JPRS ID: 10460 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050036-2
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JP(~S L/ 10460
April 1982
~ West E u ro e Re ort
p p
CFOUO 24/82~
- F~~~ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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JPRS L/10460
15 April 1982
- WEST EUROPE REPORT
CFOUO ~4/821
CONTEN7S
ECONOMIC
~1USTRIA
Ancirosch on B~uiking Secrecy Rcgulations
(Hannes Androsch Interview; CAPITAL, Mar 82) 1
- FRArdCE
Briefs
Aeronauticai Exports for 19n1
I`1't1L
liescription os Frienclship Associr~tions With Other Countrie5
(Roberto Ippolito; IL MONDO, 12 Mar 82) 5
POLITICAL
INTERNATIONAL AF'FAIRS
Thatche~^ Adc'se~ses Commons on EEC Budget Issue
(Hu~h Noyes; THE TIN~, 1 Apr 32) 10
'TIMES' ~'xplains FRG's Role in Alliance to West
(Editorial; TH~ TINIES, 1 Apr 82) 12
ITaI:Y ~ .
Communists' Local Reaction~ to 'Third Wt~,y'
(IL SC~LE-24 ORE, 14, 18, 20 Feb 82) 15
N~'Z'~IE~LAND6
Paper Criticizes Inaction, Indecision of Cabinet
(J. Van 'Ii~n, Max van Weezel; VRIJ I1E~JERLAND, 13 ~lar 82) 2~+
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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NIILITARY
FRAi.1C~
Mirage F1-CR To Update Aerial Reconnaissance C~.pability
. (AIR ET COSMOS, 6 Mar 82) 32
ITALY
~ General Cappuzzo r^,xplains Role oY Ar~y
(Cianni Rossi; IL MONDO, 12 Nlax 8~) 3~+
G~3QERAL .
INTERNATIONAL ~lr'FAIRS
Europe Plans Cryogenic Engine i'or Post-Ar, ia.xie Launchers
(Pierre Lengereux; AIR ET. COSM0.~, 3fl J~ 82) 37
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ECONOMIC AUSTRIA
ANTiROSCH ON BANKiNG S~,CRECX REGUI~ATIONS
Hamburg CAPITAL in German Mar 82 pp 18~-194
[Interview with Dr Hannes Androsch, prominent Austrian banker, by Horst Schmitz]
_ [Text] In no other industrialized c~untry are the banks as
adept at b~ing discreet as in the red-white-ied Alpine repub-
lic. The ir.stitutions do not know many of their clients.
CAPITAL interviewed Dr Hannes Androsch, 43. He is director
general and chairman of the board of Austria's largeat bank:
Creditanstalt-Bankverein. He is also president of the Asso-
ciation of Austrian Banka and Bankers. At age 33, Androsch
was the youngest minister of finance in Austria.
CAPITAL: Mr. Androsch, wheu you were still miniRter of finance and vice chancellor
of the 'Zepublic of Austria, the state took steps to protect banking sec.recy by law.
Why was this done?
- ANDROSCI~: The Austrian banks have always been very discrete; banking secrecy was
safeguarded in practice. It was established legally in 19?9 as an additional con-
fidence-building measure vis-a-vis the savzr.
CAPITAL: The regulations in your country are similar to the Swisa regular_ions.
Is the �~mall, let us say harmless, tax evader as bank client in Austria as pro-
tected ;is in Switzerland?
ANDROSC1i: That I would rather not judge. However, the banks as well as the
authorities in Austria are very careful that the lawa are observed. Banking
secrecy can be waived only in the case of deliberate financial crimes in connection
with crimxnal proceedings involving financial matters, but not in the case of
financial irregularities. Criminal proceedinga must have been instituted. Banking
secrecy must not be pierced to obtain records which then perhags would justify
criminal proceedings.
CAPITAL: Does this also apply to German bank clients whase Austriar_ accounts ehe
national revenue office would like to examine?
ANDROSCH: We provide legal assistance. Incidentally, such requests fc~r informa-
tion from the German side to Austrian authorities are rare.
- CAPITAL: Do Austrian banks inform their. clients about such requests?
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ANDROSCH: In principle ;es, so that the client can protect his legal position.
, For the bank is not able to judge whether such a request is justified. The tax
penalty authorities or criminal courts merely certify to the bank that the legal
grounds for a request for information exiat. Nothing more, otherwise they would
violate official secrets in their turn.
CAPITAL: As it is, neither tax nor penal authorities are able to find about the
tricks of many of your clients because there are really secret savings accounts
and securities repositories in Austria. What has motivated the Republic of Austria
as the only one among the large industrialized nations to allow anonymous accounts?
- ANDROSCH: We wanted to gain the confidence of the saver. MonPy deposits are
always something very intimate. Fear of taxes, I am sure, plays no role for the
mass of our savers, xt is rather the need for privacy. Many clients do not keep
~ their savings account at the bank where they also have their checking account and
therefore are personally known. They go where no one knows them. We take into
consideration this need for anonymity, and for this reason we have a high quota of
savings.
CAPITAL: But the anonymous accuunt also has ita treacherous a~pects. Whoever
loses the passbook, misplaces tlie depository records or forgets the password, no
longer has access to his money.
ANDROSCH: Here you underestimate people. Moreover, accounts can be blocked and
the relevant anonymous s~curities coupons can be declared invalid. Forgetful
clients are helped by our staff inembers. Problem cases are exceedingly rare.
CAPITAL: And in the case of inheritance? Have some :.lients not concealed the
records so well that the survivors do not find anything, or the heirs 3o not even
_ know anything at all and therefore fail to make a search at all?
ANDROSCH: The banks keep track of what anonymous accounts have not shown any
activity for 30 years. There only a fPw of those, with a minimal sum of money.
- CAPITAL: Is it possible for criminals to conceal money in anonymous accounts,
too?
ANDROSCH: The small swindler perhaps. But we do not have any problems with Mafia
money--if that is what you are alluding to. For the client must appear at the
teller's window for every deposit and withdrawal. He cannot tran~fer the money
from a safe distance from one bank to another, from one country to anuther, in
order to conceal his tracks.
CAPITAL: '~'he Republic of Austria has the welfare of its savers at heart. The
state does not levy a tax at the source in contrast to Swit~erland. When will a
tax levied at the source be applied to savi.ngs accounts and depositories [of
securities] in your country as well?
ANDRO~CH: Surely not in the foreseeable future. The discussion, it seems to me,
is over, the government has clearly committed itself: Against such a tax.
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CAPITAL: How long will Austria remain a banking paradise, such as it is found at
most in exotic countries? By a stroke of the pen the state could prescribe that
money in anonymous accounts may be paid out only upon presentation of identifi-
cation. How reliable is the legal order?
ANDROSCH: The tendency in many countries, after a11, points in the direction of
safeguarding the private sphere. I have in mind data protection alone. I regard
it as out of the question to force savers to give up their anon.ymity.
CAPtTAL: Do you have anonymous accounts yourself?
ANDROSCH: No. However, the savings account passbooks of my children are anony-
mous. In the final analysis, all passbooks in Austria are anonymous. For the
bank does not check the information regarding the individual--if inf~rmation is
given at all.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co.
8970
CSO: 3103/361
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~ .
'~ONOMIC FRANCE
BRIEFS
AERONAUTICAL EXPORTS FOR 1981--The French Aeronautical and Space Industry
Group (GIFAS) has 3ust announced the official figures for French aerospace
exports for 1981. The total figure for direct orders recorded from abroad
is 35,174,000,000 francs (HT [without taxJ), compared with 27,017,000,000
in 198Q and 26.89 billion in 1979. Only f irm orders, excluding options, are
included in this total. With regard to equipment produced in international
cooperation, only the French part has been included. This part amounts to
18,631,000,000 francs, or 53 percent of the total orders. The following is
the breakdown by activity groupe: Airframes and cou~ lete aircraf t,
13,332,000,000 francs, or 37.9 percent, including 6,983,000,000 in cooperation;
helicopters, 3,501,000,000 francs, or 10 percent, including 1,981,000,000
- francs in cooperation; engines, 3,373,000,000 francs, or 9.6 percent, including
1,764,000,000 francs in cooperation; missiles, 11,531,000,000 francs, or 32.7
percent, including 6,682,000,000 francs in cooperation; space, 987 million
francs, or 2.8 percent, including 181 million francs in cooperation; equipment
and electronics, 2.45 billion francs, or 7 percent, including 1.04 billion
francs in cooperation. [Text] [Paris AIR FT COSMOS in French 27 Feb 82 p 44]
[COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982] 10042
CSO: 3100/432
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ECONOMIC ITALY
DESCRIPTION OF FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES
Milan IL MONDO in Italian 12 Mar 82 pp 14-15
[Article by Roberto Ippolito]
[Text] Up to now there have been concerts, films, performances, conf erences,
language classes. But new requests are being made now more and more
insistently: for trade data, contacts between businessmen, and support
~ in the search for new markets. Italy's friendship associations with other
countries are being revolutionized, slowly but probably irreversibly. This
revolution may modify the nature and purpose of these associations, which
were founded to promote understanding among p~oples, knowledge about each
other, and cultural exchanges.
In one case, this issue has even provoked a public controversy. It happened
with the founding of the Italy-Iraq Association within the framework of the
Italian-Arab National Friendship Association. More than one leader of the
latter organization has contended that too much latitude has been given to
businessmen. Mauro Seppia, vice presidenti of the socialist members of
parliament and president of Italy-Iraq, has been criticized for giving
businessmen privileged treatment at the first meeting. The Italian-Arab
Association has imposed certain conditions on Italy-Iraq which the latter
must comply with if it wants to operate within the f ramework c~f the former.
Says Agostino Spataro, member of the organization's secretariat for relations
with Arab countries and a communist member of parliament: "We have noted
a prevalence of economic and commercial interests which could undermine our
ob~ective. The mercantilist trend is too obvious."
Some businessmen contact the friendship associations after reading about
their activities in the newspapers or hearing about tliem on the radio or
television. This happened in particular with Italy-Somalia. Guido Goracci,
the association~s secretary, says: Our association receives marXy requests
for help from Somalia. We have therefore facilitated meetings among business-
men. We haven't played an important role in the economic field yet, but we
intend to do more."
Many associations are already moving in this direction. Last December ~
Italy-Tunisia organized a convention in Milan with the participation of
dozens of businessmen, mainly from the construction sector. A long tour of
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the principal cities of Australia organized by the Italy-Australia friendship
association ended on Sunday 7 March. The garticipants were mainly business-
men involved in the agricultural sector, but there were also some in
industrialists. A new service--investment counseling--has been offered
gince the end of last year ~o the members of Italy-Australia. The assr~ciation
provides information about the real estate market with the help of a network
of experts in the field. Exhibitions are becoming a focal point for many
activities. At the Verona Agricultural Fair, Italy-Israel has contributed
to the organization of a seminar on economic relations between the two
countries from the viewpoint of the European Economic Community. A
representative of Israel's Ministry of Trade will participate, along with
businessmen.
The association for friendship and economic and cultural relations between
Italy and the Chinese Republic of Taiwan (whose government is not
recognized by Italy) is participating in the Verona Fair, as well as in the
Palermo Fair and in the Roman Tiber Expo. In fact, this association
represents Taiwan a~ trade functions. Taiwan's presence at exhibitions
(where products are not sold) gives it an opportunity to acquaint people
with Formosa's ach~Levements and with the possibility of gaining access to
its markets. "What we want most," says DC deputy Bruno Stegagnini, "is to
request the establishment of a trade office on the island, as other EEC
countries have done. We are losing our share of the market because we are
not represented there." A group which included many members of parliament
returned from a trip to Taiwan on 1 March. In Udine a large contingent of
businessmen participated in a convention of the association of the Christian
Union of Business Executives; they learned about sectors in which exports
could be expanded.
The request for the establishment of a trade office has been made
insistently by another association linked with a country Italy has no
diplomatic relations with: the People's Republic of North Korea. Italy-North
Korea also helped arrange a convention on cooperation and trade; one of the
participants was Sand~o Petriccione, president of FIME (Finanziaria
meridionale).
But attention is being focused mainly on new ma.rkets. Italy-Thailand is
planning an Italian week in Bangkok, to be held in November. The socialist
Franceso Colucci, an undersecretary ie the Ministry of Finance, is president
of the organizing committee. "It will be an opportunity," says Gino Ragno,
head of the Italy-Thailand Association, "to strengthen economic relations
between Italy and Southeast Asia. There is a lot to do. Suffice it to say
that there is no Italian wine there, only German wine, incredibly." The
business world immediately expressed its interest in the event, and the
Banca nazionale del lavoro [National Labor Bank], the Banco di Roma [Bank
of Rome], the Institute for Foreign Trade, and the Ente nazionale di turismo
[National Tourism Agency] have already announced their intention to
participate.
Lven more far-reaching activities have been planned by the Italian-Arab
Association, which is probably the most powerful of all because of the
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the political weight it has acquired in recent years and the nature of its
membership (see insert for the many members of the government and party
leaders who belong to this association; firms like Fiat and Eai are also
members, and one of Eni's executives, international coordinator Giuseppe
Ratti, will soon become the association's pre~ident). As the case of
Italy-Iraq shows, the association (I~eaded by Rinaldo Ossola, president of
the Bank of Naples) doesn't intend to devote its attention to small matters.
It is not without influence. Members of the association are behind the
creation cf the Italian-Algerian Bank and the Italian-Saudi Bank. Pressure
is constantly being brought to bear on the government to reach an agreement
with Algeria on the price of inethane (this dispute is keeping the gas pipeline
which has been built idle). The association is now planning to give new
impetus to the Italian-Arab chamber of commerce, and is arranging an
internationa~ convention on cooperation to be held in Florence in late
spring.
Like the others, the most recently founded association--the one linking
Italy and Libya--is also dominated by politicians and businessmen. This
association hopes to play a stabilizing role in the not always serene
relations between the two countries. Businessmen (who have 18,000 Italian
workers in Libya) cannot help but be interested in this. Says Giuseppe
Carolis DC member of parliament and president of Italy-Libya: "We try to
resolve all possible controversies in a friendly manner. Sometimes the
usual diplomatic channels can't use a11 the existing margins for under-
standing. We want to create a relationship of solidarity and r~ceptiveness
to dialogue." The first disputes the association will have to face concern
fishing.
The association's inauguration at Rome's Ritz Hotel on Thursday, 4 March,
was heavily attended by businessmen from every region and from the most
widely diverse sectors: Antonio Di Matt~.na of Saci, a company dealing with
petroleum products; Gianni Colombo, deputy manager of the Plus tannery and a
businessman involved in tools, electrical materials, and metal hot-pressing;
Ermanno Finaldi, a businessman involved in construction metallurgy, and
paving; Valention Dall'Asta, international manager at the Bank of Agriculture;
Domenico Giglio, manager of Riunione adriatic sicurta [Adriatic insurance
group]; Gianfranco Antonini, Sogene's manager of technical dev~lopment;
Claudio Arcella, of the Coprefim bell consortium, which has construction
contracts in Libya. Two surgeons were also present: Ugo Traina and Luigi
Brunetti. The Libyans spend at least 20 million dollars per year on
medical treatment in Italy.
The Friends of Friends in Parliament
They are members of the government, party leaders, members of parliament.
Numerous representatives of all political forces participate in
friendship associations linking Italy with other countries. In fact,
within these associations they create lobbies for the country concerned.
Some of them are involved with more than one country. Here is a list
of the friends of various countries, members of the government and party
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leaders (when "Arabia" appears beside a name, the person is a member of the
Italian-Arab Association, which has relations with the 22 countries of the
Arab League).
Ministers
Aldo Aniasi tPSI), Israel; Vincenzo Balzamo (PSI), Arabia; Gianni De
_ Michelis (PSI), Arabia; Michele Di Giesi (PSDI [Italian Social Democratic
Party]); Virginio Rognoni (DC), Arabia and USSR; Giovanni Spadolini (president
of the council, Italian Republican Party), FRG.
Undersecretaries
Giuseppe Amadei (Italian Social Democratic Party),.Israel and 'I'hailand;
Raffaele Costa (Italian Liberal Party), Arabia; Carlo Fracanzani (DC),
Somalia and Arabia; Mario.Gargano (DC), Libya; Giuseppe Pisanu (DC), Arabia;
Rodolfo Tambroni Armaroli (DC), FRG and Israel; Angelo Sanza (DC), Arabia;
Sisinio Zito (PSI), Arabia.
DC
L=iciano Bausi, Israel; Gilberto Bonalumi, Arabia; Lorenzo Cappelli, Taiwan;
Giuseppe Caroli, Libya; Gianni Cerioni, Tai~aan; Severino Citaristi, Taiwan;
Luciano Dal Falco, Israel; Giovanni Elkan, FRG; Antonio Falconio, Taiwan;
Alessandro Faedo, USSR; Silvestro Ferrari, Libya and Taiwan; Giorgio
Giovannoni, Arabia; Cesare Grampa, USSR; Luigi Granelle, USSR and GDR;
Francesco Lussignoli, Arabia; Guattiero Nepi, Israel and Taiwan; Guiloi
Orlando, Thailand and Tunisia; Erminio Pennacchini, Taiwan; Natale Pisicchio,
North Korea; Camillo Ripamonti, USSR; Alberto Russo, Libya; Franco Salvi,
GDR; Adolfo Sarti, Israel; Guiliano Silvestri, Palestine and North Korea;
Giovanni Spagnolli, FRG; Bruno Stegagnini, Taiwan; Michele Tantalo, FRG;
Mario Tassone, Taiwan and Libya; Emilio Trabucchi, Tawian; Pietro Zoppi,
Libya.
Communists
Pier Ciorgio Bottarelli, Syria; Paolo Bufalini, USSR; Franco Calamandrei,
GDR; Umberto Cardia, Arabia; Claudio Guilianai, Arabia; Lucio Lombardo
Radice, Somalia; Giancarlo Paietta, USSR; Michele Pistillo, North Korea;
, Antonio Roasioy Norrh Korea; Riccardo Romano, GDR; Remo Salati, Arabia;
Agostino Spadaro, Arabia; Dario Valori, Arabia.
Social ists
Michele Achilli, Arabia and Libya; Guido Albexini, Arabia, Libya and Taiwan;
Silvano Armaroli, North Korea; Mario Arta11, North Korr�a; Renato Colombo,
Tunisia; Massimo Cremonese, Arabia; Luciano De Pascalis, GDR and North Korea;
Emo Egoli, Arabia and Somalia; Antonio Landolfi, North Korea; Riccard~
Lombardi, USSR; Enrico Manca, GDR snd USSR; Bruno Marchetti, USSRp Giorgio
Mondino, Arabia; Carlo Ripa di Meana, Soma'lia; Mauro Seppia, Iraq.
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Republicans
Adolfo Battaglia, Israel; Oddo Biasini, USSR; Oscar Mammi, USSR; Ignazio
Mineo, Taiwan; Leo Valiani, Israel.
Social Democrats
Aldo Garosci, Israel, Lino Ronga, Arabia.
Liberals
Umberto Bonaldi, FRG and Israel; Salvatore Valitutti, USSR.
Proletarian Unity Party
Luciana Castellina, Somalia; Luigi Cavalieri, China.
- Independents of the Left
Guiseppe Branca, North Korea; Tullia Carettoni Romagnoli, GDR; Giancarlo
Codrignani, North Korea and Somalia; Tullio Vinay, North Korea. '
COPYRIGHT: IL MONDO 1982
9855
CSO: 3104/151
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,
,
POLITICAL INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
THATCHER ADDRESSES COMMONS ON EEC BUDGET ISSUE
PM011431 London THE TIMES in English 1 Apr 82 p 24
CReport by Hugh Noyes: "Blame France for EEC Delay Says Thatcher")
[Text] Mrs Margaret Thatcher :told the House of Commons yesterday that
there would be no agreement on proposals for changing the common agricul-
tural policy or on the industrial and social affairs of the European
Economic Community until the Br3tish Government got what 3.t wanted on the
size of Britain's net contribution to the EEC budget.
_ The prime minister's words also implied clearly that a settlement on
European farm prices was likely to be held up as a result of the failure
to reach agreement at the EEC sunnnit. She placed the blame for the failure
to agree on th ese matters squarely on the shoulders of the French and on
President Mitterrand ir_ particular.
In a statement to the house she told MPs that all th e countries of the
common unity were disappointed and surprised at the attitude of.the
French Government.
To congratulations from a labour MP fQ~ her patience, Mrs Thatcher agreed
that she was extraordinarily patient provided that she got her way in the
end. To another MP she replied that everything she had said at the EEC
summit in Brussels was fully 3ustified, "as 3t usually is."
Mrs Thatcher said that the United Kingdom and most other member states were
prepared to accept the compromise formula put fo~aard by Mr Gaston Thorn,
president of the European Commission and Mr Leo Tindema.nds, Belgian
external relations minister, as a basis for negotiation.
The prime minister told the house that she had underlined the conclusion
~ that the community had reached in London in November that decisions on all
aspects of the mandate must be taken together on the budget, the [word
indistinct] and industrial and social affairs. At that po~.nt she said,
the president of France stated that h e would not accept the compromise
formula as a basis for discussion.
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� Later, to questions from MP's, Mrs Thatcher told the house that it was
not only a question of getting a result on the budget.
''We cannot go ahead with the proposals on the CAP and on the other matters~
unless we get an agreement on the budget. The three must go along
together and unless we get reasonable budget results then a great deal
of the common market proposals will be held up severely," the prime
mi.nister said.
Mrs Thatcher went on to make clear that the government had withdrawn from
the original position on Britain's net contribution. Instead of a zero
net contribution to the European Community budget, Mrs Thatcher told the
house that she had made perfectly clear that this country was now prepared
to make a modest net contribution. That was reasonable and fair.
Mrs Thatcher's stand on the budget was widely supported in all parts of
th e house, albeit somewhat grudgingly from the labour front bench.
Mr Michael Foot, the opposition leader, recognized that she had a capacity
for stubbornness, adding that as long as she was stubborn in defence of
the legitimate interests of the British people she would have the support
of labour MP's. But he went on to criticize her degarture from the mandate
given to her by the Hous e of Commons which was that she should demand a zero
net contribution.
The prime minister was given th e more fulsome support of Mr Roy Jenkins for
the SDP, making his first intervention 3n the commons since his by-election
victory at Glasgov Hillh ead. He told the prime m3nister that she would
have full support in Britain for paying a fz,ir contribution and nothing more.
He pointed out that a small contribution was inevitable and to talk about a
nil contribution made mockery of our position towards the Third World.
Somewhat more unexpected support came from Mr Enoch Powell, official unionist
MP for down south. He told the prime m3.nister that the mass of people
in thi.s co;:ntry derivEd encouragement and hope when they read reports
indicating ~hat she was willing to ma3ntain our national 3nterests whatever
toes she might have to tread on.
Mrs Thatcher told the house that foreign affa3rs ministers had been asked
to do all in their power to secure early decisions on these matters and
they would be meeting in Luxembourg on April 3.
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspaper Limited, 1982
CSO: 3120/57
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- POLITICAL INTERNATIONELL AFFAIRS
'TIMES' EXPLAINS FRG'S ROLE IN ALLIANCE TO WEST
PM011427 London THE TIMES in English 1 Apr 82 p 11
[Editorial: "Spreading Germany's Winga"]
~
[Text] There are two main threats to western Europe. One is posed by the
vast array of Soviet weaponry looming over its eastern f rontiers. The
other is the threat of social instability provoked by recession and
unemployment, and perhaps aggravated by opposition to nuclear weapons.
The two threats are linked in so far as there is no point in trying to
defend ourselves against th e Russians if we cannot sustain political and
economic structures that are worth defending and capable of producing
- the wealth to pay for defence.
The week's European stmimit sensibly addressed itself to both threats but
fell some way short of generating the momentum necessary to deal with them.
Neither its words on unemployment (now roughly Yen mi113on) nor 3ts
complaints about high interest rates (no mentiori of Mr Reagan as the
culprit) and still less its rather tentat3ve talk of "further consultation"
with Washington, did justice to the need for a much more coherent and
forceful European contribut3.on to the joint problems of the a113ance.
If this is to develop in time for the Versailles summit meeting in June,
a lot of responsibility is going to fall on West Germany. It 3s exposed
to the military threat and most worried by the effects of economic stress
on its society. This worry often seems exaggPrated to its neighbours,
who see a democracy in pretty good working order and an economy capable
of dealing with a fair amount of trouble, but the fact that the Germans
are starting to feel uneasy and insecure is, whether ~uetified or not, a
political reality that the alliance must take 3nto account.
The first thing it needs to do is to 13steri more closely to what Her.r Genscher,
the foreign minister, has been saying recently about the need for Europe
to put aside bickering and develop a stronger voice on ma3or political
issues. The next thing is ~o look more closely at the contribution which
West Germary can make to the alliance. It 3s still understandably inhibited
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by its pasc.--or by the lingering suspicions of its neighbours--from reaching
too obviously for the leadership of Eurupe, but that is not the main issue
or the best way of looking at the problem.
The stress which West Germany now feels has been made worse by pressure
from Washington and Paris to choose between its Eastern and Western
relations. Washington has wanted West Germany to line up with more
confrontational and even punitive policies towards the Warsaw Pact. The
French have begun to plague themselves with worries that West Germany
could slide into its own versi::= of Guallism, making private arrangements
with Moscow to the detriment of the alliance. This is one of the reasons
why they are pressing for more Europeans cooperation on defense. In the
sixties and seventies they could f launt their 3ndependence and mak e th eir
own advances to Moscow because they felt securely protected behind
West Germany. Now they feel lese sure of th eir ally.
These fears are exaggerated, but it 3.s true that the West Germans have been
made restive by the fact that the alliance is no longer united behind the
concept of detente wh ich they have faithfully pursued for mor.e than a
- decade--that is, mil itary balance comb3ned with a widening of political,
commercial, cultural and personal contacts. As they frequently point out,
it is not they who have changed but the Amer3cans.
This is a problem not just for West Germany b ut for the alliance, since
West Gennany is the strongest :nd the most vulnerable power in Europe, and
a vital cornerstone of th e alliance. It also happens to exemplify the
European dilemsna of being wholly dependent fo r its security on the
United States without having sufficient influence over American decisions.
It is not drifting into neutralism but could drift into still greater
dissaffection with th e alliance if its own interests are insufficiently
respected, or seen as in conflict with those of its allies.
The immediate key to the problem is to see that the conflict is in fact
illusory. West Germany's eastern policies are not a liability but an asset
to the alliance. Th ey have opened up Eastern Europe to Western influence,
contributed to an amelioration of conditions in European Europe, and given
the states of Eastern Europe a stake in detente which the Russians cannot
wholly tgnore. During this period, too, the i3�ological appeal of the
Soviet Union to Western opinion has sunk to its lowest ebb since 1917. All
this has co ntributed significantly to the security of Western Europe and has
noC led to any diminution of the West German defence effort, which continued
to increase even when American defence spending was dropping.
It would help nobody, except possibly the Russians, if all this work were
abandoned and the Iron Curtain allowed to descend again across Central
Europe. Yet this diff icult balance of military preparedness w ith political.
openness is difficult for some members of the present American administra-
tion to comprehend. They see it as weakening their global confrontation
with the Soviet Unio n. In fact it does nothing of the sort except in the
difficult area of punitive sanctions. It has been difficult for the
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- West Germans to find ways of regietering disap~roval of Soviet actions in
Afghanistan and Polaizd, for instance, without putLi:~g ~t risk some of
the gains of detente, rhough they were among the fe a to keep their athletes
away from the Moscow oly~pics.
'This is a dile~a which cannot be wholly resolved. It can, however, be
ameliorated. Firstly, the alliant:e must accept that West Germany's
eastern relation.s are not only a vital German interest but also an alliance
interest. Any attempt to force West Germany to sever them would be doomed
to failure and damaging to the alliance. This will remain true even if
there is a change of German government in West Gerraany. The Christ3ans
Democrat5 make grea.t play with promises of greater devotion to the alliance
but in pow er they would find German interests unchanged. Therefore, the
alliance should come to accept that when sanctions are called f.or the
West German contribution to them will be less than that of some other
_ states. This is a reasonable price to pay for larger dividencls that
the alliance gains from Ge~~-man policies. It is also a reinsurance against
Germa.n disaffection with che a113ance.
To compensate, however, the West Germans need to widen their view and show
more un~erstanding for America's global problems. If they are to represent
th e interests of the alliance in Europe they must recognize that the
United States is representing their interests and defending their security
' around the globe. Among other things they should b e ready to earma.rk
troops for operations outside the NATO area. This would impress American
opinion and buy much needed influence over the way in which the force is
used. They have constitutional problems here (Gern~an forces are bound to a
defensive role) uut these could b e overcome. They also have pol3tical
problems which are more intractable. But this 3s the sort of direction
in which the West Germans should be looking if they are to win wholehearted
alliance support for the3r valuable role in Europe.
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspaper Limited, 1982
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POLITICAL ITALY
COMMUNISTS' LOCAL REACTIONS TO 'THIRD WAY'
Milan IL SOLE-24 ORE in Italian 14, 18, 20 Feb 82
[14 Feb 82 p 3]
[Text] Milan--At the "Palmiro Togliatti" section in via Palermo, the picture
of the late lamented PCI leader is only the third fram the left in the rear
rnw. In the center, between him and Gramsci, a gigantic Lenin is enthroned
with a red flower in his buttonhole. He stands with legs spread wide almost
as though he is blacking the road to the proponents of the "third road." It
is with this cumb ersome presence over his head that Napoleone Cola3anni,
senate communist, tried for 3 hours last Tuesday night to explain to the
militants what it means to practice to turn one's back on the Soviet
revolution and the Gosplan, and to plant both feet in a market economy.
It is diff icult to say whether he succeeded. However, not everyone showed
he appreciated the lesson. A"kabulista" [probably pro-Afghanistan], a youth
with a heavy beard and a hippie shirt said, "You speak well, Comrade Senator.
An alliance with the middle classes, democratic planning, business
independence, are all very beautiful things. It's a shame, however, that the
bosses lower the boom, fire people, and close the plants. How can we answer
them with round tables?"
The latest decisive shift that Berlinguer impressed on his party is meeting
with greater resistance than expected. The pro-Soviet supporters of
Armando Cossutta are champing at the bit, and the "third road" is still
enveloped in fog. There is no time to lose. Every day that passes without
a precise explanation of the proposal increases confusion and disorientation,
and gives aid to those who have a nostalgia for the great socialist
fatherland. All the leaders and brains of Bottegha Oscure [Communist Party
Headquarters] fram one end of the country to the other were mobilized in
this great campaign for political literacy. The debate on the Polish affair
and on the detachment from the USSR is mtxed with that on the choices of
econornic policies, on what is to be done here and now.
And the groups do not always agree. There are communists "of the Right" who
are determined to take the road of Western Social Democracy who privately
_ confess they have no sympathy for those romanzics in Solidarity, and who
might even prefer the technocrats of East Germany. There are also communists
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"of the Left," labor 6upporters of the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of
Labor] who took courses in the Moscow party school, and who instead believe
that it is perfectly right that the Poles should go on strike for a shorter
work week.
Colajanni has never had tender feelings toward this leftist group. Like
Amendola, h~ is convinced that to a large extent it is resgonsible for the
reverses suffered by the PCI in recent years. He says, "They pass tt:emselves
off as revolutionaries and they accuse us of being social democrats, but they
are the same ones who do nothing but ask for money at meetings. They are
the real social democrats, the true conservatives."
The trouble is that so fa~ the "cunservatives" in Berlinguer's party have
always won out. At the beginning nf the 1970's when the "historical
compromise" ~aas in a phase of incubation and the Botteghe Oscure eggheads,
the Peggios and the Barcas, were beginning to be admitted to the better
salons and to frequent the most exclusive economic conferences, indulging
in formal tributes to the market and busineas, the social democratization of
the PCI seemed to ma.ny an accamplished fact. Then came the years of national
unity and it was realized that the queation was a bit more complex and that
while at the Chiaramonte or Napolitano round tables there was praise for the
accord among the producers, in the plants the "hard and pure" of the CGIL
continued to stress "hands off ~obs" and to organize pickets against overtime.
The fact is that now, after everything that has happened, after the Fiat
dispute and the march of thE 40,000, with more than 2,000,000 unemployed and
hundreds of thousands on relief, the PCI prof essors of economics must start
_ again from zero in order to explain to the militants how and why the Soviet-
style planning will not work in Italy, and why capitalism should not be
completely discarded. This is a sign that the hard core has remained intact,
has weathered all the storms. And it is also a sign that the professors
_ were not able to weaken it, that the cultural reconversion was more a front
to capture the votes of the middle classes than it was a sign of the
collective awareness of the entire party.
On the other hand, the experien~e of n.ational solidarity caused discontent
first of all among the communist cadres. What did not work in that formula?
What errors were comm3tted.by the PCI leaders? And whose fault was it?
Colajanni has no doubts. .The name of the foremost guilty party is Franco .
Rodano. It is he, the great inspirer of the policy of austerity, who led
Berlinguer onto a wrong road: "Rodano believes that there must be an
authority who make decisions from on high about the needs of the people.
For him, everyone must be treated in the same way that a doctor treats a
child, making him swallow castor oil even if he dislikes it. In a.society
like that in Italy, this is not possible."
For Colajanni, economic planning has run its course. More than an ideological
choice, the market is a guarantee that the entire system is functioning well.
He says, "No other mechax?ism has yet been invented capable of ineasuring the
degree of satisfaction of collective needs. It is not for nothing that
there is a black market in centralized economies." Thus, a first firm f act
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is the rejection of the Sov;at-style ~::reaucratic state control. That is not
a great discovery, but it is something. There remains the other road, that
of soc~al democracy: But even that is not enough because it is based
exclusively on the redistribution of income and therefore does not function
when there is no longer any income to be distributed but only sacrifices to
be shared.
Then, what is the third road? According to Cola~anni, it would be more
exact to speak of the fourth road becauae pure capitalism without changes
must be added to the two preceding roads. Very well, this third or fourth
road, where will it go? What does it offer?
More than indicating solutions, Colajanni gets away with listing the problems.
Development has stopped, employment increases only in public services and
public administration, financial capital replaces industrial capital. Al1
this demonstrates a very simple thing that Marx had already foreseen: The
development of productive forces cannot take place within the framework of
the market system. How can this impasse be overcome? The communist senator
n
says, First of all it is a matter of identifying possible allies. Because
either we su~ceed in moving the real forces in the country, or we will merely
ma.ke propaganda without achieving anything."
Where are the allies sought by the PCI? Cola~anni answers, "It is enough to
look around. The credit crunch, the recession, does not merely damage the
working class. Businessmen also have felt its effects because if the banks
increase their profits, industries see their own decreased. We must appeal
to these groups even if they vote liberal or republican--without renouncing ~
our class view, but in order to create an historical bloc in fa~or of
development, against stagnation."
Apparently, the Gramsci concept of hegemony continues to flutter about even
in the new ~.ommunist road. The acceptance of a free market is nothing but
the corollary of a design that still looks to the center of the workers'
movement and the party whose representative it considers itself to be. It
is a plan that is still too vague to be able to establish to what extent it
repeats or diverges from the plans (and the errors) of the past.
Perhaps, in order to understand where the third road begins and where it
leads, there is no other way than to retrace the steps already taken: That
is, to see how the communists who count in the production and financial world
think and how they function. That is what we will try to do in the remaining
series of this investigative report.
[18 Feb 82 p 3]
[Text] Rome--Did the Polish crisis speed up or slow down the Italian
Communist Party's attempt to define and make a start on the third road? The
simplest hypothesis--but it would be more precise to say simplistic--is that
it speeded up the process. The detachment fram Moscow then would be the
- natural impact on international policy of the evolution of Italian communists
in domestic policy.
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Yet one cannot avoid thinking how Giorgio Amendola was extremely cautious in
~ foreign policy the more uninhibited he was in economic analyses of domestic
policy. "Don't .:reate f~r us the problem of a break with Moscow right now
when we are trying to help this country emerge from the econamic crisis with
a difficult and laborious policy of extreme austerity," replied the late
- leader to those who drew his attention to the K factor.
With an historical training and liberal traditions, Amendola was not open to
suggestions made in prescriptions by those Berlinguer advisers of that time,
_ such as Franco Rodano, who saw the choice of austerity as a lesson in poverty
that the Italian working class was supposed to transmit to the country. He
thought that austerity was imposed by facts, but could be directed only with
difficulty by the communist rank and f ile. The Amendola who made pitiless
analyses of the incongruity in activities of the trade-union Left; the
Amendola who criticized the violence at the Fiat plant; who did not ~oin the
chorus of uncritical exaltation of the trade-union ~ouncils; that Amendola
was not the same gladiatorial Amendola in regard to Moscow. And even though
history is not made of ifs and buts, it can perhaps be thought that today the
late leader would have more than once turned up his nose on hearing
referencea to Walesa and Solidarity. Perhaps that would have been too much
of a reminder of the tr~de-union extremism of a certain part of the Italian
FLM CISL [Italian Federation of Meta1 Workers Confederation of Italian Workers
Union].
At this point, the second hypothesis becomes legitimate. We may ask ourselves
whether the Polish Berlinguer in foreign policy w~uld not wind up by taking
on the identity of a Berlinguer who was trained in domestic policy at the
gates of the Mirafiori. In brief, the further the communist secretary moves
from Moscow, the more he must show himself to be--in order to avoid causing
too much unhappiness among the rank and file--unwilling to be flexiUle in
damestic policy.
This hypothesis seems to be backed up by a kind of implicit confirmation from
the progress of debate in communist sections on the Polish question and on
the beginning of the third phase. A few nights ago there was a long
discussion on this in a section of the histor~ical center of Rome. It was the
Monti Esquilino section. It is a section of the inter-classist Rome where
university professors and artisans live. Therefore, it is a section which is
the headquarters for butchers as well as the Bank of Italy cell. Giorgio
Napolitano participates in the debate. He is perhap.s the moet "rightest"
of tr~e communists' leaders.
But let us proceed in orderly fashion. The sma1Z hall is packed with more
than 100 persons and the meeting begins on time. The section secr~tary
is a youth of about 30 years old. His report is cautious. He says he agrees
with the line established by the leadership on Polish events. He calmly
- suffers several interruptions. ("We don't give a damn about Poland. Let's
talk about the electric light bill." Another sayss "You look like the Pope
to me. Always talking about my Poland." And still another, "Look here, I
wasn't excommunica;!-d by Russia, but by Pius XII in 1948.") The secretary
proceeds coldly, and onl}~ at a certain point does he say, "There is too
much nervousness among the comrades."
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And then he made some concessiona to that nervousness. Naturally not in
~ foreign policy, but in do.aestic pQlicy. And he concludCd his report saying
that preparations for the elections must be made even if the PCI does not
want them, because Craxi and Piccoli have already begun their respective
~lection campaigns. He adds that above all it is necessary to raise the
sights and the level of the struggle aga{nst the Spadolini government. He
concludes, "The 16 percent ceiling cannot be totally accepted." And then
the debate continues. We ignore the most heated statements, those of the
pure and hard pro-Ka.bul group who are numerous. Let us~look at those by the
persons who first say "I agree," and then add many buts.
"But comrades, I have a doubt." The person speaking is an elderly professor
of economic geography for many years a militant in the PCI. "I agree that
_ the workers support Solidarity. As communists, we cannot but be on the side
of the workers. But was this crisis really necessary? We knew for some time
how the situation was in Russia. Even the leaders, who have been the same as ~
always, knew how things were. I was offered eontrabantlrubles 10 years ago in
Red Square. But why the polemics right now? This is why I have doubts: I
would not want this position to be related to PQland like the three articles
in RINASCITA in 1973 related to Chile." The reference was to the article in
which, using Chile as his sub~ect, Berlinguer began to speak of the historical
compromise.
In substance, the rank and file comrade, a professor of geography, asks
himself if the shift in foreign policy does not seek to mark a sensational
change in domestic political direction; or whether it serves merely to
camouflage the disaster of the choice announced by the articles in RINASCITA ~
in 1973.
The doubt remains unanswered. It is necessary to wait. But from the debate
in the Monti section, there emerges a strong scepticism regarding the leaders.
In brief, it is not only Jacoviello who asks Pajetta: "Is it possible that
the leaders should always be the same?" The rank and file also strays and
an old militant (a Tuscan pensioner who moved to Rome) after having contested
everyone and everything except the Soviet Union, said emphatically: "In my
time, there were Concetto Marchesi and Vittorini, and the secretiary was
Palmiro Togliatti; now we have Tortorella and Cerroni, and the secretary is
Mr Berlinguer." No one applauded. But no one told him to be quiet or
protested. �
And what about the third road? It is understandable that this will take
second place compared with the Polish trauma. Yet it is discussed even in
the Monti section. And it was the comrade from the Bank of Italy section who
introduced the question.
He said, "I fully share the party's position on Poland. It is a precise
assessment of the crisis in the Eastern societies, that are increasingly more
distant from us because of socialization by coercion and single-party
democracy. But that is not enough. Now it is necessary to translate that
choice on another level. It is necessary to move from the shift to the third
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road; to seek new balances between the state and the market; to deeply study
th~ processes and the gradualism of the revolution. In brie~, it is necessary
to link the communist economic document step by step with the Polish choice."
'~Jhen he replied, Giorgio Napolitano certainly was in agreement with what the
Bank of Italy said. But more than expressing his pleasure with the agreement,
it is necessary to corre~t the dissent and, then, the third road remains above
all the definition of what it is not rather than an indication of what it
- will be. The formula goes like this: "neither USSR nor social democracy in
Giorgio Napolitano's lexicon; neither Russia nor Craxi" in the more colorful
- language of the youthful section secretary.
And so in about 4 hours of impassioned and laborious debate four-fifths of
the discussion was on Poland and one-fifth on the third road. It would be
foolish to try to draw meticulously accurate conclusions on such important
questions. The impression is that in any case, the third road must now deal
with one more obstacle, the crisis [in Poland]. It must be absorbed and
digested by the rank and file and for the time being it has not been. In
a moment of such uncertainty, the communists--and even Napolitano recognizes
this--are more worried about demonstrating what they remain, than they are
about explaining what they can become. But between the lines, discussion
continues about the third road. And we shall see that there are also those
who continue to do so, if not with definitive clarity, at least with great
energy.
[20 Feb 82 p 3]
[Text] Turin--Pietro Verzelletti did not wait for the Polish "shock" to
take his first steps on the third road. He began much earlier, in 1976,
when for the first time he took his seat in the administrative council of the
San Paolo Banking Institute of Turin, as a representative of the city
administration. From that time, day after day, this ex-high school professor
--former leader of the CGIL T~achers Union in the fiery years of the
contestation, and then a zealous functionary of the PCI Federation in Via
Chiesa della Salute--penetrated the sacred confines of the financial world.
Slowly he acquired a familiarity with the secret mechanisms of the capital
market. In effect, he became a banker. A"red " banker, perhaps the person
most heeded by party leaders on the sub~ect of credit. So much so that now,
every time there is a big problem of appointments or of banking policy, one
of the first called by Gerardo Chiaromonte, Botteghe Oscure economic expert,
is precisely Verzelletti.
But even in the garb of a manager, Professor Verzelletti has not lost the
timid and contrite air of a cleric devoted to the cause. When he is asked
how he managed to earn a reputation as an expert in such a short time, he
answers that he must give thanks to a great liberal, Luciano Jona,
ex-president of the San Paolo Bank, who died some years ago. "He taught me
the rudiments of the trade. For him, professionalism always took precedence
over the party card." But he adds quickly, "But this does not mean that I
have become an ascetic and neutral technocrat. At the bank, I learned to see
things from a certain point of view, but I did not forget that there exists
an external reality, a social dimension of problems."
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Verzelletti reached the top in the San Paolo Bank on a wave of national
solidarity, when Berlinguer's legions laid siege to the citadels of Christian
democratic pawer, raising the flag of moralization and war against division
by lot. It was the high point of the "flowering" of technicians Luciano
Barca and Gianni Manghetti, the "who's who" of the financial. Gotha [European
equivalent of Debrett's peerage] in the search for prestigious names who
could oppose party candidacies for the credit institutinns. It is useless
to say that they found not even one communist in those pages. And to sponsor
~ men like Arcuti, Milazzo or Storoni was nothing but a propaganda ploy disliked
even by those who were directly involved. With the technocratic banner thus
lawered, even the PCI moralists fell back on the road--less noble but more
trustworthy--of ma.king random choices.
In a city like Turin, the city of Gramsci, of the New Order and of the
factory councils, the conversion immediately ran into a very sticky situation.
The party cadres have a tradition of opposition; capital, identified with
Fiat, is seen as the enemy to be defeated; co-administration is almost
blasphemy. Under these circumstances, it was easier to f ind candidates
for the big Mirafiori council than for top posts in banks. So the party
had to get along as best it could. It fished out veterans like Egidio
Sulotto, the legendary head of the Fiat administrative council in the early
postwar period, who is now getting a pension as vice president of the Banca
Subalpina; or it appeals to outsiders, like Gastone Cottino, a crossover
socialist, a professor of business law, who was installed as head of
Finpiemonte, the region`s financial institr~tion. Or, finally, in the absence
of anything better, it has to be content with last-minute purchases like
that of Carlofelice Rossotto, at one time a rightist liberal, who suddenly
crossed over to the other shore and who now sits in the adminis~rative
council of the San Paolo Bank as a reward for supporting the red council.
Claudio Simonelli, a socialist, regional budget and planning councillor, says,
"The Piedmont co~unists have serious cultural limitations. They have not
understood how an industrial society functions and they do not have personnel
capable of administering it. For this reason, their attempts to get into the
boardrooms of the big shots of economic power failed miserably."
If what Simonelli says is true, the Verzelletti case is the exception that
proves the rule. A member of the executive, the limited membership group
which has the authority to make the most important decisions, "the professor"
is in fact the number 3 man at San Paolo, af ter President Luigi Coccioli
and Vice President Enrico Filippi. He recalls, "When I was appointed I was
interviewed even by the BBC. They wer.e amazed. How could a communist be in
a Fiat bank? Would he not be a trojan horse whose job was to destroy
capitalism from within? Now no one would ask me such a question..."
_ There are reported attempts to say exactly the opposite, that it was the bank
with its laws that overcame ideology: Once he had donned the banker's
doublebreasted suit, the communist detached himself from the party, he became
a part of the institution for which he worked, a manager like the others.
Verzelletti replies, "In a certain sense it is precisely how things happened.
That is also because, particularly at the beginning, I had the clear
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impression that my job was being underestimated by the comrades. Certain
party leaders go crazy if they lose the Trofarello city, but they make no
waves if thev lose a position in some administrative council. The tune has
changed a little with the co~ming of natianal unity and the explosion of
inflation. They then became aware that knowledge of economic and financial
policies is essential if they want to be a force in government."
In a city where the pro-worker spirit of the PCI is sti11 very strong, a
reformist like Verzelletti certainly did not have an easy life. He asks,
"Do you remember the conference on the Fiat in 1980? I worked on it and we
gave the militants a mass of data, we put them on guard agains~ th~ risks
of maximalism. They did not listen to us. But then facts demonstrated that
our analysis was correct."
But that was not the only time the "red banker" had to quarrel with his
comrades in the trade union. Verze112tti says, "In certain cases the plant
councils form a common front with the awners, and they defend the company
with drawn sword even if it is no longer vital. And they come here and ask
for money to save their jobs. It is a myopic attitude," he says. "But it
is equally myopic when the bank executive denies credit to the healthy
- plant which merely suffers from a momentary liquidity problem. It is
necessary to knaw how to distinguish; not to withdraw the umbrella when the
first problems arise. The more so at a time like this and in a place like
Turin where so many are in deep water but where there are also entrepreneurs
and managers who are very capable."
If there is one point in his party's "materials for a proposal on economic
policy" that Verzelletti ~ust cannot swallow, it is the statement that it is
necessary to "decongest the strong areas" of the nation in order to develop
the South. [H~ says] "If decongest means deindustrialize, I won't go along.
The advanced tertiary plan which is mouth-f311ing for so many, is merely
poetry. If we dismantle industry in the Piedmont, we can forget about the
takeoff in the South."
But what, specifically, can be done to help industry? Are.existing
instruments enough, or is it necessary to invent something different?
Verzelletti says, "The most urgent thing to be done is to create a pump for
financial recycling to help businesses that have a liquidity crisis. Not the
GEPI [Industrial Participations and Management Company], not a rescue
structure, but a pool of banks and financial experts who would intervene on
the basis of a documented opinion, formulated by a nonpartisan technical
conm?i t tee `
In addition to that, the San Paolo adviser is convinced that all the levers
of industrial policy must be put in order beginning with the Law 675 on
rehabilitation and reconversion. "It is a law that has not functioned because
it required too much regulation. The importani. thing it to aim well, to
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single out the general objectives of planning and then leave things to the
market."
If this were the third road, it would not after all be much different from
an honest social democratic statement of the case. But how many in the PCI
think as Professor Verzelletti does? .
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editrice I1 Sole-24 Ore�s.r.l. ~
6034
CSO: 3104/138
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POLITICAL NETH~LANDS
YAyLR CftITICI`L~;S INACTIUN, INDECISION OF CABINET
Amsterdam VRIJ NED~KLAND in Dutch 13 Mar 82 p 1, 2
~rticle by correspondents J. Van Tijn and Max van Weezel: "The
Hague's Great Secret: the Cabinet Does not Exist'!7
[~ex) The second Van Agt cabinet is governing in
a no-man's-land. No decision is taken there, no
knot is cut. The cabinet has now been going al-
most a year, the elections are approaching. It
is a war of nerves with everyone in his own ~ox-
hole. In a very good atmosphere,that goes without
sa,ying.
"If this cabinet would not have to, it would not be able to," the
cabinet architect at that time Doctor~,? Candidate Jan de Konig said
once when the second Van Agt cabinet was in the process of being
born. It was~then Jul,y or August. Later that cabinet took shape,
- then ~it just fell, was again helped to its feet t~,nd hobbled further
on. I3ut meanwhile it has been busy for a hal~ a year and it is time
to determine that the Van Agt cabinet does not exist. What must
have been a well kept secret, can no longe~r be concealed. The 15
ministers do not form a cohesive whole in a single respect, the
ministers really have nothing to do With ea,ch other and that which is
described as the cabinet consultation--the weekly meeting on Friday,
about which the prime minister st~ll reports--is no more than a non-
committal exchange of more or less interesting ideas.
"We have really not made a single decision in those 6 montha which
made sense," says one of the ministers, who only has one thing in
common with all his colleagues appearing in this article: that he does
not ~rant to be mentioned for any money with name and surname. He
continues: "Not thftit I really ha.ve ever heard anybody in the cabinet
talk nonsense. On the contrary, all have part of the truth in their
possession, only that they are not able to combine those truths to-
gether. And secretary of state who has already spent some time in
the profession says resignedly: "That cabimet impresses me as a com-
pletely powerless group. I see ~rom the distance busy people who
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certainly want to accomplish something, but who are completely para-
lyzed. An incredible indecisiveness reigns there, nothing at all hap-
pens."
We move further along the somber procession. Another secretary of
state, who in the grey past was once again a member of a cabinet of
the same political composition, says: "In the Den Uyl cabinet, aYter
the difPicult formation, everyone had the idea: in any case, they are
now going to do something. But now it is a weary band. The cabinet
is there, but it belongs to no one. No one feels responsible ~or its
operation or continued existence. The entire cabinet has not deliv-
ered anything else until now, but a worn out jobs plan which does not
have a single connection with the rest of policy. That jobs plan is a
source of stale humor for one, shameful self-examination for another
and of surprise for everyone. Only Minister Joop den Uyl is a very
s~.tisfied man, because of the merc Pact that it exists. When it first
came to the cabinet, the PvdA ~abor Party] ministers delayed the mat-
ter. There were various reasons for that. There were those who were
afraid that Den Uyl, the party leader, would suf~er from the publicity;
others had motives which were based much more on their own interest.
For the employment plan as it was submitted lacked an important ele-
ment: financing. Consequently, Minister of finance, doctor of laws,
I~ons van der Stee, did hia utmost to avoid contact with his colleagues .
in social affairs and employment about that financing. On the insti-
gation of his right hand, the national budget director, Dr Bart
LeBlanc, ~ormer PvdA member, brought at that time, as a talented young
man, by Prime Minister Den Uyl into the ministry o~ general a~fairs,
Van der 5tee even cancelled agreements which had already been made.
In circles in finance and the top CllA ~hristian Democratic Appeal7
leadership, the fear of Den Uyl is sometimes greater than of the devil
himself in the bishop's palace in Roermond. Especially PvdA ministers
such as Marcel van Dam and Andre van der Louw were angry that jobs
should be withdrawn from their fields, which would then again turn up
at social affai.rs and employment. That was the reason it was urged
everywhere that Den Uyl and Van der Stee should again talk with each
other. It happened this way and Van der Stee came, in fact, with an
additional contribution, especially to l~osen the puxse strings. It
made the jobs plan at least so much more substantial that Den Uyl came
bac)c in the cabinet a week later with it. None of those present still
reatly understand the fact it was approved there. Even more emphati-
cally: fa.r from all the ministers are sure whether it really was ap-
proved. Une of them says: "I thought that day: oh god: what must we
do now? I was frightfully down because of the euphoria of some that
this was in. I thought: in? What is in? I was really r~~raid that
Joop would be torn to pieces in the newspapers and I and a few others
were happy as children that did not appear to be the case the next
day. Joop had fought for it with all his might and most did not be-
grudge him the result. But there was also sadness: if you consider
how little that represented and that we still accepted it. And then
we had been busy with a crucial point in the cabinet's existence:
makin; a decision.
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Several C1)A ministers were asked why their party finally had decided
to let Den Uyl launch his jobs plan. The nature of their answers
ranges from embarrassed to ridiculou~, the answers themselves amount
- approximately to this: Joop himself liked the plan so much that
every opportunity must be oPfered him to ste,nd on the banana peel him-
self. That is the first argument. The other two are more interesting
and connected with each other.
If it should come to a break in the cabinet--and that is at least
conceivable--the PvdA would never be able to assert in the election
campaign followin~? that the CDA had torpedoed the jobs plan. And the
PvdA would especially never have the opportunity to assert that it
was a better plan than it was. If no cabinet crisis comes--and that
- is even more conceivable--in any case, during the discussion about the
spring report, demands could be made on the PvdA with the ar~ument
that the CDA had helped the socialists With the "jobs plan".
The minister who had just been appointed spoke of a crisis: the cabi-
net had made a decision. In ~act, it was the first.
A genuine cabinet decision has been made twice until noW, that means:
A meeting of the council of ministers, called by the chairman and
prime minister, who has been referred to ad nauseum as masterful, has
- led to a vote twice. The first time was that night in October, when
they voted on financing of an unemployment plan. Consequently, that
night the cabinet fell immediately. The second decision had something
to do with paying the salaries of European o~Yicials, but t'hat cannot
have been very impressive. None of the government members we ap-
proached clearly remembers precisely what that decision involved.
As for the rest, there is no cabinet. There is a gathering of minis-
ters which ~neets regularly on Friday~ sometimes for a whole day, often
for a few hours in the Treves room in the~inner court in The Hague.
It does not meet any longer at the Catshuis ,~prime minister's resi-
dence7 as was the case the last 10 years. That residence was being
rebuilt for a long time, but the restoration work has been completed
for some time. Still ~he ministers oP this cabinet--at l~east, all
to~ether--are no lon er invited by their leader to a welcome cold buf-
fet on Princess Day ~ay the chamber opens7. Rumors in the gossip
circuit that Van Agt prefers not to entrust his precious domain to
, such a bunch of crude fellows from the PvdA, whose table scraps you
may Pind days later under the empire chairs or their cigar butts in
ttie flower pots, are not con~irmed anywhere. Still more convincing
re~,sons do not seem to exist. "It meets pleasantly in the Treves
room, you are forced to genuinely discuss and not tempted to walk
around in the garden," some say somewhat sheepishly. As iP it ma~tters
in what place the ladies ~.nd gentlemen cannot reach a decision.
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And that is not exaggerated. Not a single decision has yet been
made in the council o~ ministers about investment policy and in the
field of economic a~fairs. Aftea~ the endless questions o~ jurisdic-
tion and defining of assignments in the summer between the ministers
involved, mutual agreements were made in which, Terlouw, according
to colleagues who were not unfavorably disposed to him, had been
able to get by very well. Moreover, Terlouw is naturally the cabi-
net's problem child. The question of the natural gas profits and
more in particular the so-called contract with the oil companies has
left its m~,rks. And not because Terlouw ~eels the PvdA has stepped
on his toes, but especially beca.use he lcnows his own party has left
him in the lurch. For his party associates Van Mierlo and Zeevalking
were in the cabinet ready together with the PvdA ministers to advo-
cate stiffening the agreements with Shell and Esso. Both D'66 ~emo-
crats '667 members were even ready for a decision in which the
- state's share would be increased, if the oil companies would refuse
a dra.stic revision of the "gentleman's agreement." It Pinally did
not go throu~h because Terlouw in the D'66 parliaraentary group sug-
gested tha.t he would like to link his portfolio with the question.
Moreover, the I'vdA group was warned by the leadership of the D'66
group: "If you want the bad relationship between our party le~.ders
in the cabinet to work through into the parliamentary group, you must
especially proceed that w~,y." And that led to the ~inal completely
harmless Pvd.A position in the Second Chamber.
Not a single fundamental cabinet decision has yet been talcen in the
fielcl of defense and foreign policy. "At the ministries," we manage
to hear, "there is really still no beginning o~ a new orient~.tion."
Yan der Stcel is seldom in the council of ministers and if he is
there, he Kills time silently reading diplomatic telegrams, but he ~
has th~.t in common with many of his predecessors. ~~e does not say ~
word about any ~ther subject,but foreign policy in the cabinet meet-
ings. "You cannot expect that of Max," someone says in extenuation.
In ~eneral, only few ministers speak. Van Agt hardly speaks, unless
to round off, r~strain or delay discussion. It appears he does all
three in masterly fashion. "He has an unusually clear mind" a non-
pa.rty associate, minister, says respectfully. He determines per-
fectly where the difficulties are, i~ they are not too big he mas-
sa~es them ~.way, sums up the matter and usually refers a problem to
a smaller group of ministers. Reports are mostly accepted without
much discussion. They are almost always from secretaries of state.
A number of ministers seldom say anything. Among them are Zeevaking,
for example, and to t}ie surprise of many, Andre van der Louw. 1`Iore-
over, the latter is struck by the reactions to his employment plans.
~11so impressed is the minister De Ituiter, who is silent by nature
~.nci who has been very interested in the response to the preliminary
draft oP the antidiscrimination law. Minister V~,n llijk, also no
orator, especially brought by Van Agt into the cabinet to combat
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leftist extravagance, is not he~,rd much--and that is hardly regretted.
(No one knows if he is affected somewhere). Nloreover, the fact that
t2ie minister of development cooperati"on will again assert himself in
~ the discussions about the spring repoxt, is assumed by his colleagues.
~Iis predecessor, De Koning, was also not heard much, but is still re-
garded by all parties as a unifying and conciliating figure. It is
considered somewhat ridiculous that he needed some time to get
acqua,inted with subjects such as "the most calving dPcree on a
na,tional basis" and the "aqricultural quality decision" at the Minis-
try of Agriculture, which he did not want, but which Van Agt forced
on him. Now he is there again and although his role is not as impor-
tant as in the previous cabinet when the CDA group still had a left
wing, ~�ith men like Van llam and Van Tiier].o~ he should be able to pre-
vent the cabinet from falling apart in an all-out effort.
Van Dam and Van Mierlo both contribute regularly to the discussion,
just as Van Thijn and especially Van Kemenade who has turned~out to
be the most tireless speaker, a~ter Den ~Tyl. Til also "occasionally
wants to break loose, and then we come to the four ministers where
everything seems to beat around the bush a bit. We have already men-
tioned Van Agt. Friend and foe say that he has changed af~er 6 weeks'
- absence in Nijmegen and in Madeira. They report that he no longer
keeps the cabinet in a constant crisis atmosphere. But: nyou natu-
rally never kno~v it with him. Every press conference, every tel.e-
- vision interview is again a new adventure. He has already set things
on edge from behind the scenes several times completely u~aexpected.
You never know whether or not he will. come on Friday with a report or
other document which will carry the matter to the extreme.
Van der Stee is the faithful servant of his prime minister. He
belonqs to the smal.l oroup which Van Agt always consults about finan-
cial problems. ("Fons i~ iuure the bulldog in tha power o~ Dries,"
according to a p~rty member-minister.) There also belong to thta.t
group the (nonparty member) Leble,nc, already mentioned preniously,
Piet Steenkamp, tLgain extremely active behind the scenes, the leader-
ship of the Central Ylanning Bureau and party member, Wagner (Shell).
The following do not belong, at least in the first place: Lubbers,
party chairman Piet Bukman and commissioner, Selle Zijlstra. He
_ sees Bukman and Lubbers every�Thursday evening during discussion
with the parliamentary group leadership and dailjr in the party execu-
tive committee and ~aith the ministers, at least, i~ he comes.
In all social a.nd economic discussions in the eabinet, the prime
minister and the ministers of finance, social affairs and economic
affairs are naturally involved. Other members often have the feeling
of being outsiders in a ritual dance which began last summer. "If
you hear those four, you certainly know that the cabinet still is
continuing," says a minister.
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Some are dead tired from the speeches of Joop den Uyl, which now are
somew}iat shorter, but still a,re regarded as very long, but sometimes
everyone listens with hardly concealed admiration to Qne o~ his
"m~,sterful speeches." "Especially ~rhen he defended his jobs plan,
he was sometimes brilliant," says a colleague. "I must then think
of what Pompidou said once long ago when he had spoke up for some-
thing at a top European conference: Who is that street f ighter from
Holland?" A CllA colleague. says: "Then you see Joop in his grea,t
shining role: about unemploytnent as the great scourge of our time.
You see then that some think: give.the man that money, they really
are under the influence.'~
Consequently the atmosphere is freer, Van Agt and Den Uyl put up
with each other better, ministers of diff erent parties occasionally
eat with each other (Van der Stee, Van Mierlo, Van der Louw and Van
Dam--De.Ruiter has asked since November when they will once eat
together), as a cabinet? No, that does not happen. The cabine-t is
described to us as a sort o~ steppe la,ndscape, in which no one really
functions.
The ministers are regularly in their degartments, ~Chey are very dili-
gent administrators there, they appeal especially a great deal for
contin.uity of management, if it involves economies. In other words,
the old policy must be continued ~or economies would mean irrevocable
savings.
~very Friday is then the great no-man's-land. No one ventures out
of his foxhole, no one ventures forth with a genuine proposal or a
real idea. Yan Agt and Van der Stee especially see in Den Uy~ the
great spendthrift. Together with Terlouw a.nd Van Thijn, they form
th~ cabinet's pentagon. When the pentagon has agreed on wh~.t bill
Den Uyl may send to the Council of State, the minister of soci~.l
affuirs ~.nd employment changes precisely so much in the text that his
prime minister again has the bill brought back from the Council of
State. Van llam is "now obsessed by the fact that two times two is
four and he is no longer open to a,ny other single idea." ~When
lle Ruiter hears thzt we in the Netherlands must go back (in expendi-
tures, wages anc~ benefits) he wants to know to what year. "Lvery-
thing, everything is delayed, we never make a decision on ~,nythir~~,"
says a minister despairin~.ly. Even the homework which we were given
by De Galan ~.nd H~.lberstadt must still be done. Great things
achieved? Lh...yes, that Health Insurance Act went to the Council
o~ State. Dut besides I do not.have the ~eeling o~: all right, that
is through; we are governing, we have don~e th~.t for once.
.1nd meanwhile t}ie CDA group has gone to sleep, ttie PvdA group--
potentially cut in half--is disillusioned and constantly between the
hammer and anvil of the pt~,rty ~xecutive committee and their own
ministers and the D'66 ~roup is peevish and especially dis~,~~pointed
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ir. t}ie electoral hero, Ja,n Terlow. Besides the cabinet, on the other
~iand, the leaders of the parliamentary groups do govern somewliat: in
recent weeks there have been intense contacts between group leaders
Lubbers, Meijer and Brinkhorst and their deputies De Graaf, va~n der
Hek and Engwinda and their financial experts Gerritse, Woltgens and
Nypels. With the full understanding that a miracle must happen, the
cabinet's pentagon w~,nts to work out of the spring report, they are
trying to consider alternatives. Un~ortunately, the amount of energy
which that group is putting in that undertakin is not proportional
to t}~e result. Lubbers (CDA) and Meiler (PvdA~ are somewhat less
Purt~~er apart in their opinions than their kindred spirits in the
cabinet, but the main features remain the same and the powder is kept
dry. One of the particip~,nts in this consultation says resignedly:
"It naturally must still ultimately come out of the cabinet. Now,
t�hat social-economic triangle there does not listen at all to each
other. And then there is still a prime minister who muddles it all
up." ~
It is a precarious ~.tmosphere for politics, that is certain. The
cabinet c~,n be blown up b,y no one without elections following. It is
dis~,strous for the Pvd~1, but economies such as those of Van A~t and
V~.n der Stee wi11 a.lso frighten the PvdA voters. D'66 leaders expect
th~Lt their con~;ress again will express a preference for a cabinet
with the PvdA, and. a very prominent CDA member says about the possi-
bility of cabinet with the WD ~eople's Party for Freedom and.
llemocracy7: "even llries van Agt knows by now that such a cabinet
will lack the necessary support." Then he immediately adds: "I am
.fascinated Uy the gap between reality and ~antasy in the PvdA. llries
learned at his cost from the previous period with the VVD, nothing
resulted from the so-called economies then. I must admit I do not see
how that distrust between the CDA and PvdA will ever' disappear, right
~,way.
"Those PvdA ministers made a mistake when they stepped in: they h~.d
visions of a new policy. But they must usu~.lly wheel along the old
baggage. They a.re caught up in a gigantic continuity apparatus.
But that distrust remains. In the October night of crisis Joop den
Uyl said desperately: 'Albeda gets a damned.1,900 million--he thinks
that sounds more impressive than 1.9 billion--and you do not even
want to give me 300 million.' Joop also did not understand that he
was 4 years too late."
r(e~,nwhile the politicians rattle through The Hague like calculators
~one m~.d. The 1 point 6~.nd the 3 point so and so billions roll over
the t~.ble,while no one indicates coneretely what is to happen with
~.11 those economies. Officia.is weave webs in which benefit recipi-
ents h~.nQ powerl_e~sly, telecasts are plastered. with incomprehensible
numbers, behind which social dramas are concealed. Five or 6 years
a~!o llries van Agt said that he would rather__live in Belgium, because
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everything there was so much more sensible and uncomplicated. Now
his friends, the christian democrats, whom he once called his model,
have ma.de that country such a mess that Belgiwn ho,s become the hor-
rible example for people in the Netherlands who do not want to
economize.
"It is a few minutes betore twelve~" Van Agt remonstrated with his
audience, more than three times the avera~e, in the acceptance of a
disorganized report on unemployment. And just like earlier last
week, he mentioned "brave decisions" which would have to be made.
"Dries does nat want to go down in history as the man who let the
financial deficit in the Netherlands run up unconscionably high," a
leading Pv~?x member says in The Hague. And that sounds ~recisely
like what was always said about ICennedy-Johnson Nixon: He does not
want to go down in history as the president who led America to a
defeat in Vietnam."
After the statement about the brave decisions~ Yan Agt le~t the meet-
ing, where the crisis sherry was just brought in, in a restrained
little sprint, as if he wanted to attack unemployment right outside
the Nieuwspoort press center. In ~act, he cancelled hardly an hour
later a meeting of the Pentagon (besides Yan Agt~ consequently Van
der Stee, Aen Uyl, Terlouw and Van Thijn, through official channels)
scheduled for that evenin~;, Without giving reasons. Accordingly that
meeting would have again discussed the spring report~ unemployment
and the financial de~icit, which Van Agt ran away from.
The prime minister dined well that evening in the more th~,n excellent
Royal Restaurant, with among others, the governor of Limburg Prov-
ince, Dr J. Kramers. There are also elections there on 24 rlarch.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 VN/BV Weekbladpers
8490
CSU: 3105/133
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MILITARY FRANCE
' MIRAGE F1-CR TO UPDATE AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY .
Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 6 Mar 82 pp 15, 48
[Article by J.M.: "Mirage F1-CR, Successor to the Mirage III-R")
[Text] At the beginning of 1983, Dassault is to deliver to the French Air
Force the first one of the 62 Mirage F1-CR aircraft ordered by the Air Force
starting in February 1979. The F1-CR is a version of the F1-C specializing
in aerial reconnaissance and is to replace the Mirage III-R and RD aircraft
in the 33rd Reconnaissance Squadron based at Strasbourg.
The first Mirage III-R made its first flight in November 1961. Nine air forces
ordered 159 of those aircraft (including Mirage 5-R aircraft). Twenty of
the Mirage III-RD, which came out subsequently, were built for the French
Air Force. The five OMERA type 31 cameras on the Mirage III-R were replaced,
on this aircraft, but OMERA type 33 and 40 cameras, while the avionics were
improved by means of the installation of a doppler navigation system, a gyro-
stabilized collimator, a lateral sweep radar, and so on.
The Mirage F1-CR, whose prototype made its first flight* at Istres on 20 Novem-
ber 1981 (consequently, exactly 20 years after the first flight of the Mirage
III-D), obviously benefits not only from the advantages peculiar to the F-1,
but also from the progress made in the field of equipment. In fact, the air-
craft receives, alongside its OMERA type 40 (panoramic) and 35 cameras, an
infrared unit, an OMERA 360 recorder, a ULISS 47 (SAGEM) inertial navigation
system, a Cyrano IV (MR) radar, and so on.
The present prototype is, in fact, a Mirage F1-C-200 (that is to say an F1-C
; equipped with an in-flight refueling pole), taken off the production line
and converted into the F1-CR for purposes of developing the new version. A
second F1-CR, made in accordance with the same process, is undergoing gerteral
assembly at present at Villaroche. Next will come the 62 F1-CR mass-produced
aircraft, to be delivered in 1983.
In view of its equipment and its performance (the performance of F1-C air-
craft is retained entirely) and especially of its autonomy, the F1-CR should
be an excellent close-in and distant aerial reconnaissance aircraft. It
* This information was not published until recently.
~ ~
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r~urc urri~ttw u~~ V1VLI.
should be mentioned that a demonstration of the capability of the Mirage F1
to operate at long distance was already made on 29 January 1980.: On that
day, four F1 eircraft, refueled in flight by a KC~135, f lew, in fact, from
Solenzara (Corsica) to Djibouf i, or a distance of about S,OOD kilometers,
in 6 hours.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982 .
10,042
CSO: 3100~432
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~
MILITARY IT~Y
GENERAL CAPPUZZO EXPLAINS ROLE OF ARMY
Milan IL MONDO in Italian 12 Mar 82 pp 18-20
[Article by Gianni Rossi: "Z'his is My Revolution"] ~
[Text] How does the army fit into daily reality on the eve of the year
2000? What repercussions do the anti-military and pacifist movements have
on the closed :~tructure of the army? Is an army drawn from the masses still
relevant at a time when technology and information systems have superseded
conventional combat? These and other sub~ects were broached by IL MONDO in
a talk with General Umberto Cappuzzo, who will be 60 in April. The chief of
staff of the army (and a former general comn~ander of the Carabinieri), he is
unquestionablq the top expert in the field on "global strategy" (he has
taught a course at the military academy of Citavecchia), social techniques,
and public relations.
According to General Cappuzzo, the chief cause of young people's negative
attitude toward the military establishment lies above all "In the dominant
idea of an immense ~oj~, of a freedom no one can threaten. Z'he atmosphere
of detente which we are living in nourishes their idea that military service
is senseless, contradictory."
As Cappuzzo said recently at the ISTRID [Institute for Defense Research and
Study] convention held on 26 January in Rome, these reactions "are typical
of the attitude prevalent in Western countries; the position of people living
in socialist countries like the USSR, or in Israel--countries with strong
ideologies--is different." "The fact is," explains:Cappuzzo, "that we are
feeling the effects of a strategy of deterrence based on the balance of terror
which is so obvious in Western Europe. As members of NATO we share a
common security. Now that this peaceful and defensive situation--imposed on
us by fear of nuclear warfare--has been established, we forget that we owe
! it to military instruments." The top circles of the military feel that
' Europeans indulge in disproportionate criticism of the military world. "The
idea of disarmament, for example," says CappuzZO, "is fine if it is mutual, .
progressive and controlled. Unilateral disarmament could induce our adversary
to take advantage of it and commit aggression."
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At any rate the allies' chiefs of staff and their associates talk less and
less of traditional aggressive strategy and more and more of the concept
. of "indirect strategies," which can have the same disastrous effects in an
enemy country as direct aggression.
'~These are very subtle tools," explains the army chief of staff, "because
they link up with ob~ective factors like unemployment, social tensions,
terrorism, and the economic crisis. Indirect strategiea can be carried
out by destabilizing a country through the use of internal terrorism; the
creation of economic, technological and energy-related ties; or the over-
emphasis of ecological problems which are positive and worthy of respect in
themselves, but which can 1u11 people's minds if they are exploited to
achieve goals which depart from energy self-sufficiency."
Indirect strategies are used against everyone, allies and adversaries alike:
against whatever states are vulnerable because they are sub~ect to power
vacuums. In tlie past, the effects of these indirect strategies were achieved
by the coordinated use of all a country's forces. "Today, however,: says
Cappuzzo, "we are in a permanent state of warfare that affects all fields:
the economy, technology, trade, and ideology. This war has its casualties
in terms of unemployment, social tension and terrorism." But the
deterrent provided by superior military power is still valid, and often
induces a country to adopt positions of "psychological sub~ugation" in the
political arena with respect to an adversary.
Within the armed forces, a new concept is gaining ground today: that of
civilian solidarity. This is the "Copernican revolution" Cappuzzo has been
trying to promote for some time among military personnel. "We must shift
the debate and maintain that the armed forces are not constituted for war;
rather, they are essential for keeping the pesce." This has always been
Cappuzzo's philosophy.
Probably the armed forces' assistance in protecting the civilian population
in peace time will go a long way toward creating this new image, especially
for the army. Says Cappuzzo: "The increasingly important role played by
the Armed Forces in society to promote the well-being of the people in peace
time, for example througfi disaster relief, has a favorable impact on
public opinion, helping people to understand our efficiency and or state of
readiness."
But it is clear that the use of the army for civilian purposes "Must be
based on legal safeguards and utilization criteria, within limits defined
by the law. I don't think the country is in a state of guerrilla warfare,
so I don't think it is necessary to use army units in an anti-guerrilla
role."
The fact remains that despite the modernization of the military mentality
and organizational structure, choosing a military career is still not one
of the most attractive options for Italian youth. In Cappuzzo's opinion,
"Our structure is atypical and this atypicalness has to be paid for somehow.
I can be content with my lot because I rose ta the top, but how many of my
~
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classmates got left behind along the way? There were 540 in my class
initially; only 5 of us made it. What other profession starts with an
initial basic training course and then meets advanced courses, advanced
schools, training sessions abroad, etc, all along the way? The various
stages of the military career are divided by periods of study and selection.
It probably doesn't pay young people to go through all this today, unless
they are inspired by ideals. Adequate and diversified economic measures
- couLd facilitate the choice of a military life and stop the trend to leave
the military career to seek civilian employment."
Lack of housing and constant mobility due to promotions, together with family
disputes, are further sources of frustration which induce officers of all
ranks to try their luck--often successfully--at civilian jobs, although the
exodus is being slowed today by the economic crisis. In recent years the
main effort of the military has been to produce personnel--officers at all
levels--who are professionally well trained and highly specialized, able to
speak at least two languages correctly, and in the vanguard in the use of
- advanced technologies. "Membership in NATO,' says Cappuzzo, "has been an
important cosmopolitan force for individual personnel in the armed forces.
It has meant new methods of organization, new procedural standards, and a
search for and definition of counnon objectives in industry, experimentation
and training."
But could our commitments to our allies push Italy into adventures beyond
the boundaries established by the Atlantic Alliance? On this point
Cappuzzo, like Defense Minister Lelio Lagorio, is fairly reassuring: "I
don't think there is any chance of that today," he says. "That problem might
- arise later in the Mediterranean region, but any action would have to be
freely agreed on among the various allies' governments. Our flag is where
it should be today. Also because the logic of reason is prevailing over guns
in these hot spots. It would also mean pushing the others to extend their
spheres of influence. There are well defined zones now, and for the good of
the West Italy should act with its prestige within these zones."
Of course it is hard to make predictions for the future, but General Cappuzzo
is optimistic: I believe in an army which will be more and more a militia,
perceived by the Italian people as showing solidarity with the civilian
population above and beyond ideologies. This could also lead to structural
changes in the distribution of forces on our territory and different utiliza-
tion of resources and materials. If internal cohesion increases and takes
the form of solidarity regarding fundamental democratic freedoms, and if
the external threat changes, the system may change too, so that it belongs
to the whole country, including people not in uniform. Today the worth of
the dignity of the human being is taking precedence over everything else in
international society, across parties ,~nd ideologies. This is undoubtedly
a good thing, and it may have an effect on the threats hanging over the
world, forcing people to rethink arbitrary military aspirations, especially
those from the East.
i
COPYRIGHT: IL MONDO 1982
- 9855
CSO: 3104/151
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GENERAL INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
EUROPE PLANS CRYOGENIC ENGINE FOR POST-ARIANE 4 LAUNCHERS
Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 30 Jan 82 pp 30-35
~Article by Pierre Langereux: "Europe To Develop 100-Ton-Thrust Cryogenic Engine"~
~Excerpts~ It is now established that the forthcoming post-Ariane 4 generation
of European launchers, which are to remain in service until into�::the years 2000,
will make extensive use of cryogenic propulsion; that is, of the combination of_
= liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen, which is currently the world's most effective
available chemical propellant compound.
The Ariane 5 European launcher's prin~ipal innovation will thus be its cryogenic-
propellant second stage, which will use the powerful new HM 60 engine, the need
for which is unanimously recognized by the ESA ~European Space Agency~, the French
CNES ~National Center for Space Studies~ and the German DFVLR [German Research
and Experimental Institute for Aeronaut cs and Astronautics]
This new HM 60, 90-100-ton-thrust, cryogenic engine--whi~h should preferably now
be called the HIvl 100, or by some other designation (the SEP ~European Propellant
Company~ has proposed the name "VEGA")--will be the most powerful cryogenic engine
built in Europe.
The developmental cost of a shunt-flow, 75.-90-ton-thr.ust, HI~i 60 engine is esti-
mated at around 3.7 billion francs plus a margin of 800 million francs (20 per-
cent) for unforeseen technical contingencies, for an overall developmental cost
of 4.5 billion francs over a perioc~ of 8.5 years.
For a shunt-flow, 80-ton-thrust engine with a substantial (50-percent) thrust-
augmentation potential to 130 tons, the developmental cost is estimated at around
3.9 billion francs plus a margin of 400 million francs for unforeseen technical
contingencies (a smaller margin in view of the performance figures involved) and
800 million francs in supplementary development costs to attain maximum thrust,
hence a total of 5.1 billion francs over 10.5 years.
An integrated-flow, 80-130-ton-thrust engine (with an additional 20-percent
thrust-augmentation potential) would involve a basic developmental cost of around
4.9 billion francs plus 600 million francs for a contingency margiri and 1.2 bil- .
lion francs for supplementary development costs, totaling 6.7 billion francs
extending over more than 13 years (including contingencies~.
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Recurrent costs--that is, cost per engine on an assembly-line basis--are esti-
mated at 27 million francs for the shunt-flow, 75-90-ton-thrust engine; 32 million
francs for the shunt-flow, 80-130-ton-thrust engine; and 37 million francs for the
int~grated-flow, 80-130-ton-thrust engine.
~ The integrated-flow engine thus involves an additional developmental cost of from
1 to 1.5 billion francs, depending upon contingencies, over that of the shunt-flow
engine. Moreover, the adoption of a thrust augmentation potentiai adds 2 years to
the developmental phase for the shunt-flow engine, and 3 years for the integrated-
flow engine. Furthermore, according to Mr Jacques Borromee of the CNES, an
integrated-flow engine complicates the industrial distribution of the work in
Europe.
An Engine Without Thrust-Augmentation Potential
The CNES has therefore chosen for the I~I 60 the shunt-flow design without thrust-
augmentation potential, involving costs and developmental times only slightly
greater than for the shunt-flow, 75-30-ton engine, namely the HM 60 with a basic
thrust of 90 tons that can be increased to 100 tons (+10 percent) without any dif-
ficulty. It will be used in the second stage and optimized to carry 60 tons of
cryogenic propellants to achieve planned performance ratings (particularly 15 tons
into low orbit) with a two-stage launcher.
The solution adopted by the CNES--that of the HM 60 shunt-flow cryogenic engine--
minimizes the technical risks (in view of HM 7 experience), while making it pos-
sible for European technology to advance spectacularly. The 90-100-ton-thrust
HM 60 engine will in fact be 15 times more powerful than the 6-ton HM 7 being
used currently to equip the Ariane 1 rocket.
The CNES's choice is nevertheless very conservative, in that, it provides for
developing in Europe an enqine with performance figures and technologies compara-
ble to those of the J 2 cryogenic engine developed in the United States during the
1960's. When it enters service, therefore, at the beginning of the 1990's, the
European HM 60 will be based on a 30-year-old technology!
Nevertheless, this high-pressure HIrl 60 engine will be the most powerful European
engine and especially the most powerful cryogenic engine built in Europe. It
will also be the most powerful shunt-flow cryogenic engine operating at this
- pressure (100 bars) in the world.
The 90-100-Ton HM 60 Engine
The preliminary studies and developmental activities on the HIyi 60 engine are
currently being carried out under the responsibility of the SEO (France), which
is also responsible for the studies, the building and the testing of the gas
generator and the oxygen and hydrogen turbopumps. The MBB ~Messerschmitt-Baldow-
Blohm~ company (Germany) is responsible for the studies, building and testing of
the complete thrust chamber, given its previous experience (HI~I 7 and high-pressure
engines up to 280 bars). The Volvo Flygmotor company (Sweden) is charged with
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_
the stuc~y and building of the tur'bines (under an SEP subcontract~ and of the
space-flight divergent sect,ion (under an MBB subcontract). The SABCA [Anor~ymous
Belgian Society for Aeronautical Construction] firm (Belgium) and MAN [Augsbur~-
Nuernberg Machine Factory, Inc.] (Germar~y~ will also participate in the building
of the HM 60 engine.
The configuration currently being specified for the big HI~I 60 cryogenic engine
that is to equip the second stage of the future Ariane 5 launcher is thus that of
a shunt-flow engine (gas-generator type) with 90 tons of basic thrust in a vacuum,
and with an operating region allowing for an excursion of � 10 percent of thrust
(up co 100 tons) and of � 5 percent of mix ra~io (basic ratio 5.1). The specific
impulse of this new high-pressure engine could attain 444 seconds (in a vacuum),
with a combustion pressure of 100 bars and based on an expansion nozzle outlet
diameter of 2.3 meters (and a height of 4 meters). This overall dimensien of the
HM 60 engine permits a conventional separation of the launcher's stages (with
just one separation plan). _
According to a presentation made by Mr Marcel Pouliquen, the SEP's project man-
ager, the HM 60 engine consists of a regeneratively cooled combustion chamber and
an expansion nozzle (for flight in a space vacuum) cooled by a shunted hydrogen
flow. This chamber is fed by two separate turbopumps whose turbines are driven
in parallel by hot gases from the generator (which in turn is fed by a bleed-off
from the pump outlets). The gases are then ejected to the exterior by means of
two nozzles participating in the thrust.
The engine's mix ratio is governed by means of a valve placed in the liquid oxygen
circuit (at the pump outlet), so as to complete the thrust with a quasi-simul-
taneous depletion of the propellants, and so as to facilitate simultaneous in-
creases in speeds of the two turbopumps. The startup of the turbopumps, as well
as the firing of the combustion chamber and of the gas generator, is effectd by
means of pyrotechnic cartridges. The startup and shutdown sequences, as well as
the governing of the HM 60, are controlled by a computer (based on microproces-
sors), which is built into the engine. In flight, the engine can be steered on
two axes (pitch and yaw) by means of a universal joint connected to the injector
and actuated by screw jacks.
The oxygen turbopump consists of a single-stage centrifuqal pump driven by a
single-stage turbine; an inductor is situated upstream of the pump and driven at
the same speed. The bearings are placed between the pump and the inductor, and
between the dynamic seal and the turbine. They are cooled by liquid oxygen on the
pump ~ide and by liquid hydrogen on the turbine side; an absolute separation bet-
ween the oxygen and the hydrogen is obtained by means of a set of scavenged gas-
eous-helium dynamic seals.
The hydrogen turbopump consists of an inductor and two centrifugal pump stages
operating in tandem and driven by a two-stage, full-injection turbine. The bear-
ings are installed outside the turbine-impellers assembly, owing to the power
involved. All the bearings are cooled by liquid hydrogen.
The pressure and temperature conditions at the pump inlets require a critical
admis:ion pressure of less than 1.5 bars ior the oxygen and of less than 0.5 bars
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for the hydrogen, at the basic 90-ton thrust. During the engine-cooling phase,
a sealing device prevents any escape of hydrogen from the turbopumps to the
turbine. Axial balance of the turbopumps is obtained by means of a diaphragm
bt~ilt into the pump impellers. The materials used are: titanium ELS-EL1 for
the impellers, AU 4SG for the hydrogen turbopump inductor, AS 7G06 for the pump
housings, and Inconel 718 alloy for the hydrogen turbopump's turbine diaphragms.
The oxygen pump's ind4ictor and diaphragm are made of AU 4SG and AS 7G06 respec-
tively.
~ The turbines decided upon, based on preliminary studies, are of the supersonic-
action type; the geometry of the stators and blades will be determined by the
results of aerodynamic tests scheduled for this year. The hydrogen turbopump's
turbine has two stages, most of thE expansion being produced in the first stage:
The discharge obtained is supersonic in the first rotor and the second stator.
Studies on the oxygen turbopump's turbine have led to a single-stage, partial-
injection, supersonic-discharge version
The gas generator has a planar, liquid-liquid, convergent-nozzles injector and a
non-cooled chamber. The basic mix ratio of 0.9 requires a combustion temperature
of 880 degrees K, which is compatible with the characteristics of the chamber
walls and turbine vanes. The configuration of the injector elements will be
- optimized during the predevelopmental phase. A gaseous hydrogen-liquid oxygen
generator-faed system is also being studied.
The HM 60's thrust chamber consists of a univrrsal joint, an injector, an igniter,
combustion chamber and an expansion nozzle. All these components are nut-and-
bolt assembled to enable easy interchangeability during the developmental and
fine-adjustment test phases. But a welded version is planned for the flight
version of the engines, except for the terminal section of the expansion nozzle,
which will be separatable (to a sectional ratio of 20 for ground tests?.
The combustion chamber injector is of the coaxial-injection type. The injector
elements are arranged in concentric rows: The liquid oxygen is injected parallel
with the axi~ of the chamber and through the center slot of each element; the
gaseous hydrogen is injected through the annular slot. The injectior. faceplate
is made of a porous material to protect it from recirculation and radiation of
the gases, by means of a gaseous hydrogen film using around 5 percent of the
discharge.
The combustion chamber itself (inclusive of the expansion nozzle up to a sectional
ratio of 5.8) is regeneratively cooled by liquid hydrogen. Ignition of the cham-
ber is effected normally by a pyrotechnic igniter; a second igniter is included
to provide for refiring the engine in flight fn the event it should be necessary
for certain missions (changes of orbit). An electric igniter, operating on oxy-
gen and gaseous hydrogen and capable of numerous refirings, is also under study.
The chamber is to be built using the technique already used by MBB for the HM 7
engine and for the SSME ~Space Shuttle Main Engine~ engine (under license). It
consists of an internal body of a milled copper alloy (providinq coaxial ducting)
sheathed in an external electrolytically deposited nickel shell. The chamber is
completed by inl.et and discharge annuli (of Inconel) welded to the electroly-
tically deposited structure.
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To avoid combustion instability phenomena at high frequencies (encountered with
Ariane 1), the combustion chamber injector is equipped with damping devices:
Baffl-:s obtained by elongation of certain injector elements, and acaustic cavities
located around the periphery of the chamber.
The ground expansion nozzle, for developmental and acceptance tests, extends bet- .
ween sectional ratios of 5.8 and 20. In principle, it will be built by welding
430 rectangular tubes (of Inconel 600) arranged spirally with respect to the
longitudinal axis of the engine, using the technique already used for the HM 7.
This expansion nozzle will be cooled by a liquid hydroqen flow (around 6 percent
of the total) which will then serve to cool the flight expansion nozzle, the
ejected flow providing an additional thrust. But also being studied is a regen-
eratively cooled nozzle built of conical or constant-perimeter tubes (of Inconel
X750), formed on a mandrel and furnace-brazed.
The flight expansion nozzle, designed to operate in a vacuum, up to a sectional
ratio of 93, will be built of brazed tubes (conical or constant-perimeter) or of
welded tubes (spirally), and cooled by a sh~nted hydrogen flow. This solution is
more satisfactory than cooling by turbine discharge gases, which presents several
problems and requires a pressure in excess of 6 bars and an expansion nozzle inlet
temperature of less than 600 degrees K.
It is also planned to add a deployable nozzle to the flight nozzle, to increase
the sectional ratio (beyond 93) and thus gain a few precious seconds of specific
impulse, without modifying the overall dimensions of the engine.
New Test Facilities
The development of this new engine will necessitate extensive and costly (about
- one-third the cost of the program) test facilities. It is therefore planned to
- re~.:~e existing installations--at the Vernon (SEP) and Ottobrunn (MBB) centers--as
:~uch as possible for the testing of the subsystems, and to optimi~e the installa-
tion of new facilities at Vernon (SEP) and Hardthausen (DFVLR).
This will provide a test facility for the turbopump inductors (adaptation of the
present vertical test facility for the HI~i 7 engine), a test facility for the
turbopumps (modification of the "battleship" test facility for the H8 stage), and
a test facility for the gas generator (re-use of MBB's HM 7 chamber test facil-
ity).
The new HM 60 test installations will include:
--A vertical engine-test facility and a horizontal engine-test facility enabling
ground-condition burns of basic duration (close to 300 seconds), at Vernon;
--A thrust chamber test facility enabling tests of from 20 to 40 seconds, at the
DFVLR's Hardthausen (Germany) center;
--A simulated-altitide (under partial vacuum) engine-test facility enabling tests
_ of basic duration, also at Hardthausen.
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The HM 60 engine fine-tuning program calls for 334 engine tests, totaling an
accrued operating time of 44,570 seconds. This will require the consumption of
50 million liters of liquid hydrogen and will necessitate tripling ~urope's cur-
rent liquid hydrogen production capacity. Studies are under way to limit hydro-
gen losses (close to 70 percent of the total) incurred during test operations
(evaporatior~, cooling of the engines and test equipment).
The new HM 60 developmental plan calls for a preaefinitional phase extending from
1981 to 1983 to narrow down and freeze key options with respect to the engine and
test facilities. The critical elements in this program are the completion and
assembly of manufacturing blueprints and the first equipment prototypes.
The work of this preliminary phase is aimed at hardening all choices and verifying
_ the most critical technologies involved, enabling authorization to start the HM 60
developmental program by 1 January 1984. Under these conditions, the ground
qualifying tests would start by mid-1991; complete qualification, on the ground,
of the thrust assembly--H 60 stage and HM 60 engine--would then be completed by
year-end 1992, that is, in 9 years.
~Diagrams and charts follow~
~
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- INFLUENCE OE LA PRESSION
~4~ CHAMBRE SUR L' ISP VIDE DU
MOTEUR HM 60 (900 KN )
(1) ~5~
~es~~ru~ i~: ,I 1$P(f)
1
( ~80
1 .
w =
1 I ~ 7,`~}
~
` 455 ~O
~ ~ ( 9) Ra~port de melmpe : 5,1
o ~ ~ lp ~ Dl~matre de sortie : 2,3 m
du diverqent
(2)
; .nu~u~ 450
u~
~ S ~ ISP INoteur tlnx d6rir6
- HM 60
(3)
uttu~ ~6) COIIIbtlt11011 (bif)
no~ k~
100 150 200
General configuration of the Ariane 5 launcher's
cryogenic second stage using the HI~I 60 engine.
Key:
1. Liquid hydrogen tank. 6. Combustion pressure (bars).
2. Liquid oxygen tank. 7. Integrated-flow engine ISP.
3. Vega engine. 8. Shunt-flow engine ISP.
4. Efcect of chamber pressure on 9. Mix ratio: 5.1.
space-vacuum specific impulse 10. Outlet diameter of expansion
~ISP~ of HI~! 60 engine (900 kN). nozzle: 2.3 meters.
5. ISP (seconds).
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Comparison of European and American Engine Characteristics (Source: SEP)
HM ~ A HM 7 8 NM 60 J2 J25 RL.10 A3-3 SSME
.
PO~~SSEE DANS LE VIDE ( ) (KN) 61,6 ' G2,7 900 1044 I 1180 67 2090
iMPULSION SPECIFIpUE DANS LE YID$ (S) 442,4 44A,2 444 425 435 444 455,2
RA~f'Of?T DE MELANCE GLOBAL~3~ I-) 4,43 4,80 5,1 5,5 5,5 5,0 6,0
30 35 100 53,0 86 2~ Z~~
Pi~::~SIUN GE COMBUSTTJN ~t1~ (aAR) i ; ~
A~~! f'Jt1T UE SECTION ~rj~ 62,5 I 82,5 93 ~7,5 40 57 ~~'5
Ui:!t(T YOTAL ~40'fEUR (KG/S 14,2 I 14,4 20G 250 277 15,8 468
4,24
F"~:'~;4(tltF:;F.21T : HAUTEUR 7 (7�1)
' 1,71 1,91 ~ 4,0 3,38 3,38 1,7
~S~DIAft6"fRE SORTIE (~~1) 0,938' 0,y84 2,3 I 1,98 1,98 1,00 2,39
DUi+( l�: DE COI4UUSTION ~ 9~ ~ S ~ 563 731 291 I d70 _ A50 4B0
~~~~~~~~E~ (1~) ~K~) ln9 155 _ 1450 ~ 1542 1556 132 _ _3000
UF.NiJ'I' GU GEVF:l.OPPEN,ENT (11~ 1573 j 1980 I 1984 ~ 19G0 � 1959 19%2
I
n,~rr: n;: NI:;F: F.N SERVICE~12~ 1~379 ~ 19B3 1992 I 1966 I non 1953 1981
~op~rationnel _
U'f I I.I . A7' I t~P~ :;11H F.TAGES ~ 13 ~ ` HA _ i H10 H 60 i SII-SIVB I - CEWTAUR NAVETTE
, I s iv (14)
~ ~
Editor's Note: The HIK 7B engine is the improved version of the HI~t 7A, and is to
be used in the Ariane 2 and 3 scheduled to fly in 1983; the HM 7A is now used in
Ariane 1. The J 2S engine is an improved version of the Saturn rocket's J 2 that,
however, has not yet flown. Unlike the J 2 and RL 10 engines, the HI~1 7 and SSME
engines are not refireable in flight; the HM 60 will be ref ireable.
Key:
1. Thrust in a vacuum (kN). 8. Outlet diameter (m).
2. Specific impulse in vacuum 9. Duration of burn (seconds).
(seconds). 10. Weight (kg).
3. Overall mix ratio. 11. Start of development.
4. Combustion pressure (bars). 12. Date of entry into service.
5. Sectional ratio. 13. Use on stages.
6. Total engine output (kg/sec). 14. Shuttle.
7. Overall dimensions: Height (m).
44
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+ _ . . _ - + - - Key :
~cuw mw h r.. r~ t l~nw .
J L - ~ -
~ _ 1. Tank pressuriza-
} _ ~ ~ ~ tion lines.
. ~i ~ . ~ , ~
~ ~ 2. Oxygen injection
raewroMrt
o,~a.~ (
2_","='--.b ~ 3 ~ assembly .
. i BK~'NJ[CTIIM -~�lR1'~CTM~
' u+~~ ' ~ ' ~ ~ 3. Hydrogen injection
~i , r.a� ~g~ ~ ~ assembly.
~ w~~riw
" 4. 8egulating valves.
, ' i '
~ 5. Chamber oxygen in-
u~so~um~w jection and regu-
FT ~E Rpl~11N ~iliEr[
~ ~ . lating valve.
y ogen
~ ~ 6. Chamber h dr
r �~H e�~.~rrnw 6 ' in ection and re-
NIMKlMEOEp~NA[~ ~ ~
~ ! gulating valve.
- CAbove~: Hydraulic schematic of HI~i 60 shunt-flow engine. The combustion chamber
is fed liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen by two separate turbopumps whose turbines
are driven in parallel by the gases of a pyrotechnically ignited generator.
- A--- - CHAMBRE
B
G tox ~
. C
j
~ a ~N7 ~
~ '
~ I
Ej I
Key: ' ~ I
/
F,~ ~ ~I
A. Universal joint.
B. Igniter. i
C. Injector. , I
D. Combustion chamber. I I
E. Ground expansion nozzle. ~ i
F. Flight expansion nozzle. I ~ '
f ~ ~
G. Ejection of cooling fluid. i !
G
i~i 60 Thrust Chamber.
~+5
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Charac~eristics of the Turbopumps
Item Oxy
ecLn Hydrogen
Speed of rotation 18,000 rpm 37,700 rpm
Propellant flow rate 175 kg/sec 33 kg/sec
High pressure 121.5 bars 149.5 bars
- Power 2,257 kW 8,670 kW
Critical admission pressure 1.3 bar 0.34 bar
Pump:
Number of stages inductor inductor
+ 1 impeller + 2 stages
Diameter 174 mn? 221 mn?
Specific speed 37 25
Efficiency 0.82 0.76
Turbine:
Number of stages 1 action 2 velocity
Diameter 320 mm 194 mm
Expansion ratio 17 20.6
Efficiency 0.31 0.44
46
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~.2 ; Key:
' ~ L .
~.a 1. Injector .
~
_ \ 2. Igniter.
. .
- Y,~~~) , 3. Liquid oxygen dome.
.a._.... �...15
~ , , ~ . ~ 4 . Hydrogen.
-
5. Porous faceplate.
. ~ 3~_ ~r 6. Injection elements.
,~y_~�r,;-:=
~ 7. Baffle elements.
~
8. Chamber body.
~
~ g~~ ~ 11 9. Element pattern.
10. Injection element--detail.
. ~2�Z
r 11. ACOl1St1C CdVlty.
~1~~~ 12. Outlet manifold.
' 4~~ 13. Milled copper body.
~
- 1~ _
~ 14. Nickel shell.
~ ' 15. Inlet manifolc].
~ (15) 16. Liquid hydrogen.
~ ~
i
~ ~
_ '
- - - - ~ 16 ~
~Above~: Sections through the injector and body of the chamber.
_
Key: r.a~~~ r~r_,
�~(1) ~ 3 ~N H~'
1. Thrust.
2. Mix ratio. we
~e
3. Thrust/Refer- r~
ence thrust no , ~
(percent). ~
~ o
~Right~: Operating regions of the HM 60 engine:
Flight operating region (internal rectangle) and ~-e
reference operating region (hexagon), with the
six characterization points (angles). The engine
is dimensioned (external rectangle) for an excur- ~0 ~2~
sion of � 10 percent (centered on 90 tons) of M'�*
thrust, and of � 0.5 percent (centered on 5.1) of 06
mix ratio.
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- HIri 60 nevelopmental Plan
~~Ml! 11 11 N I111 IIt~ ~1~11 It17 1111 I111 I111 11~1 Iltf 1~~7 11~~
nnlnu ~'r f~~ ~~1�! ~ ~.t I.t 1 ~ ~ 1 7 ~ 1 ~ 1 ~ I 111 ~ 1 t 11~ ~1~ f'~ ~~t:l 1-I'~
~ . . ' i : ; i I ~ ! ' . .
~ 1 ~ 17 ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ _ _ ~ t ~ ~ i 1 i � : -
uuuw~ lil~l~ ~ ~ ' ~ ' ~
. . ~ r ra_. . ~ ! : .T _ . ~ ~ ~y ~1-: ~ i ~ ~lil~ ~
. n nnr . x~ ~ ruiutM u u wul ~ar .
1 I ~ ~
' 1 i[/ I~J ? . 1~ ' I- I I I' 1 ' ~ rumm u~~ IIINII w~RUx. .1.
~
. ~ f = - : ~ ~ , _ _ ~ I
_ - - -=J - _ 1:..
anunn IfE~I I ' .
- 11 r
- i-+ - ~ - - - - i .f
ur~e 1~111_ ' _ ' ..'.t' _ _ ' ' ' ' ' ' I i
_I.1 - -j ~ i
~wrnn~ It[?i _r..l I I _ - - .l.
1
a=~=vi~ ~ -
- -
~~~IM ~I _
- _ -;7} ~ � _ _ _ - _ t~
,.p.~~
.-.M~,4g - - - _ _ _
IiVI
Key:
1. Year.. 7. S A Engine ~reference unclear~.
2. Quarter. 8. Thrust assembly.
3. Technological program. 9. Completion of blueprints.
4. Accessories. 10. Completion of test facilities.
5. Prototype + inductors. 11. Tests.
6. Ground engine ~reference
unclear~.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982
9399 END
CSO: 3100/329
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