JPRS ID: 10673 SOUTH AND EAST ASIA REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080047-7
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• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 47
• Content Type: REPORTS

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J~PRS L/ 10673 ~
2'1 July 1982
I ~
~
South and East Asia Re ort
p
CFOUO 5/82)
_ FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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a -
' JPRS L/10673
21 July 1982
SOUTH AND EAST ASIA REPORT
cFOUO s/s2)
CONTENTS
BANGLADESH
Role of Violence in Bangladesh Politics Discussed
(~hayetullah Khan; FAR EASTERN ECON~IIC REVIEW, 2 Jul 82). 1
Armed Forces~ Role in National A,ffairs Elaborated
( S. Ka~naluddin; FAR EASTERN ECON(&IIC REVIEW, 2 Jul 82 .
KAMPUCHEA
Military Conditions, PRK-SRV Relations Noted
(Rene Baclffnann; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 8 May 82) 6
PAKISTAN
Correspondent~s Conf`rontation With Zia Reported
(ASIAY~iEEK, 9 du]. 82) 18
- a- [ I I I- AS IA - 10 7 FOUO ]
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BANGLADESH
ROLE OF VIOLENCE IN BANGIADESH POLITICS DISCUSSED
Hong Kong FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW in English 2 Jul 82 p 24
~Article by Enayetullah Khan~
~Text~ The profile of Bangladesh is painted red with violence. The people
of this land have lived with terror from colonial times through the genocide
of 1971, the horrors of the Sheikh Mujibur Rahman era, and the subsequent
mayhem of coups, mutinies and fratricide.
The face of terror chanted from the veiled to the bare while its application
varied contingent upon the character and compulsion of Che ruling establish-
ments. The instruments, too, underwent changes, Loth qualitatively and
quantitatively in direct proportion to the strength or otherwise of tha mass
base for social chaage.
B ut terror remained the chief weapon in the armoury of the ruling establish-
ments. As such, it produced its own reaction of violence from the man in
the street. From time to time in the n~tion's history, he would try to
embodq history in his own person and asQ~rt his inalienable right to live
honourably. But things never happened the w~y he intended. His sovereign
will and quest for freedom became casualties in the hands of successive
ruling establishments. Violence and vengeance succeeded each other.
The scars o� genocide, the brutal elindn,ation of dissen*_ by dictatorial
regimes, the vicious class war glorified by seme as the "unfinished revolu~
tion" and the slaying of two presidents at their posts seem to prove the
dictum tha.t no gentleness can efface the mark of violence; only violence
itself can destroy violence. ~
Bangladesh has seen 11 tumultuous years of g?:eat aspirations and gr~ater
~ tragedies in which the ruling establishments never shirked from violence
to repress the ma.sses. The regimes of Mu3ib and Ziaur Rahman testiry to
this in different ways. The key questions with both the regimes and their
helmsmen were how to use the sacrifices of the people to secure absolute
power to themselves and how to satisfy the demands of the politico-bureaucratic
class at the expense of the nation's labour. Both ssed charisma as a screen
and fake ide~logies as opium for the masses and both applied the instrume*.:~s
of terror to suppress or elimina.te patriotic political dissent.
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Zia inherited these instruments of terror but took the process of violence
a stage further. His one-man rule became the hub of gun-toting killers,
muscle-f lexing bandits and a motley crowd of political pirates. He
incorporated violence into the body-politic with the active support of the
state machinery. Zia's use of terror and violence was less institutional
than under Mujib.
The spectre of. violence camiot be contained like the mythical genie in the
bottle. It al~so spilled over into the armed forces themselves. Thus over
a period of six years betwee-i the slayings of Mujib and Zia, the nation
went through roughly 18 coui~ bids and mutinies, 500 executions of mutineers
and the lynchings of two generals.
Meanwhile, the plundei~ of resources by the politico-bureaucratic retinue of
the regimes went unchanged. Mujib tribalised corruption and expropriation
- through his fand.ly group and a coterie of party faithfuls. The transparent
greed of his new commissars ~ould not even spare relief materials sent by
various countries for the succour of the people of wsr-ravaged Bangladesh.
Zia, on the other hand, like a skilful surgeon with gloves on, kept his own
~ hands and those of his i~nediate kin clinically clean. But he institution-
alizEn corruption to cement his power structure. The massive edifice of
his Bangladesh Nationalist Party was built brick by brick with the surpluses
of a poor nation--the spill-over of aid and grant money and exactions from
the pub lic sector enterprises. Every sack of wheat or development dollar
for the rural poor was subject to depredation. Power was used to acquire
cash which bought more power.
Such exercises in ~ccumulation of power and profits were bound to become
antithetical to public order. The subordination of public institutions to
person,al authority or the crea.tion of surrogate institutions to suit the
designs of absolute power gave rise to chaos. Worst of all, it prodiiced
the phenomena of counter-violence and all-pervasive anarchy that ultimately
led to the deaths of Mujib and Zia. This was the exact reverse of what a
poor, war-rava.ged nation needed--strong institutions and social consciousness
among the leaders.
The violent ends of the two regimes, however unfortunate they might have
been, proved the transitoriness of political power twice ove.r~ Now after
11 long years, the rule of violence and absence of order hopefully appear
to have run their full course. The latest political change in which the
military took over statie power in a pre-dawn strike in March was at least
bloodless--a fact Chat was so untypical of Bangladesh.
The recent emergenc~e of the military as a countervailing force to person.~l
and group aggrandisement is owed to its relative ozganisa~.ion and its
involvement in various pr~ases of the naticaal stru~gle. The military faces
the task of creating a new order to supercede the elective insr.itution of
the presidency which had been tailor-Knade for Zia a1c~Tie and did no~ provide
the democracy it promised. The military in B~.n~;lades:t~ dicl not ex.�lctly come
riding on horseback as a disinterested, noi~~partisan saviour of ri?~~ nation.
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But as Lieut-Gen H.M. Ershad said in November last year, barely 13 days after
the election of Abdus Sattar as president: "What is important is the funda-
mental c~ncept of recogniaing the politico-military problems and finding a
permanent solution in a constitutional approach."
The statement put the subsequent coup into context. The coup differs quali-
tatively from the usual rhetoric of military takeovers with their copybook
pledges of returning to civilian rule. The thesis is tl~at military inter-
vention in politics should be converted into military par~tycipaiion in
politics. The aim: to contain both uti.litary and political vi~l~nce and to
create public order and stable institutions.
Thus the militar~ is there not as the force behind personal rule but as the
only body organised enough and broad enough in composition to form the basis
for fair, firm and honest government and provide the stability necessary
for political and social institutions to develop.
Zia had used the check-and-balance strategy o� keeping the military at bay.
In doing so, he created jealousies and suspicions which resulted in the
proliferation of military violence in the form of attempted coups and mutinies.
These culmizlated in the mutiny led by the late major-general Abul Manzur
and leading to the assassination of Zia at Chittagong in May last year and
sl:ook the very foundation of the military as an institution. But events
also showed that existing political institutions including the ruling party,
were in even worse shape, reeling in corruption.
~ Thus the recent military takeover was an a lmost inevitable result of the
- situation itself rather than a result of Bonapartist ambitions on Che part
of the generals. The military moved in by default to reclaim its vanguard
role in the construction of the nation.
Violence still remains a psychic force in the Bangladeshi poli~y and the
military. The creation of order remains a distant and difficult task. God
speed to the military in its gallant attempt.
COPYRIGHT: Hong Kong FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW 1982
CSO: 4220/227
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~
BANGLADESH
ARMED FORCES~ ROLE IN NATIONAL AFFAIRS ELABORATED
~ Hong Kong FAR EASTERN ECOTTOMIC REVIEW in English 2 Jul 8? pp 22, 23
(Article by S. KamaluddinJ
IText~ Dacca--Bangladeshi strongman Lieutenant Gen H.M. Ershad has hinted
~ at power-sharing by the armed fQrces by bringing about "structural changes
in the country's economic and social order," and said that his government
will introduce a system to end people's sufferings a~,risin~ out of what he
called unfair politics.
In an hour-loag interview on Bangladesh TV on June 20, Ers'nad said the
_ long-term changes being contemplated by his government wi11 be very different
from those of previous martial law regimes. He discussed the government's
policies at length, including certain basic structural and adffinistrative
changes which led many people to believe that these chan~;es would be
- incorporated in the Constitution now suspended.
However, he did not elaborate on how these changes would be brought about or
whether his govermnent was going to frame a new constitution. All the same,
he appeared to have firmed up his views on the type of political system which
should be encouraged in Bangladesh. He said that wh:Lle democracy as such had
not failed, "imitation of foreigu politics has failed in our country."
Referring to Singapor_e, South Korea and Japan, he said these countries have
developed their own political systemo in accordance with their requirements,
'B ut," he went on, `.'unfortunately, we could not introduce the politic~;
suitable to our own age whicr? could take the n~ation forward...I con,,ider
democracy as a state system which will carry Bangladesh to the path of
lasting progress."
Agked why martial law was imposed in March, Ershad said that it was inevitable.
He added: "A great anarchy was prevailing in the administrative system...
_ Nothing tangible for the 1.mprovement of the administration could be done
because of the preasures of the ruling parties on various occasions. Fake
industrialists were being given licences and perm~ts because they contributed
towards party funds.
~1
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":~Iiscreants, masquerading as touts of political parties created a reign of
terror in society. The parties in power actually used to appease these
elements. That is wh~~ no political party after coming to power could bring
about any �?eaningful changes. On the other hand, poor people had been
ei:uuring...,silently,..~Ln fact, there was no way out of this situation ~other~
than imp~�:~ng marti.al-law rule."
Un the questiuti of structural changes, he said: "In my opinion, the
permanent changes that this regime is thinking about would distinguish it
fr,~m rhe other martial law governments in the past." Comparing the polit-
;.cal systems of the United States and Britain, Ershad said that no political
F~arty in Iiangladesh had ever voluntarily abandoned power in the past and all
~~f them had iailed to realise that no party can remain in power without the
~uppurt of the people.
He said r.hat t-he major failure of the political parties was not building up
an insti':ution over the years w~ich could hava earned the confidence and
respect of the people. "The Constitution introduced by the party in power
was subsequently scrapped by another party after coffing into power. Thus a'
total uncertainty prevailed in the politics of our cauntry," he added.
On the question of the armed forces~ direct participation in politics,
rrshad~ referring ta the liberation struggle of 1971, said that the Bangla-
deshi armed forces were born to fulfil the hopes and aspirations of the
people, which basically were political obje~tives. Apparently what he
meant was that the armed forces should be given an effective political role.
This, however, is not a new~development. In a controversial statement on
November 27, Ershad outlined a similar role �or the armed forces saying that
they ha.d fought a liberation war and thereby had bec~me highly politicised.
As they ha3 a stake in the country they should be allowed t~ play an ef�ective
role in running it. He also thought that Chis particd.pation would help build
an institution whYCh would also eliminate the possibility of any adventurism
within the armed forces.
On the role of the armed forces, Ershad said in his TV interview that they
could work as a balancing force. "With their skill and potentialities,"
Ershad said, "the arme3 forces could help replenish the shortfall in the
country's ad~.nistrative, technological ar.3 engineering seators. They
should naturally, be utilised for rebuilding an integrated powerful and
unified nation."
He felt that the role of the armed forces would be accomplished when the
prograBanes undertaken by the present government were iutplemented. Sticking
to his earlier time-frame, he hoped that his government's reaponsibility
would be met in about two years.
COPYRIGHT~: Hong Kong FAR 1sASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW 1982
CSO: 4220/227
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~ KAMPUCHEA
MILITARY CONDITIONS, PRK-SRV RELATIONS NOTED
Paris LE N~UVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 8 May 82 pp 130-131, 136, 139, 143, 145,
147-148, 151
[Article by Rene Backmann: "Cambodia: The Price of a Liberation"]
[Text] Seven years ago, on the morning of 17 April 1975,
thousat~ds of little men dressed in black, their long plaid
krama around their necks,~went into Phnom Penh. Loaded
down with cartridge belts and their AK 47's (Chinese com-
bat rif~e) over thei~t shoulders, they looked exhausted.
Seerningly coming out of the walls, they immediately took
up positions at all the intersections, tense and indiffer-
ent to the uncertain smi.les of the papulation. They were
the Khmers Rouges.~ Five days.earlier, American Ambassador
John Dean, protected by 300 marines armed to the teeth,
, ' had fled the besieged city by helicopter, the Stars and
Stripes folded under his arm.
The nightmare had begun in Cambodia. In that "China as
Seen by Idiots," as Malraux called it, "it lasted 3 years
and 8 months, 3 years and 8 months of exoduses, torture,
massacres, madness. Over a million men, women and children
1 out of every 6 Cambodians were savagely sacrificed
during the self-genocide, the first in the history of the
_ planet.
To put an end to the horror, it took nothing less than a
Vietnamese ?~ilitary intervention. And the Cambodians are
now paying the price of that salvation: Over 200,000
Vietnamese, soldiers and civilian "advisers," are campeu
on their soil, as saviors and occupiers. In this convales-
cent Cambodia, torn from the grip of famine by international
aid, mainly Western, Rene Ba~lanann spent twv weeks, traveling
over 1,000 kilometers, from the Vietnamese border to the
Thai border. Here is his travelogue:
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I. Vietnamese Everywhere
I met the first Vietnamese in Cambodia on the Air Vietnam Tupolev 134 that
makes the flight from Ho Chi Minh City to Phnom Pesh every Monday in 35 minutes.
That weekly shuttle is a veritable symbol. Except for the planes of the
International Committee of the Red Cress (~ICR) and-the British Oxfam organi-
zation, which make the connection ~,~ith Bangkok and Singapore once a week, the
Air Vietnam flight is the only link between Cambodia and the rest of the
world. In other words, Ho Chi Minh eity is a forced stop on the road to
Phnom Penh. From time to time, an Aeroflot aircraft flies in from Moscaw and
a tiny Yak 40 tri~et arrives from Vientiane: That is all.
That day, ther~ we~e only about 15 of us on the Tupo~ev: a Mexican university
professor, ennrmous and mu~tachioed, going to Angkor to continue his compara-
tive study the Aztec temples and the Khmer sanctuaries; a French business-
waman based ~n Bangkok, entrusted by the Arab oil-producing nationa to nego-
tiate with the Cambvdian Gvvernment concerning construction of a new mosque
in Phnom Penh there are 100,000 Mualim Chams in Cambodia; the wife of a
Soviet diplomat who had gone shopping in Ho Chi Minh City and who was returning
to Phnom Penh w~.th her young soa; and a dozen ~lietnamese. There were two
soldiers in green uniforms, with their kits and sacks stuffed with provisions.
Then there ~ere about ten "technical adviaers" in their white shirts, short
hair and busi,nesslike look, also loaded with sacks and thick satchels.
Nearly invisible in the eity, they are evcrywhere, these Vietnamese advisers
who have taken up headquarters in the Cambodian administration. From agri-
culture to health, every Cambodian mi.nister is aided by a team of experts
who "guide" the high officials, as it is di~creetly put in Phnom Penh.
"Call it what you waat," one of them told me, refusing to be identified but
accepting my L~teky Strikes, bought on the black market in Vietnam. "We say
that it is technical assistance or cooperation. This country has practically
no cadres left. Thase that~were not killed left. W;~en we arr~ved at the be-
ginning of 1979, there was nothing left. We had to build a new administration.
Now one exists. The institutions have been set up. The country is becoming
stabilized. Our ta$k now~consists of helping the administration of Kampuchea
to train cadres...."
Piece by piece, it is a kind of transfer of their political, economic and
social system that the Vietnamese advisers are bringing about in Cambodia.
The constitution of the People's Republic of Kampuchea is a copy of the
Vietnamese Constitution. In its most mi.nu~e details, the Vietnameae have
imposed their model. The form for customs declarations that has to be filled
out in duplicate upon arrival in Phnom Penh is the exact translation, in
Cambodian, of the form distributed before landing at Ho Chi Minh City. Even
~ better, when one leaves Phnom Penh, the document, stamped by the Camhodian
customs officials, is picked up ~t the Tan Son Nhut Airport by their Vietnam-
e~e colleagues. "A simplification ot relations between our administrationa,"
e.Yplains a Vietnamese official.
The Vtetnamese soldiers are as visible as the civilian advisers are discreet,
in the city as well as the count~y. It is true that they in no way try to hide.
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How many are there? It is impossible to know. According to offi~ials from
international organizations based on Phnom Penh and circulating in the country,
their number can be put at around 200,000. It is difficult to stroll around
in the city without running into them, these bo dai dressed in olive drab
combat uniforms, wearing the traditianal helmets. They can be seen during the
day, in pairs, ~alk3:~g along the sidewalks, squatting around the steaming
cauldrons of the soup vendors, lost in the noisy market crowds. Or they are
doing hard bargaining at the HotQl Monorom intersection over the priee of a
ride before piling three or four into the tinq rickshaws pulle~d bq cp.clists
that are the taxis of Phnom Penh. I even ran into three of them one evening
at the Vat Phnom, the oldest Buddhist teciple in the capital and one of the
only ones spared by the Khmers Rouges. After leaving their regulation ~io Chi
Minh sandals on the first step of the sanetuary, they were silentl.y looking .
at the naive frescoes, a bottle of Coca eola in their hands. At night, it is
the armed bo dai who take over for the Cambodian soldiers at the main cross-
roads. The same thing happens as soon as an otficial delegation arrives at
the airport: The road is ~ammed with green uniforms. They are not aggressive,
these little green men who do not hesitate to hail you with a"Hello!" and
~ use their rudimentary French or English when they spot a Westerner in order
to trade a few Cambodian filtered Samaki for one or two American cigarettes.
Abundant in the city, the Vietnamese military presence is even more spectacu-
lar in the country. On the southern road that winde toward Takeo and the
Vietnamese border, I found two ma~or military camps in.less than 15 kil~meters.
At the f irst, at the very gateway to Phnom Penh, groups of soldiers were fin-
ishing construction of wooden hangars that wou].d house about 30 heavy American
GMC trucks and about 20 M 113's, also American. In the other were some 30
tanks: half Soviet BMP 1's; half M 113's, camouflaged under branch shelters.
Here also, soldiers were carrying tree tru~ks. Others, in blue shorts, were
playing volleyball along the road. I also saw other camps while moving toward
the northwest, near Kompong Chhnang, around Pursat. Everywhere were light
tanks, troop transports, often American. Everywhere, soldier-carpenters were
carry~ng beams, building barracks, shelters. Manifestly, the Vietnamese Army~
continues to establish its foothold.
Wherever one goes, when leaving Phnom Penh, one finds these rural camps near
the road, housing one or two companies of infantrymen. But in practically
every large village, smaller military posts were found: a few barracks
covered with banana leaves or tin, chickens, one or two pigs, a tiny plot of
vegetables, a dozen armed men with their Kalachnikovs, machine guns and
Soviet RPG 7 rocket launchers. All along the 300 kilometers of rutted roads
that run between the railroad and the banks of the Tonle Sap toward Battambang,
Sisophon and the Thai border, one cannot go more than 5 or 6 kilometers without
encountering a green helmet with the gold star against the red background.
Every old Dodge or DeSoto bus that speeds through the potholes carrying nearly
as many passengers on the top among the bundles as in the seats hauls its little
group of b o dai on leave going to Phnom Penh or to their units in the combat
zones in the northwest.
It is difficult. when one does not speak Khmer and when one is generally accom-.
panied by an official guide-interpreter, ta evaluate the real nature of the
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relations between the Cambodians and their "liberators." One thing is certain:
The historical heritage of Cambodia, the collective memorq of the Cambodian
people are not inhabited by sErene memories. Between the year 1000, when
the Khmers built their empire on the land whieh the Vietnamese considered as
their steps to the south, and the 19th century, when.the emperor of Hue,
Minh Mang, sent Gen Truong Minh Giang to Cambodia ordered to "cut recalcitrant
Cambodians into pieces," the history of re~ations between the two countries ~
has been woven of more hatred and defiance than recipro�al gestures. Moreover,
Lon Nol and Sihanouk have nQVer hesitated, when they needed to, to awaken and
exploit the hatred of the Youns (nietnamese), which lies dormant in their
f ellow countrymen. A~ for the Vietnamese, as a former National Liberation
Front cadre who had returned to civilian life told me, they have "never had a
high opinion of those ignorant peasants, whom you in the West consider to be
~peaceful people, when they are capable of being more cruel than we are."
Under such conditions; it is not surprising that relations between the V~et-.
namese and Cambodians are not overly warm. One would have to be of bad faith
not to observe that the Cambodians congratulate themselves for having been .
delivered from the Khmers Rougeg. But one would also have to be blind not to
- see the weariness, resignation and anxiousness that veil some looks.
II. P.eturn to Phnom Penh '
The Khmers Rouge$ wanted to empty the citieg, which they considered to be
hotbeds of perversion, and scatter city dwellers who could be rehabil-
itated in the rice paddies. And they nearly succeeded: Between 1975 and
1979, Phnom Penh went from over a million to nearly 30,000 inhabitants. Today,
there is a reverse movement. Over three-fourths of the city dwellers are
people from the rice paddies. Most of them had never before lived in a cement
house. Some had never even seen a large cit.y.
They have brought their customs to the commercial streets in downtown Phnom
Penh, once lined with shops, restaurants, open air displays. Hammocks are
stretched under the arcades on what was once Monivong Avenue, now Son-Ngoc
Minh. The women, surrounded with half-naked children, light eharcoal fires on
the sidewalks to prepare their soup. Families have f illed the old shops,
piling their s~.ore of wood., a few jars and three or four kettles on the empty
shelves. It is a poor capital, mutilated, disfigured, pock-marked by the bombs,
rockets, shells, grenades, maehine-gun bursts, the looting and systematic
vandalism of the Khmers Rouges. In the final analysis, except for the big
concrete bridge over the Tonle Sap, destroyed before the arrival of Pol Pot's
troops, and a few buildings on the periphery, the victims of bombs or shells,
_ the "American war" of the Lon Nol per.iod did much less damage in the~city
than the "Khmer Rouge peace.". Z~ao or three old Phnom Penh natives, still
dumbfounded, waivering between pain and relief,~told me,what their city looked
. like "~efore": sidewalk cafes, Cambodian, Chinese, Vietnamese, French restaur-
ants, showcases overflowing onto the sidewalks, shaded, flower-lined boulevards,
the pagodas, the crowds milling around the Old Market built in 1937 by the
French, the promenades along the river, near the Palace.
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The Khmers Rouges had tried to make an agricultural production center out of
this beaten, empty city. In the ~choolpards, public parks and around the
houses in the residential section, fruit trees were p],anted. Sidewalks were
dug up to make room for banana and mango rrees between the old palms. Vege-
- tables grew among ruins of pagodas, churchss, in the middle of lawns, between
sidewalks and roadways. Houses and buildings were looted; the furniture
thrown out windows onto the sidewalks to supply wood for construction or heat-
_ ing.
Today the schoolyard$ are onee again schoolyard~; the public parks public .
parks. The Old M~rket is back in place and the vegetable plots are now
flowerbeds. But the city is still in a pitiful state of decay. Buildings
hit by shells and half ~tanding have nat been cleared away and debris and
piles of old furniture block the sidewalks. Everywhere between the trees one
sees the pitted facades of buildiags. Sewers are clogged and.garbage piling
up a11 over. Around the markets, one~wades in layers of rotten fruit and
vegetables. For 5(10,000 inhabitants, fewer than 300 employees work for the
streets and roads department. ~here i~~ a curious system of priorities: A
few weeks ago, a little group of munieipal road workers spent hours righting
a palm tree buffeted by the wii~d, whil~a 200 meters away, rats as big as cats
foraged in a~ enomrou5 garbage p;.1e ,.ight in the middle of the street. It is
true, however, that the palm tree ;aas on the Avenue de 1'Union des Republiques
- Socialistes Sovietiques! .
In many districts, water does not reach the second floor. The electric
powerhouse, repaired by Vietnamese technicians, operates only a few hours a
day. According to Freneh engineers sent to Phnom Penh by the Order of Malta,
25 percent of the electric power di~tributed is lost in countless short-
circuits to illegal connections. Atter filling the city's buildings haphazard-
ly, the new inhabitants.of Phnom Penh h~ve hooked up to the municipal system,
hitching wires to the electric cables with bamboo poles.
A crowd of free-lance businesses has~appeared. Inner tube repairmen have
set up shop on a mat at the main intersection downtown, with a few cai~~ of
rubber patches, a pot of solvent and a tiny press. A little further on, an
- "independent" mechanic mends a bicycle chain. Over his head, ~ires, pedals,
mudguards, rims and frames hang from the branches of a mango tree resemblin~
a surreali.stic plant. Hairdressers, barbers and dentists have taken up resi-
dence in the empty downtown shops. But the handymen are king. Some collect
the lead fram the batteries found everywhere. Others use pieces of foam to
make motorcvcle seats. Old wrecked furniture is turned into new. A photo-
grapher ha~~opened up a shop near the Hotel Monorom. He takes black-and-white
photos with an old camera and in a few hours, gives you a version in Hollywood
technicolor, done in gouache. Tailors, vendors of soup, fritters, spiced
pineapples, cigarettes and flavored ice cream fill the downtown sidewalks.
It is formidable and moving, this capacity for improvisation, this vitality
of the new residents of Phnom Penh., who have transformed a skeleton city
into a convalescent one crisscrossed by hundreds of tiny rickshaws pulled
behind motorcycles or scooters.
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Entertainment is rare, however. Movie theaters still open show films sent
by friendly countries that is, e$sentially t~1e Soviet Union. From time to
time, a soccer game is organized on the field of the National Sports Complex,
where De Gaulle delivered his famou$ speech. On the first floor of the School
of Fin~ Arts, between rehearsals of a militant ballet evoking Cambodian-
Vietnamese friendship and the victory over imperialism, students of the dance
have re~ained the fluid gestures of the Angkor bas-reliefs in an Apsara exer-
cise. In t~.a street, passers-by stop when they hear the forgotten sounds
of the kong, the roniPt and the sko, the cymbals, xylophone and drum that
accomTrany the traditional dances. The music of yesterday. And of hope?
III. War Not Qver
Along the vital Phnom-Penh-Sisophon road, as everywhere else in Cambodia,
every bridge is guarded. Most were demolished or damaged and have been re-
placed or reinforced by metal beams. On this rutted road cut by tens of
rivers, streams and canals, protection of the bridges and footbridges is of
cardinal importance. Sometimes the guard is symholic: a young militiaman
about 15 year:g old armed with an M 16 or an old Kala~hnikov. That was the
~ case north of Pursat, where the country seems calm. The plaia, covered with
rice paddies, does not lend itself well to infiltration and guerrilla warfare.
Further south, between Pursat and Kompong Chhnang, where the road goes througY.
an area of thin forests and runs along the Cardamomes~Mountains, the tradi-
tional haunt of the Khmers Rouges, things are more serious and reveal the
hand of the guerrilla and countc~sguerrilla experts whi~h the Vietnamese
are. Every bridge, no matter how small, is protected by a veritable anti-
sabotage fortification: a double row of pointed posts between which thorn
branches are piled and in which "we buried a few surprises," as one Vietnamese
_ soldier whom we met over a dish of ci:i.cke:~ stew in th�= village of Kroko ex-
. plained. ~ '
"The country is peaceful, but you have to be very caut~ious. Avoid traveling
at night. If we leave, the Pol Pot people will be here the next day. The
inhabitants of this region have hesitated a long, time before coming back.
Six months ago, you did not s~e a house along t1.:e road." This information
was supplied by a bus Criver who spoke a hilarious, chaotic "pidgeon French."
Here, in the tiny bridge guard towers made of dirt and tree trunks, the.re
are always at least two or three bo dai among the Camhodian militiamen and
soldiers. ''he threat i~ deemed to be so real that for 200 meters, on both
sides of the roaa, all the trees have been cut down and the brush burtled in
order to facilitate surveillance. The patrols that leave the main road.are
made up of about 20 powerfully armed men: rocket launchers, machine guns,
~ light machine guns, and this about 100 kilometers from Phnom Penh.
It is not easy to learn about the military situation in Cambodia. The off i-
cial line goes something like this: "Most of the country is calm. Alon^ t::e
Thai border, there are always raids by Pol Potists and bandits against which
our armed forces, aided by our V,'.etnamese comrades, are pursuing cleanup
operations."
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By putting together information gath~red througi:~ut the country by represen-
tatives of international organizations who are authorfzed to muve about,
by questioning military cadres in the field, cadres better trained in the use
of rocket launchers than in conventio~al language, one nevertheless finally
fits together another picture. Serious military prcblems exist in Kampong
~ Chhnang, Pursat, Battambang, Odar Mean Chey, Siem Reap, Preah Vihear, Rompong
Thom, Stur~g ~rend and Ratanakiri provinces, forming a kind of horseshoe
~ around Tonle Sap. Threats remain in the provinces of Kampo~, Kampong Speu
and Takeo. The great offensive of tl~e dry season, launched in December by
the Vietnamese expedition~ry corps, was~still not completed a month ago
along the Thai border.
By the end of :he month of March, the guns were soundiag constantly, day and
night, around Siem Reap, near the Angkor temples. During the same period,
one representative of an international organization who was to go t~ the north-
eastern region of the country was asked to make a detour through Vietnaffiese
territory in order to avoid problems. Only a few weeks ago, a bridge was
blown up near Kompong Thom, less than 200 kilometers from Phnom Penh. A group
of doctors from the French Red Cross who-were to set up at Pursat t~etween
_ Tonle Sap and the Cardamomes Mountains was finally replaced by a Bulgarian
team and the International l~ed Cross received an important shipment of inedi-
cines and. medical equ~.pment for Pursat from the Ministry of Health.
"There are wounded men in the hospitals of praetically all provincea," one
foreign technical assistant says. "Exeept along the Thai border, the Khmers
Rouges do not mount real op~ration$ and are content with individual attacks
on the roads aimed at Cambodian civil servants or Vietnamese soldiers. Above
all, they try to blow up the bridges in order to upset the country's economic
life."
Sisophon: To get there fzom Battambang, one had to obtain a special military
pass. On that nearly rectangular road that runs between the rice paddies,
traffic is limited for reasons of security. Sisophon is only ab~ut 30 kilo-
meters from the Thai border. There are small groups of Khmers Rouges scat-
tered throughout the region, which does not prevent horrendous smuggling.
Everything can be found at the Sisophon market, from quartz watches to the
125 cm3 Hondas and in~luding medicines stolen fram UNiCEF, tents stolen from
the High Commission on Refugees (HCR), clothing, shoes, canned goods, cosme-
tics, calculat~rs, transistors, pirate c~ssettes of Thai and disco music,
Thai and American cigarettes. Everything comes from Thailand after having
escaped tNe antipersonne~ minefield~, the Thai rangers, the Khmers Rouges and
the Vietnames^ soldiers.
A li~;.ie ways from the marl~et, the staff is set up in a lovely traditional
hou~se perched on brown wooden pilings. Lt Pich Ruolos, 31, is sitting on the
balcony at a big table. While o~e soldier serves tea, he goes through his
report notebook, taken from a leather briefcase: "13 March, enemy shelling of
the village of Kop, 45 ~kilometers from Sig4phon, toward the northwest. The
gunfire came from Thai territory. Three shells fell on the village. The same
day, a Thai reconnaissance plane flew wer the region. On 1 February, about
100 Khmers Rouges attacked the village of Bosbov, 19 kilometers from Sisophon.
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They used 6~-mm and 82---mm mortars and B-40 rockets, all Chinese-made~ They
wounded eight villagers, took away the young people between the ages of 14 and
15 and stole all rice reserves in every house, some 15 to 20 kilograms per
house. When our troops arrived, they fled toward the Thmor Pok district.
Also on 1 February, shells were f~ired on the village of Mka, along with 107-mm
and 122-mm rockets. On 5 February, a truck carrying rice was atta�ked near
Mka. The Khmers Rouges, who coulrl not carry off its load, burned it. The
next day, we launehed a big sweep that is still continuing. We seized AK-47
rifles and M 16's, along with antitank mines and Chinese rockets." While the
- lieutenant read his notebook, soldiers went to get the spoils of war. The
AK 47's were practically new. The mines and rockets were made in 1978 and
197':. Everything was from China. ~
"We spotted 12 camps of Khmers Roc~ges in the region," Lt Pich Ruolos continued.
"All are in Cambodian territory except for one, Kok Rhnhung, which straddles
the border. Phnom Chat is the logistical camp. We learned �rom priseners
that Pol Pot hjmself recently went to Phnom Chmt. Dien Del, chief of staff
of Son Sann,l is also at the border. Thexe are three distinct zones here.
First of all, north of Poipet, there is a st~ip of land about 60 kilometers ~
long, where you will find both the people of Son Sann and those of Sihanouk.
To the north, around Phnom Chat is the first Khmer Rouge zone. And, south
of Poipet, there is a second Khmer Rouge area in the Phnom Malai brush. You
_ in the West tend to.forget it, but the Khmers Rouges still exist!"
IV. Pol Pot: the Exterminator
Adding up the bodies, subtracting the refugees and totaling up the survivors:
Such bookkeeping i~� samehow nauseating, as if the reality of the Rhmer Rouge
holocaust were based solely on the balance sheet of the massacre and not on
the political and ideological delirium that led to the nightmare. The deport~-
tion and exterm~nation of the Jews was an integral part of IQaziism. The de-
portation and extermination of those who had been in contact with foreign
cultures were the foundations of the~Khmer Rouge "ideology."
At the end of the "American war" in 1975, Cambodia had nearly 7 million inhabi-
tants. According to one member of the government questioned in Phnrnn P'enh,
there are now 6.8 million. According to the UN High Commission on Refugees,
220,000 Cambodians who fled to Thailand under Pol Pot have returned to their
country since 1979. Over 110,000 more returned fram the western provinces of
Vietnam. The population balance sheet for the past 3 years shaws between
600,000 and 900,000 births. In other words, the Khmers Rouges eliminated
between 1 m-illion and 1.3 mill~on of their fellow countrymen. In 1979, the
American State Department put ths number of victims at about 1;2 million, ~
- which seems to be a reasonab]:.~ figure.
The traces of the massacre are everywhere: "Out of the 38 members of my
family," Huor, a civi]. servant in Battambang, explains, there are only 13
~eft. I must now support 10 nieces and nephews, plus my father. Three of
my S children died of starvation." Every province has its charnel house.
I saw the one in Khum Ruolos, about 10 kilometers southwest of Phnom Penh.
Nearly 9,000 persons were murdered and buried there, in 129 co~on graves.
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Bones are still scattered all over. One walks among tibias, wrists tied to-
ger.her by wire or electric cable. From a distance, as I approached the narrow
little dusty path lined with sugar and areca palms that winds between the rice
paddies, I thought that the big wooden f~ame ahead contained coconut~, but
the round forms were actually skulls. "Exactly 8,982," the militiB~man walkiag
with us, his M 16 in his hand, explained. "We counted them when we dug them
up. The site had once been a little park. There was even a cement kiosque
with benches in one corner. Behind a curtain of banana trees, one could hear
children laughing. "That is Choeung~Ek School," he explained. "It was re-
opened in 1980. Before that, Xhere was no school in the village. The Pol
Potists did not like schools."
"Weren't the villagers curioug abbut what was going on here?"
"Under Pol Pot, the peasants worked from 4:00 in the morning until 11:00 at
night, watched over by armed guards. They could not come and go as they
wished. And even if they suspected that somethi~g terribie was happening here,
' it would have been very unwise for them to ask questions."
Most of the men and women killed and buried at Khum Ruolos came from Tuol Sleng
Prison in Phnom Penh. Bef~re the Khmers Rouges came to power, Tuol Sleng had
been a lycee, the Tuol Svay Pr~ty Lycee. The new masters of Cambodia turned
it into a center of detention and torture. It was left as the Vietnamese
found it when they entered Phnom Penh, with the traces of blood under the
beams used for torture, the pl.aces of torture, bathtubs, little wooden cages
where the tortures raised th~ scorpions they put on the female prisoners'
breasts. Some 16,~J00 prisoners had been there. How many escaped? The class-
rooms had been divided up into t3ny cells 1 by 2 meters by brick partition~.
Rings were atta~.hed to the grouud to hold the prisoners. In one room, the
filthy, blood-stai:ied clothing fouad in the prison was piled up. Four or .
five more roams were l~a:-ar~d with photos of the men, women and children mur=
dered here. In the courtyard, the gymnastics apparatus turned into an instru-
ment of torture rises like a threat. Here, the victims were hung by their
feet and their heads plunged into a huge bucket of water and excrement. I
could not stay over a half hour in such surroundings. As I left, I met the
director of the lycee-prison-museum. He had been a prisoner there. He had
no fingernails left: They had been torn out by his tormentors.
~ Kraing Ta Chan: a little village near Takeo in the southern part of the
countrq. Here al~o, near a thicket of sugar palms, is another cemetery. It
was not discovered until 1980 and the graves have still not all been emptied.
An atrocious stench hangs over the little mounds of eaxth. The village chief,~
an old man without teeth wearing the black py3ama, his krama wound ar~und his
neck, had coconuts brought to us. The village was peaceful: about ten wooden
houses mounted on stilts in the middle of the banana and coconut trees. The
chief's wife was weaving a beige silk sarong on an old patched up loom. "We
knew what was happening there," the chief said, pointing to the charnel house
300 meters away, "because one night, the teacher Sak On climbed up into a
coconut tree to see where all those trucks we could hear arriving went. He
saw soldiers beating people to death with iron bars. In January 1979, after
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, the Vietnamese came through, we f~nnd one of the Khmer Rouges heads of the
sector. His name ~as Cheng. We killed him, but we did it cleanly."
V. Money Pumped In
During the year 1980 alone, $500 million were spent to ke2p the country alive.
_ It was the firat time in history that sueh a sum had ever been spent by the
international community for an aid operation.. One can now say that interna-
tional assistance saved Cambodia.
In 1979, after the Vietnamese military intervention and the establisY~ent of
the Heng Samrin regime in Phnom Penh, aid f irat came from Vietnam, the Soviet
Union and "friendly countries." The first UN plane landed in August. �In
November, a program of ma$sive assistance was set up. A few weeks later,
19 barge~ began to go up the Mekong, loaded with ric~, medicines, trucks.
Today, one has but to open one's eyes to see that while ~ambodfa ia under
the tutelage of Vietnam mili.tarily and politically, it 3.s also the charge of
the international community. The Land Rovers and Toyotas housed in the Hotel
Samaki (Solidarity) garage bear the initials of UNICEF, the World Food Pro-
gram, the World Health Organization, the FAO, the HCR, the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, the Br~tish humanitarian organization Oxf am, the
Ecumenical Council of Churches, the Lutheran~World Service, the French Commit-
tee of Medical and Sanitary Aid, the Chu~ch World Servic~, the American organ-
izations CARE and World Vision, the American Quakers and the CIDSE (Interna-
tional Cooperation.for Development and Solidarity).
The big Isuyu trucks that one sees everywhere, loaded with bags of rice sup-
plied by the European Community, were given by the Japanese Government. Swias
doctors work at the Kompong Cham Hospital. In Svay Rier.g, they are Norweg.ian;
in Prey Veng, Danish; in Kompong Chhnang, Swedish; in Pursat, BuZgarian; in
Tak Mau and Phnom Penh, French; and in Kampot and Takeo, Czech. A French
architect, Charles Fe~to, was in Phno~n Penh a month ago to study the conatruc-
tion of a hospital f inanced by the French Red Cross. A French doctor and
technician have opened a workshop that makes prosthetic devices.
"Because of the mines and polio mainly," they explain. "there are about two
handicapped persons for every 1,000. In a year and a half, we provided arti-
ficial limbs for 1,000 persons and at the same time, we are training Cambodian
prosthesists." The Austrailian Gover~ent provided 40 powerful agricultural
pumps which a technician is setting up in the rice paddies.
The Ecumenical Council of Churches deliv~ered seed, fertilizer, trucks, bull-
dozers, agricultura~ machinery, tractors. "Since 1979," explains Pastor Jean
Clavaud, its representative in Phnom Penh, "we have spent $17 million. This
year, we expect to have at least another $2 million."
Vietnam has sent hydrauLics engineers and meteorologists. The Soviet Union
has provided trucks (civilian or military?) and aid for the establishment of
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The Soviet Uni,on does r.ot en~oy a$terling.reputation in the �orridor~ of the
Hotel Samaki, where the little foreign community in Phnom Penh camp~. "In
1980," explains one Western expert, "they promised over 120,000 tons of grain.
They delivered about 90,000. And it was mainly corn, which the Cambodians
do not like. That same year, We~~erners supplied 250,000 tons of grain. In
' 1981, the Soviets promised 90,000 tons. They delivered 55,000. That year,
the Wes.terners supplied 75,000 tons, plus 35,000 tons of aeed. Beyond their
official speeches o:~ their unswerving friendehip, these are the thinga that
the leaders here will never fqrget. Despit~ a domestic situation that is not
very good, the Vietnamese have made a greater effort."
VI. "Pay in Dollars"
I have under my eyes a 42-page doeument: "Reports.tu the party congress on
work ob~ectives for the years ahead and on the economic and cultural program
for 1981." The document is dated 26 May 1981. At the bottom of page 8, I
found the following phrase: "Immediately after Tiberation, we moved on to
intensive prepa~ration~ and in March 1980, the new bank note was placed in
circulation in the People's Republic of K~mpuchea. The circulation of bank
notes was achieved speedily and with order throughout the country and the riel
became the sole means of exchange in Kampuehea."
Actually, while the old 50-riel notes are turned into wrapping paper and bun-
dles of 200-riel notes are sold,~brand-new, as souvenirs, the new notes,~
decorated in the edifying socialist realist style, have baen in circulatioa
for 2 years. They were printed in.the Soviet Union. ~t was also the USSR
that promised to rebuild the Central Bank. an enormous reddish building blown
up by the Khmers.Rouges. ~
And yet, it was in American dollars that I was asked to pay my interpreter- ~
buide from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and for the Soviet Lada 1500 fur-
nished by the government. And also my hotel bill at. the Monorom in Phnom
Penh. Even in Battambang, where the hotel is an old gi.rls' boarding school
turned into a storage depot by the Khmers Rouges and then very summarily
converted into a hotel after the fall of Pol Pot there is not even any
- running water I had to pay in dollars.
The official exchange rate is 4 riel for a dollar when entering Cambodia, but
upon leaving, one has to pay.8! On the black market, one can even get up
to 22 riel for a dollar. It is impossible to live without the black market.
The average salary of a government employee is around 120 riel (180 franca).
A kilo of fresh fish costs 4 riel; a kilo of dried f ish, 6 riel; a kilo of
beans, 5 riel; ~a cauliflour , 4 riel. On the average, a Cambodian family
with 5 or ! children spends nearly 30 riel.a day. There is no other solution,
conszquently, but to add an additional and illegal ~ob: driver, porter,
soup vendor to one's official 3ob and engage in trafficking. One example
of the lucrative trafficking is gas. There are practically no more service
stations operating in Phnom Penh. The gas, strictly rationed, arrives from
Vietnam by barges that come up the Mekong. Naturally,.there are few auto-
mobiles and trucks in addition to ihose of the government and international
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~ organizations, which have their own supply but there are many lightwaight
motorcycles and already a few small Japanese motorbikes (10,000 riel at the
pfficial price; $450 on the black market). The gas, scolen fram government
depots or those ~f the Vietn~mes~e Army, is sold by the liter openly, on the
sidewalks, at 11 riel (ab~ut $3) a bottle.
Nor is this the only contradiction in Cambodia. In~this convalescing country,
where the Kluners Rauges tried to abolish money and where th~ govervment stores
are empty and pitiful, one can find everything or almost everything at the
markets: agrieultural products and handicrafts, rice, vegetables, fruit,
dried fish, sarongs, mats, baskets, vegetable dyes, soap, palm sugar and
even ganja, the local mari~uana, which is sold freely. But in addition
and this is even more surprising there is a whole host of goods smuggled
in across the Thai border or by sea to the island of Koh Kong, northwest of
Kompong Som, which has became a kind of "wildcat" mini Hong Kong. A goodly
share of such merchandise: coneentrated milk, flour, oi.l, rice, canned goods,
medicines, notebooks and peacils, was furnished free by UNICEF or various
humanitarian organizations to the goverinaents of Thailand, Cambodia or Vietnam.
Some of the crates and packing materials still bear the names of the donors
and the warning "Not For Resale.". The rest: tape cassettes, clothing, shoes,
tools, soap, toothpaste, cosmetics, fabrics, watches; American and Thai cigar-
ettes, radio parts, electronic components (and how!), film, Polaroids, cooking
utensiles, detergents; w~isky, delicacies, is smuggled in from Thailand, Singa-
pore and Vietnam. ~ ~
The authorities avert their eyes from this v~st network of traff icking and
smuggling that covers the country. "Wh~t do you expeet?" one official says.
"Until the government has set up the distribution systems, the people have to
get what they need. And furthermore, after 4 years under the Khmers Ro~sges,
the Cambodians have the right to a little leniency." But how long will the
Vietnamese go along? ~
FOOTNOTES
1. The military opposition to the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia is made up
of three groups: the Khmers Rouges, the National Liberation Front of the
Khmer People (FNLPK), headed by Son Sann, prime minister under Sihanouk,
and Sihanouk's forces,. united around the FUNCIPEC (National Unity Front
for an Independent, Peaceful and Co~perative Cambodia). ~
COPYRIGHT: 1982 "le Nouvel Observateur"
11,464
CSO: 4200/42
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PAKISTAN
CORRESPONDENT~S CONFRONTATION WITH ZIA REPORTED
Hong Kong ASIAWEEK in English 9 Jul 82 p 31
~Text~ Since Pakistan's military strongman made an audible thud.~Never offcially
C;en. Zia-ul Haq imposed tough censor- bannod. the cassette has ban plaYin~ to
- ship on his country's media in October packed audienca in the social circwts
1979, dozens of newspapers and peria of mqjor atia ' lilce Lshcre. Kara~w
dicals have been forced to fald up and and lslamabadc
scores of journalists have served }sil terms. It a11 surted whm Z~i oP~~ed the
Indeed, the gagging of the pras has largely confereaa with a ranatk thst Le waa
reduced the nation's once lively journals upset at the way the press wes 1xha~i~8
to stale chroniclers of government sin~x the lifting of pre~easorship a
handouts. But despite the government fortnight~before. Osmani~ a lean~ lanky
squeeu. chere seems no shortage of msn who was the long-time Lahore
' individual crusaders among Pakistani corrospondent of Dawn, Pakistan':
scribes who are campaigning for more biggest Eaglish-language iiailY. imm~-
freedom for the coantry's "fourth diatd~ )umPed up to c6alien~e the
estate." pra~'deat. '17~ough he wasn't trying to
Back in March. an airport press defead the press~ the newsman tald Zia.
conterence given by Zia in Lahore, capital he thou~ht the president of a country
of the country's most populous province s6odd be accountable for hia dads�
Punjab, ended in a verbal dud betwan the Indeed. s~id Osmani~ q~~ ~e ~
president and Nisat Osmani~ a veteran caliph of Islam Stid Abu Bal~u. the rulaa
ncwsman who heads the outspoken w~ ~~~nbk as anYbodY� If tvlert
Pakistan Federal Unlon of Journalists. did anything Mcong, citiuns had the right
Though the event went unreported in to correct them.
Pakisian's censored press. cassette rccord- In a long-winded question that sounded
ings of that ir.+promptu more like apolitical spcech~ Osmani told
debace have been circu- Zia that there were "four or five
lacing recently and are methods" of making rylers accountable.
causing jitters up and The parliament~ the judiclary, the
down the country. political parties. the administrstion and
By the sound of it. the press aU play a part in the democratic
reports Corcesp~?~dent process of accountability ot rulert,
Zafar Samdani~ ~t isn't Osmani ostensibly said. "Uafortunately,
anything like the cassette in this country , thae is neither a
recordings of Ayatollah parliament, nor a ~ud~ciary. There are no
Khomeini that ushered potitical partia." ~Nhi1e the press was
the Islamic revole.tion in trying to play its part, the ~overnment
Iran thra years ago. Still. wouldn't ]et it do anythin`. For 27 yeart,
months after the drama- Ocmani told Zis and the asumbled
tic pras coaference the audience~ the press had ban Qag~ed in
cassettes' PoPularity is Pakisua. "Our condidon is thst we are
still soarias: F.lsewhere. turntng in to third-generadoa =lava. lf
a rccording of a pre,ts you want to (gag the prest evm turther].
conference would be of there is nothing new in it. Ciod .h~s
Gttle signifi~ance to any- given you the authority. Do what you
one but journalists cova- w~,"
ing the story. But in While Osmani's outburst enraQod the
the political stillness of president's men. Zia samed prepared to
Pakistan's martial law. let him have hia say. At one point the
the verbal sparring president tried to cut off the. moaolo~ue
18
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but Osmani ountinued
talkins~ raiait~ ~
voia. "W9~y doa't you
ract to the formation of
s n~iOnd ~ovanment so Ariey (are] from this proviaa."
that therc couid be some To be snre. n~that Osmani said
kind ofunity in the coun- wat new. Marp of sentiments had
~Y?�� ~he ukes3. !n the baa atrod py ppHticiaat and aewspapas
B~nmeat that fot y~e~r~. llfihat was new. horvever. ~
P~~ant were the fid t6at somebody 6~d f
ProPos~nt~ Osmani said mustered enou~6 ooura~e W ctand up
a~nd
" t5e pecple of Ba1u- say it publidy in front of Presidmt T3s.
chistan. Smd. of smaU Though Osmad. wilike other tovernmeat
provinoa [would be abk cridcs. hasn't ban jailed or evea offxaal-
~~cel.'� pal~e- ly scolded [a bis "act of seditlon,'� the
tan, the outspoken ro. martial law `overnmeat 6ta be~ua W
Porta rcminded the~ prai- mount other lcinds of the
dent~ �~is a very dd~c~te lournali~. ReomtlY. hi~ name ~v~s strudc
federation ~n which the from t6e 1M of seniot L~6on aewsmee
population of one pro- iavited for a dianet witb the praide~t.
~ ~~~nce [Punjab) is larger Md latt month, the Sovpnmptt reft~sed
than [the otherJ thra to ~ive 6im an exit permit whea hif
provu~ces, This province newapaper nominated ~um as a oocrp-
has the capital, ('TheJ pondent to eover the Nonal~ned fordtn
buresucracy [and theJ ministen conferena in Havaaa. ' D
COPYRIGHT: Hong Kong ASIAWEEK 1982
' CSO: 4220/226 E~
19
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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