from speeches made by the US Minister of Defense
and from bourgeois press sources that more than 830 intercontinental
rocket sites are being deployed on US territory and that 21 atomic
rocket-carrying submarines have been commissioned with 15 of them armed
with polaris rockets. The US strategic aviation fleet numbers approxi-
mately 1,300 aircraft. The countries taking part in the aggressive blocs
and the countries allied with the US by treaties for mutual defense have
approximately 180 divisions, including the 80 divisions of the NATO
countries. The NATO naval forces have over 1,200 large ships, including
19 attack aircraft carriers.
All of the concentrations of military forces in the imperialist
military bloc and especially strategic attack weapons are maintained
at the highest level of combat readiness. Intercontinental rockets
are kept ready for launch and half of all strategic aircraft are ready
to take off within 15 minutes to deliver attacks against earlier assigned
targets. More than 10 strategic bombers with nuclear bombs are con-
stantly in the air and atomic submarines patrol the Atlantic and the
Mediterranean. Vanguard detachments of the US navy are deployed in the
Mediterranean Sea and in the Western part of the Pacific Ocean.
Thus, the US and NATO commands pursue a single goal, to develop all
the conditions for the surprise unleashing of aggression.
These facts have caused us to consider the beginning period of a
modern war very seriously. Experience of the past teaches that once a
state becomes complacent toward the possibility of surprise aggressive
action, it will suffer much destruction from the very outset or will
lose the war within a short time. For this reason we must never allow
mistakes in the evaluation of the military and political situation or
in maintaining the combat readiness of our Armed Forces.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
25
Appi
PYRGH
Appi
ovedFalftecedieY200/0051:04tVAWINISSINDS,N8N00?BOOMO! 4rmed battle
will create cOnditions in a future war for the achievemen of results
In its beginning period which cannot compare with the results of the
T beginning period of the past war. The first nuclear strike can im-
mediately lead to the disorganization of the government, military con-
trol, and the whole rear area of a country and to stopping the systematic
deployment of the armed forces and all measures being conducted for
mobilization. All of this will have a telling effect on the operation
of armed tdrces deployed in theaters of military. operations. The re-
sults of the first days of military operations may have a decisive
Influence on the subsequent course of a war.
The equipping of armies with new means of waging combat, the changes
in methods in waging war, and the character of the preparations of the
Imperialist states for a future war produce a basis for the supposition
that, if it is begun, the beginning period of a future war will be very
different from the beginning period of past wars both in content and in
duration.
It is evident that in a future war both sides will immediately
execute the most decisive and violent military operations which will
embrace both the front and deep rear areas. As they prepare a new
world war, the imperialist aggressive bloc are establishing their as
goal the disruption of the economy of the socialist countries and the
defeat of our troops by means of large scale nuclear strikes. Thus the
Soviet Armed Forces are compelled to set for themselves a no less
decisive goal: by means of retaliatory operation to crush the aggressor,
:out his armed forces, destroy important military installations, demolish
his economic potential, seize the strategic initiative, and develop
conditions for the achievement of complete victory over the enemy within
a minimal period of time.
Modern means of destruction permit the most immediate strategic
goals of a war to be reached within a much shorter time period than was
possible in World War II. Therefore concerning the duration of the
beginning period of a future war, it will evidently be much shorter
than in past wars. Of course, it would be very difficult to determine
its duration exactly. However, it can be said with complete certainty
that it will not be counted in months, but probably in several days or
at most weeks.
Combat operations in the beginning period of a nuclear war will be
conducted by methods which are principally different from the methods
which were employed in past wars. Military and political strategic
goals in the past were achieved by defeating the enemy armed forces on
the battlefield to open paths for the attacking troops to seize vitally
important areas and centers of the enemy. The most important battles
(wed FM^ RPIPaSP 200010R/09 ? CIA-RIIIDR5TOOR75R000300090003-3 '
Approved
CPYRGHT
FcdEBRIMISEtARDNQIIA ciefVERDMIg9?7o/Rt9Plq.4%99999Arbli no where the
opposing forces operated in direct contact with each other. True,
during World War II weapons which were effective against installations
in the rear areas of the enemy, for instance bombers, were available.
However, in spite of their importance, they did not play a decisive
role in the achievement of assigned goals.
With the employment of nuclear and rocket weapons it becomes pos-
sible simultanewsly to destroy both groupings of armed forces deployed
on theaters of military operations and installations in deep rear areas,
including those located in distant continents. Thus, the task of de-
stroying installations in deep rear areas of the enemy acquires primary
significance in modern conditions. It muct be expected that the main
battles of a future war will at once involve the depth of the ter-
ritories of the belligerents.
Nuclear strikes may lead to the complete disorganization of the
state and military contrnl of main countries in the enemy bloc and
small countries may be wiped from the face of the earth. Areas of com-
plete destruction and radioactive contamination will be formed over
large territories. Some western military specialists have computed
that it is sufficient to explode 100 2-megaton nuclear charges in a state
with a developed economy and a territory measuring 300-500 thousand square
kilometers to transform it into an empty wilderness. All of this must
exert a decisive influence on the subsequent course and even the outcome
of a war.
However, nuclear attacks will not be the only means for achieving
the goals of a war, -earticularly in its beginning period. Simultaneously,
or on the heels of nuclear strikes, active operations will be begun in
ground and naval theaters to defeat concentrations of enemy armed forces
and seize the enemy's territory.
In ground theaters both sides will attempt to achieve established
goals chiefly by attacking, which inescapably will lead to large meeting
engagements. Defeat of defending concentrations will be achieved mainly
by delivering nuclear and rocket strikes. Important possibilities for
conducting highly maneuverable operations on a wide scale will appear.
There will be no continuous fronts either in the beginning period or
during the course of the war. Combat operations es a rule will develop
in separate areas and both sides will attempt .to make deep penetrations
Into enemy territory. The operations of airborne landing troops who
will be landed in deep rear areas will acquire special significance.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
27
App
rov2fgkvehlugl?016
CPYRGH
App
ntgiVg Oil#4014"Ailtd decisive
troops,
the most important missions will be executed by nuclear weapons. The
Taggressor's naval concentrations will be defeated by submarine opera-
ting in coordination with rocket-armed naval aircraft. Destroying
important installations along the coastline and combating enemy atomic
submarines will be very important.
Defending the rear areas of the country and the armed forces from
enemy nuclear strikes will be of exceedingly great importance. The
successful execution of this task will in many ways predetermine the
subsequent course of military operations.
In the beginning period of the war military operations will be con-
ducted mainly by those armed forces which are combat ready. It is
primarily these troops, the strategic nuclear arms, and the air defense
troops who are entrusted with the responsibility f9r the execution of
the most immediate strategic goals.
Of course measures will be taken in the beginning part of the war
to reinforce these troops by deploying newly mobilized formations. They
will form the second strategic echelon and will be entrusted with the
execution of subsequent missions of the war.
Simultaneously with the conduct of decisive combat operations and
the mobilization and deployment of armed, forces, the economy of the
country will immediately be changed over to supply the needs of the war.
This is our impression of the content and duration of the beginning
period of a future war and the character of combat operations by armed
forces during this period.
Analysis of the historical character of the beginning period of a
nuclear war permits us to make the conclusion that to ward off the first
attacks of an aggressor and to successfully develop subsequent military
operations, and the outcome of the war itself will all depend to a de-
cisive degree on how well the nation and the armed forces are prepared
to repulse a surprise attack and how able they are in the first minutes
to decisively and effectively employ all of their combat might and all
of their means for waging war to defeat the aggressor.
This compels us to develop our armed forces, equip them with modern
military equipment, and mobilize their development timely and atten-
tively with calculation of the character of a future war and the economic
capability of our state, to persistently master methods of conducting
war, and to prepare theaters of military operations beforehand. Thus,
we are always bound to be led by that V. I. Lenin said, "We must accompany
rovorarkteNjt2owao
? /eiZ.1y6tp I R915Parg) 660i1Z660ilibelliatitTi readiness...."
? pl -:
28
Approved
aPYRGHT
Approved
F9EARegi 4000g1TACIWYgglptg 04. - ?
? I li
ICHEV for
e
the Communist
strengthening the defensive might of our country, the Armed Forces of
the Soviet Union have been fully re-equipped with modern new equipment.
The main event of these years has been the establishment of the
Strategic Rocket Troops, the branch of the Armod Forces which has become
the basic nuclear might of our countoy.
The PVO Strany Troops have received further development based on
their being equipped with rockets of various types, the latest anti-
rocket weapons, and also modern fighter-interceptors.
The technical equipment of our Ground Troops, Air Forces, and Navy
has been improved greatly, chiefly due to the extensive implementation
of nuclear and rocket weapons in these branches of the armed forces.
Using the achievements of Soviet economics, sciences, and technology,
the party and state are doing everything necessary to bring about our
constant qualitative and quantitative military and technical superiority
over the armies of the leading capitalist states.
When determining the composition of our Armed Forces it must be
taken into consideration that the states of the aggressive imperialist
blocs maintain large concentrations of forces and means in peacetime and
are able to begin and carry on combat opt:rations without additional
mobilization or preliminary deployment. Naturally this forces us to
maintain our Armed Forces at such a level in peacetime that they can
be certain of executing their missions and achieving the strategic goals
of the beginning period of a war in case an aggressor carries out a
nuclear attack.
The constant threat of an enemy surprise attack on the Soviet Union
and the other socialist countries, the suddeness with which military
actions will develop in the beginning period of the war, and the in-
comparably colossal destructive power of nuclear weapons cause ex-
ceedingly high requirements for the combat readiness of the Armed
Forces.
Special responsibility for timeliness in delivering retaliatory
strikes against an aggressor and for repulsing his attacks is placed
on the Strategic Rocket Troops and the WO Strany Troops. They must
have exceptionally high combat readiness. The strategic nuclear arms
must be maintained at such a level of preparedness that they can attack
an enemy with all their destructive power at any time and, in the case
of the P110 Strany Troops, can repulse and destroy the enemy's means of
nuclear attack while in flight from any direction, regardless of attack
Pa'lig
..:ase 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
CPYRGHT
Appro
ved FalfleitiaVIZThellitelOn9tINSIR apOtkli00t5C115t not remain
unpunished if he executes a surpiMe1614c. ow, one sue factor EIS
surprise attack is clearly insufficient to seize the strategic initiative.
The aide whose economy and Armed Forces are more vulnerable to nuclear
attack will lose the initiative. The limited size of their territories,
the high concentration of economic installations, and a lack of a class
unity of their people all compose the Achilles heel of the imperialist
state. Victory in a future war will go to those who have unified in-
terests between the workers and the state, a high moral spirit on the
part of the population, and unity of the people and the Armed Forces.
The most important element in the preparation of the Armed Forces
is the training of the personnel in the methods for conducting combat
operations and in the ability to use weapons and combat equipment
skillfully, and the development among the soldiers of a feeling of high
responsibility for the defense of the socialist Motherland and persistence
in the execution of combat assignments.
In preparing the Armed Forces for War and in particular in the
correct training of personnel, the development of the theoretical koases
of military art and their asimilation in the course of combat and
operational training are of great importance. We have developed a com-
pletely contemporary theory for conducting combat operations which is
reflected in conforming regulations and manuals. As new combat weapons
and the process of troop training are developed, this theory must con-
stantly be perfected and made more precise.
One reason for the serious shortcomings of our Armed Forces in the
begin:ling period of World War II was the unsatisfactory preparation of
theeters for military operations. After full analysis of this historic
1;sson, we must also keep in mind that the unlimited spaciousness of
nuclear and rocket war makes it necessary for statee to consider the
problem of the timely preparation of not only theaters for military
operations, but of all the territory of a nation. Now the preparation
of theaters for. military operations and the territory of a nation for
war must be conducted both to develop the necessary conditions for the
deployment and operations of concentrations of armed forces and to permit
the organized activity of the whole national economy in conditions im-
posed by the enemy's use of nuclear weapons.
The character of modern war demands that the preparation of a
nation's whole economy Thr war be timely and comprehensive. Thus, we
must never forget Lenin's well-known pronouncement that it is impossible
to conduct modern war against imperialism without the most serious
economic preparation.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
30
Approved
?
CPYRGHT
Approved
F ot litolPft 4,1100
-To e
SI
OS
_Jlerious destruc-
efod of the war
and the subsequent difficulties in mobilizing industry, the necessity
is apparent for the timely and determined production of military equip-
ment reserves, material means, reserve industrial capabilities, and
strategic materiel reserves.
The maintenance of industrial vitality by despersing industrial
installations, duplicating production capabilities, and executing proper
measures for atomic defense takes on primary importance.
Along with the preparation of the economy, the preparation of the
population for war is of utmost importance. The boundary lines between
the front and the rear areas will largely be done away with in a future
war. Therefore the preparation of tho population for war takes on
exceedingly great importance. This preparation must be directed pri-
marily to the development of Soviet patriotism, certainty in the super-
iority of the socialist system over capitalism, love and devotion to
the Motherland, the Communist Party, and the ideals of Communism, high
political vigilance, and readiness to defeat an aggressor completely if
he makes an attempt to encroach upon the countries of the socialist
system.
The preparation of the nation's population to take measures for the
rapid elemination of ie effects of all enemy nuclear attack and the re-
establishment of economic vitality has become a major problem. This
preparation must be conducted chiefly witnin the civil defense system
whose role has grown immeasurably.
The correct scientific prediction of the character of a future war
and especially of its beginning period has become exceedingly important
in modern conditions. Such a predltion is necessary for the purposeful
resolution of all problems in preparing the nation and the Armed Forces
to repulse an aggressor and to not allow the slightest mistake in this
most responsible matter.
In the last few years in the Soviet Armed Forces, important theoretical
work has been carried on to investigate the possible character and methods
of waging a future war. Hom.'ever, it must be said that this research is
not completed. It must be kept in mind that military matters are not
static. The means of conducting war must be constantly developed and
perfected and scientific work directed to finding the most effective
means of their employment to certainly defeat an aggressor' must not fall
behind.
As before important problems for the further study of questions
concerning the beginning period of frture war must be considered by
F4greonlattogap:IggikkageWtopii) A nafyorg, forgotten
Ap
CPYRGHT
romatdiirgte liftleitsetp1200104/0EheektiARETWOLOBMAR0130130.6080Q03)-ament a of
their development. The task of military research in to employ the
Marxist-Leninist method"for'asserting the lawn of public life to reveal
tendencies in the development of the phenomena of war, to establish gen-
eral laws for these phenomena, and to use them creatively for contemporary
conditions with consideration of those changes which have occurred in the
means, character, and methods of conducting war.
These, briefly, have been the lessons of the past war and the most
important conclusions which must be considered in preparing the nation
and the Armed Forces for the future war which is being prepared by the
imperialists.
A quarter of a century separates us from that time when the Germans
unleashed World War II. This war was a difficult experience for millions
of the world's people. The attention which we give to this war today
is designed to illuminate the memory of the terrible tragedy of those
years productively and to mobilize all forces for the defense of peace.
The modern international situation indicates that the lessons of
history have not been taken seriously by the aggressive forces. They
are again preparing to commit treason against mankind in the form of a
thermonuclear war. Thus, the Communist Party and Soviet Government are
doing everything necessary so that the defense of our native land will
meet contemporary requirements. N. S. KHRUSHCHEV at the 22d Party
Congress said, "The Soviet people know the habits of aggressors well.
We have not forgotten the years of World War II, the treacherous and
base attacks of Hitler's Germany on the Soviet Union, Li the face of
the military threats created by the imperialists, there is no place for
satisfaction and carelessness."
Due to the successes achieved in our country in the development of
economics, science, and technology, the Soviet Armed Forces are now
equipped with the most effective means for conducting war, primarily
with nuclear and rocket weapons, which are superior to the similar
weapons of the leading imperialist armies both in quality and power.
The Soviet Union attentively observes the intrigues of the aggressors
and maintLths its Armed Forces in concentrations and at a level of
combat rtadiness which permit the immediate delivery of crushing
retaliatory blows against the aggressor. This is the pledge of the
Invincibility of our native land and of all countries of the socialist
fraternity.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
? Approved For RelainMOgtegmtfit.NRAWAE6653MREF3
CPYRGHT Y ?
Marxism-Leninism considers man and equipment as a close reciprocal
and dialectical unity which requires that constant attention be devoted
to man who develops and operateo equipment.
Combat equipment in addition to the strictly material and physical
consequences of Ito use has an important influence on the mental procesoes
of people in combat. M. V. Frunze noted in regard to this question that
"very often success is not determined by the enemy doing physical damage
to part of the combat force, bmt by this action having a depressing
effect on the mental processes of that force which remains, by destroying
its capability for resistance." (M. V. Frunze, Selected Works, Vol II
Voyenizdat, 1957, p 346).
Naturally the destructive power of modern weapons and the extensive-
ness of their use have a much greater effect on the moral condition of
each soldier than ever occurred in past wars. The moral factor has
acquired very great importance in modern conditions and the moral
qualities of personnel have a much greater indluence on the achieve-
ment of success than ever before. Thus, the requirements for the moral
and combat qualities of officers and generals, for mental stability,
bravery, and readiness for self sacrifice in the defense of their native
land, have grown inneasurably.
The rapid and sharp changes of situations and problems which must
be met by chastt aud soyedineniya and the necessity for making decisions
in minimal amounts of time require that every officer and general should
know differem, sk...118 for directing great numbers of people on the battle-
field. Only thost officers and generals who possess fine technical and
military knowledge, inflexible wills, persistence, decisiveness, and the
ability to overcome any barriers to the achievemunt of a goal can now
control modern combat and operations and execute combat missions
thoroughly and thoughtfully.
The work of a military commander makes great demands on his in-
tellect. Only a creative mind can penetrate to the essence of phenomena
and occurrences, find the essential, and notice the complex inter-
relationship between objects and phenomena. For example, to correctly
evaluate a situation and choose a target for a nuclear strike, the inter-
relationship between many combat elements must be seen and an officer
must always be ready to make a correct decision in a rapidly changing
situation.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
3
pr?yeir:1611A?A Iletiglinbo:rp.A.ArnistrIB,,9kbfonw,%1666pplifiroangicivatst commander
i!on ?to thC?laNg121Wc5MAlantamrlin TOnligical cer-
tainty, the development of firm responsibility for matters entrusted
to him, full military knowledge, and a dialectical approach to the
phenomena of life which he meets within his daily activity. These are
exactly the priceless qualities which were brightly manifested by our
commanders in the rigorous days of war and which aided them in the
successful execution of complex combat tasks to gain victory over a
strong ma dangerous enemy.
The most importance source for the inculcation of courage and
firmness of will for us has been and is the great history of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union. As the intellect, honor, and conscience of
our epoch the party personifies firm moral substance, revolutionary bold-
ness, and unflagging will and educates our command cadres in the essence
of strict revolutionary vigilance and high combat readiness.
The inculcation of moral and combat qualities among Soviet officers
nnd generals enters organically into the work conducted by our Party for
the formation of the Marxist-Leninist world outlook among laborers and
to mobilize their labor and political activity in the struggle for the
development of Communism and keep them constantly ready to rise up in
the defense of the socialist motherland.
The Communist Party of the Soviet Government affords a great honor
to Soviet commanders by trusting them with their most valuable commodity,
people. It gives them full responsibility for all operations connected
with the continual perfection of the combat might of the Soviet Armed
Forces. The party pays continuous attention to the ideological convic-
tions and strength of command cadres and trains them in the essence of
Leninist requirements to study the Leninist style of work and troop
leadership.
One of the most important moral and combat qualities is resoluteness.
Resoluteness includes the mastery of a man over himself, his ability to
control his own conduct and direct his actions toward the achievement of
consciously established goals. After determining a personal goal, a
resolute person sequentially and persistently achieves its fulfillment
in any complex and difficult circumstances. Vladimir Il'ich Lenin is to
us an example of a man with an exceedingly strong will and a brilliant
master in unifying the wills of millions of civilian and military
personnel, the army and the nation.
Every man needs a strong will, but .a military commander needs it to
a much greater degree. Modern combat is unparalleled for testing the
moral and physical strength of a man. Only the commander with a firm
and inflexible will can endure the test of war and be ready for any
practfpluttiMiA1126W0/0649u61A205158Mrt6616W0620tACE5_iifficult
Approve
CPYRGHT
ii For RWagllitieom4k1611.3tividRuntiscrtocRfnmermiresoue34 t nguished
by their complexity and intricacies and are characterized by many various
qualities or manifestations of will. The most characteristic of these
are self-mastery, decisiveness, persistence, energy, initiative, and
independence. We shall invedtigate each of these briefly with thd
consideration that these positive command qualities compose a unity and
are dependent upon each other.
The ability and skill of a commander to control himself, his activity
and conduct and a complex combat situation, to manifost persistence and
composure in the face of danger, and tu overcome various barriers and
difficulties to the fulfillment of an assignment determine the command
quality known ex self-mastery.
The most important indications of self mastery are self restraint,
a steady temperament, and the skill to correctly perceive events without
exaggerating danger.
A commander's decisiveness is shown by his ability to make decisions
rapidly and accept full responsibility for them regardless of risk in-
volved in resorting to very different methods of operation. A commander
acts boldly and decisively, basing his actions on a correct evaluation
of a situation and a sober conclusion regarding the forces and means and
the strong and weak aspects of the enemy. However, boldness and decisive-
ness are insufficient for making decisions. It is characteristic for
people with weak wills to make decisions and not to carry them out. The
essence of the resolute activity of a man is not in making bold decisions,
but in carrying them to victorious completion and in putting decisions
into practice which may require much peristent effort. Nothing in com-
bat can hinder the fully resolute commander from the achievement of a
goal.
A certain flexibility must be combined with firmness and persistence.
It sometimes happens that a decision which is made subsequently loses its
value. Then the resolute commander without wavering changes it and .
organizes the activity of his subordinates in accordance with the altered
conditions. Sometimes more rather than less resoluteness is required to
change a decision which has been made earlier. Thus, we must speak of
the necessity to differentiate between persistence and obstinancy. The
obstinate man attempts to have his awn way regardless of the expediency
of his actions which has nothing in common with the positive traits of
the man who is endowed with persistence.
Persistence is inseparably connected with the activities characterized
by energy. Inertness and passiveness are foreign to the activity of the
resolute commander who is intent on the achievement of a established goal.
Inertness which borders on inactivity is always harmful to the timely
Approved Fi5M6leftef200034109s.1439*-94121P8510W75R110163060000-3Injustified
losses. In modern war this may be followed by even more drastic con-
oPq4ence
35
CPYRGHT
App
roved fare Matte 2iiiiSKIBM9 ieCIA-ROPOTODEWEER000200o900034:pie,
Including officers and generals, are spurred to rmurageous conduct by
motives which are primarily of a social charactcr. It is namely the
ideals of the new socialist society which have a powerful positive in-
fluence on the completely resolute and courageous activity of commanders
In the Soviet Armed Forces. The courage of Soviet military commanders,
officers, and generals has its deep roots in the socialist social order,
the ideology of the Soviet man, and the heroic traditions of the Soviet
people.
Initiative is a very important quality which, as already mentioned,
is ipneparably connected with the resolute activity of a commander. To
act creatively, to know how to thrust one's will on the enemy, to upset
his plans, and achieve success is impossible without initiative. The
history of war teaches that even a superiority in strength may be un-
realistic if a commander does not manifest activity and initiative. It
is difficult to overestimate the importance of this in modern war. Now
it is especially dangerous to wait inactively for orders from a senior
commander and avoid critical situations. The rapid development of events
and changes in situations in modern war will often make it necessary for
a commander to take the initiative in making decisions within the frame-
work of the overall plan without waiting for orders from a senior commander.
This has always been true, but it is especially important in modern condi-
tions when in a decisive moment a commander must manifest his will and
take initiative upon himself. He must not remain inactive fearing to
accept responsibility for the outcome of a battle.
The ability to take initiative, to project goals for plans of actions
Independently, to refrain from the inexpedient and untimely, and to
manifest a sharp sense of responsibility for his awn actions are in-
valuable valities for a commander. Initiative and independence have
always been basic conditions for success in combat, but they are espe-
cially necessary in modern war. Of course, any decision must be thought
out in detail and carefully considered in the light of standing orders
and the actual possibilities for the achievement of success on the field
of battle.
The readiness and ability of a commander to subordinate his will
to that of his senior commander, to show high exactingness toward himself
and his subordinates, and to strive for faultless and precise compliance
to military regul,tions and orders are not in opposition to initiative.
Accurate execution does not exclude the manifestation of initiative or
a creative approach to carrying out assigned tasks. The higher a com-
mander's conscious responsibility for matters entrusted to him, the more
creative and independent will be his actions.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
36
Approv
ed F90444.1!" MittAtkAttIMMIVPitisSintralp
To=t5rcl.d HrOw-
ever, it must not be forgotten that this influence hap nothing in common
with rudeness. The will of a commander must not be shown by shouting
or administration by bare injunction, nor by ignoring the opinion of
staffs and subordinate groups on the part of officers and generals who
are one-man commanders. It is well known that those military commanders
of our army who are most exacting toward their troops have always com-
bined strength with deep sensitivity and an open manner toward people.
Their resolute conduct has always been an example worthy of imitiation.
C*PYRG HT
Approv
The resolute will of a commander has great importance on the moral
condition of his subordinates by instilling them with a certainty in
victory over the enemy. Subordinates who see their commander composed
and sure of himself and issuing clear and accurate orders even in critical
moments begin themselves to act with greater energy, persistence, and
initiative and unquestioningly follow their commander, take pride in
him, and attempt to imitate him.
As is known, war is full of dangerous situations and fear as a re-
action to danger is experienced at one time or another by every soldier.
The difference between the bold and the fainthearted is that the first
is able to suppress this feeling regardless of the danger that threatens
him, but the second loses his self-control and composure and wavers from
one extreme to another. By overcoming fear for his life, a man can take
heroic, bold, and decisive actions.
In overcoming the feeling of fear for one's life, a decisive role
belongs to a conscious feeling of military honor, responsibility for the
completion of assigned tasks, and a developed feeling of discipline.
An ideological certainty, a belief in the right of a matter, and a well
developed consciousness of military honor permit the instinct for self-
preservation to be conquered and compel the completion of heroic vic-
tories. The bravery of Soviet soldiers and the mass heroism displayed
in World War II against Hitler's fascists cannot be interpreted as a
complete absence of fear, but as an active suppression of it, self
control, and the ability to subordinate all activity to the honor and
interests of the motherland.
Thorough knowledge of new weapons, their destructive power, and
means of defending against them and the ability to conduct effective
combat operations in conditions involving the use of wer.pons of mass
destruction have great importance in suppressing the feelings of fear
in modern war. This knowledge and ability engender confidence in one-
self and in victory over the enemy. They give rise to healthy optimism
which helps both commanders of all ranks and levels and their sub-
ordinates to overcome difficulties and carry out assigned missions.
Fel Few Paloaca 9nnninging ? ria_PniDgc-rong7gPonn1nnnannn1_1
37
Ap
Ap
CPYRGHT
proved Berikellosse DOODY0810M ittAcROP8M0181410060300tOMIS-snd what
seem at first glance hopeless situations, when to many it seems that all
strength is exhausted and it is impossible to continue a battle, the
resolute commander does not lose his self-control. Using his knowledge
and skills, he musters his courage and decisiveness to develop the condi-
tions necessary for victory. On the other hand, a spineless and in-
decisive commander allows victory to slip from his grasp even when condi-
tions are in his favor.
There are many examples in military history where troops have broken
off a battle at the very moment when a small additional effort would
have led to victory, but the commander was not resolute or persistent.
Thus, combat is not a competition with the enemy in knowledge, experience,
and skills in using forces and means, but a contest in strength of wills,
persistence, and fortitude.
Some foreign military specialists are inclined to believe that in
conditions of great danger all people naturally experience the dis-
organizing influence of fear when their resolute qualities are depressed.
In reality with the conditions indicated above, the reschlute commander
experiences feelings which not only depress energy, but agitate his
activity. The excitement of combat is connected with elevating the
conscious and resolute activity of emotional experiences which takes
the character of high inspirction.
As evidenced by the experiences of war, the courageous and resolute
commander Is imspired by combat to the lofty goal of victory over the
enemy which completely occupies his conscious thought processes and
excites his emotions which enables him to show a firm resoluteness and
influence the troops under his command. Inspiration and certainty in
victory penetrate all of a commander's desires, influence all of his
conscious activity to permit him to overcome all reversals and diffi-
culties to be victorious over suffering and depravations.
The resolute qualities of a commander are always manifested by certain
actions. For example, when a commander must abstain from a certain
activity, this action will be internal, but expressed as patient and
calm expectation of the development of a situation more condusive to ex-
ternal activity by the commander.
However, the resolute and courageous actions of a commander both in
peaceful conditions involving the training and education of troops and
especially in periods of military action must not take the form of what
is called dashing behavior. True boldness has nothing in common with
dashing behavior. Boldness is one of the most valuable and necessary
resolute qualities of a commander. It is an important component in his
courage in making decisions and in guiding combat operations. Thoughtless
proved Porknetwtsti2000008109I 411ORDPWIVOVISRIA631301991i0011 ngth in a
combat situation and to prohibiting the execution of combat missions.
Approved
CPYRGHT
?
FoEfRegaiDOMPlIoNWOMAIN
C Z 4
I ? PI
e are speaking
resolute activity.
Psychologists and military specialists speak of bravery as a quality
which is manifested in a combat situation. The definition of bravery
is very broad and is not completely determined by its contents. Some
consider bravery to be identical to courage. Others differentiate it
from courage and define it as a complex quality of a man's character.
In our opinion, it approaches boldness in a psychological sense, but
somotimes manifests traits peculiar to courage. The bravery of a
coNmander is shown when he makes bold decisions and courageously puts
them into practice.
Soviet regulations emphasize that success is always on the side of
those who conduct battle boldly and bravely, persistently put their
decisions into practice, manifest initiative, and without fearing re-
sponsibility undertake the defeat of the enemy even with inferior
forces. Only under the leadership of a decisive and resolute commander
who is capable of making correct and competent decisions in the most
complex conditions without being indecisive in their implementation
can success be achieved in combat. Thus, the development and perfec-
tion of resolute qualities is of paramount importance in the training
of all officers, generals, and admirals of our Armed Forces.
An indispensable condition for the manifestation of resolute
qualities of a commander is his mastery of combat knowledge. Excel-
lent military training makes it possible for a commander to understand
thoroughly all factors in a complex and quickly changing situation,
demonstrate his will for victory with conviction, correctly use all
available forces and means for the defeat of the enemy, and skillfully
select the most advantageous and expedient approaches and methods for
combat operations. In the war years, M. I. Kalinin said, "A thorough
knowledge of military affairs permits military creativity on the field
of combat."
The command cadres of our Armed Forces are the sort of guiding force
which binds troops together, leads them into battle, and directs them.
To be in step with the time and meet the requirem-n -presented to them
by the party and the government, our officers and . ale must not only
master the theory and practice of conducting comb -ations and have
outstanding knowledge of military equipment and it ?Ibilities, but
they must also show unflagging vigilance and comprehend the organization
and weaponry of the capitalist army, their military doctrines, regula-
tions, and approaches to conducting armed warfare.
APproved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
39
CPYRGHT
Ap
proved ItiOriPlelfile12000/08i0VIEMBR1108griletet#5RW3ODOSIOrkiVS s. They
are not given to a man by nature. Rather, they are a result of the
training which he receives in his family, schools, groups, and society.
The formation of resolute command qualities among future officers is
begun when they are still in military schools, during the process of
combat and political training, and by the strict fulfillment of esta-
blished rules for internal order.
Howe- r, this is only the begimAng. Further development and tam-
pering o. resolute qualities occurs in practical work carried on
throughout military service. Resolute qualities are worked out by
overcoming difficulties, in assiduous and persistent labor, and by
strict self-discipline imposed in peacetime. In combat these qualities
are perfected, hardened, and developed to a still higher level.
Military discipline is a cohesive factor in the development of a
resolute will and a firm character in an officer. It lies at the basis
of all successes which an officer may achieve in combat or training. To
fulfill the requirements of military regulations and orders, an officer
must above all be disciplined and capable of controlling his activity
and conduct, subordinate them to the requirements of service.
In one way or another resolute qualities are developed when an
officer unquestioningly obeys his superior commanders. However in our
opinion, an especially important role is played here by operational and
tactical training, theoretical and practical activity, and self-training
conducted by an officer when training and educating his subordinates.
In the course of properly delivered tactical training, not only is there
a growth of military skill and organizational capabilities among com-
manders, but they also formulate and temper necessary resolute qualities.
There is still another aspect pertinent to instilling resolute
qualities among our officers and generals.
Certain commanders, desiring to aid their subordinates and sometimes
fearing that young officers will make mistakes, do not put sufficient
faith in them, deliberately make conditions easy for them, watch over
them, and from time to time do their work for them. None of this
facilitates creative thought processes among officers in complex condi-
tions, nor does it develop independent thinking which is necessary to
show initiative. However on the other hand, it does train them in
passivity.
To develop creative thought processes among young officers, condi-
tions must be developed so that they are presented with several possible
decisions, so that they must make a choice between decisions to answer
complex conditions most completely to achieve success.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 ? CIA RDP851-0087gR000300090003 3
CPYRGHT
Approved For Rilage2lOgitill: cquklbitvetrivitocottimo esents the
grea es pose t es or ng t e ig es com.at and moral
qualities among young officers and tempering them comprehensively. The
widest possibilities for the development of active initiative, decisive-
ness, persistence, and other command qualities which are necessary to a
young officer in war are found in the field, during day and night training
exercises, and in situations which closely approach the conditions of
actual combat.
At times during field training two officers may be observed who,
although they have identical training, execute identical assigned taska
in different ways. One manifests his will and character by acting
boldly, independently, and creatively while the other acts without
initiative, will, and spirit and often glances at his senior commander.
One of the basic reasons for the conduct of the second officer is that
he cannot manifest his resolute qualities because he has insufficient
knowledge, fears making a mistake, or sinply does not have enough will
power.
The widely known truth must also be remembered that one of the basic
conditions for instilling resolute command qualities is the steadfast
and constant observance in tactical training of the following guiding
principle! Train troops to meet that which they will actually be faced
with in modern combat. A serious error is committed by those supervisors
who allow various simplifications and conditionalities in trainirg ex-
ercises. This can do irreparable harm to the development of resolute
qualities in officers by not allowing them to act creatively. Training
is useless when supervisors and umpires bind their subordinates to their
will and decisions instead of compelling them to think and act ci..mtively.
Every officer must be given the widest possible scope to show inde-
pendence, decisiveness, activity, the ability to orient himself in any
conditions, and other resolute qualities in combat activity. It is comp-
letely inadmissable to adjust their activity and decisions to planned
variations which were considered beforehand regardless of the actual
composition of the conditions of a battle or operation.
When the decisions of a commander do not coincide with the sugges-
tions of the supervisor, but are sufficiently expedient and well based,
they should be accepted and proper corrections should be made in the
plan. When a trainee is carrying out operations without proper basis,
the supervisor must direct him to the proper path conforming to the
complexity of the situation.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
App
CPYRGHT
oved Flitittiktfliatta2000108Y09h. EPAARtypetetedgnfeleettatiogovjAarities
uf modern combat causes command trainees to experience the enemy's
presence constantly and to put their decisions into practice per-
sistently to respond simultaneously to enemy measures with counter-
measures, execute timely and daring maneuvers in opposition to his
actions, employ powerful fire, and dictate their will on the enemy.
The more complex the situation and the stronger, more resourceful, and
crafty the enemy, the greater are the requirements on officers to show
moral and physical strength, creative initiative, independence, and
decisiveness in operations. Modern combat weapons and complex equipment
present such requirements very effectively.
Senior commanders must organize tactical training exercises in such
a way that they are conducted with the best organization and at the
highest training level to develop among officers, especially among young
and inexperienced officers, the habits of operating skillfully, de-
cisively, and with initiative on the battlefield.
From the point of view of modern combat, the critique is an import-
ant moment in training and an integral part of every exercise. The
great value of the critique is that it helps trainees to comprehend the
essence of what has occurred in combat exercises and training, became
accustomed to critically analyzing their actions, and clarify the reasons
for mistakes which were committed. The critique allows the systematizing
and enriching of experiences for further perfection ol the combat,train-
ing of troops and the combat mastery of officers and generals, develops
their operational and tactical thought processes, and forms firm and
resolute qualities.
In preparing a critique, a commander systematically and compre-
hensively analyzes the actions of the trainees. This causes him to
consider his subordinates carefully and individually, delve deeply into
their actions, notice both the positive and the negative, and point out
vivid examples of what may lead to a commander being indecisive,
passive, or excessively cautious in combat.
At the same time it is necessary to notice and publicize the ex-
periences of those commanders who act bravely, decisively, and with
initiative. When a senior commander only points out mistakes to his
subordinates and does not indicate achievements, this weakens the faith
of the trainees In their awn capabilities. Thus, he must always be
maximally exacting, but at the same time just. Incorrect evaluations
almost always give rise to either hidden resentment or conceit among
individual officers.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
tf?
Approved
Approved
F05+45;44,404tORVE0atialReili ..0
wit sites committed
A04. ais Krwhat actions
are necessary in similar circumstances, the supervisor develops among
the trainees a feeling of responsibility for their actions, a belief
in their own capabilities, and a desire to execute all tasks entrusted
to them. It has been known for a long time that a correct evaluation
of an officer's actions by a supervisor both educates him and enriches
his experience.
Among the factors which have a noticeable influence on the forma-
tion of resolute qualities in officers, an important role belongs to
physical training and sports. Officers and generals who constantly
take part in sports acquire skills in calmly overcoming the dif-
ficulties involved in camp and combat, and develop quickness in their
reactions, a sense of orientation, and strength, i.e., those qualities
which form a man's strong will. The physical tempering of a commander
supplies an example of cheerfulness and a well developed capability for
work, persistence, and activity to subordinates.
Of course, the development of high moral and combat qualities among
officers is not limited to combat training. Purposeful party-political
work devoted to the comprehensive strengthening of the authority of the
one-man commander and all officers has a primary role. Party organs
and party organizations conduct important work in developing resolute
qualities among commanders and all Soviet soldiers. They conduct this
work by using the conclusions Ind auggestions of the sciences of
psychology and pedagogy. Thus, reports, lectures, conferences etc.
are organized. The use of all these methods allows senior commanders
and political workers to raise the level of training and direct it
toward the formation of moral and combat qualities.
We have dwelt on certain aspects of the complex and many-sided
task of implanting resolute qualities among our officers and generals
without pretending to exhaust or systematically illuminate this theme.
The forms and methods of this work cannot be expressed once and for-
gotten. Changes in the character of modern war and combat and in the
means of waging battle constantly propose newer and more advanced
requirements for command cadres who must make firm and knowledgeable
decisions on matters entrusted to them by the party, people, and Soviet
government.
The development of firm resolute qualities among officers is a
unified and purposeful process in combat and political training and
party-political work. It is important to know how to coordinate all
forms and methods of working with soldiers to train officers and gen-
erals thoughtfully and attentively as masters of military affairs who
are both exemplarily responsible to the socialist motherland and al-
ways ready to deliver 4...gr 15/41thUfgo ;t: 4?b?'?a he dares to
.74k)Itzl. 2r4Q90/1301A Co124- 41
ist fraternity.
pprovd/JuPtir atoll %DOOM 9t hC WoRDIPS$T89611)5 1400 03110 0966 06183 generale",
trained in the immortal ideals of Marxism-Leninism, ever more per-
sistently develop among themselves the qualities of true leadership and
educators who are ideally tempered and unquestioningly devoted to the
party and the people and ready to battle for communism courageously and
persistently.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
44
. Approved For Release 20006905r
UP
CPYRGHT
-M**0090003-3
by Maj Gen B. GOLOVCHINER
World War II, especially the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union,
is exceptionally rich in examples of the encirclement and annihilation
of large groupings of defending enemy troops.
During the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union more than ten
large encirclement operations were conducted, resulting in the annihila-
tion (or capture) of approximately 200 divisions. In the battle of the
Volga alone a grouping of more than 300,000 men (22 divisions) was
encircled and annihilated (or captured), and in the Yassy-Kishinev
Operation -- a grouping of more than 250,000 men (21 divisions).
That was in the past. But now completely new means of armed
struggle have appeared; the mobility, firepower and striking force of
troops have increased; combat action has taken on a more decisive and
maneuvering character and a large spatial scope. Military art has
naturally been confronted with the question of whether it is possible
and expedient to encircle groups of defending troops under these condi-
tions.
It would seem to be inexpedient inasmuch as defending groupings
can be annihilated with nuclear weapons, without encirclement, and
since encirclement in connected with the risk of tying up considerable
forces and equipment of the operational ob'yedineniya and depriving them
of opportunities to swiftly develop the attack in depth. Also, an en-
circling maneuver may be difficult to execute since the defending force,
using nuclear weapons, can offer determined resistance to such a maneuver.
In the grouping troops will be dispersed over large areas and will have
high mobility.
However, upon closer analysis another conclusion is suggested:
encirclement of large groupings of defending troops is possible and
expedient in a nuclear-rocket war.,
We base our conclusions on the fact that the use of nuclear weapons
In offensive operations of ground troops can not be unlimited, otherwise
these operations would be inconceivable. However, assuming the possi-
bility of such operations, it would be incorrect to exclude such methods
of conducting them as the encirclement of defending groupings. This
method would certainly accompany an attack. It could be used following
the employment of nuclear weapons and the swift movements of attacking
troops along axes, even when such an objective has not been planned
in advance.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
CPYRGHT
provelitkbrITRWfiStr 2060/0i3/09V?CIPARDP4831008115V104080 MD 0030 e as
the most expedient under existing conditions. For example, the West
German command considers a battle for encirclement especially advan-
tageous since the encirclement of groupings is one of the most con-
vient objectives for the most successful employment of nuclear weapons.
(E. Middel'dorf.) Tactics Manual. Foreign Literature Publishing House,
1960). In connection with this it has been recommended that during an
attack there be selected penetration areas, located on the main opera-
tional axes, through which an attack will promote the encirclement and
annihilation of enemy troops in these areas (Wehrkunde, March 1959).
All this is proposed for situations in which the attacking force
has a sufficient number of nuclear weapons to carry out the main
missions of the operation. If the attacking force has a limited number
ol nuclear weapons or if their employment would be inexpedient, en-
circlement would be used even more widely.
Thus, encirclement of defending groupings in molern offensive
operations can take place when the attacking troops have a sufficient
number of nuclear weapons as well as when there are limited opportunities
for their use.
The encirclement of defending troops is possible in various situations:
when the main forces and means of a defense are distributed over a 7..e-
latively small area and the attacking ob'yedineniya have an enveloping
position in regard to a certain grouping, or when there are difficult
terrain areas (a sea, a system of lakes, large rivers, marshy wooded
areas, impassable mountains).in the rear area or on one of the flanks
of the defending troops and there is a chance to "pin" the troops to
this barrier.
Encirclement may also occur in situations in which defending troops
will try at any cost to hold an area having operational or strategic
importance or during their withdrawal if the defending forces can not
offer determined resistance to the swift pursuit of attacking troops.
Encirclement is also possible when routing operational or strategic
reserves.
What is most characteristic of the encirclement and annihilation of
defending troops under modern conditions?
First of all the very concept of "encirclEment and annihilation"
has changed. Today we look on these actions as a means of defeating
separate groupings of defending troops in the course of carrying out
the main and special missions of operational ob'yedineniya, whereas in
the past they frequently were the means of defeating the main force of
a defense and achieving the objectives of an operation. The maximum
proved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
? Approved
CPYRGHT
FiYgON?gMTOOMF
Afirettreni, an annihilation of large
Obontiaya were em-
4
operational groupings and sometimes even strategic groupings took place
during these operations. At the same time combat actions were always
connected with the encirclement and annihilation of the enemy at a
tactical level.
The possibility of such operations in modern times is not excluded;
however they occur infrequently, specifically when large groupings of
defending troops are forced to conflict combat operations in relatively
small areas of operational or strategic importance or durin an attack
in the direction of a coast line. In view of the difficulty of their
organization and execution, such operations will, of course, be planned
in advance.
Judging from the experience of war and keeping in mind the new condi-
tions of armed struggle, it may be said that a decision on an operation
should include consideration of such fundamental questions as the pro-
cedure for the employment of nuclear weapons, the methods of encircling
and annihilating defending troops, the directions of strikes, forces
and equipment, the missions of encircling troops, and support of the
operation. Missions can naturally be clarified during the operation
and, if there are drastic changes in the situation, reassigned.
In the majority of cases the encirclement and annihilation of defend-
ing troops under modern conditions will be intermediate missions on
the way to achieving the objectives of an operation; consequently, a
large part of the forces and means of the attacking troops can not be
designated for carrying them out.
In the encirclement of troops in operations of the last war, interior
and exterior fronts of encirclement were established. The interior front,
as a rule, was continuous. On the exterior front attacking ob'yedineniya
and soyedineniya either developed the attack to the operational depth
or repelled counterthrusts.
In modern operations there is no need to establish a continuous
Interior front of encirclement to prevent defending troops from breaking
out of the encirclement since this can be accomplished by intercepting
their probable withdrawal routes or by creating zones of contamina-
tion on them, bearing in mind that the possibilities of troop movements
other than on roads will be extremely limited. Nor is there a need for
an exterior front of encirclement since approaching reserves can be
successfully destroyed by nuclear weapons and the swift advance of
attacking troops.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
4
CPYRGHT
Ap
proveiffdayRtilesese2000J08I,09saieliANRONIMOMR000)300a9.00613-3f en-
circling troops as in the past when there was the consecutive execution
of missions such as the penetration of the defense, the exploitation of
the breakthrough with mobile troops to create conditions for encircle-
ment, the creation of interior and exterior fronts of encirclement, and
the annihilation of encircled troops. Considerable time was needed to
carry out these missions. In the L'vov-Sandomir Operation, for example,
the breakthrough, exploitation of the attack, and the encirclement of
the Brody grouping of German fascist troops required seven days and
their annihilation took five days; in the KorsuW-Shevehenkovskiy
Operation the execution of these missions required 11 and 14 days
respectively. In certain other operations the encirclement and annihila-
tion of groupings took even longer. In the Battle of the Volga, for
instance, it took more than 70 days.
Today there can be no talk of such periods of time for the en-
circlement and annihilation of defending troops. An encircled grouping;
is capable of quickly organizing a strong defense, preparing various
types of obstacles on the operational axes of attacking troops, and
creating strong reserves for resisting encirclement. Possessing nuclear
weapons and high maneuverability, the defending side can in a short time
reinforce an encircled grouping, employ decisive actions against the
flanks of attacking soyedineniya, and withdraw the main forces from the
endangered area before encirclement is completed.
This does not mean that under modern conditions such enemy groupings
can not be encircled and destroyed. It only requires attacking troops
to take measures to prevent the enemy from employing nuclear weapons
and putting up organized resistance.
The necessity for rapid encirclement and annihilation of groupings
of defending troops will be dictated by the fact that to achieve the
objectives of an operation it is important that the attacking force
does not tie up considerable forces and means of the ob'yedineniya
(or soyedineniya) and deprin them of opportunities to swiftly develop
the advance in depth. Therefore, the encirclement and annihilation
of troops will be accomplished in a limited period of time. To do
this the attacking force must obviously have the required forces and
means.
The basis of actions for the encirclement and annihilation of
def,uding groupings is the use of nuclear weapons and a swift attack
from several directions. These actions will be organized in a way that
will deprive the enemy of opportunities to use nuclear weapons, that
will rot give it time to prepare organized resistance, and that will not
slow down the execution of the main missions of the offensive operation.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
48
Approve
PYRGHT
?
Approve
d For Re34srglantaibtil.tC*4_3PEKTI AIN ./Tilkow3is the destruc-
tion o nue ear weapon 0
s; s execu on AT .etermine the success of
the encirclement and annihilation of defending troops. This battle must
be directed not only against the nuclear means of the grouping being
encircled, but to an even greater degree against means located on the
edges of the encircled area, since the main forces of aviation and
operational-tactical rocket troops, capable of rendering the most deter-
mined resistance to troops executing an encirclement maneuver, may be
situated there. Rocket troops, aviation, artillery, airborne troops,
and various detachments of tank and motorized rifle troops can be used
in this battle. The swift actions of encircling troops must also be
considered an effective means of combat.
A very characteristic feature is the simultaneity of the encircle-
ment and the annihilation of defending troops. Strikes for breaking up
and annihilating the grouping being encircled will take place during
encirclement maneuvers, without waiting until the encirclement has been
completed, i.e., until all withdrawal routes have been cut off.
However, to prevent the grouping being encircled from breaking out
of the encirclement, the attacking force will try to deliver salient
thrusts in the directions of the probable withdrawal routes of the
defending soyedineniya. Nuclear weapons may also be used against these
routes and against units withdrawing on thcm to create zones of radio-
active contamination and destruction. Attacking troops will either
by-pass these zones or, if the level of radioactivity has decreased to
a safe level, negotiate them.
Airborne troops may be used to capture important road junctions,
river crossing, and passes in the directions of the withdrawal of the
grouping being encircled and for combat with approaching reserves or
support of rapidly advancing troops in the rear area of the grouping.
Under modern conditions, when the attacking force possesses the
required number of nuclear weapons, the encirclement and annihilation
of defending troops can be accomplished with fewer ground troops soye-
dineniyn then there are in the grouping being encircled. For example,
in the opinion of the West German Command, the over-all superiority in
forces and means needed for encirclement can be achieved with a super
iority only in nuclear weapons and with equal (or even fewer forces
in the ground troops. A shortage of ground troops soyedineniya can
be offset by wide maneuvers of armored forces and artillery and rocket
fire supporting decisive actions of troops during envelopments with
the objective of encircling the enemy (E. Middel'dorf. Tactics Manual).
If the attacking troops do not have a superiority in nuclear
weapons, they naturally must use more forces and conventional means or
el FM- iiefas?1666/6/N6 :tdik-Af5Pgittitrelge1662?0WAY63g3
CPYRGHT
Ai
Pr?v"iN9OfNPAPELPE/PRutriAtiAIYAWIR44;16NYLWOVNAIVY44741
, import-
ant that troops have the hbility to quickly locate the main enemy objec-
tives and forestall the enemy in delivering accurate strikes with nuclear
and conventional weapons. This will contribute to the accomplishment
of the operation's objectives.
When the attacking force has little nuclear ammunition, the grouping
being encircled can be broken up only in certain directions by an
attack by part of the forces from the front with the simultaneous envelop-
ment of the entire grouping. If the attacking force has the necessary
amount of nuclear ammunition, the grouping does not have to be broken
up by thrusts of ground troops. Annihilation will be accomplished solely
by nuclear and conventional weapons.
The efforts of ground troops soyedineniya during encirclement of
defending groupings will most often be directed more toward the deep
envelopment of the grouping than toward its immediate annihilation.
The number and directions of thrusts during the encirclement and
breaking-up of a grouping will depend on the objectives of the operation,
the missions, forces and means of the attacking units, the capabilities
and nature of the defense, and terrain conditions. Envelopment groupings
capable of delivering two or more thrusts in the appropriate directions
may be created to break up and annihilate the troops being encircled.
These thrusts will usually be, in essence, a continuation of the
development of a swift attack to accomplish the main missions of an
operation.
In the opinion of West German military theoreticians, the number
and composition of strike groupings will be determined primarily by the
amount of nuclear ammunition which the operational command has at its
disposal. Considerably fewer forces and means of ground troops will be
needed when there is a concentrated employment of nuclear weapons then
when missions are carried out with conventional means (Wehrkunde,
March 1959).
Conditions for the encirclement of defending troops may arise simul-
taneously in several directions. In this case the attacking operational
ob'yedinenlya, if it has sufficient forces and means, will accomplish
the destruction of the groupings simultaneously in all directions. If
the forces and means are not sufficient for this, the main efforts of
the attaCeing troops will first be directed against the main grouping
and then against other groupings with the objective of completing their
destruction.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
50
?
Approved
CPYRGHT
Approved
ForRe1164d12000/08101CIARDPOSTOOSIZA9003010090011t31-13n, etc., on one
of the flanks of the soyedineniya being encircled, a thrust may he
delivered and developed in the direction of the natural barrier. In
this type of action there will naturally be a deeper distribution of
forces and means, providing the possibility of gradually increasing the
strength of the thrust in depth.
During the encirclement and annihilation of a grouping of defending
troops on a coast line, a naval blockade may be organized. The blockade
is usually formed by aviation and submarine forces, and sometimes sur-
face ships and coastal rocket and artillery units. Their efforts are
directed toward annihilating rocket-armed and aviation forces, putting
naval bases and ports out of operation, and preventing the evacuation
of encircled troops by sea. In certain cases mines will be laid in the
ports and bases located on the coast line being blockaded, on the
approaches to them, and on the routes of transport means and combat ships
of the defense.
During combat actions to encircle and annihilate defending groupings,
the defense is capable of delivering strong counterthrusts against the
flanks of the soyedineniya making the encirclement maneuver. To break
up these counterthrusts systematic nuclear strikes can be delivered
againist the defending force's means of nuclear attack and his groupings
of ground troops in their initial assembly areas and shifts. Strikes
can also be delivered against the home bases of troop transport air-
craft. Conventional means of destruction, especially aircraft, are also
used for these missions.
Counterthrusts can also be thwarted by swift attacks. If the attack-
ing forces are unable to break up a counterthrust while it is being
prepared, they can disrupt it in a head-on encounter or repel it with
part of the forces while the main forces are simultaneously carrying
out missions connected with the encirclement and annihilation of group-
ings of defending troops.
In certain cases defending troops may employ weapons of mass destruc-
tion and deliver a counterthrust against troops developing the attack in
an attempt to break out of the blockade. The clash between the attacking
forces and troops attempting to break out of the blockade may develop
into large tank battles. In this case the combat actions of both sides
will become extremely intense.
Obviously, the greatest success in defeating groupings which are
attempting to break out of a blockade is achieved only if the attacking
forces forestall the defending forces in the employment of nuclear wea-
pons and if they are able to use the results of these strikes for a
swift advance into the depths of the enemy territory. This characteristic
Fopp6k0a?eignegyfficppliNcypesrpocAtRvuosvo091)0334z the destruction
of these groupings, but also the swift annihilation of the encircled
troops.
cl
App
CPYRGHT
roved Efflitlae4009/Qal1gtialArlar-243#5M03/ARRMOODEHNI318.11 have
a special place in modern actions for the encirclement and annihilation
of troops.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
52
Approved For Release 2
CPYRGHT
413/0WITAIRCIPM130875P.08
AND ANTIROCKST DEFENSE
01:
asoomBAFT
by Cole I. ZHELTIKOV and V. IGOLKIN
The use of' military aircraft placed the air on the level of the
earth and sea in the arena of intense combat operations in war. Air-
craft, dirigibles, and balloons were sent into the air for recon-
naissance and to be used against enemy troops in World War I. As the
aircraft fleet grew quantitatively and qualitatively and the combat
capabilities of aircraft were increased, the problem of organizing a
defense against aerial attack and the problem of antiaircraft defense
became more complicated. The first attempts by the belligerent states
to use firearms and artillery weapons for this purpose did not produce
positive results. Urgent measures were undertaken to develop special
combat means; antiaircraft artillery and machine guns, barrage balloons,
and fighter aircraft as well as special equipment for systems of aerial
observation, warning, and communications.
An unprecedented competition between the means of aerial attack and
antiaircraft defense occurred in the period between the two world wars.
In a comparatively short time, systems for defending against enemy
aerial attack in many countries acquired a structural organization which
included means of combating an aerial enemy, expansive nets of observa-
tion posts for detecting aerial targets, and fully reliable means of
communications. The later development of radar greatly increased the
range at which aerial targets could be detected, allowed control to be
exercised over the interception and destruction of aerial targets, and
led to a much more effective use of active air defense means, anti-
aircraft artillery, and fighter aviation.
With the development of a nuclear bomb as a weapon of aviation, the
capabilities of bombers grew enormously and the destruction of aircraft
carrying these weapons became the paramount task of air defense. The
search for new and more effective means of combating an aerial enemy
became a problem of state importance. The use of rocket weapons or,
more precisely, surface-to-air-guided rockets as one means of combatting
an aerial enemy was widely recognized by the military specialists of
many countries. Achievements in the development of radioelectronic
equipment prior to this time permitted the development of systems for
guiding and controlling surface-to-air rockets which caused them to be
highly effective.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
53
CPYRGHT
roved FohdRelegeeftialla/WitOikcrGIATECIR8SIODWARONNOW00.a.41 the wide
use of rocket equipment took on the aspects of crash programs in many
countries of the world in the postwar period. Many different types of
surface-to-air rocket systems intended for antiaircraft defense appeared
in the most developed countries. Especially great attention was paid
to this problem in the US, England, France, and the other countries of
the aggressive North Atlantic bloc. As they prepare for a third world
war, the ruling circles of these countries are attempting to equip their
armed forces with the most modern means of combatting aerial targets.
Series production of the Nike-Ajax surface-to-air guided rocket,
designed to hit piloted aircraft and cruise missiles, was begun in the
US in 1953. The maximum speed of this rocket is twice the speed of
sound, its effective altitude is 18 kilometers, and its range is
approximately 40 kilometers.
As the result of modifications and further perfections of the Nike-
Ajax rocket, the Nike-Hercules surface-to-air guided rocket became
operational in 1957. This rocket had half agains as much speed as the
Nike-Ajax, its effective altitude was increased by more than 60 percent,
and its slant range was increased by a factor of 4. One advantage of
the second rocket is that the system of ground fire control was
supplemented by homing apparatus on board the rocket which greatly in-
creased its capabilities for hitting targets and maneuvering. The Nike-
Hercules surface-to-air rocket can be armed with a nuclear warhead.
At the beginning of 1959 the Bomark surface-to-air rocket was added
to the surface-to-air guided rocket arsenal of the US. The Bomark-B,
a subsequent modification, has an altitude capability of 24 kilometers
and a range of over 600 kilometers. The Nike-Ajax, Nike-Hercules, and
Bomark surface-to-air guided rockets became basic weapons for the anti-
aircraft defense of large regions containing important installations
and of troops and their rear areas. After these rockets were opera-
tionally deployed among air defense forces, some foreign military
specialists began to assert that the problem of destroying aircraft in
flight had been fully solved. However, it was soon discovered that the
new rocket weapons of the air defense were not able to combat against
low flying targets. Great efforts had to be applied in the US to the
development of the Hawk surface-to-air guided rocket to solve this
problem. In the last few years, this surface-to-air rocket has been
widely accepted in the armed forces of many countries in the North
Atlantic bloc: West Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Norway,
and Greece.
Strenuous efforts were undertaken to construct surface-to-air
rockets in the armed forces of England and France. In England the Blood-
hound and Thunderbird surface-to-air rockets were developed and made
operational. The Parca, Mnsurca, and Matra surface-to-air rockets of
rovednffarrReleage 2608/01/?41461AIRDEMIfiTe0.087611t?013000,12811314-ent types
of surface-to-air guided rockets were either operational or in stages
511.
Approv
CPYRGH
Approv
c 0
Arciagigtehta?g:ICIAIACY00/868/11Y0p6061900i1er capitalist
_ countries. er owever some o hese projec s were canceled when it
became necessary to find solutions to problems connected with the
development of an antirocket defense and the reduction of the role of
piloted means of attack. Thus, surface-to-air guided rockets designed
to destroy aircraft and other targets at long and short ranges and also
surface-to-air guided rockets for combatting aerial targets at low
altitudes are in the arsenal of the air defense of many countries.
The acceptance of surface-to-air guided rockets in air defense
troops signified the great qualitative jump in the development of anti-
aircraft defense. In comparison with antiaircraft artillery, the new
weapon has greatly improved qualitative characteristics. Speed is
chief among them. A surface-to-air guided rocket is launched into space
3-4 times as fast as an antiaircraft artillery shell. An antiaircraft
artillery shell is fired at the target by leading the target with cal-
culation of its speed and altitude as well as weather conditions, which
unavoidably leads to large errors, since a multitude of factors are not
taken into consideration. Also if the target maneuvers slightly or
there are small mistakes in sighting, it is not possible to correct the
trajectory of the shell after it is fired. The use of ground control
systems and guidance systems on board surface-bo-air rockets has
corrected this basic shortcoming and has made it possible to achieve
very high accuracy for hitting targets.
The great power of the warhead which may be carried by a surface-
to-air guided rocket also is a very important factor in the effective-
ness of this new weapon of antiaircraft defense.
With the availability of surface-to-air rocket weapons and the
perfection of the means for detection, control, and guidance, anti-
aircraft defense became more effective, reliable, and difficult to
overcome while aviation, which is still preserved as a means of attack,
had to search for new methods of surmounting modern air defense. There-
fore flight at lower altitudes where the capabilities of air defense
weapons are greatly decreased were practiced abroad, radio interference
means were established to interfere with the operation of ground and air-
borne radar and guidance systems, and the use of air-to-surface rockets
which can be launched from outside of the effective zone of surface-to-
air rocket weapon was begun.
Piloted fighter-inter.2eptors are presently the second most important
means of combatting aerial targets. Significant increases in the speed
and rate of climb of fighter aircraft, the replacement of cannon and
machine guns with air-to-air guided rockets, and the installation of
radiotelemetry means for control have imparted new qualities to air
defense fighter aircraft and transformed them, so to speak, into flying
d 1elaililidik1tIVUA-RT15P8tefgettgo6rod6666M-iighter
55
FDD TRANS rove
OIJRNAI, VOYEINAYA
/APIZIi, 1965
avidWKRYWAFabiNgenARRR Pt' cAAPEMTPR. ? ? com a ng
rocket-armed bombers on distant approaches to defended territories, for
protecting areas which do not contain surface-to-air rocket positions,
and for reinforcing the air defense of areas during large aircraft
attacks against installations or groups of installations. The produc-
tion of an ever larger quantity of surface-to-air rockets, their con-
stant perfection, and the equipping of air defense chasti and soyedineniya
with this weapon as well as the increased capabilities of fighter avia-
tion have greatly increased the effectiveness of antiaircraft defense
and have caused an evolution of new conditions for waging armed battle
in the air.
However, the effective use of surface-to-air rocket weapons and
fighter aircraft is unthinkable without the timely detection of aerial
targets. Therefore intensive research in the development of perfected
systems for detecting aerial targets and controlling the forces and
means of air defense have been carried on for many years. Radar equip-
ment has been greatly developed in the post war years. The range for
detecting aerial targets has been increased approximately 100 percent,
the precision with which coordinates can be determined has been made
much more exact, and, due to the employment of automated systems, the
speed of transmitting and processing data, evaluating situations, and
controlling the ioi.:es and means of air defense has been greatly ac- '
celerated.
In many highly developed countries complex automated systems of
antiaircraft defense using rocket equipment and radio electronics have
been developed which permit the timely detection-of aerial targets and
the transmission of data to control points, rocket firing complexes,
and fighter aviation chasti. Electronic computers and other means of
automation are widely used in systems for controlling forces and
weapons.
As the means of antiaircraft defense were perfected it became
derious to uuify the air defense systems of several countries. For
example, in 1958 the US and Canada developed a combined air defense
system for the North American continent called Norad which allowed them
to centralize the control and coordinate the combat operations of the
air defense weapons of both countries and to maneuver these weapons
widely to concentrate main forces on threatened areas and distant ap-
proaches to their territory.
Then the US initiated the development of a combined air defense
system for the European countries of NATO. This system is closely co-
ordinated with the combined air defense system of the North American
continent. These measures allowed the US to advance its boundaries for
detection and interception a great distance from its own territory and
to provide earlier warning to prepare its strategic forces and air
defense systems for operation.
'SS OT-111
?
CE)YRGI-
ARRY01FAregetWgi;ORMAP440gRAR8N410 7ARPADMPAPCSRMan
continent is exercised by means of the Sage semiautomated system and
the Missile Master and Birdy systems for the fire control of surface-to-
air rocket batteries. In the Sage system information on the aerial situa-
tion is processed and data is worked out for making decisions and guiding
fighter-interceptors and Bomark surface-to-air rockets automatically by
means of electronic computers. The Missile Master and Birdy systems co-
ordinate the fire of several Hawk batteries using the same principles of
processing data and transmitting them to podrazdeleniya as are employed
in the Sage system.
The development of a combined air defense system for the European
countries of NATO was begun in January 1956 when a single coordinated
system was introduced in the NATO countries. According to a statement
by General Norstad, the former supreme commander in chief of the combined
forces of NATO in Europe, the European line for long-range detection was
developed in 1958 because the earlier long-range detection system had
many windows through which attacking aircraft could penetrate without
difficulty.
The final decision on the organization of a combined air defense
system for the European countries of NATO was made in December 1960 at
a regular meeting of the NATO council. Presently this system which is
operationally subordinate to the supreme commander-in-chief of the armed
forces of NATO consists of the air defense forces and means of all the
European countries of NATO with the exception of Portugal and part of
France.
It must be noted that along with the organizational development of
a combined air defense system in the aggressive NATO bloc, France and
other countries of Western Europe have their awn systems equipped with
modern means of detection, surface-to-air guided rockets, and modern
fighter-interceptors. US firms which specialize in the production of
various types of weapons have supplied these countries with different
equipment and even whole systems for complex use. For example, a single
automated system for controlling the air defense forces and tactical
aviation was developed with the aid of the US. With the establishment
of a unified system, limited complexes for automated control were intro-
duced in individual air defense zones and regions to centralize all air
defense forces and shorten the time needed for deriving and processing
data, making decisions for combat operations, and controlling all air
defense forces in a given area. Thus, the installation and testing of
a US automated system for controlling air defense is being completed
in West Germany and a radioelectronic complex for the automation of
target interceptions has been developed in England. Similar complexes
are being developed and produced in other European countries.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 ? CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
As they conduct comprehensivve analysis of the combat effectiveness
of various active air defensive means, the military and political
leaders of the Western countries are devoting much attention to the develop-
ment of surface-to-air guided rockets, but they are not forgetting about
fighter aviation although certain theoreticians attribute a much less
important role to it.
The development of active air defense means has caused opinions to
be changed concerning the deployment of air defense systems. Presently
the military leaders of the leading countries of the capitalist world
are not satisfied with the deployment of rocket complexes around large
individual installations and the use of these weapons to protect import-
ant strategic areas on the basis of theaters of military operations.
Surface-to-air rocket complexes are being deployed for the protection
of whole military and industrial areas and individual states.
The development of ballistic rockets imparted a qualitative jump
to the development )f the means of waging armed warfare. At first the
destruction of this formidable weapon was possible only when it was on
the ground prior to being launched. Thus, before the problem of combat-
ing aircraft had been fully solved, air defense was faced with the new
and still more serious problem of defending against ballistic rockets.
This problem became especially acute in the postwar period which
was marked by the rapid development of various types of rocket weapons
for various purposes. The flight range of ballistic rockets and their
capability to rIeliver ever more powerful nuclear charges were constantly
increased.
The problem of antirocket defense and primarily of eombating stra-
tegic rockets which threateL the interior areas of status and the
vitality of large installations, communications, and the civilian popu-
lation have acquired paramount strategic importance. The solution of
this problem is an exceedingly complex technical task which is com-
plicated by the special tactical and technical characteristics of
strategic ballistic rockets. These include primarily the great speed
of their flight which is more than ten times greater than the speed of
modern fighter aircraft, the huge altitude of their flight trajectory,
the probability of a simultaneous attack by a large number of rockets,
their small size and very durable warheads, and the possibility of the
use of decoy targets and radar interference to complicate the execution
of the assignments of antirocket defense.
All the achievements of science and technology have been mobilized,
huge amounts of money spent, and newer projects begun to solve the
problem of antirocket defense abroad.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
8
e capi wor d, the most expensive
program for the investigation of problems connected with the develop-
ment of an antirocket defense sptem is being carried out in the US.
This program has received the designation of Defender. It includes more
than 50 different projects. In this program investigations are planned
of the phenomena connected with the peculiarities of the flight of inter-
continental ballistic rockets over their whole trajectory. The results
of these investigations may be used to develop methods for intercepting
these rockets on any portion of their trajectory and to solve problems
connected with the detection and identification of rockets and the
guidance of antirocket rockets.
The Defender program is planned for a long period of time, from 15-
20 years. 128 million dollars were assigned to this program in the
1964 budget. In the opinion of US specialists it will aid in the rapid
development of a new antirocket system, the Nike-X, which is supposed
to replace the Nike-Zeus system which is presently being tested. At
the same time that scientific research work is being conducted in the
Defender program, the military and political leaders of the US are
speeding up the completion of individual projects. In the development
of an antirocket defense much attention is presently being concentrated.
on two areas considered extremely important by the US: the development
of antirocket rockets and the development and implementation of a system
to provide early warning of rocket attack by using radar and satellites
for long-range detection.
In the opinion of US specialists and early warning system must
permit the air defense command to be notified of a rocket attack in
time to enable them to prepare the antirocket defense system for
operation which includes the pr-Taration of the antirocket rockets
themselves for lauliching, the processing of necessary data and calcula-
tions, and the launch and guidance of antirocket rockets to destroy .
ballistic rockets.
The problem of providing early warning of rocket attack is being
coped with in the US by deploying powerful radar sites and systems to
provide long-range detection of ballistic rockets.
One such system called the BMEWS has alreacLy been developed. Acco.rd-
ing to US specialists this systems provides the US command with a 15-
minute warning of rocket attack if the attack is from the north. This
system is composed of three radar posts situated in Clear, Alaska; Tule,
Greenland; and Filingdales Moor in England. MEWS posts carry out air
and space surveillance at ranges greater than 5,000 kilometers. Besides
radars they have electronic computers to determine the parameters of
rocket trajectories, including the launch and impact points, and means
of communication, The US has similar radar complexes with shorter
effective ranges in the Aleutian Islands, Turkey, Canada, Puerto Rico,
and the us.
UU uuU Ill-Ill
con nuous 'ev- .opmen o make weapons has mase t necessary
to further improve systems for detecting and tracking rockets. For
example, when powerful global rockets appeared US scientists worked
out and built radar stations to detect rocket attacks from different
directions. The experimental Teepee is one such station. It uses re-
peated signal reflections from the ionosphere and the earth's surface.
This station allegedly allows rockets to be detected immediately after
they are launched, which increases the warning time from 15 to 25-30
minutes.
.111100 OT-111 III I ill I
The experimental Madre station is similar to the Teepee, but has a
longer range. To increase the effectiveness of the BNEWS system,
suggestions have been made to supplement the operation of this system
with superlong-range detection satellites launched by rockets and with
special patrol aircraft. A special system called Caesar is being
eveloped in the US to detect rocket-armed submarines. It uses packets
containing sonar equipment which are submerged in tlle ocean along the
shoreline and connected by cables to posts on shore. It is assumed
that the rockets which are launched from zubmarines will be detected by
means of the latest radar stations on the mainland.
A unified system for the control and surveillance of air and space
called Spadats has been developed and made operational for the Norad
command in the last few years. The BNEWS system and all military systems
for ccatrol and surveillance of space are included in the Spadats system.
Data on the space situation is supplied from the elements of this system
and all posts and systems of civilian departments and organtAtions to
the Spadats system center where they are processed, portrayed on a special
tableau, and transmitted to the Norad command post.
When a target is detected it must be confirmed that it is a rocket
warhead and not a decoy target or another space object of no military
Importance. Only then can it be intercepted by means of an antirocket
rocket. Until now this has been the concept of the antirocket defense
system of US military specialists.
As an example we shall discuss the US development of the Nike-Zeus
system which is presently a basis for subsequent modification of anti-
rocket defense. This is an intricate firing complex composed of anti-
rocket rockets and radar stations for detecting, tracking, and identifying
targets, and also intercept-computing apparatus which prepares data for
launching antirocket rockets and operating launchers and guidance equip-
ment. After the plans which were begun in 1956 were worked out, extensive
design and test work was done, and an experimental model was developed.
In 1962 the US began composite testing of the Nike-Zeus system.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
60
S ? Y is; ej. 41PI g
is
` 111,11, - I iagigig -1p
nta-
tives of the military and political leadrirship and US specialists on
questions concerniag the development of an antirocket defense. The fate
of the Nike-Zeus program has been repeatedly discussed in higher US
departments, in particular at meetings of various Congressional
committees and in the Pentagon. The costs connected with the implementa-
tion of this program have caused much uneasiness in the USA. According
to preliminary calculations it would cost 13-15 billion dollars to
deploy an antirocket defense based on the Nike-Zeus system. Many
specialists and influential people in the US have spoken against the
production of this system believing it to be questionable, unreliable
and ineffective. The absence of actual possibilities for the successful
solution of the problem of developing an antirocket defense has irritated
the US Army command responsible for the completion of the project.
Leaders of the US Department of Defense have declared many times that
they are planning to stop work on the Nike-Zeus system. 'However, since
no other antirocket rocket is practical at this time in the US, means
for continuing its testing were again given in 1964.
According to data from the US press, 10 successful interceptions of
Atlas and Titan ballistic rocket warheads were executed during tests of
the Nike-Zeus system. The rockets were launched from Vandenberg Air
Force Base on the US mainland across Kwajalein Island in the Pacific
Ocean where experimental antirocket defense installations were located.
However, it must be remembered that these results were achieved in test
conditions when the scientific and technical personnel who were opera-
ting the experimental antirocket Lquipment had prior knowledge of the
Atlas ballistic rocket launch point and the parameters and direction of
the rocket trajectory and the time of the launch were known.
In regard to these tests, US Minister of Defense McNamara declared
In Congress, "these tests have shown that the Nike-Zeus antirocket
system can detect and destroy approaching ballistic rocket warheads,
but they have not shown and cannot show that the Nike-Zeus system in its
present form can effectively protect our cities from mass attacks." (New
York Times, 10 November 1963). Therefore, in spite of the results
achieved in testing, the US Department of Defense decided not to begin
series production of the Nike-Zeus antirocket defense syst,..m.
As the specialists of western countries have noted, there are many
reasons for the lack of success in the development of an effective
antirocket defense system capable of destroying intercontinental
ballistic rockets at great distances from defended installations, for
which purpose the Nike-Zeus complex was intended. Primary among these
reasons are the difficulties associated with discriminating between
real and decoy targets, the unwieldiness and imperfection of systems
for detecting, tracking, and guiding antirocket rockets to targets, the
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :&IA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
impoNiAltddte0 Eardileteate8200010.8109entabtoROP85t140816R130nooletto03-3
large costs. Convinced of their failure to develop the Nike-Zeus
antirocket defense system, the military and political leadership of
the US advanced new concepts for solving this problem. The essence of
these new trends is found in the desire to develop a mixed firing comr-
plex such as the Nike-X to successfully combat intercontinental rockets
with the Nike-Zeus antiroeket rocket and a new antirocket rocket, the
Sprint. Plans call for the Sprint antirocket rocket to hit targets at
altitudes of 30-50 kilometers and the Nike-Zeus at altitudes of 100-
160 kilometers.
The development of powerful boosters is planned for the Sprint
antirocket rocket to give it great speed and premit it to meet a
target in 4-5 seconds. The development of a single multitarget radar
is also planned. This radar is to have a high resolution capability
and thus is supposed to fulfill the follwring requirements: target
detection, target tracking, and guidance of the antirocket rocket to the
target.
Since the altitude where the Sprint antirocket meets its target is
very low, the rocket is aCknowledged to be useful only in the defense
of protected installation such as rocket bases, control points, and
certain military industrial installations. Thus, a tendency can be
determined in the US to 'first protect individual important installations
and then to develop an antirocket defense system to protect areas or
all the territory of the nation when the level of science and technology
and the budget make it possible. As work on the development of an anti-
rocket rocket goes on, the problem of selecting effective warheads for
it are widely discussed in the western press. It is noted that the
most promising method of defending against intercontiuental ballistic
rockets is the formation of a prohibitive barrier such as the shock,
heat, or neutron waves from nuclear charges exploded in front of the
rocket.
To speed up the development of an antirocket defense system, the
military and political leadership of the imperialist states are en-
listing huge scienttPic effort and financial means, drawing many
military and civilian organizations into the development of projects;
and distributing responsibilities among departments. For example,
in the US responsibility for working out the problems associated with
the development of an antirocket defense system is apportioned to many
organizations. The Department of the Army conducts tests of the Nike-
Zeus system and is developing the Nike-X system and also antiaircraft
and antirocket defense means for field armies. The Department of the
Air Force is responsible for the development and construction of systems
to provide early warning of the launch of intercontinental ballistic
Approved For Release 2000/08/9 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO63'6M03-3
CPYRG
AppxevecbFctrfReclense 2009110/0@heChARREMPQ87?FNAPPANM-4e -
search for means of naval antirocket defense and is working to broaden
its capabilities in submarine warfare as it searches for methods to
prohibit an enemy from employing his submarine-launched ballistic
rockets. Responsibility for working out possible means of combating
ballistic rockets and satellites is entrusted to the Advanced Research
Projects Agency. Also, many civilian scientific research organiza-
tions and private firms are involved in solving antirocket defense
problems.
The search for means and methods of antirocket defense are re-
ceiving much attention in the countries of Western Europe which are
taking part in the North Atlantic bloc. Various aspects of the prob-
lem are considered in the press. For example, the English press has
devoted space to the seriousness of their situation in connection with
the development of strategic rockets. One specialist on rocket tech-
nology U. T. Hanston wrote that "Great Britian is exceptionally vul-
nerable if these weapons are employed because of our geographic position"
(which to tell the truth is sufficiently well known) and because of the
large population density of our island and its strategic importance.
Actually we are the only people who have endured the prolonged effects
of this weapon and we endured only because nuclear weapons had not ap-
peared at that time." (Brassey's Annual the Armed Forces Year-Book;
1957).
England's lack of a practical means of antirocket defense have
caused much apprehension there over the consequences of a nuclear rocket
war.
Having an insufficiently developed scientific, technical, and experi-
mental base, English scientists and specialists are carrying out certain
work for the development of an antirocket defense system jointly with
the US. Evidently to emphasize the fruitfulness of the alliance and to
boost public opinion, a scientific observer of the English newspaper
Daily Express wrote in 1960 that English and US scientists had achieved
remarkable progress by developing a new electronic defense against
rockets which carry hydrogen bombs. It operates on a principle which
causes the rocket to deviate from its fourse by influencing its electronic
brain immediately after launeh. Then a new plan for an antirocket de-
fense system appeared in England, evidently developed jointly with the
US. The same Daily Express wrote that the US "had achieved great success
in the development of missiles which would bring about a revolution in
antirocket defense equipment." As indicated, these new missiles would
operate according to a signal from a large radar screen in a system for
the long-range interception of ballistic rockets. It has been proposed
that a base for antirocket defense will be situated in England, in East
Yorkshire. The antirocket missiles would be launched in large salvos to
an altitude of 20-25 miles to meet rockets in flight. Each missile would
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :1A-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
CPYRGHT
geo or-, elaW4.4 - g g7 g g 7' TANK 717,74 ?4111 r 111g11 f
bezt- _ . - ? - ? ? ;red-
homing warheads. It was pointed out in the article that England had taken
part in the development of these weapons.
A more realistic evaluation of the development of an antirocket
defense system was given by the English newspaper Liverpool Daily Post.
It pointed out that the process of intercepting an intercontinental
ballistic missile had not yet been studied completely, but that it was
clear at that time that the antirocket rocket had to be considered the
only means for hitting a ballistic rocket. An intercontinental bal-
listic rocket is invulnerable because of its high speed which reaches
15,000 miles per hour.
In the opinion of many foreign specialists who have soberly evaluated
the level of development of various projects, an effective means of com-
bating ballistic rockets has not yet been developed in the capitalist
world. To intercept the warheads of strategic ballistic rockets is a
very difficult problem. That which has been accomplished toward the
solution of this problem in such countries of the capitalist world as
the US answers only the questions of yesterday. The Nike-Zeus system
was developed to combat ordinary intercontinental ballistic rockets
without calculation of subsequent developments of rocket technology.
Although the US has proposed the development of passive and active
interference, the application of special coverings fpr warheads to
absorb radar signals, the ejection of decoy targets by rockets, and the
use of special interference transmitters for jamming; they have not been
able to solve the problem of repelling a large-scale rocket attack with
the Nike-Zeus system. The developers of this antirocket defense system
did not consider the possibility of the development of powerful global
rockets and special space ships.
Lately it has openly been acknowledged in the US press that neither
the US nor its allies in the aggressive bloc have yet developed an anti-
rocket defense. Specialists of the US and western Europe claim that
more or less effective antirocket defense systems may be developed in
the future, but will require no less than 5 years. These opinions
have caused consternation and skepticism even among the highest members
of the defense department. For example, Secretary of Defense McNamara
once declared that the Pentagon did not have even reasonable prospects
for the development of an effective antirocket defense (New York Herald
Tribune, 12 March 1962).
Soberly evaluating the international situation and the possibilities
of attempts by the aggressive circles of the imperialist countries to
unleash a nuclear and rocket war, the Communist Party and Soviet Govern-
ment are paying exceedingly great attcntion to strengthening the de-
fensive capabilities of our socialist motherland, including the
development of effective means of combating aircraft and rockets.
Approved For Release 2000/08/a: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
ApprAtrcl EMP1e1elPS682600F0,810,9D9161W-IT19#815t66873514804:490WOOt081611
and testing work has been widely carried out to develop means to permit
the detection and destruction of an enemy in the air and near-space.
This work has permitted the solution to very important problems con-
cerning the reliable defense of our native land not only from aircraft,
but from various types of rockets.
' CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :6(51A-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
Approved Foniaga
CPYRGHT
by Col M. KIWYAN
TI3E875R000300090003-3
At plesent no one doubts that militard.-scientific work has become
an important factor, which makes it possible to determine correctly the
course of development of the Armed Forces, their branches, and combat
arms, and to find the most expedient methods of their combat use in
battle and operation, depending on the character of a future war.
Experience has shown that among the many forms of military-scienti-
fic work, military science (scientific-technical) conferences rightfully
occupy a leading position. In recent years such conferences have been
conducted widely at all levels of the Armed Forces, their branches, and
combat arms, and have covered the most diverse topics of a strategic,
operational, and military technical nature. In contrast to former
years, when military-scientific organs had the principal organizational
role in preparing and conducting military science conferences, this work
is now done with the participation of many generals and officers of
troops and staffs.
The wide scope of military science conferences, and the mass parti-
cipation of generals and officers who have extensive experience in wovk-
ing with troops and are well versed in military-scientific work, made it
necessary to find new methods of organizing and conducting these con-
ferences. The search for new methods of conducting conferences also
became necessary because they involve the discussion of scientific pro-
blems concerned not only with operational-tactical, but also with
military-technical matters. (For this reason the participants in the
conferences represent a variety of specialties.) Therefore, it is
necessary to use such forms of organizing and conducting conferences
which would benefit all participants, and yould enable them to make their
contribution to a solution of the general problem discussed at a con-
ference.
In this article we would like to express some ideas about military
science conferences in general and about methods of organizing and
conducting them.
First of all, we would like to say that our Armed Forces began to
conduct military science conferences immediately after the Civil War.
This was a worthwhile undertaking, which furthered the development of
the new Soviet militar7 art. Although conferences were conducted
rather infrequedtly d.Lng the first few years and the methods of organ-
izing and conducting them were far from perfect, they nevertheless served
a useful purpose. The most urgent problems of structuring the new Soviet
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
CPYRGHT
AITAiblikoved yFokuRoleftsie21360/081138vCIPARDPUTOO8V151k000,311090904103r3
operational art, tactico, and other problems, were discussed at those
confere,-.es. The characteristic features of the first conferences were
wide representation and free exchange of opinions.
During the period of the Stalin personality cult, the number of
military science conferences was reduced, representation wan more res-
tricted, and freedom of creative discussion was practically nonexistent.
A bold discussion of innovations gradually became unknown. It was
replaced more and more by eulogies nf Stalin's statenents, and at best,
by timid attempts to elucidate them. Uradually the conferences lost
their meaning as a forum for the constructive d'velopment of problems of
military theory.
All this had to be overcome by military (and not only military)
thought during the long prewar and postwar periods. It is true, after
the Great Patriotic War attempts were made in a number of military
districts to conduct military science conferencwi; however, they were
not distinguished by a constructive appr,ot.,:h or by truly scientific
results. Only after the 20th Party Congress, when the personality cult
had been discredited and a mass movement for the elimination of Ito
effects had begun, the former beat traditions of military-scientific
work, and particularly conferences, i.e., traditions of free, creative
discussion, were gradually restored.
Particular attention to military-scientific work, and especially to
military science conferences, was given as soon as nuclear weapons and
other types of modern combat equipment were developed. This was en-
tirely logical, since an unprecedented, revolutionary "jump" had been
made in all spheres of military affairs, resulting in :.adical changes in
combat equipment; organization of Armed Forces, their branches, and
combat arms; and in forms and methods of conducting a battle, an opera-
tion, or a war in general.
It is noteworthy that rockets and nuclear weapons were av1-.. led the
decisive role in the general system of armaments immediately, s..-1 not
gradually as had happened in the past, for example, in the case of fire-
arms. This was because of their enormous destructive properties, their
long range, and quick effects.
For the firt time in the history of military art, it was necessary
during such a short period (i.e. the past 10 years) to subject many
problems of troop organization and nearly all important -..oblems of
strategy, operational art, and tactics, to a radical revision. These
objective conditions created the need for a most extensive and intensive
development of military-scientific work in the Armed Forces. According
to practical experience, military science conferences represent one of
Approved For Rclmcc 2000/08/09 : CIA RDP86T00876R000300090003 3
67
the mAppaovftbFosifileleassaDokumo9dcpumRiplitafiTQW75ROM01309000-3
require the cooperation of a wide circle of generalo and ofricerr.
especially from the troops, in scientific research concerning important
problems of military art, since they arc directly interested in the
solution of such problems. Preliminary opinions, which art ki,,7.:F,'W.MOU
subjective, always require critical, comprehensive checking, cerimis
discusaion, ani exchange of opinions, and this can beat be done at
conferences attended by experienced military leaders, military special-
itAa, and numerous (other) representatives of the troops.
Such a composition of conference participants makes it possible to
penetrate deeply into the problems under investigation, to understand
them more fully, to find the most correct and feasible methods of solv-
ing problematic questions, and to establish the necessary accord of
opinions. In addition, one should keep in mind that since, as a rule,
the moot urgent and vital problems are placed on the agenda of confer-
ences, the theoretical recommendations elaborated at the conferences
maybe applied as quickly as possible to the practice of operational and
combat training. For that reason, military science conferencen are a
very effective form of military-scientific work.
One should also take into consideratic. that the great majority of
conferences (except those held in off-duty hours by voluntary military
science societies) are planned undertakings. Therefore, their prepara-
tion and conduct should be regarded as an integral part of the official
activities of commanders, as well as of scientists cadres. In the
acivities of troops, the conferences are very closely connected with
the practice of operational and combat training, thus helping to im-
prole it by analyzing the accumulated training experience and preparing
recommendations on all new questions.
That is why the interest in military science conferences has notice-
ably increased, as compared with the past, and the range of participants
has been widened considerably. Originally, such conferences were con-
ducted mostly in military educational institutions (mainly in academies)
and scientific research establishments. However, now a practical need
for conferences is felt in operational staffs of branches of the Armed
Forces, of combat arms, of operational-level ob'yedineniyal and even of
tactical elements. The number of conferences has also greatly increased.
It maybe mentioned that during 1963 the Ground Forces alone conducted
(in various units) more than 600 conferences.
The numerous levels, at which conferences are conducted, as well as
the variety of their topics and aims, require the use of proper methods
of organization and conduct suited to each occasion. This is all the
more important since under any conditions the preparation and conduct of
conferences is a complicated process, requiring intensive work of fairly
long ApptifinafdihRelezitv201)01198109ar04A-RDP8V14148716R100141300/N0003-3
CPYRGHT
ApprokierPFceRtgeast020001108484113CIPALRIDP8611.107SM030Q0190003t13
military science conferences, including the selection of topics, the
determination of aims, the periods of preparation, the composition of
participants, and the time of the conference. It should be noted that
during the initial period conferences were planned, in most cases, in a
apontancoun or arbitrary manner, and this prevented the work from being
purposeful and well organized. An a rule, many supervisors considered
military science conferences, and military-scientific work in general,
as a purel: voluntary matter.
Later, there was a sharp turn in the other direction: since there
had been many statements to the effect that military-scientific work
should be regarded as part of the official activities of military cadres,
it became customary for higher-ranking authorities to determine the
topics and time for the conferences, and even to designate the indivi-
duals who were to prepare the key reports, according to a centralized
procedure. Very often all this was done without any coordination with
authorities at lower levels At the same time, despite strict centrali-
zation, the selection of topics was often arbitrary and not coordinated
with plans for operational and combat training.
We believe that it is most expedient to combine the independent
planning of conferences by the individuals who are locally in charge of
them with the approved plans for mtlitary-scientific work, and to zoor-
dinate the topics of conferences, as well as other scientific under-
takings, with higher levels. Such an approach has already been used,
and the first remits have shown that this procedure is fully justified.
Centralized planning of military science conferences on a scale of the
Armed Forces or of their branches, including combat arms, military
academies, scientific research estIlishments, and operational staffs
(according to the principle "from top to bottom"), must be accompanied by
a well-timed and careful coordination of all questions with the persons
in charge, taking into consideration the tasks facing them in a regular
training year in the sphere of operational and combat training and in
military-scientific work. At the same time, the persons directly con-
cerned must be given the opportunity to make the necessary corrections
concerning conference aims, depending on local conditions.
This kind of planning is most appropriate, since it enables the
conference organizers to display creative initiative and to conduct
conferences in an organized, purposeful manner, thereby assuring the most
effective and meaningful development of military theory as a whole. Such
planning also eliminates duplication and lack of coordination in the
scientific work of numerous participants.
A correct selection of topics is extremely important in the planning
of military science conferences. According to experience, military
AVOiliVe8T67.9%gisgeftiothitT?ebtAbisegranarekvittizbotAtas-vbiects
69
are u
which rWitilvteidTb rt. Ft614ieem20IMIReta.) 011601413PIPS11?687MtelY3 ddiMO 0 3 -3
e uire a scientific solution of many questions pertaining to one
or more related problems of military art. Such themes would include;
for example, problems of preparation for and nonduct of war and opera-
tion? involving the use of weapons of mass destruction by the combat-
ants: prospects for the development of brunches of the Armed Forces,
con.oat arms, operational db"yedineniya, and so forth.
We do not deny the expediency of holding conferences devoted to
ouch general, theoretical subjects; however, we believe that the compre-
hensive nature of ouch themes does not make it possible zo examine, with
sufficient thoroughness, the entire complex of questions at a single
conference. The relatively short duration of a conference (a Maximum of
2-3 days) also makes it impossible to study a large number of questions
of a complex theme as thoroughly as would be required.
At present, a certain order has been established, which we believe
to be quite appropriate, for determining more limited and specific
topics of conferences, not only in the sphere of tactics and operational
art, but also in that of strategy. A similar situation exists with
regard to topics for conferences pertaining to training methods and
military technology. This makes it possible to examine a definite range
of questions more thoroughly and specifically, to concentrate attention
on these questions, and to make appropriate practical recommendations.
In some cases, we believe it would even be advisable to limit the dis-
cussion at a conference to one single question, which may not be exten-
sive but which is new and important at a given time (it may be a contro-
versial or unsolved question).
Speaking of topics for militnry sciencc eonferences, it must be
admitted that the chosen topics are not always of sufficiently current
interest. It often happens that ths sane subject is chosen year after
year, and it is not taken into c;onsidelation whether that subject is
important enough to be discusw.la at a particular time.
It must be said that until now two trends are observed in the
determination of topics and aims of conferences, i.e., they are either
extremely theoretical, or they are purely practical. In military
academies and operational staffs, preference is usually given to theore-
tical research on thematical questions. On the other hand, in L
ob"yedineniya and especially in tactical units, there is a tendency to
discuss mostly questions of a Practical nature at the conferences.
We believe that the selection of topics should be approached in a
slightly different manner, Even though, under certain conditions, a
theoretical or practical trend in the handling of each topic maybe
acceptable, it would be more correct in principle to prevent a conference
ADDrovcdF Rcica3c 2000/08/09 ? CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
A itlAibdiFtSirgtiltitils (20010108/0903101AADR8 5:700 f05 R0003P0 0:10003 -3c c
that tt provides for an analysis of the experience of training exercis-
es and of methods for the use of new military equipment by the troops.
One Jhould always remember that, in the final analysis. the principal
en; of theory is to prepare the way for practice.
An we have learned from. experience, conferences with a practical
purpose should nui: be entirely eliminated. Such conferences usually
discuss problems and matters directly related to the daily practical
activities of troops. Obviously, we learn primarily from the practical
training of troops when certain principles, rules, norms, or methods of
conducting combat operations become outdated and cease to meet mooern
requirements, and when it becomes necessary to make appropriate
changes or recommendations. All of these questions become the subject
of discussion at conferences. In this manner, not only a few individuals
but most of the conference participants may be convinced of the necessity
for replacing the old rules with new ones, based on their experience with
troops and staffs, i.e., during troop and command-post exercises.
However, it is unfortunate that in a number of cases such confer-
ences restrict themselves to a discussion of deficienciez, which have
become evident at that particular time in the process of operational and
combat training, or even during individual exercises, and that they
merely issue general requirements for eliminating such shortcomings, with-
out sufficient theoretical interpretation. At such conferences, the
theory of a particular question is not sufficiently taken into considera-
tion, practical experience is not properly analyzed, and the conclusions
and suggestions are made. hurriedly, without scientific basis, and are not
coordinated with theoretical research. As a result, there is a certain
lack of contact between theory and practice. In such cases, the confer-
ences are not sufficiently constructive, their scientific value
diminishes, and they become merely official meetings, or restrict them-
selves to a practical critique of exercises.
In our opinion, regardless of the character of conferences, they
must combine careful scientific research with a critical analysis of
practice. Conferences which have a practical purpose, and are held mainly
to review and analyse accumulated experience, should be based widely on
scientific principles.
Sometimes, as it is done in some staffs of military districts, it
is expedient to assign the same topic to several persons, when planning
military science conferences. Experience has shown that this provides
for a more comprehensive and detailed handling of the subject, taking into
consideration different physico-geographtcal and other conditions, as well
as specific features of troop operations. After holding such conferences,
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-S
73.
it j'ity384 the most and work ou' e mos' accep a 0 eccommaiva ris, wAA
fically suited for each individual case.
4023
Another method being used requires the simultaneous participation
in the prepalvtion of a topic for a conference by representatives of
different administrative echelons. This is also a useful measure. The
joint handling of a theme, for example by d military academy and one or
two staffs of military districts, also deserves nttention. We quite
agree that such an approach enables the best possible coordination
between theory and practice.
For a long time, the elaboration of a theme was limited to writing
the principal report, which was read at the conference during a period
of one hour, or not more than two hours. Depending on the nature of
the theme, two or three so-called supplementary reports were frequently
prepared.
We do not deny the expediency of such a method, particularly if
the reports are of a high quality; however, we believe that this method
alone is no longer sufficient. It was and still is acceptable in
those cases where a theme is handled for the first time and where the
aims of the conference are not outside the scope of the general formu-
lation of questions which require further theoretical research and
practical testing.
A more thorough and specific study of a complex theme obviously
requires timely preparation, not in the form of short, general reports,
but in the form of extensive materials for study by the participants of
a conference. In such cases, a consecutive or simultaneous, comprehen-
sive study of each question becomes necessary. (The number of ques-
tions may vary greatly, depending on the nature of the theme.) It
should be noted, however, that these preliminary materials cannot re-
place the principal report and supplementary reports. The latter must
be prepared, even when this method of working out a theme is used.
However, they arc composed on the basis of materials prepared in advance
and they include only the principal conclusions ard recommendations,
i.e., the new results of research.
This method was first used by the Academy imeni M. V. Frunze and
was found to be completely justified. Each of the questions pertaining
to the principal theme (including both general and special questions)
was first worked out in detail by the persons to whom this task was
assigned, and then brought to the attention of the conference partici-
pants. This made it possible to gain a better understanding of the
importance of a particular question and to select more appropriate me-
thods for solving the problems presented at the conference.
Approved For Keiease ZUUWIRMUU : U1A-KUVUOi uurs toKuuu.suuuuu003-3
2
CPYRGH
PPERIA"eGgififigieck6M8NAlta??400*4141"to.
results of the whole conference. The question maybe asked whether
such a method might not lead to a situation whom the conference partici-
pants merely have to listen to the research results and accept them. We
believe this is not the case. Experience has shown that a comprehensive
study and elaboration of a theme provides greater opportunities for
serious thought. It has become possible to present and examine original
questions, which have been subjected to comprehensive study and have .
found new, specific solutions, with the help of scientific evidence con-
firmed by practical experience. Such methods of preparing for a con-
crones, if accompanied by the necessary preliminary work with its parti-
cipants, will undoubtedly provoke the most extensive, constructive dis-
cussion and will produce good results.
In elaborating on a theme it is very important to raise problematic
questions and to find a solution for them, not only as applied to the
present but also with regard to the future, and by analyzing tendencies
in the development of means of combat, to conceive the nature of possible
changes in a particular sphere of military art. In other words, in
working out a theme one should always envision the future, at .least in
general outline. Even though such long-range solutions and revealed
tendencies may be only in the form of working hypotheses, rough drafts,
or individual suppositions, they will certainly be useful if they are
scientifically substantiated.
The study of a large number of materials discussed at conferences
has shown that many of the materials, including principal and supplemen-
tary reports, unfortunately contain too many general propositions,
repetitions of solved questions, and insufficiently substantiated
categorical statements. At the same time, they lack an original presen-
tation and constructive solution of new, complex questions and fail to
offer a deep analysis, expert conclusions, and scientifically substan-
tiated re vmendations. As a result, the reports often do not go beyond
the scope of ordinary lectures; they are read and heard without interest
and, naturally, do not stimulate active, creative discussion.
Any report, or supplementary report, must be filled with new
material; it must be deeply scientific, creative, and innovational, and
should not contain any generally known axioms. A report must compromise
a limited range of the most important questions pertaining to the main
theme, and must throw light only on what is new and characteristic as
compared with formerly accepted principles. Obviously, some of the new
questions may be discussed only in the order that they are brought up.
These requirements. apply also to speeches made at the conference.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : C,M-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
I would also like to express some neuL2pipions concerning the pre-
parAPPromad EFQUIRekeilifee WIA0/13tikualPpla875R00030-0090003-3
At present it is customary to begin this preparation only after the
conference participants have received the theses of the principal and
bupplementary reports. An a rule, these are received only very shortly
before the conference. Therefore, the conferonce participants have very
little time to examine the substance of the questions. Furthermore this
is rather difficult to do in the case of short theses.
Conference participants must be familiar with the theme and the
principal questions to be discussed, as early and as much in detail as
possible. This is a well known requirement; however, unfortunately it
is often disregarded and this produces undesirable results. In that
case, the officers and generals cannot become familiar early enough with
the existing (and previously published) materials pertaining to the
theme, study them, and work out their opinions and recommendations with
a view to a practical solution of these questions We believe that upon
receipt of the materials prepared for the conference, its participants
should already be, as they say, firmly rooted in the theme and when
appearing at the conference, they should be completely sure of the
changes and amendments that may be required on some questions. This
would also increase their constructive activity and they would not be
obliged to prepare for speeches in a hurry, i.e., at the conference it-
self, as it often happens.
The prepared materials should be sent to conference participants
as early as possible, at least the full reports, but not their theses.
In that case, the generals and officers will be able to study the theme
more deeply and comprehensively, penetrate the substance of the ques-
tions and proposed solutions, and form their own opinions. There is
nothing wrong with having to listen to a report on questions which have
been studied in advance. This will only confirm their opinions on
given matters or will stimulate them to further thought.
Unfortunately, it often happens that the theses of reports are
distributed with great delay, and are sometimes not even brought to the
attention of participants. This obviously makes it much more difficult
to dbtala active participation.
In sending the prepared materials to conference participants, we
believe it would be useful to list the questions on which their opinions
and reactions may be desirable.
To avoid duplication of speeches, or on the other hand, failure to
throw light on some important question, it is suggested that some of the
questions may be distributed in advance among generals and officers,
depending on their specialy.
Approved For RPlease 2000/08/09 ? CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
4
CpYRGH
It should be noted that in a number oP cases the ipparations for
ApprcutirdiEoedReLeasei2010/0810 3.L.G6-1361K5I0g8MIEW 900996Q-Ang
the date of the conference. Obviously, in ouch a case one cannot hope
for high quality in working out the theme and in achieving the aims
set by the conference; it either becomes a matter of form, or it becomes
necessary to postpone the date it is to be held.
As we have learned from experience, the high academic level of a
conference and the achievement of valuable theoretical and practical
results are in direct relation to the qualiuy of preparation. The
latter should begin at least seveval months in advance and should be
carried out according to a carefully determined plan.
It has sometimes been customary to plan a conference at an early
stage in the study of a theme, so as to gain a better understanding of
the basic questions which require more detailed theoretical examination
and immediate practical testing, and also to give the further work a
definite trend and the necessary singleness of purpose. We believe
that under certain conditions this method may be quite e%pedient. How-
ever, it is not always practically possible, since it may sometimes
become necessary to call a second conference in order to conclude the
solution of a theme. It would be difficult to hold two conferences on
the same theme, as this would cause an excessive work load for staffs,
generals, and officers, and it would often be difficult to find the
necessary time. We believe, therefore, that at an early stage of the
work it would be better to hold a short military science discussion to
determine the trend of research for certain urgent themes; in the case
of academies, it would be advisable to organize a scientific informative
meeting, as it is often done. Such meetings are especially useful for
operational staffs and troop elements, if the theme of the conference
coincides, at least in part, with the theme of a forthcoming exercise,
or if the content of the conference theme corresponds to the basic
problems involved in the exercise, The preliminary theoretical re-
search and recommendations will be approved in practice during the
exercise and supplemented with new data, thus improving the results of
the work as a whole. In addition, practical experience will tell which
questions require further theoretical interpretation and what the direc-
tion of further research should be,
We would like to emphasize the need for regularly scheduled con-
ferences. This is explained by the fact that there has been rapid
development in military affairs in recent times in accordance with the
intensive scientific and technical progress. It is necessary to intro-
duce changes regularly in all spheres of military theory and practice,
and sometimes these changes are of a cardinal nature. One should bear
in mind, moreover, that many questions'for which an expedient solution
had apparently been found before, must after a certain period of time be
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : C445-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
PYRG
re-examined in order to find a now solution. This requires a revision
of Asipthveci-MdrcReleatet2000t08/69A" dilitrIROP861t008115R040180000003-3
rules, which would be better suited to meet the requirements for high
combat readiness of troops and ability to conduct operations or battles
with them, in strict accordance with objective conditions of a future
war.
Fl
Judging from experience, it is most expedient to conduct confer-
ences and other operational and military science projects in large
operational staffs once a year. This makes it possible to coordinate
military theories with the interests and practical activities of troops;
it helps to carry out missions of operational and combat training, and'
it does not exceed the practical possibilities of scientific and command
cadres for conducting research and. preparing analytical conclusions.
Whenever a conference is conducted on a scale involving the Armed
Forces as a whole, it is customary to discuss important and complex
themes of a strategic or operational-strategic nature, which require
lengthy preparation. The dates of conferences are scheduled accordingly.
We have learned from experience that conferences may be held a little
more often (than customary) in main staffs of branches of the Armed
Forces, such as once every 2 or 3 years; in operational staffs, military
academies, and soyedineniya they should be held once a year, and if
necessary, twice a year.
Speaking of the time for holding a conference, it should be noted
that during the past few years a peculiar routine has become established,
especially in operational staffs, i.e., most of the conferences were
conducted at the very ena of the year. On the one hand, this is conve-
nient and advantageous for the persons concerend, since it gives them a
maximum amount of time for preparation, i.e., almost the whole year: On
the other hand, there are usually fewer other operational activities at
the end of the year, and it is possible to give these questions more
attention. Finally, such a conference serves to sum up the theoretical
work done during the past year, and it is the most suitable opportunity
for announcing the regular rixsignments in military-scientific work.
However, in our opinion, one should not be guided merely by these
departmental considerations and interests. One should also take into
consideration that the holding of several conferences at the same time
every year causes certain inconveniences. In particular) the planned
character and quality of the work of higher organs and authorities is
impaired, since it becomes difficult to carry out supervision and give
assistance to the local organizers of conferences. It becomes less
feasible for interested representatives from scientific research insti-
tutions, military academies, and adjacent operational staffs to attend
the conferences. It is also more difficult for the higher staffs to
Approved For Release 2000/08/(9 CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-8
CPYRGHTA
summarize the results of a number of conferences. In addition, the
rfpriPPOrd 114 it (Re leason20000E4/09a:t elleorROP88TOO8REER0003101,, 90(10:8 ally
on the basis of written reports, and these are not sent out immediately,
but some time after the conferences. Finally, the reports of confer-
ence proceedings, as a rule, omit many important questions, including
those pertaining to organization and methods. All this reduces the -
possibilities of becoming familiar at an early date with the work re-
sults of a conference, so that Mey maybe considered when setting up
the tasks of military-scientific work for the following year, not tO
mention the difficulties of promptly carrying out the suggestions and
recommendations made at a conference.
The trend to conduct conferences at the end of a year is not always
justified by their aims. For example, there hive been cases when 'Science
conferences were held in the interests of discussing drafts of venuals-
and theoretical works. Obviously, such conferences cOuld be held with-
out any trouble at the beginning or in the middle of e:year; in WhiCh
case generals and officers would have to be given the necessary tine for
a careful study of the drafts and for preparation of well substantiated.
speeches.
We have learned from experience that the quality of conducting
conferences depends on the iLdividuals presc...rting the prindipal and sup-
plemantary reports. Unfortunately, it must be said that in cases where
a high-ranking official is the principal speaker, the freedom of
criticism is sometimes greatly restricted, and most of the, following
speakers support the propositions made by the principal speaker, or at
best, may try to elaborate them to some extent. Hardly anyone Over
offers his own suggestions, especially if they might conflict with the
statements of the principal speaker. It is also bad that in some
cases the same speakers are appointed year after year. This does not
promote the participation of a wide circle of generals and officers in
constructive work, and it further reduces -b:-!e active spirit and quality
of conferences. All this, undoubtedly, represents a holdover from the
influence of the personality cult, and ic should be opposed.
There is one more serious shortcomdng, The preparation of a re-
port is usually entrusted to persons who are subordinated to the
principal speaker, and the latter frequently joins in the work directly
before the conference. In that case, it is naturally difficult for him
to become deeply absorbed in the theme and to examine all its details,
not to mention his inability to make proposals and present scientific
arguments containing anything really new and original.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CWRDP85T00875R000300090003-3
eve at t e principa aim= Dhoti d not necensari y be a
leading official. It is also not advisable to follow the rule that
only leading specialiGt should present oupplementary reports at a
conference. This has besiu the case recently at almost every conference.
In our opinion, it would be more correct for the principal speaker
to prepare his own report (especially if previously prepared, extensive
materials are available). Subsequently, the whole report or parts of
it should be discussed by a.group of comrades contributing to this re-
port, so that the conclusions mid suggestions to be dioduovid.by the
Conference participants may be carefully analyzed, summarized, and well
reasoned.
This, of course, does not preclude the possibility that the
principal report may be made by a leading official. However, in that
case he should personally supervise the prepaleation of the report. And
yet it happens, as we said before, that the speaker Wal look over the
prepared report just before the conference, and will then give instruc-
tions for revising it. This will result in hasty work and nervousness)
and there will be no time to think about a high theoretical laid l and
constructive content of the report.
Conferences may be conducted by various methods. For example, in
the form of a general plenary meeting. The advantage of this method is
the fact that all participants of the conference are well informed of
its work and able to join in the discussion of any question. This is
the simplest method, but not the only one.
Another method, also widely used, is the sectional method of con-
ducting conferences. In that case, the principal report is presented
at a plenary meeting, and the discussion of questions is handled in
sections. An operational (tactical) section may be formed, as well as
a number of sections for branches of the Armed Forces (or combat arms),
for services, and for party-political work. With this method, the final
meeting is also a plenary meeting, at which the results of the work of
sections and of the conference as a whole are summarized. The advantages
of this method are in the fact that the total nutter of questions to be
discussed increases in proportion to the number of sections, and the
theme as a whole is studied more deeply and comprehensively. Moreover,
it promotes more active participation at the conference and increases the
number of speakers.
Experience has shown that the number of speakers at conferences con-
ducted by the sectional method is 3-4 times as great as in the case of
conferences held in the form of plenary meetings. It is true, one must
take into consideration that the sectional method requires much more time
Approved For Release 2000/08/098: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
PYRGHT
ApprovvoirRbltuRelOase20042011/09 afilAIRDP8613110.?MBOQUIRPANN53 on
a limited numb-x of special questions (to be considered and discusnad
by a given section). This my be partly compensated by the fact that
the decinions of a section are brought to the attention of all partici-
pants at the concluding plenary meeting.
In the case of a complex theme 'Dn.,. -lay use a combination method of
conducting a eonference; thin requires holding a plenary meeting first
for the purpose of discussing the most general and important questions,
then continuing the work in sections, and holding another plenary meet-
ing at the end.
Usually a conference begins by hearing and discussing the princi-
pal report; then the work continues either at a plenary meeting, or in
sections; and after that the concluding plenary meetng'io held. How-
ever, a different order may be possible: the sections do their work
first, then their decisions are heard at a plenary meeting, where they
are discussed together with the propositions of the principal report.
There ib another method which should not be ignored, according tc
which the complete materials of principal and supplementary reports
prepared for the conference are distributed in advance among the parti,.
cipants In that case, the plenary meeting begins directly with a
discussion of the questions involved. It would be better, of course,
if the participants could send in advance copies of their speeches. In
our opinion, ouch a method would promote a more active participation of
generals and officers in the work and would make it possible to use a
maximum amouni of time for speeches by the participants.
Thus we see that there. are various methods of conducting confer-
ences and the best method should be selected by a constructive
approach, i.e. by considerin3 the topic and aim of the conference, the
quality and quantity of participants, the amount of available timep.and
other factor
In some operaticual staffs and soyedineniya it might be useful to
conduct conferences on the theme of a forthcoming or past .exercise
concerned with experiment or research. This would greatly benefit the
coordination of theory and practical operations in troops and staffs.
The value of any conference is determined, in the final analysis,
by its results, 1.e , the development of practical recommendations on
the basis of what has been achieved in the course of the work by
unanimous agreement. The recomm,ndations (or conference decision)
should be adopted directly at the conferenze, at the conclusion of its
work; when summarizing the work results of the conference, these re-'
commendations may be further elaborated, substantiated in detail, and
Approved For Release 2000/08/09i1A-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
%{,
the riApovutd irEP LeciacaQ4081610% feth-RIDANE 00 WNW wawa -3
presented to the higher authority in the form of a report. In our
opinion, deciaions Should always be adopted at a conference so that it
may be determined what results were achieved in the discussion of a
given theme. However, experience ban shown that such decisions have
been Lamed very rarely (we explain this mainly by the fact that
orgwimtional questions have been given insufficient thought). At
bebt, the leader of the conference makes a final speech, which cannot
always be regarded as an indication of the 17esulto achieved through
the work of the conference.
Naturally, not every conference decision may be considered as the
only correct one, and not every question may be fully exhausted. We
believe that the time has come to devote more serious attention to,the
elaboration of decisions at conferences, co that truly acceptable
recommendations (theoretical and practical) would be introduced more
boldly into the practice of operational and combat training, trid, that
special (experimental) exeycises may be conducted in some caries.
In conclusion, I would like to stress once more that military
science confercnces at all levels are one of the most important and
most effective forms of mass activities in military-scientific work,
which has enormous significance for the development of military theory
and the perfection of practice in operational and combat training.
This, in turn, increases the combat .readiness and combat capability of
the Armed Forces. Therefore, conferences should be held regularly and
the most expedient mthods of their organization should be chosen, based
on the specific conditions attending each conference.
CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 2000/08M : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
Approved For Release 2000/ 9 11AIRDP8I5ID30875R000300090003-3
MILIARIA PEOPLE'S ARMY
by Col Gen D. DZIIUROV
Minister of National Defense of Bulgaria
CPYRGHT
The Bulgarian People's Army is marking the 20th anniversary of the
socialist revolution in Bulgaria and its own military holiday on
23 September, devoted to the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) standing
firmly behind its Central Committ,-) headed by Comrade T. Z1IIVX0V, and
ready to protect our socialist fatherland and the socialist commonwealth
against possible imperialists agrestlion, together with fraternal armies
of Warsaw Treaty Forces, whenever called upon to do so by the party and
the people's government.
Our country marks this great anniversary in an atmosphere of great
political and industrial up:mirk; in socialist building. The past two
decades were years of fax-reaching, revolutionary chances in all spheres
of our life. During this short period of history, Bulgaria was trans-
formed from an extremely backward, predominantly agricultural country
into an industrial-agrarian socialist state. As compared with 1939, in-
dustrial production in 1963 had increased about 17 times; electric power
production -- 27 times; chemical industry -- 55 times; and machine build-
ing and metalworking -- 139 times. Our people also performed great feats
In the socialist reorganization of agriculture. In place of the former
)
-41 100 000 small private farms, there are now 85 large, mechanized, state
agricultural farms and 980 enlarged cooperative-labor agricultural farms.
We have also achieved great success in the sphere of culture and science.
Together with the development of Bulgaria on the road to socialism,
our people's army was strengthened and became the faithful guard Of our
people's socialist achievements.
Under the supervision of the party, the Bulgarian People's Army
has gone through a glorious development. It has incorporated all the
revolutionary and combat traditions of the Bulgarian Communist Party
and of cur freedom-loving people.
For several decades, the party of Bulgarian Cormunists worked
selflessly and consistently with the aim to disintegrate the bourgeois
army and create a revolutionary, people's army of the proletariat and
workers. The turning point came during the years following the victory
of the Great Socialist October Revolution. In 1919, at the 22d regular
congress (First Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party), the party
of "close" socialists was renamed the Bulgarian Communist Party. In
the Program Declaration adopted by the congress, the task of creating
a Red Army to defend the revolution against counterrevolutionary plots
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
81
wAPPIR1VcitaruMgffe gagliNgao:rC46aRRWPAA.g9M5PARPRNWi
tee of the Cuntral Committee of the BCP, the newspaper Narodna Arrtlya
(People's Army) was published. In the spring of 1921, an illegal military
organization was formed, which had the purpose of improving the military
training of Communists and Komsomol members, providing guards for clubs
and public demonstrations, and supplying arms.
Under the leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the first
anti-fascist uprising in the world took place in Septemblr 1923 and
spread over a large part of the country. A workers' and peasants'
government was established in 440 villages and eight cities. During
the uprising, the party organized an insurgent people's army, numbering
tens of thousands of soldiers. It was the first armed force of the
party, the working class, and the toiling peasants in the struggle
against fascism and capitalism. The "druzhin:e (druzhina was an organi-
zational combat unit of the insurgent army, equivalent to the force of a
battalion) and detachments created in battles against the enemy were the
prototype of the Bulgarian People's Army organized after 9 September 1944.
Their combat experiences are an inexhaustible source for the patriotic
education of our people and of army soldiers. Therefore, the day of
23 September was established as a military holiday of the Bulgarian
People's Army be decision of the party and the government.
After the defeat of the uprising, and despite the "white terror")
the Bulgarian Communist Party did not cease to work for the creation
of its army. At the Same time, it developed extensive anti-imperialist
activities among the people and the bourgeois army, campaigning against
Bulgaria's entry into the war on the side of fascist Germany.
The Bulgarian Communist Party conducted widespread military.-
revolutionary activities during World War II, especially after the
attack of Nazi troops against the Soviet Union. AS early as 22 June
1941, the Central Committee of BCP addressed an appeal to the Bulgarian
people, which described the war of Soviet peoples as a just, progressive
war against the barbarous invasion of Hitler's hordes. Two days later,
the Politbureau of the Central Committee of BCP adopted a course to pre-
pare for an armed uprising. The first partisan "chety' (a cheta was a
combat tudt within a detachment, numbering 20-60 men and having its own
commander and commissar), sabotage and combat groups were organized in
the country.
With the victories of the Soviet Army over Nazi troops, the partisan
movement became more widespread in our country. The chety grew into
detachments, which did not give the enemy a moment's peace. In the spring
of 1943, the Politbureau of the Central Committee of BCP formed the main
staff of the National liberation Insurgent Army and divided the country
Into 12 military operation zones. The army included one division, 11
brigades, 37 detachments, and more than 200 chety, with a total number
Approved For Release 2000/08/09g CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
CPYRGHT
?
ApprstylpstfcgAllertne Rap rg gegATA3 utNg wpm? 9,3,54 200, 000
"yataki" (yataki were legal, clandestine comrades -- either party,
Komsomol, ur non-party members -- who supplied the partisans with food,
weapons, shelter, conducted enemy reconnaissance, and performed other
functions) and party supporters. The partisan movement drew strength
from the support and admiration of all the people.
In the battles against fascism the National Liberation Insurgent
Army recorded events of great heroism in the war annals of the working
class and of all working people. According to its nature and purpose,
its aims, and tasks, this was a real people's army. Therefore, the
workers of villages and cities loved it, provided it with food, helped
it, and were full of admiratis. for its heroism. Although not large in
numbers, the army diverted the attention of large fascist forces and
prevented the tsarist government from sending a single Bulgarian soldier
to the Eastern front against the Soviet Union. From each battle against
the enemy, the National Liberation Army emerged ?stronger and better pre-
pared for new exploits in the name of freedom of our enslaved country.
The uprising of 9 September 1944, which had the decisive support
of the Soviet Army, was successful. Under the leadership of the BCP,
the workers of our couirtry established a people's government of the
patriotic front. The uprising prepared the way for building socialism
in Bulgaria.
In view of the exiting internal and international situation, our
party did not dissolve the old army, but carried out measures to trans-
form it into a new-type army.
As a result of many years of BCP activity in the army, large numbers
of soldiers, most of whom were the sons of workers and, peasants, joined
the patriotic front under the leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Party.
Soldiers' committees, organized on the initiative of the party in
each combat chact?, played an important role in the revolutionary reor-
ganization of the army. During the uprising, these committees were
actually the leaders of the soldiers' masses.
Under the leadership of the party and with the help of soldiers'
committees, all fascist officers vho had been guilty of crimes were turned
over to the people's court. In a chort period, attempts at partial
resistance in some garrisons of the country were suppressed.
An institute of assistant commanders was established to carry out
the policy of the party in the army. This institute was extremely
active in rallying the troops and raising their morale and fighting
spirit for participating in the war against fascist Germany. The
assistant commanders could rightfully be called emissaries of the party.
itiggLAVirig /A.CC,t4 !IMP
? el ;:empnetop6.6666,?23.diers'
PYR
APPRZYMAIM FigliP4HAQQ/010fhe geiggia8?.31ABAROMMINOkni,ly
formed the basis of the new army. They were its nucleus and backbone.
At the same time, another new current joined the army -- volunteer
GHIEFoldiers and those mobilized from the reserve. Many partisan commanders
and fighters received army ranks and were assigned to command positions
in the army. Reserve officers, many of whom had participated directly in
the 9 September uprising, were also called up. As a result of these
measures, the make-up of the army was radically changed and it became
truly a people's army in its character, purpose, and composition. To
conduct the forthccming combat operations against Nazi toops the army
needed military specialists. Therefore, officers of the old army, ;"ho
had not performed any crimes against the people, remained in the selvicct.
The party openly informed them that their furture service in the army
would depend on their conduct and work.
As a result of the wise policy of the Central Committee of BCP,
the 3ulgarian People's Army developed in a short period as the army of
workers and peasants, the army of the socialist revolution devoted to
the cause of 9 September. The new and not yet firmly established Bul-
garian People's Army conducted its victorious battles in the Patriotic
War against Nazi troops, shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet Army. In
the first period of the war, three armies consisting of 445,000 men
participated in the liberation of the Balkans from German invaders. In
the second period of the war, when combat operations were transferred to
Hungarian territory, one army numbering 120,000 men took part in them.
Therefore, our army cooperated direct:y in the liberation of the peoples
of Macedonia, Southern Servia, and Southern Hungary from fascist occupa-
tion. The battles of Strazhin, Stratsin, and Kumanovo, of the Drava and
Mur rivers, and of Yastrebets, represent a number of illustrious pages
in the history of the Bulgarian People's Army, which lost over 30,000
men in battle. Three-ban salutes in the capital of the Soviet Union in
honor of the victories of our heroic army were the highest reward for the
army, the Bulgarian people, and for the heroic Bulgarian Communist Party.
After the Patriotic War, the Central Committee of BCP and Georgi
Dimitrov personally entrusted the Bulgarian People's Army with the task
of learning from the experience, strategy, and military art of the in-
vincible Soviet Army, in order to become a modern, excellently armed and
trained army and a true defender of socialist achievements. A number of
military educational institutions was opened for the purpose of training
highly qualified military cadres. Many officers and generals graduated
from courses and academies in our country and in the Soviet Union.
The period of the personality cult had a negative effect on
the development of our country, including that of the army. Personal
command of the army by V. CHERVENKOV, and the reprisals against a number
of military cadres which had been tested in battle, hindered the further
growth of the army.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 ? CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
PYRGH
ApprOadROP:RdiSaSeinteiONNI:OX-FirganriSanclant3G60?00043ttee of
BCP were historically significant in the life and. development of our coun-
try and army.
The plenum drew conclusions, necessary for the activity of our party,
from the decisions of the 20th Congress of CPSU; condemned the incorrect
methods of the personality cult period; and adopted an extensive program
for restoring the norms of party life and the iprinciples of party leader-
ship. An invaluable role in the building of our army was performed by the
decisions of the October 1956 Plenum of the Central Committee of BOP, at
which the Central Committee clearly determined the tasks of further in-
creasing the leading role of the Central Committee of BCP in the army,
strengthening one-man command on a party bRsis, and increasing the role
of political organs, party, and. KomsoMol organizations in the whole life
of the army.
The, plenum stressed that the supreme Leninist principle in building
an army of the new type is its leadership by the Central Committee of the
Communist Party.
The restoration of Leninist norms and principles of party life and.
of the Leninist principle of one-man command in the army based on the
party, and, the reinstatement of criticism and. self-criticisr., played a
decisive role in strengthening the army. After the plenum, commanders,
political organs, and party and. Komsomol organizations developed conatruc-
tive initiative and activity. Socialist competition and, various projects
designed. to achieve high combat efficiency were instituted on a wide scale.
The decisions of the 8th Congreae BCP, which took place in November
1962, greatly benefited the development of the Bulgarian People's Army.
In evaluating the current international situation, the congress established
the task of further strength-ining the defense capability of our country.
The congress stated in its resolution: "It is necessary to increase the
vigilance of the people ?and strengthen the defense capability of our
fatherland., and. to improve the combat skill of the people's army, so that
it will be able to defeat relentlessly any attempts of the imperialists
and their servitors to encroach upon the peaceful labbr of our people,
and upon the independence and territorial integrity of the Bulgarian
People's Republic."
We are well aware of the importance of the position occupied by our.
country in southeast Europe; we realize that the US imperialists are try-
ing to carryout insane: aggressive plans in this part of the world; and
we are deeply aware of our great responsibility to the party and. the
people for the defense of cur socialist fatherland.. In view of these
considerations, our army personnel has vigilantly watched the preparations
of our enemies for a surprise opening of hostilities and has shown great
concern for maintaining the armed forces of the country in a state of
constant, high combat readiness.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : Cl1b5RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
HT
APPrfiVff&frgifRIN8kEigu2gialPen9rrioWAIRPFECITIO grtgtO@RigiOdaggit3situa-
tion, a comprehensive reorganization and rearmanent of all branches of the
Armed Forces took place during the past few years at the instruction of
the Central Committee of BCP. As a result of the fatherly concern ofthe
party and the selfless assistance of the brotherly Soviet Union, our army
has the most modern combat equipment and arms, which 'represents the basis
of its combat strength. Within the Ground Forces., well corrdinated, highly ,
mobile and maneuverable chasti and soyedineniya were organized, which are
trained for conducting combat operations under difficult Conditions ,of
modern warfare. The large-scale supply of these chasti and soyedineniya
with automatic weapons, tanks, and other combat equipment, has greatly
increased fire power and striking power.
The total volley of our modern division is five times Stronger, and
the mobility of the division is 6-7 times greater than that of a division
in World War II.
The PV0 troops and Air Forces have undergone a special development
in the past few years and have been equipped with the most perfected com-
bat equipment, i.e. guided surface-to-air rockets, supersonic fighters,
and modern radar. Our Navy is also constantly being rearmed and its or-
ganizational structure is being improved.
The revolutionary changes in military affairs have increased demailds
in the training of personnel, especially of command cadres. The develop-
ment of military art requires that officers be capable of exercising con-
tinuous, firm, and flexible control of the troops. During the past few
years, our officer cadres have accumulated considerable experience in or-
ganization and training methods. They are successfully supervising the
daily troop activities; using modern methods in the training process of
their subordinated soyedinenj.ya, chasti, and podrazdeleniya; and conduct-
ing complex operational and tactical command-staff exercises and troop
exercises. Considerable success has been achieved in the theoretical
formulation and practical application of new methods of troop control,
taking into consideration the specific conditions of our army. At pres-
ent our commanders and staffs are capable of solving, in a short period,
the whole involved complex of problems concerning the organization of
an operation or battle, and of carrying out the operational direction
of troops during combat action.
As a result of the constant concern of our Central Committee, the
Bulgarian People's Army has been staffed with highly qualified command
cadres, loyal to the party and the people. Many of, them were active
fighters against fascism and capitalism and participants of the Patriotic
War. More than 83 percent of the officers are members of.theBCP. One
out of every 6 or 7 officers has higher military education.
ved For Release 2000/08/09 aCIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
PYRGH
ApprovgdmPRqUfbfii4 MAST& ?.209WIRE9198kft ?..ic,ip,p duties
assigned to them by the party. They are contrAttpriMov ng their
Marxist-Icninist and operationa-tactical training and studying the charam-
ter of combat operations in modern war, particularly during the initial
period. Their organizational work is also constantly improving. The
number of commanders who haire trained outstanding podrazdeleniya has
increased.
The priucipal attention of commanders) staffs, and troops of the
Bulgarian People's Army is now directed toward a complete mastery of new
combat equipment and toLuvd their training for joint combat operations,
mainly in the initial period of a war. The Seventh All-Army Party Confer-
ence suggested that the Aastery of equipment be considered a priority fibld
of endeavor for party organtations, commanders, and ail military personnel,
and adopted detailed decisions to that effect.
During the past few years, combat training of our army troops has
been raised to a new, higher level. Chastd and podrazdeleniya of the
Ground Forces are being trained to conduct bold, resourceful) and hibhly
maneuverable combat operations by day aml night, under any weather condi-
tions, and on different typ(!s of terrain. They are constantly improving
their field training, physical endurance, and combat skill) and are being
trained to perform long marches at high speed, to force river barriers
from the march, and to conduct meeting engagements and battles in diffi-
cult, mountainous terrain.
PV0 Troops and Air Forces are trained in rapid, accurate firing and
bombing, involving complex maneuvers under any weather conditions. They
are able to detect an air enemy on distant approaches and are:.ready to
destrcy any enemy airplane attempting to violate our air space. The Navy,
although not numerous, is well trained and preparing to provide reliable
protection and defense of our maritime borders.
Socialist competition is an important factor in achieving success
and improving combat training. Every year there is an increased number
of commanders who take a more active part in competitions, and conduct
them in a more speciAc and efficient manner, making use of their great
effect in achieving high, lasting results. During the 1963 training year
alone, over 25 percent of soldiers and mmmanders earned the title "Out-
standing in Combat and Political Training," and there are more than 3,200
outstanding podrazdeleniya. The movement for Communist labor has found
widespread support. During the past year, 1,325 otdeleniya, crews, teams,
and groups were awarded the title "Collective of Communist Labor."
In honor of the 20th anniversary of the victory of the socialist re-
volution and in answer to the Appeal of the Central Committee of BCP, the
army has now developed large-scale orgamLzational activities to prepare
for a worthy celebration of Victory Day.
0300090003-3
GrntogRrNettrogliMaCIOWNegegdittgi
ness of the army. The socialist military science regards discipline as a
deeply political manifestation, which focuses the moral and fighting
qualities of soldiers, High ideological convictions, selfless devotion
to the fatherland. and the Communist Party, and correct understanding by
all soldiers and commanders of the patriotic duty and, the international
tasks of our, army, constitute the solid foundation of an iron military
discipline.
4?Ahreadi_
Party-political work plays a great role in strengthening the combat
capability and combat readiness of the Bulgarian People's Army.
The May1964 Plenum of the Central Committee BCP has been invaluable
for the development of party-political work in the army, having, discussed.
measures for the further strengthening of the leading role of the BCP in
atriving to carry out the decisions of the 8th Congress. These decisions
have enormous significance for our whole party-political and command activ-
ities. Political organs have concentrated their attention on strengthen-
ing the 14catang efficiency of army party organizations and on ensuring a
leading role in combat aria: political training and distipline for all party,
members.. All ideological work in the army is founded on the decisions of '
the 8th Congress of the BCP. The main emphaSitAn this_work is placed on
the Communist education of personnel and the ideological aspect of combat
training and discipline.
The Bulgarian people and the peoples of the Soviet Union are pe=a-
nently united by an indestructible, brotherly friendship, which was
tempered in the fire of the common struggle. As Comrade N. S. Khrushchev
empahsized at the workers meeting in Sofia on 19 May 19621 "The ftiendship
of our peoples has a tradition of many centuries. They have repeatealy
fought shoulder to shoulder against a common enemy. Russian troops and
Bulgarian national guardsmen acted. together for the liberation of Bulgaria
from +he yoke of the Ottoman Empire. The best sons and daugthers of the
Soviet Union and Bulgaria fought together against fascist invaders. How-
ever, our friendship reached its high point only after 9 September 1944,
when the Bulgarian workers chose the path of socialist development. The
Soviet-Bulgarian friendship became truly nation-wide, and there is now
no force that could shatter it."
The brotherly friendship and. cooperation between our peoples and Armed
Forces continue to develop and grow stronger. In March 1948, the USSR and
Bulgaria signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance.
Our country is a member of the Warsaw Treaty. The BCP is educating soldiers,
sergeants, and officers of the People's Army in the spirit of eternal love
for the EkT7Let Union and indestructible military friendship with the USSR
Armed Forces. Bulgarian soldiers are honorably fulfilling the historical
precept of Georgi DIMI1ROV: "Our army must be like the Soviet Army. We
A roved For Release 2000/08/09 : MA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
CPYRGH
?
SAlsom461(paillk-eirmYciventaio9c;:vokittaltdit5 0
ame mi itary science. we must ave c p e akt
mon language on all questions."
$ #1
1 IS
s
q3c11d. the
6e corn-
The development and strengthening of military solidarity between
our armies was furthered. by joint exercises, organized by the Command of
the Warsaw Treaty Forces, the exchange visits Of military delegations, and
other measures.
A new stage in the development and strengthening of Bulgarian-Soviet
friendship was marked. by the visit of our party and government delegation,
headed by Comrade T. ZEIVICOV, to Moscow in February of this year and the
signing of a joint Bulgarian-Soviet declaration. Our relations with the
Soviet Union are characterized by a further intensification and. general
strengthening of economic, political, and cultural cooperation. Our
military cooperation is being strengthened and expanded on this basis.
The -iirincipal source of strength and power of our army is the fact
that its orgari zer, leader, and educator is the Bulgarian Communist Party.
The BCP and. its Central Committee headed by Comrade T. ZHIVICOV are
constantly guiding the People's Army and are concerned with its training
and education, the strengthening of discipline and, the increase of its
combat power.
The instructions of Comrade Todor ZHIVKOV and the decisions of the
Politbureau of the Central Committee BCP, concerning the increased, role
of sergeants in the training and education of soldiers, the complete
mastery of new weapons and combat equipment, the more direct and. active
supervision of commanders and staffs of troops, and. the general improve-
ment of party-political work, have served as the principal guide for the
activities of army Communists, 1. e., commanders and 'political workers.
The close ties between the army and the people are a life-giving
source of strength and power for the army.
Our people's Army is based on the socialist system and its rapidly
developing economy. The army is truly a part of thq'people in 'its spirit,
composition, and. tasks. It has no other interests but those of the people.
The working people, on their party, surround the army with sincere love
and warm concern. The :rora.1 and political unity of military personnel is
an exhaustible source of inner strength and. solidarity of the army.
One of the most important sources of strength and invincibility of
our army is its inviolable friendship and military solidarity with the
fraternal armies of the Warsaw Treaty Forces headed. by the great Soviet
Army, and the education of military personnel in the principles of Marxism-
Leninism and proletarian internationalism.
A roved For Release 2000/08/09 : -RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
The BCP has rejected as harmful Ilnd clngerous for the world Communist
mov6K1E?Yg&I ?SWA9Mgeagg9NR@Mti ciAARIMMT9W?WMONMAArs
T"concerning reliance on one's own strength" in socialist building, and also
concerning an independent military defense.
In our country, absolutJly very uound-thinking individual is con-
vinced that, without the fraternal and unselfibh aid of the Soviet Union
and the cooperation with other socialist countries, we would have been
unable to achieve such great success in our socialist building within such
a short period. Withthc exception of the Soviet Union, not a single coun-
try of the world socialist system could singlehandedly defend its social-
ist achievements and would lose its national independence in the event o f
Imperialist aggression.
Our party sees an important condition of the strength and invincibil-
ity of the great cause of Communism in the unity of the socialist camp
headed by the Soviet Union. In his speech at Vratsa on 2 June, the day
honoring the men who were killed fighting against Turkish slavery, capi-
talism, and fascism, Comrade Todor ZHIVKOV stressed that "in the friend-
ship and cooperation with the Soviet Union the Bulgarian people see the
principal guarantee of preserving their freedom and national independence."
Being convinced of this, the Bulgarian soldiers and all our people reject
the malicious abuse and slander of the Chinese leaders against the Soviet
Union and the leadership of the Central Committee of CPSU under Comrade
N. S. Khrushchev.
For 20 years, the Bulgarian People's Army has stood firm, Guarding
the great victories of the party and following its militant course, and
for 20 years the Bulgarian soldiers have guarded ..(2 borders of our be-
loved fatherland, Our soldiers are selflessly and ardently devoted to
their socialist country, the People's Republic of Bulgaria; they aro proud
and happy to serve it. For the soldiers and commanders of the People's
Army there is no duty more sacred than to be constantly linked by indis-
soluble bonds with the party and the people and to serve communist ideals
selflessly. This is the source of the soldiers' enthusiasm, which was
kindled by the wise words of the Central Committee of the party in its
proclamation honoring the 20th anniversary of the socialist revolution
in Bulgaria: "Improve your combat and moral-political training, and
ac'4,1ve complete mastery of modern military science and technology! Be
vigilant, promptly expose and ruthlessly suppress any attempt to disturb
the peace and labor of the people, who are advancing confidently on the
bright road of socialism and communism."
Devoted to their patriotic and international duty, the soldiers and
commanders of our Armed Forces, together with their brothers -- soldiers
of the Warsaw Treaty Forces -- headed by the soviet Union, are prepared to
retaliate with a shattering blow against imperialism, if the latter should
dare to disturb the peace of our peoples.
pprovea ror Feiease iuuuIuoIu?
_90
Approved For ilaliWittlitibe,i'l
? y
CPYRGHT
gIR000300090003-3
(Review of journallama)ry Ventnik)
by Lt Col L. SALTYKOV
yultunyentnik in the oldest Soviet military journal. For 43 years
it han carried on extensive work in the training and education of cur
officer cadres. The Journal has been a true friend and ansintant for
officers. It has made definite contributiOnn to the development of the
theory or combined-arms combat and progressive methods of training and
education and in the generalization of the experience of past warn.
The present-day role of the journal is especially important. An the
result of the grout growth of science and technology and changes in the
economic and technical principles of war, a genuine revolution has taken
place in military affairs. It encompasses the means of armed struggle,
troop organization, methods of warfare, and methods of training and
educating personnel.
Drastic changes in the charactr and methods of warfare demand a
new approach to many problems of Nilitary affairs and the further develop-
ment of military theory and practice. Under these conditions military
journals Ilave an exceptionally responsible role. As stressed by the
Minister of Defense Mar SU R. Ya. MALINOVSKIY, they "can and must do
much for the deep interpretation of the essence of the revolution in
military affairs and the resulting concrete requirements for the training
and education of personnel of the various arms and branches of the Armed
Forces."
It is from this position that the work of the journal Voyennyy
Vestnik in recent times should be examined.
In 1960 Voyennyy Vestnik underwent an important reorganization on
the basis of which the periodic publicatiuns of the arms and special
troops were combined. It became the common journal of the Ground Troops.
Not only the purpose of the journal, but the structure, character, and
volume of tasks to be performed changed as a result of the reorganization.
The tasks of the journal are many and varied. Unfortunately, the
editors did not clearly and accurately set forth these tasks in the
journal and did not reveal its program, even though there was a real
ne(1 for an editorial statement following the reorganization. During
n similar reorganization in 1927 the journal publisL-1 an article
entitled "From the Editors.." which briefly but clear4 defined the
purpose and main tasks of the journal and set forth its initial aims.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09.:,CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
93:
CPYRGHT
AfAisivecirPor Magenta In0o4816/9 :ZIAMIDIDA5TCH311715P1000100 t,Ctri013-3
podrazdeleniye commanders of all arms and ecial troops of our ground
troops in their everyday practical work. BuL this general took is
many-sided. It includes the ideological education of officers and the
improvement of their professional maotery, which in turn includes the
thorough study of the theory of modern combined-arms combat, general
military-technical training, special training, the maotery of progressive
methods training and education, a detailed familiarity with foreign
armies, etc.
How are these tacks being solved on the pages of the journal? In
evaluating its work in general, it must be noted that recently the
quality of materials being published has improved considerably.
First of all, it is to its credit that VoyennyyVestnik has not
confined itself to narrow professional limits. It gives serious
attention to general political questions. It actively propagandizes the
decisions of the 22d Party Congress and the plenums of the Central
Committee of the CPSU and discusses important events in the life of the
Soviet people. And this is completely justified. The professional
training of an officer can not be separated from his ideological educa-
tion.
While it is true that all materials on these questions published
in the journal are not of equal value, the best are very beneficial and
are well received by readers. In a number of cases the editors have
found effective forms of presenting materials. For example, in the
No 11 issue for 1961, under the heading "Delegates of the Congress Speak,"
there were published speeches of the delegates of the 22d Party Congress,
including famous military chiefs, outstanding officers, scientists; and
shock workers of communist labor.
The editors are giving much attention to propaganda of the decisions
of the June 1963 Plenum of the CPSU Central Connittee on questions of
ideological work. But in this respect the journal should more frequently
show what effect the decisions have had on improving combat training,
strengthening military discipline, and further developing military theory.
In this review it is impossible for us to examine the materials on
military education published in the journal, but this matter is important
and merits special analysis.
Considerable space in the journal is devoted to questions concerning
the military-technical training of officers. It is well known that now,
when revolutionary changes are taking place in military affairs in
connection with the appearance of new equipment and new types of weapons,
the importance of military-technical training has increased Immeasurably,
and this in turn requires .a thorough knowledge of the principles of nu-
clear physics, mathematics, chemistry, and electronics. This fully
AMVitted.fatt7e,),hi. 2t9WIn gINts'o
rei,.0m,sence
ve articles
were published in this section, there were four articles published in
1963. Their themes have become more timely and the content has ac-
quired depth in a scientific respect.
In particular: such articles as "Lasers and Their Use" by M.
KASEN= (No 2, 1963), and "Destructive Factors of Nuclear Explosions
and Protection Against Them" by V. LOGACHEV (No 2, 1964), attracted
the attention of readers. We would like to see on the pages of the
journal, in the near future, articles that are equal in scientific
interest and equally well written, which would tell us about the use
of the latest achievements of chemistry in relation to arms and combat
eqpipnent, and IL, relation to the development of military affairs as a
whole.
Present-day officers must be familiar with the organization, armament,
and tactics of the principal armies of capitalist countries. In this
respect, Voyennyy Vestnik has done a great deal. It regularly publishes
materials on foreign armies, presents timely reports on all changes in
the organization of troops and their operational tactics in different
types of combat, and regularly provides information on new types of
military equipment and arms.
One might only suggest that the materials on foreign armie3 devote
more attention to methods and means of combat training of probable
enemies.
At present the Soviet Army has loyal friends -- the armies of fraternal
socialist countries. The exchange of experience with these armies is
extremely significant. Therefore, Voyennyy Vestnik deserves praise for
its initiative in organizing a special section under the heading "Reports
From Our Friends." It would not hurt other journals to follow this
example.
Voyennyy Vestnik has permanent sections pertaining to the arms and
special troops. A considerable amount of useful material has been
published on questions concerning fire and weapons. Rocketeer officers,
artillerymen, engineer-technicians, signal men, officers of PV0 troops,
and other specialists will find material of interest to them on the
pages of the journal.
However, the most important questions, of course, are those con-
cerning tactics and training of personnel.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
93
CPYR
G[44t6iNiikkiiNSOANtlarliPON 4?9g,
protection against weapons of mass destruction are discussed in the
section entitled "Tactics." With regard to volume and quantity of
published materials, this is the leading section of the journal. It
publishes from 80 to 100 articles and notes annually. In addition,
materials on tactics of podrazdeleniya of the arms and special troops
may be found in other sections of the journal.
As a result, the total percentage of articles co tactics is very
high. They include theoretical articles, reports from tactical field
exercises, articles analyzing specific examples of actions by podraz-
deleniya and their commanders during exercises, recollectio,ss of
participants in the Great Patriotic War, individual combat episodes,
etc.
However, regardless of the various forms of these articles, they
all have the same purpose, which is mainly practical, i.e. to assist
commanders of podrazdeleniya how best to organize and direct operations
during exercises, and in the final analysis, in battle.
This practical trend of the materials on tactics also reveals it-
self in the subject specialization of individual issues of the journal.
For example, one issue may be devoted mainly to combat actions in winter,
another to marches and meeting engagements, and a third to attacks from
the march.
As an example, let us look at the No 3 issue of the journal for 1964.
It is devoted to problems of marches and meeting engagements. Accord-
ingly, the Section "Tactics" includes the following articles: "Marches
and Meeting Engagements of a Motorized Rifle Battalion," "Reconnaissance
Group on the March," "Technical Support of the March of a Tank Battalion,"
and the tactical problem "A Tank Battalion in the Advance Guard."... The
section includes only one article not related to the specialized subject
and one commentary on a previously published article.
Other sections also include articles on marches and meeting engage-
ments, and the issue has a total of 10 articles on this subject.
The subject specialization of this journal has been practiced since
1961. This has, undoubtedly, been of some positive value. It is now
easier and handier for officers to use the materials of the journal in
preparing for a study course on a certain subject. It is no longer
necessary to dig in numerous issues in search for a required article.
With this order of publication, better possibilities are provided
for studying problems of the organization and conduct of different
combat operations, both in detail and as a complex.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
PYRGHT
APiagailEVVErBraglI014601tVr,
. I 6 0
r13,4144fItft14? Ve4onrily
accepted principle, one has to admit that it has some serious short-
comings. In our opinion, it would hardly be expedient to make: all
issues of th, journal into collections of artVlles on one particular
subject. Such a strict division of combat into its individual types
results in the fact that the common characteristics of combined-arms
conbat, as an aggregate of its various types, are lost from sight. How-
ever, in the case of modern warfare, the variety and continuous, rapid
alternation of different types of combat are a characteristic phenomenon.
A podrazdeleniye may complete a march, then it will have to conduct a
meeting engagement or attack the defending enemy from the march; in
case of success, the podrazdeleniye will pursue the enemy, cross zones
of radioactive or chemical contamination, force water barriers, then
conduct another meeting engagement or break through the defense. In
case of necessity, the podrazdeleniye may have to turn to the defensive
temporarily to repulse strong counterattacks. In the past war, such
alternation of various types of combat operations was usually done
gradually, during a relatively long period of time; now, however, the
change would be much more dynamic. It may often happen that during a
24-hour period a podrazdeleniye will have to conduct different types of
combat, changing rapidly from one to the other.
In view of this character of operations performed by podrazdeleniya,
tactical exercises and training are conducted as a complex, with slick
alternation of different operations.
Therefore, the commander of a podrazdeleniye, who is preparing for
exercises, now revires not only material discussing one particular
type of combat, such as for example, attack from the march, or defense,
but other materials which would discuss the whole complex of problems
connected with the forthcoming operations. Unfortunately, such materials
are almost never published on the pages of the journal. One of the reasons
for this is, apparently, the subject specialization of each issue.
It is not surprising that some important subjects have been overlooked
by the editors. For example, dur1..-.7, a long period there were no articles
discussing the organization and conduct by podrazdeleniya of such a
widely known type of offensive acticn as the pursuit of a withdrawing
enemy.
It is quite justified that the journal has given its main attention
to the offensive. This corresponds to the spirit of our military
doctrine and the combat capabilities of the trocps. However, it would
be a great mistake to ignore questions of defense in tactics, parti-
cularly in the tactics of podrazdeleniya, where it has retained an
important role.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
CPYRGHT
0049fed FtOrLRWat& 1400/0S/CPSIttAIROPtitcP008119KEKRT3066945MPA
be avoided under modern conditions. In the course of combat operations,
including the development of attack, troops will often find it more to
their advantage to repulse strong counterattacks of the enemy by de-
fense, and then to continue the offensive. Defense may also have to be
employed in the event of the unsuccessful outcome of a meeting engage-
ment.
Therefore, one should not underestimate defense. However, apparently
the editors of Voyennyy Veetnik have followed this road. While several
special issues of the journal were devoted to problems of defense in
1961 and 1952, there was no such special issue in 1963, and none has
been planned for the current year.
Only two articles On problems of defense were published in 1963, i.e.,
"Defense of a Tank Battalion" by A. KISLYAKOV (No 12) and "Defense in
the Mountains" by A. DOROFEYEV (No 11). However, the practical experience
of troop exercises has shown that most of the problems not clearly under-
stood by officers concerned matters of defensive combat. Two articles
a year concerning defensive combat is, undoubtedly, not enough for a
journal like Voyennyy Vestnik. We believe that one of the causes of
this abnormal situation, in addition to other reasons, is the extremely
rigid uniformity of subject matter in individual .issues.
This situation has resulted in the fact that, for example, on the
subject of marches and meeting engagements the journal publishes the
same kind of articles year after year, which duplicate each other in
many respects. Apparently, things are done acclrding to the principle:
"Once you have started something, you can't stop." Once the special
subject of an issue has been designated, you have to supply suitable
material, whether you want to or not.
Obviously, it would be most expedient to have only a few issues a
year with a specialized subject matter and to select actually important
and necessary materials for this purpose. Also, one should not repeat
the same subject specialization of journal issues, year after-year. In
the remaining (non-specialized) issues it is advisable to publish mater-
ials on various subjects, but always deeply informative.
What is the quality of articles on tactics published In the journal?
If we evaluate them from the point of view of practical application,
we must admit that most of them answer their purpose both in content
and in form. Their positive aspects are the practical value and specific
nature of the material, and the wide utilization of experience gained in
recent troop exercises. The materials on tactics contain a large amount
of practical advice and recommendations, which are very helpful to com-
manders of podrazdeleniya. For example, such recommendations are
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
06
46401ggg! .I0414444"4. " 1
- ?45.26
4g (No 8,
P 40
ense of a
- 8 0
Tank Battalion" (No 12, 1963), "March and Meeting Engagement of a Mo-
torized Rifle Battalion" (No 3, 1964), and others.
However, at the same time it should be noted that there is a cer-
tain stereotyped pattern in using the experiences gained in exercises.
Most of the material is based on the description and analysis of one
specific example.
Let us look at the articles published in No 10, 1963. The first
article in the "Tactics" section is entitled "Skill and Determination
Will Win." The article carefully analyzes an airborne landing made
during one of the exercises of a rifle company under the command of
Capt MUMS K1Y.
The second article, "An Amphibious Landing," describes the actions
of a rifle company under the command of Capt MARTIWYANOV during an
amphibious landing, and the next article, "Coordination in a Tank
Company," analyzes in equal detail the actions during an exercise of
a tank company under the command of Capt RASTORGUYEV.
Three articles in one issue are built on the same plan. Isn't that
too monotonous? One should not forget that the journal must be not only
informative, but also interesting. However, this same pattern is
characteristic for many other issues.
Aside from monotony, which palls on the readers, the result of
this uniformity in planning articles is that they become an analysis of
specific, but individual examples. It is not surprising that the authors
of such articles usually limit themselves to an evaluation of whether
the actions of podrazdeleniya and their commanders conform to certain
recommendations contained in military regulations. However, the pur-
pose of the journal is much more comprehensive than merely to acquaint
its readers with military regulations. The journal must, above all,
explain the reason why such recommendations have been made in the re-
gulations, so that each officer may corree1: -1derstand and construc-
tively apply them in different situations,
Unfortunately, the editors have given 1, , _tention to this aspect
in recent issues.
The positive quality of articles on tactics of motorized rifle and
tank podrazdeleniya is their discussion of specific actions; however,
the materials on tactics of podrazdeleniya of the arms and special troops
are merely a restatement cf general regulations or a description of ac-
tions without an attempt at thorough analysis. As an example, we might
point out the article "Engineer Reconnaissance in the Area of a Nuclear
Explosion" (No 7, 1963).
Approvod For Roloaso 2000/08/09 : CIA RDP85T00875R000300090003 3
The most characteristic feature of modern warfare is the fact that
itAlbpirakat Raillkieftbse12013008109 : CIALREN2806087i51R100913V00904084-
razdeleniya of all arms and special troops are closely tied together
(30-nto one indivisible whole. In this manner they should be analyzed in
the articles on tactics. The fact that journals of the arms and spe-
cial troops have been merged in Voyennyy Vestnik particularly favors
this type of approach. However, all possibilities have not been fully
utilized. There is a certain lack of connection between sections of
the journal. Therefore, the materials on tactics of podrazdeleniya
of the arms and special troops are often insufficiently coordinated
with the character of actions of motorized rifle and tank podrazde-
leniya.
Actually, the first attempt to correct this lack of coordination
was made in the article "March and Meeting Engagement of a Motorized
Rifle Battalion" (No 3, 1964), which makes a comprehensive analysis of
actions in the advance guard of a motorized rifle battalion, a tank
company, an artillery battalion, and a combat engineer podrazdeleniye.
In our opinion, such comprehensive articles should occupy a leading
position among materials of an applied nature.
The article "A Company on the March and in a Meeting Engagement"
No 5, 1954) once again gives a description of one particular example in
the actions of a company. Having shown a successful initiative, the
editors should follow up on it. Naturally, this form should not become
a stereotyped pattern either.
In summing up the above, it may be said that Voyennyy Vestnik has
on the whole been successful in the solution of problems designed to
assist commanders of podrazdeleniya in their daily tactical training,
although even here there is room for improvement.
However, it would be wrong to restrict the journal to such problems
alone. In 1927, the editors emphasized quite correctly in the article
referred to above that the main purpose of the journal was to assist
commanders of podrazdeleniya in their daily work, but that this did not
mean that "the journal would fail to state general problems of military
structure." If this was correct at that time, it would be even more so
now, when radical changes are taking place in military theory as a result
of the revolution in military affairs.
It is characteristic that in answer to a question from a group of
editors of military newspapers and journals Mar SUR. Ya. MALINCVSKIY,
Minister of Defense USSR, placed the emphasis on problems of military
theory, involving propaganda and interpretation. He particularly
stressed the fact that "one must act more boldly in breaking down and
discarding everything which hinders the creative development of
Approved For Release 2000/08/ CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
CPYRGHT
?
progressive military thought and the formation of correct, innovational
pptICIViednE0erReisaaS04080i0.809 : $31144RDP85NOWSRP00306091H10334eful.
to publish constructive, animated discussions of current problems of
military theory and practice, to be followed by detailed, expert con-
clusions and generalizations. It is important that these discussions
include the participation of as many as possible military men, who are
concerned with theory and practicer i.e., those connected with scientific
establishments and military educational institutions, as well as those
serving with troops."
Of course, a journal such as Voyennyy Vestnik should not be permitted
to become a purely military-theoretical journal. However, it should
also not be reduced to a narrow practical purpose.
Officers, especially the younger ones, need not only practical advice,
but also a deep understanding of the nature and character of modern
combined-arms combat, a good knowledge of the principles of modern
tactics, and a correct understanding of its laws of development.
The present commanders of battalions, companies, and platoons will
in the future become commanders of chasti and soyedineniya, and some
of them may even become important military leaders. It Is very impor-
tant to instill in them, at this early stage, an interest in military
theory and a desire to gain a deep understanding of it. Our command
cadres are not just mastering a trade, but a military art.
It is characteristic that the readers themselves have shown the
greatest interest in such articles. This has been confirmed, in
particular, by the wide response to the article by Col I. SEMENOV,
"Tactics of Podrazdeleniya in Modern Combat" (No 2, 1963). This
article was quoted as an example at many readers' conferences.
A positive evaluatim should be given, on the whole, to such
articles as "Foresight in Battle" by R. SIMONYAN (No 4, 1964), and
"Combat Capabilities of a Company and Its Role in Modern Combat" by
M. DESHKO and I. SEMENOV (No 50 1964).
A serious shortcoming of the journal is the fact that such articles
appear very seldom (usually in the form of disollssions). It may suf-
fice to say that, during the past few years, out of 80-100 articles on
tactics published each year in the journal only 8-10 articles were con-
cerned with theory, and these too were mostly devoted to individual
problems and not to general problems of tactics.
In some measure, the situation is improved by the fact that the
journal regularly publishes discussions of some problems of tactics.
For example, in 1961 and 1962 discussions of the following articles
were organized: "Defense of Rifle Podrazdeleniya" (published in No 10,
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : -RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
1961) and "Offensive of Rifle Podrazde1er4ya" (published in No 11,
196PPrOVIKI 51931ReleawandliW019e:riciAADE415.T0.0871A0000CR09809a3
deleniya in Modern Combat" was discussed.
The promotion of such discussions contributes to the correct solution
of complex problems of modern tactics. It also instills in the officers
cpyRGH.Tdesire for critical analysis and independent evaluation of some aspects
of military affairs. This is a higher form of perfecting the tactical
skill of officers then, for example, a simple reading of articles and
the use of recommendations made in them.
There is no doubt that the effectiveness of a discussion depends on
the quality of its organization, on the importance of the problems pre-
sented in the article to be discussed, and the editors' ability to sort
out the frevently contradictory responses from readers and to draw the
correct conclusions in summarizing a discussion.
In this respect, we believe that the discussion of the article
"Tactics of Podrazdeleniya in Modern Combat" was a definite success of
the journal. The article raised several urgent problems, which had
received a contradictory interpretation in our military literature, in-
cluding the following topics: the expediency of refraining from dividing
marches into normal and forced marches; the order of organizing recon-
naissance and security on a march; thoughts on the character of operations
of podrazdeleniya in meeting engagements, during an offensive against a
defending enemy and on the defensive; and others.
In publishing the article, the editors gave the readers enough time
to study it and express their opinions. In three issues of the journal
(Nos 7, 8, and 9 of 1963), the editors published 10 comments from readers,
and No 10 of the journal contained a review of the remaining comments.
In the first issue of the journal for 1964, the editors summarized the
results of the discussion in a detailed, well-reasoned article.
Undoubtedly, such a discussion not only aroused the interest of
readers, but also helped considerably to broaden their tactical outlook,
which is very important under present conditions. We hope that the
journal will continue to publish such discussions in the future. In
addition to special discussions, it would be desirable for authors of
the remaining articles to express their opinions with regard to state-
ments of other authors and conduct arguments with one another, supply-
ing well-founded reasons for their conclusions.
The revolution ia military affairs does not signify by any means
that the experience of the last war has become obsolete and that the as-
similation of this experience can add nothing to the development of
modern tactics. In his awn time, V. I. Lenin emphasized: "We cannot
learn to solve problems with new methods today, if we have not learned
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
100
CPYRG
?
from yesterday's experience to recognize the mistakes of the old methods."
AppKorteciff,ovfle4wkbaiii0QM/092lirelfiraWMIN8Z5ROMOIQQ9C4034tuati on
in military affairs.
-IT
We must also take into consideration that many methods of operations,
which were characteristic for the last war, will find their application
in modern wqrfare. However, they must be used in conformity with the
new conditions and with the changes in the character of combat and the
means of conducting it.
A constructive assimilation of experience gained in the last war is
also very important because of the fact that many officers, who are
now in command of podrazdeleniya, have no combat experience. Their
number will gradually increase. It is very important for them to become
familiar with the militnry past.
Voyennyy Vestnik has done much to promote the assimilation and
utilization of experience gained in the Great Patriotic War. The jour-
nal regularly publishes recollections of our outstanding military leaders,
generals and officers who took part in the war. The journal published
interesting collections of articles in honor of the 20th anniversaries
of battles of the Volga, of Kursk, and of the Dnepr, of the victories of
Leningrad and of the Korsuns-Shevchenkovskiy operation. There have been
many descriptions of instructive combat episodes, and the authors of
tactical articles frequently refer to examples from past war experience.
In this respect, therefore, the journal is to be commended.
However, there is one aspect in assimilating the experience of the
Great Patriotic War which has been largely neglected. Any example, even
the most instructive one, is nothing but an illustration. A single
example is not yet a basis for research r.,..nd ecientifically founded de-
ductions. Therefore, without in any way belittling the importance of
using examples to illustrate certain situations, it is hoped that the
journal and its authors will devote themselves to a more thorough
analysis of the development of tactics and its individual elements
during the past war and that they will determine methods of operations
which could be used constructively at the present time, not on AATe
basis of isolated facts, but as a result of careful analysis of all
aspects.
The development of military theory and the perfection of the
officers' professional skill are, of course, not the ultimate aim. The
solution of these tasks must further the fulfillment of the major aim
of our army, i.e., to achieve, in every possible way, an improvement in
the combat readiness of troops. One of the mo3t important elements of
combat readiness is combat training. Therefore, the requirements and
conclusions of modern military-scientific thought must be applied per-
sistently to the practical training and education of personnel. Theory
and practice must be combined into a single whole.
ADDroved For Release 2000/08/09 ? CIA RDP85T00875R000300090003 3
CPYR
APIPINACRIMEIFtligataggPOR.?%ligl,f00.85HPFgalelgiggigNOtNeb3
lb.e combat trainiLa and education of personnel are in the center of its
I
ttention. This is the leading theme of the journal, both in regard to
the quantity of articles and the:? singleness of purpose. It should
also be noted that most of thr mt...b.ials on tactics in other sections
of the journal are closely connected with the main theme.
In the present survey, we are unable to discuss all aspects of
solving this many-sided proelem in the jornal, and we shall mention only
a few Of then1,! mainly tbOse cOhcerhed with improvihg the quality of
training.
Every year, the first issue of the journal opens with an editorial
which SUMS up the results in the work of soldiers of the Ground Forces
during the past' year and announce the tasks for the new training year.
Such an editorial, entitled "Toward New Achievements," appeared in
the first issue of the journal for the current year. It emphasizes
the inseparable connection between ideological and organizational work
and draws particular attention to the role of combat readiness under
present conflitioils.
The first editorial, as it were, sets the tons for all following
articles. High quality of combat training and, consequently, the
combat readiness of troops are impossible without a thorough study of
regulations and their strict execution by the personnel. It is vite
justified, therefore, that the lead editorial in the same issue of the
journal is followed by another editorial entitled "The Requirements of
Regulations Must Form the Basis of Training and Education." The article
explains the role of regulations in training and education of personnel
and draws attention to some aspects of the requirements established by
regulations. However, unfortunately, in many respects this article,
which is not bad on the whole, repeats some of the principles expressed
in the first editorial published in that issue. For example, it dis,msses
the need to refrain from stereotypes, the importance of mastering collbat
equipment and weapons, the significance of improving gunnery training,
the importance of good drill, etc. Undoubtedly, repetition is essential
to learning, but in this case it would be better to avoid it. Otherwise
one gets the impression that both articles were insufficiently coordinated.
There are many factors determining the quality of training. However,
the principal factor at this time is undoubtedly concerned with training
methods.
The revolution in means and methods of combat operations must na-
turally result in radical changes in the methods of training and educa-
tion of troops.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
102
PYRGHT
?
.....-. ....; ..; ...-...
a new corn a equipmer nna arms are a great ea more complex than
the oneu existing only a few years ago. Consequently, it is more dif-
ficult to master them. This fully applies to the mastery of new methods
of warfare. A mechanical increase of the time for training will not do
any good. Figuratively ()raking, it is now very important to increase
the efficiency of combat training, to achieve higher results with
minimum expenditures. This in impossible without using new moans and
methods of training.
Therefore, the new, leading methods are the main factor in improving
the quality of combat training. The lead article "Toward New Achieve-
mento" correctly stresses that "the training and education of soldiers
is a complex task, requiring grom the officers great knowledge, high
culture, and a mastery of methods."
Let us see how the journal itself takes part in the elaboration of
new training methods and how it helps officers to improve their mastery
of methods.
In this respect, the principal task of our entire military press,
including the journal Voyennyy Vestnik, consists in the generalization
analysis, and publication of progressive methods in the training and
education of personnel.
From an analysis of the journal's contents one must conclude that
serious attention has been given to the propaganda of progressive
methods. In 1962, a special issue, No 12, was entirely devoted to
this subject. However, such a concentration of generalization in one
issue proved to be wrong. What this generalization amounted to was one
single "campaign"; it was mostly a summing up of results, without showing
the development of new, progressive methods of training and education.
Many articles of the issue miffer from excessive eulogizing. It is true,
however, that even progressive methods must be evaluated critically,
without hesitating to point out the difficulties and mistakes which had
to be overcome by commanders, as well as party and Komsomol organizations,
on the way to the achievement of high end results.
It would also be better to generalize and publici:e progressive
methods not just once a year, but from day to day.
It is not surprising, therefore, that in 1963 the editors used a
different approach. Beginning with the first issue and in almost every
following issue, the journal published a selection of articles concerning
outstanding podrazdeleniya of different arms and special troops. This
made it possible to discuss progressive methods in the course of one
year in a more systematic manner. Another good feature was that many
selections of articles were preceded by Introductory articles by noted
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
10
v te? ? t
PYRGliffven in our army to tho publicizing of progressive methods and helped
commanders and party-political workers to concentrate on the most im-
portant aspects of these methods. The publication of selections of
material made it possible to show the different aspects of the work of
commanders, and party and Komsomol organizations of leading podrazdeleniya.
Outstanding officers had the opportunity to give an account of their work.
and journalists also wrote reports about the officers' methods.
The most satisfactory selections of material concerned leading
motorized rifle and tank battalions (No 11), an engineer-technical
company (No 7), and a leading landing force company (No 8).
Some of the best articles on progressive methods are filled with
facts and vivid examples. One can say many words about the need to use
different forms for developing creative, intelligent initiative in sub-
ordinate officers, without stirring the readers' imagination. The
article by M. YEPISHKIN, "The Strength Lies in the Collective" (No 11,
1963), cites an example showing how Maj P. MMTIN, commander of a motorized
rifle battalion, taught Capt V. SYROYEGIN, company commander, a lesson
on the correct choice of a line of defense; this example is more im-
pressive than wordy explanations. However, the same article describes
the role of a party organization in general, conventional phrases: "The
party organizations decide all complex questions placed before them with
expert understanding." This is followed by a list of names of party
organization leaders and of soldiers admitted to the party. The author
of the article was unable to explain, however, what actually constituted
the practical help given by the party organization to the commander in
forming and educating a united collective.
We had a reason for citing this example from a fairly good article
which was included in one of the best selections. General statements
and "phrases for the sake of phrases" are particularly out of place in
articles on progressive methods. The editors should be very exacting
in regard to such articles.
Unfortunately) articles on progressive methods also have other
shortcomings. Even though they are written about different podrazde-
leniya, they often repeat one another. Frequently, the praise given to
leading servicemen detracts from the essence of the progressive methods
used; it prevents the author from fully explaining the training methods
in general and in regard to particular training subjects.
Moreover) during the past year the same strict demarcation existed
between progressive methods used by different podrazdeleniya of the arms
and special troops, as had been the case in the previous year. Only in
that year the materials on all outstanding podrazdeleniya had been col-
lected in one issue and this time they were distributed over several
Approvea Keiease zuuuiutsiuu : (AA-KU-Job I UUtlibKUUUJUUUUUUUJ-J
id+
?
osues. As a resu t, some problems which applied equally to all pod-
razdeleniya were repeated several times, while the specific problems
often were of no interest to officers of other arms.
During the current year, the journal has once more changed the form
of presenting materials on progressive methods. It now publishes the
generalized experience of several outstanding podrazdeleniya on one
particular subject of training. For example, issue No 2 contained
articles on prcgressive methods of training paratroopers, while issue
No 3 contained a similar article on rifle training of a rifle company.
It is noted that the articles have become more purposeful and that
their description of methods has improved considerably. As an example,
we may refer to the articles "A Solid Foundation," and "In a Para-
tropper Garrison" (No 0); "Makes Use of All Possibilities" and "Devotion
to Work, Search, and Innovations" (No 3).
This form of propaganda of progressive methods is therefore quite
justified. However, in our opinion, it should not become a routine
matter. In addition to such selections of articles on a special sub-
ject, one should publish from time to time comprehensive selections
concerning one outstanding podrazdeleniye, similar to those published
in 1963. Or, one may select a form such as the regular publication of
reports from the same podrazdeleniye during the period of one year.
This would make it possible to report and analyze progressive methods
without any delay. Or, for example, one might publish the diary notes
of an outstanding officer.
In general, the forms of presenting material may vary greatly, and
the editors should continue to select the best ones, without making it
a matter of routine.
The generalization and propaganda of progressive methods in a jour-
nal is not restricted to material in special issues. There are some
elements of it in the remaining articles, particularly in those con-
cerning detailed discussions of methods.
However, the journal has another serious shortcoming of the same
order, as mentioned before in our discussion of articles on tactics.
While the editors have published numerous and often quite successful
articles devoted to the generalization and propaganda of individual new
methods, too little attention has been given so far to the study and
assimilation of all accumulated experience in the use of methods. The
theoretical princi;les of modern methods of trifling and education are
very rarely discussed in articles. However, the time has come to shift
the emphasis from individual cases to generalizations. After all, this
is the only journal which is in a position to do so.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
105
CPYR
AR Ap8mrFbreikrag6Ityde. qA-10151586c4.8741ktreitiobtl; 6 S2St
tuut, un now i as mere y been'p lic zing progressive met o.s but
has not been active enough in trying to introduce such methods in
. _practical training. The party teaches us that the most important thing
(3hVs to introduce progressive methods int,) practice. A journal should
not merely make recommendations. It should report on its pages how
these progressive methods, which have been discussed, are applied to
practice by the troops. Also, in the event such methods are not being
introduced in some podrazdeleniya, it would do no harm to publish some
critical comments. However, in either case, one should not merely cite
examples, but present a thorough anPlysis of the actual situation and
help officers to introduce progressive methods into the daily practice
of their work.
One of the main indices of the quality of combat training is the state
of field training. It is quite correct that the journal has given this
subject constant attention. In 1963, it published several articles which
deserved the readers attention, such as "Skill is Forged in the Field"
(No 7) and "The State of Field Training of Officer Candidates" (No 9).
Now, as never before, training and education are closely related.
The journal has published many articles on educational themes. Un-
fortunately, their cpality is by no means uniform. For example, No 1
of 1963 published an article by V. KONONENKO entitled "Authority and
Position," and No 12 of the same year contained an article by V. samouv,
entitled "To Be a Friend and an Exacting Commander." The subjects and
contents of both articles overlap to a considerable extent, and both of
them expound correct principles. But what a difference between them!
The first article attracts attention because of its tone of Eincerity;
it is like a talk with an older, more experienced friend. The second
article will hardly inspire any emotion whatsoever in the reader. It is
a collection of correct, but well known truths, moderately seasoned with
quotations or simply references to high authorities.
Articles on education must be written with heartful sincerity and
must express trust in the readers and their ability to figure things out
by themselves. One should be a friend of the reader, and not a dry
mentor. Things of the soul [i.e. human relationships] must be discussed
in a warm, sincere manner. Of course, instructions are also necessary,
but not in such a delicate matter,
Some articles discuss questions of training and education apart from
one another. However, the main purpose of Voyennyy Vestnik should be
to illustrate education in the process of training. The June 1963 Plenum
of the CPSU Central Committee also drew attention to this need for close
connection between education and training. Here we call attention to an
interesting selection of articles under the heading "Training and Educa-
tion" in issue No 1 for 1964. We would like to see such selections more
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090008-3
106
App F6196119esliil*Peig% 200V/08TO ISM131:185110087351R81)0v3609131100)3r-3 onunand ors
of podrazdeleniya, similar to the one entitled "Where There is aWill,
There Is Success," by Lt Col V. VOYEVODIN, commander of a tank battalion.
From time to time the journal publishes articles on important ques-
tions, such as the strengthening of one-man command, the maintenance of
high discipline, and others. These questions deserve constant attention.
To further the improvement in the training and education of soldiers,
the editors should not hesitate to publish sharply critical articles,
followed by reports on the measures taken to correct the situation.
This will only help to increase the authority of the journal with the
troops.
In concluding this review, I would like to make a few more comments
and suggestions. For some reason, the journal has neglected a form of
publication which includes answers to interesting questions by readers,
i.e. the publication of articles in the form of consultations or answers
to questions sent to the editors.
There has recently been a considerable improvement in the literary
style and language of most of the articles. However, in this respect
there are still many shortcomings. The principal shortcoming is prob-
ably the fact that all articles in the journal are written in the same
manner. The authors are different, but the language is the same. Some
kind of an average standard has been established. However, even military
articles require not cnly a literate style, but a vivid, graphic language.
One should not hesitate to use apt proverbs or vivid comparisons.
The journal has also established a certain standard with regard to
the volume of published material. Of course, one should not criticize
the desire to enable the largest possible number of authors to publish
their articles, but one should not forget the difference between a
simple informative report from the training fields and a theoretical
article.
A campaign must be waged against wordiness, but not so that it would
detract from the arguments presented by the authors in support of their
opinions.
On the whole, the journal Voyennyy Vestnik has done a great deal.
However, there is still much that remains to be done, since it must
meet the requirements of modern military theory and practice.
* * *
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
10