DIA AND OSD MEMOS RE: ISRAELI RESPONSE TO SYRIAN MOVES ON THE GOLAN FRONT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00506R000100150011-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2001
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: October 24, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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DEFENSE IN't E1 LIC;! NCE AGENCY
0P3rations Support Division
brief `.t+.;; Era.tch
r 1:I--1C
24 ?ctr>ber 1375
MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. ordesman
Re: Your question regarding Israeli
Approved For
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
responses to recent and projected Syrian mo ;- ,
on the Golan Front, the following informatic_I
L " -
w
d'
v
e
?""` Israeli reconnaissance flights were
conducted over the area of the Golan and
:south Syria yesterday and on a daily basis
since 20 October.
"'... No reported. increase in IDF alert posture
on the Golan Front has yet been noted, but
our feeling is that the Israelis could well
h
ca
s a n
increased their alert posture somewhat. So.,._
minor redeployment of, forces in the area may
have occurred, probably into areas which
have recently experienced Syrian incursions.
"- In face of continued posturing by the
Syrians, Asad's option.#1,-no change is t
expected in current Israeli actions.
In face of o p t i o n initiative), the ID? is expected tolmeety
the Syrian initiative on an equal footing.
This would most likely be characterized
by .responsive artillery attacks by fire and
small-scale, temporary incursions across
ave instituted selective re
lld
WARINIRG NOTICE - SENSI T I E" ITST't,.LIGENCE
SOURCES A ETIiODS INVOLVED,_,...?-
Jm.''"^.`?M'r+'T~!^.r.'+~-+....~..~~..t+.~..w4^~-o,r ?y~..?v.t-?-.~...r ww..!;vrn a?..~ qi : hin...
DIA, OSD Declassification/Release Instructions on File
Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100150011-7
 4 Approved For Release 2001/09/03': CIA-RDP84B00506ROOQ150011-7 ~,(/c~?
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
the border. They cciuld also strengthen
forces in the area by instituting a limited
recall of reserves and demonstrate their
concern by conducting exercises in northern Israel
To date
we hav
seen no
vid
.
e
,
e
ence
of this activity.
-- In face of cption #3, or IDF perception
of.' the imminence of such a possibility,
Israel could well Initiate a preemptive
ground or air attack with forces
now on active duty.
r
-5
J5F
CFlARNTI1G flOTICE SEN TI 4r a ?'ET~ L2 Y
SOU1 CES .ID I-r.TYlQDS 1NV?L'VED
Approved For Release 2001/09/03 CIA-RDP84B00506R000100150011-7
 ,Approved For RelqWe 2001/09/03 :.CIA-RDP84B00506R0100150011-7
MEMCPRANDUM OR VADM RECTAANUS
SUBJ 'C'Ti
DIAPIAI-'P1 , 14;-75, . v ria: Mavee 'ot~,ard ~~ilitaz
!a. atio . G'~'ar~?zitx cat~Ili, enca . p a s Z4 October ex
(S) This' is a good joib Of reporting. ? Most of ?the .
intelligrence evidence is provided and all of the data is laid out
.in logical, order. The tone is exception.al.ly well balanced and
objective, It has a good summary and it lays out the major
possible corxtingerzci s and. aesigna them a probalti.Uty. This is
precisely the kind bf warning that the Commi.mity ahoulci give
vr.hen it fe not sure Of events. but sees various indicators buildIvig
tip..
(S) The apprai.;a?I also does son-te'thing moat of the
briefings have not. It mentions Lebanon and assigns a good set
of probabilities as to, Syrian intentions for the day avlo yIaich it
Was written. Its major defect is that it does not mra.rn that
Syrian intentions; could change radically if evennts get totally out
o? control in Lebanon. It does not cover the range of possible
cantingen.cles.
(C) The appraisal also falls to consider possible Israeli
reactions. S. asked for a. sepa.xate note on these (attached), and
there; ias eVidently a. good probability that Israel might seriously
over-react to .llmites3 .`3yrinin initiativeo. I have confirmed this
with the, DIO. Unfortunately, many Alert lv'.emoroncla fail into this
same trap.. They consider only the actions taken ley the side or
group whose indicators have changed. They fail to consider the
probable response. In thin case, the problem is particularly
striking because Israeli over-reaction might trigger Soviet reactions
sifled by_-__..__-~~!~1_(
'PT FI,Q'd GENERAL DECLASSIFIC1''TION SCUEDULI OF
UTI'VE ORDER I.IG52. EXhMPTION CATEGORY _~ -,
;ASSIFY
Ap.proved For Release 2001/09/03: CIA-
 Approved For Release 20014091 p0 ~;RDP84BW` ?A(~6R00J0 ~, ~1\y~,~)17 y
-- A cietallcct chronology of events and indicators
should be providod. The reliability of the
noarce of ind{catorc should be stated, and
minor or leas rctlablc 3ndicatoris ah.ould ba
listed to gi rc a camp rot-ion s We picture. of the
all alert memoranda. or warning appraisals
should be terminated.
Anthony H. Cord.esu an,
Chief? Pvorloct rwaItzation Division
4 % {
SECRET ~' vii , C~~' ~ ~ iG ' p.~i W~~.+~`51
L'r iS.~. t-