JPRS ID: 10462 EAST EUROPE REPORT POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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JPR S L/ 1046"c
15 Apr.il 1982
,
East Euro e Re ort
p p
POLITICAI, SOCIOLOGICAI AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
cFOUO si82~
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JPRS L/10462
15 April 1982
EAST EUROPE REPORT
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
C'~o~ro 6/ e 21
CONTENTS
POI,AND
- Cultural F`igure Gives Views on Situation in CoL~.ntry
(Andrze~ Zulawski Iaterview; PARIS MATCEf, 25 Dec 81) 1
F`rench Journalist Comnents on Military Take-Over in Poland
(K. S. Karol; LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR, 6 Feb 82) 5
French Journalist~s Interview With Internee Noted
(P~ul Baudry Iriterview; LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR, 6 Feb 82).. 8
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POLAND
CULTURAL FIGURE GIVES VIEWS ON SITUATION IN COUNTRY
PM301439 Paris PARIS MATCH in French 25 Dec 81 pp 25, 103 ~
[Interview with 4ndrzej Zulawski, Polish poet, writer and movie director,
by Jean-Francois Chaigneau: "'Jaruzelski Will Fire on the Crowd ~r Commit
Suicide "'--in Paris, date unspecified]
[Text] Andrzej Zulawski: This time, that's it, the two trains haive set
off, and they are :raveling in opposite directions.... ~
PARIS MATCH: Which did you t~:ce?
Andrzej Zulawski: You can't really take the Communist Party and Army
train: so I took Sclidarity's....
PARIS MATCH: Do you regret it?
Andrze3 Zulawski: Yes indeed: Walesa's train has been derailed. It is
~ a monumental error to have reached ~his pofnt. Primarily I blame his lack
of political sense. Everything should have been done to prevent this
- direct confrontation from arising.
PARIS MATCH: Are you thinking of civil war?
Andrze~ Zulawski: `The fundamental question is whether the Polish people .
are tired enough to capitulate or angry enough to concinue. For my part
I ani sure that they are too tired--that the women are too tired to make
war, too sick of s~eing their children not have any milk...that physicians
havE~ had enough of hospitals filled with 3- or 4-year-old children suffering
from malnutrition.... I hope that thc population will think that the mili-
tary coup is after all an honorable outcome, proving that courage is not at
issue bF.cause the disproportion between the forces is too great.
PARIS MATCH: Do you want the Poles to capitulFite?
_ Andi�ze~ Zulawski: Yes, at this stage, but only in order to resume the
struggle later, in the sphere of ~what seems posaible to me.
PARIS MATCH: What is this sphere?
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Andrzej Zulawski: First let me dcfine what is not feasible: A general
revolt by all the USSR's satellite countries? The revolts do not happen
simultaneocsly (Budapest 1956, Pra~ue 1968). The breakup of the Soviet
Union into 100 nationalist republics? It is possible but cPrtainly not
tomorrow. World war? The cost is too high. So, what is there left?
- Well, the sphere of "what is feasible".... I ha~e always thought that in
the history of Polish resistance the example was set by the Church. Since
1944, the Church has been chippin~ away slowly and patiently and nobody
can do anything to stop it. They c~uld imprison Wyszynski and tear out
, his fingernails, or mistreat a priest who spoke freely in thE pulpit...that
had no effect. The Church conti;;~ed to advance. We must do the same. This
was all the easier in 1980 since tlse economic collapse of the Gierek regime
made it possi.ble to introduce a new positive factor: the obvious fact that
there was no possible retreat. So that allowed an improvement in the eco-
nomic system.
~ PARIS MATCH: In the immediate future will General Jaruzelski give orders
to f ire on the Poles?
~ Andrzej Zulawski: My reply is cynical: To fire on the Poles "a bit," I
would say yes. "A lot"? I would say certainly not. All I know is that
Jaruzelaki ~nd people like him have been trained in murder and destruction.
' He probably does not know himself where the line between "a bit" and "a lot"
lies. In my opinion, he will soon be faced with a Draconian alternative:
either to give orders to fire on his own people or to blow his brains out.
" PARIS MATCH: But he is a totally pro-Soviet general, after all.
Andrze~ Zulawski: Yes, but that is one of the paradoxes of Poland. This
communist general, pro-Soviet and politicized in the extreme, is certainly
in the f inal analysis a Polish nationalist, as we all are. Anyway, ~ust
before Saturday's events, he said this: "Poland is not dead as long as we
live." He thus used the double language to which every Pole is accustomed.
This simple phrase means: If I, a Pole, do not do it myself, someone else
' will. So I beg you, give in....
PARIS MATCH: And the Army?
Andrzej Zulawski: The Army is two-thirds composed of draftees. The remainAer
constitutes a caste of professionals. They are reco~nizable. They are big
and fat a:.u ~reasy-skinned. They have all the privileges offered by the
ragime: apartment, food, car and clothes.... They are people educated
within the system; in defending it, they are defending themselves. They
will obey and fire.
PARIS MATCH: For the West, Poland is the ~ountry whicn is causing trouble
for the Soviet bloc.
Andrze~ Zulawski: Yes. Unfortunately that is perfectly in keepizg with the
' Polish spirit. For a long time~now, especially since the 19th century,
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Poland has had a sort of ines~ianic dr~am. The Poles aee themselves as a
model, concentrated on their sufferinga and misfortunes; and today they are
convinced that they will prompt the start of the fall of the Soviet empire.
PARIS MATCH: It is understandable that the Poles are sick of communism.
Andrzej Zulawski: They never wanted it. They are a people who are 98
percent Catholic and who were handed by the West to the Soviet system. In
1945 Stal:tn drew the borders and that was that. Nothing paved the way for
it, yet merely at bayonet-point the country became communist. At the time,
90 perc~nt of the population had neither an outlook nor a political educa-
tion leading tc~ communism.... But everybody knows that. The problem was
rather how to manage communism differentiy from the others.
PARIS MATCH: So the country cannot become free?
Andrzej Zulawski: It cannot become a democracy, either bourgeois, capitalist,
liberal or anything else. It cannot change its regime. The country is a
land of passage, an enormous plain crossed by the railroad tracks taking
Soviet troops into East Germany. Oura is only a geopolitical role. Stalin
himself granted us this favor. In fact, Stalinism was never as oppressive
in our couittry as it was elsewhere.
PARIS MATCH: The explosion of Solidarity, is that the difference?
Andrze~ Zulawski: It is more than that. It is quite simply tbe exaspera-
tion of a people who can no longer endure lies, poverty, lack of liberty
and ineff iciency. So the country expl.odes and loses its head.
PARIS MATC~I: The detonator?
Andrzej Zulawski: The Pope accounts for 90 percent and sausages for 10
percent.
PARIS MATCH:
?~ndrzej Zulawski: Bef.ore John Paul II's election, there were long periods
in Poland when the working class did nothing. Intellectuals and students
were regularly beaten up but the working class did not care. At the same
time, food began to be f righteningly scarce under Gierek's team. And then
the Pope came. You have to be Polish to understand what it meant to see
the Pope arriv~, all in white, and get out of h~s white helicopter on his
visit to Krakow, the old royal capital. The country then rediscovered
language, and that was the real miracle: Somebody was speaking to it clearly.
Poland got drunk on words and pt?rases and Walesa got nothing but promises.
PARIS MATCH: Yet Solidarity was legalized?
Andrzej Zulawski: Solidarity--what difference does that make if you can
not eat to satisfy your hunger? Walesa is very wrongheaded. I do not want
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- to add to his burdens at this difficult time, but he is a man who has been
puffed up by events tY?ough he is incapable of taking charge of them or
_ understanding them. He is too simple.
PARIS MATCH: But he has held the powerful Communist Party in check.
Andrzej Zulawski: But look where we are now. A huge surge of hope has
ended up in military dictatorship. Since 1795 the country has experienced
continuous occupations and dismemberments. And World War II has never
ended for it. It is painful to say, but I think that in the country's
historical genes there is a skill in living under constraint, as well as
a tendency to misfortune. But I would not like to f ind today that there
is also a suicidal determinism.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 per Cogedipresse S.A.
CSO: 3100/422
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POLAND
FRENCH JOURNALIST COMMENTS ON MILITARY TAKE-OVER IN POLAND
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 6 Feb 82 p 34
[Article by K.S. Karol: "The General's Ruse"]
[Text] The ergument is classic: "If you do not help me,
others, who will be tougher, will succeed me." But the trap
is too obvious.
"The month of February began badly in the streets of Gdansk," proclaims the of-
ficial agency PAP, which then goes on to report~, in a few sentences, a"deplor-
able demonstration by young people," and then to list the reprisal measures
taken by the miiitary regime against the region's population as a whole. If
one beJieves this incoherent version, there were only 3,000 young people demon-
strating in the streets of Gdansk last Saturday. Why, then, was it necessary
to extend the curfew by 3 hours in an urban cen~er with a population of
750,000, cut off telephone communications again, and forbid all private vehicle
traffic?
The Warsaw officials claim that it was a matter of hitting 'aard on a preventive
basis, in order to discourage an,y protest movement against the price hikes (300
- percent on the average) just coming into force. This explanation is doubly
' fallacious: first of all because the Warsaw putschists are constantly hitting
hard (the courts passed nearly 500 sentences during the last half of January),
and secondly, because the workers' reaction against the amputation of their
buying power could not, in Poland, be a 1-day affair.
"Not One Step Backward"
It is difficult, nevertheless, to understand the dynamic of the Gdansk demon-
stration and of those that are also said to have taken tilace in Silesia, Lodz
and Wroclaw, because the military in power have proved to great experts in
the blocking of information. In principle, at the beginning of January, on the
eve of the meeting of the NATO foreign-affairs ministers in Brussels, they
abolished censorship for the Western preas, believing that this gesture would
be sufficient to agpease the chancelleries of the West. But in practice, the
situation of the journalists accredited to Warsaw has not changed. They do not
have the right to leave the capital or to telephone to their editorial desks,
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r~K urri~~w~ vivLY
and their accreditation is subject to renewal each month, which constitutes an
additional means of pressure on those who might try to inform themselves "too
much." The Western governments, even though there are reci~rocity agreements
with Poland in the matter of the press, have not even deigned to raise a pro-
test against these restrictions.
Poland, of course, is too dependent on Western food aid to be able to isolate
itself totally. Those persons who go with the convoys of foodstuffs and medi-
cines--into the "closed" provinces too--necessarily meet people ~nd bring back
news. Thus it emerges that Solidarity is now functioning clandestinely not on-
ly in Gdansk, Wroclaw and Katowice--its traditional strongholds--but also in
the peripheral centers and in the countryside. Despite the "state of war,"
samizdat leaflets and even pamphlets have a broad circulation. Thus it was
learned in Paris this week, with unusual speed, that the intellectuals interned
in a relatively comfortable camp in the northwest of the country have sent to
Lech Walesa a letter commending his tenacity and informing him that they will
neither let themselves be corrupted by their privileged treatment nor separated
from their worker comrades, who are the worst-treated of the prisoners of Jaxu-
zelski's gulag.
Then, on 26 January, Walesa was in his turn served with an internment order
dated 12 December, and managed to communicate his response: "Not one step back-
ward. This partner has never been honest and never will be." After this mes-
sage, the delegation of bishops, led by the primate of Poland, Jozef Glemp,
that has just visited the Vatican, is fully aware of the fact that the Church
cannot make the least concession as regards Solidarity without cutting itself
off from its popular base.
_ The putschists r~ply that there is no longer any Solidarity in Poland. As the
only people in charge, they are asking the Western governments for credits, and
in order to overcome their reticence, are trying to get them to believe that a
battle is in progress in the upper echelons in Warsaw: Jaruzelski and his po-
lice generals Milewski and Kiszczak are supposed to represent the "liberal"
wing of the regime, anxious to carry out reforms and behave as in the time of
"enlightened absolutism" (as it is put by the minister Ciosek). Pitted against
these despotic "good guys" there is supposed to be a"tough" wing grouped
around Albin Siwak and the weekly of the Grunwald police association, "Real-
ity," supposedly determined to achieve 100-percent normalizatio~n of the coun-
try. In short, a Polish-style police war is supposed to be in progress, since
on both sides the principal protagonists are in the security forces.
It is probable that the minister of foreign affairs, Jozef Czyrek, came to
Claude Cheysson precisely to inform him of the "new development" in Polish po-
litics. But the ruse is too old to be credible. In the East, anyone who holds
power would like to have it believed that hi3 passible successor would const:-
tute the worst of calamities for the world. It suffices to recall that Gustav
Husak too normalized his country while calling himself "liberal." But the case
of Jaruzelski is even more serious than that of the Czechoslovak quisling.
In the interview granted to L-E NOWEL OBSERVATEUR last week, Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt explains that because of their guilt complex, the Germans need to have
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with the Polish nation a relationship that is "morally clear, no matter what
person is in power in that country, whether it is Gomulka, Gierek or now an-
other communist, perhaps still another tomorrow, I don't know." I confess that
this way of viewing the communists as a race apart, immutable and self-con-
tained, leaves me perplexed; it flattens and empt~es~ of all its content the
real history both of Poland and of its CP. In fact, Gomulka and Gierek were
not only men with very different ideas and biographies; they also incarnated
two very distinct phases of the evolution of "real socialism." The former was
the promoter of the policy of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, with its promises
of de-Stalinization. The latter represented the phase of Leonid Brezhnev's
"technological and scientific revolution" and believed, as did he, that he
could solve the problems by means of equi~~ment imported from the West.
Sudden Changes ~~f Pace
Jaruzelski, who arrives after the failure of these two attempts, is therefore
not simply "another communist." He incarnates a different phase, and it is not
by chan~e that he is the author of the first military coup d'etat in the his-
tory of the Soviet world. From Rome to Tokyo, the communists who know how to
think refuse to consider this putschist dictator one of their comrades. After
Enrico Berlinguer, the chairman of the.Japanese CP, Kenii Miyamoto, proclaimed
loug and clear that Jaruzelski struck his blow against the cause of socialism.
Why must the chancellor of the FRG recognize a certain "communist" dignity in
thi~ Polish Pinochet, and why does our minister of external relations agree to
receive his representative at the Quai d'Orsay?
The answer probably lies entirely in Francois Mitterrand's little phrase about
"the delays of history." No one has any illusions about the nature of the Po-
lish regime. But everyone believes that he has to live with it, because a lot
_ of time is needed in order to change it or beat it. Maybe. But one should be
on guard: since Idorld War II, there has been more than one sudden change of
pace in Polish history. Despite its limited sovereignty, this country is al-
ready in its sixth different regime, and the West would be making a serious
mistake if it closed its eyes to its extraordinary fragility: this time, it is
an entire people who, having found its political and social identity again, op-
poses the regime.
, PHOTO CAPTION
General Jaruzelski receiving workers. Solidarity is now functioning clandes-
tinely
COPYRIGHT: Copyright 1982 "Le Nouvel Observateur"
11267
CSO: 3100/462
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rvn vri~aa..ana. ~.~a, vit~�
POLAND
FRENCH JOURNALIST'S INTERVIEW WITH INTERNEF. NOTED
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 6 Feb 82 p 35
[Interview by Paul Baudry: "Three Weeks in One of Jaruzelski's Prisons"; date
- and place not given]
[Text] Few accounts have reached the West about what has
been happening in the Polish jails for the last 2 months.
Here, in an interview by Paul Baudry, is the account by a
painter arrested on the same night as the coup d'etat-,
13 December.
[Question) How were you arrested?
[Answer] The militiamen came to my studio on 13 December, at 1 a.m., and i found
myself in an ice-cold cell, alone, without knowing anything about the coup or
the reasons for my arrest. How could I have guessed them? I had indeed been
militant in the 1970's, and after 1976 took part in the activities of the KOR*,
- but since 1980 I had been quite simply one of the 10 million members of Soli-
darity, without exercising any particular responsibilities. It was only on
Sunday evening, when I was given some cellmates, that I learned what had hap-
- pened. Two days later, I was transferred to the prison of X..., where I re-
mained until I was freed.
[Question] Always iri a cell?
[Answer] No, in a big room, where there were some 30 of us: most of them work-
ers, trade-union officials interned from the 13th, or militants arrested on the
occasion of the first strikes. There were also two peasants of the rural Soli-
darity, some engineers, some students and myself, a painter. During rr~y
stay there, there was no right to have any walking exercise and no visiting
rights; the broadcasts of Radio Warsaw were the only link with the outside.
For the rest, we had relatively favored treatment: central heat, lighting.until
9 pm, and we were brought something to eat at 7 am, 2 pm and 5 pm. The mili-
tiamen did roll call morning and evening, and whenever the do~r was opened one
could see their stony faces in the corridor. On the other h-1nd, the prison
* Committee for the Defense of the Workers, founded in 1976.
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guards, who had counted on Solidarity to improve their miserable living condi-
tions, gave evidence of their sympathy for us and went to the trouble of pro-
curing for us, as much as they could, the things we asked them for.
[Question] How did you pass your time?
[Answer] We determined.at the outset that in our prison there was neither any
informer to spy on us nor any microphone for listening to us, so that we there-
by evaded both the police system and the fear that it engenders. And a program
of presentations was established: each morning and each afternoon, one of us
would talk about his professional and political experience, and a debate fol-
lowed, often impassioned.
[Question] What divided you?
[Answer] While the social movement that Solidarity constitutes is unanimous in
contesting the dictatorship of the party, it is made up of different currents.
The ~najority, who recognize themselves in Lech Walesa, have to deal, on their
right, with the people of the KPN*, and on their left, with the former leaders
of the KOR. In the microcosm of our roomful of people, the KPN was represented
by a nucleus of five persons, with a few sympathizers sometimes rallying to
them, on the occasion of certain debates. The KOR was not represented as such,
since it was dissolved into Solidarity; but we divided on the ideas of Kuron,
for example--with the majority, incapable of imagining a communism that is not
totalitarian, reproaching him for not having clearly broken with the Marxism of
his youth.
[Question] What makes you classify the members of the KPN as being on the
"right"?
[Answer~ Their attachment to the past, to the country's military and insurrec-
tional traditions, their nat'ionalism.
[Question] Nationalism--antisemitism perhaps?
[Question] Quite so; we questioned them about that, but they evaded the ques-
tion as if it were a taboo subject, one that gave them a bad conscience. The
Communist Party has at least rendered one service to Poland: it has cultivated
antisemitism so muct~ on its own account that it has put it out of fashion.
[Question] In your debates, what pitted Solidarity against the KPN?
[Answer] Th~ KPN reproached Solidarity with having been timorous and ineffec-
tive, with not having aimed at the government's vitals, with having mobilized
the masses for combats lacking greatness. Solidarity explained that it had
chosen to change the people and the structures patiently, that it preferred
humble daily work to blows of heroic brilliance. It reproached the KPN with
* Confederation for an Independent Poland.
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rvn vrr~~,it~a. vivi,Y
having furnished a pr.etext for the coup by revealing its long-term strategy, by
declaring war on the Party and on the USSR.
Furthermore, life in prison revealed two attitudes: while the KPN people were
plbtting impossible escapes, the Solidarity officials, negotiating with the
prison administration day after day,were improving our living conditions, thus
expanding their influence.
[Question] Did you discuss the future also?
(Answer] We did nothing else! We talked, for example, about the oath of
allegiance that a great many Poles have to sign on penalty of losing their pro-
fession or their liberty. Some were resolved not to make any compromise, even
if they were to be sent to Siberia. The majority agreed that it was necessary
to show realism and use stra~agems against force, that the first imperative was
to get work again, one's place, one's influence within society. At the time I
was freed, I myself signed a commitment not to undertake anything against the
so-called popular and P~lish republic; but that doesn't bother me. But there
are some more compromising formt;las, and I know people who are not forgiving
themselves for the disavowals extort.~d from them.
We also talked about the "passive resistance" spontaneously mounted by the pop-
ulation and consisting essentially in sabotaging its work. Some found it dif-
ficult to accept Solidarity's making a watchword of struggle out of this, and I
have since learned that the Church shares this point of view. Should the cost
of the downfall of the communist system be the total ruin of our country? Is
it by reaching the depths of poverty that the Poles will be delivered from
- their tyrants?
[Question] Did you speak yourself about your profession of painter?
[Answer] Yes. I warned my c~mpanions against the temptation to engage artists
in the liberation struggles, to turn the methods of "socialist realism" against
"real socialism." A painter does not address himself to the masses, he speaks
to persons. It is not by pitting some slogans against others that he has a
chance of being useful; on the contrary, he will be useful if he helps individ-
ual people to exorcise the demons interiorized in 35 years of dictatorship, to
kill the fanaticism inside them:
[Question] What weighed on you the most during your detention?
[Answer] Not knowing anything about the struggles in progress, not being able
to take part in them. On 17 December, when Radio Warsaw announced the death of
the Wujek miners, there was a moment of extreme tension. Since there was
fighting outside, it was insupportable not to be fighting:, we contem-
plated a revolt, a mass escape, at least a hunger strike. But a few Solidarity
officials kept their cool and fought hand to hand against these projects in-
_ spired by impotent rage.
[Question] What was most valuable to you in this trial?

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[Answer] Firat of all the aolidarity, really lived. I told you about our im-
passioned discussions; I remember especially that they were conducted with tol-
erance and respect for one another, without violence or aggressiveness. And
then the shared hope. It is only since I have been out of prison that I have
met pessimistic people. Every day, friends assure me that we have returned to
the Stalinist era, that we are in for it for 10 or 20 years. In Stalin's time
there were convinced communists, coldly determined to sacrifice everything to
their c:i~tant chimeras, but now we have only cynics, as preposterous as inquis-
itors who have lost the faith, short-sighted military men who have come out of
their tanks without having planned any political scenari~.
But that's enough anout them! People are too concerned here about what they
are doing; we were optimistic in prison because we always talked about what
/we/ were going to do. We have changed since August 1980: through the strug-
gles, the strikes, the liberty found again, we have woven new relationships
among ourselves, we have learne~' to speak to one another, to love one another.
That is tnainly what makes me optimistic.
COPYRIGHT: Copyright 1982 "Le Nouvel Observateur"
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