JPRS ID: 10712 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS ~L/ 10712
4 August. 198~
ub-Sahar~n Africa Re ort
S p
C:FOtJO~ No.~ 784)?
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCASY INFORMATION SERVI~E
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JPRS L/10712
' 4 August 1982
_ SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT
FOUO No. 784
CONTENTS
ANGO.LA
Briefs
UNITA Operation Announced 1
Mocamedes Port Importance StressEd 1
CAMEROON
Economic Situation at lOth Anniversary Noted
2
(Gerard Negreanu; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 19 May 82)
CHAD
_ Habre Seen as Gaining Over Goukouni, Kamougue 5
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 19 May 82)
GUINEA BISSAU
Briefs
EC Regional Development Financing 7
MOZAMBIQUE
Briefs 8
Cahora Bassa Electricity Production
Netherlands Beira Port Loan 8
NIGER
Effects of Decline of Uranium Prices, French Aid Noted
(Jacques Latremoliere; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MIDITERRANEENS, 14 May 82) 9
- - a - [III - NE & A - 120 FOUOJ
_ F~1R (1FFif f 4i. 11SF ONi.Y
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SENEGAI,
~ Country~s Neutrality in Falklands Wax Seen as ~Curious~ f
. (Siradiou Diallo; JE[TNE AFRIQUE, 19 May 82) ....o....... 1?
Z]:1KMMBA$WE
Success of Mugabe~s Etiiropean Trip Reported
~~'SY1C01S ?5'O11C~8Y1~ ~~'i ~1~Q~'i~ 9 eTll11 ~`Z~ 19
-b-
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~xc;o~
BRIEFS �
UNITA UPERATIONS ANNOUNCED--In a communique published by its delegation in
Paris on 1 July, UNITA lis~ed the operations it conducted during the first
half of June, announcing that it killed 173 Angolan soldier�, as well as
14 Cuban military; its operations also resulted in 550 wounded and the capture
of 35 foreign citizens (half of whom are Portuguese nationals). UNITA more-
over noted that it captured 41 members of the government armed forces and that
it destroyed 9 helicapters. UNITA losses amounted to 12 dead, 43 wounded and
5 whose fate is unknown. [Texr.] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 16 Jul 82 p 2041] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.J
MOCAMEDES PORT TMPORTANCE STRESSED--The port of Mocamedes--the main outlet to
the Atlantic Ocean ~or Angolafs southern provi.nces--is important both
st:ategically and econom3ca11y. Tta role is now threatened both by the
aerial supxe~naacy of South Afr3ca, which has increased its reconnaissance
flights in the region 3.ately, and (but ~nore d3.stantly, as this latter threat
is mainly of concern to the htaterland) by the stepp~ng up of th~ activities
of the Units opposition ~novement in areas where it 3s active. Regarding the
strategic 3mportance of the port, the authorities ~n Luanda deny South
Afr3ca's clsim that Mocamedes ~.s used for the unloading of military materiel
for SWAPO. But the port 3s the sna3n approach for the provision of supplies
to the southern Angolese army, since the overland routes linking the ports of
Zobito and Benguelu (400 lc~ to the narth) w3th towns in the interior (Hui~.a
~nd Lubango) and unsafe and diffl3cult, the situation being insecure. Regard-
ing, the economic importance of the port, it is now practically the only outlet .
to the sea for Angola~s southern provinces. Zts ore port, which was estab-
xished for iron ore leaving Cas~3nga, 3s the terminus of the railroad which
servi~es fihe province of Cuando-Cubango via that of Hu31a. Mocamedes is also
Angola's principal f3shing zone and one of the mast important on the African
cont~nent. An Angolese and an Angolo-Spanish f ish3ng fleet use it; Soviet
tra~vlers operate farther north. But Moscow is sti11 Angola's principal
partner in th3s sector. [Text] [Paris MARCcIES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS
in I'rench Na 1907, 28 May 82 p 1413] [COPYRTGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris
1982.] 9855
CSO: 4719/1058
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~
CAI~lEBOON �
ECONOMIC SIT[1ATION AT lOth ANNIVBRSARY NOTID
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1115, 19 Maq 82 pp 63, 65-66, 69
[Article by Gerard Negreanu: "Capital Trust"]
[Text] On the 20th of May, Csmeroon celebrates brilliantly the lOth anniver-
sarq of the reunification of the t~rn former Engliah-speaking (Southern) and
Fxench-speaking provincea. It Mas, ia effect, in 1972 that the former Federal
Republic became thn United Republic of Cameroon.
The decade thus defined has been an economica119 8ood one. A few key figures
show progress in pxactiaally all sectors:
' 1. The gross national product (GNP) increased nearly fivefold, rising from
326.3 billion CFA francs in 1971-1972 to ~,625 billion in 1980-1981.
2. Th~ state budgets aad those of the development plans have taken vertihtile
leaps faxward. The atate budget? It was 54.4 billion CFA france in 1972;
todaq it is 310 billion. Denelopment plans? ~o liundred eighty CFA francs
were allecated to them in 1972-1976, and nearlq ten times more wi11 be al-
located to the Fifth (1982-1987).
3. Similarly, ~nd this is an indication of good management-frow 19T2 to 1982,
the portfon of investments not directly productive fell from 75 to 45 percent.
These statistics aren't always easy for the sverage Caaerooniaa to interpret;
on the other hand, the evolution in the sectors of production is d3rectlq felt
in his daily life. Agriculture, for example. It conceras more than three-
quarters of Camerooniana: more than a3x ~cillion people living ia rural areas
ar.e farmers. Their successes are often cited as an e~cample for all of Africa,
Car~eroon:.an agricul.ture being the real lifeb~ood of the countrq and the prin-
cipal source of currency.
Some examf~es: cacao, first agricultural production of 105,000 tons in 1975-
1976, 122,OQ0 tons in 1979-1980; coffee which went from 58,000 tons in 1977 and
83,000 tons in 1979-1980; pineapplee, wood, palm oil, sugar, and cotton advance
everqwhere, not to mention food crops. Cameroon ia on its ~ay to alimentary
self-sufficiency, when it ian't ezporting to the neighboring couatriee to the
east and south. R'he goves~nment isn't satisfied with giving moral support to
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farmera, it l~elpa them with concrete meaaurea: an increase ia the market
purchase price of products, a special inceative institnted in Febrvary 1971 to
favor new groWars of cacao and coffee. In the sase vay, the sodernizatio~n of
aultivated areas, the policy of eztending food-producing croplaads and the de-
velopment of cooperativas have peroi.tted tbe groMth of a"peasant claes"
conaciousceae, the ~rorking backbone of tbe comitry's econasic develop~enrc.
Worth noting also, on the atructural level, is the tranaforoation of FONADER
(National Rural Developsent Fnad, created in 1973), a baaking eatablist~~ent
capable of accepting deposite so as to better fulfill its role of "banter of
the peasants, and the dupply of fertilizer, vhose i~portatioa co~t 2.12 bil-
lion CFA fraaca in 1977-1978 aad 3.92 billion francs in 1979-1980. As a vhole,
thia policy, aided to be sure by tairly favorable cli~aatic conditions, is
bearing fruit, and the country's leaders are dre~ing af becosing, Mithin the
not too diatant future, "tlu granary of Cen~ral Africa." Meanvhile, Caseroon
ia eafe from faaine aad is even seeing a decr~ase in its i~portatioa of food
prodncta: 1.38 billion Mheat flaur imports in 1980-1981 as opp~sed to 2.34
billion in 1978-1979.
Cameroonian induatry is a1.so esperiencing a fairly speetacular development,
sided, it's true, by natural richee not maay African cauntries poasess (de-
posite of bauaite, iron, hydrocarbides, a very denae and easily controllable
water systen--the second best sqstem in Frenchrsp~aking black Africa, after
~hat of Zaire) and bp a~il-organized banking sys~em.
. P~arsuing the imentory aad ezploitation of its natural rasources, the couatry
is proceeding rapidlq With ita industrialir.ation, aeeking "no holds barred"
the development of its natural reeourcee: iroa depoeits have been disc~trered
in the region of Mbalam, while that of Mamellee, close to Rribi, promises 120
miYlion reeerve tone, according to estimates. The gcvernmrnt pro~ects an in-
vestment of 60 billion CFA france tor its exploitation. In the area of natural
gas, also, all hopes are persiasible: uith reserves estimated at 200 billion
cnbic meters the Civil Society for the Esploitation of Csseroonian (SEGAZCAM)
plans to establish a liquefaction factory in the Fsibi region.
We must also dra~ attention to the gaverameat'a realistic oil policy. The
production of Camerooaian black gold, which ia still in an infant state since ~
it only begaa ia 1978 with 800,000 tons of unrefined oil, reached 4.3 million
tons in 1981. The ealea volume: 300 billion CFA france of which 178.62 (that
is, more than 57.62 percent of the 1981-1982 budget) Ment to the Treasury fuad.
It's a conaiderable aum. But th~ leaders have had the wisdam of keeping a
cool head in the face of the temptations oil a~ealth usually provokes and
haven't thrown themeelves into o~verly ambitious pro~ects based solely on oil,
so as not to run the riek, se hae happened elseWhere, of an upeet in develop-
ment pro~ectiona and an acceleration of the rural e~wdus, which aould deprive
agriculture of laborere. Oa the contrarq, according to the Minister of the
Economy and ~he Plan, Bello Bouba Maigari,.the sutboritiea consider the revanue
proceeding fram oil "a subsidy fos the realiz~tion of development ob~ectivea."
For, "oil reeourcee are uncertain; depoeite sre ezhauated with time; tbe prices
of this product are sub~ect to unpredictable fluctuations."
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Th~a economic picture of the couatry on this eve of the lOth anniversary of the
creation of the Unitsd Republic of Cameroon does not of course coneiet en-
tirely of positive aspecta. There are ahadoM+s in certain s~ctora, "developing"
Cameroon is beginaing to be confroated by the problms of industrialised
couatries:
--a consumer retail price index xhat is climbing;
--rental ratea that increase more rapidly than salaries;
--difficulty in finding employment in certain aectora, notable for youag people
and profeeeionals (the corollary, a1so, of a high rate of school attendance:
100 percent at the primasq level);
--the "Cameroonization" o� certain key aectora of the economy ~+hich the leaders
would like to see move more quickly, all the whiie maintaining the overall
balance and the neceseity ~or foreign investmeats.
Besides t:~is, the Fifth Plan proposes as one of !ts prioritq objectives the
promotion of natioaal small and medium-eized buainesses and the willingaeas
to build an ecoaamy more or~aQed tawards the dome~tic market.
Everything 'encourages us to think that these ob~ectives can be attained.
For Cameroon hae another asset: it's the African country with the least debts
(around 25 billion CFA franca in 1981, that ie, hardly 8 percent of the budget).
This is all the more meritorious in that these results have been obtained ia
aa unfavorable iaternational contiext, characterized by the two oil sbocks af
1973-1974 aad 1979-1980, a general economic crisis, a m~~or slump in world
prices of the ataples eaported aad the coasiderable increase in value of the
merchandise and equipment imported. It's also one of the African countries
that has best succeeded in "managing" its budget: thanks to a diaciplined
policq of economic libera'ism, opea and directed at the same time.
State budgets are balanced ~ri.th their own receipts (with the exception of the
two deficits of 1973-1974 and 1974-1975). ~'he authoriCies demonstrate the
same rigor with respect to debt utilization: long-term loans, lese costly,
finance investments which are not directly productive while short-term laans,
closer together and tied to more onerous conditions, are allocated to pro~ects
which are more immediatelq profitable.
This manner of sdminietering public finances is reeponeible for the fact that
Cameroon en~oya a precious capital trust with the foreign investors from whom
it cont~acts for the 1.aans it n~eds. "Busiaeseman's paradise" as JEUNE
ATRIQUE ECONOMY wrote several months ago, foreiga investors ~ostle each other
in Cameroon: in ~g80 Ameri~ana, Prenct?, Englieh, Spanish, Dutch purchased al-
tc~gether 296,981 milliou CFA francs in Cameroon, which repreaented an increase
of 49.3 percent campared to the preceding year. A nice score for 10 years of
management:
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 198?~
9825
CSO: 4719/1047
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CHAD
HABRE SEEN AS GA~NxNG Oy~~ ~OUICdUN~, KA'MOUGUE .
Paris JEUNE AFRTQUE in ~rench No 1115, 19 P4ay 82 p 26
[Article: "Goukoun~. Losing, Kamougue Not Winn~.ng"]
[Text] The minister~al reshuffl~ng announced by President Goukouni Oueddei
has become...a consti~ut3onal revislon. Except that Chad doesn't have a con-
stitution. By sign3ng on 8 May a"Nd~ amena declaration" setting up, on a '
_ para11e1 basis to ~he GUNT ('~~tansiCional National Union Government), a State
Council, "a body for the conception of ideas, for reflection, or consultation
and orientat3on," Goukouni and h3~ vice president, Col Wada1 Abdelk~der
Kamougue, have given the 1ie to what they have been professing during tl~e last
few weeks: Goulcotini ~*3.shed to reahuffle the government, he decided (or was" he
forced?) to double cross it; he planned to get rid of Kamougue, crediting the
latter as bei.ng the strongest today of a11 the other Chadian enemy brothers;
K~mougue threatened to withdraw into ttle south--to plan a secession;-�-Y~e is
establishfng himself and reinforcing h3s poeition in the capital and as the
leader of Chad.
For at least by appearances, the State Council, pres:Lcled over by Col
F,Emougue--ana made up of a11 the other faction leaders of whom Goukouni him-
self is one--has been called upon to exerc3se the real power. Most likely its
duty i~ to "help and assist the head of state and the government in conducting
domestic affairs, organizing the army, and running the adninistration," but ~t
~~ill be called upon especially to aeek out "the ways ancl mPans to achieve
peace, maintain and consolidate it, and preserve national un3ty and territorial
integrity." The bas3c m~:ssage must be retained Chrough the words: financial
management will be ~he ~rovince of the government; peace and diplomacy, in
short pol3tics with a capital "P," will devolve upon the State Council. Or in
other terms: Kamougue, w1~o presides over the Council, has taken the upper
hand over Goukouni who r.uns the government.
However, these appea~�ances do not portray the realities. The state's two
"strong men" are perhaps among tt~e most isolated in Chad today. One of them,
Goukouni, has wanted to make changea in his government at a time when his re-
fusal to accept any negotiati~ns ~rlth Hissein Habre has been conCeated by all
his partners, including Kamougue himself and Acyl Ahmat, who is reputedly pro-
Libyan bu~ who is p:epared to deal.
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As for Kamougue, protestations have been made against him within the Permanent
Comnittee of the South, ~ahich he prea3des over now onlq symbolically. Further-
more, the tw~o-headed govertunent eetablished in Nd~amena does not resolve the
heart of the problem: the Chadian criS3s involvea less the current "governor.s"
thau tP,e "peace of the stroag" Hhich Risae3n Habre is the only one in a posi-
tion tcday to offer.. Pur~lq and a3mply because it is he who holds the reins
of militarq power. Rebel though he is, he is the one occupying the territorr.
Tt~e heada of neighboring atatea are pushing Goukouni to negotiate. He is still
refusing to do so. Se ie the onlq one. And he no longer has the wherewithall
to support his obatiaacy.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRIIPJTA 1982.
9927
CSO: 4719/1009
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GUTNEA BISSAU
BRTEFS
RC REGIONAL DEV~LOPMENT FTNANCTNG--The Connniss3on of the EEC 3s preparing to
adopt a numTier of decisions about f3nancing for the following projects approved
- by the member states at an 18 T~tay ~?neeting of the FED [European Development Fund]
(1 ecu = aUout $1). Gu~,nea Bissau: rural development of the Safata Gabu zone
(6.8 millton ecu subs3c~y). The new pro~ect, which wi11 be cofinanced by the
FAC [A~d and Development Fund] 3ncludes: /construction work in rura:l areas/:
access and servics roads, reclamat3on of 1owlands; /harness in farming;
suppl~es of multi-purpose cult3vators, seeders and carts; /village equipment/:
huskers, peanut threshers, corn she113ng ~,achines, scales, ~ni11s, village ware-
houses; /peanut silos/: cons~ruct3on of new silos; reconstruction and main-
tenance of o1d s3~os, equtrrment; /seed production/ for peanuts and replace-
ment of 1oca1 variefiies by ~noxe productive grain varieties; /animal husbandry/:
h~alth protect3on for draPt an3mals; /factors of production/: fertil3zers,
trucks to transport products and crops; /~maintenance% af build3ngs and equ3p-
ment; /'personnel/: 1oca1 personnel and tts logist~cs; /tra~ning/: mainly on
the spot for ~atanagexial personnel, and tra3ning of some craftsmen, espec~.ally
blacksmitha; a 13fiexacy program w~11 a1~o be set up; /technical assistance/:
f:tve experrs w3.7.1 be prov3ded by ~'ED. There are 25,000 fam313es who wi11 be
a~~'.ected by the project. Extra production due to the pro~ect ~s expected to
be about 13,000 tons of grain, 4,000 tons of cotton, and 6,OQ0 tons of peanuts.
k'AC wi11 contribute 3.6 million ecus, to fihe pro3ect. There wi11 be inter-
national bidding for the supply contracts; other expenditures will be under
state superv~s3.on. [Excerpts] [Paris 'MARCHES TROPZCAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French No 1907, 28 Ma.y 82, p 13$1] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreaux et Cie Paris
1982.] 9855
CSO: [~719/1058
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MOZAl~IQUE
BRTEFS
CAHORA BASSA ETaECTRTCTTX PRODUCTT~N--Electrical energy produced by the Cahora
Bassa dam wi11 be able to' xeach central and northern riozambique by the middle
of 1985, when the woxk an;d pxo~ects now betng carr3ed out under the heading
"Centex-Noxth 7.ine" are complete. Wtzen th3s ltne becrnnes operat3onal it wi11
enabl~ Mozamb~c~ue fio dixect7,y consume al~most 20 pexcent of the electricity
prod~uced by fihe dam. The annual growth rate 3s expected to be 10 percent.
Next Aecember the f~rst phase of tRe const�ruct3on of the Center-North line
wi11 be comp7.eted. Current w3.1~. then reach T~ocuba, in Zambez3.a, making it
possible to tmplemenfi a nun~bex of 3ndustr3al, agr3cultural and mining develop-
ment pxo3ects. Among the centers slated for development are Caia (r.eavy ~n-
dust~ry), T~ua~o, and ~Iarrameu (sugar industry). Electrical energy wi11 also be
l~roughfi to the uxban centers of Nampula, Que13a?ane and Pemba; these areas now
rely on old dtesel 031 power plaiits. The second phase of the pro3ect--which
has a~.ready begun--w~.17. brtng electric3ty to Nampula. Pemba is the ob~ective
o~ the th~x+d phase, wh~ch alsa provtdes for a number of secondary lines lead-
~ng ~'rom ~he ~a3n one that w~11 prov3de electric3ty to less 3mportant indus-
tx3a~, and uzban cent~ra. The whole pro~ect w311 cost $230 mi113on; it ~s to
be f3nanced by credtt 1~nea opeaed by ~rench and Ttal3an banks. The work will
be dune by a consort~um of enterpr3ses of these two countries. B3ds have been
requested 3nternationally for the construction of six secondary stations on
i:h~~ line. At present Mozambic~ue uaes a very sma11 part of the total energy pro-
duced bv the Cahora Bassa dam, and part of that ~s transformed 3n South Africa
_ before be3ng seat back to 'Mozambique. Zimbabwe 3s interested in buy3ng elec-
trical enexgy from Cahora Bassa; the second power plant would have to be in-
stalled for this. 'Most of the energy produced by Cahora Ba~sa is now sold tu
South Africa, although acts of sabotage agains~ the high voltage power lines
interfere with these sal.es. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPTCAU:C ET P'IF:DITERRANEENS
3.n Trench No 1907, 28 May 82 p 1413] [~OPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris
1982.] 9855
.
NETHERLANDS BEIRA PORT LOAN--The Netherlands granted Mozambique a 31 milYion
florin loan (approximately 12 million dollars) on 7 July to improve the port of
Beira. The loan is reimbursable in 25 years at a rate of interesr of 0.75 per-
cent and carries a 10-year grace period. The funds will be used for the purchase
of materials and services in the Netherlands. [ExcerptJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Jul 82 p 2041] [CUPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie .
Paris 1982.]
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NIGER
EFFECTS OF DECLINE OF URANIUM PRICES, FRENCH AID NOTED
Paris MARCHES TRQPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French :~0 1905, 14 May 82 pp 1251-
1254
[Article by Jacques Latremoliere: "Niamey, a New Rate of Development"~
[Excerpts] There is no doubt that Francois Mitterrand ha~ chosen Niger for his
first presidential trip to tropical Africa because Co1 Seyni Kountche was one
of the first African heads of state to make contact with him after 11 May
1981. It is also because this "midway republlc"--which 3s not only a neigh~
bor of war-torn Chad and of that seething mass of ethnic groups and cultures
that constitutes Nigeria but also part and parcel of the Sahara region agi-
tated by Qhadhdhafi's propaganda--plays a particularly important role in French
policy.
Nigeriens and French have a lot to discuss in the political and economic
spheres. B~~:: for these talks to be conducted on a sound basis, both sides
will ha~;~ to dwell in depth on their past relations. French people are not
aware of the identity problem experienced by Niger. Tt is c}uestionable whether
the Nigerien people themselves have a correct appreciation of this problem.
In France, Niger is often viewed as one of those artificial states whose
borders were drawn according to the whim, arbitrary decision or interests of the
former colonizer. This is perhaps true in the case of its Saharan borders, al-
though the officers and geographers who drew those borders took into account the
points to which the populations were gravitating. In any event, i~s southern
borders were: set f.or specific reasons and it is hard to understand why some
Nigeriens deplore the split of ethnic groups for which the colonizers are
blamed.
These are not simple differences of opinion among scholars. Sone provinces--
because they were distant or had princes who wPre good at maneuvering--managed
to avoid being conquered or faliing within t:~e sphere of influ~nce of the Shehu
of Kouka and of the emirates rules by the Foulbe aristrocracy, thanks to a
sense of identity which Niger was able to turn to good account to consolidate
its national unity endangered by the length of its vital central region.
It is also inaccurate as well as risky to consider the Kaossen rebellion of
1917 as one of the heroic mements of the Nigerien resistance to colonialism.
Inspired and armed by the ~'?nussiya--whose former ambitions Colonel Qhadhdhafi
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tends to espouse today after oueting the last khallf from the Libyan throne--
in the Nigerien arena that rebellior merely reprer~ented, the resistance of the
Berber grouFe, both pre~Touareg and ToL~reg1, to the inet�itable dismantling of
their symbiotic association with the black inhabitants of the Sahel.
The Tambari of the Kel Gress, for instance, insisted on describing the annual
taxes paid to the French administrator as a"war tribute" and this attitude
did not change when the French left. In 1981, Qhadhdhafi used it as an ex-
cuse to accuse Niger of "persecuting the Touaregs" and it was a decisive
factor in the betrayal committed b~ Mohamed Ag Ahmadou, Colonel K.ountche's
former principal chief secretary, who defected to Tripoli with 11 other dis-
affected companions. This incident showa that the Touareg society is un-
stable rather than that it wants to form a separate state. It is a socio-
economic problem rather than a political problem but is 3ust as important for
the government in Niamey, considering the loeation of the uranium deposits,
its ma~or source of revenue.
' Misunderstandings To Eliminate, Ob~ectives To Understand
- With Francois Mitterrand arriving in Niamey in a few days' time, these histor-
ical facts need to be recalled so that the effectiveness of his visit is not
msrr~d by basic misunderstandings. It would be to the advantage Af Niger to
revise some of its national themes, not so much because they have anti-French
overtones bu~ because they actually run c~unter to Niger's goals of cohesion,
strongly shared by France which is bent on preventing the creation of new
methods of destabilization in the region.
The s;ime change of attitude is required on the part of the French side where
people have taken a long time to accept the overthrow of Diori Hamani, who was
considered to be one of the pillars of the independent French-speak3ng Africa,
and to discontinue their biased remarks against the authors of the overthrow.
Jean-Pierre Cot�s few words on 18 September 1981 when, addressing the European
and African Press Association, he mentioned that unilitary regimes in Africa
represent an "acknowledgment of failure" caught people's attention in Niger
because it came shortly after Colonel Kountche's visit to Paris. The problem
with that phrase is not so much its literal meaning as the interpretation at-
tached to it: namely, that in the view of the French minister a military re-
gime can be ~ustified when a situation becomes catastrophic but that there can
be no recovery at all unless there is a return to civilian rule. According to
this interpretation, the minister was not stating a fact but expressing a poli-
tical principle which caused irritation.
As a political principle, the idea is questionable. If 8 out of the 15 French-
speaking countries of tropical Africa are now under military regimes or under
regimes headed by military leaders, it is partly because, in those countries,
the army is the normal career for high school graduates from the poor classes,
unlike the sons of civil servants and merchants who prefer to go into other
careers. Also, i.n a period of crisis, it is natural for the army to be consid-
ered as a repository of learning an~ its hon~sty seems to be guaranteed by the
fact that the military stay away from top economic positions. In Africa, con-
' trary to what happens in other continents, most military governments have
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escaped the charge of being the too~.s used by the establishment--consisting of
landowners, industriali.sts and businessmen~-to curb the aspirations of the
masses.
_ In Niger, through his personality and by keeping a tight rein on his associ-
ates, Col Seyni Kountche has succeeded in maintaining the spirit of discipline
and integrity which led to the overthrow of Diori Hamani's regime. He did not
try, as was done in Benin and in the Congo, to advance his own interests by
setting the Marxist ideolo~y in motion through the expedient of a party wh.ose
leadership posts are occupied by mr~re or less the same men who form the gene~.:~
staff. What he has tried to do is to channel the youth toward specific, tasks
of public purpose, among others, land development, building schools, health
centers and small dams, planting trees, by incorporating that youth ii~to the
Samarya which now has 9,000 village cells and includes close to 60 per~:en*_ of
persons under 30. In the sphere of zural economy, he opted for the caoper-
ative system. The genuine and voluntary participation of all social classes
in this pro;ect which, since February of this year, has been giv~n the label
of "development ~ociety," offers in Niger the peculi~?-ity of not claiming to
be inspired ~y a revolutionary ideal but by the tradition of its bs3ic politi-
cal and administrative structures which have always covere~ the entire country,
even during the colonial years, in Niger as we11 as in Moslem Chad and in
northern Nigeria.
~ Today, Niger is one of the few French-speaking African countries where tribal
chiefs have direct access to the central government in their official capacity
and are entitled to participate in the task of parastatal development. The al-
liance between the regime and the tribal chiefs increases the points of contact
with the masses and greatly decreases the measures which need to be taken. Tt
is to be hoped that Francois Mitterrand wi11 recognize this policy as being
socialism in action even if it is not called by that name. This wi11 help the
two governments reach the fairly large number of decisions which they need to
_ adopt jointly.
After settling these preliminary problems, both heads of state must clarify a
problem the so].ution of which is of paramount importance for the economy of
Niger and for that country's ~elations with France: it is the question of the
uranium. To understand the conditions which under the talks will take place,
one m~st remember that in 1981 Colonel Kountche made a public statement strongly
denouncing international speculation whicr, according to him, has prevented the
Nigerien state from pursuing its development goals by bringing down the price
of that met:l on the international ~~arket. In 1981, uranium revenues--in
terms of ~irect and indirect taxes, dividends and others--amounted to ~ust
11.7 billion CFA francs compared to 26.8 billion in 1980, so thaC instead of
providing enough assets to cover 90 percent of the investment budget, these
revenues only contributed 6 percent.
~ Uranium, Niger and France
France, represented by the COGEMA (a subsidiary of the French Atomic Energy Com-
mission dealing with the fuel cycle) and by other French companies sucSz as the
CFMU (French Uranium Ores Company), MINATONE [expansion unknown] and Pechiney-
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Mokta, holds a 54 percent interest 3n SOMATR [A~r Region Mfn~ng Company].2
On an average year, France buys 30 percent of the uxaniwa it requires from
Niger and French purchases represent slightly less than 50 percent of the total
production which, in 1981, amounted to 4,200 tons of uranium metal reFresenting
5.700 tons of exported yellowcake. France then was likely to feel that the
criticism made by the Nigerien head of state was directed at it.
_ The latter's disappointment is the more acute because his coming to power had
coincided with the petroleum crisis which fol~owed the Yom Kippur War. As a
result, groduction of uranium metal 3umped from 1,306 tons in 1975 to 4,200 tons
in 1981 while the price of a kilo of uranium rose from 8,750 CFA francs to
24,500 CFA francs. This resulted in the investment capabilities of the country
being greatly increased. The investment budget could be 10 times higher. Thia
investment drive was accompanied by important requests for foreign funding
which meant that between 175 and 1980 the external debt of the state quadrupled
(approximately 190 bi~.lion CFA francs). During that same period, the GDP in-
creased in value by 8.6 percent. Tb.e size of the pro~ects increased accordingly
and the development plan for the 19~1?-1983 period envisaged a 9.5 percent an-
nual growth rate. This far-reaching plan reflected the optimism of a nation
which thought that it was finally going to overcome its poverty of many
centuries, a poverty felt to be particularly unfair for a country which had
joined the market economy.
The price slump ts nut enough to ~ustify the recession which followed. Uranium
is still not quoted off3cially in the London Metal Exchange. The quotai~czs
put oLt by the NUEXCO [expansion unknown], a private organization, only give an
indication of the spot prices based on sales of sma11 amounts of uranium and
these prices have dropped from $45 a pound in 1978 to a current $25 or $26, or
15,500 CFA francs per kilo. At the initiative of the COGEMA, the group of
German, Italian, Japanese and Spanish shareltolders with stock ~n SOMAIR and
COMINAK have agreed in 1982 to pay a surcharge on Nigerien uranium raising its
price to 24,000 CFA francs per ki1c, but this move w311 not preT~ent the 1982
revenue which the state derives from these two companies fa113ng below 10 bil--
lion CFA francs.
The real problem lies in the decreased demand for uranium in the world market.
The ma~or producing countries, such as the United States and Canada, are also
the main users of uranium. They produce enough to satisfy their own iequire-
ments and have huge reserves without even counting the reserves of the uraniwn
in Namibia and Australia. The rate of growth of consumption in the world can-
not be measured by the example of France because the French nuclear program
constitutes a genuine epiphenomenon as a result of the fairly moderate attitude
of its environmental3sts and of the fsct that the EDF [French Electric Company],
which is a state company, can take out long-term loans without desperately try-
ing to seek profits. While it is true that the cost of one oil or coal-
generated kilowatt is respectively three and two times higher than the cost of
one nuclear kilowatt, in the case of the nuclear kilowatt most of that cost
represents the initial investment. This is why 3n Anglo-Saxon co~:~itries, where
the generation of electricity is in the hands of private companies, the fact
that it takes a long time to build a nuclear power station (around 12 years)
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acts as a deterrent given the uncertainty of changes in the price of equipment.
The overall situation is already negative 3n the United States; ~ahere there
have been far more cancellat:tons than new orders.
France itself could be led to take advantage of same characte:�istics of the
uranium maxket. Indeed, its own estimated reserves (150,OO~:i tons with about
2,600 tons mined annually) will only last 50 years prov3.din; that its power
, plants continue to operate as they are doing now by import'ng 60 percent of
the uranium r.equirements, or 23 years if they only use French uranium. But
the rate at which uranium w311 be purcrased cc~tld be influenced by the advan-
advantages offered by the storage of concentrated uranium from the viewpoint
of cost (a 3-year supply of uranium to feed a Y:,~aer station costs the same as
a 3-month supply of fuel oil) and of the storage area required (a 2-year sup-
ply or uranium for all the French nuclear power plants can be stored in a
han~gar). Consumption will also decline as the use of the breeder reactor be.-
comes more generalized and this has nothing to do with the fear of exhausting
reserves of fuel but with wanting to use the potential energy of uranium more
= efficiently.
Looking ahead 30 years, and barring a political upheaval which would result in
Europe being cut off from the oil fields of the Middle East, this situation 3s
not likely to improve since Great Britain has its offshore oil in the North
Sea, the FRG has large reserves of lignite as a backup fuel and Japan, wh3ch
ccsld be a good buyer or uranium, is suffering from an acute attack of "en~
vironmental fever." After that period, the prospects for uranium could be
good ~gain if, as will probably be the case, no other source of energy is found
which can replace uranium from a commercial standpoint.
Summing up, one cannot suspect the companies, either French or foreign, which
are involved in the mining and concentrating of uranium 3n Niger of being in
that business f.or speculative purposes and, as far as that country is concern-
ed, these companies continue to be irreplaceable clients. Half of the produc-
tion of concentrate of sodium uranate or concentrate of magnesium uranate, not
sold to Frence, is regularly exported to the other feur countries, partners of
SOMAIR and COMINAK, in proportion to the capital contributed. The ONAREM (Na-
tional Office of Mineral Resources of Niger) sold 2,000 tons of concentrated
ore to Libya with a surcharge even higher than the one paid by the Western
countries. The use ~o which that ore will be put remains unclear.
Along with exCracting the ore the operating companies and their shareholders
are careful to make this a prof3table operation and to bring to the Saharan
- population the technical benefits which result from these operations. The
first unit (ly megawatt) of a coal-burning thermal power plant in Anou-
~ Araren, wt:ich burns locally mined coal, began operations in 1981. This power
plant is run by SONICHAR [Anou-Araren Coal Company of Niger], a company in which
the Nigerien state holds 60 percent interest, the Islamic DevelopmEnt Bank. 23.4
percent, and SOMAIR nnd COMINAK together, 16 percent. A second unit with the
same generating capacity will be added to the first to provide electricity to
the mines and th~ concentration plants, and to neighboring towns, especially to
Agades. The agricultural experiment of AMIDAR (Arlit Hydro-agricultural De-
velopment) run by the CEA [Atomic Energy Commission] under the sponsoxship of
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Nigerien Ministry of Rural Aevelopwent, an experiment which 3.nvolves pwaping
water from deep layers and using znineral ~ertilizers to improve the soi1, has
made it posaible to plant orchards and fields right in the~mi.ddle of the desert,
initiating the local population in the uae of irrigation. The pro~ect is al-
ready supplying the personnel of the mines, in AgadAs and even in N3amey with
. fruits and vegetables during part of the ysar.
The 650 kms of road between Tahoua and Arlit--which wag c~~mpleted in December
1980 and is absolutely essential to supply the mining district (25 kilos of
material and miscellaneous products must be brought fn to obtain 1 kilo of
uranium concentrate)--was financed by CONCERTA [expansion unkna:mj w-ith the
mini.ng partners contributing 75 percent as their share. These partners have
also helped to set up the Mining Scizool of the Air Region which graduates 40
furemen a year. Some of them go to work in the mines while the othera have no
trouble finding ~obs in Nigerien industry.
The fact remains that the expan~ion of mining operations wi11 be slowed down by
the economic sttuation and that it will be sub3ect, above a11, to an increase in
demand. The N'rassa N'Taghalgue Mining Company (SMTTj constituted by ONAZtEM,
COGEMA and Kuwait Foreign Trading Contracting and Investment; pursues that goal.
A consortium formed by ONAREM, COGEMA and the 'U.S. campany CONOCO has carried
out exploration work in ~he region of Imourarem, 90 lcros svuth of Ar1it. These
operations have revealed the existence of a deposit of 100,000 tons o~ 1ow~
content uranium. Fluor (USA) and Creps (France) have conducted a feasibility
study on that deposit. Prospecting for coal continues and, in this sphere, im-
portant signs and deviations have been noted.
Necessary Adapfiation
The decline in earnings, created by the drop of uranium prices in the market,
has meant an economic slowdown and a significant heightening of ~ocial tensions.
Another effect was that the Treasury reserves have almost disappeared, dropping
from 20 billion to 10 billion CFA francs in 2 years and these reserves were, in
fact, the s.~curity for the government debt in the private sector (pub].ic works)
and in the semipublic sector. This development is accompanied by a higher
forei�n trade deficit, by the postponement or delay in the implementation of
mai,or projects (a sugar refinery in Tillabe�ry, a cement plar.t, a dam in
- Kandadji) and, finally, by a drop in the number of orders with consequent fi-
nancial difficulties for the enterprises.
At the same time, the country is turning more and more to foreign aid to finance
its programs. In 1981, the amount of foreign sid received was 84 billion CFA
francs, of which 25 billion were prbvided by France and, in 1982, the latter is
expected to give at least 5 billion more; the amount of Arab aid requested for
the current fiscal year is almost 20 billion CFA francs.
Niger realizes the importance of this aid even if only half of it is free of
charge and even if it means a future increase of its debt servicing charges
which have already jumped from 2.4 billion CFA francs in 1976 to 16.6 billion
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1982. But Niger must also realize that there is a certain gap between the
abundance of proposals and aid given and the reality of the economic situ-
ation.
For the time being, nothing is likely to replace uranium in the country's pack--
age of resources. Peanuts and cotton have practically disappeared from the
statistics. Exports of ineat and of cattle on the hoof re~main at their usual
- iow level. Prospects are good for the textile industry where SONITEXTIL [ex-
pansion ur:known], formerly NITEX [expansion unknown], has been strengthened by
its partnership with Schaeffer, Riegel Textile Corporation, CFAO [French Com-
psny of West Africa] and CNF [expansion unknown]. But its prcducti:,n wi11 only
go to the domestic market. ELF [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France]
continues to carry out explorations in the area around the oil fields of Agadem,
between Termit and Bilma, but nothing has indica;~ed., so far, that the pro~ect
could be profitable. Projects to mine phosphate and iron ore in Say are still
_ in the initial stages.
Uranium has produced an export economy the profits of which should have made it
possible to exploit more mineral resources, to impleme~lt large pro~ects and to
develop potential resources on an industrial scale. Tn the same measure that
uranium revenues decline, the economic ob~ectives must be redirected, lacking
support from exporr.s toward agriculture to subst:3tute for impor*_ed goods, but
despite the fact that it is very important and in conformity with the social
organization established in the country by the new regime, this cannot have
the same attraction for international capital. It is to be hoped that the gap
mentioned in the previous paragraph will close gradually.
This situation requires more than ~ust postponing the implementation of un-
profitable projects and revising the estimated expenclitures of the 1979-1983
5-year plan. It also calls for using the maximum amount of available financial
resources, that is to say foreign resources, to replace unnecessary imports,
mostly by making the country self-sufficient in food production. Col Seyni
Kountche, who kPeps a c.l.ose yearly account on the crops, thinks that in 1982
the cauntry will probably have to buy 120,000 tons of grain which wi11 increase
tiie defi.cit of the bala.nce of payments by 20 billion CFA franes.
Because ir_ is consi.stent, French and European aid will play an important role
during tl:is period, which is not so much one of "harrowing changes" as of
adaptation to circur~stances; it has already done so by channeling most of its
~vailabJe funds 3nto hydroagri.cultural development pro~ects in the Niger River
Va11ey. The recently started projects of Namarde-Goungou, Karma and Karaigorou
will increase the irrigated area by 1,200 hectares, and the EDF [European De-
vclopment Fund] will have thus financed 25 percent of td~:oer's water pro~ects
for agricu.itural purposes.
krench aid stands at ~ high level. In terms of value, it amounts to 30 percent
of all aid given by foreign governments. This aid was the driving force behind
the study and implementation of big projects such as Kadand~i, the railroad
between Parakou and Niamey, the telecommunications network, the university,
and industrial and mining development. But in the sphere of rural development,
the assistance has been limited (23 percent of the credits granted by the Aid
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and Cooperation ~und and 10.4 Qexcent of loans extended by the Central Fund
for Economic Aevelopment during the last 5 yeara) anc a change of poiicy ia
required. There must also be a change of direction in the technical aid sys-
tem which has hardly evolved.
Uranium is not "finished" as some people are happy fio announce. For a certain
period of time, and it is hard to say how long, uranium will have to occupy a
less prominent position in the programs. Investments must be selectively re~
- vised. This is not a heart attack but, as a mechanic would say, a:lowdown in
the timer regulating the speed of dQVelopment. After clAaring away the ~a^
biguities cluttering the conference table, President Mitterrand and President
Kountche will be able to effectively devote their talks to the tenor Qf the
changes required as far as French ai~ is concerned.
FOOTNOTES
1. Currently, they number 800,000 and are divided in aeveral "con~ederations":
Sandal-AmakiLan in the Koutous, Kel-Air and Ke1~Gress. There are also some
Ulliminden near Mali and some Jambanza ("red foreigners" in Haus$) who ar~
rived in that region before fihe Touaregs. By extension, the Berbers are
called Azbinawa (men from Air) in Niger.
2. In 1979, the capital stock of SOMAIR (Air Region Mining Company) was
4,348.9 million CFA francs distributed as follows: Nigerien state (ONARJ~I
[National Office of Mineral Resonrces]), 33 percent; COGEMA, 27 percent;
French companies, 27 percent; Urangesellschaft, 6.5 percent; Agip Nucleare,
6.5 percent. The COMINAK (Akouta Mining Company) had a capital atock of
3,550 million CFA francs with ONAREM ho131ng 31 percent of the stock;
COGEMA, 25 percent; OURD [expansion unknown] (.?apan), 25 percent and ENUSA
[expansion unknown] (Spain), 10 percent. ,
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
8796
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SENEGAL
COUIvTRX' S P1EU:RAT ITX TN FALKLANDS WAR SEEN AS ~ CURIOUS'
Parts JEUNE AFRTQUE in French No 1115, 19 May 82 p 26
[Articl.e by our special envoy in Dakax, Siradiou Dia7.1o: "Senegambia Requires
zt"]
[Text] Dalcar and fihe Cape Verde pen3n~ula have always been considered a
strateg3c pos3.zton o~ px~,~rne iutportance in the eyes of m311tary experts. Zt is
known that ~?ur3ng tAe 7.ast year {'1.9~9-1945) , De Gaulle tried in vain to con-
quer tt. A~nd the Petain regfine d~.d a11 it could to reta3n it. During the
negor.~,ations which 1ed to Senegal~s 3ndependence (1960), the French government
ins3~ted upon keepfng a naval atr base in Dakar. The strategic interest of the
Cape Verde peninsula has ~ust been d3scovered by the British government on the
occasion of the Malvinas war. '
Tor t~~o weeks, Roya1 Air ~'orce planes coming from their bases ~.n Great Britain
}?ave been putt~ng on a verttable a~rborne ballet in the skles above the Dakar-
Yoff air~ort. Hercules C~130 type a3rcraft heavily laden with war materiel
land or take off there 3n very qu3clc succession. T3me only to .~111 the tank,
refurbish the watex aupply, and qu~ckly check the enginea. (?n the landing
str3p, it is not unusual to f3nd a c3vilian Aerolineas Axgentinas plane
parked next to the RAI' planes. The apparent Senegalese neutrality is such
~hat the British and Argentine crews could fraternize, if they wished to do so.
W:~en ti.ley have time to rest and relax somewhat, they coexist and get along on
very p,ood terms at th~~ Hote1 Te~anga, at the Diarama or at the Ngor Hote1.
Whi1e waiting to do Uattle und~:r lesa kindly sk3es, Br3tish an~ Argentines
st.roll around like amiable tourists, cameras and movie cameras slung over their
stioulders, through the streets of Dakar.
'i.~: is a cur3ous neutrality which allck~s the planes of one former colonial power,
Great Britain 3n this case, to use the airport of a non-aligned country to go
bomb the terri.tory of another non-aligned country: Of course, with the birth
of Sen~;;ambia, Senegal's heart beats somewhat to the rhythm of the Common-
wealth. It is not in the name of the solidarity of the members of this group
that another Afr:ican country, Sierra Leone, is authorizing British warships on
r_heir way to the Malv3nas to put in at Freetown? Might we say that North-
S~uth relat3ons are solid in ways in which South-South ties are not? The atti-
tude of the Dakar and Freetown governments in any case reveals the weakness of
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of Third Wor1,d oxganizations. ~'ortunate~y, ovex and above the official
positions~ the people's hea~c~a do aot wavex. Ta th3a cage those of the African
peoples beat to fiha rt~yt2n4 0~ the v~.'va Axgentina! ("Long Live Argentina! .
And so it w311 be ae long as tt~ere remains oae paxcel of colonial territory to
be liberafied.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afr3que GRUPJTA 1982.
- 9927
CSO: 4719/1009
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ZIMBABWE
SUCCESS OF MUGABE'S EUROPE.AIv TRIP RFPORTED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 9 Jun 82 pp 28-29
[Aiticle.by our Harare special correspondent Francois Soudan: "In the Land
of ~:+ntinuing Miracle" ]
[Text] Robert Mugabe came to introduce his country to
Europe. With some strong trumps in his hand.
Robert Mugabe is a calm president. Unlike some of his African counterparts,
glued to their presidential palace out of an obsessive fear that a coup d'etat
is 3ust waiting for his departure to brEak out, the Zimbabwean prime minister
on 3 June was to.complete a trip far from tlarare. What better argument,
after all, could there be than such a long absence--seven European cuuntries
visited in close to three weeks*--to demonstrate to the West that there was
no substance to the dire predictions of civil war that have been stirred up
continually since the ouster of Joshua Nkomo in February 1981? "Zimbabwe is
a stable country, Robert Mugabe said repeatedly in both private talks and
press conferences.' "Help out. Invest. History will vindicate you." Did he
persuade his listeners, this 57-year-old former guerrilla leader_ who 26 months
ago became pz~ime minister of what used to be white-farmer Rhodesia?
Doubtless it is too soon to say. But after several days spent between Harare
and Bulawayo, from townships to ministerial offices, one can at least say with
cer.tainty that there is a case to be made.
Tl-?e first success, and a remarkable one it is--Mugabe called it a"veritable
miracle" in London--was the formation of an integrated national arnry. The odds
were certainly against any attempt to turn ex-freedom fighte~s accustomed to
loose discipline into a highly structured force by integrating them with the
white offiers who formerly served under Ian Smith and had fought against them
for 7 years. Especially since relations between the guerrillas of ZIPRA
[Zimbabwe People's Liberation Army] (Nkomo) and ZANLA [Zimbabwe African
National Liberation A.rmy] (Mugabe) have not been warm since pre-independence
days. It is a fact unique in the annals of colonialism that it is the same
white gen~~al--Sandy MacLean--who was commander in chief of the colonial army,
* Great Britain, Wpst Germany, Italy, Holland, Belgium, France and Greece.
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who today commands his fc-rmer adversaries, ;.he latter having moved up from
ttie status of "terrorists" tu that cf regular soldiers. Assisted by Rex
Nhongo (the former commander of ZANLA) and Mafela Masuku (ZIPRA), MacLean
is at the head of 60,000 men who have been trained and organized by 70
British advisers and 300 "recycled" white officers. This army, the
reorganization af which was completed several months ago, has in the n:ain
succeeded in withstanding the tensions Which divided Robert Mugabe and Joshu~
N'~como in 1981: only 500 ZIPRA guerrillas (out of 20,000) deserted when
"Big Josh" w:~s thrown out. Th~re remains one qi~esLi.on, however: what is
ultimately +.o be the real mi~sion of the 5th brigade, trained in the eastern
moun;.ains by I~orth Korean inst.ructors and composed exclusively of former
''Mugabe-ite" combatants from ZANLA? Some observers in Harare believe that
~.his elite unit, extremely low-profile at the moment, might well constitute
Ro?-~rt Mugabe's pretorian guard...
The spectacular military reconciliation is in fact nothing but the reflection
of another, more fundamental one: that between Whites and Blacks. "You are
Africans like us," Mugabe had told them. "We want you to stay." Hostile,
then skeptical (40,000 of them left the country in two years), many were
fin~lly convinced, and the emigration rate has been in declin~ for several
months. These 170,000 "white Zimbabweans" (compared to 210,000 at the time
of independence) are no longer interested in politics, and only two ;.hings
matter to them: the education of their children, and maintaining their
standard of living.
At their private pools and bridge clubs they talk at great length about their
apocalyptic fears that the social changes made by the new regime will translate
into a c~ecline in their income. And it is tru~ that free primary education,
the spectacular expansion of the health infrastructure, the general increase
in wages and the creation of 100,000 jobs havQ considerably increased their
tax burden. But it is also true--and u?any admit it--that they would never
find such quality of life in Europe, Australia or even South Africa:
"Zimbabwe is super!" proclaim the tee-shirts worn by their fair-haired
children.
But for the great rural masses--90 percent of the 7.5 million inhabitants--
the change from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe is not always in evidence. Only 14,000
peasant families crowded into the Tribal Trust Lands (native reserve areas
on poor land) have been re-established on white faru~s abandoned by their
proprietors. Officially it is claimed that in the next 3 years some 164,000
families will be established in thi~ caay. But in order to do that it is
necessary to compensate the European farmers--credibility compels it--and
thus considerable sums of money must be mobilized. This is undoubtedly the
most difficult problem today confronting Robert Mugabe and his finance
minister, Bernard Chidzero. Especially since the Zimbabwean economy, once
the euphoric boom of the months immediately following independence had
subsided, has settled into an unstable equilibrium. Growth in Gross National
Product [GNP], which had reached the remarkable level of 12 percent in 1980
and 10 percent in 1981, wi11 probably not exceed 5 percent this year. The
rumors of a massive devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar (between 12 and 20
percent) are becoming increasingly believable in Harare, and several gold,
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nickel and asbestos mines belonging to Anglo-American and Turner Newall, have
iiacl to either close their operations or cut back. Worldwide recession, drop
of currency, the disastrous corn harvest of 1981 (down 45 percent because ~f
drought) and the shortage of skilled labor are probably responsible for the
disappointir~g level of Western investment, in spite of the modest success
a year ago of the International Conference for the Reconstruction and
Development of Zimbabwe (ZIMCORD). This concerned Robert Mugabe and allegedly
convinced him to go to Eurppe to plead the young republic's cause, despite
~ his abhorrence or "the perpetual mendacity of some Third World leaders."
He came to obtain the loans needed to finance the very ambitious 1983-1986
development plan, which calls for expenditures equal to Fr 34 billion, or CFA
` Fr 1,700 billion, 38 percent of which are supposed to come from OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentJ countries.
Is there real substance behind his high-sounding words, and does he have the
~iationwide base needed? Apparently, yes. His prestige has not been tarnished .
in two years of independence, and his party, ZANU, [Zimbabwe African National
Union], has a solid ma~ority (57 of 100 seat~) in the parliament. Especially
since the spe~tacular winning over of f ive of the 10 white deputies in Ian
Smith's Republican Front (which has now become politically insignificant).
There remains Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU [Zimbabwe Afri~an People's Union], which is
still quite popular in Matabeleland and which has not without reason been
accused of fomenting armed d3.sorders. But between the hardliners of his
party grouped around former political commissax Dumise Dabengwa (kno:Jn as
the "black Russian") and the conciliators (p~rticularly the four ZA2U
ministers who remained in the government after the ouster of their leader),
"Big Josh" is left with nothing more than an increasingly marginalized role
as mediator.
In any case, he is no longer the undeniabl~ leader of the opposition, the
alternative he had hoped to become. And it w:tll not be for him to exploit
the real differences within ZANU dividing a:radical central comQnittee born
in the guerrilla phase and a very pragaiatic governing team. These differences,
incidentally, are responsible for the prime minister's sometimes inconsistent
- rhetoric: violent, very "Comrade Bob" when he speaks in Shona to members
of his party; moderate, almost soothing when he speaks in English to white
farmers. Split personalitv? No, the tactical skill of a loner foi~ whom
solitude, up to this point, has been a pretty good teacher.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982
9516
CSO: 4719/1085 E~
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