JPRS ID: 10691 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080065-7
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• Sequence Number: 65
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/10691
_ ~ 27 July~ 1982
Near East N~r~l~ Africa Re ort
p
cFOUO~ 27ia2~
~ ~
Fg~$ FvREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SEI~VICE
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JPRS L/10691
27 Jul~ 1982
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
cFOUO 2~/s2)
CONTENTS
ALGERIA
Development of South Supported
(MARCAES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERItANEENS, 18 Jun $2)........... 1
JORDAN
Prominent Figures Criticiza Syrian Role in Lebanon
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 18-24 Jun 82) 4
LEBANON
, Bashir A1-Jumayyil Interviewed
i (B, al-Jumayyil; LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUIt, 19-25 Jun 82)...... 8
! r10ROCC0
~oreign Trade in 1981 Reveals Growing Deficit
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 25 Jun 82)........... 19
Labor Union Chief Describes philosophy, Government
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 18-24 Jun 82) 22
~ Livestock Raising, Meat, Milk Production in Maghreb Examined
(MARCHES TRJPICAUX ET MEDITEEtRANEENS, 25 Jun 82)........... 25
- a- (III - NE & a- 121 FOUO]
F'OR nFFTC'T ~?i. I1SF. nNT.Y
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i
i
~
,
ALGERIA
DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH SUPPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1910, 18 Jun 82 p~ 1553
[Text] It is one case out of every twenty, or rather, every one hundred: an
oasis in the southern region of the Algeriari High Plateau. Thirty years aga,
carts left from that oasis carrying vegetables to the north. Today, that same
road is traveled by trucks from the north carrying essential commodities to
the south.
The causes are many and th~ir systematic analysis remains to be completed.
" And yet, any new attempt at development should be based on such a study.
In the absence of such a methodical procedure, one must resort to the explana-
tions given by local residents, whQ do not a�lways even agree.
First of all, the population of the oasis has doubled. The way of life has
changed somewhat and needs have grown. But same resources have emerged: money
sent from the many nati've sons who have emigrated; local purchases by neialy
assigned civil servants, who are paid by the government and wiio spend their
. money in the area. However, the traditional means of production seem to have
declined: A foggara, an underground pipe bringing water from the mountains,
has not been maintained and the flow is scanty; distribution canals are par-
tially filled with silt; the average age of rural workers has risen consider-
ably; and too many plo`_s of ground resulting from the division of large land-
holdings are now in thE~ hands of incompetent or negligent owners.
And yet, "the future of market garden crops is in the south," Minister of
Hydraulics Brahimi Brahim told officials from his ministry and hydraulics
experts from the governorates of Adrar, Bechar, Laghouat, Ouargia and Tamanras-
set on 21 April. Irrigated areas must be expanded and developed, he said,
using small water projects, utilizing recycled water an~ organizing a drinking
water supply for papulated areas.
Disappointments and Encouraging Pro~ects
At tn Ghar, near In Salah, volunteers have cleaned out and reactivated a
foggara. The minister congratulated them. But is ~uch an effort possible
everywhere, for example, where the very long underground pipes are broken
down? Right in the center of the governorate of Adrar, the main f oggara that
once enclosed the parks of the chief town has been abandoned since 1976 and
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in the governorates in general, the f~?gara now supply only 4 cubic n~eters a
second. The peoFle living in the fortif ied villages believe that the solution
l.ies in increasing the number of we11s equipped with small electric pumps.
The fact is that since the unf ortunate experiments with the huge irrigated
area of Abadia, there is little confidence is large dams. The five villages
set up there to use the Djebel Torba reservoir have been able to begin develop-
ment of only half of the 12,000 hectares planned. First the overloaded dam
was "tapped," probably too heavily, as a result of orders from af ar. Then the
lack of rainfall this winter kept it from being refilled. In additiona it is
silting up and since the bank of the basin of the Guir Wadi is in Morocco,
there can be no question of trying to reforest it. Only the rainfall in April
stopped the exodus of a discouraged population.
In some cases, as in that of the Brezina Oasis south of E1 Bayadh, one could
envisage the "inferoflux" type dam, which makes it possible to supply and raise
the level of the phreatic layer downstream. But the expertcs ar~ hesitating:
Northwest of Laghouat, a dam of this type was built in 1948 and it made it
possible to irrigate 61G hectares. Today, the water flow seems to have dropped
off by nine-tenths and only 160 hectares are being cu'ltivated. The orchards
have been abandoned and barley is being planted.
Careful maintenance of existing ~~rojects undoubtedly con~titutes a priority
of greater importance than new construction: for example, on the traditional
dams, sufficiently early use of dredging valves. In the long run, however,
the solution consists in development of the basin bank to prevent erosion,
through the construction of terraces and tree nlanting.
This long-range work has been undertaken in some valleys, but a great deal
remains to be done. Priority has been g-t.ven to the creation of the green
belt, that broad new forest zone that is to halt the advance of the desert.
In many places in southern Algeria, one can see the extent of the pro~ect
undertaken. Work is actively underw3y. in 1981, a million hectares were
treated and over 20 million trees were planted. Despite the caterpillars and
risks of fire, the Upper Plateau forest has become a reality.
_ The local climate will most likely be improved and in the long run, new re-
sources will emerge. But will the expansion of the desert truly be checked?
Some experts doubt it. The sand that threatens to submerge the High Plateaux
is evidently not, as has previously been believed, from the Sahara and driven
by the wind from the south. It is most likely proc~uced locally by exosion
of the gritt.y terrain. The usefulness of the green belt will therefore lie
less in its fu~iction as a barrier than as a vast wooded area.
Saving Pasture
Moreover, Algerian experts know that the problems of the steppe and the pasture
it must provide must be faced again. The error was probably to launch this
"third phase" of the agrarian revolution in the governorate of M'Sila, the
most mediocre one, the least well equipped, the least likely to succeed in
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~uch an experimen~. More money will have to be spent to resume the third
phase. Conditions for the new beginning must be studied more carefully.
The Algerian steppe covers 12 million hectares and some experts believe that
fram 2 to 3 million can already be considered as lost. Every year, tractor
plowing, which must henceforth be effectively prohibited, destroy 200,000 hec-
tares of "volunteer" plant cover. Every family ruins 1 hec~are per year for
- its domestic needs, meaning that 150.000 hectares disappear every year. Final
ally, when rainfall is abundant, the owners of large herds let them get dis-
proportionately large, mean~.ng uvergrazing which becomes disastrous in the
dry years that follow.
The Commission on Grazing set up in Djelfa is to take up these problems from
the standpoint of the socioeconomic advancement of the people living on the
steppe.
Along with the grazing effort and the development of roads, there is taore
systematic thought about railroads in the south. To date, the south has been
served only by "penetrating" lines from the north. The plan would therefore
be [o build an east-west railway in the High Plateaux. Work would begin on
15 June at Ain Touta in the governorate of Batna. The existence of such a
railroad in the south would make it possible to relieve the current line from
the north, which is greatly overloaded, and, together witt~ the road system,
- help stimulate this steppe area heretofore paralyzed by the excessive cost
price of transport for heavy goods (iron, cement, machinery, and so on).
The vastness of the Saharan and sub-Sahara regions in Algeria requires an
ambitious program systematically adheted to. After local improvisation, with
some success, and after meeting the most urgent needs while generally postpon-
ing what is essential, the need is now felt for a more methodical approach.
However, seen from this angle, the evaluation of needs points to enoranous
requirements and it will undoubtedly be necessary to wait a long time for
investments to pay off.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
11,464
CSO: 4519/221
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JORDAN
i
PROMINENT FIGURES CRITICIZE SYRIAN ROLE IN LEBANON
Paris AI,-WaTAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 279, 18-24 Jun $2 pp 29, ~0
~Article: ~~Jordan Condemns Syrian Collusion: They Have Not Been Fighting, Dut They
Did Confiscate Blood Supplies in Dar'aI"/
~ex~ ~,mong Arab arenas, Jordan is the one which has been the most affected and the
most agitated by what has been happening to Lebanon and the Palestinian resistance
in Lebanon. In Amman, there are in.creasing expressions of condemnation and vindictive-
ness against the negative Syrian role on the Israeli invasion.
AL-WATATJ AL-'ARABI talked with a number of major personalities in Amman on the
situation and developments in it.
The chairman of +.he National Consultative Assembly, Mr Sulayman ~Arar, former minister
of the interior, said, "The position of the political leaders in Syria regarding the
cease fire reminds us of the truce and cease fire decrees after every Israeli
invasion, from the catastrophe of 194$ to the invasion of Lebanon.
'~T~le had expected that Syria; which had entered Lebanon urider the umbrella of the
League of Arab States with the objective of prdserving Leganon's unity and territory,
would have remained a strong partisan of the resistance and the joint forces and would
have played its part in defending the territory of Lebanon and the Palestinian cause,
so that the Arabs could forget the massacres of Tall al-Za'tar and 7.'ripoli and other
acts. However, what has caught us by surprise was that the duration of the Syrian
forces' confrontation of the Zionist forces (if there was any) was less than that
of the war in Hamah, which lasted 18 days.'~
Concern3ng the cease fire decree, he said ~~That was not accompanied by a clear
decree on withdrawal withizi a specific period on the part of Israel or America. If
the period of negatiation over withdrawal conditions goes on, this decree will result
in the establishment of a fait accompli in the areas the Zionist army has occupied,
a separation of forces, and the creation of a corresponding situation through which
it will be possible to eliminate pockets of resistance. This period will also probably
lead to the emergence of disputes on the Lebanese stage, which it will be possible to
use in service of the Zionist invasion.
"One of the first practical results of the cease fire was the prohibition of Arab,
Jord~iian and Palestinia.n volunteers from entering Syria and passing through it to
Lebanon. That proves that that was one of the conditions for failing to consol.idate
t~e position of th~ :esistance. We do not laiow whether there uere other conditions
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for failing to consolidate it by arms, i~ the agreement contained conditions like
~hese.
~~,lmong the important results this decree has underlined has been a ventilation of
the spirit that has become widespread in the Arab and Islamic worlds and anong all
peaceloving peoples against the Israeli invasion, putting the cause in a vicious
circle of wondering who will break the cease fire, Who will comnit hi.mself to it,
rand what its conditions and practical applications will be, since we will fail to
achieve international concensus, condemnation, the demand for an i.mmediate Withdrawal,
condemnation of ~the aggression and perhaps the adoption of disciplinary measures
against Israel.
:-ie said, ~~This issue affects Jordan directly. The government o� Jordan is maintain-
ing constant coordinal:ion with other Arab countries in adopting a position on an
Israeli withdrawal and the cessation of the Israeli attack and its effects. The
;;overnment~ s position has beer~ clear from the first day, since Jordan was the first
11r~b country to facilitate enlistment in ~.he emergency force of combatants in
Lebanon, and it opened centers fox donations and cotnmittees in this regarr..'~
rii1~aL: Ido Justification
~ir Tahis Hil~at, chau~man o~ the Lega1 Committee of the National Consultative As-
sembl;/ and a former minister, said "The cease fire operatifln ent~iled great frustxa-
tion. It does not only mean giving the Israeli forces a free hand to liquidate the
resistance; if we add the restrictions on going into Lebanon, the serious situation
arising from this operation appears ~ust as great and clear, and one cannot accept
it the way Syria did.
"I do not believe that there are any terms or ~deas in the Syrian publicists'
le:ticon which can justify the Syrian posi~' ion. One must bear in mind that the
Syrian authorities have stopped volunteers' buses for 3 days on the Jordanian-
Syri~n borders and sent them back to Jordan."
aLl-~u~~ra~idsh: A Scenario
;ir ' Abd-al-Ra' uf a1-Ruwabidah, member of the National Consl.Lltative Assenbly and a
former minister, said 11The fact is that Syria did not declare war on Israel but con-
fined itself to skirmishing upon clirsct encountars with the invading Zionist forces,
and ~this cii.d not develop into real combat. Therefore one can interpret the ce~se
~ fire a~ a lack of desire to get into a battle to protect Leba.nese territory and
protect the Palestinian resistance on this tarritory, :~ich is the basic purpose of
the S;,~ri~n oresence on Lebanese soil, and goes beyond participation in th~; deter-
: ~nt force: .
for the issue of 3yrian missi.Zes in the Biqa' valley, t'r.ey were D2S1C1~.Zf ~UST~
~or snotir, not to deter any air aggression."
';ie a:'~;~d, ''~ir.at can one e;c~ect now, as f~s _~s you are cor.cerned?"
:,r:id, ''I icaadi.~e tnat the scenario ti:~t P'tiilip naoib is runni.ng, i.~ i'r.~ ir.u:r~ct
ne~;ot~ations ~~etween 3;~'ia ~nd Israel, especiaL~ ~ter tne advant oi tne Israeli for-
ces, their de~ioyment cn Lebanese territor;/ and their attempt to effect pi: ce~ s
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,movew:.~nt a~a.inst the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance, will lead to an internatinr~al.
quest to resto.e the legitimacy of Lebanor.. It is a demand th~t no one can reject
and one of its bases and exaggerated puints will be the fact that there should be
no arm~ or ~.rmed persons on Lebanese territory except the Lebanese army, which wi11
result in the roduction in the status of the Palestinian resistance and the lo5a o�
. the territory it is standing on.
''Peopi e i:ave set their hopes on Y:aving the Palesti.nian resistance fail to endorse
this scenario by persevering with the struggle a.nd emerging from the framework of
cooptation by Syria.~~
Al.-' Ibacli: They Confiscated Blood:
~'D~r ~lamduh al-'Ibadi, a senior member of the Physicians' Union i.n Jordan, spoke about
the ~~ray Syrian authorities treated volunteers, inclucling doctors, saying "They
threw them out on the public road in Dar'a for 48 hours, exposed to air raids,
without water or food. The volunteers were 500 in number. They then brought them
back to Jordan, in spite of all their attempts to get permission to go through Syria
''~.o Lebanon.
"It got to the point ~ne~e packages of blood that had been sent to the Palestinian
_ 'resistance by the Jordanian Physicians' Union were confiscated."
He said, ~~There is a general spontaneous feeling that the Syrian position has reached
the poin+, of conspiracy against Leba.non and the Palestin:ian resistance.~~
r~i1 al-Ghuri: A Conspiracy
.Mr ~ail al-Ghuri, for a long time a well known person in the context of the Palesti-
nian cause, said, in response to our question on the Syrian position, "The fact is
that this question provokes sorrow and sadness, although it is difficult to ansuer
it in these circumstan.es because of the events a.nd developments which have occurred
recently i.n Lebanon.
. "A ~-roup of uell informed ~abs and A.rab poli.tici~ns believe that it is or rras in
Syria'~ power to have a role different from its present one as far as the events
in Leba,non and the occupation of southern Lebanon go. However, it has.failed to
play this role, for numerous reasons, including Arab clisputes, ideological disputes
an3 the desire of the regime there to survive and keep goi.ng. There is no doubt
that it would have been in Syria's power to take a truthful nati.onalist position,
seek to save Lebanon from its ordeal and prevent the occupation o� southern Lebanon
by the Jews.
"This is bezring in mind that we have grown up with the policy of not interfering
in the internal affairs of any Arab country. Palestine and its cause need to have
~11 Arabs reach agreement on supporting them. However, we can only refer to what
r~~liable bodies are sayin~, to the effect that t,here is an Arab conspiracy to liqui-
date the causa of Palestine and the Palestinian resistance. Syria is one of the
bodies that are taking part in this conspiracy. The people msking tY:e accusation
find eviaence to justify t~.is belief in the positions and actions Syria has taken
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vi:.-a-vi~ Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, the occupation of southern Leb3non and the occupa-
~ion of Golan. There is no doubt that ..ne desiz~e to keep the existing regime alive
and in power was one of the main elements in Syria's accommodating role.
~'The Jeus have a well lmown plan, which is to estahlish a greater Jewish state from
the ~Iile to the ~ phrates, They are on th~ir way to carrying out this project in
accordance with their scheme, for :~iiich various stages of action have been set
forth. Af'ter they took over all of Palestixie and incorporated Golan, they have nou
occupied Lebanon (and uill not leave it), and Lebanon :~;i71 not be ~he last, unless
the ~,raas strive to rid themselves of their rifts and ri�ralxies and regain the wi71
to fight, confront and o~pose." �
tJe asked, ~~;~Riat is y~ur opinion on Egypt~ s positicn?"
i-Ie replied, '~The positior: of the Lgypt of Husni t�~ubarak gi~res good ticlings of igypt's
iauninent xeturn to its distinguished position in the Arab group. However, restric-
tions have been imposed on igypt, as a result of the Camp David agreements, which
inhibit it from resuming its political role in the ~1rab uo=1d. If the Lgypt of
?~usni 14ubarad manages to ext,ricate itself fron these rest.rictions and it can,
if it wants to and is determined to it wi11 be one of the most nationalistic of
�rab countries.
"Syria, in its current situation, like a!.-~:zadhdha�i' s jamaniriyaii, is as far from
ab nationali~m as anyone, and is its ~ost intense enemy and its utrongest ogponent.
If what is said to the effect that Syria and Lic:ya have supplied Iran with ~rns and
naterial is correct, and it appeaxs that it is, tha~t is prooi of the extent to which
they are alienated from Arab nationalism. How can they be nationalistic Arabs when
- they are helping the enemies of the Araoa, ~ran, against Iraq, which is defending
Arab nationalisa?
~'The events in Lebanon are to a large deg ee ~onnected ~;o the Traq-Iran war.
"In any case, the position of Husni Mubarak's r~g�,~'p-t regarding the Iraq-Iran was is
more nationalistic and more Arab than that oi the Steadfastness and Confrontation
Front states. _ _
~~;~'inally~ the only nationalistic grouD that can be called a true nationalist group
in the war, def~nding Arab national.isn and trying to promo'te the status of the Arabs,
i~ the Iraqi-3ordanian group. I am confident in t'r.e lsnowledge that Iraq, in spite
of its preoccupation with the Iran.ian war, is still observing its national respon-
sibilities vis--ervis the Palest:~nian cause, and that if Syrian opposition to Iraq
endea it !JOUld be able, in spite of its war ?aith Iran, to assume a serious responsi-
bility toward the Palestinian cause and the Lebranese crisis."
COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
11587
cso : 4.'+04/551
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LEBANON
BASHIR AL-JUMAYYIL INTERVIEWED
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French No 919, 19-25 Jun 82 pp 106-122
[Interview with Bashir al-Jumayyil, leader of Christian camp, by Guy Sitbon:
"Lebanon: One People Too Many"]
[Text] He is the leader of the Christian camp, an armed camp
whose members succeeded in carving out at gunpoint the
only relatively secure enclave in that besieged country which
Lebanon is. A few weeks befoxe the Israeli invasion and the
lightning war that have ~ust reshuffled the cards in a way mak-
ing it impossible to measure the consequences, Bashir al-Jumayyil
received Guy Sitbon in Beirut and told him: "There is one people
too many: the Palestinians." But he added: "We are not being
aided by Israel," and then: "Those who accuse us of wanting
partition are insane." That voice, in the bloody imbroglio, now
has strange echoes. ~at did al-Jumayyil know about Israel's
intentions? Is he really Begi~'s man, as some think he is?
What is his true relationship with the Syrian occupiers? These
are all questions to which this interview with one of the key men
in the Arab theater brings singular clarifications.
[questionJ The war in Lebanon has entered its eighth year. Will it continue
for 10 or 20 more years? Is the end in sight?
[AnswerJ The final sprint has not yet begun.
[Question] Is there hope for peace?
[Answer] As soon as we lose hope, we shall lose the war. Over the past seven
years and at the beginning of this new year, there is nPw hope every morning;
Every morning a new leap of hope. That is what has enabled us to hold on so
L~ng, to bear our suffering.
[Question] It is often said that this war will not end until the conflicts in
the Near East are solved. So that could last....
[Answer] Two thousand years.
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[Question] So you have embarked upon ^ 2,000-year-long war?
[Answer] I don't think so. There is a light at the end of the tunnel. Look
~ at what is now happening in West Beirut, in the so-called Muslim districts,
- in the north, in Tripoli.
[Question] What is happening?
[Answer] A war has begun between Muslims and Palestinians.
[Question] Why this new war?
[Answer] That is simple: Why have we Christian~ fought against the P~lestin-
ians? There is one people too many in this part of the world, a people that
is trying to gain af irsthofdall from the Christians.anTodayt it isialsoeaected.
The rejection came
Muslim rejection.
(Page 108 missing]
[Question] [portion of text missing] Three men: your f ather, Pierre al-Jumay-
yil, head of the Kataieb (the Falangists), Camille Chamoun and Soleiman Fr^n-
gie, resolved to get rid of the Palestinians because the Lebanese Govex�nment
could not do so. That was not campletely out of the question, but they did not
foresee that they were pushing the country into~an endless war.
[Answer] Those accusations, that slander, do not affe~t uss We are tough-
skinned. Don`t worry: Go ahead and insult us, c~ll us American agents, the
agents of Israel.... ~
[Question] You m~an that it is not truc:, that the Christian parties did not
start this war?
[Answer] I do not say they did or did not. I do not respond to slander; I
do not even listen to it.
[Question] Then tell me how the war began. ~
[AnswerJ We were attacked and we defended ourselves. That's all there is
to it. The whole world has called us every name. The insults rained on us
from the Palestinians, the Syrians, half of the Lebanese, but also from America,
the Vatican and France. Every crime on earth has-been attributed to us, but
First~ of aYl,
we foughr, without even realizing wh~t they were accusing us of.
we had t. live, to live and put together an existence that ~oes back over
6,000 years. I did no~c want to wander around like the boat people or land in
_ a refugee camp.
[Question] Like the Palestinians.
[Answer] I will never be like the Palestinians, no matter what.
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[c~uestionJ How olci were you at the beginning of the war?
[Answer] Twenty-eight. I am 35 now.
[Question; T~v'lien did you first go to war?
[Answer] At 2:00 in the afternoon on 13 April 1975, as soon~as I learned
what had happened. I was practicing at the stadium, as I did every Sunday,
between 10:00 and 1:00. I went home and showered. A little later, I felt
that something was wrong. The bodyguards of Shaykh Pierre, my father, with
whom I was very close, seemed tense. In the afternoon, we were supposed to
go to the christening of a 2-month-oid baby, Bechir Abou Assi. His fathpr
was the first victim of the war, killed in the Ain el-Romaneh bus incident.
[Question] That was your first battle.
[Answer] A new church had just been consecrated in Ain el-Romaneh, in the
- presence of Shaykh Pierre. A bus filled with armed Palestinians wanted to
drive in front of the church. A police barrier tried to dissuade them so
they would not meet up with the group of Kataieb at the church doorway. A1-
ready at that timE, we were not on good terms with the Palestinians. The
bus drove through the barrier. In front of the church, Qur young people in
ctiarge of maintaining order asked the bus to go back and were machir.e enTned
in response. Joseph Abou AsSi and Antoine Houssaini were immediately k.illed.
There was a skirmish and the 30 Palestinians in the bus were....
[Question] Were killed.
[Answer] That is how it began.
[Question] You learned about it at 2:00. What did you do?
[AnswerJ I stood for nothing at the time. I was just a party member, head
of the Achrafieh district. I was beginning my career as a lawyer. After the
incident, we all met at the headquarters of the Kataieb, in Ain el-Romaneh.
I then heard conversations that had a big impact on me. Shaykh Pierre begged
tlle president of the republic, the cammander in chief of the army, the head of
the Second Bureau, to br3.ng in the army to force the Palestinians to respect
the law. The response.of those leaders was: "We don't dare; the army will
disintegrate. In our own districts, the Palestinians shot at us and our
army could do11nothing to defend us, f or you have to remember what East Beirut
was like in 1975. Three.Palestinian zones existed: Tell el-Zaatar, Jisr el-
Pacha and the Quarantaine. ~
[~uestion] They were camps. ~
[Answer] Not camps. They had rented a bunch of apartments, stores and
~;arages. There was a whole apparently harmless infrastructure: a boutique, a
kiosque, a dormitory. We were naive enough not to realize what they were
planning. The people living in the region were very happy to have "tenants"
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who paid double and who o�~ernight turn=d out to be Palestinian marksmen.
The army could do nothing to defend us. I immediately understood, as did
other young peopZe, that.the army could not guarantee our security, any more
than it can today..
[Question] What did you do?
[Answer] I asked the partisan~ present then to ~.eave the political discussions
to others and to go out in the f ield. We had to make up for the military
deficiency in the field as soon as possible in order to have a minimal struc-
ture. The whole structure.that you see 7 years later came nut of that little
group and its action.
[Question] And the men. that were With you then are still?
[Answer] Those that did not fall in battle are still with me.
[Question] Many have died?
[Answer] Thirteen hundred have died from among the elite of the Kataieb youth
and there have been 5,U00 deaths, 5,000 martyrs among the ranks of the Leban-
ese resistance.
[Question] Civilians? �
[Answer] No, soldiers from the different parties and organizations of the
Lebanese forces. Our party alone had 1,300 killed. Nearly 1,100 civilians
have been killed. In Damour alone, 5,000 of them fell.
[Question] The~:e was algo the Quarantaize, where hundreds of Muslims were
massacred. Were you responsible?
[AnswerJ We are all responsible for what happens. At the time, the battle
was waged by the people. We did not have a di$ciplined army as we~do now.
For years, Christians had suffered unimaginable things from the Palestinians
in the Quarantaine before the beginning of hostilities. On the Quarantaine
bridge, 196 of our civilians were murdered. What do you think those whose
brothers and mothers.were killed on the bridge were going to do when they
went into the Quarantaine?
[Question] Were manyPalestinians killed that day?
[Answer] About 30. The whole world blames us for them. We lost 5,000 in
Damour, but no one accuses the Palestinians.
[Question] Could you have avoided the Quarantaine massacre?
[Answer] I would have tried. When I arrived, it was all over. ~
[Question] And at Tell al-Zaatar? Some 1,000 Palestinians were murdered
after the fall of the camp.
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[AnswerJ Are you sure that there were 1,000 deaths? The InternationaZ Red
Cross was there, but that it not what it says in its report.
[Question] What was your f irst battle?
[Answer] I have been in them all. .
[Question] Af ter a year and a half of war, ymu were losing. In Beirut, in
the mountains, yo~ir lines were crumbling.
[Answer] I see what you are getting at. But to be specific, in Beirut, the .
front had been stabilized. It was in the mountains that we were in trouble.
You naturally want to tell me that w~ were the ones who called on Syria.
[Question] In the city, you had already retreated quite far.
[AnswerJ Indeed. '
[Question] The adversary: the Palestinians and the progressive Muslims,
was more powerful.
[Answer] Better equipped and better trained. The Palestinian cadres had ~ ~
just come fram East Europe; others had been trained by the English in Jordan,
while ours knew nothing about bearing arms. They did not even know how to use
the equipment. The weapons the other side had was much more sophisticated: ,
RPG's, the douchkas, it took us six months to understand what they were. We
didn't even know their n~mes.
[Question] You t,ave learned. Now you are known as one of the best military
leaders in the region. How did you learn?
(Answer] By trial and error. ,
[Question] In other words, you flipped through the weapons catalogues saying,
"Hey! That's not bad!"
[AnswerJ The catalogues from the weapons m~rchants came to us from our Pales-
tinian enemies, who were our main suppliers. They stole ~fram their own stock
and sold to us at a ridiculous priee. Furthermore, that is still going on f or
some products not available to us on the market.
[QuestionJ Could you cite specif ic cases?
[AnswerJ No.
(Question] What do you think of this military career? Dn you like it? Do
you like war?
[Answer] I hate it. No soldier likes war; you can be sure of it.
[Question] What about the exhilaration of combat?
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[Answer] Do you th~.nk it is exhilarat~ng to see your people lose their eyes
or their legs? My best friends fell right beside me.
[Question] It is said that every soldier feels 13.ke a superman because he
has the guts co defy death, while the average man is afraid of it.
[Answer] One pays too dearly to have such senriments. And you 9,magine things.
I am not the mi?itary leader you think I am. I lead the Lebanese forces,
where the military man is only performing a duty.
[Question] The fact is that on that mountain; where your people have survived
for centuries.... ~
[Answer] Lived, Mr Sitbon, lived completely, as free men. �
[Question] In short, you were losing.
[Answer] We were losing territory, not the war.
- [Question] You then called on the Syrians.
[Answer] Let a~ be clear: We called on no one, especially not the Syrians.
It was the Syrians who provoked the war. Assad admitted it one day in a
speech.
[question] What was Syria's purpose? To absorb Lebanon?
[Answer] Don't forget that in 1975, the peace process had quietly begun
between Egypt and Israel. In my opinion, there was a race between Egypt and
Syria to see who would reach a Camp Davi~. type peace first. Hafiz al-Assad
thought he was in the best position. First, he had to muzzle the Palestinian
in order to speak in his behalf. Add to that the statN of political dissolu-
tion in which Lebanon found itself and the obsessive dream of a Greater Syria.
All helped give the f inal attack on the Lebanese Republic. Kamal Jumblatt
then said: "All we need is five Palestinians to throw the Christians into the
sea. The Syrians therefore came to hasten the process and gather the fruits.
_ Everyone asked us to legalize the Syrian pregence: the Americans, the Vatican,
France, the Arab countries. They considered Syria to be the stabilizer of the
region. We were thus given to Assad as a payoff.
Then Sadat went to Jerusalem. Assad was immediately reduced to the status of
a district leader. Everything took plaee alongside h3m. At that time, in
order to iake a place f or himself, Assad tried to kill some Lebanese, starting
with the Christians. He bombed us for weeks in 1978 and 1981. We did not
yield. Now they are not killing any more Christians: It is the turn of the ~
Sunnites and Shiites. They are also resisting and are beginning to understand
the meaning of the fight that we have been waging since 1975 and the position
we take.
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[Question] Which is that an undPrstanding can be reached.
[Answer] At first, to do away with any foreign occupation of our country.
Then we will see.
[Questionj You havP remaine3 allied with Syria for how long? Three years?
[Answer] I have never been an ally of Syria. As long as it is in my terri-
tory, I will f ight it. There was a political-type agreement between Syria
and a Lebanese government that since 1943 has led the country to the 1975
catastrophe. Corruption, the mercantile spirit and compromise governed.
It was only later that we began to change people's way of thinking and even
the people themselves.
[Question] You are the son of Pierre al-Jumayyil, the founder of the Falange,
the Lebanese Forces, on the side of the Christians. On the other side is
Walid Jumblatt, the son of Kamal Jumblatt, who is the leader of the Muslims.
How can one explain that?
[Answer] What surprises you? That people have children?
[QuestionJ And that the children are leaders like their fathers.
[Answer] We are in the East; don't forget that.
[Question] But at the same time, you say you want to break with tradition
and change ways of thinking.
[Answer] And we shall continue to break that patriarchal system. If a hey
or a zaim has a stupid child, he is first of all a stupid person. New genera-
tions are coming out of the universities, from our people. We need to break
once and for all the Ottoman heritage that kee~ps the Lebanese man as a subject
and not as a citizen.
[Question] To arrive at that rejuvenation, you simply eliminated many people
fran your own camp.
[Answer] For example?
[Question] The son of President Frangie, Tony, was murdered along with many
other people in the north. You are blamed for it.
[AnswerJ History will 3udge. You krow that in the north, jus primae noctis
~till exists? Did you know that in the north, it is forbidden to have a
school or hospital outside the control of the bey? In 1976, after the Chris-
tian population defended itself, the Christian beys also tried to take back
tt?e weapons they had won? We would have had to go back to jus primae noctis.
The people refused; they had freed themselves in the war. Neither you nor
I nor anyone else can stop the movement. The affair of which you speak is a
time in their emancipation f ight, not a family quarrel, not a clan struggle,
but a social liberation phenatnenon.
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[Question] You also eliminated the mi~itary force of President Chamoun. Why?
[Answer] In order to cut out a gangrene. Look at West Beirut: It is anar-
chy, looting, generalized in~ecurity. Oa our side, it is the same thing.
'There had to be a surgical operation to restore order in our camp and unify
our armed forc~s. Today, among us, personal security is gua~anteed.
[Question] You have suddenly made a bunah of personal enemies. Many people
want to kill you. Did you knc~w that?
[Answer] Only too well. I lost my daughte.r in an attack aimed at me.
[Question] Can you continue to live normally and go about your business while
knowing that so many guns are simed at you?
[Answer] They have often tried to kill me. That does not bother me, not
~ecause I am a superman, but simply, as I was telling you in the begi.nning,
because every morning, there is new reason to hope. Gods gives us courage and
I have an easy conscience. We hzd nothing to do with that affair in the
. north, the murder of Tony Frangie. ~
[Question] On your side, was the fight waged on the basis of Christianity?
[Answer] As I of ten say, we were attacked as Christians and we defended our-
selves as Lebanese. We have never tried to set up a Christian state and
Christian feelings have never been a political force.
[Question] Crosses on guns....
[Answer] There was a religious thrust, ~ut in a national f ight. There were
crosses because there comes a time when one has to absorb an overdose of spiri-
tuality.
[Question] In th3s connection, it would appear that drugs are often used in
your units during the fighting.
[Answer] That has never been a serious problem.
[Question] Does that help the drugs when going to the front?
[AnswerJ They think it does.
[Question] Does one continue to be afraid when one is on the front line?
[Answer] Less SO Toda Wanaaffair~like that of~theSQuarantaineewouldanoted,
better equipped. q,
happen; our cvumnand keeps its troops in line. And we no longer have the pri-
vate armies. The guy with two guns and 30 men who wages his own little battles,
the little local leaders who fight between themselves over a refrigerator:
All that is over with.
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[Question] ThEre is no more banditry in your rEgion?
[Answer] No, but on the other side, that`s the general rule. Not with us any
_ more. The order we have es~ablished in our territory is for the purpose at
reaching that poin*_: a single army. The PNL [expansion unknown] of Camille
Chamoun exists, and other parties also.
[Question] But you have liquidated their military forces.
[Answer] To put an end to the reign of the war lords, to enable people to move
about in peace. It was necessary. Between the nightmare of West Beirut and
the peace on our side, I would opt for our side. This operation of internal
purging cost us 94 victims. It was expensive; it was a very hard decision to
make.
~
[Question] It was you who made it?
[Answer] Yes. Ninety-four victims to obtain order is a great deal, but on
the other side, there are 94 every day.
[Question~ Very good. Civil order does exist in this part of Lebanon. You
are in the midst of an economic boom. The price of ground has never been so
high. Isn't that a gigantic illusion?
[Answer] Naturally. This Liechtenstein will not be able to live. Those who
accuse us of wanting partition are insane. Our nation would collapse if it
were mutilated. This region is a symbol for all Lebanon when it is free.
And if anyone wants to back us up into those 50 kilometers of coastline and
those 2,000 sq~are kilometers, we will refuse. We will get out. r;ither the
10,452 square kilometers will be like these 2,000 or Le~anon will not be worth
the tr~uble of fighting for. .
[Question] And to get where?
[Answer] To rebuild a new Lebanon in which religious and ethnic communities
will be able to cnexist. That is what the soul of Lebanon is. Obviously,
each community will enjoy complete freedom and complete security. Our tradi-
tions, our values, permit us to set our sights high. We no longer want t4 be
a people of inerchants and courtiers, but a nation like any other. When the
Syrians and Palestinians leave our country, we shall set up the structures of
a new state along with the. Muslims.
~Question] Will the Muslims not be afraid that the force you have created
here wi11 dominate them?
[Answerj Let them clioose. Let them cr.oose between my force and that of the
Palestinians and the Syrians together. The Muslim cannot contint~e to eat
at every table and believe that he is going to win every time.
[Question] For the time being, you alone against the Syrians are not enough.
If they wanted to liquidate you, they would infiltrate you and there would be
no more talk of Lebanese Forces.
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[Answer] They have 2,000 tanks; we have 20. They have 3,000 guns; we have
30. They have 300,000 troops; we~ have 3,000. Th~. ratio of forces is clear.
And yet, we have brought off our xesistance war and perfectly. The.liberation
will depend on an upheaval throughout the Near East. France was freed from the
Germans by a planetary war. Our core of resistance is 2,000 square kilometerH,
a mobile amed force, a fast navy, effective information. I believe that that
resistance will never be quelled. Could the Syrians invade us? Do you be-
lieve they did not try, in 1978, in 1981? I do not want to overestimate us,
but against a united population, tanks and artillery cannot do much. They
tried to conquer Zahle and to Islamize the whole Bekaa plain, but they failed.
[Question] Why do you have so much prejudice against Islam, against the Arabs?
You are Arab yourself. Why do you deny your Arabness? For me, you are an Arab.
[Question] We have never denied or proclaimed our Arabness. We do not know
what it is.
[Answer] A language, a culture and membership in a universe. You are what
Arabness is.
_ [Answer] If that is what it is, alright. But most people include religious
obedience. That is where we disagree. religiously and philosophically.
[Question] You are aided by Israel.
[Answer] What proof do you have? We are not aided by Israel.
[Question] I.don't believe it. I know that the Israelis are helping you.
[Answer] You have your convictions; I have mine.
.[QuestionJ If you lean more toward Israel than toward the Arab world, as I
believe, isn't that ~ust one more gap between you and the Lebanese Muslims?
[Answer] We lean only toward Lebanon.
(Question) In a word, you are a minority in a Muslim world. Is it not in
your natural interest to accept that and to resign yourselves to your status
as a minority?
(Answer] There are 7 million Coptic Christians in Egypt, several hundreds of
thousand Christians in Syria and Iraq. They eat, dr�ink, work and have children.
Their condition comes down to that. Politically speaking, they have no rights.
Their secirity is that of animals, I would say. They are at the mercy of the
slightest incident.
[Question] The minister of foreign affairs in Egypt is Christian.
[AnswerJ What is his name?
[Question] Boutros-Ghali.
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FAnswer] And his title?
~ [Question] Minister of state for foreign affairs.
[Answer] He is not a minister but only a minister of state, which in Egypt
corresponds to the rank of undersecretary of state. He is in that post because:
he is the only one to have dared signed the Camp David Accord with Sadat.
And he still did not get a full ministry. That is the fate of the Copts.
[QuestionJ The Copts have existed forever. They number in the millions, with
their families, their churches.
[Answer] Have you been to see their churches? Are they still presentable? Do
they have the right to repair them? If a bell tower falls down, do they have
the right to replace it? Go see them; go ask them. Here it would be the same
thing. They are willing to tolerate us, to let us live and work in a state
of dhimitude. The dhimi, do you know what that means in our regions? It is
the second-class citizen, the non-Muslim. If we had given in, the problem
would have been solved. But when I los~ my freedom, I will no lot~ger have any
reason to live.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 "le Nouvel Observateur"
11,464
CSO: 4419/20
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MOROCCO
FOREIGN TRADE IN 1981 REVEALS GROWING DEFICIT
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1911, 25 Jun 82
pp 1696-1697
[Text] Completing the information supplied within the framework of its provi-
sional balance sheet for 1981 (MARCHES TROPICAUX, 28 May, p 1388), CEDIES
[Socio-Economic Research and Information Center], an organ of the CGEM (Moroc-
can General Economic Federation), now returns with the following study on
Morocco's commercial trade last year.
Deficit
Morocco's commercial trade with other countries showed a final deficit of
~ 10.4 billion dirhams (1 dirham = 1.05 francs), with exports (12 billion dirhams)
covering 53.4 percent of all imports (22.4 billion dirhams). An analysis of
this deficit by groups of noteworthy products shows that it can be attributed
to all headings, with the exception of unfinished products, for which Morocco's
; sales cover its purchases with a percentage of 196.4. It should be noted that
' while unfinished products constitute only 10.9 percent of Moroccan imports,
they make up 40.2 percent of all exports.
Foreign Trade 1981 (in millions of dirhams)
Imports CIF Exports FOB
Category Amount Percent Amount Percent Balance Cover X
Food, beverages, tobacco 4,613 20.6 3,040 25.3 - 1,573 65.9
Energy, lubricants 6,125 27.3 543 4.5 - 5,582 8.8
Unprocessed products 2,457 10.9 4,825 40.2 + 2,368 196.4
Semi-finished products 3,890 17.3 2,096 17.5 - 1,794 53.9
CaFital goods 3,860 17.2 29 0.2 - 3,831 0.7
Consumer goods 1,510 6.7 1,470 12.3 - 40 97.3
Total 22,455 100 12,003 100 -10,452 53.4
Morocco's purchases mainly involve unfinished products of animal and plant ori-
gin (1,596,000,000 dirhams) rather than of mineral origin (861 million dirhams).
They essentially include unprocessed vegetabla oils (508 million dirhams),
wood (470 million dirhams), synthetic fibers (169 million dirhams), artificial
fibers (98 million dirhams) and sulfur (589 million dirhams).
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rvn vrr~~.iwi, IJJ~ VIVLY
With respect to exports, the mineral ~sbstances are preponderant (4,488,000,000
dirhams, including 3,827,000,000 for phosphates), while shipments of unfinished
products of animal and plant origin are relatively low (337 million), mainly
including paper pulp (125 million} and cotton (57 million). Compared with
1980, an analysis of the structv.:�e of Moroccan imports in 1981 shows an in-
crease in the respective shares of energy and food purchases to 27.3 and 20.6
percent compared with 23.6 and 16.8 percent respectively. This shif t came
about to the detriment of the shares of other purchases, which went from 11.7
to 10.9 percen~ for unfit~ished products, from 21.1 to 17.3 percent for semi-
finished products, from 18.2 to 17.2 percent for capital goods, and from 7.8
to 6.7 percent for finished consumer products.
Energy and food bills alone absorb nearly 90 percent of all export receipts.
The latter essentially come from unfinished products (40.2 percent), food
products (25.3 percent), semi-finished products (17.5 percent) and to a lesser
extent, from finished consumer goods (12.3 percent). Compared with 1980, the
structure of exports has changed somewhat in the direction of a reduction in
the shares of r'~e first two to the behef it of the last two.
Geographical Structure of Trade
Most of Morocco's commercial transactions with other countries are with Europe,
mainly the EEC. The rest is, in descending order, with Asia, particularly the
Middle East, America, Africa and Oceania.
A total of 57.7 percent of all Moroccan imports are from Europe, which also
absorbs 76 percent of the exports. The balance shows a deficit for Morocco and
amounts to nearly 4 billion dirhams. However, the rate of cover is relatively
high (70.5 percent), compared with that of Morocco's trade with Asian and
American countries.
_ Morocco gets 40.7 percent of its imports from the EEC, to which it ships
49.2 percent of its exports. France heads the EEC countries, with 5.55 bil-
lion in imports and 2,614,000,000 in exports. Morocco's other top trading
partners among "the Ten" are the Federal Republic of Germany, in second place
with 858 million ~dirhams and Morocco's f ifth-ranking supplier with 1,078,000,000
dirhams; the Netherlands, with 669 dirhams in Moroccan exports and 552 million
in imports; and Italy, with 596 million dirhams in Moroccan exports and 973
million in imports.
Outside of the EEC, Morocco mainly trades with Spain and the USSR. Spain is
in third place among customers with 834 million dirhams and in fourth place
among supnliers with 1.54 billion dirhams, following t1?e United States
(1,572,OC1,000 dirhams) and Saudi Arabia (3,384,000,000 dirhams). The Soviet
Union is in fourth place among Morocco's customers with 684 million dirhams
and in seventh place among suppliers, with 861 million dirhams.
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~ ~eographic Distribution of Trade (in millions of dirhams)
~ Imports Exports
~ Country Amount Percent Amount Percent Balance Cover X
i ~
Europe 12,932 57.7 9,113 76 - 3,819 70.5
~EC ~ 1,131 40.7 5,902 49.2 - 3,229 64.6
; EFTA d07 412
CEMA* 1,388 1,4~7 �
~ Other countries 1,606 1,342
Asia 6,465 28.8 1,745 14.6 - 4,720 27
Middle East 4,943 260
Other countries 1,522 1,485
America 2,661 11.8 509 4.2 - 2,152 19.1
North America 2,122 200
Other countries 539 309
Africa 386 1.7 627 5.2 - 241 162.4
Maghreb 82 326
Other countries 324 301
Uceania 11 9 - 2 81.8
Total 22,445 100 12,003 100 -10,442 53.5
* CEMA (or COMECON): German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland,
Romania, Czechoslovakia, the USS1~, Cuba and Vietnam
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
11,464
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MOItOCCO
I~,B~ UNIQd CHIEF DESCR~ES PHII.OSO~'liY, GONEt~ffiNT
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ABABI in Arabic No 279, 18-24 Jun 82
/Article: "A Moroccan Trade Unionist Makes an Accusation: The Socialism of Be-
pressioa Aas Never Been Consumn~ated"/
/Text/ 1Yade union activity in Morocco goes back maay years before independence.
The firet attem~pte at union organization were made in 1934, when the late leader
Allal B1 Fassi started to organize a uaion for taai owaers to defend paople's
ordinary rights, which, as a union chief in M~orocco says, are slightly different
fram the public righte that politics represents.
After the eetablisbment of the Uaiaa of Small Taxi Owners, the roeary was retold
and people in the liberal professione within the aational movement started demand-
ing the organization of unioae which would guaraatee them their rigbte.
After Morocco's independence, trade unioa activitq assumed a more cc~mQrehensive
structure. The trade union leaders demanded that cultural activity we kept aepar-
ate from political action and that trade uaian leadership be kept apart from nation-
alist leaderehip, especially following the rifts that had appeared in the ranks of
the Istiklal Party in 1958. The unions coneidered that it was aeceseary tlut tbep
acquire political gaine aad that tbe union leaderehip retsin an escalatiag scale
that would guarantee them theee gains. Thie brought a n~ew unioa to praminence,
and there then were two fedesatiana of labor unione in the Uingdom of Morocco.
The firat, which had accomganied the national mavement aince its e~ergence, was
called the General Union of Moroccan Workers; the aecond ie called the Moroccan
Labor Federatian.
Mohamed Beajelloun Andaloussi, member of the Central Canmittee of the Istiklal
Party, n~ember of the eucutive coa~aittee of the General Uniou of Moroccan Workera
and the secretary general of the Free Univereity of &lucation, told AL-~iATAN AL-
'ARABI, "~be rifts that occurred within the Istiklal Party were not the result of
ideological diaputes, becauae this Would mean a contradiction between oae approach
and another. The Ietilclal P~rty leadership at that time considered that a polit-
ical atruggle could be integrated only if it was aimed at making the p~or prosper-
ous ia the firat place and at apree~ding about the n~otion of justice and coacilia-
tion and vuioue meaas of briaging mutually supportive groupe together. That is
the goal of trade uaion activitq. Otheraiae, ideologq will regraes an~d lag behind
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its proper progressive positions, which have the goal firat of all of mobilizing
the entire national atruggle for the attainment of workers' rights."
Ths Birth of the Union
Benjelloun went on, "After the General Union of Moroccan Workers was established
in 1960 in Morocco, in circles in the Free IIniversity of Bducation, where thp first
of the union's labor unian cells was formed, the process of reconsidering the
nationalist view of unioa activity was begun, with the goal of getting the workera
to co~it thetoselves to this development, because they, that is, the workers, when
they make a union cam~itment, also conmit themselves to political notions that can
rid them of wretchednese, distress and all kinds of exploitation. The establish-
ment of the General Union of Workere was plauned to thwart the conspiracq that vas
~ aimed at reducing the workere' effectiveaesa, since this union was born of the
blood of martyrs, prisoners, exiles and oppreased persons. Abdelaziz Bendiss, one
martyr, wham the Istiklal Party co~nsidere the martyr of the working class, was the
first brick in t~e edifice of the uaion. Fram the first moment of ita birth, ~he
proclaimed the Istiklal Party's political commitment, becauee we consider that the
party believes in a struggle based on national valuea far removed from provocation
and aggravatiQn. Provocation meana that the union becomes a meeas for moving the
machine, whereas it is the party, aay party, that should strive for that. ThiB
process of provocation ie concentrated in numerous slogans, post~re and phrases
aimed at depriving people of the meaaing of the holy war they must wage with them-
selves to attain total conscioueness.
"We in the union have found, through our co~itment with the Istiklal Yarty, that
the provocation process i.s very simple, since it is eaey to tell people that it is
through struggle that socialiem and equality will be realized, and so forth; how-
ever, we believe that for truly active, fighting people, go implanting awareness
can be realized only if theae people are conscioue of the valuea they represent ae
persons and the values the struggle represents."
Regarding the aocialist notion of labor unions, Ben,ielloun said "When we say
'socialism,' we must ea~phasize a specific concept, a nationaliat notion and a his-
toric struggle, along with a clear viaion of the �uture, and then we will be able
to judge what socialism will do in our country. The socialiam that some peapls
are speaking about here and whose books they read has never been realized, especi-
ally not in accordance witt? the contents of these books. Rather, what has happened
in more than one place is that there was a historic process and a historic practice
which pravided the theory and gave a concept and a name; the name did not precede
it. This caimon adaptation which we witness from time to time can only do some-
thing; either it fortifies the working class with more sensitive methods or it
mobilizes the toiling cl~ss by diluting the struggle. Thus a struggle that does
not have a epecific goal and specific objective and does not rely on a process of
stages will become a means of dilution and a means for fragmenting the cambative
power of the toiling claes." .
Concerning the ideology of the General Onion of Moroccan Workera, he said, "We
believe that the working cleae feels that Islam, as a religion, brings about just-
ice and equality and that it ia necessary to apply Islamic principles in order to
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attain the legitimate righta of every ~ndividual. Therefore we are working for
the sake of the moral enlightenwent which Is3am~? has revealed, in addition to the
proper nationalist enlightenment. The e~loi~ation of human labar is one of the
greatest sins in Islam. 'rJhen this feeling becomes wfdespread and there is proper
religion in the spirits of people, th~n a development occurs tn the core and es-
sence of human relations.
"Therefore, to us, the equation hss been to achieve a revolution of conscience.
The concerns that workers expezience ~in rheir beliefs, ideas and lives are the ones
tha~ cause upheavals within them~ l~ading them to became elements in the struggle.
Struggles that ~re concentrated on techniques of provoca~tion and co~a~does cannot
be continuous and effective; rather, tiiey b~cazn~ mills~unes gxinding down the
people who commit the provocat~.on while not benefiting the people who are provoked.
"We wish to bring about workers' participa~ion in factoriea and peasants' partici-
pation in free agricultural organizations Chrough a d~ialogue with the govertia?ent
and via all the democratic means oE pressure, We are also struggling so that the
Iabor courts may become a means fo.r putting pressure on emQloyers who ignore work-
ers' human rights and expel workers for any .reason whenever they like. The Min-
istry of Labor must play a part in this srea and the gavernment and employ~rs must
not forget that the workex's intePest3 are tha plant's int~xests, that the peasant's
interests are the interests of tkxe la;nd, ~nd tria~ ~p~ression by any financial
authority must be ~if~ed from ~k~e workers and peasan~cs and conseq~nently the working
and productive sectars. We are also struggl.ing agatnst ~he hixing of any persons
on a temporary basis, because teu~ornry hirP means 3isguised unemployment human
exploitation of workers, and th~e attc~t to iacpose future poverty and hunger on
their families. We are also demand3ng a national retirement fuu,d and requesting
that all workers have some money to enable their families to live on in the event
workers are exposed to harn~. The union's r~preseatatives in the Chamber of Deputd.es
are trying with all the~r effort to inti� duce campensations into the basic salary
as far as the retirement law goes. We are striving ~a turn all social reforms in
the labor sectors into a means for raising and iwproving producCion so that the re-
sults will be proper. This refozm, and its results, can came about only through a
general freedom o~ union activl.ty, and thi.s talces place through enlighternnent of
the worlcers and their instituttons ax~ci ~he poli~ieal agencies i.n the eountry, with
the objective of bringing abouC the gxeatest p~ssible a~ount of gaine both in the
context of the workers and factories and in th~ limited g~neral context of the
goverrnnent, in the shortesC pnssible period of time~"
COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-A12ABI.
- 11887
CSO: 4504/373
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MOROCCO
LIVESTOCK RAISING, MEAT, MILK PRODUCTION IN MAGHREB EXAMINED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1911, 25 Jun 82 pp 1633-
1635, 1637, 1639
[TextJ The dominant climate in the Maghreb is Mediterranean, with autumn and
spring rains. However, as soon as. one leaves the coastal regions, the aridity
of the land permits only extensive livestock raising. Under 400 mm of rainfall,
one finds semi-nomadic goat and sheep raising.
In the arid regions (under 200 mm), livestock raising can only be practiced on
the move or on a nomadic basis. The extent of the arid ~or semi-arid regions
explains the importance of livestock raising, but with 1ow yields and high mor-
tality rates (epizootic, drought). Many nomadic herders who were once cara-
vaneers are now semi-sedentary. .
Cattle raising is developing in the more fortunate regions that are richer in
pasture land: the plains and mountains of~Atlantic Morocco and northern Tunisia.
In Morocco,.the western regions and the westward-facing mountain slopes receive
the heaviest rainfall (Tangiers: 833 mm), but it gradually decreases as one
goes south (Agadir: 225 mm). Differences in temperature are great and it
freezes in the mountains. ~
Agriculture juxtaposes two sectors: one, traditional, with 95 percent of all
rural people; the other modern, partially oriented toward exports.
As Eor the mountains and oases in the south, the f armers raise small animals
on tt~e move. On the Atlantic plains, cattle and sheep raising uses fallow land
since the crop growing system is based on biennial rotation.
Livestock raising retains its traditional place, with mediocre yields. Smaller
livest~~ck (15 million sheep, 8 million goats) is the most common in the interior,
wtlile cattle raising is the rule on the Atlantic plains, where there are some
3.6 million head.
Sixty percent of the active population (over 3 million persons) engages in an
activity linked to livestock raising, with over one-third being breeders.
Traditional livestock raising (cattle, sheep and goats) occupies over a million
breeders, whose herds are either of one type of at~imal or two or three c anbined:
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Sume 400,000 breeders raise cattle ex~~'_usively, while 300,000 have both cattle
and sheep, 150,000 have herds of all three, 70,000 raise only sheep, 70,000
raise sheep and goats and another 30,000 have herds of only goats.
The number of livestock breeders thus looks impressive, but such a presenta-
tion might give a false idea of the situation. One should specify that these
~re people who engage in livestock raising activities in general along
with others and that many of them have only a few animals.
The size of the herds provides a clearer picture. For cattle raisers, for �
example, 760,000 have from 1 to 5 head, while 125,000 have 5 to 10, 27,000 have '
10 to 20, and only 200 have over 100 head.
One should add that there are four ranches in Morocco and that their operation
is s~tisfactory.
As far as sheep are concerned, intensive breeding is conf ined to a few rare
industrial breeding and extensive grazing operations, which occupies the inter-
ior areas on the plateaux and mountains and employs some 575,000 persons. Of
these, 230,000 have 10 head at most~ wh-lle 270,000 have from 10 to 50, 55,000
have from 50 to 150 and 17,000 have ~~ver 150 animals.
Goat raising is essentially found in the southern provinces (Marrakech, Agadir,
Ouarzazate). It is also found in the Rif (Tangiers, Tetouan) and part of
eastern Morocco (Taza). The average size of the herds is about 20 head.
Moroccan animal production has greatly suffered from the catastrophic drought
lasting throughout the final quarter of 1980 and the entire year of 1981.
It is therefore difficult to describe th~ current livestock situation, as
the data remains incomplete.
Official statistics available for Morocco show substantial drops in the siza
of herds.
The number of cattle, long stable at around 3.6 million head, was only 3.4 mil-
lion for 1980 and dropped still further in 1981.
Moroccan Livestock (number of head)
1980 End 1981
Cattle 3,396,000
Includi~g: Local breeds 1,136,000 919,000
Crossbreeds 146,000 133,000
Imported 72,000 66,000
Sheep 14,840,000
Including� Ewes 8,692,000 7,400,000
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(cont. ) "
Goats 5,100,000
Including: Females 2,856,000
Draft animals
Norses 300,000
Mules 350,000
Donkeys 1,400,000
Source: Moroccan statistics
The FAO figures coincide�for cattle, but are substantially different for sheep
and goats. According to the FAO, the number of sheep, 17.1 million in 1970,
fell to 15.6 in 1979 and then rose slightly in 1980 to 16.1 million head.
The number of goats went from 8.5 million in 1970 to about 6 million in 1979
and 1980.
One can see that the order is the same and that the figures give a good idea of
the relative size of the herds, whatever the sources.
Morocco has a great livestock raising potential because its livestock produc-
tion represents over one-third of total agricultural production. However, that
production is still inadequate to meet its own needs.
Morocco has two types of livestock raising: livestock raising for milk, essen-
tially cattle; and livestock raising for meat, where one f inds sheep, goats
and loca~ cattle.
Cattle Raising
Cattle raising is of two types: intensive and extensive. Extensive cattle
raising uses grazing land and fallow fields. The breeds~are mainly local:
Atlas Browns and the Oulmes. The areas where it is practiced are the dry
farming zones and the mountains, of. mediocre interest, where productivity is
low. E forts are now being made toward genetic improvements and toward pro- ~
viding good feed.
Intensive cattle raising essentially involves improved imported purebreds
(Friesians, Holstein). It is practiced on state farms (COMAGRI [Moroccan
Farm ManaRement Company], SODEA [Agricultural Development Company],
SOGETA [Agricultural Land Management Company], experimental farms) and private
Earms in irrigated areas. The departments of the Ministry of A.griculture
are in charge of organization, particularly with respect to shelters and animal
health and preventive medicine.
Productivity is good and the performance of the cows :.onstantly improving,
particularly because of efforts made toward genetic improvements.
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Vi~wed on the whole, cattle raising p~~formances are poor as a result of the
extensive and traditional nature of the activity (90 percent local breeds).
Nevertheless, the development of forage crops and the spreading of more modern
raising methoa~ have resulted in substantial improvements. Still, there are
marked differences because of the breeds.
For example, the age of the f irst calving of a Pie Noire cow is 28 months,
compared with 39 months for a local breed. A local cow will give 450 kilo-
grams of milk a year; a Pie Noire, 4,000.
Sheep
Sheep raising is essentially for the purpose of providing meat and wool. The
milk is almost all used by the lambs.
Four main breeds are found:
the Timahdit, of average size (.60 meter high; 40 to 50 kilograms), a dark-
headed sheep mainly found on the western slope of the Middle Atlas Mountains,
with good resistance to the cold and bad weather thanks to its long, less kinky
fleece (weight of fleece: 1.8 to 2 kilograms).
the Sardi, a large sheep (.60 to .80 meter high; 45 to 60 kilograms), with
black spots on the head, ears and legs. Lambs grow rapidly. Fleece weighs
from 1.5 to 1.8 kilograms. It is found on the Moroccan central plateau.
the Beni-Guil, a small breed (.50 to .60 meter high; 35 to 40 kilograms),
with a brown head and brown or spotted legs, very firm fleece and very sought-
after meat; a very resistant breed and ahle to transf orm cellulose. It is
found on the high pleateaux of the Algerian-Moroccan territories.
the D'mane, a good breeder and an excellent milk giver. This is a"population"
- more than a breed. The types are diverse and not specific and are generally
of inediocre conforma~'on. The ram has no horns. This is the sheep of the
northwest Saharan oas~9.
Only a few years ago, research advised that the Merino breed be spread to the
Moroccan oases and its introduction is still sometimes encouraged in the coun-
tires of the Maghreb, to the detriment of some local breeds, particularly the
D'mane.
. This type is an excellent breeder, with two lambings a year and frequent multi-
- ple birth~. It has swarmed over a rather broad area: the palm plantations of
Tafilalet, Draa, Sarro, Todra, Ferkla, Gheris and Guir; the Dades Valley,
and also in the Middle Atlas and on the edge of the Atlas Mountains (Marrakech).
It is generally raised in small herds by families of sedentary farmers. In
the oases, it is often stabled in buildings that are part of the dwellings.
It is rather small: 40 to 45 kilograms for ewes and 65 to 85 kilograms for
rams.
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Its appearance is very distin~t: The males have no horns, the animal is loag
and light in the body, with a fine, aquiline head, long, drooping ears, a long,
thin neck, and the fleece is long and coarse. The wool is varied in color, with
black and white dominating. ~
Its qualities are remarkable: a very good breeder (190 days between two lamb-
ings); two lambings a year; natural aptitude for having twins (or triplets);
new eyes are apt to reproduce in a year and are very fertile;'and ewes can suckle
three lambs.
For the Saharan regions, they constitute a major element in development.
The D'mane fits perfectly well into palm agriculture and it would be mosf un-
fortunate to lose an animal so well-adapted genetically, even if its short-range
advantages may seem less attractive than newly introduced breeds.
Fortunately, the Royal Domains Directorate has made it possible to set up a
ranch in Tafilalet, to be used to preserve and improve the breed.
One should also mention the Mediterranean-type found in the mountains, in
Morocco as well as Algeria. It is known by different names: the Atlas breed,
the Rif sheep, and so on. Small, the ewes weigh from 25 to 35 kilograms.
It has long, -_tirly rather than kinky fleece and the wool is white. It is a
good milk giver and can stand cold and iritemperate weather.
The pastoral tradition of the Maghreb dates from ancient times and North Af rica,
with some 35 million sheep, is one of the greatest sheep-raising regions in the
world. .
The Maghrebian breedr~ are excellent and 'well-adapted 'to their ~ilieu. ' The
incruduction of foreign breeds is of little i~?terest and emphasis ahould rather
be placed on the best local breeds.
Selection has already obtained excellent results and based on a common herd, ~
one needs but 3 to 5 years to achieve substantial results. How~ver, the applica-
tion of simple, inexpensive measures would~bring about a considerable increase
in the production of local flocks. Provided that su~table zootechnic measures
are taken and by using mere selective breeding, Moroccan (and hiaghrebian) live-
stock has excellent production potential and should easil~ meet the Maghreb's
needs for mutton.
The basic actions include adequate water, salt within reach, some supplements
and proper feed. Research should be aimed at more numerous births, a reduction
in pre- and postnatal mortality, larger lambs, increasing resistance to drought
an~i speedier growth.
~111 of this implies the spreading of techniques and proper training.
Application of basic measures helps the flock rapidly, but also lays the way
fur the future through the obtention of animals that are stronger and more pro-
~iuctive (at an earlier age, fertility, weight).
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hult uMMIl.~1AL U,~: UNLY
Meat Production .
Meat production was by and large adequate until 1974, but the combination ~of the
drought and population growth made it inadequate. In the form of ineat and offal,
it totals an estimated 350,000 tons for 1981, up 6, percent over 1'~80, but predi~-
tions for 19'82 show a drop of from 7 to 8 percent: to 326,000 tons. This is
because of the drought, but it is still a lesser evil because for red meats
alone (cattle, sheep and goats), official statistics show the following figures:
1980, 194,000 tons; 1981, 234,000 tons; and 1982, 146,000 tons (eatimates). ~
It is poultry that will make the difference, with the great boom in industrial
poultry raising. Figures for poultry production are as follows: 100,000 tons
of ineat in 1980; 75,000 tons in 1981; and 153,000 tons in 1982 (estimates).
Beef production, announced by Moroccan statistics at 107,000 tons in 1980 and
132,000 tons in 1981, is expected to total only. 90,OOO.tons in 1982. Production
of lamb and mutton: 55,000 tons in 1980 and 65,000 tons in 1981, is also~ex-
pected to drop substantially in 1982 (35,000 tons). .
The damage of the drought is manifest. Cattle provide 56 percent of all red
meat production, but one must note that if one is talking abou~ total animal
protein (red meats, offal, poultry), they represent only 26 to 27 percent, with
the expanding poultry sector accounting for 47 percent by itself.
The carcass yield is low: The average weight of a carcass is 117 kilogram for
cattle (average for Africa: 139 kilograms) and 11 kilograms for sheep�(average
for Africa: 13). However, these are national averages. Near~the large cities,
supplied by ranches with improved breeds, the carcasses weigh from 170 to 200
kilo~rams.
Poultry production has developed greatly and contributes more and more to the
effort to make up for the meat shortage in Morocco.
The traditional poultry-raising operations represent some 50 percent of all
production, according to the most recent estimates available to us. The other
hatf comes from modern poultry farms (nearly all of them privately owned). T;e
mcdern sector uses very productive strains and is essentially oriented toward
production for meat.
Annual production of poultry meat, estimated'to total 70,000 tons in 1977 (it
had increased over 60 percent since 1970), was 100~000 tons in 1980. But a
drop occurred in 1981, when the total was 75,000 tons. Nevertheless, the very
great effort underway in the sector points toward a doubling of production for
1982 (esti~lated 153,000 tons). ,
Egg production in 1980 was 613.million.
Development of the poultry sector presumes the existence of poultry slaughter-
houses and development of a cold storage facility, now not suff iciently in use.
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' Milk Production
From 420 million liters in 1971, milk production in Morocco went to 530 million
liters in 1975 and an estimated 780 million in 1980. This is clearlp not enough
be~ause in 1980, Morocco imported the equivalent of 630 million literi..
Because of climatic uncertainties, production varies greatly from one year to
the next. However, what is even more remarkable, it is very irregular during
the year also. There are two di,stinct periods: heavy milk production (February
to August) and low milk production (September to January).
This very specific phenomenon is directly related to the birthing season, which
is itself related to the availability of fodder.
In 1975, only 20 percent of all production went to processing plants and 30 per-
cent went for family consumption.
In 1977, the amount of milk produced was 620 million liters and imports of milk
products (butter, concentrated and powdered milk, cheeses) totaled the equivalent
of some 350 million liters, representing a total consumption of about 1 billion
liters, or SS liters per person (60 percent from national production). Since
that time, these levels have progressed substantially due to the great effort
made to develop livestock raising: infrastructures, the establishment of collec-
tion centers (76 in 1975; 214 in 1980), an intensification of genetic improve-
ment efforts (artificial insemination, breeding stations, importation of dairy
stock), subsidies, and so on.
_ At the same time, emphasis was placed on the related industries, with an increas-
inK number of processing plants in milk producing regions, with eff orts tending
to regionalize these units so as to permit the development of production by re-
gions and encourage collection under the liest possible conditions.
Zootechnic measures (controlled breeding, supervision of lambing, choice of
rams, ewes and lambs) and sanitary measures (vaccination, prophylactic care,
control of parasites) are an indispensable complement to development.
Goats
Coats are the third element of Moroccan livestock raising. Although the herd
;~as decreased in the past l0 years, it still represents some li percent of all
a~iimals. Along with sheep, goats are the animals most able to take advantage
o~ the pasture available, especially in mountainous regions (southern Morocco,
forests of the Upper Atlas and the Rif). They are generally found in the arid
and semi-arid zones. Their hardiness is well-known but their productivity
remains low. Meat production is about S to 6 kilograms per female kept for
breeding per year. In 1971, the official statistics put Moroccan goat milk
~>roduction at 42,000 tons, 95 percent consumed locally.
'
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Other Types of Production
Wool
Wool is produced locally by different breeds, especially crossbreeds (40 per-
cent). It is often coarse and uniform. An effort at selec~fon is being made in
regions considered as the main origins of the breeds.
The FAO gives production f igures of about 5,600 tons, while calculations based
- on the number of head and the basis of 1.6 kilograms of wool per head per year
give a theoretical production of 20,000 to 25,000 tons.
� Crosschecking based on the needs of handicrafts and industry lead one to think
that Moroccan figures are more accurate. Actually, the need for wool totals
an estimated 14,000 tons, met as follows: 15 percent by local production, which
yields 20,000 X 15 percent = 3,000 tons; 80 percent by imports, or around 11,000
tons.
For 85 percent of the local production a minimum of 15,000 tons it would
be interesting to learn the final use.
Hides
They often have flaws due to parasites (scabies, tics, warbles), certain viral
or bacterial diseases, mechanical causes o accidents or improper skinning.
The amount of production is showr_ by the following figures:
1977 1980
Cattle hides 700,000 800,000
Sheep and goat skins 4,160,000 6,500,000
Livestock feed includes: local production,
Local production: grazing, 6.6 billion forage units; fodder production from
forage and leguminous crops (687 million forage units); fallow land, straw and
stubble, grain, bran, pulp, cakes, and so on (4.12 billion forage.units); and
imported fodder and livestock feed, whether on a regular basis (corn, oil cakes)
or circumstantial basis.
Moroccan Livestock Raising Policy
Moroccan livestock raising policy corresponds to an objective of an annual con-
sumption of 20 grams of animal protein per person by 1985, with self-sufficiency
achieved through.increased national production and improved quality.
The main guidelines are: an increase in production and productivity; greater
income for the livestock breeder and Moroccanization (ownership of farms is re-
served for nationals and national companies); profesaional training of livestock
breeders and supervisory personnel; and a balance between production and process-
ing.
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Emphasis is clearly placed on cattle and mainly on genetic improvements through
crossbreeding with imported animals. In addition, some purebred stock is being
imported, especially milk cows. Finally, an effort is being made to select the
best local stock. .
Introduction of Purebred Stock
The introduction of foreign livestock, especially milk cows, is the short-term
answer to immediate needs. Purchases come from the following source�: animals
imported outright (27,800 pregnant heifers imported during the 1973-1977 Plan),
with an annual general program reviewed every year; COMAGRI "nurseries."
COMAGRI turns out a thousand heifers a year and its model ranches serve as a
means to spread modern intensive livestock raising methods.
Selection Farms
Six cattle selection farms keep purebred herds of select Moroccan stock. Pro-
ceeds are returned to breeders.
Artificial Insemination and Breeding Stations .
Artificial insemination for cattle is systematically organized on a national
scale with two national centers~ one at Afn Djemaa, which oversees the southern
provinces, and the other at Renitra, which oversees the north. The breeding~
stations now serve only regions where there are not yet any.local artificial
insemination centers.
Public Supervision ~
The support organizations for this policy are national, paranational and private
(of a cooperative nature). They involve:
1) research, teaching and technical assistance, under the National Institute
of Agronomic Research (INRA) in Rabat, the Hassan II Agronomic and Veterinary
Institute in Rabat and the National�School of Agriculture in Meknes. �
Ttie departments of the Ministry of Agriculture and ..~grarian Reform: the Direc-
torate of Livestock Raising and regional departments (regional offices of agri-
~:u~tural development and provincial agricultural directorates).
It iG the Ministry of Interior which oversees the municipal slaughterhouses
anci the administration of collective grazing land.
2) state organizations:
clie National Livestock Development Company (SNDE), whose task it is to set up
livestock raising units (meat or milk) of the ranch type on national lands;
the Moroccan Farm Management Company (COMAGRI), which manages national land and
whose main task is the production of pregnant heifers fo�r return to livestock
breeders (Friesians, Holsteins, Tarentaise);
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the Agricultural Land Management Company (SOGETA) and the Agricu~tural Develop-
ment Company (SODEA), which manage state land, with very important animal pro-
duction, and which also produce breeding stock to return to breeders; and -
the National Agricultural Credit Bank (CNCA), SO percent of whose loans involve
livestock raising. ~
3) cooperative organizations:
the National Milk Cooperatives Union (UNCAL);
milk pickup cooperatives (200 colLection centers; 10,000 me~bers), centers for
the dissemination of infoYmation and health and development support;
agrarian reform cooperatives; and
associations of purebred livestock breeders, whose core was set up in Casablanca
and whose expansion is planned.
Organization of Market
State sector: production of breeding stock and seed; dfssemination of tech-
niques (SNDE, COMAGRI, SOGETA, SODEA); 53 municipal slaughterhouses. The
largest handled a total of 56,000 tons of ineat in 1980 (Casablanca, 30,000
tons; Rabat, 8,700 tons). ~
Cooperative sector: the agrarian reform cooperatives, on recovered land; the
dairy cooperatives, which include several milk collection centers; and the
commercial circuits: livestock markets (souks), wholesale butchers, butchers
supplying urban zones; livestock markets with slaughterhouses at markets for
rural areas; milk collection centers; anu the organization of poultry markets
now underway.
Budgets and Pro3ects '
Moroccan livestock raising contribute 35 percent of the agricultural GNP and .
makes up 15 to 25 percent of the GNP. ,
The portion of the national budget devoted to livestock raising is regularly
increasing and is making a real leap in 1982: 1980, 41 million dirhams;
1981, 68 million dirhams; and 1982, 200 million dirhams.
For the 1981-1985 Plan, out of the 10 billion dirhams provided for eqnipment
credits tc the Ministry of Agriculture, 1,156,000,000 concern livestock raising.
Along with an intensification of saniCary and health action, the 1981-1985 Plan
emphasizes the expansion of forage crops, the improvement.of pastureland and
genetic improvements and every sector is the target of specific pro~ects.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Pa.ris 1982
END �
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