JPRS ID: 10601 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070047-8
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• Sequence Number: 47
• Content Type: REPORTS

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~
JPRS L/10601
- ~1 Ju~vE 1982
~ West E u ro e Re ort
p p
;
~ ~FOUO 39/82~
i~
! '
FBIS FOREIGN sROADCAST INFOR~VIATION SERVICE .
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NOTE
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JPRS L/10601
- 21 June 1982
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 39/82)
CONTENTS
ECONOMCC
FE DE RAL REP UB LI C 0 F GE RMANY
13nions Accept De crease in Purchasing F~wer
(Marc Le roy-Beaulieu; VALEURS AC TUELLES, 15-21 Mar 82)..... Z
I TALY
Interview With Finance Minister ari Fiscal Reform
(Rino ~ormics In~erview; EUROPEO, 5 Apr 82) 3
P OLI TZ CAL
FRAr? CE
Qlaracteristics of PSF Activists Examined
(Rc~land Cayrol, Colette Ysmal; PROJET, May 82) . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.hemes for Commission an Planning Reform Examined
~ (FUTiTRIBLES, Max 82) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
SPAIN
PSOE Acts To Improve Its Standing With Military
(CAMBIO 16, 10 May 82)...e 35
CEOE's Salat Foresees Slow Economic Recovery
( Carlos Fe rre r S ala t In te rvi ew; LAiZ TUDE AUJQURD' HUI ,
May c32) 38
- a - (III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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E CON OI~ff C FE IIERAL R~P UB LI C 0 F GE RMANY
UNIONS ACCEPT DECREASE IN PURCHASING POWER
Paris VALEiJRS ACTUELLES in French 15-21 Mar 82 p 34
[Article by Marc Leroy-Beaulieu: "The Krefeld Consensus"]
The other Saturday at Krefeld, in the Ruhx, the regional authorities of the IG-
Metall metallurgy union and the Gesamtmetall employers~ federation accepted the
proposal of an arbitration committee whic`~ suggested an average salary increase
of 4.2 percent for employees in the metallurgical industry in Rhineland-West-
phalia. The agreement is valid for 12 m~nths as of last 1 February. The most
optimistic forecasts predict a 5-percent rate of inflation for the current year.
The unions have therefore deliberately accepted a decrease in purchasing power.
TraditionalYy, the first regional agreement on salary increases in the metallur-
- gical industry is used as a standard not ~ust for all of this sector but also
for the rest of West German industry.
In fact, 2 days after it was signed, the Krefeld agreement was used by labor
and management in the metallurgical industry, notably in Berlin and Baden-Wurtem-
berg.
~ At the begir~ning of negotiations in January, industry owners had proposed a 3.5-
percent increase. IG-Metall loudly and strongly demanded 7.5 percent. Shortly
therefore, it became merely a question of "maintaining the employees' purchasing
power." And even after publication of the government's economic forecasts,
which anticipated a 5-percent price increa~se in 1982, the metallurgical workers'
union was fighting only "for a 4 before the decimal point."
"We got all we were hoping for," said IG-Metall's directors after concluding the
Krefeld agreement.
The purchasing power of German employees had already decreased in 1981. With an
inflat:~on rate of 5.9 percent, the average salary increase was limit~d to 5.3
percent. (It is true that at the time of the negotiations, the increase in ~
prices was estimated at only 5 percent,)
So, despite government forecasts which predict an average increase of between 7
- and 9 percent in firms' profits for the current year, the celebrated German
- social consensus continues to hold sway.
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Two elements should be considered:
--At the beginning of February, the unions received a 12 billion DM government
recovery plan designed primarily to subsidize private investments. This en-
deavor, which could have a positive effect on the labor market, has undoubtedly
subdued the unions' ravenous appetite.
--The unions' combativeness would have been stronger, were there not 2 million
unemp?.oyed worker~. Although economic stagnation is continuing in the FRG as
elsewhere, the problem of maintaining employment has won out over that of the
purchasing power.
In addition, the Krefeld agreement can help the public employees' union refuse
- the 1-percent reduction in base salaries of civil servants and state officials
which the administration, as part of its budget reductions, wants to impose be-
fore beginning tt.~e annual negotiations on salary increases. Having thus saved
face, the union, through its salary base, could have a decrease in its purchas-
ing power which would benefit the national treasury. This is the "realpolitik"
of labor and management.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 "Valeurs Acr:uelles"
9720
CSO: 3100/537
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ECONOMIC ITALY
INTERVIE!~l'rrITH FINANCE MINISTER ON FISCAL REFORM
P~ilan EUROFDO in Italian 5 Apr 82 pp 12-14
[Interview with Ita.lian Finance Minister Rino Formica, by Salv~.tore Rea~
[Text~ If he succeeds (and he is determf.ned to succee~d)~
Rino Formicz~ the socialist minigter of finance, will be
remembered. in Italian history as the politician xho opened
the safes and files of the banks to the attentive eyes of
the agents of the Internal Revenue Service so that the latter
covtd audit the accounts of the suspect citizens. Tax
~ evaders and holders of laxge ba.nk deposits deri.ved from
Mafia, Camorra or otherwise illicit sources ~ill no longer
en~oy a life of ease.
The minister's initiative~ hoKever, is unpalatable to many
people other than those directly concerned, and in particu-
lar to the bankers, antrepreneurs and profeasiona.ls of the
- more or less seeret finaneial conununity. They see it as a
threat to their businees operations a.nd as a violation of
their civil and professional right~. 5o the fears (and
ob~ections) are mounting~ inasmuch as Formica--in order to
carry out his purpose--has chosen the quick expedient of
the deeree la~r rather than that of the draft bill~ xhich
takes much longer to get through Parlia.ment and (xith the
aid of good fr~.ends) can be amended to the point that it is
rendererl innocuous.
[Question~ Minister Fbrmica, have you decided to press for your legislative
me~.sures?
[Ansxer~ On this point you x~eed have no doubt. Let me begin, hoWever~ by
saying that xhat we are talking about is not a decree law '~at a"delegated
decxee." We intend to follox a courae of utiliaing the poHar possessed by the
govez~.nment to issue decrees based. on the tax law.
~Question~ The communists~ however. are specifically challenging the form you
ha.ve chosen for your legislative measuress naanely, the decree. Vinicio
Bernardini, PCI repreaentative on the paxliamentary Committee of the Thirty
that is considering the matter. Was very clear on +,his point.
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[Ansxer~ No~ that's not the case. To be sure, poxerful interests are going to
be hurt; but Bernardini has explained to me that his ob3ection xa,s based on
principle--so to speak--rather than on content. On the contrary~ he has
assured me that the communists xill make a significant contribution to the
process of attacking, and solvfng, the problem of bank aecrecy.
[Question~ Are you convinced. that it will really be solved?
[Answer~ In short, in our country~ rrhenever the phenomenon of tax evasion iR
encountercd no one--and I mean no one--raises his voice in its defense. On the
contraxy, everyane corxiemns it. There are accordfngly t~o hypotheses~ either
everyone is against tax evasion and is even ag~inst tax evadere (Who in Ital;~
ax~ so numerous)~ or e13e our country ia a country of extreasly honest tax-
payers where everyone is angry xith anyone xho cheata the Revenue 3ervice.
~Question' Aren't they all probably hypocrites?
~Ansrrer~ No~ and. I believe that the tax evaders (and there are a great many of
them) are themselves calling for action against tax evasion. Why is this so7
Well, beca,use in Italy no one has ever opposed the principle that tax evasion
should be comba,ted. The oppositio~, surfaces the moment an attempt is made to
put the principlP into practice. At that point various rights are cited and
- rnotection for those rights (o.ften ~�ested rights) is invoked. T"his is a xay
of defending one's assets and. is the most conservative formula. Naturally~ a
~hole series of theories and legal principles axe also unsheathed--not~ hoWever~
in order to devise xays to ca,tch the evaders but rather to ereet impassablc
' road blocks.
[Question~ Impassable for whom?
- [Answer~ For anyone xho in~tends to combat tax evasion. Do you knox, moreover~
Khich of the road blocks thpy ase trying to erect is the most important? It is
the one that xould impede identifica,tion of these movements of financial re-
sources. Granted, if xe xexe to say that tha bank accounts of our citizens ,
shouZd ba posted on community bulletin boatds xe would be talking nonsense~ but
between that kind of nonsenae and the assertion that all transactions passing
through the ba.nking system enjoy "protection" there ase many intermediate
stages.
~Question~ Protection from what?
rAnsxer~ The truth is tr.at no one really knoxs, because there isn't any ].ax to
protect banking secrecy. It's ,just the custom; it's ~ust the practice, nothing
- more.
~Question~ The bankers axe the moat relentlees protesters these days against
the vi:,?.ation of banking ~ecreoy. They begin by saying that there is no con-
nectic-; between the institutional ae~ivity of the banks and the unla~rful prac-
tice of tayc evasion.
~Ans~er~ I irndeed hope so~ for othezwrise +.hey woulci all be sub3ect to criminal
prosecution.
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- [Question~ But don't you believe--aa has been said--that there are be~nks xhose
specific function is to launder money from illegal sources?
[Ansxer~ If that is the case, then xhat xe aace dealing xith is criminal be-
ha.vior. If such things are taking place~ I xould hope it is not being done on
- an institutional basis and not xith the knowledge of the organs of any bank�
That would be a suicidal way to operate.
~Question~ Isn't it possible that some banks have actually been fouryded xith
Mafia and C~morra money--that is to say~ xith the proceeds from drugs and
kidna.pings?
(Answer] We say thiss the Bank of Italy is in a better position than xe at
the Ministry of Finance ase to have knoKledge of an operation of this sort~ for
it has an inspection service and is therefore quite xell axare of the source
of th~ese large sums of money. If it has suspicions~ moreover~ it should so
info~a the 3udi.cial authorities.
[Question~ What suspicions do you have?
~
~Answer~ In the fight against organized crime xhich xe are attempting to carry
out~ xe have identified--in the areas where crime is most prevalent--a nwnber
- of individua.ls xho should be sub3ected to invRe�~gation not only with respect
to their total assets but also xith respect to t~eir relations xith the banking
- system.
~Question~ Which axe these areas?
~4nswer~ The Kell-known areas af the Ma.fia and the Camorra.
[Question1 In other xordss Sicily, Calabria and Campania. The unde~xorld has
- als~ emigrated to the North~ however.
_ ~Answer~ Naturally, it is able to branch out to other territorial subdivi-
sions. No one is saying that the financial operations of the Mafia are limited
' to certain axeas. They axe nox internationa.l in scope.
~Question~ The ba.nkers are asking that the neW legislative measures contain
~ prec3se rules governing audi~s of bank accounts by the Internal Revenue Service.
Will you cob~ply kith this request?
' [Ansxer~ In the proposal now under study by the Committee of the Thirty we
have already establishe3 certain prineiples that are quite strict. In order to
request a ba,nk audit, the Revenue Service should be certa,in that the taxpayer
in question has failed to d~clare his income or has filed a declara.tion that
contrasts shaxply either xith his total assets or xith any substantial finan-
- cial movements of funds totaling more than 50 million lire. Moreover, under
the provisions of Law 159 regard~ng the export of capital and irregular trans-
actions in foreign exchange, the foreign exchange pfllice group of the Revenue
Service already has access to the banks. This larr has been in effect for 5
- yeass and (according to the Bank of Italy) has not oacasioned any ~aste, abuse
of process, or abuse of p~wer. Thsre has been no excessive uae of power.
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[Question~ ~he fears may be of a somexhat different na.ture, namely that too
much discretion will be exercised in the process of intervening in the banking
system and auditing the accounts of individual citizens.
[Answer~ No, that is not possible, beca.use a onurt ord.er is necessary to carry
out the intervention. The amount of discretior. employed is therefore the same
regardless of Khether the order is issued by the 3udge or whether--at the
request of the Revenue Service--it is issued by the chairman of the tax commis-
sion of primary jurisdiction, xho is always a ma.gistrate.
~ [Question~ Couldn't you, ~he minister of fina,nce, ~lso issue such an order?
At your discretion?
[Answer~ No, the mini~ter cannot. We don't xant to arrogate police poxers to
ourselves.
(~Question] You say that the minister cannot or3er an audit in a bank?
- ~Answer~ The government can order an audit~ artid therefore the or3er can also
be issued by the appropriate governmental entity. .
~Question~ And therefore also by the minister?
[AnsNer~ A~cording to our draft legislation, ho~+ever, authorization to dp so
should be given by the chairman of the tax commission of primaxy 3urisdiction.
rauestion~ You have not answered my queation. Can the minister intervene~ or
not?
[Ansxer~ He can alxays do so in those ca.ses authorized by la~v. It's not that
I can call the Revenue Service ar~d order it to audit anyone's ba,nk account. An
individual must be in one of those situations of noncompliance specified in the
decree. If someone has no declaxed income but has purchased a house for 200
million lire~ he must explain xhere he has obta,ined the money. In thia case,
access to the ba.nk may be requested for the Revenue Service.
[Question~ Does this procedure apply in all ca.ses? If a high official of a
government agency or public enterprise purchases a house for 1 billion lire,
what happens? tJhat action do you take?
~Answer~ If the official in question has filed a declaration that is congruous
with the purchase~ no audit will be necessary. If~ however~ the declaration is
not congruous with the purchase, he should undergo the neceseary audits.
~Question~ Do you know what the bankers axe saying? They axe saying that your
decree against banking secrecy will impel people to withdraw their money from
the banks and send it abroad.
[tinswer~ I think that would be difficult.
[~luestion~ I believe you are rather optimistic.
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[Ansxer~ Look: the existence of ba.nking secrecy has not grevented the export
of tens of trillions of lire. Th~ export of capital is linked to other phenom-
ena.: to a lack of confidence in one's aHn currency, to domestic political
conditions~ to the desire to obtain profits in places xhere they are higher~
and to more lucrative opportunities for speculation. In short~ the export of
capita.l is more a function of the evaluation ma,de of the genera.l economic
situation. Otherwise~ no one in the United States--xhich has an internal
revenue audit system that amounts to downright persecution--would any longer
have so much as a dollax on deposit in a bank~ but such is not the ca.se. I am
convinced~ hoxever~ that in this area it is definitely necessasy to proceed by
stages. If we were to decide at this time to carry out the total alx~lition of
banking secrecy~ it would be a mistake. It is accordingly necessary t~ begin
by penetrating this secrecy in those situations which are the most odious to
the civic conscience of our country. I do not believe it is acceptable for the
underworld in Italy to have gross annual receipts of betKeen 15 trillion arul
20 trillion lire. ~'he instrumentalities for intervention an~d auditing should
therefore be increa.sed.. The taxpaying conscience of the na.tion does not
increa~e in proportion with preachments.
~Question] Does the "penetration" specified in your "delega.ted decree"' relate
solely to ba.nking secrecy?
[Answer~ No; xe are also lookin~ at the professional offices. We do not xant
do abolish professional confidentiality. but much documentation of a fiscal
nature is conta.ined in professiona,l offices.
[Question~ In other xords, the offices of lawyers and notaxies?
~Answer~ Iaxyers, notaries, brokers, accountants. The Revenue Service should
have access to their offices.
[Question~ Are you thinking of intervening in the finance companies and the
so-called trust companies?
[Answer~ As minister of finance I have expressed myself in favor of approval--
by the Fina.nce and Z~easury Committee of the Qiamber of Deputies--of the bill
by Deputies Minervini and Spaventa. which will authorize the Revenue Service to
penetrate the inner sanctums of the trust companies. This proposal xas not
included in the delegated decree concerning banking secrecy, beca.use in the
view of the laKyers it was not included in the po~rers delegated to the govern-
ment.
[Question~ Do you think that Mlnister of the Treasury Nino Andreatta Will go
along with approval of your decree concerning banking secrecy?
[Answer~ Andreatta has issued an excellent statement concerning this problem.
He said that he is not opposed to the decree; that the ma,tter is not absurd;
and that it is proper to deal xith the problem while of cour~e establishing
adequa.te safeguards. But then I don't believe I am an "adventurist."
_ [Question~ Won't your decree provoke a flight of savings from the banks?
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[Anstrer~ I don't see any reason for it. On the contrarys we shall soon ~it-
ness a strong trend toxard settlin~ accounts xith the Revenue Service. The
problem itself has arisen because of the failure of the pre-3udicial tax pro-
cedures. What is this "rrre-3udicial" grocess? Italian law establishes the
criminal r.orms governing infractions of the tax laks~ but the criminal process
cannot be used until all administrative proced~es before the apgrogriate tax
commissions ha~ve been e:�.hausted. The fact is that in our country the time
required. to reach a decision in a tax case is meas~ed not in years but in
lustrums. and the more important the case the more lustrums axe required. This
means that the crimina.l penalties are, in practice, eludeci by ~�irtue of the
pre-3udicial tax proced.ures. This question is currently before the Constitu-
tional Court. Inasn.uch as the pre-~ud.icial process is manifestly unconstitu-
tional, the Constitutional Court xill be wnable to declare it legitimate, even
regardless of any restrictions placed on its use. At the same time, Parlia.ment
has before it a government-sponsored. bill that xould eli~inate this pre-~udiC;~l
process, thereby ena.bling the crimina,l norms to be applied independently of
administrative grocedures.
[Question~ And the handcuffs xill be placed on the tax evatiers?
[Answer~ Yes, indeed. Even in these cases~ howevsr~ I believe Ke will see--as
in the case of the decree on banking secrecy--a trend. toKaxd settling up Nith
the Revenue Service. In my opinion the effect of these measures will be that
we shall have an increase of several trillion lire in tayc revenue. There's
only one way to fight tax evasion, and that is to increase the government's
poxer to cnnduct audits and investigations. Other~rise~ the effort xill lapBe
into hypocritical policies, and the fight against tax evasion xill be Kaged
with xords.
~Question1 Meaning that the only action xill take the form of verbal "moral-
ism"?
(~Answer~ Precisely. Let us take the daily LA REPUBBLICA, for example. It is
alxays preaching mora.lity~ but xhen word leaked out of o~xr initiative concern-
ing ba.nking secrecy it rrrote that an avalanche of criticism was rushing doxn
from all sides. Well~ then I says How is it possible to change anything in
this country if no effort is macie to increase the power to investigate and to
intervene in those sectors that axe the matrix of evildoing? I challenge LA
REPUB3LICA to wa,ge a splendid caanpaign in support of my decre~ � To judge f`rom
what I have seen~ hoxever~ it is doing nothing mcre than conduct a campaign to
liquidate my initiative.
rQuestion~ Professor F~anco Reviglio~ your fellox party member and preaecessor
at the Ministry of Fina,nce, had prepaxed a draft bill which provided for the
introduction of ca.sh registers into commercial enterprises. What became of
that bill? Is it locked up in a drawer of his desk?
~Ansxer~ No indeed. We have offered some amendments to this proposal, in
order to soften the impact of the new regulations on small businesses. This
measure is now under study by the Fina,nce and. T~easury Committee of the Chamber
of Deputies. We have requested that it take precedence over ~.11 other legis-
lative measures~ as soon as the norms for business taxes are approved.
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[Question~ Independently of any considerations of a paxtisan political nature?
_ [AnsKer~ Yes, for xe have no problems of a partisan politica,l nature. It's a
mistake to imagine that when something bensficial to the country as a xhole ie
- being considered~ consideration is s~mul.taneously accorfled to personal or
partisan interests. Defending special interests never pays off.
~Question~ That's the way i~ should be in a country that is really functioning.
[Anawer~ Quite so. This is~ moreover, xhat separates the reformists t~om the
corpora.tists. I h;a.ve never made a proposal of a corporative nature. It is
posaible that in certain insta.noes p~eferential treatment is granted to a
. pasticular development policy (or particulax sector) instead of anothar; but
any intent to rexatd or protect special interests to the detriment of the
- collectivity is a suicidal policy.
_ COPYRIGHTs 19~z Rizzoli Dditore
10992
CSO: 3104/191
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_ PO'LITICAL FRANCE
CHARACTERISTICS OF P~F ACTIVISTS EXAMINED
Paris PROJET in French May 82 pp 572-639
[Article by Roland Cayrol and Colette Ysmal: "Members of the PS: Originality
and Diversities"]
[Text] Political party congresses constitute a particularly significant event
- for anyone interested in the sociology of militancy. In fact, at a time chosen
by the politj.cal culture of the organization, they bring together all leaders
of the party at its different levels of activity: national and local, inter-
mediate cadres and active representatives of tiie rank and file anxious to
participate in this high point in the life of their political group, a time
when the party line for the months and years ahead is defined, when the new
leadership is chosen, Grhen the image the party wants to project to the outside
and f or the media is shaped. The phenomenon is further strengthened in parties
in which the delegates are, on the one hand, "rightful members" (members of
the party's leadership organs, members of Parliament and future members of the
. government) and, on the other hand and this is an essential~fraction numeri-
cally speaking representatives elected by the rank-and-file sections. At
a congress, one is thus in contact with the very flesh and blood of the organ-
ization, with ~hose who bring it to life and who act at all levels. That is
the case of the Socialist Party.
A few years ago, we began right here our sociological research into the dele-
gates of the socialist congresses, making it possible to draw an outline of
the PS.1 Since that t3me, further investigation has delved.more deeply into
the same subject.2 Within the framework of a European comparison,3 we have
been able to conduct a new investigation by m~ans of questionaires submitted
to delegates to the last congress of the Socialist Party, which met in Valence
on 23-25 October 1~381.4
Slow Progress of Women
The PS remains a predominantly male party, but the percentage of women is
~ steadily growing. They made up 12 percent of congress delegates in 1973,.
. 15 percent in 1977, 16 percent in 1979 and 20 percent in Valence in 1981.
_ Ttris presence is visibly linked to the deliberate policy of quotas followed
by the party. While in 1973, only 47 percent of the women held responsibili-
ties (local, federal or national) within the PS compared with 81 percent of
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all men the situation is profoundly different t'oday: A total of 86 percent
of the women delegates hold such responsibilities, compared with 91 pezcent of
the men.
The women therefore have a definitely minority position among party members,
but the determl.nation to ensur.e their advancement guarantees them proportion-
ally easier access to posts of responsibilities at the level of the offices
of local sections and departmental federations. � ,
The growing number of women in mil~tant strata of the PS can be verified in
their more recent~membership. An absolute majority qf socialist women attend-
- ing the Valence congress joined the PS after 1974. ThaC is the ease of 55
percent of them (of which 10 percent joined aftPr 1978), while 39 percent of
the men became members of the PS during that 7-year period (5 percent since
1978). Much more often than in the case of inen, these are women who had no ~
other political experience before joining the PS: 65 percent, compared with
57 percent for the men.
As a result, they have not succeeded in reducing a traditional male/female
disproportion in the politYcal parties. Because they are active women,
_ because the problem of the women's "double work day" still exists and perhaps
also because they are less willing to attend little meetings or to yield to
militant pressure,.they do not devote as much tj.me as men do, on the average,
to party activities. Only 15 percent devote over 50 hours a month compared
with 31 percent of the men =-~2nd 33 percent devote less than 20 hours, com- .
pared with 27 percent of the men.5
Regarding factions,6 the Mitterrand faction turn~ out, as in 1973, to t: the
_ one with the most female backing (21 percent), closely followed by the
Rocardian trend (19 percent) and CERES [Center for (Socialist) Studies, Re-
search and Education] (18 percent). The Mauroy faction has only 13 percent
of the socialist women.
On the whole, while the PS�remains, ~in terms of inembers and even militants,
a party of inen and while the place of women remains weak with respeet to candi-
dacies in legislative elections, especially in the "good" districts,~ the fact
remains that the efforts made by the party in recent years, especially by t;:e .
majority group, have bagun to bear fruit and the female presence is stea~ily
developing in militan�t organs.,
Party of Those Between 30 and 50
The evolution in the distribution by age of socialist delegates to the con-
- gresses during this decade shows a certain trend:
A~e (in 1973 1977 1979 1981
Under 30 31 16 16 8
30 to 39 27 40 42 45
40 to 49 23 26 24 29
50 to 59 12 12 13 11
60 and over ~ 7 6 5 7
Total 100 100 100 100
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There is definitely no upheaval. The socialist cbngresses always underrepre-
sent those over 50~and overrepresent the young and the middle-aged. But ther
has been a gradual shift from the.category of 'those under 30 to that of those
between 30-40,which now includes nearly,half of all delegates. ~
There are several possib3.e exp}.anations for this trend and ea.^h'one is probably
partially true. One can see.the difficulty of recruiting members among the
very young, but also, while the party is experiencing sensational progress in
elections, the congresses tend to be less open to young representatives of .
the rank and file and to appeal rather to more "responsible" militants. Fin-
ally, over the years si.nce the "Epinay, renewal" in 1971 there has
emerged a group of active party members Chat tends to form the militant central
core of the PS. This core goes from congxess to congress and naturally tends
to be a year older each time.
� This weight of the generation between the ages of 30 and 40 can be seen in all
- factions, which do present some differences, however, although less accentuated
than in 1973, when a young CERES could be pitted against an "old" Mollet fac-
- tion and a Mitterrand faction in a central position. �Nevertheless, the differ-
ences should be noted. .
Distribution of Members by Age (from left to right: under 30; 30 to 39; 40 to
49; SO and over)
Mitterrand Mauroy Rocard CERES
Faction Faction Faction
The above age pyramids showing internal tendencies af the PS show that the
weight of the young remains proportionally greate� in the CERES (13 percent
under 30) and that on the other hand, those over 50 are more important in the
Mitterrand (20 percent) and especially Mauroy (22 percent) factions.
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~
These are the nuances from bne faction to another and they are decinitely
important. However, one can no longer, when speaking ab.out the PS, point
out a"young" faction and an "old" faction. While the CER}:S, followed by
the Rocard group, can claim a proportionately higher number of young people,
we are seeing a party in which the age aspect introduces a certain coloration
in the different �actions, xather than structural oppositions truly due to
any generation split. ~
Class Front, Advanced Bourgeoisie and Social Compromise
Continuity rather than change dominates the'soc?.al recruitment of socialist
members. While miniL?um variations appear here and there over the years, one
finds a basic structure always founded oa the higher wage-earning groups.
Professions 1973 1977 1979* 1981
Farmers 1 2 1 2
Industry, commerce employers 3,5 2 2 1.5
Liberal professions . 9 4 6 ~ 5
Engineers and management
personnel 19 19 9 17
- Professors 19 24 19 25
Teachers ~ 6 12 11 5.5
Intermediate-level personnei 20 16 ~32 26
White-collar workers 8 9 5 '
Blue-collar workers ~ 3 5 5 5
Students 8 ~6 2 1
Inactive 3.5 2 6
Other
(or unspecified) - 1 11 1
Total 100 100 100 100
* The 1979 figures must be considered with caution because the delegates were
not, as in other studies, to clearly indicate their profession which was
then classified according to INSEE [National Inst~.tute of Statistics and
Economic Studies] codes but rather�, th~y were to classify themselves on
a precoded scale of categories, w'hich perhaps explains the smaller.number
of persons in the "management persorinel" group.
The three outstanding factors for 1973 are still observable. The lower-income
groups: blue- and white-collar woskers, are still as weakly represented,
making up 10 percent of thP delegates (~1 percent in 1973). Half of those
attending the congress still, come from the.more "bourgeois" strata of society:
industry and commerce employers, liberal pr0�essions, management personnel,
engineers, teachers in high schools and higher education. Finally, the weight
of the university milieu: professors, teachers and studenfs, continues to
comprise an imposing mass (nearly one-third of the members: 31.5 percent,
with a noteworthy drop iri.students).
The "proletarianization" of the congresses, which Paul Bacot tho~ight he dis-
cerned in 1979, putting on his glasses highly tinted with ideology,, therefore
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remains a lure. Moreover, it is most likely outside the scope of the PS, given ,
the absence of an intense political determination for organization, comp,arable,
for example, to that relating to the preserice of women and which would undoubt-
edly imply, as in Communist parties or other European socialist parties, the
_ privileged recruitment of party workers among the workers making it possible
for workers in industry to have access to party responsibilities difficult to
reconcile with their way of life.
While they tend to perpetuate themselves, our data on the social rank and file
of socialist members confirm the diagnosis of the'nature af the organizat~on.
The party recruits its leaders and.most active mmabers more easily in.the~dif-
ferent strata of the bourgeoisie and middle.classes than among city or rural
workers. As a partisan stre~cture, the PS is definitely the party of the bour-
geoisie and advanced middle classes politically speaking. Or, if one prefers,
given the profoundly interclass nature of its voters and therefore, of its
base among the people in the country it is the party that achieves an ori-
ginal social compromise between the lower-income categoYies of French society
and its advanced bourgeoisie, with the latter continuing to hold the reins of
party action. While, on the election level, the PS has managed to achieve its
objective of establishing the party of the "class front" of wage earners, on
the party level, on the other hand, this class front underrepresents white-
and blue-collar workers to the benefit of teachers and upper-level personnel,
who definitely intend~to act "on behalf of the.workers," but who have not yet
succeeded in fully integrating them in'to the militant apparatus of the social-
ist organization. ~
Regarding tendencies within the party, according to the following table, the
resemblances are also more important here than the differences. Based on
these figures, one cannot say that internal political splits refer to marked
_ social distinctions.
Profession Factions
Mitterrand Mauro Rocard CERES
Farmers 1 1 1 3
Industry and commerce employ.ers Z 3 - -
Liberal professions 5 7 5 8
Engineers, management personnel . 15 ~ 16 22 19
Professors ' 29 21 23 18
~ Teachers 6 7 6 4
Intermediate-level personnel 23 32 27 28
- White-collar workers 5 1 5 6
Blue-collar wor.kers 4 5 3 9
Students 1 - 3 -
Inactive 8 ~ 2 3
Other (or unspecified) 1 - 3 2
100 100 100 100
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One can nevertheless pick out a number of significant differences. kThile no
faction is composed on the basis of recruitment among the truly low-income
- groups, it is within CERES that white- an~ blue-collar workers are the most
numerous (15 percent). And it is in the Mauroy group that, proportionately
speaking, the intermediate-level personnel are the most numerous (32 percent).
Within the higher-ineome~groups, an opposition is tending to develop between
the Mitterrand faction, in which recruiting among educators especially among
professors is particularly dominant, and the Rocard faction, in which en-
gineers and upper-level personnel carry more weight than in all other factions.
While on the whole, rhe roots of inember"s of the PS are not among the lower-
income groups, on the other hand, the social origin of inembers is quite often
humble. The following table shows the professions followed by the fathers of
delegates to the Valence congress. Warkers make up nearly one-fourth of the
background of congressional delegates and the white-/blue-collar worker com-
bination makes up 36 percent.
Profession of Fathers Factions
Total Mitterrand Mauroy Rocard CERES
Farmers 10 10 8 4 12
Industry, commerce employers 12 13 16 8 9
Liberal professions 4 4 4 4 3
Engineers, management personnel 10 10 9 17 8
Professors 4 4 4 7 5
Teachers 6 5 7 1 9
Intermediate-level personnel 10 ~ 12 12 7 7
White-collar workers ' 12 12 10 13 11~
Blue-collar workers ' 24 23 21 31 27
Other (or unspecified) 8 7 9 8 9
- 100 100 100 100 100
The bourgeois origin (fathers in industry or commerce, among management per-
sonnel or professors) makes up only 24 percent of the background of inembers.
The Socialist Party therefore appears to be a party, ;f not of the "sons of the
people," then at least of the sons and daughters of the lower-income groups
and middle classes. .
In this connection, new nuances but here again, not deep splits enable
one to ma}~e a distinction between factions of the party. The Mitterrand and
Mauroy factions appe3r to be central, remaining close to the PS on the whole.
_ The Rocard group stands out as stemming from a rather curious double pole:
more "worker," on the one hand (eight points more than the Mitterrand group;
ten more than the Mauroy group), more "management personnel," on the other
hand (eight points more than the Mitterrand Mauroy factions). There are def~.n- .
itely fewer. "Rncardians" from families in which the father is self-employed:
as a farmer, employer or member of a liberal profession, than is the case with
a11 other party groups. From the standpoint of social background, this would
appear to be the characteristic of "Rocardism": a milieu deriving from the
wage-earning background, both lower- and higher-income groups.
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On the other hand, CEF:ES appears to be halfway between the mambers of the
Rocard group and members of the other groups, with this original trait: It
- has, propurtionateiy speaking, more sons of teachers and farmers than all
other groups.
On the whole, it is definitely a rising social mobility that constitutes the
mark of socialist militants. I~ or,e draws a mobility table from the generation
of fathers of the militants themse~ves, one notes that 64 percent of the social-
ist professors, 52"percent of the teachers, 45 percent of the management per-
sonnel, 48 percent of the intermediate-level cadres and even 45 percent of the
white-collar workers come from fathers whose profession was less "privileged"
than theirs. This fact, which has already been typical of socialist deputies8
for over 10 years is undoubtedly one of the characteristics of socialist re-
cruitment: The PS appears first of all as the party o� individuals whose pro-

~ fessional activity translates a progression in terms of intergenerational
social mobility. ,
, That is perhaps what explains the party's ability to play the role cf organizer
of a social compromise between the working class and the advanced wage-earning
bourgeoisie on the social and r~litical level. Evolving in a wea]..*_:~i.er profes-
sional framework, professing leftist ideas and often coming from modest cir-
- cumstances, PS members are well placed to constitute this meeting place, this
place for draf ting a political program bringing modernization and structural
reforms, thereby resulting in the alliances of strata around them.
Literary, Legal Background
Considering what has just been said about social background, one will scarcely
be surprised at the levels and training of PS members. A clgar majority of
them: 60 percent, attended institutions of higher learning.y
In other words, they are well-educated members. Let us add that their culture
has two poles: literary, on the one.hand, and legal-economic, on the other.
Out of 100 members with a higher education, 31 majored in liberal arts and
30 completed their studies in law or political science. Only 12 had scientific
disciplines (iricluding six doctors and five engineers).
The socialists therefore prefer letters to figures; they are persons more
versed in the use of the word than the slide rule. When they are professors,
which is not rare, as we have seen, they either teach French or history rather
than physical sciences or mathematic:3. Perhaps this is not unrelated to some ~
of the minor sins of the socialists, to their taste for debate over doctrine
rather than the rigors of financial management, to their ability to express
themselves orally and to somewhat of a gap between the word and action.
In terms.of f actions, an absolute majority in all groups has completed higher
studies: 58 percent in the Mitterrand group, 61 percent of those who support
Mauroy, 66 percent for the Rocard faction and 64 percent of those in CERES.
- The most literary are the Mitterrandists (34 percent, compared with ~nly 22
percent of CERES, which are the least literary). The legally-inclined are
more numerous among the Rocardians (40 percent) and the Mauroy supporters (36
percent), while the latter are also the most scientific (14 percent).
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It is in CERES that one finds the most gr3duates of schools of engineering
(9 percent). And while political science and the ENA [National School o� Ad-
ministration] are the doorway to everything, in the PS, at any rate, these �
channels lead rather to the Rocard faction (10 percent, compared with 3 percent
in e~ch of the other groups).
More Christians Among the Rocardians
We know that a certain penetrat3.on of Christian circles has since 1971 consti-
, tuted one of the traits of the $ocialist Party, whose recruiting tended toward
innovation compared with the cul*ural traditions of the French left. Thus, as
early as the Grenobl~s congress in 1973, some 12.5 percent of ttie delegates
said they were practicing Catholics, CERES having the most practicing Catholics~
_ (17 percent). The situation has little changed, on the whole. On the contrary,.
the socialist congress tends rather to become less marked by recruiting among
Catholics, but it does express a reclassification with respect to political .
trends.l0
Actually, the Rocard faction has become the group most'marked by the Catholic
origins of its members.-L1
Religion Factions
PS Overall Mitterrand Mauroy Rocard CERES
Practicing Catholics 10 9 9 16 8
Nonpracticing Catholics 25 25 . 22 26 25
Other religions 4 4 4 3 3
No religion 59 60 65 51 61
No answer 2 2 - 4 3
100 100 100 100 100
On the other hand, CERES has lost this originality. Some Catholic members
have gone from this group ~o the Rocardians (following the route of Gilles
riartinet) and others have reclassified themselves and no longer participate in
CERES delegations, while some may have left the Socialist Party.
While the Rocard group appears to be the most Chr~.stian (besides the 42 percent
Catholics, there are 3 perc~nt Protestants, compared with 2 percent foz the
Plitterrand faction, 2 percent in CERES and 3 percent in the Mauroy oroup also),
the group led by Pierre Mauroy claims to be the most atheist (not by far),
inasmuch as two-thirds of its delegates say they have no religion. However,
while the Rocard faction is, internally speaking, the most practicing Catholic,
the weight of that faction in the party does not authorize one to say that the
practicing Catholics in the PS will necessarily be in that group: On the
contrary, while 22 percent of the practicing Catholic members are Rocardians,
45 percent are Mitt2rrandists.
Like Father, Like Son? .
Another distinction having to do with the socialization of inembers is that of
the family political environment. ~We know that the fact of being raised in a
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political family inereases the statisti~al chances of children belonging to
a political party in their turn. The Socialist Party illustrates this tradi-
tional fact of political science. While only 2 to 5 percent of the active
French population belongs to a political party, 28 percent of the delegates to
socialist congresses are the~sons of po~itical party members. The members
of the Mauroy and Mitterrand groups are the most of ten political "heirs"
(32 and 31 percent respectively). This is less often the case with CERES
delegates (20 percent) or Rocardians (19 percent). ~ ~
Even more interesting is the politicaZ coloring of the family milieu, which,
for lack of space, we shall illustrate only through the political orientation ~
of the father.12
Political Orientation of Father Factions
~ Overall Mitterrand Mauroy Rocard CERES
PC 12 13 8 13 10
SFIO [French Section of ~lorkers
International] or PS 33 36 40 21 28
Other left.ist group (or un- 48 53 51 39 41
specif ied lef t) 3 4 . 3 5 3
Radicalism* 6 6 7 8 3
Right 23 17 24 35 29
Unspecif ied 23 24 ~18 18 27
100 100 100 100 100.
* We have left radicalism separate because, based on the age of the members,
the radical orientation of their fathers could have a varying political meaning.
In examining the table, one can see ttiat one out of two of our members have or
had a father who already tended to the left, while only a fourth were inclined
- to the right. This process of political reproduction is particularly clear for
delegates in the Mitterrand and Mauroy groups, with the latter being, more than
any others, deriving from socialist families (40 percent, a particularly high
f igure) .
On the other hand, membership in the Rocard.and CERES groups generally expresses
the individual itinerary of inembers from milieux outside the left. Proportion-
ally speaking, the gains of the PS in membership over rightist family background
grounds theref ore usually come through CERES and even moreso, through the
Rocard group (35 percent of whose members, more than one out of three, have a
rightist father).
Contrasting Political Itineraries
Coming from diffexent social, religious and political milieus, socialists have ~
themselves followed different political itineraries. With the PS, most of
them experience their first party.affiliation, but many have already belonged
to another party, as Lhe following figures show, and the situation is quite
distinct from one group to another.
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- Party Affiliation . Factions
Before the PS . PS Qverall Mitterrand Mauroy .Rocard CERES
~ No previous membership 58 60 47 49 68
pC 2 2 2 - 3
- PSU [Unified Socialist Party] 11 . 6 2 39 11
- Extreme left 1 1 1 2 3
SFIO ~ 14 13, 36 6 9
Convention of Republican �
Institutions (CIR) 9 13 8 4 4
- Other 1 1 1 - -
- Unspecified 4 4 3 - 2
- 100 100 100 100 100~
Those whom Francois Mitterrand once labeled as "sabras" that is, those born
into party life with membership in the PS,, have turned out to be particularly
numerous in the Mitterrand group, but even more numerous and this may be
surprising within CERES (where over two-thirds are.in this case).
The groups re~ain rather strongly marked by militant solidarities formed in
the past. The former SFIO members clearly color the Mauroy following, just
as there are many former PSU members in the Rocard group. These two factions
seem to be the most linked to a po~litical experience previous to the affilia-
tion with the current Sociallst Party.
Over 7 out of 10 former "Conventioneers" (members of the Convention of Repub-
lican Institutions) are now among those headed by the leader they had already
followed during the time of the CIR, Mitterrand, and this is logical. However,
- considering the imposing number of inembers of the party's majority faction,
they now represent only 13 percent of the Mitterrand group in Valence, no more
than former members of the SFIO who turned to that group.
The length of inembership in the PS also reflects the same phenomenon in a way:
While the absolute majority ~(53 percent) of the members of tihe Mauroy faction
joined the party in 1971 (or pxevious to that time), 39 percent of the Mitter-
randists are in that case and only 28 percent of the CERES followers and 21 per-
cent of the Rocardians. It should also be noted that the years of the "great
vintages," as far as recruitment of �the current congress delegates is concerned,
were 1973 (11 percent of the deleg~tes joined that ye~ar) and 1574 (16 percent,
for a year that was both the year of the president~ial ~lec~ion and the meeting
of socialists). -
Two Trade Union Poles: the CFDT and the FEN
Socialist militants are now often trade unionists. Only 15 percent claim not
to be unionized (one should perhaps add~the 5 percent of the delegates who du
not answer thc question).13 Practically on an equal footing, the trade unions
best represented are the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] and
the FEN [iVational Education Federation]. But the figures show a rather wide
~ diversity of union commitments and here again, significant differences from
one group of the party to another.
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Union Affiliation Factions~
_ PS Overall Mitterrand Mauroy Rocard CERES
Not unionized ~ 15 15 19 12 7
CGT 10 11 4 8 14
CFDT 28 19 19 46 47
FO [Workers ForceJ 6 8 12 2 1
FEN 26 33 25 16 15
Other organizations ~ 10 9 13 12 15
- Unspecif ied 5 5 8 4 1
- 100 100 100 100 100
One will note, in fact, to what extent membership in the FEN is dominant within ~
the Mitterrand faction (one out of three Mitterrandists belongs to~an FEN trade
union). The CGT is mainly influential within the Mitterrand group and even
more, in CERES, and for its part, the CFDT is the dominant trade union in two
_ factions, CERES and among the Rocardians; in which it invo.lves one aut of two
members. Only one out of five is a member of the CFDT in the other groups.
Inclination toward or reticence regarding the CFDT are not only ideological
within the factions of the PS. They are embodied in specific, contrasting
trade union practices. ' ~
The F0, which seems to be less and less popular (10 percent of the delegates
at the 1973 congress, 11 percent in 1977, 8 percent in 1979 and 6 percent in
1981), is particularly out of favor with the Rocard and CERES groups and is
mainly influential only within the Mauroy faction because it is less unionized
and it has scarce membership in tl~e CGT.
Originality and Diversities
- In this investigation, socialist membership turns out to be original in French
society. It is both quite type-cast sociologically speaking: The typical
- portrait of the PS member i~ that of a man ,in his prime, with a very high level
of education, on the average, a profession in management or education, raised
in a leftist family, not a churchgoer and belonging to a trade union organiza-
tion; but also plays a role as a hinge, a link between various social, philo-
sophical, polit~.cal and trade union activities. This relatively privileged
individual is often from a humble background. He is increasingly from a
family background outside the ~ocialist tradi,tion. He frequents Christian .
members more than the socialist of days gone by aud in his section or his fac-.
tion, he finds members from unions other than his own.
This originality and, at~the same time, this relative diversity of PS members
is reflected in the existence or diverse~"sensitivities" or factions within the
pa~ty. Compared with.1973, the sociology and personal experience result in
less opposition between the internal~factions. With the aid of party recruit-
ing and a shared political lif e, the:factions look less different from one
~ another than they did a few years ago.
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It is certainly not an accident, however, if the Mauroy faction is closer to
a tradition inherited from the SFIO, with members on the average a little older
and predominantly male, recruited less from upper-level personnel and more
frequently from a socialistic family and a socialist milieu who usually went
through the SFIO themselves, with an atheist perspective and more sensitive to
the FO than the.GGT. '
Nor is it any accident if the Rocardians and the members of CERES seem to be
younger, less socialized .by leftist families, usually graduates of educations ~
of higher l~arning, more tempted by the commitment to the CFDT, but having ~
differences between them, mainly religious, sometimes social origins and the
political trajector~ that led them to the PS (membership in the PSU stil.l
clearly marking the Rocard group).
Nor is it any accident, finally, if the majority Mitterrand faction is in a
central sociological position, generally with figures close to those of the
party average, while being a little higher here and~there regarding the pre-
sence of women, for.example, liberal arts graduates, teachers or members of the
FEN.
This is so true that if the now dormant'factions that makP up the Socialist
Party are theoretically based on political and ideological orientations,
sociology and solidarities born of the militant experience help them in turn
to endure and keep going. But is.the existence of factions, so dangerous ~
elsewhere when it turns into pure personality struggTes, not also a means
of diversifying the systems of influence and recruitment of a pluralistic
party?
FOOTNOTES
1. Roland Cayrol: "Members of the Socialist Party: Contribution to a
Sociology," based on a study made at the Grenoble congress of the PS in
June 1973, PROJET, No 88, September- October 1974, pp 929-940.
2. In particular, the IFOP [French Public Opinion Institute] at the Nantes
congress in June 1977. See SONDAGES, Nos 2-3, 1978, pp 97-108, and
Paul Bacot at the Metz congress in Apri1 1979. See UNITE, No 380, 1980
(and the data presented by this researcher to the Socia.liGm Study Group,
French Political Science Association, 6 June 1980).
3. Study on parties from 12 European countries, headed by Karlheinz Reif
(University of Mannheim) and Roland Cayrol.
4. Our questionnaire was filled out by 669 delegates in Valence.
5. Let us note in passing that the rate of militant activity seems down in
the PS. In 1973, 51 percent of the delegates said they devoted over 20
hours a month to party activities. The proportion�was 66 percent in 1981.
6. Theoretically speaking, there were no factions set up on the occasion of
the Valence congress. But we asked delegates to the congress to tell us
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- Ghat faction th2y had chosen at the Metz congress. For the sake of easy
reading, we shall not designate here the faCtions of the PS by the letters
corresponding to the Metz motions, but by confining ourselves to the
four main gro~ups, by their custama.ry labels: Mitterrand, Mauroy, Rocard
and CERES.
7. Women represented 8 percent of~the PS candidates in the legislative elec-
tions of June 1981. See A. Guede, S. A. Itozenblum: "Candidates in the
. Legislative Elections of 1978 and 1981," REWE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLI-
TIQUE, Oct-Dec 19$1.
8. See Roland Cayrol, Jean-Luc Parodi, Colette Ysmal, "Le�Depute Francais;"
A. Colin, 1970.
9. Some 23 percent have a secondary educatiorl, 11 percent a technical or
commercial education, 6 percent elementary.
10. In our questionnaire, the question was thus formula.ted (in 1981, as in
1973): "No matter what type of education you received, may we ask you if
you now consider yourself as a: practi~ing Catholic, a nonpracticing
Catholic, of another religion (specify) or ha�ving no religion.
11. It will be remembered that the holding of the Meeting of Socialism, pre-
vious to the entry into tHe PS of most members of this faction, da~es
- from Octobsr 1974. ~
12. Our question was as follows: "When you were a child, did your father
and mother belong to a political.group? If yes, which one? If no,
to what party were they the closest?"
- 13. The proportion of nonunion members was 32 percent in 1973.
COPYRIGHT: by CERAS, 15, rue R.-Marcheron, 92170 Vanves April 1982
11,464 ' ,
CSO: 3100/639.
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- POLITICAL FRANCE
THEMES FOR COMMISSI~N ON PLANNING REFORM EXAMINID
Paris FUTURIBLES in Frenct~ Mar 82 pp 59-71
[Article in FORUM: "Reform of French Planning"]
[Text] A commission for reform of French planning has
just been set up by the Miniater of Planning and National
and Regional Development with a view to developing a draft
law reforming the procedures, methods and content of
French planning.
In his letter to Mr Christian Goux, chairman of that co~-
mission, Mr Michel Rocard pointed aut six categories of
essential questians for study by six working groups.
These working groups examine the views of the central com-
mission, which itself should draw up:
--A provisional report (10 March) to be used for prepar-
- ing the draft law to be presented to parliament a~ the
spring session;
--A f inal report (end of June) whose proposals will be
- used for drawing up the future 5-year plan.
Taking into account French planning tradition and in
conformity with the new situation resulting particnlarly
from decentralizatior. and the extension of the public
sector, the reform under way raises numerous questions
whose importance will not be lost on readers of
FUTURIBLES.
_ Therefore we publish below a brief introduction to the
subjects which the General Planning Commissariat has pro-
posed for study by the reform comm:Lssion. In a future
issue we shall try to give an account of the commission's
conclusions. Until that time, we are sure that our
- readers' reactions could usefully contribute to accom-
- plishment of a totally essential reform.
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The Field and Functior.s of Planning
The first task of the commission is to examine all the conditions which
since 1945 have been peculiar to French planning and to establiF,h the extent
to which these conditions remain valid and how they have been madified by
_ the structural changes under way (decentralization, nationalizations, work-
ers' rights). It appears that, within current limitations, the require-
ments for drawing up the future 5-year plan are that it be based on the
concept of a national plan in an open economy, its content adapted to a
system of mixed economy, and its character indicative of its great economic
and social objectives.
Considering the international environment and its hazards, and raking into
account the structural changes which have occurred, or will occu~, what
should be the area and functions of planning?
One must first def ine how desirable it is for�the plan to aspire to include
all the econo~ic, social and cultural changes which today can be foreseen
or brought about.
The planning project is by its nature inclusive. It tends toward an exhaus-
tive presentation of a11 the problems confronting a society at a given stage
of its development. It is based on future projections whose purpose is to
identify the long-range changes foreseeable in the most diverse areas of
social and cultural lif e. A f irst problem, related to this concern for con-
trolling or orienting long-range developments, is to know what is correctly
to be included in the plan. For example, the real implications of "plan-
ning" cultural development, the sociocultural aspects of daily life or
even of changes in the demand for services, and what does such planning
embrace? Are there not areas which should remain outside the planning proc-
ess although they can be subject to long-range studies? Can long-range
- studies, indispensable f or identifying the plan's problems and objectives, be
- based on, or composed of, long-term pro~ections? Should they give more
place to the systematic study of the changing and permanent aspects of life-
styles, behavior and values? And why? To avoid confusion it seems appro-
priate to set forth three interrelated steps in the planning process: that
of identif ication of problems, based on long-term considerations and
= dependent on the freedom to carry it out in future; that of definit3.on of
the mid-term objectives, which takes place under the control of the political
authority and sets up the cor~tent of the plan; and that of choosing means
- which the plan can provide or recommend.
This f irst question about the f ield of planning and its possible extension
to the whole of social life leads to reflection on the conditions for a
fully democratic cancept of planning, even before defining the plan's
objectives. If it is indispensable to assign the roles of parliament, the
social partners, the economic agencies and the decentralized collectivities
equitably, it seems no less necessary to base the dialogue on a joint,
complete, clear and, no doubt, conflicting knowledge of the forecasts,
none of whose methods of establishment, means or results can in future be
an administrative monopoly. This assumes, f irst, that conditions will tse
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- established for freer access to the forecasts; then, that the mid-term
forecasts (macroeconomic balances, social indicators) will be discussed
prior to the selection of ob~ectives. Without such a discussion, without
seeking agreement on a prognosis af development, or on certain of its
results, the extended dialogue on which the definition of objectives will
be based would be deprived of some of its significance.
- An open discussion of the f orecasts--and in general of all the assunptions
on which the plan is based--is the more necessary since their future credi-
- bility will be put to the test by a chronic instability of the international
environment. ~ao problems in particular should be posed in that connection:
--On the eff ects on the development of the national plan arising from the
open economy in France, and particularly from its membership in the EEC;
--On the opportuneness and the value of a plan based on assumptions and on
quantif ied objectives, since the growth rate, the inflation rate, the evolu-
tion of foreign disequilibrium and the exchange rate cannot be forecast
for a period of 5 years with suff icient accuracy.
If it appears that certain economic and social objectives--which ones?--can
and should be expressed numerically, under what conditions should they be
quantif ied? In which areas, and under what conditions, will it be possible
to plan and quantify the actions chosen ta achieve the plan's objectives?
_ The new conditions for planning also lead to questions about plan duration.
Is a fixed and uniform 5-year framework, covering an identical period of
development for all the sectors and for all the planning elements, still
suitable? Some of the choices made in the interim plan, and its recent
development, tend to call into question a single framework for f ixing simul-
taneously attainable ob~ectives.
The 5-year framework for fixing objectives is not appropriate in certain
' areas--in particular those of energy, defense and research. The develop-
ment strategies to be conceived~ and their implementation, require the
definition of long-term objectives whose coordination with the plan should
- be defined under different conditions.
In other areas--particularly all those directly concerned with the imgle-
mentation of economic and social strategy--the 5-year framework for fixing
objectives, matched with a fixed term, has become an uncertain, or not
easily usable, reference point. When changes on the world scene put the
initial fcrecasts into question, that leads to either the objectives, or
their terms and fulf illment deadlines, being brought into question during
the period of execution. They can be adapted, either by using a floating
plan, or by including floating programs in a"fixed" plan, or by estab-
lishing a formal pracedure for revision during the course of plan imple-
mentation.
In any hypothesis, if it is wished for the future plan to leave nothing out
in examining and coor3inating national sectoral p~licies (with variable
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terms) and regional plans, it is important for it to be able to ~oin together
f lexibly different or variable time frames, the 5-year plan thus being
thought of more as a conventional reference for forecast and coordination
- than as having an inviolable pericd of implementation.
Strengthened in its function of coordinating and establishing a common
project by expanding the dialogue and bq defining the procedures for con-
tractual execution,should the plan furthermore be strengthened in its
juridical scope, or~more exactly, given the force of law by the adoption of
a legislative mechanism separate from the report itself? That poss3bility
ought to be examined in connection with the effects of decentralization and
the consequences of developing the system of plan contracts.
The law on the rights and liberties of communes, departments and regions has
already provided that the measures of the policy for national and regional
development which regulate economic intervention by territorial collectivi-
ties would be included in the law approving the plan. Articles 3 and 4 of
the law approving the intermediate plan anticipate such an arrangement.
Should not, or could not, legal means be provided to make the measures which
commit the state and the contractual and decentralized planning powers-- .
but not those involving the state itself--obligatory, and hence susceptible
to legal sanction?
Such a 3uridical evolution and the conditions under which it will or will not
integrate regional plans--possibly infraregional ones--perhaps even all the
contractual provisions for implementation with collectivities and public
enterprises should be contained in the plan itself. The problem of the
juridical scope of the plan should have different solutions, depending on
whether the "plan" will be a single national plan, or a combination of all
the national, regional and local plans, or a combination of all the plans
and joint couanitments.
Public Administration and the Plan
There are two aspects to the problem of relations between public administra-
tions and the plan. On the one hand, there is the problem of the ministries
adopting real internal planning which is a precondition to coordinating a
national plan. Or? the other hand, there is the problem of whether provisions
of the plan, voted by parliament, can be opposed by these same administra-
tions.
This problem is posed under new conditions, just mentioned, resulting from
the development of decentralized planning and plan contracts. In practice,
in more operative conditions it will arise especially if the conditions of
the plan's development and the strengthening of parliament's role in con-
trolling its execution and follow through work toward guaranteeing respect
for the original measures in the context of annual budgeting.
Without calling for lengthy exposition in the i~ediate future, it is impor-
tant to recall the few ma~or questiona which require profound study.
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The first of the major questions concerns the priority tasks of the state in
- democratic, cor.tractual and decentralized planning. It is up to the state
to def ine, f irst, the conditions for macroeconomic co4rdination and to set
the priorities to be followed in the matter of collective functions and
social contributions. It will also be incumbent on the state to see to it
that there i~ mutual compatib~lity in the provisions of the regional plans
and that they are compatible with the national plan. The state is also
responsible for securing respect for its own commitments as regards collec-
tivities and public enterprises as well as the social partners. What means
should it use, to which procedures should it'have recourse, on what institu-
tions should it be based? This is the f irst series of problems.
A second question concerns the areas and conditions in which certain provi-
sions of the plan can in fact apply to the government services responsible
for their execution. Can the plan cantain, or provide for, annual commit-
ments f or expenditures for ministerial departments? Under what conditions
should the laws on projects be subordinate to the provisions of the [localJ
plan? In applying the plan, can one prescribe the execution of the adminis-
trations' contractual engagements? Can the plan include norms for region-
alization of the use of budgetary resources, either in conformity with the
space the plan devotes to each ob3ective or in applying the prioritiea of
the national policy for national and regional development? What procedures
will be available to ensure that the development of social contributions and
their f inancing conforms to the ob~ectives of the plan?
Finally, a third, more basic, question concerns the specific role of the
Ministry of Planning and National and Regional Development in developing
and implementing the f inance law, particularly concerning financing contracts
" and the regional division of credits. It is mentioned here ta put it on
record.
Decentralization and Planning
Decentralization cannot be reduced to a transfer of executive power to the
departments and regions, nor to a transfer of authority between s~ate and
territorial collectivities, nor to a new way of dividing public resources,
nor even to a combination of these three kinds of administrative change.
It is a dynamic process which tray perhaps cause a new developmental logic
to be brought into play. This dynamic finds its clearest exgression and best
application in infraregional, regional and national planning; in the integra-
tion of projects created by a multiplicity of decisionmaking centers.
Although still an unfinished creation, decentralization will profoundly
change the conditions for drawing up and implementing the national plan.
Its being brought :into play, and its being taken into consideration, in
the planning process at once raises six orders of problems of which,
beginning this year, a number should find a clear institutional solution in
the law on planning reform.
First, there is the question of def ining the conditions of dialogue between
state and regions in preparing the national plan, whatever its nature.
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Regional consultation obviously cannot be asaured by means of a simple
questionnaire comb ined with the inclusion of a limited number of regional
leaders in the preparation and execution of the national plan. It must be
carried out by the regions themselves, in direct contact with the off icials
responsible for preparing and implementing the regional plans. There are
thus grounds for foreseeing and defining the procedures for a national
decentralized consultation, and one might wonder if that consultation should
not be mutual, involv~ing, in return for the views of the regions, an
evaluation by the state of the consequences of the choices made in regional
planning. Because of the very strong connection which can exist between
the execution of the national plan and all the regional plans, one can also
wonder if after their deliberations the regional leaders should not express
an overall view on the hoped-for orientations of the national plan.
There is also the matter of asking oneself about the conditions for defining
and putting into operation the national policy for national and territorial
development, whose normative and stimulative content will be profoundly
changed--outside the minimum body of its permanent principles--by putting
regional plans into operation. In fact, because they will differ in the
- volume of resources mobilized, in their content and in their quality,
regional plans could bring about new forms of uneven regional development
which, should such a thing happen, it would be desirable to correct by new
means.
A third uncertainty stems from the nature of regional plans, which can vary
independently of the conditions of development stipulated by law. Will
they be simple programs for investment and localization of activities,
setting forth in a multiyear framework the terms for the use of domestic
or external resources to finance projects falling under the direct authority
of the regions?
Beyond this limited concept, will they be real developmental strategies?
- Furthermore, what will be the procedures for associating the departments or
groupings of collectivities with the drawing up of regional plans? Will,
or will not, these plans integrate the operations programmed in the outlines
of city planning, in the glans for rural development, and, in general, in
all the documents for physical planning which apply to any part of national
territory? If there is such integration, a~:cording to what procedures?
These are some of the basic questions raised by regional plans, an important
further question being whether they will be obligatory or optional.
The development of infraregional planning is a new, important source of
innovations. No doubt it can be taken as certain that this planning, based
on [local] initiative, will be optional. Under such conditions, should it
develop within the framework of permanent zaning (scientif ically necessary
for a number of considerations) or, on the contrary, can it be based on
voluntary or temporary zonings, according to specific forms of spatial
- organization? When infrareg~onal planning does take place, will it be
obligatAry for the regions to take it into consideration? Or, to the con-
trary, may it call for direct dialogue and direct contracting witr. the state?
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Still, in effectively decentralized planning, relations between the national
plan and the regional plans are the most difficult problem to handle. What-
ever their nature, regional plans will influence the definition of the
national plan and it would not be consistent with the nature of the plan ta
a~.low autonomous regional plans to develop at the outset without enlighteni.ng
their leaders about the chances for effective implementation of their ob3e~-
tives. It is therefore necessary to def ine the conditions under which the
state can ensure the compatibility of all the regional plans:
--With the macroeconomic consistency of the na'tional plan;
--With the prioritiea of national sectoral policies;
--With the national policy for regional and national development (see
above).
If regional plans require state arbitration of their contractual implementa-
tion, under what conditions will such arbitration take place? In fact, it
is important that, without resorting to any form whatsoever of direct or
indirect administrative supervision, the state should be able to: temper
the effects of the competition in which regional efforts may become~involved;
guarantee the ~oint and simultaneous achievement of regional plans; ensure
the conformity of regional aims with the objectives of national sectoral �
_ policies; and def ine as well as possible the field of contractual action
between state and regions. This new function, whose resources it remains
to def ine, ia the key to the success of decentralized planning.
It remains to define the type and content of the plant contract which state
and decentralized planning authorities will be led to negotiate and sign.
In this connection, is it necessary to set forth a juridical formula which
limits possibilities or which pei-mits a great number of them to coexist?
Just f or a start, there is a wide variety of possibilities. One might think
that plan contracts could be signed with interregional groupings, with regions
or with the microplanning authorities. They could bear on all the regional
territory, or on certain zones of the latter; they could be content with
def ining ob~ectives or they could designate coumion resources; they could
be implemented within variable time limits (from 1 to 10 years); or they
could be bilateral or interministerial. Supposing it were necessary (and
possible) to organize this diversity, what would be the best way to proceed? ,
Is some authority for ratifying all these contracts necessary, inaking it
possible to verify the conf ormity of their provisions with the national plan
and with regional plans? Is it possible that, after consultations with all
the regional leaders, the national plan should f ix the priority, or exclusive
areas, for contractual implementation of regional plans? These are some of
the methodological questions posed by the contractual implementation of
plans in relation to territorial collectivities.
~lanning and Productive Activities
The association of productive activities with future planning and their .
consideration in national, regional and local plans is based on new
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procedures for associating the working sector with the development of these
plans, with the emergence of a more favorable environment for enterprises
and with the development of contractual f ormulas for execution. The new
provisions organize a dialogue at the diff erent planning levels and seek an
effective link between collective negotiations and the plan's provisions
to serve as a reference point and to contribute to securing the introduction
of productive activities, their strategy and their objectives into the whole
process of planning under the best conditions and the planning of these
activities at the sectoral, branch or enterprise levels.
This pro~ect requires an improvement in economic and technical information
about the production apparatus and eff ective dissemination of this informa-
tion to all the planning partners. The definition of new conditions and the
role of.economic information is an important basis for intervention of
productive activities in the planning process.
It is a responsibility of the plan to def ine the general conditions of the
enterprises' activities and their environment. In this regard one wonders
if, for the implementation period, its role will include defining the regula-
tions governing aid to productive activities (investments, local development,
exports, consolidation of sectors in diff iculty).
The future plan will not have the purpose nor the objective of planning all
productive activities. In this area, planning tritervention should reff?ain
selective, and be applied according to the individual case, to branches, to
types of enterprise, or, in a manner at the same time most general and
most precise, to technologies. The role of the ministerial departments con-
cerned is, in consultation with the planning and coordinating authorities,
t~ identify the sectors, enterprises or technologies where specific inter-
vention is justif ied in terms of national ob~ectives. For all that, state
intervention can be general or it can be specif ic. It can be integrated
into an overall developmental strategy of activities in such and such a
sector, or contribute to the achievement of specific objectives of modern-
ization, of conversion, or of starting up new products for export. Selec-
tion of areas f or intervention and def inition of specific procedures for
assistance is a task for each plan. It is to be hoped that it is based on
new methods of coordination. The formula of tripartite branch committees
provided for in the interim plan could serve as a model in that regard.
It would be appropriate to ascertain, through trial, that it is best suited
to collective drawing up of national sectoral policy proposals for produc-
tive activities.
There remains the question of p~an contracts. First, one should ask what
will be the content and the basis for contract reciprocity that the
stockholder-state will conclude with public sector enterprises. i~1i11 the
provisions of the contracts be f inal or subject to revision, exhaustive
or selective, indicative or mandatory? Under what conditions will indepen-
dent management of contracting enterprises be reconciled with adherence to
the plan's objectives? What will be the legal and financial consequences
of their possible nonfulf illment?
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Furthermore, and asi3e from the problem of plan contracts, there is the ques-
tion of the contractual relations the state may f~rm with private enter-
prises. Should, and could, there be such contracts? With reference to the
plan's ob3ectives, what would be the content of such contracts?
Finally, assuming a rapid extension of decentralized planning to the develop-
ment of productive activities, under what conditions should the regions be
_ involved in the conclusion of plan contracts with enterpri$es or take the
initiative in contractual relations with enterprises within their area of
responsibility?
The Financial Instruments f or Implementing the Plan
The definition and use of f inancial instruments for implementation.of the
plan should be examined, taking into account three factors of change which
apply equally to implementation of future national and regional glans.
First, in financing the economy full advantage should be taken of the conse-
quences of nationalization of credit which have thus far been touched on
only in a general way. Then, account should be taken of developments in
- the thinking on reform of f inancing networks. Finally, consideration should
be given to the reform plans under discussion concerning possible region-
alization of f inancing of productive investments, even of the collective
plants mentioned during the discussion of the draft law on decentralization.
Three ma~or questions should be examined in relation to these anticipated
or planned developments:
--The first concerns the f inancing of productive activities: One must know
to what extent and under what conditions the plan could fix rules for the
allncation of f inancial resources among the major sectors of activity,
even among contracting and noncontracting enterprises in order to guarantee
the latter nondiscriminatory access to the outside resources they need.
--The second concerns the f inancing of public investments in collective
plants, whose planning will be an important part of the f inancial commit-
ments of the national plan and, above all, of regional plans. In thie con-
nection~it is desirable to know whether the plan can guarantee access of
territorial collectivities to specialized loans needed for the financing of
regional or local plans, and, if so, under what conditions.
- --The third concerns the eventual delineation of arbitration procedures as
_ a condition for attribution of these resources, if the latter are found to
- be insufficient for the f inancial needs of the enterprises and territorial
collectivities.
Planning Partners
The theme of ciemocratization of the plan transcends all others. It is
expressed, first, by an extension of procedurea for dialogue in the regions,
in the urban areas, in the countryside or employment centers, in the produc-
tive activities at the level of branches as well as at the workplaces
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themselves, and, therefore, by the appearance of a new network of partners.
~ The plan's priority task will be to register and compare the suggestions,
and organize mutual exchange of information.
Reference has already been made several timea to this needed appearance of
new proceedings for dialogue, requiring new partners. In this connection
the following can be cited:
--The necessity for open debate on the forecasts, baaed on a multiplicity
of sources and on free access of the groupings of territorial and depart-
mental collectivities in the development of.regional plans;
--Inclusion of the regions in preparing the national plan under conditions
differing from previous consultative procedures;
--Consultation with all the territorial collectivities (deliberative and
consultative bodies) on the options concerning national and regional
_ development;
' --The preparation of sectoral political choices in productive activities
within branch tripartite committees, or comparable bodies;
--Development of contracting procedures between: state-regions; state-
territorial collectivities; state-enterprises;
--Necessary coordination of collective negotiations with the plan's ob~ec-
tives and provisions.
All these new provisions in themselves constitute a new sharing of power
which secures more influence in the whole planning process for the decen-
tralized planning agents and the social partners. This should result in the
state having strengthened means of execution, arbitration and follow-through
at its disposition. Institutional procedures and adjustments should be
created, taking into account the increase in the number of partners and the
diversity of their possible intervention, giving full expression to the
demacratization of the plan. Several questions should be raised in this
connection.
--The f irst concerns the process of preparing the plan: Should the princi-
ple of a two-phase preparation b~ maintained. and i.f so, how can the dialogue
between state and regions be organized under the best circumstances? Should
regional plans themselves be prepared in two phases so that a better coordi-
- nation with the national plan can be secured on the initiative of the
regions?
--What should be the functional relations between the consultative authori-
ties for regional planning and the national comnission (or comuunissions)?
Must the law define for all the regions mandaEory procedures for associating
the social partners in the preparation of regional plans?
--Can the preparation of the national plan be based on ad hoc and temporary
structures as in the former system of co~itteea and commissions? Or, on
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the contrary, should it be taken over by a permanent agency, for example
the Economic and Social Council and its sectiona, whose co~position and
powers could be amended?
--Will the structures for dialogue: national, sectoral, regional or local
be actively associated only with the preparation of the plan or, on the
~ contrary, with the whole of its execution and follow-through? In the latter
. circumstances, and by way of illustration:
--What would be the bases and the authority for a periodic dialogue between
the social partners and the public authorities concerning the observed and
~ contemplated develo~ments in prices?
--Under what conditions could the trade union organizations be present in
the negotiation of plan contracts and be eocial partners in the regions,
associated with the preparation of state-region contracts?
In the same spirit and w~atever may be the form of organization of dialogue
on the national plan, sho~ld not the preparers of the plan be associated
with its follow-through?
It remains to clarify the role of parliament in a process wh~ch, in advance
of the legislative debate, calls for thoroughgoing consultation between the
elected representatives, the social partners and the economic agents. In
this regard it may be feared that the preeminence accorded parliament by the
f inal vote on the plan may become rather ceremonial if, according to its
role and ob3ective, the plan effectively integrates a number of suggestione
from the consultative authorities and decentralized decisions. It may be
that parliament will participate directly in the preparation of the plan
prior to the debate on ratification of decisions and the vote on the law.
It is appropriate, moreover, to reflect on the meana for an effective
parliamentary control over the execution of the plan. The interim plan
outlined some sol~utions in this direction. Can these be considered satis-
factory and thus transferable to the future plan?
[Box 1]
Extract from the letter from Mr Michel Rocard, Minister of Planning and
National and Regional Development, to Mr Christian Goux, President of the
Commission for Reform of Planning:
"The Government considers the reform of planning as an essential element in
the structural changes on which, during the next few years, a pervasive
transformation of French society wfll be founded.
"The plan should be the instrument for the needed mastery of the national
economy. It is indispensable for the good management of a mixed system of
economy having a broad and innovative public sector. The market cannot
~ suffice to determine the desirable thrust and directions for the future.
"Such a plan, the elaboration of which will be based on the broadest par-
- ticipation of the elected representatives, the social partners and the
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enterprises, will be wholly democratic. It will guarantee free~~oms against
bureaucratic encroachments. It will stimulate the initiative of local
collectivities as well as the spirit of enterprise.
'~It will also be a cohesive agent in assuring the joint and compatible
elaboration and execution of regional and local plans, and fixing the
framework of contractual relations between the state and the large enter-
prises.
"Based on social dialogue, it will transform fatalistic denial and resigna-
tion in the face of a crisis and its senseless effects.
"To respond to all these requirements, we should think again about the
methods as well as the means af planning.
"The interim plan, approved by parliament, has already def ined new methods
of implementation and follow-through. The strengthening of the role of
parliament, the widening of dialogue, the extension of contracting prac-
tices, and the economic intervention of territorial collectivities will
give the plan an effective role and influence in implementing the economic,
social and cultural policy of the government.
"The future 5-year plan will be based on the changes which decentrali~ation,
extension of the public, banking and productive sector, and the extension of
workers' rights will introduce into national life. In its concept, it should
be better adapted to an open economic situation and take advantage of all
the consequences of the development of real regional and local planning.
That is the reason why the government will aubmit to parliament in the spring
of 1982 a dr.aft law fixing the objectives and method of planning, particularly
in its rea~ltions with the planning of enterprises and local collectivities.
"This reform requires extensive preparatory work, with the close cooperation
of planning experts and leaders in social, economic and cultural life. I
thus hope to install near me a Commission for reform of planning, whose
work and proposals will assist me in preparing the new law and clarify the
conditions for applying it."
[Box 2]
Extract from the speech by Michel Rocard. Minister of State, Minister of
Planning and National and Territorial Development, to the National Assembly
during the presentation of the interim plan, 11 December 1981:
"We want the plan to regain its capacity and its role of stimulator of
imaginations, wills and energies around a great national ambition. It
should again become the expression of a grand design that the country takes
upon itself. We shall accord it this outstanding place when political,
economic and social decisions cease to be the concern of a few ministers
and their offices but are understood, recognized and taken over by the ~Tital
forces and elected repreaentatives of the nation."
COPYRIGHT: Asaociation Internationale Futuribles 1982
9772
CSO: 3100/545 34 .
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POLITICAL SPAIN
PSOE ACTS TO IMPROVE ITS STANDING WITH MILITARY
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 10 May 82 pp a5-36
[Text] The keys to defense policy and funding for the armed forces have started
a national debate, with a confrontation between the government and the opposi-
tion, although the possibility of success in the upcoming general elections
moderates the position of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party [PSOE].
It is the military compromise for the next 8 years.
The beginning of parliamentary discussions on the armed forces funding plan
for the next 8 years and the presentation of the defense policy by Defense Minister
Alberto Oliart have brought about a fundamental political debate between the
government and the opposition, tempered by the 23-F trial of the coup leaders.
Following a meeting held by Minister Oliart and the president of the Council
of the Chiefs of Staff, (PREJUJEM) Alvaro Lacalle Leloup, with PSOE leader Felipe
Gonzalez and some of his collaborators, the socialists maintain their opposition
to the budget bill on funding for investments and support for the armed forces,
but they neither presented an amendment to the total, nor did they support the
existing funding.
The opposition's disagreement with the government's bill is primarily centered
- in the uncertainty on where and how the 2.15 trillion pesetas will be spent
through 1990, in which armed forces personnel costs apparently are not included,
but are treated separately.
From the ranks of the Righ.*., in cautious language, there is talk of a lack of
true parliamentary control over the development of such a long program of these
dimensions for national ife.
The PSOE, with expectations of coming to power in the near future, is under-
going a process of strengthening its ties with the actual powers. This curbs
more radical opposition, which could be interpreted in military circles as an
attitude critical of the armed forces.
- With the outlook for coming to power in the next general elections, however,
the socialists have becoine convinced that the existence of a bill such as this
covering 8 years, if passed now by parliament, would greatly facilitate their
relations with the armed forces.
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L'Vl\ V11'11,1t1L UJL' V1VL1
The government and the military commands claim security reasons and long-term
- planning in order to justify the absence of specificity in the bill that will
now begin to be debated in parliamentary procedure.
The bill presented by the government, which includes 10 articles and 3 final
dispositions, is thus defined in its presentation: "It indicates the minimum
- budgetary appropriations that will be available to the Defense Ministry from
1982 to 1990, in order to make the most urgent investments, as well as for all
sorts of acquisitions and expenses intended for the support of the armed forces."
The document further adds that the indicated figures may be increased "as circum-
stances permit."
But aside from purely economic considerations, the utilization of this bill
- is inserted within the general outline of the defense policy that Minister Oliart,
' accompanied by three generals, presented to parliamentarians of the Defense
" Commission last week.
A defense policy with a clear Atlantic orientation, described as follows by
the minister in the situation analysis: "Today the Western World is threated
by the Warsaw Pact, and, in the face of this threat, we see its defense in the
framework of the Atlantic Alliance, because only the survival of a free Europe
can guarantee Spain's survival within the model of life under democratic freedom
that has been chosen by the Spanish people."
In regard to the imporr_ance of our geostrategic position, this analysis calls
for "Spain to assume a strategic role of worldwide importance, because the zone
is of worldwide importance."
The document developed by Oliart's cabinet makes specific reference to the deli-
cate situation with the Hassan regime in Morocco, and the concern that the Spanish
garrisons in North Africa, Ceuta and Melilla, could be the objects of armed
aggression. This is a priority defense ob~ective on armed forces charts, where
aggression is considered most likely.
Indicating North Africa, Oliart says: "We are concerned about the instability
of some political regimes. The indirect strategy of the USSR could endanger
our territorial integrity, to a considerable degree exploiting possible states
of tension in that geographic zone."
The defense policy foreseen by the Spanish Government puts special emphasis
- on the need to "guarantee control of the axis Balearic Islands-Gibraltar-Canary
Islands."
"A military force established on this axis," according to the analysis, "pro-
duces the following direct effects:
--It makes Spain assume a strategic role of worldwide importance, because the
zone is of worldwide importance.
--It tends to guarantee national territorial integrity.
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--It facilitates the recovery of Gibraltar through negotiation.
--And it prepares us to face the inevitable implications of a generalized conflict."
In order to develop defense and military policy, there is a need to modernize
and strengthen our armies in all areas from personnel to materiel, with highly
sophisticated arms, operative systems, etc.
Altogether, these elements ~uppose, in fact, the beginning of a great national
debate on technology and Spanish defense, on the reorganization and capacity
of the armed forces now muddled by the 23-F trial of the coup leaders. In some
respects this event detracts from the debate and its natural contours. As a
consequence, it demands greater effort by the government, the political parties
and the armed forces themselves to regain a normality that would permit the
modernization of one of Spain's neediest sec.tors.
COPYRIGHT: 1982, Informacion y Revistas, S.A.
9746
CSO: 3110/141
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P OLI TICAL ~
SPAIN
CEOE'S SALAT FORESEES SLOW ECONOMIC RECOVERY
Paris LATITUDE AiiJOURD'HUI in French May 82 p 4
[Interview with Carlos F~:rrer Salat, president of the CEOE]
[Text] [Question] How 3o y~~u view S~ain's forthcoming membership iZ the
Common Market?
_ [Answer] The CEOE is in favor of its membership, but not at any price. An
agreement acceptable to the two parties must be found. The ~egotiations are
undergoing some difficulties at present, largely because of the EEC's inter-
nal problems. ~
The current crisis is probably responsible for the fiact that the community
- has adopted an equivocal position and one that is thu~ unacceptable to Spain.
As for becoming part of the community industrially--an area in which it is
much stronger than Spain--t}ie community would like to see a rapid integration,
in 2 to 3 years--for instance, by lifting customs dutiea and providing for
free circula tion of industrial goods. In the agricultural field, however,
the co~unity is asking for a period of 10 years before spain is fully in-
_ corporated, since it views Sp~nish products as a problem. The third important
point involves the circulation of labor under the Treaty of Rome. Here, too,
the co~mun ity is asking f~~r 10 or more years. Finally, on the subject of
taxes and application of tile value-added tax (VAT), which takes 12 years to
p~st inr_o practice, the community is demanding that Spain put it into effect
from the very beginning.
~ Naturally, this pasition would be damaging not only to Spain but to Europe as
we~l. I think that it is in Europe's interest to have new members in a
health conditiona �
We believe that there should be a single timetable for industrial, agricultural
and fiscal members}?ip, o,�~~r a period of 10 years. .
Moreover, it is oiir vi~w that the period required for incorporation i.nto the
community in the area of labor could be reduced. The free circulation of
labor i~ more a theoretical than a practicsl dan~er for the EEC countries.
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[Question] Is Spanish i~dustry competitive with its future European partners?
[Answer] Spa~n's probl~m is that its system of industrial production and
business in general has been founded, set up and developed exclusively on
rhe basis of the domestic market, unlike British industry, for exa.mple.
Also, for Spain to adapt to its new situation, it will have to overcome the
_ economic crisis--as will the other European countries, as well--and complete-
ly change its production system.
~ Productivity of Spanish firms in the 70's amounted to about 40 percent of
that of the community countries, on the basis of production per worker. The
- situation has improved, but naw we are only up to 70 percent of the European
average. Productivity cannot be computed on the basis oF averages, of
course. There are export sectors that are competitive. In any event, this
70 pzrcent of productivity is only a numerical response to the question of
_ our competitive capacity. In the industrial area, one factor is important,
and that is technology. Spain made an effort to modernize the entire system
_ to reach the 70-percent figure.
Now ~e have to make a major effort to adapt. Another aspect of the problem
is that Spain had a highly closed production system for 40 years, with [gov-
ernmentJ intervention in all areas: labor was immobilized, the financial
system was immobilized, etc. Another basic objective is to loosen the mech-
anisms of government intervention.
[Question] How would you describe Spain's current economic situa.tion?
[Answer] Spain's situation differs in several ways trom that of the Western
- countries. Spain shares the crisis in the fields of oil and energy, but
there are two factors that differentiate our country from the rest of
Europe. On the one hand, Spain had to adjust to a change in its political
and social system, to shift from the previous authoritarian regime to demo-
cracy, and that entailed an extra mental effort and also a period of uncer-
tainties that lasted for quite a while--the time needed to adjust to new ways,
_ new social forces, labor unions, the new political regime, etc. These are
problems that the rest of Europe faced immediately follawing World War II.
- Moreover, our economy had to undergo a complete change from a closed to an
- open system.
[Question] What are your short- and medium-term economic forecasts?
[Answer] We are predicting a s lightly better year in 1982 than in 1931.
Inflation is slawing down and the national product is slightl} on the rise--
. grawing at about 2 percent. Farming is also improving somewhat, as are con-
struction, tourism and exportso The important issue, however, is unemploy-
ment~ Theoretically, there are 1,8 million unemployed workers at present,
although in fact the figure is lowero Employment will probably decline
slightly this year but not by as much as last year. My forecast, therefore,
is moderately positive in comparison with 1981.
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[Ques*ion] What is your opinion of the Spanish Government's current economic
policy?
[Answer] It has positive and negative aspects. The government is doing
pretty well in its effort to increase productivity. The most serious prob-
lem, however, is probably government spending. Spending by government and
social security in Spain has increased appallingly. This public spending has
involved primarily consumption and not investment expenditures. The public
debt, therefore, has increased substantially, and this means that the re-
sources that private enterprise could have used for investment and the
creation of jobs are seriously reduced. Reform of government administration
is a critical issue that the government should tackle more decisively.
[Question] How do you view a possible socialist victory in the upcoming
legislative elections?
[Answerj First of all, we think it would be detrimental to the Spanish
economy if the socialists were to win. The policy would be to increase
. government spending, which is against all logico Interventionism would
also increase, and that would have a bad effect on Spain's economic and un- ~
employment problems.
However, our attitude as businessmen would be to respect the outcome of
the elections. Our organization has greatly defended and supported the
advent and strengthening af democracy in Spain. This is why we would estab-
lish the appropriate relations between business organizations and the govern-
ment of the socialists, should they come to power.
COPYRIGHT: Latitude SARL: 4 trimestre, 1981.
9805
CSO: 3100/615 END
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