JPRS ID: 10612 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070058-6
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• Document Page Count: 31
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• Sequence Number: 58
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS V10612
24 JuN~ 1982
.
W~st Euro e Re ort
p p
(FOUO 40/82)
.
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMAT~ION SERVIC~
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JPRS L/1Q612
24 June 1982
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 40/82)
CONTENTS
THEATER FORCES
FRANCE
Nava1 Forces in North Indian Ocean Inc rease
(Paul Ring; ARMEES D'AUJOUR~'HUI, Mar 82)........���.�������� 1
ITALY ~
Falklands Conflict a Test for Military Technology
(Stef~.no Silvestri; EUROPEO, 31 May 82)��������������������� 4
- TERRORI SM
FRANCE
Carlos' Activities, Friends, KGB Ties Examined
- (Je an Cau; PARIS MATCH, 14 Mey 82) ..............e............ 8
- TURICEY
Armenian Arrested for Smuggling, ASALA Connection
(AL-WATAN A.L-'ARI~BI, 14-20 May 82) 14
~ POLITICAL
FEDERAL REPLBLIC OF GERMANY ~ .
~ Journal Views CDU/CSU ' Shadow Cabinet'
(Werner P. D'hein; STERN, 19 May 82) 15
_ a _ [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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MILITARY
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Dpub~ Over French-German P.dH-2 Helicopter Lingers at Hanover
(AIR ET COSMOS, 2~ May 82) 17
Firms Show Helicopters, by Jacques Morisset
PAH-2 Seen To Be Vital~ by Pierre Langereux
- FRANCE
Briefs
Adapted Exocet in Testing 20
Fiber Optics Guide Torpedo 20
Anti-Aircraft Decoy 21
GENERAL
SPAIN
Details 4f Recently Uncovered Aeroflot Spy Net Recounted
- (CAMBIO 16, 10 May 82) 22
- b -
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THEATER FORGES FRANCE
NAVAL F'ORGES IN NORTY INDIAN OCEAN INCREASE
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in Fren~h Mar 82 pp 18-19
~rticle by Chief Surgeon Pau' Ring, chief inedical and personnel staff officer,
~ French naval forces, Indian Ocean: "The Navy in the Indian Ocean"
~ex~ The size of the FM02 rmaritime forces, Indian Ocean~
shows French concern with that immense zone where vital
interests may be threatened. The Navy provides a permanent
- presence made possible by the deployment of many combat and
= logistical suppert vessels.
The Porces
The preponderant part taken in recent decades by Arabian-Persian Gulf states
in world energy supply has given the Indian Ocean a capital economic and stra-
tegic importance. Protection of inerchant commerce has always been an essen-
tial task of navies. The importance ~f our possessions in the Indian Ocean
had led France solidly to establish its naval forces in the region, centered
on the base at Diego Suarez. The revision of the Franco-Ma].agaby agreements
and abandonment of that dockyard have entailed ma.jor shifts in deployment of
our military and maritime forces. The operational ships of the ZMOI ~ndian
Ocean Maritime Zone7 have th.us been constituted an independent maritime force.
The FMOI is cominanded by a rear admiral embarked with his staff aboard the
command ship La Charente: Besides that vessel, which is also a supply tanker,
the force lias assigned to it four corvettes, the multi-mission repair ship
Jules Verne, a light transport vessel, a1d two patrol~v~ssels; more recently
. ttie supply tanker Isere was assigned to it, and the missile-launching escort
vessel Kersaint attached as a permanent reinforcement. In addition, an Atlan-
- L-ic type patrol aircraft and a marine commando unit complete the permanent
reinf.or~cements. These forces have been periodically strengthened by units
_ fr�om metropolitan France, either sing].y or in groups constituted like the
Mousson ar:d Saphir missions.
The deterioration of the geopolitical situation resulting from the Iraqi-
Iranian conflict, and the danger of individual or coor3inated actions capable
of affecting petroleum traffic, have led maritime nations to stren$then sig-
nificantl,y their forces in the northern Indian Ocean.
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In the first; days of the conflict the French navy placed in the area a patrol
- intended to intervene without delay in the event of any threat to our merchant
ships. The capability was needed to face a triple threat: from the air, from
the surface, and from mines. The air threat is significant because of the con-
fined waters which place the theater of operations within range of land-based
aircraft; the surface threat is represented essentially by patrol boats armed
with sea-to-sea missiles; and the geographic context lends itself perfectly to
mining. The Sea of Oman patrol and the DAMOI ~ndian Ocean Anti-Mine Divisio~
are intended to counter that triple threat. The submarine threat, on the other
_ hand, is very weak in the Arabian-Persian Gulf~ owing to both the shallow depths
and to the characteristics of the forces deployed there.
At the Gates of the Galf
The Sea of Oman patrol is permanently constituted by a group of three vessels,
that is, at least:
One vessel with high anti-aircraft capability (missile-launching escort vessel
or frigate) ;
~ One vessel with high anti-surface capability equipped with MM 38 missiles;
One supply tanker.
The constraints imposed by length of patrols, ship maintenance, and operational
requirements--particularly for anti-aircraft defense--have required a consider-
able reinforcement in ships.
As f or the DAMOI, it consists entirely of ships which have come from metropoli~-
i;an France: two minehunters, one ocean minesweeper, two coastal minesweepers,
and the logistical support vessel La Loire. It has in addition a team of mine
disposal di.vers.
Some 20 vessels today are part of the FMOI, some assigned and some attached as
temporary reinforcements. Most of them operate at sea more than 200 days per
year.
The facilities providad by the Republic of Djibouti to the French armed forces
under the defense agreement between the two countries make availah:Le a very
useful strong poiiYt rela-tively near the theater of operations. It is in fact
at Djibouti that the logistical support ships are most often stationed, that
the DAMOI is Lased, and it is from ther~e tha': relief personnel is sent to units.
Prom there, ships leaving on patrol have 4 or 5 days' transit to the Sea of
Orr~an. After the hot moistness of the Gulf of Aden, the turbulence of the mon-
soon is met in the Arabian Sea; then, having weathered the now familiar Ras a1
1Iad, we meet in the Sea of Orr~an a climate once again like that of the Gulf of
Aden. The relievin~ ship takes its place in the ~roup and makes contact with
its predecessor, to which it brings ma.il, spare parts, and at times personnel.
Ttie patrol then be~ins. An attentive watch, contacts with French merchant
ships, traffic study, and keeping track of the situation in the zone are the
essentials of this extended operational activity. Fue1 economy dictates slow
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steaming, at times with a single screw. The distressing heat must cause no
drop in operational efficiency or slowing of reactions: individual or group
l.r~ainin~, daily action stations, and resupply at sea serve to break the seem-
in~ monotony of "the rounds at sea." At mid-patrol, a short ca11 at Karachi
often allows--while remaining on 6 hours' sailing alert--the taking on of freah
stores, whi~h are not indispensable, but wElcome in the mess.
In Southern Waters Too
Its responsibilities in the Sea of Oman have brought a reduction of other FMOI
activities. However, even though the inherent mobility of these naval forces,
and their availability, has allowed them to make their weight felt at thosP
points where the course of events required, a presence south of the Equator
is not on tha.t account neglec}ted. In addition to the support and transport
missions carried out by the Lflagship?7 Champlain, the patrol vessels Altair
and Epee, and a corvette in rotation, continue to keep watch over our economic
zone. The recent interception of Formosan trawlers has fully shown tY~e useful-
ness of this mission.
Vigilance and Endurance
By its prompt deployment of the Orr~an Sea patrol the French navy showed its
capacity for rapid response to an overseas threat. By maintaining that patrol
continuously for 18 months it affirmed its role as a full-time oceanic navy
able to keep the sea. The crew of the corvette Commandant Bordais, which
made a 42-day patrol without putting in to poxt, can testify to thdt. If guns
have not spoken in these sensitive seas--and who would complain of that?--our
naval forces are there, and by their very presence reduce the probability of
combat.
~ COPYRIGHT: 1982 Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'h~zi"
6~ 45
c~o: 3~0~/496
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THEATER FORCES ITAL'Y
rALKLANDS CONFLICT A TEST FOR MILITARY TECHNOLOGY
Milan EURAPEO in Italian 31 May 32 gp 34-37
[Article by Stefano Silvestri]
[Text] The winninb weapon is the nucl.ear submarine." This is the conclusion
drawn by"David Owen, Britain's former minister for Foreign Affairss now one
of the leaders of the new British social democratic parliament. The Falkland
war has many aspects--historical, political and moral--but what counts most
in the long run is the fact that it has become the first real test of naval
war technology. The problem is the confrontation between ship and missile.
In 1973, after the Yom Kippur War between Arabs and Israelis, Ian Smart--then
vice director of the London Institute for Strateg~c Studies--said: "It was
like the battle of Crecy in the 100-year war between the English and the
French. At that time the English archers massacred the French armoured
calvary using long and powerful bc,ws. Today the Egyptians' a~ntitank antii-
aircraft missiles have massacred the Israeli armoured troops and bombers.
We are on the threshold of a technological revolution."
An Exocet missile launchQd from an airplane 60 km away suff iced to destroy
a modern destroyer. A little earlier, an MK24 Tigerfish torpedo sank an
. Argentine cruiser, rhe General Belgrano. Is this the end for large surface
ships?
- This queGtion, which affects Italy directly too, has stirred up heated
arguments in our armed forces. We are about to launch our new through-deck
cruiser, the Giuseppe Garibaldi, whose design more or less resembles that of
the small British aircraft carriers Invincible and Hermes now engaged in the
South Atlantic. It is supposed to carry helicopters to combat submarines,
but it can also carry fighter aircraft which take off vertically or on a
~ short runway, like the Sea Harrier. Is this a good choice or a mistake?
In the event of war, should we resign ourselves to the idea of seeing the
Garibaldi sink during the first minutes of the war?
This is an important question for the navy. It would not be the first time
we did everything wrong. During the last war our surface ships--which seemed
very powerful--didn't manage to sink a single enemy ship.
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At that ~ime our errors were mainly technological: we didn't have radar, and
a ma~or portion of our communications were intercepted by the enemy. But it
was also:a question of the strategies we chose; we had no effective air
cover or support for our navy.
Today Ad~iral Angelo Monassi, chief of staff of the navy, is explicitly asking
for "reliable and rapid air support" and for "close integration of ogerations,
and therefore of comraand, between aircraft and ships;" he calls this "the
key element of feasibility and success for military operations at sea." The
aeronautic branch says the navy wants to get its own private air force this
way.
Admiral Frauco Micali-Baratelli, former chief of staff of the navy and one
of the DC's main military experts at present, says that in fact the navy
should have the power to make autonomous ctioices, within the framework of
its budget, as to whether it should acquire one or two new ships or buy
some airplanes. But this obviously puts an end to any idea of common
defense planning (and therefore to any hope--however vague--of ever
rationalizing expenditures).
The lesson to be learned from the battle of the Falklands is naturally
ambiguous. Many people say that the sinking of the British destroyer
Sheffield could have been avoided.
But i:~ fact the Sheff ield's presblems had been known for a long time. In the
latest yearbook of the British Royal United Services Institute (the famous
Brassey's, which has been published for the past 92 years), naval weapons
expert Roger Villar pointed out the defensive weaknesses of the missile
system on that fighter. The Sheffield was armed with Sea Dart missiles;
these are rather large, almost 4.5 meters long, weighing half a ton, and
have a range of more than 30 km and a velocity of about Mach 2. Due t~,
their limited range they could not hit the French-Argentine Super Etendard
_ fighter from which the Exocet missile was fir.ed.
They should have hit and struck down the missile. But to do this, the Sea
Dart (relatively "slow," even though it is f aster than the French antiship
missile, which had a velocity of almost Mach 1) needed more warning.
According to reports, it had oi:ly about 25 seconds' warning; this, as Villar
points aut, is because the radar on British ships is not rapid enough or
powerful enough, as is the American AN/SPY-lA, for example--the core of the
Aegis antiaircraft and antimissile defense system. But AN/SPY-lA radar,
- besides being very expensive, weighs at least 60 tons by itself and is built
for a type of U.S. ship that is about twice as heavy as the British destroyer.
These may be good reasons. But not having radar means not being able to
defend oneself. The British have tried to offset this vulnerability by
developing the Sea Wolf, a brand new missile which is smaller than the Sea
' Dart (a couple of ineters long with a weight of only 78 kg), faster, and can
hit an attacker with a much shorter warning period. Its purpose is to
enhance what is called "point defense," in other words defense close to the
ship, after an attack has already been launched.
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The Sea Wolf missiles have certair.~y downed some Argentine Skyhawk fighters,
and maybe some antiship missiles too, in the Falklands war. But what use
is a defensive device that flies at a speed of little more than I~~ch 2
against a Soviet SS-N-19 antiship missile, which flies at the same speed?
Or--still worse--what hope does a surface ship have of surviving an attack
by a Soviet Charlie submarine, which can fire without any warning--while
sabmerged--a volley of eight supersonic SS-N-7 missilesy all aimed at the
same target, from a distance of about 50 km, without giving the target ship
any time at all to react, for all practical p+irposes?
The U.S. answer to this threat has been to develop further the idea of the
task force--a naval squadron built around a large nuclear aircraft carrier
like the Nimitz, which has a tonnage of almost 100 thousand tons and carries
about a hundred airplanes. Obviously these ships are also vulnerable to
large-scale missile attack, but they broaden their defense perimeter
enormously by using coordinated submarines, escort ships and airplanes.
These squadrons use every means to increase their effectiveness, even
satellites, which provide information about the movements of enemy surface
ships and trace the exact trajectory of missiles having a longer range.
But the need for defense runs the risk of undermining the very concept
of the U.S. task force. The Nimitz, cruisers like the Ticondoroga--equipped
with the Aegis system--and the new fighter atomic submarines like the
- Los Angeles, coordinated among themselves thanks to the Navstar satell:~_te
network and the Jtids navigation system, operate more like a defensive
structure than an offensive task force.
The United States, with its enormous technological and financial power, is
about to attain its goal of having a complete and continually updated map
of everything moving on and below the surface of the sea. But {t will use
this map above all to defend ships.
In other words, the task force can extend a protective shield having a radius
of about 200 km around itself, mainly based on the use of Hawkeye radar
- airplanes, F-14 interceptor fighters, and offensive submarines. But to do
this it uses 70 percent of its military capability. The Soviets, on the
other hand, have developed a formidable offensive capability, likewise
based on satellites; apparently the Argentine attack on the Sheffield was
facilitated by information provided by Cosmos satellites which the USSR had
launched into orbit in the South Atlantic.
At sea the Russian fleet is deploying its new 32-thousand-ton Kirov-type
cruisers equipped with SS-N-19 antiship missiles that fly at a speed of
Mach 2.5 for about 500 1~ (well outside of the defensive range of the task
force); they defend themselves w~th antiaircraf t and antiship SS-N-6
missiles which attain the considerable speed of Mach 5. These are r_omple-
mented by the new Oscar-type submarines, which are armed with SS-N-19s,
and Alfa-type fighter submarines which can travel faster than 42 k.nots
(about 80 km/hour) at a depth of 700 meters.
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All this cannot help but worry NATO. The experience of the Falkland war is
already indicative; the pro-Western Argentines have been able to give the
British fleet serious trouble even though they lack modern Soviet weapons.
They have purchased weapons from France, Great Britain and the United States:
three NATO countries which have adopted a"philosopny" that is more defensive
than offensive. The Argentines' missiles have a much more limited range thatt
the Soviets', and they f ly at much lower, subsonic speeds (less than Mach 1).
And yet 'they were abl~ to sink the Sheffield. What would the Argentines have
done if they had had Soviet weapons?
This is a serious matter for Italy. We certainly cannot set up an American-
type task force. The tonnage of our entire fleet is equivalent to that of
the Nimitz and a couple of escort cruisers alone. The Garibaldi is not meant
~ to be any bigger than the British Invincible (in fact it should be even less
than 20 thousand tons). It was conceived as a ship to fight submarines.
But what is the sense in building a ship for defense against submarines that
is so large and vulnerable it is an ideal target for enemy attack, if we
can't defend it?
The usefulness of these aircraf t carriers is undeniable, but it is mainly an
offensive usefullness; they serve as mobile platforms to transport offensive
aircraft far from their bases of operation. Without theix two small
aircraft carriers, the English would not have been able to attack the
Falklands. The Dutch, who have no aircraft carriers, keep a batttleship,
a regime.nt of marines, and a whole group of fighter bombers in their
possessions in the Antilles to defend them from Venezuelan claims.
The Italians, to defend their new aircraft carrier, shauld create a naval
air force, including some very expensive radar airplanes. But then they
- could only use the Garibal~i within the range of land-based aircraft, and
that would obviously greatly reduce its value an an offensive ship.
Of course it would still function against submarines thanks to the use of
helicopters. But once again, a vicious circle is appearing from which
there is no way out: the defensive weapon must be defended.
Thus we come inevitably to David Owen's conclusion: everything that is on
the surface, and is therefore visible, is vulnerable. The defense of such
surface craft ends up paralyzing all available military capabilities, thus ~
diminishing offensive potential. That which remains invisible, however,
like the nuclear submarine, doesn't need such sophisticated defenses and can
concentrate all its potential on its main task: attack.
The whol.e Brigish blockade of the Falklands was based, in fact, on three or
four nuclear submarines. They have proved to be practically invulnerable,
and by themselves have forced the large Argentine fleet to stick to its
bases. Italy has no nuclear submarines, nor has it developed the technology
for them. It missed an opportunity to do so twice: once at the beginning of
the 1960s, when it suspended studies for the development of a naval nuclear
engine; and again, more recently, when a pro~ect came to light for a joint
Italian-French nuclear fighter submarine.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Rizzoli Editore
9855 7
CSO: 3104/219
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TERRORISM FRANCE
CARLOS' ACTIVITIES, FRIENDS, KGB TIES EXAMINED
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 14 May 82 pp 51, 52, 74
[Article by Jean Cau: "Carlos, and the High. Life'~
[fiextl It is beginning to become clea.r why a bomb ex-
ploded on Rue Marbeuf.
The Carlos Mystery
Still dazed from the shock of the Rue Marbeuf explosion,
the French are realizing to their horror that their
_ country is caught up in the complicated intricacies
- of inter-Arab politics. And, since the darkness which
descended that morning, they know that now they are the
target of killers from the "Mysterious East." Since it
' is always necessary to find an individual to blame, they
think they see behind the smoke of the massacre the
mask of a certain Ilitch Ramirez, tragically famous ~
under the name "Carlos." But who is this Carlos and
who is providing him weapons so he can attack, in Paris,
both a Lebanese newspaper and passers-by? A merciless
struggle is taking place in the Middle East; it has split
the Arab world in two. On one side there are the
Lebanese Shiites, the very special movements which have
brought a reign of terror to Syria under the control of
- Rif'at el Asad, the brother of the president of the
' Republic and the Iranians. On the other side: the
Lebanese nationalists who refuse to be gobbled up by
Syria, the Iraqis and the ma~ority of iche PLO. WATAN
AL ARABI, the Lebanese newspaper on Rue Marbeuf, belongs
to the second grouF. And France is proposing a policy
in the Middle East which does not suit Syria's game.
That is why the passers-by on Rue Marbeuf ~aere tar-
- geted at the same time as the Lebanese we~...1y. Carlos
is one of the close associates of Rif'at el Asad, who
wants to poison at any price relations between France
and his country. After the assassination of Ambassador
Delamare and two French officials in Beirut, the gangre~e
was exported to France�
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Son of a millionaire, trained in terrorism in Cuba and Moscow, fanatic about
revolution, and crazy about girls.
He is never seen. He is f eared everywhere. He is thought to be behind every
' bomb that explodes. He has already killed many people. Perhaps he
organized the attack on Rue Marbeuf. He is certainly very dangerous. But
he has also become a myth. Who is this stubborn and invisible madman
who was named Ilitch by a very wealthy father, a kind of "conservative" of
the Revolution, and who, under the name Carlos, today terrifies the whole
world?
I. Education
When a child was born into the household of Jose Ramirez and his wife Maria
Sanchez, on 10 October 1949, there was a joyous outburst: It's a boy! "We
will call him Ilitch, like Lenin," said his father who, after almost having
~ become a priest, during his adolescence, abandoned his faith and adopted
another one, Stalinist communism.
How he managed to reconcile this new faith with a sharp buc.iness sense
~ in real estate, which made him a millionaire with a prosperous business
in his native Venezuela, remains one of the mysteries known only to the
_ dreamy idealists of the Western middle class.
But that is the way it goes: the fathers eat the green grapes of ideologi-
cal fanaticism and the sons devElop an appetite for it and become activists.
~One day Ilitch Ramirez y Sanchez will be called Carlos. Still, at least his
two younger brothers, baptized Vladimir and Lenin, have been better able to
cope with their names and have not followed in the footsteps of their older
brother....
At 17, Ilitch was sent to school abroad. His father thought this would help
- him overc.ome his shyness and wouid get rid of his complexes. Actually,
(O.K. Dr :?reud?) this young man was somewhat pudgy, both his features and his
body, and suifered from the nickname "muchacho gordo," (the little fat kid).
He ended up in Cuba and, as with other "well-born (etc.) souls," here he was
in Campo Matanzas, the pupil of Comrade General Victor Simonov (of the KGB)
who was instructing his large flock in the art of subversion. In 1967,
the Cubans landed small rebel groups on the coast of Venezuela, to stir up
trouble in Caracas. Twice Carlos landed. Twice tie was arrestQd by the
police. Twice he was released. At that point, his parents got divorced and
his mother, accompanied by Lenin and Vladimir, went to live in London and--
she was much younger than her husband--to live her own life.
- II. The Road to rioscow
Ilitch, however, took th~ road to Moscow and, more precisely, to Lumumba
University (called off icially, in all seriousness, "The University of Frierid-
~J ship Among Peoples"...) which accepts students from the Third World and where
the KGB selects, as from a f ish hatchery, the best students to be trained
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FOR ( 'IAL
for subversion and its numerous variants, running from terrorism to assas-
sination. But, surprise! Ilitch was expelled, in 1969, for "anti-Soviet
provocations and dissipated living." Later, Carlosologists who will go over
his career with a fine tooth comb, will wonder if this expulsion was not
trumped up with the help of Carlos himself so as to give him the reputativn
of an unimportant playboy troublemaker with whom the KGB would not want to
_ compromise itself. A mere war strategem. Whatever the case, the wayward
student, after being "expelled," went on to East Berlin and then to London
to see his mother and then to the Middle East where, according to him, he
asked Palestinian groups in Jordan to train hiin in guerrilla warfare. The
proposal was accepted and Carlos studied in the training camps at Mount
(Gilead) and Um-(Juraysat) before going into combat. Then, he was once
again in London where he killed some time waiting for an assignment.
III. How To Become Carlos
A green light. He returned in 1973 to Beirut where he expressed his impa-
tience. Then he was given a green light to kill Lord Seif (president of
Marks and Spencer stores), an outspoken Zionist. He went to his house on
30 November 1973 and f ired three shots at him. Lord Seif survived. In an
interview with the newspaper.AL WATAN AL ARABI, Ilitch calmly explained his
fa ilure: "A comrade had given me an old revolver and f ive rounds of ammuni-
tion. Well, to bring~off an assassination successfully, you need two
pistols, one with a silencer, the other a very powerful one to defend your-
self in case of surprise. You also need two grenades and a driver. That is
what is considered the strict minimum if you want the operation to succeed.
So you can see what a position I was in with only five rounds and a single
pistol that I had not even tried out." Put yourself in his place. In any
case, on that day Ilitch became Carlos. One month later, once again in
London, he tossed a bomb into an Zsraeli bank. It exploded but only
slightly wounded a typist. No luck, he explained, "the bomb had slid over
the floor."
Then he hopped over to Beirut. And then on tq Paris to dy~amite the ORTF
LOff ice of French Broadcasting and Televisio~ (it did not go off) and to
conduct an operation against three newspapers: L'ARCHE, MINUTE and
- L'AURORE, accused of being Zionists and fascists. Another quick trip, to
Holland this time, to take hostage the ambas'sador of France in order to
negotiate the release of a member of the Japanese Red Army. That ended in
gunf ire. Two policemen and one of the terrorists were wounded. Actually, it
was only a partial failure, because of poor coordination, and Carlos left
hastily for Paris where he learned that the Japanese had succeeded in taking
~ the ambassador ("I don't know why they didn't kill him," he said later) but
that the French were refusing to give in to the terrorists' demands. So
then Carlos threw two grenades into the Drugstore, at Saint-Germain-des-
Pres. That resulted in 2 dead and 30 injured--and he warned the French
Government that he would resort to even bloodier acts if the Japanese
~terrorist was not released. Since the Drugstore incident suggested that
- these threats not be taken lightly, the slant-eyed comrade was put aboard a
Boeing and landed somewhere in the Middle East. "A complete success,"
claimed Carlos.
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IV. A Wild Guy, Full of Fun
This is the most difficult section of the article to write because now I
have to come to some conclusions. Who is Carlos? He is nothing like, for
example, the Russian anarchists at the beginning of the century, with their
~ drawn faces and wild eyes, slouching along walls, hiding under their coat a
bomb which they are planning to toss into the car of a grand duke. He has
nothing in common with these passionate mystics. His style, Carlos' style,
is rather that of finding in the Revolution a kind of euphoria, a kind of
"~~igh." Lif e, which ha considers unimportant for others, he loves. Drink-
ing, eating well, smoking big cigars, strumming,the guitar, playing cards,
dancing, that is his "O1~" side. This wild guy really loves to kick up his
heels and knock someone around with his claws drawn, as if he were only a
nice stuff ed tiger. Unfortunately, the tiger is made up of real flesh and
blood, with claws and fangs. When he strikes, he kills. But w11at goes on
in his head? "I am not a professional killer," he says. "It is not easy to
shoot point blank someone who is looking at you...." He f ires, however, in
the name of the Revolution, as if shaken by a calm orgasm, and the "guy who
is full of fun" becomes a cold angel of death. Then, lif e begins again,
between raids, and the girls, lots of girls, comfort the terrorist. There
was Angela Otoala, th2 young waitress at a Spanish restaurant, 23 years old,
and pretty, whom he seduced in 1973 in London. There was Maria Romero, also
in London, a Colombian lawyer, older (39 years old) and a former member of
the Secretariat of the Colombian Communist Party, who fell for his charms.
In Paris, there was Nancy Sanchez, a Venezuelan studying anthropology at the
Sorbonne, and Angela Armstrong, ~the very young Englisti girl born in South
Africa. On Rue Toullier, the Fifth Ar~ndissement, a few steps away from the
Pantheon where Nancy was renting an apartment, it was a nonstop party. Every-
one had a good time. The students living in the maid's rooms on the sixth
floor were a?ways welcome. They were off ered a drink and permitted to use
the shower or to wash their jeans. Very nice, these Americanos. You
couldn't ask for better hospitality. Did the girls know who their boyfriend
was? No. Probably not. But why ask qciestions? Carlos, a virtuoso of fake
identities was only for them a Venezuelan friend, funny a~d cosmopolitan,
who was working for an "international company and had plenty of money. If
he was using their studios or apartments as hideouts, he obviously refrained
from admitting it to these young women. Other questions: for whom was Carlos
working during those years? 4fficially, if we can use the term, for the
Palestinians, alongside the PLO. Unoff icially, to find th~.t out �you have to
zigzag your way through a labyrinth of international terrorism, bumping�up
- against artif icial mirrors, having to retrace your steps 10 times, going
- around in circles, going from the Red Brigades to the ETA jBasque Fatherland
and Liberty Group], to the RAF ~ed Army Faction, Germany,7, from the RAF to
the Japanese, etc.... If you don't let yourself get caught up in this mare's
nest, one fixed point remains, around which are centered the "trips" of
Carlos: the services (and among them the most special ones) of the KGB.
- Thus, and according to the most reliable information, the famous terrorist
is said to be in Damascus, in Syria, close ta Rif'at el Asad (the brother of
President Haf ez el Asad), the head of a militia composed of 50,000 men in
political police work so serious that it of ten worries his own brother.
And everyone in Damascus knows that Rif'at "is playing for" the Soviets....
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V. Necatoml~
The further adventures of our man. In 1974, the attempt to launch a rocket
- attack at Orly against a plane belonging to the Israeli airline E1 A1. A
failure. In December 1975, the stakes were raised. In Vienna, during a
meeting of OPEC, a terrorist group led by Carlos and made up of two Germans~
a Palestinian and two Lebanese, attacked the builcling where the oil ministers
were meeting. Three were left dead and one wounded. And the ministers
were held captive. The Austrian Government capitulated and the DC 9 which
they boarded as hostages, along with their captors, ended up, after a wild
odyssey, landing in Algir_r;, where the right of asylum was g?-anted the
terrorist group in exchange for the hostages. Why this "action," as Carlos
called it? So that the rich oil stares do not forget, under the shower of
dollars they are receiving, that they must serve the Palestinian cause. All
right. It's as good an explanation as any.
But it was 5 months earlier, on 27 June 1975, in Paris, that Carlos carried
out, if not his bloodiest exploit, at least his boldest. The police, acting
on information from an informer, a certain Mokarbel, who was the contact
between Carlos' team and the FPLP Lpopular Front for the Liberation of
PalestineJ raised (unarmed!) Rue Toullier, where the terrorist was living.
Mokarbel, had stated to the police that a certain Maya Lara, a Venezuelan, in
whom they were interested, was there; the police went in. They were also
carrying in their pockets a photograph in which, next to Mokarbel, appeared...
another man. He is the one who opened the door. They politely asked him if
he knew Mokarbel. He politely answered that he did not know anyon~ by that
name. They politely told him that this man claimed to know him and they
showed him the photograph. He politely asked where Mokarbel was. They
politely told him that he is over there in a car. He politely asked if he
could see him. Of course. The police went to get Moicarbel. When they came
back, it was to meet their death. Two were shot dead and a third wounded.
- Mokarbel, lastly, got a bullet between the eyes and was finished off with a
bullet in the temple for good measure. And from one building to the next,
Carlos, leaping like a deer, got down to the street and ~inally made his way
to a hideout on Rue Amelie, rented by a friend, Sylvie Masmela. From that
- ~ hideout, he left, once more, to disappear in the wilds of the other side of
the Mediterranean, from which he did not reappear, as we said before, until
he showed up in Vienna. Since then....
- VI. Fingerprints
Since then the trail of Carlos has become vague and is lost. Did the real
man fly off into the heaven of myths to repose in his frightening glory?
Is he in Libya, in Yemen, in Lebanon, in the East, in Syria? Everywhere and
nowhere at the same time? Has he become a prof essor or doctor of
terrorism, given his vast experience and is he planning acts of terrorism
or is he putting a stamp of certification (seriously) on those who are
carrying them out? Recently, we know, and this is his most recent sign of
life after a long absence, he threatened Mr Deferre, leaving f ingerprints
to authenticate his message, if two of his terrorist friends arrested in
France were not freed. They were not. LE CAPITOLE blew up. Carlos? Not
Carlos? Who knows or will know?
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l'V~\ V~'~'CL�~Y1L v~rie VI\L~l
VII. A Business and a War
Unquestiona.bly, Ilitch Ramirez has ~reated a famous nickname and has suc-
ceeded in raising himself up to terrorism, is highest rung and he is the
number one world star. That being said, as the saying goes, one lends only
to the rich, which is sometimes a m�istake, as Carlos is ncw being credited
for what has been done by someone else. Actually terrorism is not limited to
a single man, a kind of bogey man, present everywhere and everywhere
invincible. Terrorism is a business. Deliberate. Calculated. Perf ected.
Terrorism is a war. In the limelight, Carlos is only the most famous .
footsoldier. It remains to be seen who are the officers who, in the shadows,
order the disorder of this army of terror.
And that, more frightening than Carlos, is the real question.
.
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[Photo caption] Behind the tragic smoke on the rue Marbuef emerges the
shadowy figure of Carlos, but more than he, it is his "protectors" who
have declared war on France.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 par Cogedipresse SA
8956
CSO: 6131/509 13
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TERRORISM TURKEY
ARMENIAN ARRESTED FOR SMUGGLING, ASAi.A CONNECTION
London AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 14-20 May 82 p 27
[Article: "Turks Arrest Lebanese Armenian Connected with Smuggling Operation,
ASALA"]
[Text] It's been determined that the process of arming the secret Armenian army
is being carried out by a smuggling organization in Turkey that is being managed
from Cyprus by a Lebanese Armenian called Fahe Ohanes Koligian who lives in the
Turkish sector of the isiand.
- Turkish police investigations have led to the arrest of 1,000 persons suspected of
belonging to the aforementioned smuggling organization.. Some of them admitted that
they were using Turkey as a base for smuggling various weapons, munitions and
equipment to various countries of the Middl.~ East, especially Lebanon and some
countries of the Gulf.
It's been determined that the organization actually began operations 1$ years ago
and that the value of the weapons, goods and merchandise that it smuggled exceeds
2.5 billion dollars. Fahe had gone to Istanbul in 1965 to direct the organization,
but 'then he soon moved his office to Cyprus after forming friendships with various
Turkish and Greek organizations on the island. These friendships placed some
Cypriot customs representatives~at his disposal. ~ .
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has learned that when a police force in the Turkish sector of
the capital, Nikosia, raided the office of the Import-Export company Fahe manages,
the aforementioned businessman was able to escape arrest and fly back to Lebanon
on a private airplane. It was established that that import-export company was the
actual command post for the secret smuggling operation that included weapons,
narcotics, electric and electronic equipment, pharmaceuticals and surgical
supplies.
In Instanbul Turkish police arrested Ahmed Tenir who is considered the "godfather
of the Turkish Mafia" and Fahe's major partner.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
8592
CSO: 4604/34
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~
1'UL1'PlCAL FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
JOURNAL VIEWS CDU/CSU 'SHADOW CABINET'
Hamburg STERN in German 19 May 82 pp 236-237
[Artlcle by Werner P. D'hein]
[TextJ For the sake of a Christian-liberal government in Bonn, CDU-chief
Kohl must give up important cabinet posts. FDP and CSU insist upon infl~iential
government posts.
The prize is not yet in the bag, and they are already fighting over the spoils.
Opposition lsader Helmut Kohl boasted that "without any difficulty," he
could "practically overnight" present a complete government cabinet, if tfie
FDP were to switch over to a center coalition. In the CDU, however,
irritation is growing over Kohl's quick cabinet sleight-of-hand. Only 8 of
the 16 ministerial posts are reserved for the CDU, the rest--and particularly
the attractive ones--the CSU and FDP will share.
Prominent Christian Democrats are murmuring about "betrayal." Kohl
supposedly has sold out the inter~zsts of his own party in order to finally
become chancellor. The critics are doing him an injustice there. Truth is
_ that the influential government posts were already spoken for by the time
Kohl started mak~ng up his list. CSU chief Franz Josef Strauss had directed
the show from behind the scenes.
When the Bavarian minister-president, first of the opposition leaders to
publicly announce at the beginning of the year that the FDP, in a coalition
with the Christian Union, could "of course" retain its present ministerial
posts, the CDU leadership had at first no misgivings. No one considered
taking the Foreign Ministry away from Hans-Dietrich Genscher if he helped ~
Kohl attain the chancellorship. Despite his involvement in the contributions
affair, Otto Graf Lambsdorff was to retain the Ministry for Economics,
Gerhart Baum of the liberal left the Ministry of the Interior, and old
liberal Josef Ertl the Ministry of Agriculture.
The CDU was alerted only when the clever CSU chief demanded "at least the
same representation" for his Bavarian party in the Kohl cabinet. According
to Strauss, the CSU, with 10.3 percent of the votes in the last Bundestag
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elections and 52 seats, has almost the same parliamentary strength as the FDP
with its 10.6 percent and 53 seats. For himself, Strauss claimed the Finance
Ministry which is of special importance at the present ctiticsl time. His
second-in-command in Bonn, CStI state party chief Friedrich Zimmermann, he put
it~ charge of the Federal Armed Forces [Defense Ministry] and filled two other
influential ministries with Oscar Schneider (Housing) and Hans Maier (Education
and Science).
One of Kohl's advisers excuses the empty hands with which his boss now faces
his own people by saying, "one can hardly object to treating the CSU no worse
than the FDP." For high-powered CDU politicians, such as the respe.~ted
economic expert Kurt Wiedenkopf, or defense,expert Manfred Woerner who in the
past pitched in for the CDU in the secur~*_y policy discussions, there are no
appropriate cabinet jobs available. Hesse's CDU prince, Alfred Dreg;ger, if he
does not become Minister President in Wiesbaden this fall, would haxdly have
a chance for an important cabinet seat in Bonn.
Kohl can place only three shining lights in the CDU part of his cabinet.
The Ministry for Social Affairs is planned for Berlin senator Norbert Bluem,
chief of the CDU employees' organization "Social Committees." CDU Secretary
General Heiner Geissler, for a long time at lo ggerhe3ds with Kohl, is to
exchange his party job for the Ministry for Youth, Family and Health. And
the Ministry of Justice is to go to a man of the new CDU generation, Walter
Wallmann, mayor of Frankfurt.
The rest of his team remains colorless--a council of technocrats from the
Bundestaf;: Dieter Schulte for [the Ministry of] Transport, Christian Schwarz-
Schilling for Post [and Telecommunications] (because he ma.de a specialty of
- the new media), Heinz Riesenhuber for Research and Technology, and Volkmar
Koehler for Economic Cooperation.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co.
9917
CSO: 3103/490
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MILITARY INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
DOUBT OVER FRENCH-GERMAN PAH-2 HELICOPTER LINGERS AT HANOVER
Firms Show Helicopters
Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 22 May 82 pp 26-27
[Article by Jacques Morisset: "Helicopters: In the Shadow of the PAH-2"]
[Excerpts] Six helicopter manufacturers were directly represented at Hanover:
Agusta, Aerospatiale, Bell, MBB [Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Bloehm], Sikorsky and
Westland. Real novelties were relatively rare; of course, but not totally ab-
sent.
With Agusta, the emphasis was mainly in the IFR [Instrument Flight Rules]-
equipped A-109: the Milanese builder has now sold 304 A-109's, including a good
15 of the A-109 Mark II, an improved version which is now the only one being
marketed. The rate of production is four machines per month. Four A-109's
have been sold to the FRG, and the number will soon be six, because of two con-
tracts on the point of being finalized.
On the other hand, no new in~ormation was given on the A-129 Mongoose, one of
whose basic missions is antitank warfare and which could quite obviously be one
of the candidates for filling the German needs (PAH-2 program)--but on condi-
tion, of course, that the Franco-German program (MBB-Aerospatiale) is not
launched, which would open the doors of the German market to the American,
British and Italian industrialists. The situation, in this area, remains "op-
en," despite the efforts of MBB, Aerospatiale, the French and German engine
manufacturers and the equipment and missiles industries of the two countries to
find a solution offering the best possible cost-effectiveness ratio.
The same discretion prevails at Aerospatiale and in MBB; but Euromissile has
taken a strong stand for a Franco-German program (see following article, by
Pierre Langereux).
Contrary to what had been announced, Aerospatiale did indeed present, in addi-
tion to an Ecureil, an Ecureil-2 ~AS-355E, No 5027) and a Daupine-2N, a Super
Puma--AS-332B, No 2005--which had just come back from a series of tests in
freezing conditions north of the polar circle, conducted from Tromsoe, Norway.
The machine left Hanover �or Bretigny in the afternoon of 18 May. We shall
come back to this test program, which will constitute an important element in
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the integral all-weather certification (flight in freezing conditions) of the
AS-331., as was the case also for the certification already obtained by the
AS-330 P�ima .
MBB pres~2nted the new Bo-105 LS, of course, and the BK-117. The Bo-105 LS has
two Allison 250-C28C turboengines of 55~ HP, as against 2 X 425 HP; the extra
power thus provided enables the machine, which has been undergoing tests since
last October (it has 35 hours of flying time), to be usable with better condi-
tions in hot weather or at altitude. It is hoped that certification of the
Bo-105 LS will be obtained by the end of this year, and the ii.rst deliveries
are planned for next year.
~he BK-117 presented was the lead machine of the series and has been flying
since 23 April; a first lot of 100 of them t?as been launched (71 for the MBB
marketing zone and 29 for the marketing zone reserved to Kawasaki).
MBB has also published the first data on the bench tests of a new rotor without
any mechanical articulation (including pitch), which is the material result of
the studies and research carried out in cooperation with Vertol in recent
years. This new rotor should fly on a Bo-105 quite soon.
PAH-2 Seen to Be Vital
Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 22 May 8,2 p 34
[Article by Pierre Langereux: "The Future of Franco-German Cooperation Rests on .
the PAH-2"]
[Text] Franco-German cooperation in armaments, launched by the two governments
20 years ago and conducted for the last 10 years within the framework of the
Euromissile group, was an important theme of the 1982 Hanover Exposition.
Euromissile is showing very positive results. The order book currently stands
at more than Fr 20 billion, 55 percent of it for export, it was announced by
Marcel Morer, president of Euromissile, who anticipates a turnover of about
Fr 5 billion for 1982.
Aerospatiale and MBB are producing each month 1,900 Milan antitank missiles and
70 firing posts, 1,000 Hot antitank missiles and 15 firing posts, and 350 Ro-
land ground-to-air missiles and 6 firing posts, it was stated by Sepp Hort,
chairman of the Euromissile members' assembly.
Thus, Franco-German cooperation in these three programs is providing work for
aout 13,000 persons in the two countries, including the subcontracts, which are
sizable (80 percent for Roland). Furthermore, the cooperation was recently ex-
tended also to Great Britain, which is associated with Euromissile in the new
EMDG [expansion unknown] group for development of the future medium-range and
long-range third-generation antitank missiles (cf AIR ET COSMOS, No 900, p 43
[See JPRS L/10496, dated 6 May 82, No 28/82 of this series, pp 31-32]). EMDG
is also to be the cooperation structure for development of other missiles and
eventually for artillery rockets, Mr Hort declared.
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FOR (
klowever, some shadows are creeping over Franco-German cooperation. Last year,
defense-budget compressions led the FRG to "defer" the orders for Roland
(installments 3 and 4) for the Luftwaffe and the Navy and also those for the
Milan (installment 4). Mr Hort considers, though, that Milan installment 4 and
- the Rnland installments for the Luftwaffe could be reinstituted.
But the essential problem is in fact that of the Franco-German cooperation on
the new HAC [Antitank Helicopter]/PAH-2 antitank-helicopter project.
"It is important for France and the FRG to reach an understanding rapidly in
order to laucnh this program, which is necessary for the future of Franco-Ger-
man cooperation," Roger Chevalier, vice president of Aerospatiale, declared un-
ambiguously. The FRG is, of course, experiencing financial difficulties in its
more.than Fr 2 billion participation in this program. But it is also tempted
toward trans-Atlantic cooperation with the United States for development of
this new helicopter and its weapons system.
13ut there is no doubt that such an attitcde, which would in fact lead to the
introduction of an American competitor into the European market, would sound
the death knell of Franco-German cooperation. Therefore, this is not only a
technical choice but a political one!
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982
11267
CSO: 3100/706
~
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FRANCE
BRIEFS
ADAPTED EXOCET IN TESTING--Adaptation of the Exocet antiship missile, AM-39
air-to-surface version, to the Atlantic New Generation (ANG) maritime-patrol
airplane is in progress. The first phase of adaptation of the AM-39 to the ANG
began in March 1982 with the dropping of three mockups of AM-39 missiles at the
Flight-Testing Center (CEV) of Cazaux in the Landes (France). We recall that
adaptation of the AM-39 missile to the Navy's Super Etendard carrier-based
plane was completed on 2 February 1982, with the success of the last qualifica-
tion firing, made on that date against a towed Trimaran marine target. Four
out of five AM-39 firings from Super Etendards of the French Air Force were
successful, one having failed for a reason independent of the weapon system.
Certain firings were dc~.e by a Super Etendard of the French aircraft-carrier
Clemenceau in the presence of Argentine flyers. Since then, as is known, AM-39
missiles have been fired by Argentine Super Etendards in combat, an~ one of
these missiles destroyed the 4,100-ton British destroyer "Sheffield." Valida-
tion firings of the MATRA [Mechanics, Aviation and Traction Co] Magic air-com-
bat missile have also been done by a Super Etendard of the aircraft-carrier
Clemenceau at the Mediterranean Testing Center (CEM), in cooperation with the
teams of the CEV and of the manufacturer. (Text] [Paris AIR ET COSMOS in
French 22 May 82 p 47] [COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982] 11267
FIBER OPTICS GUIDE TORPEDO--The ECAN [Naval Anns and Construction Establish-
ment] of Saint-Tropez and the Thomson-CSF company have just begun developnent
of the New Light Torpedo (NTL) for the Navy's submarines. Thomson-CSF expects
that it will take 4 to 5 years to complete development of the new NTL torpedo,
which should go into mass production in 1987, it was recently declared by a re-
presentative of the submarine-activities division of the company. The NTL tor-
~ pedo is the first French wire-guided torpedo using optical fibers. It is con-
sidered to be a competitor of the British Sting-Ray light torpedo, but faster.
Thomson-CSF has specified that the NTL torpedo would have a limited range of
20 to 30 km by the wire-guidance technique. But the NTL torpedo would never-
theless have a greater range than that of the new French F-17 torpedo that has
just been placed in service, in January 1982, in the French Navy and seqeral
foreign navies. In addition, it was decided in 1979 to modernize the F-17 tor-
pedo to make it multipurpose, so as to equip the Navy's convent~onal-propulsion
and nuclear-propulsion (SNA) attack submarines with it. (Text] [Paris AIR ET
COSMOS in French 22May 82 p 47] [COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982] 11267
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ANTI-AIRCRAFT DECOY-The Navy has finelly chosen the French compeny CSEE [Electrical
Entreprise and Communications Company] to build the new Sagaie decoy-la~ching system
to equip the antiaircraft corvettes. CSEE was in competition with Creusot-Loire,
Thomson-CSF [General Radio Co] and Thomson-Brandt for this contract, whi~h consti-
tutes the f~rst application of the Sagaie decoy-lal.mcher. The Sagaie T-*ill be used
for protection of surface vessels against attacks by antiship missiles, to de-
coy the dumbo radars before enemy firing and the self-guidance systems of mis-
siles fired against ships. The electronic-warfare action of the Sagaie system
will be joined with that of CSEE's Dagaie decoy-launcher and of the close-self-
defense weapons systems. Each Sagaie system will comprise two carriages, each
with 10 decoy-launching rockets (electromagnetic and infrared), as well as the
cases for the control mechanisms, siming, power supply, processing, supervision
and maintenance. The designing of the Sagaie munitions has been assigned by
the Navy to the French company Lacroix, which is already making the munitions
for the CSEE's Dagaie decoy-launcher and for the new Magaie ~cf AIR ET COSMOS,
No 902). Some 50 Dagaie decoy-launching systems have been ordered by 10 coun-
tries. It is planned to equip initially, in 1985, four ~Tavy corve~tes with the
Sagaie, which is also offered for export. [Text] [Paris AIR ET COSMOS in
French 8 May 82 p 42] [COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982) 11267
CSO: 3100/1708
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GENERAL SPAIN
DETAILS OF RECENTLY UNCOVERED AEROFLOT SPY NET RECOUNTED
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 10 May 82 pp 23-29
[Text] The Soviet commercial airline company in Spain has another business
~ besides flying. In the past 3 years four of its employees--two last week--
= have left the country after being linked with espionage activities, with
their pilots suspected of being more than ~ust operators of planes. This
story tells about the life of the two Aeroflot men in Madrid, where as in
any sinister tale, the sordid underground work or spying is mixed up with
a still unexplained death.
= At the beginning of this year, Esther, a British air hostess, who was trying
to buy a bottle of brandy in the Bara~as airport, lost a heel off her shoe.
So as not to fall, she grabbed onto a pilot, whose briefcase fell from his
hand onto the floor, spilling out its contents.
The stewardess, somewhat upset and embarrassed, apologized to the owner of
the briefcase, and set about helping him to gather up the papers which were
scattered on the floor. ~ ~
� At that moment, two men who were dressed in the same uniform as the pilot
pushed her roughly aside, hurriedly gathered up the papers, and put them into
the briefcase again.
~Incredulous and suprised by the rude behavior of the crew members, Esther
looked for the broken off heel of her shoe and went away. Then she remembered
two things. The crew members were wearing the Aeroflot emblem, and the papers
which they had not allowed her to touch were made up of strange cambinations
of numbers and ciphers. They were undoubtedly coded messages.
A few months after this episode, two colleagues of the strange Aeroflot crew
~ were eapelled from Spain for carrying on�activities harmful to the national
security. The two spies, Vasiliy Nikolayevich Fedorin and Vladimir Lukich
Tirtishnikov, director and~assistant director, respectively, of the Soviet
_ sirline company, left Spain for good last Thursday, after the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs gave them a week to collect their belongings and get out.
~
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Agent og Influence
Vasiliy Fedorin, age 48, was born in Olguino, Saratov Province, in the Soviet
Union. He studied engineering in the Patrice Lumumba University, that great
Soviet center of higher education where so many Russian agents and revolutionary
leaders have served their apprenticeship; and he married Yanna Petrovna
Fedorina, a young woman of Eurasian appearance, born in Polotsk, Belorussia,
- in October 1940.
After spending several years working in Spanish-speaking countries, Fedorin
was assigned to Morocco in the mid '70's as an agent of the GRU, the militiary
branch of the KGB, using the cover of a representative of the Aeroflot
company in Rabat. In April 1980 the Soviet authorities transferred him to
Madrid.
Tall and thin, with a wide face, high cheekbones and b1uA eyes, Vasiliy
Fedorin arrived in Spain as director of Aerof lot, replacing its former head,
Oleg Suranov, who had been expelled from the country after having been
accused of carrying on espionage activities. This made him a suspicious
person from the start.
Subjecting him to strict surveillance, the agents of the Ministry of Defense's
c,.~interintelligence service, who began to follow him from the very day he
arrived in Barajas, soon noticed that under the cover of the director general
of Aeroflot and of a prosaic Soviet aeronautical engineer, there was concealed
- a person of refined culture, with courteous and educated manners, who dressed
with a certain elegance, spoke Spanish and French perfectly, and who had
come to Spain for something morg than selling airline tickets.
However, there was something that did not fit in. After months and months of
being followed and watched, Fedorin had not decided to reactivate the network
of Soviet agents which his predecessor, Oleg Suranov, had set up in the
country.
One day things changed. The pretended director of Aeroflot suddenly left
his office and proceeded to~a centrally located Madrid cafeteria, where he
had a meeting with a journalist from a mass circulation daily newspaper.
There was nothing strange about the meeting. On the other hand, there was
something strange about FPdorin's behavior. Too many precautions for it to
be an ordinary meeting.
A 'Fully Trained Field Man'
Before keeping the appointment, the sham Aeroflot director had made two calls
from a phone booth, had changed taxis twice, had gotten out 300 meters away
from the place of the meeting, crossed the street twice before going to
the pedestrian crossing in order to see if he was being followed, and then
went into the cafeteria, where for an hour two Russians had been setting up
a discreet system of counter-surveillance.
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After this first meeting, which was followed by many others, Spanish
counterintelligence found the key to the problem: Fedorin was not an
operations agent. He was an agent of influence, and his mission in Spain
was to set up a network of ~ournalists who would write under the orders of
the Soviet Union. .
All Spanish counterespionage operations then were centered around unmasking
him. For several months agents of the CESID [Higher Center for Defense
Intelligence] and the fake director general of Aeroflot played a cat�and-
mouse game. Every time that someone laid a trap for him, Fedorin sniffed
it out. Finally, last March, Vasiliy Fedorin, one of the most astute men
in Soviet military espionage in Spain, fell into the snare of the national
security services.
. "In the murky and stormy world of spies," a specialist told CAMBIO 16, "t~fhen
someone discovers a network belonging to the opposite side they can only
do two things: either liquidate the agents, or force them to work for their
captors. Anything but put them into prison." That was what happened to
Fedorin. The CESID "turned around" one of his spies, made him into a double
agent, and used him to dig the grave for his boss.
Samething similar happened to Tirtishnikov, "assistant director general" of
Aeroflot, who accompanied Fedorov on his journey "into the cold." One of
the men from his own network, captured by Spanish counterespionage, sold
him out unceremoniously.
Vladimir Tirtishnikov was born in North Korea 34 years ago. The son of a
Soviet father and a Korean mother, he studied engineering in the USSR, and
joined the military branch of the KGB. He carried out several missions in
the Middle East, and during one of his stays in the Soviet Union for recycling
he married Tat'yana Mikhailovna Tirtishnikova, a Muscovite 4 yeara older
than he, by wham he has a young child.
, The KGB took 6 years to prepare the ground for putting him into Spain.
As an inspecting engineer from the Ministry of Civil Aviation, Tirtishnikov
travelled to the country with some regularity, and began to make friends
with several people. Fifteen months ago he was finally posted to Madrid
with the cover of assistant director general of Aeroflot.
Gifted with a special talent for outwitting the vigilance of Spanish
counterintelligence, Tirtishnikov was a"fully~trained field man," interested
in all kinds of information, but especially in anything related to the plans
of the Spanish Armed Forces in regard to Spain 3oining NATO, and the supplies
of military ma.terial which the United States was prepared to sell to the
Madrid authorities; as well as the training and capabilities of the Spanish
military men who were going to fill positions of responsibility within the
Western military bloc.
Fedorin and Tirtishnikov are not the only spies who have been detected in
Aeroflot. Nor are they the first to be expelled for taking advantage of their
cover in the Soviet airline company to carry on their nefarious work.
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rvn ~~rr~~ ~n~. ~,.~r, rn~~.~
On Friday, 15 March, 1980, Oleg Suranov--age 41, tall, with a robust build,
partly bald and baggy-eyed--left Spain after the CESID found proof of his
covert espionage activities when he was "sold", by means of a double agent,
some plans of the electronic~system of the French Mirage aircraft, in which
Suranov had shown interest.
Born in Leningrad, married and with two children, Suranov was also an
aeronautical,engineer and director of Aeroflot in Spain, a position that
allowed him to be on good terms with the pilots of the Western airline
companies--many of whom had previously been military pilots--and to keep
.informed about some of the secrets of NATO.
Another Soviet GRU agent who was detected by Spanish counterintelligence was
Gennadiy Katychev, a heavy individual, of inedium height, with rosy cheeks
and an oblique expression, who in 1979 was the commercial director for
Spain of the Soviet airline company.
At the end of 1980 Katychev was promoted to assistant director general of
Aeroflot in Spain; and the Western secret services, who had thought he might
be a Soviet agent, detected some links in what could be his network of
informants.
The KGB, which had set up a discreet countersurveillance system to protect
him, then noticed that he was "blown," and in order to prevent the collapse
of the network of agents, they decided in January 1981 to transfer him to
another "rezidientura" (the KGB station in a country).
A cou~le of years before, Enrique I.opez Alcantara had suffered a worse fate.
He was a former Spanish military man aged 58, a personal friend of the former
director of Aeroflot in Spain, and former sales manager of the Soviet
commercial airline company.
On 19 March 1979, 2 days after having made a trip to the Soviet Union, Lopez
Alcantara was found dead in the seat of a"Citroen GS" at no. 3 Canillejas
Street in Madrid.
Three years after it occurxed, his death is still surrounded by mystery.
He was.apparently attacked by some criminals, who assaulted him for the
purpose of robbery, but none of his possessions were missing, and his car
was still parked in the garage.
The wound that caused his death was also very strange. A simple cut on the
back of the knee ended his life. The cut, which severed the femoral artery
of the former Aerof lot sales manager with diabolical precision, either
happened by sheer chance, as the family thinks, or was the work of an
experienced professional.
Shortly before his death the Russians had named to the post of Aeroflot sales
_ manager a person whom they trusted completely: Nieves Cuervo Elizalde, a
relative of Vicente Cuervo, the "Russian boy" who heads the Hispanic-Soviet
Friendship Association, one of the two associations for friendship with the
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USSR which exist in this country, and which receives direct support and
funding from the KGB.
Everything seems to indicate that Aeroflot, whose ~~ctivities in Spain began
- before the death of Franco and the opening of dipl~~++~*ic relations with
the East, has been the most important center of the GRU, Lhe military
~ branch of the KGB, ever since the first Russ~an Tupolev landed at the
Barajas airport.
Western military intelligence sources think that more than half of the staff
of this company--made up of four Soviets and two Spaniards--are using their
positions as cover for carrying out espionage activities.
They also believe that the crews of the Russian planes, which have been
landing uninterruptedly at Bara3as on Mondays and Saturdays for about a
dozen years, are working for Soviet military intelligence as couriers and
as agents in charge of securing information inside the country.
� During the 24 hours that they usually stop over, the two Aeroflot pilots
and the four air hostesses which make up each crew usually spend most of
_ their time outside the hotel, dressed in civilian clothes and almost without
_ police surveillance.
The government suspects that some of the pilots or air hostesses have already
set up their own networks of informants, although there.is still no
information to prove it.
One thing that seems clear, though, is that the seemingly harmless Soviet
Tupolevs which travel to Spain are taking advantage of their arrivals and
departures from Madrid to photograph the military installations of the
. Torrejon de Ardoz base, and to compare the material that they obtain with
the information sent by Soviet spy satellites.
Foreign political observers find it strange that Soviet aircraft are allowed
to land at an airport like Bara~as which is situated baraly 20 kilometers
from the most important Spanish-U.S. base in the country, when normally
they would be forbidden to come within 100 kilameters of it.
But that is not the only thing that is strange. On Princessa Street, in
Madrid, where the Aeroflot offices are located, the Soviet spies work at
night and sleep during the day. And it is this not-so-strange predeliction
for dark, silent and patient work that makes Aeroflot a company that does
its flying in low places as well as high ones.
Aeroflot Personnel~in Spain
Vasiliy Fedorin, director general. Expelled. Sergey Sesikov, assistant
director general and commercial director. Suspected of espionage.
Vladimir Tirtishnikov, assistant director general. Expelled. Valeriy
Smirnov, field director.
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Nieves ~Cuervo Elizalde, head of programming and reservations. Nationality:
5panish:,
Antonio Modesto Diaz, head of pramotion. Nationality: Spanish.
COPYRIGHT: 1982, INFORMACION Y REVISTAS, S.A.
8131 ~D
CSO: 3110/142
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