JPRS ID: 10418 TRANSLATION WARTIME OPERATIONS IN 1941-1945: THE BREAKTHROUGH BY A.I. RADZIKYEVSKIY

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JPRS L/ 10418
26 March 1982
Translation
_ WARTIME OPERATIONS IN 1941-1945:
_ THE BREAKTHROU~H
B.y -
A,t. Radziyevskiy
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JPRS L/10418
- 26 March 1982
_ WARTIME OPERATIONS.~N 1941-1s~5: THE B~EAKTHROUGH
Moscow PRORYV (PO OP'~TU VELTKOY OTECHES.TVENNOY ~70YNY 1941-1945 GG. ) in
Russian 1979 (signed to press 16 Nov 78) pp 1-192
1Translation of book "The Break.thro~gh (~rom the Experience of the
Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945~", by Army Gen Prof Aleksey Ivanovich
Radziyevskiy, iiero of the ~oviet Union, Voyenizdat, 17,000 copies, 192
pages plus d~agrams] ~
C ONTENTS
Introduction 1
Chapter One. Per~etration in O,perations of the First Period of the G~eat
Patric*~c War 6
1. Rxperience ci Penetration in the Operations of the Summer-Fall Cam- ~
paign of 1941 6
2. Penetration in the uperations of the Winter Campaign of 1941/42 8
3. Penetration in the Operations of the Summer-Fa71 Campaign of 1942 20
Chapter ~ao. Development of Theory and Practice of Penetration in World
- War II 33
1. Penetration in the Winter Camp,3ign of 1942/43 33
2. Penetration of a Static Defen~= t}s2 Operations of the Summer-Fall
Campaign of 1943 48
Chapter Three. Improvement in r_he Forms and Modes of Penetratior. in the
Third Period of the War 71
1. Penetration in the Operations of the 1944 Winter Campaign 71
2. Improvement of Penetration in the Operations of the 1944 Summ~r-Fall
C~_.oaign 88
3. The Art of Penetration of the Enemy's Defenae ~n the Operations of
1545 . 113
.
Chapter Four. Results of Development of Theory and Practice of Penetration
in the Great Patriotic War 150
. [IT - USSR - F~UO)
- a- IIIT - USSR - 4 FOUO] ~
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1. Types and Forms of Penetration of the Enemy's Defense 150
2. Selection of Axes of Advance and Breakt~rough Sectors 154
~ 3. Massing of Forces and Combat Formations 159
4. Delivering Fire on the Enemy 162
5. Breaking Through the Tactical Zone of Defense 165
6. Development of Tactical Into Operational Breakthrough 169
7. Development of Operational Into Strategic Breakthrough 171
Conclusion 174
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INTRODUCTION
Penetration as a mode of offensive actions 2imed at breaking up a fortified frontage
occupied by defending enemy trooFa by means of forming a breach (breaches) in the
defense, for subsequent maneuver to depth or toward the flanks, began to be employed
in the wars of the era of imperialism in connection with the establishment of con-
tinuous static fronts.
The absence of ex~osed enemy flanks and the imposaibility of outflanking or en-
veloping the enemy compelled attacking troops to seek to accomplish the mission by
means of a direct frontal attack.
The need to penetrate a defense first appeared in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-
1905, but as a cc~nsequence of the newness of the problem and heavy casualties in-
flicted in a frontal attack, in this war neither side succeeded in accomplishing
penetration.
Bourgeois military theory, other than percei~ring the difficulties of penetration,
was unable to see its laws and patterns, ways and meane of accomplishment. Shortly
before World War I, military theorists concluded from an analysis of. th~ enormous
destructive power of rapid-fire weapons that a frontal att~..,k was out of the
question. By virtue of this, the strategic war plans of the opposing sides were
constructed on the basis of improving outf?anking and enveloping maneuvers. But
the battles fought at the beginning of World War I shnw~d that the rate of advance
of flanking troops did not exceed the rate of buildup of the defensive frontage by
the opposing side by virtue of engaging addi+.�ional combined units and large
strategic formations. When the flanks of th.e steadily expanding combat front im-
pinged onto natural obat3cles which were insupera~le to ground forces seas,
mountain ranges, as well as neutral countr.tes the failure of strategic war plans
became obvious.
The art of warfare of the armies of all countries was faced with the problem of
penstration of a strategic front. Without accomplishing penetration, it was no
longer possible to conduct offensive operationa and to capture important strategic,
industrial and administrative centers, without which it was impoasible to win a
war or to achieve those ob~ectives for the sake of which a war was initiated.
All warring armies proved to be unprepared theoretically, technically, and
materially to accomplish penetration.
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The search for a solution to the problem of penetration of a deliberate defense
continued throughout World War I, by attacking in a single narrow (i2-15 km)
sector, on a continuous wide (40-80 km) frontage, and simultaneously in several
- sectors; artillery densities (up to 180 guns per kilometer of breakthrough sector),
degree of delivery of effective firv, depth and degree of saturation of combat
dispositions with men and weapons increased from one Campaign to the next. Never-
theless attacking forces were unable to penetrate the defense to a depth where they
could shift to fluid actions. The cause lay primarily in the slow rate of advance.
- Endeavoring to penetrate the defense, attacking troops would mount one assault after
another, spalling off one pie~e after another from the solid core of the defense, as
it were. But the defending enemy, moving reserves to the endangered point, would
build up the depth and streng*h of the defense more rapidly than the at~acking
force could wear it down. And op~rations usually kould stu:.l.
The appearance of tanks on the battief ield created realistic preconditions for
rapid penetration of a static defense. But bourgeois art of warfare failed to find
ways to realize their potential. By war's end the only problem which had been
' basically solved was that of penetrating a tactical. defense by means of massed em-
ployment of artillery, tanks, infantry and aircraft in selected sectors. The
problem of exploiting and developing tactical into operational penetration, however,
remained unresolved.
During the civil war in the USSR, when cavalry armies were established, in a number
of operatior.s Soviet troops succeeded not only in penetrating a tactical defense
but also in exploiting the attack to considerable depth, Which coristituted a
decisive condition for devastating defeat of the enemy and liberation of vast areas
of the Soviet Republic.
Synthesis of the experience of World War I and the civil war, as well as correct
determination of the cQmbat capabilities of new weagonry enabled Soviet art of war-
- fare to formulate a theory of tb.z offensive o~eration in depth. It consisted es-
sentially in penetration of an enemy defense to full tactic~;l depth, breaching and
_ smashing of the enemy's defense frontage in a sector where the enemy could not
deliver effective artillery firP from adjacent sectors onto friendly troops in the
penetration sector. Engagemer_t of :he breakthrough exploitat~on force, which con-
tained mechanized as well as airborne troops, sought to achieve rapid penetration
of ofiP:isive forces to operational depth, dest~:~~;_tion of approaching reserves, com-
mand and control facilities and suppl;~ depots, and sought to deprive the enemy of
the opportunity to establish a defense along a new line.
Close tea:aworic and coordi.nation between fro~ntally-advancing troops, the tareak-
thraugh exploitation force and air should 3,ead to complet~'.on of the defeat in
detail cf the enemy's main forces in the zone of advance af the army or front and
offensive exploita4~on to the planned depth.
The forwar~i operational echelon, which contained reinforczc~. rifl~ corps, was sup-
_ pc~ed to advance to a depth of up to 20 kilometers on the first day of the offensive.
- The breakthrough exploitation force, eiitering the breach in the area of the enemy's
main artillery positions or beyond the main defensive zone, was to penetrate the
- second defensive zone without a halt in attack position and, routing advancing
enemy r~eserves, to capture areas and positions at operational depth, ensuring rapid
achievement of the operation objective.
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When penetrating a hasty defense, it was recommended that the attack be mounted at
a weak point or unoccupied sector, with subsequent offeneive exploitation to depth
or toward the flanks.
Penetration was to be accomplished with the approach of troops to the enemy's
defense or from close contact with the enemy.
The Great Patriotic War demonstrated that our prewar views on penetration were es-
sentially correct. Modes and method of preparing for and executing epenetration
experienced considerable development in the course of the war, however, which was
- dictated by changes in the conditions of conduct of warfare, the capabilities of
our forces, the character of the enemy's defense, plus other factors. This volume
is devoted to an investigation of this process.
The investigation is broken down by periods of the war, and in ~ach period by cam-
paigns, in which the general situation conditions for the majority of operations
were approximately identi.cal. Within campaigns ~e investigated penetration of the
enemy's defense not in all offensive operations, but only in those which revealed
- the characteristic features of its preparation and conduct, making it possible to
trace progress in achieving a practical solu~ion to the problems ~f penetration in
_ a concrete situation and general development trenda in theory and practice of
penetration.
This wlume is based on a study of materials from the Central Archives of the
Ministry of Defense, military historical works, war memoirs and reminiscences of war
veterans published in the periodical press. The author also utilized his personal
combat experience ir. analyzing penetration in those opArations in which he par-
ticipated.
CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stated in his speeeh
at the 16th Trade Union Congress: "We perceive the past as a rich reservoir of ex-
perience, as waterial ior reflection, for critical ana~ysis of our own decisions anri
- actions. We draw from the past inspiration for present and future deeds."1 This
statement also applies in full measure to military-historical experience.
Synthesis of the wealth of combat experience ~f the Soviet Army in matters pertain-
ing to penetrating an enemy defense in the Great Patriotic War and assimilation of
this experience by our command cadres will promote more successful accomplishment
of the tasks facing us today.
The author would like to express his profound gratitude to Maj Gen B. V. Panov, Col
A. A. ~idorenko, and Col N. F. Naumov for aseistance rendered in working on this
vo lume .
' FOOTNOTE
1. PRAVDA, 22 March 1977.
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, Chapter One. PENETRATTON IN OP~RATIuNS OF THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE GREAT
PATRIOTIC WAR
1. Experience of Penet~ation in the Oper2tions of the Summer-Fall Campaign of 1941
Soviet troops gained their first exper3.ence at penetration in the Great Patriotic
- War in the July 1941 offensive in the ~lestem Sector. It was carried out in a very
complex situation. As a result of the treacherous~ attack by fascist Germany on the
USSR, our troops sustained heavy casualties in frontier battles. Their combat
capabilities were diminished, and they were forced to fight savage defensive battles.
The need for rapid deployment of new combined units and large strategic formations,
with a shortage of co~and personnel, command and control equipment facilities led
to a change in the organization of �orces. Mechanized and rifle corps were abolished,
and t~ie fighting strength of combined-arms armies was reduced by 50 to 67 percent.
H~eadquarters, Supreme High Command (Hq SHC) established four army groups of 2-4
divisions each for mounting a:. o_ffensive in the Western Sector, and instructed them
to attack along axes converging on Smolensk (Diagram 1). Each army group was to
advance in a zone 30-50 km in width to a depth of up to 100 lan from assembly areas
situated 12-30 km from one another, while Gen V. Ya. Kachalov's army group was
150 kilometers dis~tant.
Co;nmand authorities of the Western Sector noted a significant flaw in the plan
proposed by Hq SHC: "A weak point of this operation lies in the fact that the army
groups are isolated from one another by a considerable distance and, since each army
group is small, therefore they can be separately enveloped."1 This deficiency
was not corrected, however, due to haste in turning the troops to the offensive.
Scattering of the efforts of the front was aggravated by decisions made by the army
comwanders, who were endeavoring, although the army groups Were of limited numerical
strength, to advance on several axes and, as a rule, with an approach march. In
- Gen V. A. Khomenko's army group, for example, each division was assign2d a zone
of advance approximately 10 km in width. A common breakthrough sector was not
designated. In the zone of advance of the forces under the command of Gens S. A.
Kalinin and K. K. Rokossovskiy (50 1~? in width), three assault groups were formed,
each containing one or two divisions, separated from one another by a distance of
- 12-15 km.2
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The troops under the co~and of Gen V. Ya. Kachalov were to advance in a more com-
~ pact force all three divisions were in flank contact with each other.
As a result of planning the offensive opera~tion by the army groups on several axes,
with limited artillery availability, there were on the average not more than 4 to 6
guns and mortars per kilometer of offensive frontage. The Western Front also had
extremely little air support 186 bombers and 102 fighters, only 39 of which we~e
of new types; 60 percent of the aircraft were under the command of the 20th, 21st,
= and 22d armies. The offensive by the army groups could be supported by a maximum
of 118 bombers_and 48 fighters. Air efforts were further scattered by the fact
that airstrikes were planned against numerous enemy targets, as a rule selected
deep in the enemy's operational dispositions. Such a limited number of weapons not
only failed to break up ti~e defense to full tactical depth (1-4 km) , but also resulted
in failure to neutralize the enemy's f ire plan at the forward edge of the battle
- area.
By decision of command authorities of the Western Sector, the army groups were to
turn to the offensive on 23 July, executing a forced march of 70-180 km. Such a
t~sk was beyond the capabilities of divisions which had 3ust been deployed. The
differing distance of the divisions from the battle line and attempts to initiate
an attack from an approach march led to their engagement at different times, which
weakened the force of the att4..n to an even greater extent. In General Kalinin's
group, for examp?e, the 91st Rifle Division commenced the attack on the morning of
25 July, while the 89th Division ~egan the attack at midday.3~ Because of all these
reasons, no deep breach in the enemy's defense ~aas achieved on a single axis, and
the aruay and front operationa failed to reach the exploitation pY~ase.
A second offensive at Smolensk was undertakea in mid-Auguet. Many of the deficien-
cies of the first offensive were corrected during preparations for and execution
of this offensive. Armies of 5-6 divisions each were formed on the basis of the
army groups. The axes of advance of the 19th and 30th armies were brought closer
together, which made it pos3ible more clearly to delineate the front's main axis
of advance.
Breakthro~sgh sectors were assigned to the arnaies as follows: 10 km to the 30th,
12 km to the 19th, and 5 km to the 16th.4 This made it possible to narrow the
division zones of advance to 1.3-3 km. In the 30th Army a support echelon was
formed of the 107th Tank Division and the 45th Cavalry Division, which to some
- degree expressed the intention to execute the offensive on the basis of the tenets
~ of the theory of the operation in depth. Artillery densities increased to 20
_ pieces per km. There were improvements in massing of air szpport and organization
, of teamwork and coordination.
But the enemy, concerned for his strategic center, reinforced troops in the
Smolensk area, strengthened hi~ defenses, and dug in a large number of tanks.
Therefore the battle groups formed of the diviaions, which had been advancing
~ almost continuously from 25 July to 14 August, were unable to achieve even the
- minimally required superiority in relatiive strengths in men and weapons. In addi-
tion, the troops lacked ammunition for massive preliminary bombardment. As a
result our combined units, when turning to the offensive, were able to penetrate
6-12 km deep into the enemy's defense only in ~a few sectors, but they were unable to
- open a breach and exploit to the planned depth.
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- At the end of August-beginning of September the troops of the Western Sector
launched a third offensive in order to pin down the forces of Army Group Center and
to defeat Guderian's forces in detail. The Reserve Front, which routed the enemy's
Yel'nya force and liberated the tok~n of Yel'nya, achieved the greatest success.
The pri.ncipal result of the offensive operations of the armies of the Western
Sector in the Battle of Smolensk, in spite of limited advance, was the fact that
they forced the Gezman-fascist command authorities, for the first time in Wcrld
War II, to shift to defense on their main axis of advance.
At the same time the offensive operations of the Soviet- f~rces at Smolensk in the
summer of 1941 demonstrated that an army of a new composition, particularly an a~~
group, was not capable of penetrating to operarional depth even of a hastily taken-
up def ense which, thanks to the employment of tanks and swift construction of
strong defensive works, acquired rather good stability. Pen~atration required, as
Hq SHC had concluded, establishing "striking forces of 7-8 divisions." But no
practical ways had been found to implement this conclusion. While at the army
echelon a concentration of effort in a aingie sector, narrcvwed 3-4-fold, was mapped
out fairly clearly, in the front a battle group was atill broken down into separate
army groups, while on the whole a front operation did not have a clearly marked
front main attack. The requisite superiority over the enemy in men and weapons was
not established in the breakthrough sectors. Delivery of fire on the enemy's
- defense pr~ved weak, as did artillery and air support of the infantry and tank at-
tack.
2. Penetration in the Operations of the Winter Campaign of 1941/42
The most important ev:nts of the winter campaign of 1941/42 were the counteroffen-
sive at Moscow and the Soviet Army's general offensive.
The counteroffen,sive at Mc~scow began in a difficult situation for the Soviet Union.
A number of this country's econamically most important regions had been captured by
the enemy. That part of the USSR which had b~en temporarily seized by the German-
fascist forces by November 1941 had accounted for 63 percent of the nation's pre-
war coal production, 68 percent of its pig iron and 58 percent of its steel, and had
produced 60 percent of the Soviet Union's aluminum, 38 percent of its grain, and
84 percent of its sugar.5 The situation was complicated to an even great extent
_ by the fact that a large number of industrial enterprises had been evacuated
eastward, including from areas adjacent to the front. Production of arms and
munitions had declined by December 1941. The troops at the front were short of both.
The enemy was biockading Leningrad, had broken through to Tikhvin, was advancing on
Moscow, and by December had enveloped the M~oscow industrial area in a half-ring and
had captured Khar'kov and the Donbass.
Under these conditions Hq SHC made the deciaion to ahift to a counteroffensive a*.
Moscow.
Organization and execution of penetration of a hasty defense in turning to a
counteroffensive at Moscow. The Hq SHC plan for the counteroffensive at Moscow
called for mounting simultaneous attacks by the forces of three fronts at the enemy
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forces threatening Moscow, in order to inflict a decisive defeat on them and to
_ push them back as far as possible from the city.
At the mument our forces turnPd to a counteroffensitie, the enemy was attempt~ng to
continue the advance anly at Solnechnogors~, Naro-Fominsk, and Tnla. He was stopped
in the other sectors of the front and in the span of several days was able to es-
tablish a defense in the form of separate strongpoint~ and centers uf resistance in
populated localities, at road junctions and on tactically important high ground.
The strongest defense was to the north of Moacow. On the approaches to Tula gaps
between centers of resistance in places ran as much as several kilometers.
In a directive Hq SHC assigned the following missions to the fronts: to the Kalinin
Front: concenzrating a oaciie group in the course of the next two to three days, it
was to frontally attack Kalinin and Sudimirka in the direction of Mikulino-
Gorodishche and Turginovo. Advancing to the rear of the enemy's Klin force, it was
to assist the troops of the Western Front in destroying that force.
Western Front: attack on zhe Klin-Solnechnogorsk and Istra axes, defeat the enemy's
northern force on the right eide of the front; attack in the direction of Uzlovaya
and Bogoroditsk, into the flank and zear of the enemy's 2d Panzer Army, crush the
enemy's southern force on the left side of the front.
The armies of the right side of the Southwestern Front were to rout the enemy's
Yelets force and, exploiting in the direction of Orel, assist the troops of the
left side of the Western Front in defeating the 2d Panzer Army.6
Thus the general plan formulated by Hq SHC for the counteroffensive by the forces
of three fronts called for mounting four front attacks in a zone more than 600 kilo-
metexs wide. From 2 to 4 armies were designated for each of these, which was a
signii?cant step forward in the art of concentrating forces for an attack on
selected axes.
Hq SHC directives for the counteroffensive required decisive massing of manpower
and equipment on the part of the fronts. Hq SHC noted that individual assaults
in different sectors were ineffective, and ordered the commanding general of the
Kalinin Front to establish a battle group consieting o~ not less than 5-6 rifle
divisions, including the most battleworthy combined units, a large percentage of
Reserve SHC artillery, all rocket launcher systems and tanks.
This idea was not convincingly incorporated, however, in preparations by the fronts
for these operations. Front attacke continued to be broken up into several army
attacks mounted on separate axea (piagram 2). The offensive strike by the Kalinin
" Front was in fact executed by the forces of the 29th and 31st armies in discon-
nected sectors 20 km diatanfi from one another. On the right aide of the Western
Front attack forces included the 30th Armys lst Assault Army, 20th, 16th and
subsequently 5th Army. The distance between army atCacks was as follows: 30th Army
and lst Assault Army 30 km; lst Assault Army ~nd 20th Army approx~mately
15 km; 20tk? and 15th armies approxima~ely 10 km. Distances were even greater
between the main attacks of the armies of the left side the Western Front (up to
50 lan) and the right side of the Southwesterra Front (90 imi) .
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The complex conditions of ahifting the fronts to a counteroffensive predetermined
the number of offensive Rtrikes in the army operations and the density :f troops on
- tY:eir axes (Table 1) .
Table 1. Some Fiburea on Organization for Breakthrough in the Armies at the Shift
- to a Counter.of�ensive at Moscow
Densities in Breakthrough
ArmY w d i o
~ ~ b ~ ~ d m Sector
~
~ 3 0 g ~ a.C ~ x Artiller Tanks
~ r+ o ~ ~i .53 ~ ~ r�-~ ~ A ~ y
_ t^ .,r,
b0 ~d w ~ c~d .~G ^ O q,~ H 4a 1~-i
q GJ O N cd tA O v.C O,~ ~
~ uq d ~ w a+ ~ s~
~ o~o cU p ~ ~ ~ ~ c~ ~ c~d a~+
d0 rl 'O D ~ tJ ~ 7 U GJ 'd d C)
w~ 3~ z oc�n~ z~-n ~a~a 3a~ac~n
29th 5 150 3-15 3 5 9 -
31st 5 40 . 1-b 3 2 2 -
30th 8 80 3-27 ~ 3-5 Up to 15 1-3
lst Assault 6 30 1-11 5 2.1 16 4-5
20th 3.5 30 1-6 2 3 16-20 1-10
16th 7 25 1-7.5 2 3.5-4 16-43 8-10
50th 7.5 140 3-32 5 4-7 4-6 -
lOth 9.5 lOJ 3-56 7 5-10 9-10 -
Kostenko Group 4 31 2-21 2 9-12 - 1-3
13th 7 50 1-20 2 10 - -
The tactical order of battle of the tronts and armies, with few exceptions, was
single-echelon, with designation of ineager reserves. The combined units and units
were formed for th? most part into two echelons. Artillery groups were established
only in certain arraies, as a conaequence of a shortage of artillery. In the divi-
sions, APP (artillery in support of infantry) grQUps, consisting of one or tiwo
battalions, were formed, one for each attack-echelon regiment. ADD (long-range ar-
tillery) groups were formed in the independent divisions, fro~ RVGK [Reserve of the
Sul~reme High Command] artillery, to suppress and neutralize enemy artillery and
reserves. The meager availability of artillery in the lOth Army forced the command
authorities to attach it primarily to subunits for 3oint actions as close support
guns.
The tro~,ps were extremely short of ammunition. As of 6 December they ha~ from
1 to 1.4 basic combat loads, and somewhat more only for the 82 mm mortars and 152 mm
howitzers. This made it necessary to limit ammunition consumption from one fifth
to one third of a basic load, and for RVGK artillery to 4-5 roLnds per gun on
the first day of the offensive.
In the majority of the armies artillery preparation was limited to a brief bombard-
ment lasting 10-15 minutes. The preparatory bombardment ran 30-60 minutes only in
the armies of the Kalinin Front and in the center of the Western Frant. Artillery
support of infantry and tank assault and combat deep in the defense was essentially
not scheduled.
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The main air forces conaisted of Moscow air defense zone aircraft and long-range
~ bombers. Of a total of 1,170 aircraft, Frontal Avi~tion claimed 515, including
381 bombers and ground-attack aircraft. As of 6 December the Western Front had only
177 aircraft ixi operable condition. .
Air support of the breakthrough was to involve hitting the enemy at strongpointa at
immediate tactical depth and artillery in fire positions. On the night of 6 Decem-
ber preliminary airstrikes were scheduled forward of the forces on the right side
of the Western Front, with aircraft to attack headquarters, communications centers
and enemy reserves on the armies' main axes of advance. Airfields in the Klin and
Vatulino areas were hit simultaneously. The great number of targets which were hit
led to a scattering of air efforts.
Low artillery densities, poor massing of air, and difficulty in organizing coordi-
nation between ground troops, Moscow air defense aircraft and long-range bombers
made it impossible to achieve a powerful, uni'.~ied delivery of artillery fire and
airstrikes in the breakthrough sectors. Ther~:fore infantry bore the main burden of
breaking through the enemy's defense.
Execution of penetration of the enemy's defenise was rather difficult in the
majority of armies, although defense depth was shallow at the commencement of the
counteroffensive. The divisions of the 29th Army, for example, crossing over on
the ice to the south bank of the Volga on 5 December, were pushed back to their ini-
tial position of 6 December. '
The combined units of the 31st Army, by massing manpower and weapons in a single
sector, advanced 4-5 km on the first day. But on succeeding days, in connection
with the approach of enemy reserves, the advance slowed and assumed a protracted
character. The city of Kalinin was finally enveloped by the lOth day of the
_ operation, and was subsequently liberated by 5aviet forces.
The troops of the 30th Army shifted to the offensive ~ust before dawn on 6 Decem-
ber. Prior to commencement of the assault, on.ly in certain sectors did rocket
- batteries fire several sa.lvoes at enemy-occupied towns and villages. As soon.as
the infantry commenced the assault, artillery proceeded to provide supporting fire.
A considerable :.~,.n~~er of close support guns were mounted on sledges, which made it
possible to adva_:lce Lhem behind the infantry.
The surprise attack produced good results. The enemy, taken unawares, was unable
to offer organized resistance. The strongpoints on the first line were taken by
dawn. Favorable conditions had been created for advancing to depth. Deep snow and
a lack of roads, however, made it impossible to speed up the pace of advance. That
afternoon the enemy succeeded in moving up reserves and, togetlier with retreating
troops, forming a new defensive line. Nevertheleas, however, by evening depth of
penetration had reached 5 1~? an the main axis of advance, and the frontage had been
enlarged to 12 km.
The army commander engaged his reserves in order to complete the breakthrough and
crush the approaching reserves. By evening on the third day depth of penetration
was 6-10 km, and the offensive involved a zone 35 km wide. Enemy resistance had col-
lapsed, and the enemy began to retreat.
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The s~iccessful advance of the 30th Army helped the lst Assault Army. It captured
- several villages, and by the evening of the third day had advanced to a depth of
10 1~.
Penetration of the tactical defense had created the requisite conditions for an
advance at a faster pace. The laak of offensive exploitation echelons, however,
- made it impossible to take advantage of this favorable moment. Such an echelon was
formed in the 30th Arny in the course of the operation, consisting of a motorized
rif le and cavalry division, a motorized regiment and a tank battalion. Its engage-
ment immediately boosted the pace of advance. In 3 days the mobile group ad-
- vanced 36 km, thus fac~.litatin~ the advance of the army's main forces.
After the 30th Army and the lst Assault Army captured a stretch of the Leningrad
Highway, the tactical breakthrough was exploited to operational penetration. They
were able to shift to operational purauit of the enemy.
Breakthrough in the zone of advance of the 20th Army took place more slowly, since
a shortage of artillery and ammunition prevented reliable neutralization of the
enemy.
The 331st Rifle Division, reinforced by a tank battalion, an R'VGK gun artillery
regiment and a rocket launcher battalion, began the offensive on 4 Dec e m ber in a
zone 4.5 km in frontage. As a consequE:ice of hasty preparation for the attack, it
failed to acr.ieve appreciable success, but suffered 20 percent casualties and lost
30 percent of its tanks.
_ Preparations for a new attack were made on S December. Following a brief bombard-
ment, on the following morning units of this division once again shifted to the
attack, together with all the army's troops. The attack was developing slowly. It
was accelerated by a.bold dash by an assault force on four tanks. This force
_ fought its way into the village of Gorki and brought confusion into the enemy's
defense. The regiments took advantage of this and captured the village, which
opened up the approaches to Krasnaya Polyana. .
In the 8 days of occupation, the enemy had transformed the village into a very
- strong center of resistance. Upon reaching the village, the division's units were
halted. On the first day the enemy also succeeded in fighting off assaults by
other of the army's combined units.
The assaults on Krasnaya Polyana resumed on 7 December. One hundred artillery
- pieces were diverted from the Moscow defensive zone, as well as some of the SHC
aircraft, in addition to army and front weapons, to support the advancing combined
units.~ Difficulty of coordinating with them via several levels of command, how-
ever, made it impossible to utilize their capabilities in full measure. Units of
the army penetrated the village, but assaults within the village were of an
extremely savage nature. It was necessary to dislodge the enemy by force from
practically every house. That afternood units of the enemy's 106th Infantry and
2d Panzer divisions mounted a strong counterattack. It was beaten back, and during
the night of 7-8 December units of the 331st Rifle division, working in coordination
with the 28th Rifle Brigade, captured Krasnaya Polyana.
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These combined units advanced 4.5 km on 8 December, thus completing the break-
- through of the enemy's defensive line. The commanders of the combined units took
measures to execute tactical pursuit of the enemy, who had begun to retreat, in-
tending to advance 30 km in 2 days. But a lack of ~kis prevented them from form-
ing outflanking detachments. There were not enough tanks or troops on the roads
to neutralize the enemy by fire, in order to smash aside the enemy's strong road-
blocks. Therefore by the evening of 10 December the troops of the 331st Division
and the 28th Brigade had advanced 10-12 km.
Thanks to the successful actions of the brigades advancing on the army's flanks,
a breach formed in the enemy's defense. The army's combined units accelerated its
advance on Solnechnogorsk.
- The 16th Army commenced penetration on 7 Decemher with the forces of the 8th Guards
Rifle Division and the 44th Cavalry Division, following a 13-minute preliminary
bombardment. After capturing trenches, emplacements and structures adapted for
defense on the outskirts of Kryukovo, the subunita encountered heavy enemy resistance.
The advance was particularly hampered by emplaced tanks. An effort was being made
to destroy them with assault teams and direct-fire artillery. The fighting assumed
a protracted character. That afternoon the divisions' support echelons were en-
gaged, and the 17th Rifle Brigade was added to the assault. Presenting a threat of
encirclementy they mounted a night assault and drove the enemy out of Kryukovo and
neighboring villages. Penetration of the defense on the main axis of advance
- enabled the army's other combined units succeaefully to commence the attack. The
_ enemy's defense was breached practically throughout the entire zone of advance.
Capture of Krasnaya Polyana, Kryukove, and the preceding capture of villages in
the zones of the 31st, 30th and lst Assault armies disrupted the enemy's defense
and exerted a strong psychological effect on the German-faecist troops, which were
expecting an early capture of Moscow, or at least a substantial breather from the
fighting, cold and illneas which had exhausted them. The unexpected attack shook
them. The resistance of the defending enemy troops in the zones of the 20th and
16th armies diminished considerably. They began a disorganized retreat, as captured
officers and enlisted men acknowledged, without control by their com~and personnel.$
The troops of the 16th and 20th armies now had a real opportunity swi'ftly to ex-
ploit tactical into operational success and to break through without a halt the
def ensive line occupied by the enemy along the Leningrad rail line. But the 20th
Army did not have an exploitation echelon. In addition, the restricted nature of
_ off-road maneuver through deep snow and frontal assault on villages held by enemy
rear guards made it i.mpossible to increase the rate of advance sufficiently to ex-
ceed the enemy's rate of withdrawal. The army's rate of advance increased some-
what following the capture of Solnechnogorsk on 11 December.
Exploitation of tactical into operational auccess took place considerably more
rapidly in the 16th Army. On 10 December Gen K. K. Rokossovskiy formed three
_ mobile groups: under the command of Gen F. T. Remizov (145th Tank Brigade, 44th
Cavalry Division, and 17th Rifle Brigade); General A. P. Beloborodov (9t-h Guards
Rifle Division and 36th Rifle Brigade), Gen M. Ye. Katukov (lst and 17th Tank
brigades, 89th Independent Tank Battalion, and 40th Rifle Brigade).
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~i 1
At first the actions of these groups were not distinguished by swiftness or
mobility. But the mobile groups of Generals Remezov and Katukov played an important
role in offensive exploitation aimed at breakir.Q *~+rough the Istra defensive line.
Swinging aroun3 the reservoir from the north and south, they threatened with en-
circlement the enemy force which had taken up position on the west shore of the
Istra Reservoir, which predetermined its capture and a aubsequent advance to the
defensive line along the Lama and Ruza rivers.
An important role in the defeat in detail of the Ietra force was also played by the
mobile group of the Sth Army, containing the 2d Guards.Cavalry Corps. This corps
executed a ma.rch to the vicinity of Kubinka Station, from which it was engaged
northward on the third day of the offensive. Crushing the main forces of the 78th
Infantry Division in the area of Safonikha, it wheeled abruptly westward, advancing
toward the Ruza River.
By 15 Decenaber the armies of the right side of the Western Front, having broken
through two~iefensive lines, had advanced 40-50 1~, inflicting heavy losses on the
combined uni*_s of the 3d and 4th Panzer groups. ~
On the left side of the Western Front the ma.in attack was mounted by the lOth Army.
Commencement of the offensive was proceeded by advance of combined units from depth
_ to assembly areas. In a 24-hour period the diva.sions traveled 30 km or more along
snow-clogged roads, into the teeth of a blizzard, while the 326th Rifle Division
was proceeding at a forced-march pace, covering 45-50 l~n per day. The 322d Rifle
Division, traveling approximately 50 km in 36 hours, reached the town of
- Serebryanyye Prudy by the morning of 7 December. Following a brief artillery
bombardment and delivery of fire by direct-fire guna, the regiments launched an
assault from the north and east, taking the enemy by surprise. In the course of
the engagement one regiment executed a maneuver to the southern edge of town and
immediately commenced an assault, without delay. The surprise attack from three
directions threw the enemy troops in the town into a state of confusion. While
offering resistance,' the enemy deaperately sought a way to escape. Nevertheless
after 3 hours of fighting two battalions of an enemy infantry regiment were routed
and the town captured. The division's losses totaled only 7 dead anrl 19 wounded.9
Repulsing scattered enemy counterattacks, the division continued advancing toward
Venev.
Of decisive significance for the army was a breakthrough in the center of the zone
of advance, where they were to capture the town of Mikhaylov, in which a strong
enemy garrison was stationed. This mission was successfully accomplished by a
night assault by the 330th Rifle Division, working in coordination with the 328th
Rifle Division.
The rout of the enemy at Serebryanyye Prudy and Mikhaylov led to formation of a
~ 50-km breach in his defenses.
The army cou~mann attempted to exploit through this breach. Forward detachments
were sent forward. Sledge teams were mobilized to speed their movement. But
nevertheless they did not possess the necessary mobility to outflank the enemy's
rear guard off roads.
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Th~ divisions' main forces, advancing on the road, were frequently halted by air-
strikes; frontal assault on enemy centers of reaistance led to protracted engage-
ments.
The rate of advance was also slower than that of the first day because the enemy,
having recovered from the surprise attack, began hastily closin.g the breach which
had formed in his defenses. The lOth Army did not have a mobile group which
could split the enemy's front more deeply: the 41st Cavalry Division, dispatched in
the direction of the town of Yepifan', engaged the retreating enemy, turned from
the designated direction and was unable to accomplieh the mission of capturing the
town.l0
The 50th Army shifted to the offensive on the morning of 8 December. In spite of
the fact that the enemy force facing it was somewhat weakened, penetration of the
defense was accomplished slowly, for the army's divisions were weak and fatigued
by defensive engagements. By 17 December they had managed to advance only 8-12 km,
and captured the town of Shchekino. Since the army wae unable to breach the
enemy's defense, it was unable to advance to the rear of the enemy's 2d Panzer Army
and, working in coordination with the lOth Army, to encircle part of its forces.
On the right side of the Southwestern Front the troops of the 13th Army launched
an attack on 6 December, hitting the enemy's Yelets force from the north. General
Kostenko's force was advancing from the south. One feature of the breakthrough and
penetration deep into the enemy's defense lay in the fact that in the enemy's
strongpoint-type defenae, attacks would be launched for the m~ost part between
strongpoints and centers of resistance. The lst Guards Rifle Division, for example,
attacking a weak point, had penetrated 14 lan by evening. The Sth Cavalry
Corps initially engaged to capture built-up areas, but subsequently changed its
direction of attack and drove between enemy strongpoints, which enabled it swiftly
to advance to depth. On 8 December the corpe advanced 10 km, 12 km on 9 December,
and 20 km on 10 December.ll The corps got behind the enemy's Yelets force. It was
only the slow rate of advance of the 13th Army's assault group which prevented en-
circlement within a few days of the main forces of the 34th Army Corps south of
Yelets. In the course of offensive exploitation, however, the troops of the right
side of the Southwestern Fr-ont encircled its main forces and defeated them in
detail north of the town of Livny, which made it possible to consolidate two army
breakthroughs into a single front penetration and to create some preconditions for
developing the breakthrough into operational pursuit.
Penetration of prepared defensive lines in the course of a counteroffensive and
general offensive of Soviet forces. Seizure of the strategic initiative by the
Soviet Army in the counteroffensive at Moscow forced the enemy to shift to the
strategic defense for the firat time in World War II. On the Moscow strategic
_ axis he undertook considerable efforta to establish defensive lines on the Lama,
Ruza, Don and Shat rivers.
The lOth Army was the f irst to encounter the advance-fortified defenaive line in
the counteroffensive at Moscow. Guderian rad issued the order to prepare this line
at the end of November, subsequently making ~,he decision to shift to the defense on
the night of 6 December, that is, on the ev.~ of our counteroffensive.
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In 10 days time the enemy was abla, using loca~ citizens pressed into service, to
construct trenches and empla;;~nents, dugout shelters w~th from one to thzee layers
of logs, earth-and-timber emplacements, had adapted masonry buildings for defense,
had covered the sloping river banks with a sheet of ice at many points, and had
cdnstructed barbed wire entanglements in places. .
For a number of reasons, front and army intelligen.ce had not been able immediately
to discover the enemy's shift to def.ense and construction of defensive lines to the
rear, which prevented the commanding generals from making a decision while still
approaching these lines and thus preventing the occurrence of scattered, disconnected
assaults by the combined units.
For example, the commanding general of the lOth Army made the decision to break
through the defense on the Don River on 9 December, that is, after several com-
bined units had already launched assaults to take thia defensive lirie. This
deci~.ion (Diagram 3) consisted essentially in the following: pinning down enemy
troops with part of his forces in the Stalinogorsk (Novomoskovsk) area, he would
disengage the army's main forces and redeploy them southward with the ob~ective ~f
launching the main attack on the Yepifan'-Bogoroditsk axis.l~
As a consequence of redeployment of the divisions southward, the lOth Army launched
the offensive two days 1'ater than the designated time. On 12 December a hastily
organized assault, with weak artillery support, proved unsucce~sful. Subsequent as-
saults launched that same day also failed to pzoduce the desired results.
On the night of 13 December the efforts of the combined units were concentrated
on breaking through in the gaps between centers of resistance. Thanks to the ex-
- tensive employment of artillery for direct fire at strongpoints on the flanks of
the breakthrough aectors, the enemy was neutralized and the attacking troops began
enveloping and bypassing his centera of resistance, threatening them with en-
circlement. The result was immediate. In the course of 13 December the defense
was penetrated in several sectors.
The army's rate of advance increased appreciably with penetration of the defensive
line on the Don River. In two days the troops of the lOth Army advanced 20-35 km.
The army's mobile group the 41st Cavalry Division penetrated to a depth of
more than 50 km, but this division, weak in composition, was unable to accomplish
operational missions. A more powerful mobile group was needed. Such a force
had been formed by the evening of 16 December, consisting of three cavalry divisions
and one rifle division, with the ob~ective of advancing swiftly to the town of
Plavsk, and capturing it without a halt. Unfortunately the army cavalry group was
displaying insufficient mobility, and it lacked striking force, since it contained
no tanks. In a~dition, execution of maneuver was complicated by deep snow. As a
result, the cavalry force failed to drive to the enemy's rear and failed to become
the spearhead of the army's opei~ational attack. On 20 Deceanber the armies on the
right side of the Western Front reached the line on the Lama and Ruza rivers,which
had been fortified by the enemy as a system of strongpoints set up in villages and
on hilltops. The strongpoints contained a large number of earth-and-timber pill-
boxes, dugout shelters, emplacements, trenches, and were girdled by "Bruno" type
barbed wire entanglements.
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Western Front intelligence was unable to establish in a timely manner that the
_ enemy intended to halt the a3vance of our forces at this line. Zn connection with
this the offensive was launched in the formation in which pursuit was conducted,
that is, without establishing battle groups in the armies. Attempts to break
through the enemy's defense on the Lama River without a halt in attack position,
undertaken on 20-22 December, were unsucceseful.
On 23 December the command authorities of the Western Front, convinced that suc-
cess could not be achieved by ac~vancing on a wide front, issued an order to the
armies "to narrow the spearhead of attack at a specified point, breakthrough the
enemy's defense on a narrow front with concentrated forces, and exploit by engaging
fresh forces."13
_ An attack based on instructions from the commanding general of the front was laurrhed
_ 24 hours later. It was impossible in such a ahort time appreciably to alter the
force groupings of the armies, and their attack inevitably assumed the character of
assaults along a'uroad front with the ob~ective of capturing individual strong-
points. By 1 January the troops of the 20th Army had aucceeded in capturing only
- seven strongpoints.
The armies of the Kalinin Front, due to linearity of formaL�ion, were also advancing
slowly. By 20 December they had reached approximately the eame line as the armies
of the right side of the Western Front.
By decision of Hq SHC, at the end of December the main effort of the Kalinin
Front was shifted to the right side of the front in order to attack Rzhev from the
north and capture it. Toward this ob3ective it was planned to establish a battle
group of divisions from the 39th, 22d, and 29th armies. But time-uncoordinated ac-
_ tions by the armies along a wide front, with poor artillery support, was leading to
protracted engagements. The divisions of the 39th Army, for example, operating
in the army's entire zone of advance, were able to advance only 1-3 km in the first
three days. Only by narrowing the sector of active efforts to 20 km and establish-
ing a density of 40 guns and mortars per km in this sector was the Kalinin Front
able finally to penetrate the enemy's de.fense to a depth of 15-20 km and to open
a wide breach.
Similar deficiencies also characterized the armies of the other fronte. They at-
tested to the fact that the enemy's ehift to defense on prepared, fortified lines
with a well-organized fire plan and obstaclea, required a sharp rise in the level
of preparation for and conduct of de�ensive operations.
Massing of inen and weapons on the axes of advance and delivery of effective fire on
the enemy, formulated in an Hq SHC directive letter dated 10 Jaauary 1942, proved to
be the root items, successful resolution of which determined the success of offen-
sive operations.
Chaages which had occurred in the character of the enemy's actions were noted at th~
beginning of the letter: "In order to stem our advance, the Germans have shif ted to
the defense and have proceeded to build defensiv~ lines with emplacements, ob-
stacles, and other field fortifications." It further stated: "In order to ensure
pene~rat:ion of the enemy's defensive line to its full depth... at least two
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conditions are essential: first, it 3.s necessary to replact: actions by individual
divisions disposed in a line, presently practiced by our armies and fronts,
with actions by assault groups concentrated in one sector; second, it is essential
to replace so-called artillery preparation with artillery support for the attack."
The ma.keup of the assault group of the armies was apecified at three or four divi-
sions, and in the front se~veral armies. In addition to massing the forces o~
combined-arms large strategic formations, the directive letter also specifie:d con-
centration of artillery: 60-8C~ gune in an army aseault group sector, and 150-200 in
a front assault group aector. ~
Execution of the instructions of the Hq SHC directive letter caused a sharp change
in preparation for and execution of off ensive operationa. This can be seen in the
experience of the Rzhev-Vyaz'ma Operation, conducted by the troops of the Western
and Kalinin fronts in January-April 1942, and in particular in the advance of the
- 20th Army of the Western Front.
In view of unsuccessful attempts to break through the enemy's ~ef ense, which had
been fortified in advance, on the Lama River at the end of December-beginning of
January by the uncoordinated efforts of the let Assault Army, 20th and 16th armies,
Hq SHC ordered the commanding general of the Western Front to form a battle group
of troops of tne 20th Ar,ny, transferring to it part of the forces of the adjacent
lst Assault Army and 16th Army. By 10 January the 2d Guards Cavalry Corps, a
cavalry division, a tank brigade and four rifle brigades, five ski battalions, five
artillery regiments, and two rocket artillery battalions had been transferred over
to the 20th Army.
The breakthrough sector 8 km comprised less than half of tts 20 km zone of ad-
vance. The army's main forceQ and weapons were concentrated in this sector: both
rifle divisions, six of the eight rifle brigades, all tank brigades, and 77 percent
of artillery. To achieve better command and control, the army's troops were
organized into three groups, each of which comprised a reinforced rifle diyision.
The 2d Guards Cavalry Corps comprised a mobile group. A decisive concentration of
men and weapons in the breakthrough sector made it possible to establish densities
which were fairly high for that time: approximately 3.5 rifle battalions, 60 guns
and mortars, and 12.5 tanks per km of breakthrough sector,14 and to achieve an
almost threefold superiority over the adversary. In the counteroffensive the rifle
divisions had been penetrating the defense in a zone of 3.5-4.5 km, while on the
Lama River the 352d Rifle Division, for example, was penetrating the defense in
sectors only 1.5 km wide.
Substantial changes in comparison with the counteroffensive occurred in the deploy-
ment of the 20th Army's artillery. An APP group was established in each combined
unit, consisting of 2-3 battalions. In the divisions 1 or 2 battalions would be
designated to aupport the attack-echelon regiments, and in the brigade the at-
tack-echelon battalions. An army ADD group, consisting of two regiments, wasformed
in the army. R~cket artillery battalions were placed directiy under division com-
- manders. Twenty-five percent of a11 regimental and antitank artillery was set up
for direct fire.
Artillery preparation for the attack was to run 1.5 hours. It was preceded by a
period of demolish~ng enemy installations. For the period of artillery support
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of infantr,y and tank assault, the battaliona were instructed to deliver fire on
- request by rifle battalion commanders and at newly spotted targets. Airstrikes were
to be employed to neutra].ize and destroy the enemy during the offensive.
According to the operation plan, on the first day the enemy's defense was to be
penetrated to a depth of 10-12 km.
The troops of the 20th Army launched the attack on 10 January 1942. It was snowing
heavily, which worsened conditions for the artillery. All aircraft were grounded.
At 0930 the army launched the attack. The 352d Rifle Divieion was attacking on the
main axis of advance (Diagram 4). Since the artillery groups contained few heavy
guns, they were unable to demolieh and neutralize.the earth-and-timber emplacements
and weapon emplacements in structures. The first aesault was unsuccessful. Finally
at 1130 the regimente entered the village of Timonino, which had been transformed
by the enemy into a strong center of reaistance. Ite troope had resisted with the
stubbornness of the doomed.
Storming one eartl~-and-timber bunker after another, the division's subunits slowly
advanced. Due to a shortage of ammunition, artillery provided little support of the
attacking infantry and tanks. In spite of all this, on the firat day the regiments
of the 352d Division advanced 2-3 km, and an additional 6-7 km on the following two
days. This created conditions for engaging the army's mobile task force the
2d Guards Cavalry Corps, reinfarced by the 20th Cavalry Division, the 22d Tank
- Brigade, and 5 ski battalions. On 13 January the army's mobile group entered the
breach. The army's rate of advance picked up.
The achieved success enabled the lst Assault Army, the 16th and 5th armies to join
in the offensive. The offensive frontage broadened, which made it difficult for
- the advarsary to localize the threat of deep penetration. Our rate of advance,
however, did not exceed the enemy's rate of withdrawal, which was due to a number of
factors. The mobile group did not possess eufficient striking power, since it had
an insufficient number of tanks, and it was having considerable difficulty maneuver-
ing through the very deep anow. The troops were critically short of ammunition.
- Frequently units and combined units would advance primarily along roads, mounting
only frontal attacks on the enemy. By 25 January the armies of the right side of
the Western Front had fought their way forward 50-70 km and were forced to halt for
- an extended time at the Gzhatsk defensive line.
Analysis of preparation for and execution of penetration in the operations of the
_ w3nter campaign of 1941/42 indicates that penetration of the enemy's defense con-
tained a number of specific features which were determined t;y the general nature of
the armed struggle, by our force's shift to a counteroffe-asive, and by its develop-
ment, without pause, into a general offensive.
Prepa~ation of all armiea for the counteroffensive at Moscow was accomplished on a
tight timetable, which prevented the enemy from establiehing a deliberate defense.
The fact that the enemy was considerably under strength in troops prevented him
- from establishing high densities in the defense, while the low morale and physical
tiredness of the troops diminished their combat efficiency.
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In turning to the counteroffensive, only the troops of the armies (and not all of
them) began penetration simultaneously. Subsequently penetration broke down into a
number of aequential attacks mounted on the scale of combined units, units, and even
- subunits, which diminished the force of the attack and affected the rate of advance.
In view of the low tank densities, the main burden of the breakthrough effort was
shouldered by the infantry and artillery. A lack of mobile group8 in the
armies prevented them from rapidly exF,loiting to depth. In a number of armies such
forces were established in the course of the operation and played an importan+t role
in boosting the rate of advance.
When the enemy shifted to a strategic defense, it became necessary to break through
' a defense prepared in advance, which required a greater massing of inen and weapons
- and improved coordination of efforts. ~Advance establishment of mobile groups
in the armies accelerated exploitation of tactical to operational penetrations and
increased the rate of advance.
3. Penetration in Operations of the Summer-Fall Campaign of 1942
- The most characteristic features of preparation for and execution of penetration of
the enemy's defense in the summer-fall campaign of 1942, which on the whole was a
defensive campaign for our forces, can be seen in the example of the Khar'kov and
Rzhev-Sychevka offensive operations.
The general plan of the Khar'kov Operation (Diagram 5) specified launching two at-
tacks: one from the Volchansk area and the other, the main attack, from the
Barvenkovo salient, on converging axes toward Khar'kov.
Forces attacking from Volchansk included the 28th Army and part of the forces of
the 21st and 38th armies, which were attacking on adjacent flanks. The northern
- battle group contaiaied 18 rifle divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, 7 tank brigades,
and 2 motorized rifle brigades. Ten divisions were assigned to the forward echelon,
8 divisions of which comprised the main forces and were to break through the
enemy's defense in a 26 km sector.
A m o b i 1 e group, consisting of the 3d Guards Cavalry Corps, reinforced by a
motorized rifle brigade, was formed only in the 28th Army. It was to be engaged
at a depth of 15-16 km on the third day of the operation.
- The southern battle group contained the 6th Army and Gen L. V. Bobkin's army group.
It contained 10 rifle divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, 11 tank and 2 motorized rifle
brigades.15 5.5 divisions were assigned to the firet operational echelon, 3 of
these to the main axis of advance.
The breakthrough exploitation echelon in the southern group included 2 tank corps
in the 6th Army and a cavalry corps, reinforced by a tank brigade, in Gen L. V.
Bobkin's army group. The tank corps were to move into the breach on the third day,
and the cavalry corps on the second day of the operation, at a depth of 10-12 km.
_ The reserves of the commanding general of the front on the main axis of advance
comprised two rifle divisions and the 2d Cavalry Corps.
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The armies designated to conduct this operatian were able to establish the troop
densities specified in Table 2.
Table 2. Densities of Men and Weapons in the Breakthrough Sectors of the Armies in
the Khar'kov Operation
Army Width of Zone Width of Breakthrough Densities in Break-
of Advance, km Sectors km throu h Sector
Army Division Artillery Direct In-
; fantry Sup-
ort Tanks
21st 120 14 2-4 23/60 3.5
28th .15 15 2.5-4.5 45/60 12
38th 100 26 5.9 14/20 5
6th 75 25 4-10 30/51 6.4
- Army group of General 26 11 � 5-6 19/27 4
Bobkin
Note: Average artillery densities are given in the numerator, and maximum densities
in the denominator.
The enemy's defense in the breakthrough sectors consisted of a system of platoon
strongpoints linked into centers of resistance, with gaps between them. Strong-
points at the forward edge were linked by communication trenches, which essentially
comprised the first fighting trench, continuous over considerable stretches. A
large number of earth-and-timber emplacements were constructed in important
sectors, especially in villages. Emplaced tanks were positioned in the gaps be-
tween strongpoints. The enemy made extensive use of barbed-wire entanglements.
The main defensive zone, 8-12 km deep, contained two positions. In some sectors
the enemy prepared a second and third defensive zones. The enemy's total depth of
defense was 25-30 lma.
This defense was to be broken up with a one-hour preliminary artil:lery bombardment,
with ammunition consumption of 0.5-0.8 basic load. On the first day of the opera-
" tion the armies distributed from 0.6 to 1.5 basic loads for the various artillery
and mortar systems. The command authorities of the Southwestern Front, well aware
of the limited fire capabilities of the artillery, issued special instructions
which stated that in view of the low densities of artille y and limited issue of
ammunition, massing of fire was exceptionally important.l~ Therefore almost all
fires were to be delivered only on well-reconnoitered targets. All battalion and
regimental artillery 4 to 6 guns f rom each infantry support group were set up
for direct fire, which increased artillery fire results.
Support of the assault phase was to be in the form of a rolling barrage, while sup-
port of infantry and tanks at depth was to be by fire on request. Planning of these
periods of offensive artillery support was assigned to the division artillery com-
manders, which could not help but introduce lack of coordination in the employment
of available artillery.
We should note that planned artillery capabilities differed substantially from ac-
t~tal capabilities. This is due to the fact that front and army artillery
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tieadquarters had not drawn up detailed plans for redeployment of artillery unitr~
and Y~ad failed to consider the fact that many artillery regiments lacked the
minimum requisite means of transport, as a consequence of which only 17 of the 32
reinforcement regimeats we~e able to reach their fire positions by the evening of
11 May; 11 regi.ments were still en route and did not take part in artillery
preparation, while 4.regiments did not arrive until the offensive was in progress.l7
For a number of reasona the front's air forcea were unable appreciably to make up
for the lack of artillery fire capabilities ta soften up the enemy's defense. In
the Southwestern Front they had not yet been unified into an air army, and 337 com-
bat aircraft (about 50 percent) were at the disposal of the armies. If one con-
siders that 70 percent of the bombers were PO-2 light night bombers,l$ the extreme-
ly limited capabilities of the air forces of the Southwestern Front to suppress the
- enemy's defense will be obvious. In addition, their main efforts were dir.ected to-
ward neutralizing targets deep in the enemy's defen~e.
The main points contained in the Hq SHC directive letter of 10 January 1942 were
put more fully into practice in the Khar'kov offensive operation than in preceding
operations. The battle groups contairerltrao or three armies apiece, and they were
assigned a common breakthrough sector. The battle groups of the armies contained up
to 8 rifle divisions, while mobile groups were additionally fo.rmed in the
armies advancing on the main axes. The breakthrough sectors were sti21 very wide,
however, which made it impossible to achieve greater superiority over the enemy and
substantial force densities, especially artillery.
On 12 May, following an hour of artillery preparation, the northern and southern
= battle groups launched the attack. The troops, which were in good spirits and
well prepared politically, simultaneously attacked the enemy's forward positions
and, destroying the defending troops, immediately created conditions in a number of
sectors for a swift advance to depth. The auccess of the breakthrough was also
influenced by the fact that the morale of the enemy troops, which had been ad-
versely affected by our winter offensive, had not yet been fully restored. .
In the northern battle group, the combined units of the 21st and 38th armies suc-
~ ceeded on the very first day in breaking through the enemy's entire main defensive
- zone, advancing to a depth of 6-10 km. The divisions of the 28th Army, which were
attacking on the main axis of advance, moved forward only 1-3 km that morning, that
is, were able to penetrate only the first position, while in front of the second
position they encountered heavy fire from the reserves of the infantry regiments
and subunits which had withdrawn to the second position from the forward edge of
the battle area. All the deficiencies in preparing for the operation affected the
actions of the 28th Army. The infantry and tank assault began at different times,
as a consequence of lack of coordination of their movement toward the enemy's for-
ward positions and the fact that the combat engineere had done a poor job of clear-
ing lanes through the minefields. On the first day 22 tanks were disabl ed by
enemy landmines.19 The combined units of the 28th Army advanced only 2-4 km that
day.
The fact that the 28th Army had fallen behind adjacent units led to a unique jam
in the vicinity of Ternovaya, which threatened to disunite the efforts of the
assault group. The situation had to be rectified immediately, which could be
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achieved by attacking frontally and on the flaaks with fresh rifle troops follow-
ing massive airstrikes and artillery fire, or by exploiting to depth in the sectors
where a successful advance had been achieved. Engagement even of one division of
the two divisions comprising the 28th Army's support echelon would make it possible
to complete penetration of the ma.in defensive zone and to create favorable condi.~
tions for engaging the mobile group. We should note that ~oaditions ofi its
engagement had already been created in the zone of the 21st Army. The command
authorities of the 28th Army, however, failed to take advantage of this. By evening
the divisions of the army's support echelon had ~ ust begun advancing closer to the
troops of the attack echelon, while the mobile g r ~ u p remained in its position,
30-35 km from the battle Iine.
The attack-echelon troops, weakened by casualties and by the fact that part of
their forces had been diverted to cover the.flanks, had slowed the pace ~f advance
by evening. The enemy, taking advantage of this fact, began to move up to the
breakthrough sector tactical reserves and forces from sectors not under attack and
to establish force groupings for mounting counterthruatso
Thus the first opportunity to develop tactical into operational penetration was not
utilized.
On 13 May the northern force achieved the greatest success s~n the flanks. The
divisions of the 21st AXmy and the right-flank divisions of tk~e 28th Army advanced
6-10 km, enveloping the enemy at Ternovaya. Divisions of the 38th Army advanced
an additional 6 km deeper into the defense by noon. But the stability of the
enem}~�s defense in the breakthrough sector was not completely broken, as a con-
sequence of the fact that the enemy was still holding in the center and on the
flanks. That afternoon the enemy mounted a counterthrust in the zone of the 38th
' Army with two panzer divisions and approximately an infantry division.
Repelling the counterthrust was requiring more and more forces with each passing
day, especially tank forces (6 tank brigades were brougi~* into action), for the
divisions of the 38th Army had very few antitank weapons. S~nce this was being
done with attack-echelon troops, the offensive capabilities of the force which was
attacking on the main axis of advance began drop~ping off sharply, which affected .
the pace of exploitation of the breakthrough. On ik May the rate of advance dropped
to 5-6 km, and on 15 May very little progress was made. �rospects for engaging the
support echelon and mobile task force for offensive exploitation had essentially
disagpeared.
Penetration by the troops of the aouthern battle group was developing much more
- successfully. By evening on the firet day the attack-echelon divisions of the
6th Army not oaly had broken through the main defensive zone but had reached the
second zone on a 20 km frontage.20 Gen L. V. Bobkin's army group advanced to a depth
of 4-6 km that morning. But the enemy's defense proved to be disorganized, and
General Bobkin engaged his mobile g r o u p, which reached and seiz~d a bridge-
head on the Orel' River by evening. The army group had advanced approximately 12 km.
Penetration of the enemy's defense on a frontage of more than 40 km and advance by
the troops of the southern battle group to a depth of 12-15 km made possible and
iirgently demanded engagement of the 6th Army's mobile gzoup 2 tank corps (ap-
" proximately 300 tanks), for the enemy had begun hastily redeploying to the area the
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reserves of the army corps and his 6th Army. But the combined units of the mobile
group had not even been brought close to the attack-echelon troops and were now
, 35 km distant from them. Nor was the army's support echelon engaged.
The following day the troops of the southern battle group completed penetratz..c:~ of
the second defensive zone, but their advance amounted to only 3-5 lan in the 6~h
Army and as much as 10 km in General Bobkin's army group. The sharp decrease in
the rate of advance of the 6th Army attested to the need to build up efforts, and
- particularly to engage the tank corpa. In addition, the troops had actually reached
the previously designated point at which they were to be brought into the breach.
On the night of 14 May, however, the point of engagement of the tank corps was ex-
tended to beyond the enemy's rear defensive line, which was established at a depth
of 30 km.21 The commanding generaZ of the front switched all aircraft supporting
the 6th Army to support of the northern assault group, into the flank of which the
enemy had launched a counterthrust. Nor was the commanding general of the 6th
~ Army engaging his support echelon. Thus in the ~outhern sector favorable conditions
for decisive development of tactical into operational penetration were not utilized
for a second time.
In the meantime the enemy's situation was becoming increasingly more critical.
Colonel Selle, former chief of engineer troops of the German 6th Army, writes:
"The events of the following day took on a threatening cast. Russian forward
units were approaching Krasnograd.... On the Orel' River the front of the 8th
Corps, which was being defended by rear security units, was breached, and Russian
tanks with cavalry had begun advancing unopposed in a westerly direction. The
113th Infantry Division, which had launched a counterattack from the Yefremovka
area, following initial success was encircled on the east bank of the Orel' River
by enemy tanks and, sustaining heavy casualties, was thrown back several kilo-
meters.... The 6th Army's casualties and equipment losses were heavy.... The mood
was somber at the 6th Army's command post in Poltava. Preparations began for
defense of the city. Measures were taken to ensure the safety of Kiev."
Penetration of the defense south of Khar'kov forced the commanding general of Army
Group South, Field Marshal von Bock, to waver. He now considered it impossible to
mount Operation Friedericus (code-name of an operation with the objective of en-
circling Soviet forces south of Khar'kov A. R.) and was inclined toward an at-
tack launched from the Lozovaya araa in the direction of Merefa, as safer for
his army group and at the same time less dangerous for our southern assault group,
for the support echelons and reserves of our 6th Army were positioned on this axis,
and tank corps of the mobile group could be redeployed here more rapidly when being
engaged, if a critical situation developed here. It was only an order by Hitler
which forced von Bock to undertake a counteroffensive northward from the Kramatorsk
area.
There is no doubt that the operational results could have been much greater if the
tank corps had been expeditiously engaged. But the command authorities of the
Southwestern Front were endeavoring to complete penetration of the enemy's rear
defensive area by attack-echelon troops and only after this to engage the mobile
task force and support echelon of the 6th Army. This led to protracted fighting
. for strong centers of resistance.
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The advance achieved on 14 May totaled 6-8 lan.22 Only the 6th Cavalry Corps of
~ General Bobkin's group, taking advantage of freedom of maneuver, exploited at a
more rapid pace and drove 40 km deep into the enemy's defense.
The enemy hastily began redeploying reaerves to threatened sectors. In addition
- to the 113th and 108th Infantry divisions, the 305th Infantry Division was proceed-
ing from Khar'kov. Gradually the enemy achieved a balance of forces and, supported
by a system of fortified deep positions and providing his troops with air support
by aircraft transfarred from the Crimean sector, began to stabilize the situation in
the rear def ensive area. Prospects for engaging tank corps into the breach began
di~iinishing sharply. The entire operation was also loosing steam. The conmand
authorities of the Southwestern Front, however, had a different assessment of the
situation. On 15 May they reported to Hq SHC that the offensive was developing
well and that conditions had been created for the troops of the Bryansk Front to
shift tu the attack and for further off ensive exploitation by the assault groups.
"Judging from the enemy's actions, we conclude that he has not yet figured out the
general plan of our operation (p i n c e r drives on Khar'kov), and he has directed
his main offensive effort toward secondary aector of our front (38th Army), giving
freedom of action to our battle groups...." And further :"We have the i.mpression
that at the present time the enemy not only is unprepared for aggressive actions on
the Kursk-Voronezh or Oboyan'-Oskol axis but does not even possess strong forces in
order firmly to hold the Kursk-Oboyan' Front.i23
- This was the situation estimate ma.de by the front's command authorities two days
before the enemy launched a counteroffensive. It attests not only to excessive op-
_ timism on the part of the front's command authorities and poor knowledge of the
enemy's force grouping and intentions, but also indicates an endeavor to convince
Hq SHC to bring the forces of the Bryansk Front into the initiated operation and to
conduct it on a large scale.
On 15 May the attack echelon of the 6th Army succeeded by aggressive actions in
capturing a number of positions in the rear defensive area and thus for the third
time created conditions for engaging the tank corps. But by evening the tank
corps were 25-35 km from the battle line and were unable to enter the breach by
0300 hours on ].6 May, as required by the order issued by the comnnander in chief of
the'Southwestern Secr.or and the commanding general of the 6th Army.24
Their engagement was postponed another 24 hours, that is, to tk~e morning of 18 May,
when the enemy himself launched an offensive. Now their engagement was not only
tardy but dangerous as well, for the southern group of forces was faced with
an ominous threat, which demanded immediate eastward redeptoyment of the tank
corps in order to prevent encirclement of the entire southern group of forces.
On the mo~rning of 17 May, that is, on the aixth day of the operation, the tank
corps engaged. But it was a belated move. The enemy aucceeded in completing re-
deployment of his forces and that same day launched strong attacks, with rhe element
of surprise, on~the troopa of the southern and southwestern fronts. On 19 May our
offensive ground to a halt, and the troops were ordered to shift to the defense
along the entire Barvenkovo salient, to repulse enemy attacks and to reestablish the
situation.
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Without going into the reasona for the unsuccessful outcome of the Khar'kov Opera-
tion as a whole, we should note that penetration of the enemy's defense wae ac-
complished only by the armies' first operational echelon. Engagement of the ~up-
port echelons of the armies and the tank corps was unwarrantedly delayed. Recon-
naissance of the enemy was poorly organized, and air engagement of the enemy's
reserves was conducted very feebly. The offensive of tne Southwestern F'ront proved
to be isolated and unsupported by aggressive actions by the ad~acent fronts. This
permitted the enemy freely to maneuver his forces and to mount powerful attacks on
our troops.
The breakthrough in the Rzhev-Sychevka Operation merits attention. This operation
was conducted in the summer of 1942 with the ob~ective of immobilizing the enemy's
forces in a passive sector of the strategic front; it embr~died those methods of
penetration which experienced fur~her de~velopment in subsequent campaigns of the
Great Patri~tic War.
Proceeding from the stated objective, the general plan of the operation (Diagram 6)
consisted in mounting attacks by ad~acent flanks of the Kalinin and Western fronts,
clearing the enemy from the Rzhev and Zubtsov, Karatnzino and Pogorelaye Gorodishche
area, advancing and consolidating along the Volga and Vazuza rivers.
The Western Front mounted the main attack with the 20th and 31st armies in a sector
_ 20 km wide, to a depth of only 35 km. A subsidiary attack was to be mounted some-
what south of the main attack, with the forces of approximately a rifle division.
Three days later, that is, when the enemy's reserves were diverted to the axis of
advance of the main force, the 5th Army was to launch an attack, followed by the
33d Army.25 The time differen~e in launching the offensive by these armies was due
to the necessity of transferring artillery support initially to the 5th and sub-
sequently to the 33d Army.
Concentration of the efforts of two armies and the tront's forces in a single break-
through sector made it possible to establieh densities which were high for 1942: one
division every 2-2.5 km, approximately 100 guns and mortars of 76 mm ar~d larger and
15-23 infantry-supporting tanks per kilometer of breakthrough frontage.
The combat formations of the divisions and regiments were as a rule arranged in two
echelons. In addition to a suppart echelon, a mobile group was formed in each
- army, containing three tank brigades and in the front a mobile group consisting
of 2 tank corps and 1 cavalry corps.~6
Duration of artillery preparation was specified at 90 minutes. Since M-30 heavy
rocket-propelled projectiles were employed for the first time in this operation,
they were expecting fairly good neutralization of the enemy's defense, in which
there was clearly noted a shift to a trench system with contruction of solidly-built
weapon emplacements in strongpoints and centers of resistance. In addition, they
- established high densities of artillery designated for dir~ct fire 15-2Q pieces
per km. Guns up to 152 mm were employed for this purpose. Support of the as-
sault was to be provided with a rolling barrage.
Zfao air armies were assigned to provide air support of the operation. Initially
they were to support breakthrough by the armies of the Kalinin Front, and subsequent-
- 1y the Western Front.
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On the Kalinin Front the main attack on Rzhev was mounted by the 30th Army, which
in composition had been strengthened to an assault army of prewar organization
13 rifle divisiona, 3 rifle and 8 tank brigades.27 The front's subsidiary attack
was mounted by the 29th Army 15 km from the main attack, employing 3 reinforced
rifle divisions.
The armies, proceeding from prewar views, also launched main and secondary attacks.
Thus four attacks were planned in the front operation, which extended approximately
50 km in frontage and less than 20 km in depth. Since two armies of the Western
Front were mounting a powerful attack only 16 km from the Kalinin Front's secondary
attack and were to advance toward Zubtaov, that is, where the 29th Army was aimed,
the need for it to attack on an independent axis seems little justified.
Secondary army attacks by the forces of one or two divisions, with very weak artil-
lery support, failed to penetrate a strongly fortified defense. Elimination of
secondary attacks and unification of the efforts of the 30th and 29th armies in a
single breakthrough sector would have made it possible to have a frontage of at
least 18 km instead of 12.5 km on the main axis and 6 km in the secondary sectors,
which would have made it difficult for the enemy to close the breach with immediate
operational reserves. Forces supporting the penetration on the flanks would be
almost cut in half. One must agree here with the opin~ion of Gen L. M. Sandalov,
former chief of staff of the 20th Army, who writes: "It is very probable that if
the Kalinin Front had combined its forces for penetration in a single sector, its
- actions at Rzhev would have resulted in earlier an.d more substantial success."28
Artillery densities on the main axis of advance, although high for that time 113
guns and mortars per kilometer of breakthrough sector, were not fully in conformity
with the character of the enemy's defense. Approximately 50 percent of the tubes
were 82 mm mortars, while defense of the Rzhe;,� bridgehead constituted a field
forti~ied area consisting of two strong defensive areas and a large center of
resistance established in Rzhev.29 On the aecondary axis artillery density was
67 guns and mortars and 50 rocket launchere.
We should note that the Kalinin Front had the capability to increase artillery den-
sity and improve its qualitative composition in the breakthrough sector. Only
SO percent of the ~ront's artillery was asaigned to participate in the breakthrough.30
_ The front's 4 armies which did not take part in the operation contained 22 artillery
and mortar regiments,31 at least half of which could have been assigned to the
operation.
Densities of tanks providing close aupport of infantry were fairly high for 1942
32 tanks per km of breakthrough sector on the main axis and 16 on the secondary.
But few tanks were assigned to the 30th Army's mobile group a tank brigade
and a tank regiment a total of only 80 tanks. This force also included two
rifle brigades and an antitank artillery regiment.32
The command authorities of the Kalinin Front limited themselves to a comparatively
narrow range of ineasures in order to gain the element of surprise. Preparations
were made for a feint attack in the narrow gap between the breakthrough sectors of
the 30th and 29th armies. From an operational point of view it was inadvisable,
because the enemy, taking preparationa for the diversionary operations for the real
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thing and moving reserves to the northeast from Rzhev, could use them to oppose the
forces both of the 30th and 29th armies, sin~e fiis reserves were not more than 8-
12 km from the actual breakthrough sectors. Preparation of a diversionary front
operation from an area south of the town of Belyy toward the feint attack
being prepared (and which proved highly effective) by the Western Front at the
~unction of the 43d and 49th armies, to repel~which the enemy established a force
consisting of 3 tank divisions and 1 infaatry division, could have been more ef-
fective.
The offensive by the forces of the Kalinin Front began on 30 July 1942 in un-
favorable conditions. The enemy, t{aving determined the day when the offensive would
be launched, brought his troops into a state of combat readiness. A solid overcast
and pouring rains ma.de preliminary artillery bombardment and airstrikes difficult.
During the entire day only 86 sorties could be flown. ~
Launching a number of assaults, the 30th Army's battle group succeeded in penetrat-
- ing the first defensive position. The commanding general of the army engaged his
mobile group to build up the offensive effort. This force consisted primarily of
light tanks. They advanced slowly along the roads and cross-country routes, which
had been washed out by the heavy rains and were pockmarked by shell craters; some
. of the tanks bogged down. Artillery support of-engagement of the mobile task force
proved ineffective due to the small numbers of long-range artillery and delay in
displacing the APP groups.
As a result its attack proved weak and insufficiently coordinated with the efforts
of the attack-echelon divisions.
As a result of the first day of the offensive, an indentation had been formed in
the enemy's defense, 9 km wide and 6 km deep at the center. The enemy moved
reserves to the threatened sector and not only stabilized the front but at the end
of the day launched a number of counterattacks. Attempts to deepen and widen the
- breach on the second and third days of the offensive led to an extremely modest ad-
vance by the army's forces. On the following day, after some redeployment of
forces and change in the direction of attack, the troops of the 30th Army succeeded
in reaching the Volga east of Rzhev. Under threat of being outflanked by the forces
of the 31st and 30th armies, the enemy began to withdraw his troops from in front
of the 29th Army. As a result of stubborn, heavy fighting which lasted more than a
month, the troops of the Kalinin Front advanced from 8 to 20 km, but were unable
fully to accomplish the assigned missions. ~
The offensive by the forces of the Western Front wae delayed from 31 July to
4 August due to heavy rains. Following a 90-minute preliminary artillery bombard-
ment, assault battalions and forward units crossed the Derzha River on river-cross-
ing equipment and, accompanied by tanks, launched an attack. Sequential engagement
of the support echelons of the subunits, supported by artillery fire and airstrikes,
made it possible to build up efforts and make the attack almost continuous, without
a halt, to the depth of the entire first position.
The fighting for the town of Pogoreloye Gorodishche, which had been transformed in-
to a particularly strong center of resistance, assumed a more stubborn character.
At about 1400 hours the right-flank troops, having enveloped the town, finally fought
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their way into it and wiped out the garrieon defending the town. This made it pos-
sible to link up the breakthrough sectors of the 31st and 20th armies and to push
- the advance further.
- The assault on the second position began that afternoon, following heavy artillery
bombardment and a massive airstrike. Units of the 161st Infantry Division agai~l
sustained heavy casualties and were essentially wiped out. Arriving reserves of the
27th Army and 46th Panzer corps halted the further advance of the rifle divisions,
while the tank groups, due to delay on the Derzha River crossings and in advancing
along the roads, which were still wet following the lengthy rains and had been
chewed up by the attack-echelon troops, were unable to engage on the first day.
- Finally on the morning of 5 August they attacked together with the forward-echelon
troops and completed penetration of the main defensive zone. The breach created in
the enemy's defense was 30 lan in frontage and 25 km in depth.33
The commanding general of the front decided to engage the front's mobile group.
It again began to rain, however, which hinde~ed movement of the tank.corps across
the river and their advance to the pointa where they were to enter the breach. They
did not enter battle until 6 August, reaching the Vazuza River on the following
day.34 But by tl~is time the enemy had brought up his operational reserves 3
panzer divisions and an infantry division, intending to reestablish the situation
with two counterthrusts. The fighting took on a protracted character. Our troops
not only repelled counterthrusts but also captured bridgeheads on the Osuga and
Vazuza rivers.
The success achieved by the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts was important.
The initiative had temporarily been seized in the western aector, and the enemy had
been deprived of the opportunity to redeploy 3 trained and prepared panzer and
several infantry divisions to the Southern Front35 to carry out their principal
strategic missions assigned for the summer of 1942.
* * *
Analysis of penetration of the enemy's defense in the offensive operations of the
summer-fall campaign of 1942 indicates that a trend toward decisive massing of inen
and weapons in breakthrough sectors wae clearly evident in Soviet art of warfare.
This was expressed in assigning a cou~on breakthrough sector for 2 to 3 armies or
in increasing the strength of 1 army. Concentration of a substantial number of
rifle combined units in a single breakthrough sector made it possible to double-
triple their operational density, which improved preconditions for penetrating the
enemy's defense and achieving deep exploitation. Most fully embodied in this was
an important point contained in the flq SHC directive letter of 10 January 1942 and
its practicaT implementation.
Artillery densities in Lreakthrough sectors became double or triple those in the
winter campaign of 1941/42, reaching 100-150 guns and mortars per km. Mortars com-
prisedthe bulk of this density, however, which did not permit reliable delivery of
suppressive fire deep in the enemy's defense, thus creating conditions for penetra-
tion of the defense without a hslt, at least to the enemy's principal artillery
~ position areas.
;
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Establishment of air armies in the fronts expanded capabilities of massed employment
of air. At the same t:tme they contained extremely few bombers, as a consequence of
which aviation could not appreciably supplement artillery fire during preliminary
bombardment.
Tank densities also increased appreciably,especially in the operations of the Western
Front. Fairly strong m o b i 1 e g r o ups began to be formed in the armies, and in
certain instances even in the front. For a number of reasons, however, their en-
gagement was not always accomplislied expeditiously and with precision. The ex-
perience of combat employment of armored troops was summarized in People's Com-
_ missar of Defense Order No 325, dated 16 October 1942, which laid out the basic
principles of employment of tank and mechanized combined units and units.
In spite of a clearly evident trend toward massing men and weapons in breakthrough
sectors, it was not accomplished to the degree which wae possible and necessary.
An endeavor to mount secondary, blocking attacks in addition to the main attack was
leading to the scattering of forces.
The experience of offensive operations conducted for the purpose of pinning down
an3 immobilizing the enemy demonstrated that the best result was achieved when a
small number of attacks would be mounted, but'of a force sufficient to ensure
breaking through the defense and penetration by the attacking troops to a consider-
able distance (the Western Front in the Rzhev-Sychevka Operation). In the endeavor
to i~obilize as many enemy troops as possible right at the outset, that is, by
launching saveral attacks of little power along a broad front, the battle groups,
especially with hasty preparations for an offeneive, as a rule failed to
penetrate the enemy's defense, to create a threat of reaching operational objectives,
and thus to force the enemy to move substantial reserves to the threatened sector.
Consequently, in preparing for offensive operations the main objective of which is
to immobilize e.iemy rorces, penetration must u~ planned on a generai hasis, ~ymit-
ing only the depth of thrust, and planning employment of mobile groups and sup-
port echelons in conformity with this.
On the whole, during conduct of offensive operations in the first period of the war,
which was essentially a defensive phase, the art of organization and execution of
penetration was improved taking into account change in the material foundation and
conditions of conduct of warfare. Trends toward massing men and weapons in break-
through sectors, increasing reliability of suppressive fire on the enemy's defense,
increasing the rate of penetration, and development of tactical into operational
success by engaging mobile groups, support echelons and reserves, became clearly
defined. Soviet troops acquired certain experience in conducting penetration to the
entire tactical defense depth.
Synthesis of the experience of conducted operations and critical analysis of errors
which occurred made it possible by the end of the first period of the war to for-
mulate the principal points pertaining to matters of preparation for and execution
of penetration, which played an important role in euccessful resolution of this
problem in the subsequent periods of the war.
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- FOOTNOTES
lo Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defenae, Fund 208, List 2511, File 20,
Sheet 353.
2. Ibid., File 746, Sheet 1.
3. See S. A. Kalinin, "Razmyshleniya o minuvahem" jReflections on the Past], Moscow,
Voyenizdat, 1963, pp 139-140.
4. Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Fund 208, List 2511, File 46,
Sheet 36.
S. See N. Voznesenskiy, "Voyennaya ekonomika SSSR v period Otechestvennoy voyne"
[War Economy of the USSR During the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, Gospolitizdat,
1948, page 42.
6~ TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], Fund 202, List 9,
File 11, sheets 164, 165.
7. See L. M. Sandalov, "Na moskovskom napravlenii" [In the Mosco~ Sector], Moscow,
Nauka, 1970, page 257.
8. TsAMO SSSR, Fund 373, List 6631, File 4, Sheet 7.
9. Ibid., Fund 1380, List 4774, File 3, sheets 7, 8.
10. Ibid., Fund 353, List 5866, File 605, sheets 32-34.
11. See I. Kh. Bagramyan, "Tak nachinalas' voyna" [Iiow the War Began], Moscow,
Voyenizdat, 1977, pp 496-498.
12. See F. I. Golikov, "V Moskovskoy bitve" [In the Battle of Mosco~J, Moscow,
Nauka, 1967, pp 68-69.
13. TsAMO SSSR, Fund 373, List 6631, File 21, sheets 11, 12.
14. Ibid., Fund 343, List 6631, File 31, sheets 29, 30, 38, 39.
15. S~e "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [Hietory of World War IIj, Vol 5, Moscow,
Voyenizdat, 1975, page 127.
16. See "Sovetskaya artilleriya v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945 gg."
[Soviet Artillery in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945], Moscow, Voyenizdat,
1960, pp 128-129.
17. TsAMO SSSR, Fund 229, List 170, File 45, sheets 131-135.
18. Ibid., Fund 251, List 646, File 145, sheets 145,.238.
19. Ibid., Fund 382, List 8452, File 45, Sheet 26.
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20. Ibid., Fund 229, List 161, File 836, Sheet 449.
21. Ibid., Fund 229, List 161, File 836, sheets 480, 481.
22. Ibid., File 120, Sheet 331.
23. Ibid., File 17, sheets 311-317.
24. Ibid., File 88, Sheet 27.
25. See L. M. Sandalov, "Pogorelo-Gorodishchenskaya opsratsiya" [The Pogoreloye-
Gorodishche Operation], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1960, page 14.
26. TsAMO SSSR, Fund 208, List 2511, File 1468, Sheet 26; File 1087, sheets 45-71.
27. Ibid., Fund 213, Liat 2002, File 422, Sheet 16.
28. Sandalov, op. cit., page 117.
29. TsAMO SSSR, Fund 213, List 2002, File 121, sheeta 1, 2.
30. Ibid., Fund 208, List 2511, File 1044, Sheet 187.
31. Ibid., Fund 213, List 2002, File 422, Sheet 67.
32. Ibid., File 65, Sheet 23.
33. See "Istoriya vtoroy..," op, cit., Vol 5, page 245.
34. TsAMO SSSR, Fund 208, List 2511, File 1466, Sheet 10.
35. See K. ~ippel'skirkh, "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [History of World War II],
Moscow, Izd-vo Inostr. Lit., 1956, page 241.
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Chapter ~ao. DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PENETRATION IN WORLD
WAR II
1. Penetration in the Winter Campaign of 1942/43
By the beginning of the winter campaiga of 1942/43 the Communist Party and Soviet
Government had done a~-~ enormous job of mobilizing material and manpower resources,
increasing production of war materials and strsngthening the Soviet Armed Forces.
And although this country's economic situation atill remai~d difficult, and the
situation at the fronz was tense, thanks to the heroic efforts of the Soviet
people we had been able not only to replenish the losaes sustained in the summer
of 1942 but also to increase the quantity of military equipment at the disposal of
the fronts and armies.
Increased production of arms and ~ombat equipment made it possible to adopt new
tables of organization and equipment for the rifle divisions, additionally to
deploy several tank and mechanized corps, and to begin forming SflC Reserve artillery,
antiaircraft artillery and .rocket artillery diviaiona. Unification of all air
forces into air armies was completed in the fronts. In the first period of the
war command personnel acquired combat experience, going through a difficult school
of combat against a pawerful adversary. All this expanded the capabilities of the
Soviet Army to conduct operations in depth.
In spite of the fact that in the summer of 1942 the enemy achieved large-scale mili-
tary successes on the Eastern Front, he failed to achieve his ultimate objectives.
The Hitlerite command authorities were forced to shift to a strategic defense in
mid-October. The troops of the Soviet Army were faced with a complex task to
crush the enemy's strategic defense and to initiate a campaign to liberate the oc-
cupied areas. To achieve this, it was planned to conduct a number of offensive
operations. Each of these had ite own apecific features. The most characteristic
features of penetration in the �rinter campaign of 1942/43 were manifested in the
~ counreroffenaive at Stalingrad and in the operations on the Upper pon.
_ Preparation for and execution of penetration in the counteroffeasive at Stalingrad.
Hq SHC began planning the counteroffensive at Stalingrad in September 1942. As we
know, this plan consisted easentially in launching attacles by three fronts the
Southwestern, Stalingrad, and Don breaking through the enemy's defense in
several sectors and, exploiting toward Kalach along ~oaverging axes, encircling and
annihilating the enemy's main force grouping in the Stalingrad area. The defeat in
detail of the Stalingrad force created an enormous breach in the enemy's defense,
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which presented the opportunity to cruah the entire southern side of the enemy's
strategic front.
From the standpoint of execution of operational-strategic breakthroughs and their
exploitation, the plan of the counteroffensive is notable in the fact that the
axes of attack were selected with consideration of possibilities of establishing
battle groups primarily where the enemy's defense was weaker and where the line was
defe~led by less stable Romanian and Italian troops. At the same time the battle
groups were made strong enough so that they werecapable of successfully accomplishing
a breakthrough and exploiting it at a rapid pace to the area where the troops of
two fronts would link up and form a sufficiently strong outer perimeter of en-
circlement. As a rule the efforts of two or three armies of one or two fronts would
be linked on the axis of advance (Diagram 7). The 5th Tank Army and part of the
forces of the lst Guards and 21st armies, for example, were to attack on the main
axis of advance of the Southwestern Front. A second. powerful~attack was to be
launched from the Don River by the ad~acent flanks of the Southwestern and Don
fronts, with the forces of the 2lst and 65th Armies. The gap between the two
breakthrough sectors was approximately 20 km, was defended by approximately 1.5
infantry divisions and did not possess more than tactical importance. Penetration
by the battle groups beyond the enemy's main defensive zone would make it possible
to isolate these forces, subsequently to annihilate them and to form a single inter-
front breakthrough sector.
The Stalingrad Front was to mount its drive toward the Southwestern Front. It would
involve the efforts of three armies. Each of them, however, was to penetrate in a
~ separate sector. Under those specific situation conditions such a form of offensive
drive by the front was warranted. The opposing Romanian 6th Corps was defending on
a wider front than the enemy troops opposite the Southwestern and Don fronts, which
facilitated penetration of the defense and deep exploitation of the breakthrough.
In addition, with separate army offensive drives there would be a sma.ller volume of
operational redeployments, which was of great importance for gaining time and the
element of surprise.
The selected form of operational breakthrough made it possible to soften up the
enemy defense on a 400-kilometer front aimultaneously in several sectors, which
made it difficult for the enemy to maneuver reserves for the purpose of closing
breaches.
Another characteristic feature of penetration was the fact that it was essentially
undertaken with an equality of forces bewteen the opposing sides. In order to
achieve the requisite superiority over the enemy in the breakthrough sectors, the
Soviet command authorities displayed a high degree of skill in massing men and
~ weapons. In the Southwestern Front, for example, 50 percent of the rifle divisions,
3 tank and 2 cavalry corps, approximately 80 perceat of the artillery of the SHC
Reserve, all rocket artillery and a large portion of available aircraft were con-
centrated in the breakthrough sectors, representing a total width of 22 lun. In the
Stalingrad Front two thirds of the rifle divisions of the armies carrying out the
penetration, all mobile combined units, and the bulk of artillery and air were con-
centrated in breakthrough sectors representing a total frontage of 40 km. This
made it possible to establish a two to one and three to one superiority on the main
axes of advance of the fronts. The superiority was even greater in the breakthrough
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sectors ~f a number of armies. ~In the Sth Tank Army, for example, it was as fo1-
lows: 2.5:1 in personnel, 5:1 in artillery, in tanks an absolute superiority
within the tactical zone of defense and 2.8:1 in the zone of advance.l
The densities indicated in Table 3 were achieved as a result of decisive massing of
men and weapons in the breakthrough sectors.
Table 3. Average Densities of Men and Weapons in the Breakthrough Sectors in the
Counteroffensive at Stalingrad2
Width of Width of km per rifle divi- Guns and Tanks per
Front, Army Zone of Break- sion Mortars km of
Advance, through In the In the per km of Break-
km Sector, km zone as Break- Break- through
a Whole through through Sector
Sectors Sector
Southwestern Fro_r.t
5th Tank Army 35 16 6 4.5 68 13/37
21st Army 40 12 6.6 2.4 62 5/25
Don Front
65th Army 80 6 9 1.5 71.5 15
Stalingrad Front
64th Army 36 12 5 4 47 3-4
57th Army 35 15 14 6 33 6/12
Slst Army 110 12 24 6 30 3/12
Note: Density of infantry-supporting tanka is indicated in the numerator, and
operational density in the denominator.
It is evident from the table that average densities of rifle troops in the break-
through sectors in the armies of the Southwestern Front were 2 to 4 times those in
the overall zone of advance. Artillery densities in the armies of the Southwestern
and Don fronts as a whole were in conformity with the Hq SHC instructions issued to
the Don Front on 15 October to have 60-65 ~ieces per km of frontage, not includ-
ing rocket launchers. On the Stalingrad Front they were half that, and therefore
the front scheduled the armies to launch the offensive at different times, in order
to maneuver artillery from one breakthrough sector tn qnQther, but this plan did
not succeed because there was insufficient time for mane~ve:~:.
The tactical order of battle of the fronts was eingle-echelon, with up to two rifle
divisions assigned to the reserve. Z'he armies which were executing penetration �
contained two echelons. Mobil~. groups were formed in the majority of the at-
tacking armies. Their composition varied. In the 5th Tank Army, the mobile
~roup contained 2 tank corps and 1 cavalry corps, the 21st and 51st armies 1 tank
(mechanized) and 1 cavalry corps, and the 24th and 57th armies 1 tank
~ ~nechanized) corps.
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The tank arid mechanized corps were to engage on the first day of the operation,
3-4 hour's~after initiation of the attack, at a depth of 3.5-5 km, that is, to com-
plet~ penetration of the main defensive zone. By evening they w~re to penetrate
to a depth of 40-50 km on the main axes of advance. In view of an insufficient
number of infantry-support tanks in the arffiies, part of the forces of the tank and
mechanized corps were to be used in the close infantry-support role.
Thus penetration and its exploitation were to be accomplished solely by the
forces of the forward-echelon armies, with tactical air support. Unfortunately,
due to insufficient forces and the absence of powerful mobile offensive weapons at
the immediate disposal of the commanding generals of the fronts, they were unable
to move the operations at a more rapid pace.
The infantry combat formations were based on People's Commissar of Defense nrder
No 306, dealing with maximum and simultaneous participation of infantry and in-
fantry weapons in combat, from the beginning to the end of an engagement. That
same order prescribed the following: "In order to avoid excessive bunching of
battlefield dispositions, and hence heavy casualties during the advance of an
average-strength division (7-8 thousand men), a zone of about 4 km in frontage, and
in no case less than 3 km in frontage, shall be assigned to the army battle group."
The division zones of advance c.n the main axes rai~ 4-5 km, which made it possible
to have a tactical density of approximately 2 rifle battalions per kiiometer of
frontage.
The combat missions assigned to the rifle divisions for the first day were specified
to a depth of 11-20 km, and in certain instances to 28 km.
Plan~.iing of artillery combat actions was performed according to the principles of
artillery support for the attack. Artillery preparation was to run 80 minutes in
the Southwestern and Don fronts, and 40-75 minutes in the Stalingrad Front. From
15 to ZO minutes, or approximately 25 percent of artillery preparation time, was
a~located for neutralizing the enemy's defense with concentrated fire. The densest
suppressive fire ~as placed on the forward edge of the battle area and the first
defensi.ve position. Infantry weapons fire was to be extensively employed in the
course of artillery preparation.
Air actions were planned for the first time in the form of an air offensive, which
included preliminary airstrikes and close support of ground troops at operational
depth. This ensured better coordination of airstrikes and artillery fire with the
advancing ground troops. Tactical air efforts, however, were still scat.tered among
the combined-arms armies, for the support of which air groups were formed. In
planning the air offensive, insufficient forces were assigned to close support of
the troops executing the penetration.
Soviet command authorities displayed great skill in gaining the element of surprise
- in launching the counteroffensive. Measures of a strategic, operational and tac-
tical character were carried out for this purpose.
Penetration of the enemy's defense on the Southwestern and Don fronts commenced on
19 November with massive preliminary artillery bombardment. Adverse weather condi-
tions ruled out the use of air.
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The nature of penetration of the msin defenaive zone can be traced in the actions
of combined units of the 5th Tank Army (Diagram 8).
Duri.ng the final artillery bombardment, infantry approached the enemy's forward posi-
- tions and, at the moment artillery fire was shifted to deeper targets, initiated
the assault phase together with infantry-supporting tanks. The infantry and tanks
swiftly penetrated the enemy's forward positions. In a number oi sectors the at-
tacking subunits succeeded in penetrating deep between the front-line strongpoints.
The single-echelon disposition of the regiments, however, prevented them from ex-
ploiting. In the 124th Rifle Division, for example, a successful advance was
achieved at the junction of the 622d and 406th Rifle regiments, but there was es-
sentially nothing with which they could exploit. Mounting repeated assaults, by
1100 hours the division nevertheless succeeded in breaking through the first posi-
tion in the center of the zone of advance and reaching the etrongpoint on Hill 223.0.
Offering a stubborn defense and counterattacking, the enemy held up the division's
advance the rest of the day.
The 119th Rifle Division was advancing with greater success. By 1100 hours its
right flank had broken through the first position and had reached Klinovoy, where
the enemy was hastily digging in with division reserves and thrown-back subunits.
The division's left flank was almost 2 kilometers further back.
The 47th Guards Rifle Division was experiencing similar success on the left flank,
but its right flank bogged down in fighting for the village of Bol`shoy.
Thus on the main axis of advance the army was preaented by 120Q hours with condi-
tiflnsfor breaking through the enemy's entire defensive zone, but the fact that the
divisions had no support echelons ruled out accomplishing this mission.
A decreased rate of penetration of the main defensive zone demanded building up the
offensive drive with the armies' available forces. The commanding general of the
5th Tank Army decided to engage his tank corps, which proceeded to move forward from
the assembly areas soon after the attack commenced. This enabled them to catch up
- with the advancing infantr~ by 1300 hours.
The simultaneous appearance of great numbere of tanks on the battlefield had a
powerf ul effect on the enemy's morale. By f ire and offensive momentum, the tank
corps smashed the enemy's resistance and swiftly advanced into the area of the
enemy's main artillery positions near Klinovoy - Livestock Unit 1. Mounting an
assault from the flanks and f rontally, the four tank brigades smashed 2 artillery
regiments and an enemy infantry battalion. Only amall groups of enemy troops,
taking advantage of fog, succeeded in withdrawing. The enemy's defense was
~ penetrated on the Sth Tank Army's main axie of advance. Exploiting, the tank corps
advanced 18-20 km by evening.
The 8th Cavalry Corps was engaged following the tank corpa, exploiting in the
direction of the flank with the ob~ective of establishing an outer perimeter of
envelopment.
The success of the army mobile g r o u p a 1 s o enabled the rifle divisions to in-
crease the rate of advance. By evening they had advanced to a depth of 3-19 km.
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Yenetration was accomplished in approximately the same manner in the zone of the
21st Army. The 4th Tank Corps was engaged along two routes. Two brigades on the
right flank, deployed into combat formation, working in coordination with rifle
divisions, completed penetration of the enemy's main defensive zone at midday. By-
- paesing centers of resistance, they proceeded rapidly advancing to depth. The
brigades had advanced 30-35 km by evening, capturing Manoylino.3 Forces on the
left flank advanced 12 km.
The 65th Army was able to penetrate only 3-5 km into the enemy's defense during the
first day. However, it drew the forces of the Romanian lst Cavalry Division, which
facilitated the advance of the 21st Army. There is no doubt that if the 65th Army
had had a mobile group, the defense would have been breached on its axis of advance
as well.
The element of surprise in launching the offensive by the troops of the Southwestern
and Don fronts, the forming of two deep breaches in the enemy's defense and penetra-
- tion in an addition.al sector produced confusion in the German-fascist command
authorities. This is evident from the missions assigned to the 48th Panzer Corps.
Initially it was assigned the missior_ of attacking the troops of the 21st Army,
who in tr.e opinion of the enemy command authoritiea were mounting the main attack.
At midday the direction of the offensive drive was shifted to the zone of the Sth
Tank Army. The Romanian lst Tank Division was to advance in a westerly direction,
while the German 22d Panzer Division and the Romanian 7th Cavalry Division were to
advance toward the northeast. The enemy was planning to use the offensive thrusts
of the combined units to close the breach which had formed in the defense. Our
tank and rifle troops, however, successfully repelled the counterthrust, which
- created the prerequisites for a swift advance toward the designated lines.
On 20 November the 26th Tank Corps, skillfully employing battlefield maneuver and
flank thrusts at the enemy, began advancing swiftly. Capturing Perelazovskoya,
it opened up an aver~ue for the army's troops to operational depth. But the fact
that the brigades were dispersed along a large front, that there was only or~e radio
set at corps headquarters, and that the rifle divisions had fallen far behind led to
a delay in the advance of the corps toward Kalach. Finally at noon on 21 Ivovember
it proceeded to sweep toward the Don, with the lst Tank Corps advancing in echelon
behind it.
Penetration in the armies of the Stalingrad Front began on 20 November and also
took place in adverse weather conditions and without air support. Artillery
preparation began at different times: at 0730 in the 51st Army, at 0815 in the
57th Army, and not until 1350 hours in the 64th Army. In spite of the difficult
conditions of delivering fire, the enemy's defense nevertheless was for the most
part neutralized, which was promoted to a considerable degree by the element of
surprise. In short order the troops of the Slst and 57th armies had broken through
the first defenaive position. Due to shattered morale, and weakness of his
reserves, the enemy was unable to take effec~tive measures to close the breaches in
his defense. This enabled our rifle troops to reach the enemy's main artillery
position areas and to create favorable conditions for engaging the armies' mobile
groups. By evening the 4th Mechanized Corps had advanced 10-15 km, and the 13th
Mechanized Corps 16-17 km.
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The success of the troops of the 64th Army was considerably l~ss, since little
daylight remained for the attack, and it did not have a mobile group.
The srmies resumed the attack on the morning of 21 November, following brief artil-
lery preparation. Repelling counterattacks by arrived enemy reserves, the 51et and
57th armies, completed the breakthrough on the main axes, consolidated it into a
single front breach, and cut the Stalingrad-Kutel'nikovo rail line, thus opening up
the road to Sovetskiy, where the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts
linked up at 1623 hours, closing the perimetei of envelopment.
Analysis of the breakthrough in the November operation at Stalingrad indicates that
success was ensured by correct selection of main axes of advance, by decisive mass-
ing of personnel and weapons in the breakthrough aectora, by achieving the element
- of surprise, by skillful employment of artillery and armored troops, and by a high
degree of aggressiveness by the troops.
Experience in penetrating the enemy'a defense in the Stalingrad area was further
developed in Operation "Malyy Saturn," conducted on the Middle Don in the latter
half of December 1942 by the troops of the Voronezh and Southwestem fronts. On the
- main axis of advance, an attack mounted by the ad~acent flanks of two fronts, an
even larger battle group was formed 12 rifle divisions, 4 tank corps, and 2500
guns and mortars.
The breakthrough sectors of the xifle divisione were narrowed to 2.2-3.5 km.
Changes occurred in the tactical order of battle: the rifle divisions in the lst
Guards Army containedtsao echelona, withcre echelon in the remaining armies, but all
- reginients formed up in two echelons. This was a conaequence of the influence of
the experience of the November operation, in which the regiments and divisions
began employing a two-echelon formation from the very firet days of the offensive.4
Penetration of the enemy's defense was preceded by reconnaissance in force, con-
ducted on 14 December 1942, that is, two days before the offensive began.
Although it had also been employed previously, in this instance reconnaissance in
force was assigned more specific missions, defined by instructions issued by the
Supreme Cormnander to the Southwestern and Voronezh fronts at the beginning of
December 1942. Regarding preparations for an operation, the instructions stated:
"...Since the Germans know about our M-30s, which blast the entire forward edge
of the battle area, they have adopted the following tactic: they leave only securi-
ty at the forward edge of the battle area, while w:tthdrawing forward positions to
a depth of 4-5 km. We should counter this German t~:ctic with our own counter-
tactic, which consists in the following: before commencing an attacic, combat
reconnaissance should be conducted in order to locate the ex~emy's forward po~itions,
and we must reach the enemy's forward positions at all coats. A number of aggres-
sive reconnaissance forays are to be mounted, taking prisoners and obtaining
enough information from them so that we do not waete ammuni~ion. Reconnaissance in
force shall be conducted, by independent bat*_alions, two days i,~fore an operation
_ commences."5
The offensive on the Middle Don once again confirmed that massing personnel and
weapons in breakthrough sectors is one of the most important prerequisites for
successful penetration. Increasing the strength of the defense also reqLires
higher densities of inen and weapona, particularly artillery.
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Some new elementa in development of the art of penetrating the enemy's defense were
- revealed in the operation to defeat in detail the enemy force encircled at
Stalingrad. They were dictated by the fact that the troops of the Don Front had
- to break through s deliberate defense organized by the enemy along earlier
Stalingrad defense perimeters. The efforta of three armies were ~oined on the main
axis. The main battle group, deployed in a 16-kilometer sector, consisted of 13
rifle divisions and various reinforcement units. Thirty-three percent of the fra:~t'~
rifle divisions, 50 percent of its artillery, 57 percent of rocket launcher and
75 percent of tank brigades and regiments were concentratea in this battle group.6
Narrowing the width of the front's offensive thrust and additional reinforcement of
the Don Front with artillery of the SHC Reaerve made it poasible to establish an
artillery density which was very high for the beginning of 1943. It amounted to
135.6 guns and mortars per kilometer in the breakthrough aector of the 65th Army,
which was 12 km wide, and ].60-165 guns and mortars per kilometer in the zones of
- some divisions. In addition, two rocket launcher divisions were concentrated in the
army's breakthrough sector. The high artillery densities made it possible to es-
tablish a 6:1-8:1 superiority over the enemy, and a 10:1 superiority on the main
axis of advance of the 65th Army, although overall artille.~}? superiority was 1.7:1.
During artillery preparation a special time was all.ocated for delivering fire by
direct-fire guns, the density of which was 37 guns per km of frontage in the
breakthrough sector of the 65th Army. Another advance was made in organizing ar-
tillery support of the assault phase, which involved a moving b3rrage to a depth of
1.5 lun.~
The offensive was launched on 1J January 1943. The infantry and tank attack was
preceded by close airstrikes and massive arti].lery preparations. The high degree
of massing of artillery made it poseible to soften up the enemy's deliberate
defense. Overcoming savage resistance by the encircled enemy troops, the motorized
rifle combined units advanced 6-8 km on the firat day of the offensive in a number
of sectors.
Artillery density increased as the offensive frontage narrowed. In breaking through
the former inner Stalingrad defense perimeter, for example, artillery density in-
creased to 186 guns and mortars per km in the battle group's breakthrough sector,
and 222 guns and mortars per km in the brea.kthrough sector of the 21st Army. By the
end of January artillery density in the sector of the 27th Guards Rifle Division
, had been boosted to 338 guns and mortars per kilometer of frontage.$
- The increased power of artillery fire led to a significant reduction in friendly
casualties and increased enemy casualties. On the first three days of the break-
through, the most difficult, casualties ran to 4 percent of the army's strength,9
while on the final days of the assault, in spite of combat in a built-up area,
casualties did not exceed 2 percent.l~ Casualties among the defending enemy troops
exceeded 100,000 in the first 16 days of operation "Ring," amounting to almost one
third of the numerical strength cf the encircled force.
In the counteroffensive at Stalingrad the art of penetration and exploitation to
full operational depth was raised to a new, higher 1eve1. Experience in penetration
once again demonstrated that success is achieved not only by possessing overall
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superiority over the enemy in personnel and weapona but also by the ability to
establish superiority on selected axes by strict economy of forces in secondary
sectors, as well as by gaining the element of surprise.
- Penetration of the enemy's defense at Stalingrad was not immerliately exploited to
strategic depth, since considerable efforts were required to r~~pel enemy attempts
to relieve the encircledfn~e and to annihilate it. A lull which occurred in the
. conduct of offensive operations enabled the enemy to strengthen the weakened sector
of the front by bringing up forces from his atrategic reaerve and from other sectors,
and thus to prevent the formation of a strategic breach in his defense.
Foreseeing this, the Soviet Supreme High Cot~and provided for the conduct of a
series of operations to i~nobilize enemy forces in other sectors and to chieve
final collapse of the enemy's strategic defensive front on the southwest~rn axis.
They include the Soviet operations on the Upper pon and the operation of the
Western and Kalinin fronts to elitninate the enemy's Rzhev salient (Operation "Mars"),
and the operations of the Transcaucasian Front to rout Army Group A.
Preparations for the Qstrogozhsk-Rossosh Operation began in the last 10 days of
December 1942, when a solid ring had fnrmed around the encircled enemy force at
Sta~.ingrad, while an attempt to relieve it ended in defeat for Army Group Goth.
An Hq SHC directive called for the Voronezh Front to conduct an offensive operation
with the objective of defeating in detail enemy forcea on the Upper pon and to
liberate from the enemy a section of the Liaki-Kantemirovka rail line. Support of
the operation from the south was aseigned to the 6th Army of the Southwestern Front.
The ~enemy's main efforta were concentrated on holding the tactical zone of defense,
which consisted of a main defensive zone 6-8 km in depth and a second fortified
zone 12-20 km from the forward edge of the battle area. The enemy worked on im-
proving these defensive positions over a period of 6 months, with the exception of
a sector south of Pervomaysk, where he had ~ust consolidated and where his defense
was weak.
By the end of December the Voronezh Front had 18 rifle diwisione, 5 rifle and 9 tank
- brigades more than 243,000 officers and men, about 4000 guns and mortars 76 ~
and larger, 909 tanks, and 208 aircraft.ll It en~oyed a 2.2:1 superiority over the
enemy in artillery and 3:1 in tanks, but was inferior in personnel and air forces.
The Soviet command authorities considered in detail all the features of the
prevailing situation in the forthcoming zone of advance and made a bold decision:
to break through the enemy's defense with three battle groups concentrated on
bridgeheads at Pervoye Storozhevoye and Shchuch'ye, as we11 as in an area northwest
of Kantemirovka and, exploiting along converging axea, to encircle and annihilate
the enemy force.
The selected form of operational penetration (Diagram 9) was most in conformity with
the operation ob~ective assigned to the front, the situation of our troops (pos-
session of bridgeheads on the Don) and the situation in which the enemy forces
found themselves. In contrast to the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, only army
- attacks were mounted here, while a cleaving drive was mounted by an independent
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rifle corps. Since the defense was better fortified than at Stalingrad, the of-
- fensive thrusts seemed weaker. But in conditions where Soviet forces possessed the
strategic initiative an~ enemy troop's were suffering low morale, their strength was
sufficient not only to penetrate the defense but also to exploit to operational
depth.
Since an enemy offensive thrust in the front's zone was improbable, the Soviet
command authorities very boldly weakened secondary axes to form battle groups
capable of independently penetrating the enemy defense and exploiting to opera-
tional depth.
Five rifle divisions, one rifle brigade and three tank brigades were concentrated
in the 40th Army in a breakthrough sector 10 km. wide. Vari~us subunits and units
- totaling 8 rifle battalions, 57 guns, or 1 battall.on for every 10 km and less than
1 gun per kilometer of frontage were left on the remaining 75-kilometer frontage
of the army's zone of advance.l~
In the 18th Independent Rifle Corps 3 rifle divisione and 1 rifle brigade with sup-
port weapons were concentrated in an 8-kilometer breakthrough sector. One rifle
division and independent subunits u,p to 12 battalions ~n strength remained to defend
sectors stretching 15b km.13
The 3d Tank Army formed the most powerful battle group. Three reinforced rifle
divisions were assigned to its attack echelon, and 2 tank corps were designated
for breakthrough exploitation. On this army's left flank, the 7th Cavalry Corp s was
to be engaged into the breakthrough gap.
The attack-echelon rifle combined units of the battle groups were disposed in one or
two echelons, and the rifle regiments in two echelons.
As a result of decisive massing of inen ann weapons on the main axes, somewhat
greater densities were establiahed than when launching the counteroffensive at
Stalingrad, which ensured superiority over the enemy (Table 4).
Table 4. Average Densities and Relative Strengths in Personnel and Weapons in
Breakthrough Sectors in the Ostrogozhak-Rossosh Operation
Battle Group Break- Densities in Breakthrough Relative Strengths in
through Sector Personnel and Wea ons
Sector, 1~ per Guns and Tanks In- Artil- Tanks
km rifle Mortars fantry lery
division
40th Army 10 1.8 92 13.3 3.7:1 8.2:1 1.3:1
18th Independent
- Rifle Corps 8 2.3 83 15 3.5:1 8.0:1 1.2:1
_ 3d Tank Army 16 5 52 10 2.3:1 5.1:1 3.7:1
26
Note: Density of infantry-support tanks is indicated in the numerator, and opera-
- tional density in the denominator.
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In spite of the faet that the enemy troops were in a shattered etate of morale, the
command authoritiea of the Voronezh Front did a great deal to achieve a maximum
- element of offensive surprise, which was complicated by the limited extent of the
bridgeheads from which the 40th Army and 18th Independent Rifle Corps laL~nched the
attack. Deception measures and dissemination of false information played an im-
portant role in this. During the period of preparation for Operation "S~turn,"
the 40th Army feigned preparations for an attack from the Storozhevoye bridgehead,
at the same time utilizing this simulation for preparing for its own off~nsive
operation. When the enemy's attention abated as a reault of the offensive thrust
on the Middle Don, the command authorities of the 40th Army took a number of con-
cealment, camouflage and deception measures. All troop redeployments were carried
out only at night;.a substantial portion of the artillery was deployed beyond the
riv~r, in order to prevent the enemy from spotting it from gro.und observation posts;
Concentration and readying of troops for an offensive act3on were feigned south of
Voronezh.
Penetration of the enemy's defense was preceded by reconnaissance in force by
forward battalions, conducted 48 hours prior to commencement of the offensive. In
the 40th Army the attack by the forward battalions was supported by a one-hour
- preliminary artillery bombardment, involving approximately half of all artillery.
Their actions were successful. By engaging the main forces of two divisions, they
succeeded in penetrating the enemy's defense on a 6-kilometer frontage to a depth of
3.5 lun. Reconnaissance in force in the 18th Rifle Corps and 3d Tank Army made it
possible only to determine precisely the enemy's forward poeitions and fire plan.
The co~anding general of the 40th Army, evaluating the results of the recon-
naissance in force, made the decision, with the approval of the commanding general
of the front, to launch the offensive on the morning of 13 January, that is, 24
hours prior to the scheduled time. Forward of the divi~ions which had already
softened up the enemy's defense, artillery preparation was replaced by shelling of
enemy centers of resistance, headquarters and batteries. The army's troops swiftly
completed breakthrough of the main defensive zone acrass the entire sector and
- advanced to a depth of 10 km.
On the following day the army's troops were compelled to repulse strong enemy
counterattacks, which led to some delay in exploiting penetration. The army com-
mander engaged his support echelon: a division on the main axis of advance and a
rifle brigade to enlarge the breakthrough sector toward the right flank. By
evening they had succeeded in penetrating to a depth of 17 km and widening the
breakthrough sectox to 50 km. Only on certain axes, however, did the divisions
reach the second zone, which was defended by arrived enemy reserves. This made it
_ necessary to engage an additional division, handed over to the army from the front
reserve. Penetration of the tactical defense was not fully campleted until the
third day.
The reasons for delay in breaking through the tactical zone of defense, in spite of
a highly succesaful beginning, were that the 40th Army had launched the attack
, alone, a day before the general offensive, which drew operational reserves; as a
result of delayed arrival of the 4th Tank Corp from the Southwestern Front, it was
- without an exploitation echelon; it was seriously threatened by an exposed right
flank, which the commanding general wae forced to secure by detailing substantial
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forces. But the defeat in detail of the enemy's operational reserves within tac-
tical defensive depth opened up extensive oppoXtunities for the troops of the 40th
Army to advance swiftly to the withdrawal rAUtee of tt~e main forces of the
Hungarian 2d Army for the purpose of encircling it, which was completed on 18 January
1943.
The troops of the 18th Independent Rifle Corps attacked on 14 January f"ollowing a
2-hour artillery pY�eparation, and broke through the main defensive zone on the
first day. The ene,my, however, aware that Soviet troops were launching an attack
from the bridgehead in the Shchuch'ye area, moved up two divisio;?s a panzer and
an infantry division from the operational reserve against the corps. The
relative strengths equalized, and the corps advance ~3s slowed for 3 days. Although
the corps proved unable to exploit the pene�:ration on an independent axis, its ac-
tions played an important role in the over311 courae of the operation. Immobilizing
large enemy operational reserves, it prevented the enemy from off ering significant
~ opposition to exploitation of penetration on the axes of advance of the 40th and 3d
Tank armies.
The commanding general of the 3d Tank Army, receiving additional information on the
enemy, decided to extend artillery preparation to 90 minutes.14 This decisi~n was
unquestionably correct. Mistakes made in the hasty planning of the artillery
bombardment, however, led to insufficient fire effect. In addition, a five-minute
lull occurred between the termination of artillery preparation and the attack,
enabling the enemy to recover and prepare to repel an assault. The supporting
tanks, which had become bogged down in a snow-choked ravine, were also delayed in
la~inching the assault. As a consequence of this the f irst assault was unsuccessful.
Undertaking new efforts, the rifle divisions with attached tanks were finally, after
3 hours, able to penetrate the defense to a depth of 1-3 km.
The commanding general of the 3d Tank Army wae forced to engage his tank corps.
Their thrust decided the oLtcome of the breakthrough. By the end of the first day
they had penetrated the entire tactical zone of defense, outstripping the infantry
by 6-8 lun. The opened breach was 23 km deep and 10 km wide. The two right-flank
divisions, however, advanced 2-4 km. Thus operational-tactical errors led to a
situation where the opportunity swiftly to penetrate the shattered defense was not
fully exploited.
The end results of the Ostrogozhshsk-Rossosh Operation proved substantial: the
Hungarian 2d Army, the Italian Alpine Corps, the German 24th Panzer Corps, and a
large part of the operational reserve forces of Army Gzoup B had been routed; the
rail line had been captured on the stretch between Liski and Kantemirovka, which
was essential for the conduct of an operation to capture the Khar'kov industrial
area; a substantial area. was liberated between Don and Oskol rivers. This
created favorable conditions for conducting the next operation the Voronezh-
Kastornoye.
This operation had many features which were similar to the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh
Operation: the enemy was shattered to an even greater extent on the left flank of
the zone in which the new offensive was to develop; the enemy's defense ran along a
hastily occupied line, on bolstering which the enemy had expended all his reserves.
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An influx of forces from other aectors would be limited in the i~ediate future;
the Voronezh and ~ryansk fronts were driving toward one another.
~
At 1300 hours on 24 January 1943, following a 30-minute preliminary artillery
- bombardment, the 40th Army launched the offensive. The enemy, who had been littl2
~ neutralized, proceeded to pour heavy artillery-mortar and machinegun fire on the
advancing troops. Fighting along the army's front assumed a protracted and stubborn
character from the very beginn.ing of the attack. The rifle divisions were able to
advance only in the center, penetrating 0.5-3 km by evening.
The 4th Tank Corps, which was advancing in the attack echelon together with the
rifle divisions, was having succesa. In 2 houre it advanced 6-8 km, but took sub-
stantial casualties. That day it was unable to penetrate to operational depth.
~ Its total advance amairted to 16 km instead of the planned 35 Ian. Of all the rifle
divisions only one, exploi~ing the succeasfu]. advance of the 4th Tank Corps, ad-
vanced 5-6 km, while the 2 rifle divisions and the brigade apent all day fighting
for the enemy's forward positions. As a conaequence of this, coordination between
the tank corpa and rifle combined units, whi..ch had been hastily organized in any
- case, was disrupted, which was strongly reflected in exploitation to operational
depth. On the followin; day the troops advanced 10-18 1~. It was only a lack of
fuel in the tank corps which prevented the capture of Kastornoye on 25 January.
Penetration assumed a protracted character in the 60th and 38th armies. In the
13th Army, however, where superiority over the enemy was 4.7:1 in infantry, 9:1 in
artillery, and 5:1 in tanks, by 1500 houre the enemy's well-fortified defense was
penetrated to a depth of 6-7 km, which accompllshed the day's mission. This made it
possible to engage the army's mobile task force and two rifle divisions. By evening
on the second day the army had penetrated the enemy's defense to a depth of 20 km
and had widened the breakthrough frontage to 25 km, which opened up the road to
Kastornoye.
The breakthroughs accomplished in the course of the Voronezh-Kastornoye Operation
and their exploitation to depth led to encirclement and defeat in detail of more
than 11 enemy diviaions, which created an operational breach about 160 km wide in
~ the enemy's defenae. Together with the zones of advance of the 3d Tank Army and
the 18th Rifle Corps, the breakthrough frontage was about 300 l~n.
During the same days the offensive mounted by the forces of the Southwestern Front
into the Donbass and the Southern Front toward the lower regions of the Don was
progressing well. The strategic breach in the enemy's defense was growing day by
day. By the beginning of February it announted to 540 km, ::nd 900 km including the
sector from the Don to the Kuma, where amall enemy forces were hastily retreating.
Collapse of the enemy's defense in the SouChwestern Sector created favorable con-
' ditions for further advance in the Western Sector and in the Northern Caucasus,
which made it possible to widen even more the strategic breakthrough, exploitation
of which by means of operational purusit could lead to even greater atrategic
results. Unsucceasful actions by the Kalinin an3 Western fronts in mounting Opera-
tion "Mars," however, and the insufficiently decisive offensive by the troops of
the Transcaucasian Front made it impossible, as noted, to reach the Desna and
Dnieper in the spring of 1943.
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The failures of these fronta were based on aeriou~ mietakea made in preparing for
_ and executing penetration.
The general plan of Operation "Mars" (Diagram 10) was as follow~: the defense in
the area of the Rzhev salient was to be split up by 8 thrusts mounted by the Western
Front and 4 offensive thrusts by the Kalinin Front; wiping out the forces
_ defending this salient, they were to advance toward Smolensk. At the same tizne the
3d Assault Army of the Kalinin Front was fighting its way toward Velikiye Luki and
, Novosokol'niki.
By virtue of the fact that a total of 13 battle groups were formed, the majority of
these, with the exception of the Zubtsov battle group of the Western Front and the
Olenino battle group of the Kalinin Front, were small in strength two to three
divisions with a mechanized or tank corps. The great many separate offensive
thrusts, more than half of which were aimed at immobilizing the opposing force, led
to a scattering of firepower. Although artillery densities were 70-85 and even 100
guns and mortars per l~m of breakthrough sector in eome battle groups, half of these
weapons were mortars, which could deliver fire only on the first position.
Also unresolved was the problem of gaining the element of offensive surprise in con-
ditions when it was necessary to feign preparations for a large-scale operation,
in order to deceive the enemy regarding the main axis of advance in the campaign.
The offensive commenced in a~nowstorm. As a consequence of poor visibility, ar-
tillery preparation produced poor results, especially in the breakthrough sectors
of the 20th and 31st armies.
Long before the operation commenced,the enemy pinpointed the deployment areas of the
battle groups, beefed up forces opposite them, especially artillery, and moved
operational reserves close to the flanks. When our artillery preparation began, the
enemy opened heavy return fire. The movement forward of infantry and tanks from a
distant assembly area was disorganized to a considerable degree, and coordination
at the moment of assault on the enemy forward positions was disrupted, for some
rifle subunits were late or wandered off course in the snowstorm. Only certain sub-
units of the 31st Army's divisions succeeded in overrunning the enemy's front-line
trench.15 The regiments and divisions had nothing with which to exploit. It was
necessary to engage a division from the army's support echelon, which required con-
siderable time, during which the attack echelon divisions were under intensive
enemy artillery fire. When the fresh division was engaged, they poorly supported
its attack, and it advanced only 1 km.
On the first day combined units of the 20th Army advanced from 1 to 3 km. The
holding forces advanced even less.
On the second day the front command repeated artillery preparation, which resulted
in expending more ammunition than was allocated for the entire operation.16 But
success was achieved only in the zone of one of the 20th Army's divisions. Here a
tank corps was engaged, mounting a headlong assault, smashing its way through to
the Rzhev-Sychevka rail line, and cutting it. Advancing without infantry support,
it lost 70 of its 120 tanks. Taking advantage of the gap which formed between the
6th Tank Corps and the rifle divisions, the enemy recaptured a number of villages.
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The Soviet co~and was unable on this and the following day to engage a cavalry
corps behind the tank corps. Finally on the night of 28 ,lovember 2 cavalry
divisions drove through to the tank corps, but without driving open a breach
through which the successful advance of the entire army could be exploited. Cut
off from the main forces, they were subsequently compelled to take up partisan
actions.
Penetration was proceeding somewhat better. on the Kalinin Front. Breaches were
driven into the def enae to full tactical depth in the zones of the 22d and 41st
- armies. But this required engaging mechanized corps, for the armies' weak attack
echelons were unable to accomplish their assigned miesions. ~
The 3d Mechanized Corps was engaged in the zone of advance of the 22d Army on the
second day of the operation, when the enemy's defense had not yet been broken, while
his operational reserves had juat begun advancing towa~d the breakthrough sector.
This led to protracted fighting in the tactical zone of defense. The corps was
taking heavy casualties and advancing slowly. A rifle division, engaged from th~
army reserve, failed to alter the operational aituation on the 22d Army's axis of
advance. The penetration stalled.17
The lst Mechanized Corpa was engaged on the first day, when the offensive capabi~.i-
ties of the 41at Army's attack-echelon combined units were still substantial. Re-
- inforcing their offenaive thrust, it completed penetration of the enemy's tactical
zone of defense and on the third day reached a depth of 33 km. It would be
dangerous to continue pushing the drive, for large enemy operational reserves
began to approach the exposed flanks and gaps which had formed between the mechanized
corps and the lagging rifle combined units.
The commander of the 41st Army was unable to close the gaps with his weak reserve.
The enemy attacked through theae gaps with 2 panzer divisions and 1 infantry divi-
sion and restored the aituatian.
Two more attempts were made in January to eliminate the Rzhev salient, both without
success.
The enemy's failure to end 1942 with a decisive victory and his acknowledgement of
the inevitability of a protracted war forced him to shift to a static defense in
the Northwestern and Weatern sectore. Operatione connected with penetrating this
defense indicated that in order to break through,masaive delivery of firepower would
- be required, achieved by establishing high artillery densities, improving the ac-
curacy of shelling, and by good coordination of movement of fire and combat forma-
tions.
Penetration of a static defense in depth alao required that the attacking forces be
- disposed in depth. The single-echelon formation of regiments and divisions,
mandated by People's Commissar of Defense Order No 306, deprived advancing rifle
troops of the capability of exploiting through weakened aectora in the enemy's
defense and of building up the force of the offensive drive in order to achieve con-
tinuity of attack. In the course of the campaign the forces proceeded to dispose
the units and combined units in depthr A primarily single-echelon formation was
retained in the subunits.
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'Pank and mechanized corpa were a deciaive means of developing tactical into opera-
tional penetration; the most advantageous moment to engage them ~as on completion of
breakthrough by infantry of the strongest defensive line the first position, and
even better enemy regimental defended areas. TEieir earlier engagem~ent would lead
to considerable casualties.
Penetration of a less stable defense took place with lower troop densities. The
experience of operations indicated, however, that certain mistakes are inevitable
when preparing for penetration on a tight timetable, mistakes which lead to
diminished effectiveness of fire and coordination of troop actions. In order to
achieve definite penetration of defense and at an adequately rapid pace, troop
densities in breakthrough sectors should be close to those established when
penetrating a deliberate defense.
In the winter campaign of 1942/43 the element of surprise remained one of the most
important factors in preparing for and executing penetration both of a static
defense and an insufficiently developed enemy defenae.
The diversified experience in penetration obtained in the course of this campaign
formed the basis of preparations for offeasive operations in the summer-fall cam-
paign of 1943.
2. Penetration of a Static Defense in the Operations of the Summer-Fall Campaign
of 1943
By the summer of 1943, thanks to the selfless labor of the Soviet people, guided by
the Communist Party, output of war materiel had increased substantially. There was
also an appreciable increase in production of new military hardware. The numerical
strength of the army in the field had increased slightly in comparison with the
commencement of the preceding campaign by 24,000 men but the number of guns
and mortars had increased by 28 percent, tanks and self-propelled guns by 26 per-
- cent, and combat aircraft by 140 percent.
By the beginning of the campaign the transition by rifle troops over to corps or-
ganization was basically completed, which helped improve troop control and utiliza-
tion of troops in combat. Army and corps artillery were established. Breakthrough
artillery corps, gun artillery divisions, etc were formed in SHC Reserve artillery.
This greatly increased the capabilities of operational maneuver of large masses of
artillery and their concentration in breakthrough sectors.
Increase in the production of armored vehicles made it possible to form 5 new-or-
ganization tank armies and to increase the number of independent tank and
mechanized corps, independent tank brigades, tank and self-propelled artillery
regiments.
Following the defeat at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus, the German-fascist leaders
came to the conclusion that "there is no longer ~ possibility of bringing the war
in the East to an end by means of an offensive." $ Having commenced preparations
for a large offensive in the area of the Kursk salient, they took all measures to
establish a strong defense aYong the entire Eastern Front. Wehrmacht headquarters
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operational Order No 5 of 13 March 1943 stated that "in some sectors of the front
the task boils down to ~rearing down the advancing enemy by attrition. Here we
. should establish in advance a particularly strong defense, by employing heavy
weapons, improving fortification of positi~ns, placing minefields where needed,
setting up rear-area strongpoints, establishing mobile reserves, etc."19
This order bolstered the German army's shift to a static defense disposed in depth,
as a rule consisting of two 2ones with two or three positions in each, fortified
with the extensive employment of fighting trenches, communicating trenches,
various obstacles, and solidly-constructed fighting bunkers and shelters.
At the end of 1942 Soviet command authorities noted a trend on the part of the enemy
to shift from a center-of-resistance type defense to a static defense and took
measures in advance which ensured successful penetration of such a defense. This
was expressed in purposeful guidance of qualitative and quantitative development of
weaponry, especially artillery, improvemeat in the organizational structure of
troops, and in methods of planning and executing penetration in operations and the
campaign as a whole.
In view of the fact that by the summer of 1943 the Soviet Army did not yet possess
the capability to overwhelm the enemy eimultaneously along the entire Soviet-German
front, the Soviet Supreme High Com~and, on the basie of a tihorough analysis of the
. military-political situation, proceeded to plan in advance a number of.sequential
operations on a wide front. This made it possible more extensi~ely and purposefully
to maneuver reservea, especially SHC Reserve artillery, armored troops, air forces
and materiel, and to establish battle groups capable of smashing and breaking
through a static defense and exploiting each operation to considerable depth.
~ Hq SHC, having made the decision to exhaust the enemy in a deliberate and stubborn
defense in the area of the Kursk salient, made plans for a shift to a counterof-
fensive with the objective of routing the enemy's largest forces in the Orel,
Belgorod, and Khar'kov areas. After this,offensive operations were to be launched
to push toward the Dnieper in the entire Southwestern as well as Western Sector.
In contrast to the two preceding Soviet offensive campaigns, the general plan of
the summer-fall campaign of 1943 clearly contained the idea of developing a number
of operational-tactical breakthroughs into strategic penetration, that is, formation
of a wide breach in the enemy's strategic front, in which mobile actions could be
undertaken by large forces and in order to cloae which the enemy would be forced to
bring in his strategic reserves and weaken other sectors of the front.
Advance planning of development of a number of operational-tactical breakthroughs
- into str~it~egi.c penetration signaled the beginning of a qualitatively new stage in
the evoluti~n of penetration in Soviet art of warfare, which experienced its fullest
embodiment in the final campaigns of the Great Patriotic War.
Breakthrough in the counteroffensive at Kurek. Hq SHC detailed large forces to con-
duct the counteroffensive: 132 rifle, 13 artillery, 3 mortar and 19 antiaircraft
artillery divisions, 17 tank corps and a large nuunber of independent brigades,
regim~ents and battalions. Numerical strength totaled 1,396,000 men, 19,100 guns,
and mortars, more than 3,400 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 2,172 aircraft.20
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This comprised approximately 30 percent of the Soviet Army's total forces. They
_ were concentrated in a sector slightly exceeding ~0 percent of the entire Soviet-
German front. Such a concentration of inen and weapons enabled the operational com-
mand authorities to establish powerful offensive forces and to choose decisive
forms of~penetration and conduct of operations as a whole (Diagram 11).
The general plan of the Orel offensive operation called for mounting four powerful
attacks: from the north by the troopa of the left side of the Western Front; from
south by the troops of the Central Front with the aim of advancing west of Orel;
from the east two splitting attacks by the Bryansk Front directly toward Orel.
A different mode of operational penetration was selected in the Belgorod-Khar'kov
Operation; a powerful splitting attack, supplemented by several subsidiary attacks,
with the objective of splitting the opposing enemy force into two parts, en-
veloping and defeating the enemy in detail in the Khar'kov area.
By defeating in detail enemy forces in the Orel salient and in the Khar'kov area, a
breach;aasto be formed in the enemy's strategic front, through which military ac-
tions could be pushed directly toward the Daieper.
The importance of each operational sector in the strategic zone of advance pre-
determined the composition of the battle groupa. At the same time Hq SHC and the
command authorities of the fronts determined the composition of each, to ensure that
it would be capable of successfully breaking through an enemy static defense dis-
. posed in depth and of pushing the operation to the planned depth. Table 5 shows
the composition of the battle groupa in the operations.
Table 5. Composition of the Battle Groups of the Fronts When Commencing the Counter-
1 offensive at Kursk2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Battle Group Combined- Rifle .Tank Indep~:n- Air Artillery Ax~y Arti~y
- Arms Divi- Armies dent 7~.`nlc Armies arl Mortar ~l arl Matar
Armies sions Cor s Divisions ' d ts*
Orel Operati.~n
Battle group on the
left side of the
Western Front (llth
Guards Army, 50th
A~y) 2 14 3 1 3 7 21
Main battle group of
the Bryansk Front
(63d and 3d armies) 2 12 1 1 3 3 12
Auxiliary battle groy~
of the Bryansk Front
(61st Army) 1 6 1 2 1 9
Battle group of the i
Central Front (48th,
13th, 70th armies,
2d Tank Army) 3 22 1 2 2 3 11 16
* (excluding rifle division artillery regiments)
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Table 5 (cont'd)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7. 8 9
Belgorod-Khar'kov
Operation
Main battle group of
- Voronezh and Steppe
fronts (Sth and 6th
Guards armies, 53d
Army, lst and 5th
Guards Tank armies) 3 20 2 2 2 4 3 4
Auxiliary battle group
of the Voronezh Front
(27th and 40th armies) 2 9 3 2 4
As is evident from the table, each battle group contained principally 2-3 combined-
arms armies, 1-2 tank armies, 1-3 tank corpe, and from 2 to 4 artillery and mortar
divisions. Their operations were aupported by one to two air armies.
In addition to these forces, Hq SHC specified that the following should be added to
the force groupings: to the left side of the Western ~ront a combined-arms army
and a tank army; to the Bryansk Front a tank army; to the main axis of advance
of the Voronezh Front two combined-arms armies. Unfortunately the llth Combined-
Arms Army, the 3d Guards and 4th Tank armies had not yet completed forming by the
commencement of the �olmteroffensive and joined the fronts while the operations were
in progress, which had a substantial effect on their development.
The power of the battle groups of the fronts was also increased because by the
summer of 1943 the combined-arms armies contained 2-3 and sometimes 4 rifle corps
' and 7-12 rifle divisions instead of the 5-6 in the preceding campaign. They were
SO-100 percent greater in nu~rical strength and equipment than armies without
corps organization, they were reinforced by 1-3 breakthrough artillery divisions,
by tank brigades and regiments, and were supported by large numbers of aircraft.
Tank armies were now of uniform composition. According to the table of organiza-
tion and equipment, they were to contain 800 tanks and self-propelled guns, and
approximately 700 guns and mortars. The strength of the battle groups was greater
than in the battle of Moscow, as follows: 50 percent in personnel, 360 percent in
guns and mortars, 500 percent in tanks, and 150 percent in aircraft. Battle groups
possessed 50 to 100 percent more equipment than in the counteroffensive at Stalin-
grad.
Powerful battle groups were formed by transferring troopa to the fronts in advance
from SHC Reserve, as well as by maneuver between fronta and armies. During prepara-
tions for the Belgorod-Khar'kov Operation, for example, three breakthrough artil-
lery divisions and a rocket artillery division were transferred from the Bryansk
Front to the Voronezh and Steppe fronta. This made it posaible to increase artil-
lery density by almost 20 percent in the 5th Guards, 27th and 53d armies.
The guns and mortars of rifle divisions in the support echelons, the artillery of
mobile groups and part of the artillery of armies operating on secondary axes began
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to be extensively employed in artillery preparation, in order to establish high
artillery densities in breakthrough sectors. In the breakthroupa sector of the
Sth Guards Army, for example, the artillery of the lat and 5th Guards Tank armies
and 4 artillery regiments from the divisions of the 40th army, which was to com-
menCe the offensive 2 days later, were used for artillery preparation. In the
_ breakthrough sector of the 6th Guards Army, the artillery of the 5th and lOth Guards
Tank corps and 2 divisional.regiments of the 27th Army were assigned to artillery
preparation, and in the breakthrough sector of the 53d Army of the Steppe Front
the artillery of the lst Mechanized Corps.21
The art of massing personnel and weapons on the most important axes was raised to a
higher level in the counteroffensive at Kursk. At Stalingrad average operational
density in the breakthrough sectore was as follows: 1 division for approximately
3 km of frontage, from 30 to 80 guns and mortare and from 12 to 17 tanks per km of
breakthrough s~r, wt~1e atK~c average operational density was as follows: 1 division
for every 1.6 km of frontage, 170-230 guns and mortars and 18-70 tanks and aelf-
propelled guns per km of breakthrough sector (Table 6).
Table 6. Average 0perational Densities During Penetration in the Counteroffensive
at Kursk22
Front Width of Width of ~ Per Rifle Guns and Mor- Tanks & Self-
- ivision tars per km Propelled
Zone of Break- Guns er km
Advance, through Entire Break- Entire Break- Entire Break-
- ~ 1~ Sector, Zone through Zone through Zone through
_ 1~ Sector Sector Sector
Western (left side) 70 20 3.7 1.4 60.1 183.1 8.8 30.7
~ Bryansk 158 30 8 1.9 40.3 173.7 4.9 18.6
Central 150 36 .4 1.6 42.0 104.9 8.0 40.0
_ Voronezh 160 20 1.9 53.9 215.8 13.5 70.0
Steppe 90 11 1.3 57.5 230 5.5 42.0
- Relative strengths wera increased sharply in favor of our forces by skilled massing
of inen and equipment in breakthrough sectors, particularly by boldly weakening
secondary sectors.
Special attention in preparing for penetration was devoted to planning delivery of
fire on the enemy. In connection with the necessity of penetrating a static defense,
duration of artillery preparation in the Western F~ont was specified at 2 hours and
45 minutes, and at 2 hours and 50 minutes in the Voronezh Front. Depth of delivery
of massed artillery fire for effect on the defenae ran 3-4 km. A moving barrage in
combination c~rlth sequential concentration of fire to the depth of the first posi-
tion in the enemy's defense began to be employed more frequently for supporting the
infantry and tank assault.
Our air power had increased by the summer of 1943. The advance of troops in the
Orel Operation was to be supported by more than 2000 aircraft of 3 air armies. The
Voronezh and Steppe fronts had more than 1300 aircraft. In addition, 200 long-
range bombers were assigned. In addition to quantitative growth of air power, air
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efforts were being increasingly focused on supporting the advance of ground troops.
In the counteroffensive at Stalingrad 43.6 percent of all sorties were employed for
this purpose, and 55.0 percent in the Orel Operation; 80-85 percent of all sorties
_ involved attacking targets in the enemy's tactica~ zone of defense.
Employment of air was planned in the f~rm of an air offensive. Preliminary air--
- strikes on the axes of advance of the battle groups were varied. On all fronts with
the exception of the Central Front, a large number of aircraft were assigned mis-
sions of mounting massive night strikes. Fifteen minutes prior to or immediately
before an attack, airstrikes would be delivered into the enemy's main defensive
zone.23 But the main efforts of the air armies were focused on supporting the ad-
vance of ground troops, which should be acknowledged as appropriate, for range of
artillery fire was insufficient to supprese targete at great depth, especially in
the course of an attack, when it became difficult to epot them from ground points.
The main targets of airstrikes in the course of an offensive included enemy person-
nel, artillery and tanks in the first and subsequent defensive zones, as well as
enemy reserves moving up toward the breakthrough sector.
The enemy's shift to a static defense dictated the necessity of somewhat reducing
the depth of combat missions. And the zones of advance were cut in half, which
helped increase tactical troop densities.
Rifle combined units formed up for the most part in two echelons, while regiments
formed in two and sometimes three echelons. Stronger artillery groups and
reserves were formed. Density of infantry-support tanks increased to 10-18 per km
of breakthrough frontage. Self-propelled artillery was included for the first time
- in infantry-support tank groups; the self-propelled guns were to advance behind the
tanks and provide them fire support.
Mobile groups containing one or two tank corps were formed in the combined-arms
armies operating on the main axes for exploiting a tactical into an operational
breakthrough. Tank armies of uniform composition were first employed in the fronts
for this purpose. The Voronezh Front had two tank armiea which, for the purpose of
maximum concentration of offensive tank power, were to be employed simultaneously
on a single axis, in the zone of a single combined-arms army.
Engagement of exploitation echelons was planned differently in each front and in
each army, taking account of the specif ic features of the enemy's defense and other
situation data. In th~ llth Guards Army of the Western Front, for example, the
5th Tank Corps was to engage on the first day of the operation, after rifle combined
units had broken through the main defensive zone, while the lst Tank Corps was to
- engage on the second day. Subsequently the 25th Tank Corps as well a reserve of
the commanding general of the front was to be employed in this same army's zone.
In the 61st Arnay of the Bry.ansk Front it was decided to move the 20th Tank Corps in-
to the breach within tactical defense depth, while in the 63d Army the lst Guards
Tank Corps was to be engaged following penetration through tactical defense depth.
On the Voronezh Front it was decided to engage forward tank brigades one from
each tank army forward-echelon tank (mechanized) corps (a total of approximately
200 tanks on a frontage of 10 km) in the area of the ene~y's main artillery
positions in order to complete penetration of the main defensive zone. With the
support of apecially designated artillery, acting in coordination with rifle
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divisions, they were to penetrate the third position in the first defensive zone
and create favorable conditions for engaging the main forces of the corps. The main
forces of the tank armies were designated for penetrating the second defensive zone
without a halt and for offensive exploitation at immediate operati~nal depth. It
was planned to engage the support echelons of the tank armies beyond the enemy's
army defensive zone.
Concentration of large masses of troops in the breakthrough sectors and the necessi-
- ty of penetrating a well fortified static defense demanded parti~ularly thorough or-
ganization ofteamwork and cooperation. Reestablishment of the cozps hea.dquar~ers
agencies facilitated this task at the army ec~elon. In organizing cooperation,
teamwork and coordination at all levels of command and control, principal attention
was focused on coordinating troop actions in taking up an attack position, con-
ducting preliminary artillery and air bombardment, and performance of combat mis-
sions by the troops. Coordination was organized moat closely to the depth of
penetratinn of the main defensive zone.
Engineer support of penetration was in large measure organized in a new manner and
on a larger scale than in the past. As a rule attack poaitions would be provided
- with an elaborate system of trenches. In connection with increase in density of
artificial obstacles in the enemy's defense, clearing of lanes through minefields
became an important task of engineer troops. Usually two lanes would be cleared
per rifle company and three to four lanes per tank brigade.24 An important task of
engineer troops was preparation af routes for execution of troop redeployment and
maneuver, especially by tank combined units and units. Engineer subunits would be
incorporated into forward battalions, and would alsa be detailed for performing
special missions in the capture of particularly tough enemy installations.
Party-political work played an important part in preparing for penetration. The
victory at Stalingrad and liberation of considerable territory from enemy occupa-
tion was a good foundation for development of thia work. The lull between campaigns
was utilized regular political instruction clasaes and information sessions were
held. At these classes instructors would discuss the advantages of the socialist
state and the ever increasing capabilities of the Soviet Army, the enhanced interna-
tional prestige of the USSR, expansion of the struggle of peoples against fascism,
and deepening of the conflicts between fascist Germany and its satellites. Par-
ticularly extensive work was conducted with new troop replacements.
Extensive measures pertaining to concealment, deception and camouflage were con-
_ ducted in ti_ie armies of the Western and Bryansk fronts in order to gain the element
of surprise. Preparations for penetration in the Sudzha area were feigned in the
Voronezh Front. In an operational respect this offensive action looked convincing
and drew.the enemy's attention and forces. No less effective was accelerated
preparation to launch a counteroffensive in that sector where fierce defensive
battles had recently been fought. Manstein wrote in his memoirs: "We were hoping
to smash the enemy sufficiently in the course of Operation Citadel so as to have a
breather on this front. This hopc: aubsequently proved fatal, however, for develop-
ment of the situation on the group's northern flank, since the enemy began the
offensive sooner than we expected."
The rapid shift from defense to a counteroffensive played an important role in
gaining t'~e element of surprise, but only on ~hose aice.s where powerful forces w~th
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high troop densities had been established (Voronezh and Steppe fr~nts). The Central
Front, which had only 2 days to prepare for the offensive, was unable to establish a
strong battle group in a narrow sector of frontage, which affected penetration and
the opera~ion as a whole.
In the Or.el Operation the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts began penetration
early in the morning on 12 July, when the enemy was still attempting to achieve the
objectives specified in Operation Citadel. It was preceded by reconnaissance in
force by forward battaliona, which the German-fascist comm,and authorities assessed
as an unsuccessful attempt to keep available Germa.n reserves on the Ore1 salient
from being committed to the drive on Kursk and failed to take the necessary
preventive measures.
In the llth Guard Army, as a result o~ considerable softening up of the enemy's
defense by heavy artillery preparation and airstrikes, in the course of which the
forward echelon of the ener:ry's 211th and 293d Infantry divisions sustained 50-
60 percent casualties, penetration began succesefully, especially in the zone of
the 8th Guards Rifle Corps, where artillery density amounted to 259.4 guns, while
immediately prior to the assault phase a strike was delivered by 70 Pe-2 bombers.25
The attacking extended lines of riflemen closed the enemy to a distance of 150-200
meters whila the final preparatory fire w~as still being delivered and, when f ire
- was shifted back to the second trench, attacked the forward positions, capturing
them without much enemy resistance (Diagram 12).
Attacking behind a moving barrage, the attack-echelon battalions of the regiments
of the llth and 83d Guards Rifle divisions broke through three trenches of the first
position and penetrated 500-700 meters into the enemy's defense. When the moving
barrage was raised, the regiment's support echelons were engaged. The first posi-
= tion was penetrated by 0830 hours. The regiments' third echelons were engaged to
add to the offensive effort. The corps commander engaged the 43d Tank Brigade
the corps forward detachment.
While the llth and 83d Guards Rifle divisions were immobilizing the enemy by fire
and assault in strongpoints east of Pochinok and Perestryazha, the 43d Tank Brigade
sliced into their point of juncture and advanced to a strongpoint in Otreshka, while
the rifle regiments reached the tactical approaches to the second position.
Artillery, part of which had changed gun poaitions, concentrated fire on the second
position, fortified as strongpoints. During the shelling, tanks and infantry ap-
proached these strongpoints and attacked when fire was shifted to depth. Following
stubbord fighting,the atrongpoints in and to the east of Otreshka were captured by
the advancing combined units, and by 1200 houra they had reached the third position,
set up beyond the Fomina River.
- The command authorities of the enemy's 293d Infantry Division, gathering remnants
of subunits, launched counterattacks together with reserve units of the 53d Corps,
with artillery support, endeavoring to prevent penetration of the third position.
Heavy fighting erupted, especially in the zones of llth and 31st Guards Rifle divi-
sions, which were forced to stand and repel counterattacks.
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Appreciable casualties were inflicted on the counterattacking enemy troops by
massed artillery fire and airstrikes, and by 1500 hours penetration of the third
position was completed at many points.
The commanding general of the llth Guards Army gave the signal to engage the Sth
Tank Corps (136 tanks). Due to the fact that the roads were heavily damaged by ar-
tillery fire and the necessity of crossing two barriers of antitank obstacles and
the Polyanka River, the corps did not reach the deployment line forward of the
second defensive zone until 2000 hours, that is, 3-3.~ hours behind schedule.26
During this time the enemy had succeeded in bringing the main forces of the 5th
Panzer Division up to the second defensive zone and, together with retreated sub-
units of the 293d Znfantry Division, organized a fairly solid defense. Two as-
saults on this defenee, undertaken at 2030 and 2200 hours, resulted ~nly in in-
significant advance by the corps and ita neighboring units.
_ Thus the gap which occurred in building up efforts by the 5th Tank Corps prevented
penetratifln of the enemy's second defenaive zone on the first day.
Redeployment of troops was accomplished during the night, and all artillery was
moved �orward. But at dawn on 13 July the enemy once again mounted counterattacks
by gr~ups of 15-30 tanks in the sector of the 8th Guards Rifle and 5th Tank Corps.
They were busy repelling these counterattacks up to 1200 hours. Thirty-four enemy
- tanks were disabled, and large numbers of enemy personnel were killed.27
The adjacent corps, engaging their support echelons the lst and 84th Guards
Rifle Divisions during this time succeeded in penetrating deep into the enemy's
second defensive zone. The commander ot the Sth Guards Rifle Corps concentrated
more than 250 guns in a 2.5 kn? sector and focused airstrikes on this sector as well.
The simultaneous delivery of artillery fire and airstrikes by the 224th Air Assault
Division made it possible to shatter the enemy's resistance. He was able to hold
on for a certain time in the Staritsa strongpoint. But outflanking of this strong-
point by the 24th Tank Brigade of the Sth Tank Corps, the 43d Tank Brigade and
regiments of the llth Guards Rifle Division hastened annihilation of the enemy in
this strongpoint. This opened up avenues to operational depth.
Penetration in the zone of the 61st Army was progressing' less successfully, chiefly
as a consequence of inadeqi;ate damage inflicted on the enemy during artillery
preparation and failure to follow the plan and schedule of support of the assault
phase. The divisions took 6-8 hours to penetrate the first position, and by evening
had advanced onl~ 3-7 lcr in a sector 12 km wide.
On the second day the commanding general of the army engaged a tank corps and two
rifle divisions from the support echelon to exploit penetration. But during the
_ night the enemy was able to move the 12th Panzer Division to Bolkhov from the Kursk-�
Orel axis and to offer stubborn resiatance to the troops which had resumed the at-
tack. In spite of the fact that artillery density was high in the sector where the
fresh forces were engaged (180-220 guns per km), they were unable to neutralize the
enemy, since the bulk of the artillery was delivering long-range fire from beyond
the Oka River at inadequately reconnoitered targets. On 13 July the troops of the
61st Army, repelling enemy counterattacks, captured several centers of resistance,
- but were unable to exploit penetration to depth.
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_ On 15 July the commanding general of the army engaged another rifle division, his
reserve, but even this failed to result in a breakthrough. Redeployment of the
16th Artillery Division from the 61st Army to the Voronezh Front greatly reduced
this army's artillery force. This made it even more difficult to break through the
tactical zone of defense, with penetration finally completed on I9 July, that is,
on the 8th day of the operation.
Troops of the 3d and 63d armies swiftly penetrated the first position. But sub-
sequently the advance slowed. The enemy began continuously bombi.ng the troops,
especial.ly of the 63d Army, and mounted several counterattacks.
Buildup of the offensive effort was hindered by the fact that a substantial part of
the 3d Army's artillery and almost all its observation posta were sited on the high
bank of the Zusha River, far to the rear of the infantry combat formations and gun
positions of the batteries deployed on the bridgehead. This led to disruption of
coordination between artillery, infantry and tanks at the most critical moment in
the battle during completion of penetration of the enemy's main defensive zone.
The greatest advance 6-7 km was achieved at the boundary of the 3d and 63d
armies. The advance ran 3-4 km on the remainder of the front.28
During the night the enemy succeeded in moving up to the breakthrough sector the
36th Infantry Division and forward units of the 8th Panzer Division. By mounting
strong counterattacks, with the support of large numbers of aircraft, on 13 July
they attempted not only to halt the advance of our forces but also to drive them
- back to their initial position. Massive fire delivered by the 2d Breakthrough Ar-
tillery Corps and airstrikes by the 15th Air Army succeeded in thwarting the enemy's
" plans. Combined units of the 3d and 63d armies re~umed the advance and, capturing
several strong centers of resistance, created conditions for engagement of the lst
Guards Tank Corps. But the enemy, discovering the advance.of this corps to the
deployment line, mounted airstrikes on its tanks. Engagement of the mobile group
was delayed until the aFternaon. By this time the enemy's 8th Panzer Divsion had
in its entirety reached the breakthrough sector and had closed the gap. They ~ere
unable to increase the rate of advance, but nevertheless by evening the enemy's
second defensive zone was penetrated. The gap was 25 km in frontage and 15 lun in
depth.29
The troops of the Central Front commenced the offensive on 15 July. The limited
time available for preparing for the operation made it impossible to displace the
attack away from the main enemy force, which had ~ust atopped its advance and still
had very dense co~bat formations. The force of delivery of fire, along a wide
frontage, proved to be much less than that required by the situation conditions.
- As a consequence of this the armies on the right side of the front "advanced slow-
ly, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the Hitlerites, who were skillfully
utilizing their well fortified poaitions.... Now and then the enemy would counter-
attack with panzer troops, and he had plenty of these left."30
The commanding general of the front engaged the 2d Tank Army to accomplish penetra-
tion. Engaging the enemy within his first positions, it took substantial casual-
ties, but was unable to smash a gap in the enemy's defense.
, Thus penetration of the enemy's tactical zone of defense in the Orel Operati:^ was
successfully completed by the end of the aecond day of the of.fensive only on the
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axes of the main battle groups of the Western and Bryansk fronts. Opportunities
to exploit tactical into operational penetration developed precisely on these axes.
The Western Front had two additional tank corps at its disposal for accomplishing
this mission (one was an element of the llth Guards Army, and the other was in the
front's reserve). In addition, Hq SHC was planning to assign to the front, ef-
fective 18 July, the 4th Tank Army, wY:ich was completing formation in the Moscow
area. The Bryansk Front had no reserve mobile combined units, and the 3d Guards
- Tank Army, which had been forming in the vicinity of Plavsk, was assigned to it
effective 14 July.
The commanding general of the llth Guards Army, as soon as penetration of the enemy's
secor.d defensive zone was completed, engaged on 13 July the lst Tank Corps with a
support-echelon division of the 16th Rifle Corps. An offensive thrust by ~he two
tank corps and rifle division, with artillery and air support, enabled them to ad-
vance 25 km. They still were unable, however, to obtain freedom to maneuver. The
enemy moved up three panzer divisions and a motorized division to the gap which had
been opened. Intensive fighting raged. On the following day the enemy was finally
forced to begin a withdrawal. The conditions were right for further offensive
exploitation. But the tank corps had sustained losses and no longer possessed the
necessary striking power for independent actions at operational depth.
On 18 July, that is, on the seventh day of the operation, the 25th Tank Corps from
the front's reserve was engaged. It was successful in its exploitation efforts.
Depth of penetration was increased to 70 km. One brigade had even reached Khotynets
Station on the Orel-Bryansk rail line. As a result of an enemy counterattack, how-
ever, this brigade withdrew toward the corps main forces. The army lacked the
forces to cut the rail ].ine. Its zone of advance had widened to 150 km. By moving
reserves to the most seriously-threatened sector, the enemy equalized forces and
even mounted a number of counterattacks to rout forward units of the 25th Tank
Corps. Engagement of fresh forces was necessary in order to build up efforts and
reach operational depth.
On 18 July Hq SHC assigned the 4th Tank Army to the Western Front. It could not
take the line before 24 July, that is, on the 13th day of the operation, with
great delay, when the llt.h Guards Army could conduct aggressive actions only with
two divisions, since the tank corps had sustained heavy losses in combat with enemy
tanks. The adversary, exploiting the 1u11 in the action, strengthened his defen-
sive positions. Therefore the 4th Tank Army would not be entering a breach as
planned, but would be commencing combat actions with penetration of a new enemy
defensive line.
On the first day of the offensive it was supposed to smash enemy resistance in a
sector 14 km west of Bolkhov and to advance 50-60 km to the south of it.31 Only
24 hours were given to prepare for executing the breakthrough. Due to the limited
time available, coordination was not properly organized. Artillery w3s not con-
centrated in the sector where the tank corps engaged. The tank brigades received
their mission assignments late in the evening and did not have time to make the
necessary preparations for the attack. As a result of all this the tank army, en-
gaging the enemy on 26 July, was only able to advance 2-4 km by evening. Nor did
the second day of the offensive produce the desired results. Finally on the third
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day the army forced the enemy to begin a withdra~ral. However, as a consequence of
- the fact that the army had not succeeded in peaetrating to full depth of the enemy's
' tactical order of battle, he was able to carry out aa orderl.q withdrawal, by bounds,
4-8 1~ per day.32
On the first few days in August the 4th Tank Arnry assigned at the end of July to the
Bryansk Front, attempted to break through to the Orel-Bryansk r.ail line near
Khotynets, the approaches to which were defended 6y a particularly strong enemy
force, which had previously been applying presaure on the troops of the llth Guards
Army. Penetration on this line was to be initiated by divisions of the llth Guarda
Army, while the 4th Tank Army was to enter the gap for offensive exploitation.
On 6 August the llth Guards Army, following artillery preparation, advanced 3 km in-
to the defenae by 1300 hours. It was unable ~o push the advance further, since its
combined units no longer possessed the neceesary striking power. But the commanding
general of the 4th Tank Army waited until 1530 hours to order the 30th Urals
Volunteer Tank Corps to enter the gap. The delay in engaging this tank corps
prevented a continuous offensive drive of increasing force. The tank corps offensive
thrust was delayed, and engagement of other tank corps proved difficult in the
forested terrain. On the first day the tank army advanced 4 km, 5 km on the second,
and on 8 August it advanced 14-16 km, but was halted in front of a new defensive
_ line to which the enemy had withdrawn his forces. After penetration of this line
the army was delayed in front of the third line, and therefore was unable to break
through to operational depth.
Assessing attempts to develop tactical into operational penetration by the forces
of the 4th Tank Army, which had just completed formation and therefore was insuf-
_ ~iciently smooth and coordinated, one muet agree with the view of Mar I. Kh.
Bagramyan, at that time in command of the llth Guards Army, that it would have been
more advisable to engage it not on the approaches to Bolkhov, where the enemy had
a very strong, fortified defense, but toward Khotynets,33 where the defense was dis-
rupted to its entire depth. At this point, even with an independent bre~kthrough
of the defensive line at the end of July, it could have penetrated to operational
depth and thwarted the enemy's plans of executing an orderly withdrawal to a
prepared defensive line to the rear. '
The 3d Guards Tank Army, assigned to the Bryansk Front on 14 July, arrived in the
concentration area toward evening of the following day, having completed a 150
kilometer march. By this time the enemy had withdrawn to a well-fortified defeneive
line along the Oleahnya River, while the offensive capabilities of the 63d and 3d
armies were already significantly reduced.
The 3d Tank Army also had 24 hours to prepare for the operation. As S. M. Shtemenko
testifies, in transferring the 3d Guards Tank Army to the Bryansk Front, the
Supreme Commander recommended that it be engaged "as quickly as possible, in order
to prevent the enemy from consolidating."34
But this decision inadequately took into account the enemy's capability to organize
a defense on new but previously prepared defensive lines, along which the enemy
had merely to deploy his troops in their designated areas and to organize a fire
plan. This required 24 hours or less, while the tank divisions needed several hours.
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Therefore the attacking force gained little hy seeking to break through such lines
with limited time to prepare for an offensive, but it lost a good cleal. Poor or-
ganization of combat actions sharply diminished their comhat capab:~lities, which in
the final analysis predetermined either a slow advance or total iEsilure.
A breakthrough sector with a frontage of 16 km was selected for th~a 3d Guards Tank
Army. The following densities were to be establiehed in this sectr~r: guns and
mortars 43, and tanks 50. The enemy also had high densities in this sector:
35 guns and mortars, and 10 tanks. In addition, spotting the advance of the tank
army, the enemy called in large numbers of aircraft to attack it, flying 1000
sorties on 19 July.35
With these relative strengths, when the enemy's defense had been poorly recon-
noitered, the offensive had been organized hastily, and the element of surprise was
lacking, one could hardly count on rapid penetration. In spite o~f the high tank
operational densities, the 3d Guards Tank Army advanced 7-10 km that day, and 20 km
only on the southwestern axis. Its corps, however, were unable t:o reach the Optukha
River36 before the enemy had taken up a defensive position there, and therefore were
unable to break through to operational depth.
Unquestionably another element in play here was the fact that Hq SHC, receiving
information from the command authorities of the Bryansk Front tnat the enemy had
begun withdrawing the Mtsensk force toward Orel and that the path of advance of the
3d Guards Taak Army westward was blocked by strong enemy resistance, issued an
ctder to the commanding general of the Bryansk Front at 0200 hours on 20 July to
change the direction of.advance of the 3d Guarda Tank Army and to initiate an at-
tack on the morning of 20 July with the objective of routing the Mtsensk force.
Between 19 July and 10 August the 3d Guards Tank Army made seven attempts to break
through the enemy's defense and penetrate to operational depth, but was unable to
obtain maneuvering room. Advancing slowly and penetrating the defense like in-
fantry, it sustained heavy losses, while achieving limited operational results.
During the Orel Operation the army lost 60.3 percent of its T-34 tanks and 72.9 per-
cent of its T-70 tanks.37 The army's battleworthiness was substantially diminished,~
and on 11 August it was withdrawn into the Hq SHC Reserve in order to be rebuilt to
strength.
The experience of engaging tank combined units and foz~ations on the Western and
Bryansk fronts indicated that, without executing expeditious and continuous buildup
of offensive power to depth, it is diff icult to achiev~e swift development of tac-
tical into operational penetration; employment of a tank army independently to break
through a~rior fortified enemy defense, without adequate delivery of firepower, led
- to heavy losses, in connection with which the front's forces were deprived on a
powerful means of offensive exploitation.
The initial experience gained in employing tank armies of the new organizational con-
figuration was taken into consideration in the Belgorod-Khar'kov Operation.
Penetration of the enemy's defense in the Belgorod-Khar'kov Operation began on
3 August (Diagram 13). On the eve of this operation, ~ust as in the Orel Operation,
reconnalssance in force was conducted with forward battalions, which confirmed that
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the enemy was atrongly defending in the previous positiona. Artillery preparation
began at 0500. The aircraft of two air armiea mounted heavy airstrikes on the
enemy. As a reault of the maesive artillery preparation a:~d airstrikes, the enemy
sustained heavy casualties, and his morale was shattered. His artillery was well
suppressed.
Infantry and infantry-aupporting tanks, launching an attack with the support of a
moving barrage, within 2 hours had captured the entire first position and had ad-
vanced to a depth of 1.5-2 km. Qne must acknowledge that the rate of advance in the
attack, which was 1 km per hour ~uith massive neutralization of the enemy's defense,
was insufficient. The reason was th~.t the moving barrage was provided primarily by
SHC Reserve artillery, communications and coordination with which were handled
through several echelons of command, ae a consequence of which shifting of fire was
delayed and the attack was conducted at a slowed pace.
Enemy resistance increased as our troops advaaced deeper, but sequential engagement
of support echelons made it possible to build up the force of the attack. In a
period of 5 hours the troops advanced to a depth of 4-5 km on the main axes of the
fronts, breaking through two positions, and reachiag the enemy's main artillery
position area. Here the advance of the combined-arms combined units began to slow.
Due to insufficient long-range artillery, the third position proved to be little-
neutralized. In addition, the effect of suppression and neutralization had es-
sentially disappeared 5 hours after artillery preparation had terminated. There
was a shortage of weapons which could reliably neutralize during penetration enemy
reserves occupying the third position, since a large percentage of the artillery
had begun changing position and could not support the advancing troops with massed
fire with the previous density. The small number of infantry-supporting tanks,
which in addition had taken losses, could not make up for the inadequate fire
delivered by artillery which by this time had expended 73 percent of the day's
- ammunition allocation.~9 In this situation a decisive role in completing penetra-
tion of the main defensive zone was plaqed by the forward tank brigades of the lst
and 5th Guards Tank armies.
They proceeded ~o advance when the attack commenced. At 1200-1300 hours they en-
gaged and, together with the rifle divisions, completed penetration of the enemy's
main defensive zone. There was a poesibility of advanc:Lng swiftly to the second
zone and breaking through it without a halt. But the 200th Tank Brigade of the
lst Tank Army, which was operating in the zone of the 66th and 97th Guards Rifle
- divisions, which lacked close-support tanks, was unable to outpace them, as it was
advancing for the most part through villagea. The 49th Tank brigade was operating
in the zone of the 13th Guards Rifle Division, which ~aas aupported by the 93d In-
dependent Tank Brigade. After completing penetration of the main defensive zone,
it could proceed swiftly toward the second zone, which for the present was weakly
defended by arriving enemy reserves. Ignorant of the situation, however, the com-
mander of the 49th Tank Brigade could not make such a decision. Thus a favorable
moment for penetration of the enemy's aecond defensive zone without a halt on the
axis of the lst Tank Army was not.utilized by the forward tank brigades, and ad-
vance to the point of engagement of the main forces of the forward-echelon corps
was delayed. ~
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The corps of the lst Tank Army were advancing in a zone only 3-4 km wide, which per-
mitted only one route per corps. On approaching tfie forward edge of the battle
area, the~ would have to cross the narrow (5-7 metera), but with a swampy floodplain,
_ Vorskla River, spanned by five bridges. But since approaches to the bridges had not
been constructed, they were so damaged following passage of the forward brigades that
the rate of advance of the corps dropped from 15 to 2 km per hour. The attack-
_ echelon tank brigades reached the line of thE advancing troops as evening was fall-
ing rather than at the scheduled 1500 hours. The lose of 5.hours of time permitted
_ the enemy to occupy the second defensive zone with the forces of the 6th and llth
Paz~r divisions, which in the final analysis led to incomplete accomplishment of the
missions of the first day of the offensive. Finally at dawn on 4 August the lst
Tank Brigade of the 3d Mechanized Corps eucceeded in breaking through the second
zone at a weak point, thus creating conditions for offensive exploitation to opera-
tional depth.
On the axis of advance of the Sth Guards Tank Army, the achieved continuity of
penetration exploitation produced results which were excellent for 1943. The for-
ward tank brigades of its corps, overtaking the rifle units, swiftly made their
~ way across the first defensive zone. The main forces of the tank corps broke
- through the second defensive zone without a halt and had reached a depth of 20-26 km
by 1800 hours. It is true that the main forces of the 18th Tank Corps, due to the
fact that the troops of the 53d Army had fallen behind, had to be deployed to
repel enemy attacks from the east, which subaequently affected the assault on
strongpoints in the enemy's army defensive zone. As a consequence of weak artillery
support and employment only of frontal attack, they were unable to take these
_ strongpoints, which led to certain failure to achieve the day's ob~ective and
affected offensive exploitation at operational depth. Thus in the Belgorod-
Khar'kov Operation, on the main axis of advance they were able to break through.the
solidly defended tactical zone by the end of the first 24 hours and to reach the '
army defensive zone, although in a narrow sector. This created conditions for
offensive exploitation to operational depth. But involvement of the 6th Tank Corps
in frontal attacks to capture Tomarovka and th~ necessity of assisting the 53d
Army of the Steppe Front and supporting the flank of the 5th Guards Tank Army
against a threat of counterthrust by an enemy panzer division made it impossible to
reach operational depth on 4 August. On that day the army defensive line was
reached only by the 3d Mechanized Corps of the lst Tank Army. It was not penetrated
until 5 August.
Penetration of the army defensive zone, defeat in detail of the enemy's Tomarovka
force, and offensive exploitation by the 27th and 40th armies, reinforced by three
tank corps, opened up an operational breach in the enemy's defense on the Bogodukhov
axis, to close which the enemy lacked sufficient forcea. By evening on 7 August
our forces' breakthrough frontage had widened to 120 km. The tank armies advanced
to a deptk~ of 100 km, and the combined-arms armies to 60-65 km.
Analysis of the breakthrough in the counteroffensive at Kursk indicates that sig-
nificant changes took place in its preparation and execution. The numerical
strength of the battle groups was increased, as were the troop densities and reliabil-
ity of delivery of effective fire on the enemy. A deep tactical order of battle made
it possible continuously to build up offensive power and to conduct penetration at
an increasingly more rapid pace, with immed~ate development of tactical into opera-
tional penetration.
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The modes of penetrating a deliberate defense employed by the Soviet troops, where-
by the defense was softened up with heavy artillery fire and airstrikes, while
penetration was begun by rifle troops, with subsequent engagement of tank and
mechanized combined unite and formations, echelon by echelon, proved to be
much more effective than the unoriginal method enployed by the Hitlerite army, ac-
cording to which penetration of the defense wae aseigned primarily to panzer corps,
which would form armored spearheads. In Operation Citadel, for example, the 9th
Army of Army Group Center, in penetrating a defense which had been in preparation
for a period of 2.5-3 months, was able to penetrate only 12 km in seven days, while
the llth Guards Army of the Western Front was forced to penetrate a defense in
which improvements had been in progress for more than a year. On the very first
day of the offensive it broke through the main defensive zone, on the following day
the entire tactical zone of defense, and opened a breach 25 km deep and 28 km wide.
In seven days it advanced to a depth of 70 km, or 6 times deeper than the enemy had
- been able to penetrate.
On the southern flank of the Kursk salient penetration of our defense was being con-
ducted by the enemy's 4th Panzer Army. In the first 24 hours it only broke through
the main defensive zone, while the battle group of the Voronezh Front penetrated two
- zones. The 4th Panzer Army achieved this result only by the fourth day of the
operation. By this time the troops of the Varonezh and Steppe fronts had opened an
operational breach approximately 90 l~ deep and more than 100 km wide.
The majority of fronts taking part in the counteroffensive succeeded in opening up
deep operational breaches, but an insufficiently rapid rate of advance at immediate
operational depth prevented them from exploiting the breakthroughs without a halt,
in order to link them up into a single front and interfront breakthrough, which
would have provided optimal conditions for the troopa to advance to operational
depth and for development of a series of operational penetrations into a single '
strategic breakthrough.
Improvement of the art of penetration in general offensive exploitation in the
course of a campaign. The actions of the fi0th Army of the Central Front at the
end of August 1943 are an instructive example of penetration of the defense in
these conditions (Diagram 14).
Development of the Orel Operation led to the retreat of enemy troops opposite the
Bryansk and right side of the Central fronts to defensive position Hagen, which con-
tained three to four trench lines and a large number of solid weapon emplacements.
The front situation remained unchanged ahead of the 60th Army. The enemy's
defense opposite this army had been in preparation since March 1943 and was more
strongly fortified than the defense opposite the front's other armies.
On 16 August Hq SHC, having made the decision to launch a general offensive, as-
signed to the Central Front the misaion of attacking in the general direction of
- Sevsk-Mikhaylovskiy Farm, and subsequently toward Kiev. The main force grouping
of the Central Front, consisting of the 48th, 65th, and 2d Tank armies, was to
penetrate the defense in a~5 km aector and, exploiting, cross the Desna River with-
out a halt. The 60th Army was to penetrate in a separate sector 10 km wide, at a
distance of 15 km from the sector of the frant's main force grouping.
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Ten days were allocated for preparing for the operation. Preparations for the at-
tack on the front's main axis were conducted hastily and without strict observance
of concealment, camouflage and deception measures. In addition, in connection with
postponement of the timetable of the offensive, the force grouping which was stand-
ing in attack position for the offensive was for five days in sight of the enemy,
who determined the front's main axis of advance and redeployed from less threatened
sectors the main forces of the 2d Army five of eight divisions.4~
The enemy's defensive front in the zone of the 60th Army proved to be considerably
weakened. In the sector where penetration was to be accomplished, somewhat more
_ than a regiment-size enemy force was defending, and most of its subunits had been
stretched out along the forward edge of the battle area. The commanding general of
the army deployed in the breakthrough se ct o r the 24th Rifle Corps, two tank
brigades, a breakthrough artillery division, and army artillery. This provicied
only moderate tactical densities: 2.1 rifle battalions, 6 tanks, and 90 guns and
mortars per kilo meter of fronta~e.41
In preparing for the operation, the commanding general of the army took measures
to achieve undetected concentration of troops. His staff worked out and executed a
plan of concealment, camouflage, deception and disinformation measures, which in-
cluded feinting actions on the army's left flank in order to give the enemy the im-
pression that preparations were being made for an offensive in that sector.42
The troops of the Central Front commenced the offensive on 26 August. On the main
axis the enemy, who was prepared to repel an attack, offered stubborn resistance
to the troops of the 48th and 65th armies, resulting in failure to exploit to
depth.
Within 24 hours the 60th Army had broken through the main defensive zone and had
advanced to the second zone. On the morning of the second day the army's support
echelon was engaged the 17th Guards Rifle Corps and the 9th Tank Corps, which had
been placed at the disposal of the army commander. In spite of the limited capabil-
ities of these combined units, which had taken casualties in preceding defensive en-
gagements, the troops of the 60th Army succeeded in quickly breaking through the
second defensive zone and reaching operational depth, where the enemy no longer had
reserves.
The commanding general of the front, taking advantage of the successful advance of
the 60th army, redeployed the 13th, 2d Tank and blst armies into its zone.43 With-
in five days the breakthrough gap had been widened to 100 km and depth of penetra-
tion had reached 60 km. Thus success in breaking through the enemy's front was
determined noz only by the power of the offensive thrust but also by skill, that is,
an unexpected attack into a vulnerable point with subsequent buildup of efforts by
engaging the support echelon and troops redeployed from other sectors.
Fearing a flank attack in the southern and southwestern sectors, the enemy began
withdrawing his troops opposite the Voronezh Front from the Sumy area. Advance of
the Voronezh and Steppe fronts in turn presented a threat of deep envelopment of
the strong enemy force in ~he Donbass.
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The troops of the Southern Front broke through a deliberate defense on the Mius
River and, attacking the troops of the German 6th Army in the rear, defeated them
in detail, which sharply weakened the enemy's southern flank.
The stability of the enemy's strategic front was weakening day by day. The
German-fascist command authorities, realizing tha.t it was impossible to hold the
Left-Bank Ukraine, hastened to withdraw their troops beyond the Dnieper, in order
to prevent their total defeat.
In order to disrupt the enemy's strategic front and to accomplish a hasty crossing
- of the Dnieper, the Soviet command authorities reinforced the troops of the Central,
4oronezh and Steppe fronts with three combined-arms armies and a tank army. The
pace of pursuit of the enemy was stepped up. On the tactical approaches to the
Dnieper several gaps were formed in the enemy's front, exploitation in which would
make it possible to achieve strategic penetration. But the wide Dnieper lay in
the path of the Soviet forces. It delayed their advance by 6-8 days, which
enabled the enemy to set up a defensive front beyond the river and to avoid
strategic penetration.
One of the reasons why strategic penetration was not achieved on the far approaches
to the Dnieper is the following: during the fighting on the Kursk salient the tank
armies had sustained heavy losses and were unable to chop up the ener~y's front so
as to beat the enemy to the river and envelop large forces on its left bank. But
nevertheless, even in these unfavorable conditions, our troops succeeded in seizing
a number of bridgeheads on the right bank of the Dnieper, thus thwarting the enemy's
- plan to establish an impregnable eastern wall.
The experience in penetrating a static defen~.= which was aniassed in the course of
the summer offensive of 1943 was vividly embodied in the Kiev offen~ive operation.
The general plan of the operation called for an offenaive thrust by the troops of
the 38th, 60th, and 3d Guards Tar.k armies and the lst Guards Cavalry Corps from the
Lyutezhskiy bridgehead in a southwesterly direction (Diagram 15). The 3d Guards
Tank Army and the lst Guards Cavalry Corps comprised the front's mobile group,
which was to enter the gap on the second day of the operation in the zone of the
38th Army.
The 38th Army contained 4 rifle corps and was reinforced by the 5th Tank and 7th
Artillery Corps. The 60th Army was given a breakthrough artillery division and
other reinforcing units.
Defending opposite them were 12 infantry and 2 panzer divisions from the 30 divi-
sions opposing the First Ukrainian Front, that is, almost half their strength. This
enabled the enemy to have a division every 4-5 1~ and 18-40 guna per kilometer of
defense frontage, which consisted of a ayatem of powerful strongpoints linked by
trenches. The depth of the defense was 14-15 km.
The armies were disposed in two ~chelons. In the forward echelon the 38th army
would be attacking with 2 rifle corps reinforced by 2 tank brigades of a tank
corps and an independent tank regiment, and in the support echelon also 2 rifle
corps. In addition, a mobile group was formed in the army of the remaining forces
of the 5th Tank Corps. The powerful attack echelon and army mobile group were to
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penetrate the enemy's tactical zone of defenae, and the army's support echelon and
front mobile group would be utilized for offensive exploitation to operational
depth.
Three rifle corps and a rifle division were advancing in the 60th Army's forward
echelon, and 2 rifle divisions and a tank brigade in the support echelon.
In order to establish high troop densities, the commanding generals of the armies
narrowed the breakthrough sectors to the maximum possible extent. In the 38th Army
it was 6 km, and 13 km in the bOth. In these sectors 2 rifle corps advanced in the
forward operational echelon, supported by the bulk of the artillery. This made it
possible to establish high troop densities in the 38th Army, comprising 9 battalions,
380 guns and mortars, and approximately 20 close-support tanks (including the army
mobile group) per kilometer of breakthrough sector. Operational density of tanks
amounted to 70 tanks and self-propelled guns. In the breakthrough sector of the
SOth Rifle Corps artillery density ran 416 guns and mortars per kilometer. This was
the highest artillery density achieved up to this time in the offensive operations
of the Great Patriotic War.44
~ Troop densities were much lower in the 60th Army. While they were almost equal in
infantry, in artillery on the main axia they comprised only 74 guns and mortars per
kilometer of frontage.45 Overall density of tanks on the main axis was only 10-12
per kilometer.
The armies' offensive was supported by all forces of the 2d Air Army.
Decisive massing of personnel and weapons made it possible to achieve a substantial
superiority over the enemy, which in the 38th Army's breakthrough sector was 3:1 in
infantry, 4.5:1 in artillery, and 9:1 in tanks.46
Gaining the elemeat of surprise was also of considerable importance. Preparations
for the breakthrough proceeded with strict observance of camouflage, concealment
and deception measures. Redeployment of the 3d Guards Tank Army and the 7th Break-
through Artillery Corps from the Bukrinskiy to the Lyutezhskiy bridgehead, which en-
sured the element of offensive surprise, was executed skillfully. On the eve of
this offensive drive the 27th and 40th armies were to attack from the Bukrinskiy
bridgehead, diverting attention to themselves and immobilizing the enemy's forces.
- Penetration of the enemy's defense began on 3 November with heavy artillery prepara-
tion lasting 40 minutes. No preliminary airstrike sorties were flown due to dense
fog. The effectiveness of aztillery preparation was so great that infantry and
_ tanks advanced unopposed to a depth of 2 km. Only a few batteries of the ene~y's
~ numerous artillery were able to open fire.
The enemy, seeing that our troops were threatening to break through to Kiev, which
was only 10 kilometers away, began hastily moving reserves up to the breakthrough
sector. That afternoon the 8th Panzer Division appeared opposite the 60th Army,
and the 7th Panzer and 20th Motorized diviaions in the zone of 38th Army. This
delayed the army's advance, but nevertheless by evening the troops had advanced to
- a depth of 7-12 km.
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At 2030 hours on 3 November Hq SHC, in a telegram addressed to the commanding
general of the front, demanded that the initiated operation "not be allowed to
drag out, since each additional day merely gives an advantage to the enemy, enabling
him to concentrate his forces in this sector, utilizing good roads, while on our
side of the front the enemy-demolished roads complicate and limit maneuver." Hq SHC
ordered that roads leading to Kiev be cut, and that the city of Kiev be captured no
later than 5-6 November. "Make sacrifices to accomplish this mission, bearing in
mind that these losses will be many times fewer than those which will occur if the
aperation drags on."
The front's troops resumed the offensive at 1000 hours on 4 November. The enemy met
the troops of the 38th Army with counterattacks. Engagement of the army's mobile
group, followed by the 3d Guards Tank Army made it possible to achieve a break in
_ the penetration effort and to advanc~ to a depth of from 3 to 5-6 km. The break-
through was completed that night, when the 3d Guards Tank Army, supported by com-
bined units of the 38th Army, attacked with headlights on. This stunned the enemy,
- and he begaa a hasty retreat. Exploiting, the armies' combined units cut .he
Zhitomir highway, which ensured the prompt liberation of Kiev.
Un 5 November the 60th Army also completed the breakthrough. Kiev was liberated
the follouring day. The front's troops had penetrated 150 km by the end of the
operation. They had succeeded in establishing a bridgehead of strategic signif--
icance on the Dnieper, which played a decisive role in the liberation of the Right-
Bank Ukraine.
* * *
In the summer-fall campaign of 1943 the Soviet force~ had the task of penetrating
- a static defense in depth, which was highly stable. Breaking open a gap in such a
defense required the forming of large battle groups, high troop densities, and a
- 6-10-fold superiority over the enemy in the breakthrough sectors, as well as
thorough organization of the combat operations of the troops participating in the
penetration.
An important area in development of the art of panetration was a steadily increas-
ing massing of inen and weapons in the aelected sectors. In the first period of the
war penetration in one sector was as a rule accomplished by the forces of a single
army, containing 5-7 divisions, while in the second period, especially in the
~ summer-fall campaign of 1943, for the most part the efforts of 2-3 combined-arms
armies (15-20 divisions), 1-2 tank armies (or 2-3 tank corps), as much as a break-
through artillery corps, with the support of an air army, c�~ere concentrated in a
single breakthrough sector or mare than one sector located close to one another.
This quantity of inen weapons provided the required euperiority over the enemy
and high troop densitiea, which made it possible to deliver massive, effective fire
on the enemy's defense and sequentially to build ug efforts not only_in the course
of penetration but during exploitation to conaiderable depth.
In the summer-fall campai~n of 1943, j ust as in the second~period of the war as a
whole, the art of achieving the element of surprise experienced considerable
development a very important factor in penetrating a deliberate enemy defense.
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The task of deception and dissemination of falae information was extremely suc-
cessfully performed by Hq SHC. Achievement of the element of sur-
prise at the front echelon also became an essential element in planning and
preparing for an offensive operation.
Employment of tactical and operational echelons whj.ch ensured sequential buildup of
efforts, maintaining superiority over the enemy and increasing the rate of penetra-
tion as troops advanced deep into the enemy's defense was specified and def.ined in the
course of penetration. An important role was played by mobile groups of armies
and fronts, engagement of which was accomplished in part or in full when the attack-
ing troops reached the main artillery position area for completing penetration of
the main defensive zone and assault of the enemy's second sefensive zone without
_ a halt.
In the su~er and fall of 1943 the art of developing tactical into operational
penetration in conditions where the enemy had shifted to a static defense in depth
was perfected. It was achieved by engaging the main forces of tank (mechan~zed)
corps and tank armies and their actions separated from the combined-arms large
units and formations which, engaging in offensive exploitation, would increase the
rate of advance, seeking to move ths battle front as rapidly ae possible to opera-
tional depth.
An increase in the combat power of battle groups, troop densities, and greater
skill in organizing and executing penetration made it possible to increase the num-
ber of successful breakthroughs from 50 percent in the first period of the war to
70 percent in the second. The acquired combat experience was utilized and en-
larged in the third period of the war.
_ FOOTNOTES
l. See "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [History of World War IIJ, Vol 6, pp 45, 48.
2. Table prepared on the basis of TsAMO [Central Archives of the Ministry of
' Defense] Materials, Fund 331, List 5041, File 31, Sheet 16; Fund 375, List 5113,
File 122, sheets 15-34.
3. TsAMO SSSR, Fund 335, List 5113, File 124, p 13.
4. Ibid., Fund 242, List 6850, File 10, Stieet 240; File 5, Sheet 184; Fund 227,
List 140946, File 1, sheets 1, 2; Fund 266, List 271, File 19, Sheet 18.
5. Cited in K. S. Moskaleno, "Na yugo-zapadnom napravlenii 1941-1943" [In the
- Southwestern Sector, 1941-1943J, second edition, Book 1, Moscow, Nauka, 1973,
pp 383, 384.
6. See "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne
1941-1945" [Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War,
1941-1945], Vol 2, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1958, page 75.
_ 7. See "Istoriya vtoroy...," op. cit., Vol 6, page 78.
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8. TsAMO SSSR, Fund 422, List 12568, File 20, Sheet 64.
9. See "Velikaya pobeda na Volge" jGreat Victory on the VolgaJ, Moscow, Voyen~z,~at,
1965, page 455.
10. TsAMO SSSR, Fund 226, List 3G6, File 16, sheets 176-198.
11. See "Istoriya vtoroy...," op. cit., Vol 6, pp 110, 111. ~
12. See "Operateii Sovetskikh...," op. cit., Vol 2, page 113.
13. Ibid. ~
14. See "Sovetskaya artilleriya v Velikoy Otecheatvennoy voyne" [Soviet Artillery in
the Great Patriotic War]; Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1960, page 185.
15. TsAMO SSSR, Fund 208, List 2511, File 1467, sheeta 11, 12.
lE, Ibid., List 2513, File 1156, sheets 265, 266.
17. Ibid., Fund 213, List 2002, File 179, Sheet 41.
18. "Sovershenno sekretno! Tol'ko dlya koma.ndovaniya!" [Top Secret! For Command
Authorities Only!], Moscow, Nauka, 1967, page 458.
19. Ibid., pp 499, 500.
20. See "Istoriya vtoroy...," op. cit., Vol 7, page 1~+4.
21. See "Sovetskaya artilleriya...," op. cit., page 245.
22. See VOYEENO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 7, 1968, page 88.
23. See "Sovetskiye ~;oyenno-vozdushnyy~~ sily v Velikoy Otechestvenony voyne, 1941-
1945 gg." [Sovizt Air Forces in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945], Moscow,
Voyenizdat, 1968, pp 186-190.
24. See "Inzhenernyye voyska v boyakh za Sovetskuyu Rodinu" jEngineer Troops in
Battles for the Soviet Homeland], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1970, page 166.
25. See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 1, 1971, page 20.
26. Ibid., page 22.
27. TsAMO SSSR, Fund 666, List 225565, File 2, Sheet 197.
28. Ibid., Fund 202, Lisr_ 5, File 1434, Sheet 1.
29. See G. A. Koltunov and B. G. Solov'yev, "Kurakaya bitva" [Battle of Kursk], Mos-
cow, Voyenizdat, 1970, page 215.
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30. K. K. Rokossovskiy, "Soldatskiy dolg" jSoldier's Duty], Moacow, Voyenizdat,
1968, PP 227, 228.
31. See "Boyevoy opyt bronetankovykh i mekhanizirovannykh voysk v Velikoy
Otechestvennay voyne" [Combat Experience of Armored and Mechanized Troops in the
Great Patriotic WarJ, Vol 3, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1944, pp 46-60.
32. Ibid., pp 63-68.
33. See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 7, 1963, page 94.
34. S. M. Shtemenko, "General'nyy shtab v gody voyny" jThe General Staff in the
War Years], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1968, page 172.
35. See "Boyevoy opyt...," op. cit., Vol 3, page 14.
36. Ibid., pp 16, 17.
37. Ibid., page 41.
38. D. Rokossovskiy, op. cit., page 228. .
39. TsAMO SSSR, Fund 203, List 51354, File 3, Sheet 2.
40. See "Operatsii Sovetskikh...," op. cit., Vol 2, page 351.
41. See P. G. Kuznetsov, "General Chernyakhovskiy," Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1969, page
111.
42. TsAMO SSSR, Fund 301, List 14950a, File 4.
43. See Rokossovskiy, op. cit., page 232.
44. See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL. No 11, 1963, nage 9.
45. TsAMO SSSR, Fund 417, List 10501, File 4, Sheets 208, 209.
- 46. See "Operatsii Sovetakikh...," op. cit., Vol 2, page 384.
r �
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Chapter Three. IMPROVEMENT IN THE FOItMS AND MUDES OF PENETRATION IN TIiE
- THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR
1. Penetration in the Operations of the 1944 Winter Campaign
As the 1944 winter campaign began, the military-political situation was character-
ized by further strengthening of the economic, political and military might of
the Soviet Union. At the same time the steadily increasing scale of offensive opera-
tions and stubborn ene.my resistance were cauaing an increaeingly larger expenditure
of materiel, a rate of consumption which our industry, in the absence of a lull in
military actions on the front, was unable to cover. At the end of 1943 and begin-
ning of 1944, for example, our industry was producing 160,000 tons of ammunition
, per month. But the consumption of a single advancing front was 40,000 tons. In
other words, Soviet industry was capable of aupplying from 4 to 5 active fronts,
and yet there were 12 of them. There were also difficulties in supplying the
troops with fuel and lubricants. Continuous combat operations in the gigantic of-
fensive in the summer and fall qf 1943 resulted in considerable casualties and
equipment losses. Many divisions needed rest and time for replenishment and combat
training.
The autumn season of bad roade deteriorated lines of communication and worsened
airfield basing and the capability of extensive maneuver during the conduct of
operations.
All these and other situation conditions imperatively demanded a breather for the
troops and time tu amase supplies, to bring units up to strength, ~o set up rear
services, and for other needs. Crushing defeat of the enamy in the summer-fall
campaign, however, created certain preconditions for successful continuation of the
offensive. Many enemy divisions, especially in the southwestern sector, were ex-
hausted, operational reserves were chewed up, while the enemy had virtually no
strategic reserves, since there were only 8.5 divisione in the strategic reserve
on the Eastern Front, and these reservea were under etrength.
Continuation of the offenaive without a pause in operations would.make it possible
to thwart the enemy's plans to stabilize the Eastern Front on a line running along
the Dnieper and to libe~ate a substantial portion of Soviet territory by the begin-~
ning of spring planting. Reaching the borders of ihe USSR would make it possible
to shift military operations onto the soil of Germany'a satellites, which would
force them to seek withdrawal from the war.
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A car~ful analysis .f the complex strategic situation existing st the end of 1943
enabled Hq SHC to see realistic poasibilities of dealing the enemy a powerful blow
in the winter of 1944 without a pause between campaigns. Implementation of these
possibilities, however, was a complex matter and demanded a number of revisions in
op~ration plans, missions of the fronts, and modes of conduct of the offensive~ es-
pecially penetration.
Penetration of the enemy`s strategic front in the winter campaign was to be ac-
complished in the Southwestern Sector. In addition to the political and economic
objectives of the planned operations, also taken into account was the fact that in
this sector the enemy did not have a well prepared defense disposed in depth, while
the Soviet Army had an advantageous configuration of front and a number of large
bridgeheads on the Dnieper. The main forces of the Soviet Army were also positioned
here, which made it possible to launch an offensive immediately, without strategic
redeployment, thus without giving the enemy time to establish a solid defense, to
redeploy his forces and rehabilitate pr~viously routed units and combined units. In
addition to an offensive in the Right-Bank Ukraine, aggressive missions were also
assigned to the fronts operating in the western and northwestern strategic sectors.
Specific features of penetration in the operationa in the Right-Bank Ukraine. The
strategic operation to liberate the Right-Bank Ukraine was conducted by the troops
of four fronts in two stages. The first stage ran from 24 December 1943 to
29 February 1944, as a result of which the enemy's strategic defense in the south-
western sector was shattered; the second stage ran from the beginning of March to
17 April 1944, when the Ukrainian Front accomplished a strategic breakthrough and
- advanced through the Western Ukraine and to the Romanian border.
Soviet forces in the Right-Bank Ukraine were opposed by a powerful enemy force
grouping, which totaled 91 divisions, including 18 panzer and 4 motorized divisions,
1.2 million officers and men, 16,800 guns, 2,200 tanks and assault guns, and 1,460
aircraft.l This enabled the enemy to establish very high operational troop densi-
ties 13 km per division.
At the first stage all Ukrainian fronts were employed in the battle to liberate the
Right-Bank Ukraine. The lst Ukrainian Division was to mount the Zhitomir-Berdichev
Operation, the Second Ukrainian Front the Kirovograd Operation, and the Third
and Fourth Ukrainian fronts the Nikopol'-Krivoy Rog Operation. The most
characteristic traits and features of preparation for and execution of penetration
in these situation conditions were displayed in the Zhitomir-Berdichev Operation,
- which ran from 24 December 1943 to 15 January 1944. Initially the front contained
seven combined-arms armies, two tank armies and one air army. It totaled more than
450,000 men, 5,830 guns and mortars of 76 mm and larger, 1,100 tanks and self-
propelled guns, and 750 aircraft.
The forces of this front were opposed by an enemy force totaling 30 divisions, in-
cluding 8 panzer divisions and 1 motorized division. It contained approximately
300,000 men, 600 tanks and assault guns, approximately 3,500 guns and mortars, and
500 aircraft.2 Consequently the troops of this front enjoyed a 1.5:1 superiority
over the enemy in personnel, 1.6:1 in artillery, 1.8:1 in tanks, and 1.5:1 in air-
craf t .
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_ FOR ( ,
Preparatian for the breakthrough were conducted for a period of 9 days, immediate-
ly after repelling the enemy counteroffensive in the Kiev sector.
The general plan of the operation called for launching four cleaving attacks in a
200 kilometer zone, with the front's zone of action extending a total of 490 km
(Diagram 16). The main attack was to be mounted on the Brusilov-Berdicbev axis
by the forces of the lst Guards, 18*_h and 38th Combined Arms armies, the lst and
3d Guards Tank armies. The following subsidiary attacks were to be mounted: to
the right of the main attack by the forces of the 60th Army, reinforced by two
tank corps, in the direction of Shepetovka; to the left by the adjacent flanks
of the 40th and 27th armies, in the direction of Khristinovka, where they were to
link up with the troops of the Second Ukrainian Front and encircle the enemy force
defending the Kanev salient. On the northern side of the front, the 13th Army was
to attack with the forces of 2 divisions and a tank corps.
'Phus all seven of the front's combined-arms armies were being utilized to accomplish
the breakthrough. A fairly strong force grouping was established on each axis,
with a particularly strong force (30 rifle divisions, 4 tank and 2 mechanized
corps) on the main axis of advance.
Although the enemy's defense was shallow and of a focal area type, and the battle
- groups were fairly strong, nevertheless the front's command authorities, in view
of the experience of the preceding operations, assigned narrow breakthrough sectors
in order to establish high troop densities in conditions of seriously understrength
combined units: 18 km for the main force grouping, 15 km for the 60th Army, 10 km
for the 40th and 27th armies, and only 4 km for the 13th Army.
The selected width of breakthrough sectors provided the requisite conditions for
- engaging the front's mobile groups and armies. At the same time the fact that the
breakthrough sectors were close to one another would make it possible, when penetra-
tion of the tactical zone of defense had been achieved, and breakthroughs were
widened toward the flanks, to join them into a single common breakthrough sector and
to form a wide gap in the enemy's defense.
High operational densities were established as a result of skillful concentration of
personnel and weapons in the breakthrough sectors: 2-3 km per division, approximate-
ly 180-200 guns and mortars, and more than 20 tanks and self-propelled guns per
kilometer.3 Density of close-support tanks was light, however even on the main
axis of advance, and then not in all divisions, it did not exceed 8-9 tanks and
self-propelled guns per kilometer of breakthrough sector.
Initiation of the offensive was not to begin simul:.~neously on all axes, but
sequentially initially on the main axis, subsequently, on the second day, on the
- ~ left side of the front, and on the right side of the front on the third day. This
would make it possible to employ air assets in masaed numbera and more effectively
on each of the axes, as well as to maneuver part of the RVGK artillery from the
main axis to secondary axes.
Since the enemy's defense was shallow, it was decided to engage the mobile groups
during penetration of the main defensive zone or after the rifle combined units cap-
tured it. Engagement of the mobile groups after shallow penetration was also due to
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the fact that densities of close-support tanks were low, and many of the rifle com-
bined units were far below T/0 strength.
By decision of the commanding general of the front, a uniform procedure of deliver-
ing artillery supporting fire was established in all armies. Artillery preparation
was to run 90 minutes, while artillery support of the infantry and tank assault was
to be conducted by the rolling-barrage method.
The air support plan called for striking enemy headquarters, rail junctions and
reserves 48 hours before the operation commenced, while all ground-~ttack aircraft
and bombers were to hit the enemy's tactical defense immediately prior to the assau]t.
_ As penetration began, the assault by the main forces was to be supported with con-
tinuous delivery of fire on enemy strongpoints, and when the tank armies were en-
gaged, the main air effort was to be directed toward supporting them.
Penetration of the enemy defen~e on the main axis of advance commenced on the
morning of 24 December 1943. Actions by the main forces were preceded by recon-
naissance in force by the forward battalion. A specific feature of this activity
lay in the fact that it was conducted not on the eve of a general offensive, as had
generally been the practice up to that time, but directly on the day of the of-
fensive, a f ew hours before it commenced, which not only eliminated predictable
routine in the actions uf the troops, but also depriv~d the enemy of ~he opportuni-
ty to take any measures to strengthen his defense. In addition, this had a certain
psychological effect. In case the reconnaissance in force was repelled, the enemy
could assume that the offensive, just as had been the case in the past, would not
begin in the following day; he would lower his guard, expecting a lull of almost
24 hours. ,
The reconnaiseaz:c.e in force was followed by heavy artillery preparation and air-
strikes. Tsunching the attack, the troops of the front's main force grouping
quickly captured enemy strongpoints and centers of resistance in the f irst position
and as~aulted the second position without a halt. Here the fighting took on a more
savage character.
In order to complete penetration of the enemy's tactical defense as quickly as pos-
sible and to break through to operational deptn, both tank armies were engaged at
midday: the 3d Guards in the zone of the 18th Army, and the lst Tank Army in the
zone of the 38th Army. As a result of their simultaneous attack, enemy resistance
was crushed, and penetration of the tactical zone of defense was completed by the
- evening of this short December day. The tank armies had advanced to a depth of
15-20 km, and the combined-arms armies to 10 km.
On the following day, in spite of a sharp deterioration in the weather (it had
started raining), which limited employment of air and made ground troops actions
more difficult, the combined units of the battle group were successfully advancing.
That same day the troops of the 40th and 27th armies commenced the off ensive. By
evening the breakthrough had been widened to 80 km in frontage and to 20-30 km in
~ depth. Conditions had been created for operational pursuit of the enemy.
On the third day of the operation, when the enemy's operational defense was severe-
ly battered, and the enemy had begun moving up reserves to the threatened sector,
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tl� w~~~ker i~rc~s ~1 ttie right side of the front commenced to attack. `l'tie bUtl~
Army was particularly successful. In the course of the day its troops advanced
to a depth of 25 km. Forces were also successfully advancing on the other axes.
Thus penetration of the enemy's tactical zone of defense in all four sectors was
accomplished in the span of a single day, while by the end of the third day of
the operation all breakthrocghs were linked up into a single gap 200 km wide, and
the armies proceeded to engage in pursuit of the enemy along a wide front. With
their offensive the troops of the First Ukrainian Front, enveloping the enemy's
Kanev force, had created realistic preconditions for its encirclement and annihila-
tion, which made it possible to open up a substantial gap in the enemy's opera-
tional defense, exploitation in which could lead to a strategic breakthrough. It
was up to the Second Ukrainian Front.
A somewhat different form of operational breakthrough was selected on the Second
Ukrainian Front. ~ao attacks, launched south and north of Kirovograd, were to end
in encirclement of the enemy, after which drives were to be launched in the direc-
tion of Khristinovka, toward the troops of the First Ukrainian Front and toward
Pervomaysk. The armies of the right side of the front were to execute independent
breakthroughs with the objective of splitting the enemy's encircled Kanev force
(Diagram 17).
The Third and Fourth Ukrainian fronts were planning three army thrusts each for
conduct of the Nikopol'-Krivoy Rog Operation.
In contrast to the First Ukrainian Front, the battle groups which were to mount the
Kirovograd and Nikopol'-Krivoy Rog operationa were much weaker, which affected the
troop densities established in the breakthrough sectors. In the breakthrough
sectors of the battle groups of the Second Ukrainian Front, for example, the
greatest artillery density was 120, while average density was 50-60 guns and
mortars per kilometer of breakthrough sector. Firepower was diminished additionally
by the fact that when the operation coumienced the front was short on ammunition
with 0.6-1.1 basic combat load, as a consequence of which only 0.6 basic combat.
load was allocated for artillery preparation, and 0.4 basic load for close support
of the assault phase. Airstrikes could not compensate for the insufficient artil-
- lery fire. There was little air available. In addition, the weather did not favor
employment of air.
Infantry and tank densities in *.he combined units were also low, due to a severe
s~ortage of inen and equipment.
Although the enemy's defense was not pa:ticularly firm, the first defensive position
was quite stable, which required heavy delivery of fireo With low artillery densi~-
ties and limited ammunition availability, however, it proved impossible to deliver
sufficiently effective fire, which affected penetration and the results of the
operations as a whole.
The troops of the Second Ukrainian Front commenced the operation on 5 January. The
enemy proved to be poorly neutralized in the breakthrough sector of the battle
group south of Kirovograd. The enetny had spotted our offensive preparations, and
he had well protected personnel and weapons from artillery fire. When the assault
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ptiase began, the enemy offered fierce reaietance. Stubborn attacka by our divisions,
one af ter the other, were Lnsuccessful. The lack of close-support tanks and air
support was having its efffect.
In these conditions the commanding general of the front ordered the 5th Guardg Tank
Army to engage, with the mission of breaking through the enemy defense together
with infantry, and accomplishing the day's ob~ective. The tank army had 238 tanks
and self-propelled guns, and was engaged in two echelons: the 29th and 28th Tank
Corps in the first, and the 8th Mechanized Corps in the second. The tank corps also
advanced slowly, however, encountering an organized enemy defense, saturated with
tanks and particularly antitank artillery. By evening the joint efforts of the
combined-arms and tank large units had succeeded in completing penetration only
of the main defensive zone.
Penetration was developing differently on the axis of advance of the northern
battle group. The enemy, learning of the concentration of the 5th Tank Army south
of Kirovograd, failed to react to the reconnaissance i,n force in the zone of the
northern battle group and did not beef up ita combat dispositians opposite it. At
_ 0900 hours infantry, supported by a rolling barrage, launched an assault. In the
- zone of the 53d army the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps commenced the attack simul-
taneously with it. At 1100 hours, foliowing pEnetration of the first position,
the 7th Mechanized Corps, containing only 41 tanks, engaged in the zone of the 5th
Guards Army. This offensive thrust by the two armies, reinforced by two tank corps,
- made it possible to open a gap in the defense 18 km wide during the first hours, a
gap which the enemy was unable to close with tactical reserves, while his opera-
- tional reserves were positioned further south. The tank corps penetrated the second
position, and subsequently the entire main defensive zone. By evening the 7th
Mechanized Corps had driven to a depth of 24 kzn.
The commanding general of the front had transferred the 8th Mechanized Corps here
from the southern force grouping with the mission of offensive exploitation. In
spite of the reinforcement, the northern force was unable to reach operational depth:
the enemy, in the belief that the main attack was taking place north of Kirovograd,
moved his panzer units there.
Weakening of the enemy's defense south of Kirovograd enabl.ed the 7th Guards Army,
tog~ther with the 5th Guards Tank Army, to break through ;the second zone and to
advance to a depth of 20 km by evening, while forward units reached the southeastern
edge of Kirovograd. On the second day the southern force advanced 6-7 km and linked
up with the northern force. Penetration reached 70 km in frontage and 30 km in depth.
The city of Kirovograd was liberated on the morning of 8 January.
The right-flank 52d and 4th Guards armies advanced 20-30 km in their sectors.
Although the results of the Kirovograd Operation were substantial, the troops of
the Second Ukrainian Front failed to break through to operational depth, to reach
Khristinovka, and there to close the ring of encirclemen`t behind the enemy's Kanev
force.
Penetration on the Third and Fourth Ukrainian fronts failed due to insufficient
numerical strength of the battle groups.
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The course of the firat operationa in the Right-Bank Ukraine showed that the enemy
still pussessed sufficient forces to maintain the stability of his strategic front.
The enemy could be crushed only by launching a number of deep, cleaving offensive
drives, as called for by the initial plans, for which the front lacked suff icient
forces, or by initially mounting local offensive operations with available forces,
in the course of which the enemy's defense could be shaken up, followed by deep of-
_ fensive thrusts, smashing the enemy's front and accomplishing the missions speci-
fied for the winter campaign. Hq SHC, amassing forces for the summer-fall campaign
of 1944, chose the second way, for which three operations were designated: the
Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy by the forces of the First and Second Ukrainian fronts;
the Rovno-Lutsk on the right side of the First Ukrainian Front; and the Nikopol'-
Krivoy Rog by the armies of the Third Ukrainian Front.
The Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy Operation was the central and most effective operation
(Diagram 18). The main objective of this operation was annihilation of the enemy's
large Kanev force, which totaled nine divisions and a~to rized brigade with numerous
support weapons;' comprising approximately 10 percent of the higher numerical
strength of forces defending in the Right-Bank Ukraine. Their total annihilation
would substantially weaken the enemy's forces and prevent him from establishir~g
reserves by pulling back from the Kanev salient, and beefing up the most
- threatened sectors.
The German-fascist command authorities, endeavoring to hold the Korsun'-Shevchen-
kovskiy salient, which could serve as a bridgehead from which to launch an offen-
sive, were hastening to establish a stable defense. In the course of a short
period of time following establishment of this salient, the enemy succeeded in
adapting the majority of towns and villages for defense, in digging emplacements,
organizing a fire plan, and constructing field fortifications in places.
The main defensive zone opposite the troops of the Second Ukrainian Front was from
3 to 6 km deep and consisted of strong points and centers of resistance linked by
trenches. Within strongpoints there was an elaborate network of fighting trenches.
A second defensive zone was set up at a distance of 10-12 km from the forward edge
of the battle area, but its construction was not completed by the commencement of
our offensive. The enemy's defense opposite the First Ukrainian Front was more weak-
ly fortified.
Preparations for the operation were conducted in a complex operational situation,
in which the troops of the fronts had just completed the preceding operations, had
expended a substantial quantity of inen and equipment, and in a number of sectors
were fighting heavy defensive engagements with large enemy forces, as the enemy
still entertained hopes of reestablishing the integrity of the Eastern Wall. Con-
siderable forces, especially of the First Ukrainian Front, were involved in the
fighting against the counterthrusti~tg enemy panzer divisions. Part of the forces
of the front's 40th Army (the 136th Rif le Division, a regiment of the 167th Rifle
Division, part of the forces of the 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade) were even fight-
ing in a position of encirclement. This greatly complicated forming a front
battle group.
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The ammunition aituation was extremely critical. The principal artillery systems
in the armies had from 0.7 to 1.5 basic combat loads.
Weather condieions wer,e also unfavorable. A thaw had set in, the ice had broken up
on small rivers and creeks, and the roads were in a deplorable state. The weather
was overcast, which made it difficult to employ air.
Hq SHC's concept for the Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy Operation called for adjacent sides
of the First and Second Ukrainian fronts to drive toward one another in a pincer
movement, to break through the enemy's defense at the base of the salient and,
_ linking up in the Zvenigorodka-Shpola area, to envelop and destroy the defending
enemy force.
Although defense at the base of the enemy`s Kanev salient proved to be significantly
weaker, the commanding generals pf the fronts established fairly large battle groups
for the conduct of this operation two combined-arms armies and one tank army each.
Operational densities and relative strengths in the fronts' breakthrough sectors are
indicated in Table 7.
Table 7. Operational Densities and Relative Strengths in the Breakthrough Sectors
in the Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy Operation
~ ~ G
Battle Group ~ ro ~ ~ Relative Strengths
~ F, ~ r.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~ s.�+ o~ 0 01 ~ ~d ~o o�~o a~i r+ ~
,L" ~ O G v~ a I D~ t~ G
O ~ ~t~A ~ � N ~ rl ~ Ul ~ H i-+ ~0
cU 1.~ �rl .a V LL tA ~A .Y~ H a�? Qi E-~
N U f~ D f~ G i-+ 't7 A ~ i-~
y a�r~l ~ :J R1 G' N ~d f~ c0 C'+ 41 4+
Cq V) Z A z C7 ~d CL E~ H 4a H r-1 H
Battle group of the 25* $0
6 2 2.5 10 2.5:1 3.3:1 5.0:1
- First Ukrainian Front 15 (104)
Battle group of the
Second Ukrainian 90
Front 19 14 3 1.4 (117) 14.2 4.6:1 6.3:1 10.4:1
* The figure in the numerator was specified by Hq SHC, and in the denominator
the number decided on by the commanding general of the front. The figures in
parentheses include rocket artillery.
Proceeding from the character of the defense, it was to be neutralized not along the
entire continuous breakthrough sector frontage but by centers of resistance and
strongpoints. The plan of the comananding general of the 40th Army specified: "Since
the enemy's defense is of a focal type, the frontage of suppressive fire will be
reduced to half, which makes it possible to increaee actual artillery density to
100-120 tubes per kilometer of suppressive-fire delivery area."5 Artillery fire
was planned against the most important targets in the 27th Army as well.
Artillery preparation was to run 35 minutes in the First Ukrainian Front and 56
minutes in the Second Ukrainian Front, From 10 to 20 guns per kilometer of frontage
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were set up for direct fire, for knocking out important targets on the forward edge
of the battle area. Support of the assault pha.se in the Second Ukrainian Front was
to be by moving barrage in combination with successive fire concentration, and in
the First Ukrainian Front - only by successive fire concentration.
Both fronts devoted considerable attention to gaining the element of surprise.
Toward this end, the battle group on the First Ukrainian Front was formed with
minimal redeployments. On the Second Ukrainian Front, in addition to measures
worked out in sietail to achieve undetected concentration of troops in the break-
through sector, preparations were made for an operation to deceive the enemy. It
pursued the aim of convincing the enemy that preparations were being made for an at-
_ tack on a previous axis, west of Kirovograd, in the zones of the Sth and 7th Guards
armies. As Mar SU I. S. Konev notes, "phony tank and artillery concentration areas
were established here, for example, phony gun positions, and movements of troops
and equipment were simulated. All these measures as an aggregate greatly promoted
the success of the operation."6
The troops of the Second Ukrainian Front commenced the attack on 24 January, Taith
- actions by reinforced forward battalions. Supported by artillery and small groups
of ground-attack aircraft, they shattered the enemy's resistance at the forward edge
of the battle area with a surprise assault, and by evening had advanced to a depth
of 6 km along a 16 km front.~
In this situation it would have been expedient decisively to exploit the offensive
success achieved by the forward battalions, by engaging the main forces of the
front's battle group. The front's command authorities, however, would not alter
the original operation plan and did not engage the main forces that day. As a result,
the enemy had time to move forces to the breakthrough sector from other sectors.
= On the morning of 25 January, following 10 minutes of preliminary bombardment, the
main forces of the 4th Guards and 53d armies were engaged. They immediately en-
countered stubborn enemy resistance. The suppressive fire had proven insufficiently
effective. Tactical air was not operating due to the bad weather.
It was necessary immediately to build up the efforts of the attacking troops. The
armies and corps, however, disposed in a eingle echelon, lacked the personnel
and weapons for this, and by 1400 hours the commanding general of the front engaged
the 5th Guards Tank Army in a sector only 6 km wide. This army, working in close
c~urdination with combined-arms large units of the 53d Army, completed penetration
of the tactical zone of defense. By evening its forward-echelon corps (20th and
29th Tank Corps) had advanced to a depth of 18 km.
On the second day the armies' advance slowed, since they were forced to repel a
number of counterattacka by units of the enemy's 14th and 3d Panzer divisions, which
had hastily been moved to the breakthrough sector. On 27 January the enemy mounted
counterthrt~sts from the south by 3 panzer divisions and from the north by 2 infantry
divisi,~ns and a panzer division, and following fierce fighting succeeded in closing
the gap which had formed in the defense. The 20th and 29th Tank. Corps were cut off
from the rest of the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army.
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'i'li~ cunwia?idiiib gen~ral ot tt?e tront, eetimating the aituation, made a bold decision:
the 20th and 29th Tank Corps would continue advancing toward Shpola and Zvenigorodka,
where they would iink up with the forces of the First Ukrainian Front; the 18th Tank
and 5th Guards Cavalry corps would respectivel~ engage in the zones of the 53d and
4th Guards armies, would crush the opposing enemy force in cooperation with them,
and would exploit on the heels of the forward-echelon tank corps o� the Sth Guards
Tank Army.
The 20th and 29th Tank Corps captured the town of Shpola in a night battle, cap-
tured Zvenigorodka at 1300 hours on 29 January, and met the forward detachment of
the 6th Tank Army, which had reached the town.
The troops of the 4th Guards Army and 53d Army, working in coordination with the
18th Tank and Sth Guards Cavalry Corps, on 28 through 30 January fought their way
through the enemy's screen in the neck of the penetration, and swept forward in the
- direction of Shpola, simultaneously establishing an inner and outer perimeter of
- envelopment, which was in place by 2 February.
The troops of the First Ukrainian Front.commenced the attack on 26 January. Fighting
was of a stubborn character along the entire penetration frontage. The troops of
the 40th Combined-Arms and 6th Tank armies encount~red particularly strong enemy
fire. By evening they had advanced only 2-5 lan. The 6th Tank Army's losses
totaled 59 tanks and self-propelled guns. Combined units of the 27th Army had suc-
ceeded in advancing 8-12 km that day.
On the second day the forces of the First Ukrainian Front, ~xploiting the success-
ful advance of the 27th Army, advanced 10 km on the right flank and 25 km on the
left flank of the breakthrough sector. The enemy's tactical defense was penetrated
along the entire front. At 1300 hours on 28 January the forward detachment of the
6th Tank Army, which had been dispatched ahead, reached Zvenigorodka, where it
linked up with the 20th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army. The enemy's Kanev
- force was in a solid ring of encirclement. The rout of the enemy's Korsun'-
Shevchenkovskiy force, completed by the evening of 17 February, greatly weakened
the center of the strategic defense in the Eti$ht-Bank Ukraine. By successful execu-
tion of the Rovno-Lutsk and Nikopol'-Krivoy Rog oper~tions, the Soviet forces had
also succeeded in putting the defense in disarray on the flanks as well. We
should note that in the Rovno-Lutsk Operation (Diagram 19) the command authorities
of the 13th Army had skillfully utilized a gap in the enemy's defense in the Sarny
area to penetrate to operational depth: two cavalry corps moved across forested-
swampy terrain through this gap and attacked the enemy force from the rear. In
this same operation the 13th Army's main forcas accomplished penetration directly
from an approach march. The difficulty of organizing coordination with this mode
of penetration and difficulty in ensuring that the attacking forces reached the
~ enemy's fQrward positions simultaneously led to a slow breakthrough. It was only a
weakening of the enemy's operational defense by the unexpected drive by the cavalry
corps deep into the enemy's rear which made it possible to complete penetration,
to capture the Lutsk-Surazh-Rovno area, and to place the forces of the ~irst
Ukrainian Front into a threatening position vis-a-vis Army Group South.
Completion of the Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy, Rovno-Lutsk, and Nikopol'-Krivoy Rog
operations ended the first stage of the enemy's defeat in the Right-Bank Ukraine.
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Heavy losses had been in~licted on the ene.my in almost 3 montha of intensive fight-
ing. The morale of the enemy troopa was low, a fact which could not help but
reflect in the stability of the defense, wh~ch proved weak in many sectors. All
- tr~is created the requisite conditions for a decisive breakthrough of the enemy's
strategic front from the Polesye to the Black Sea and complete liberation of the
Right-Bank ITkraine. The spring season of bad roads was setting in, however, which
in the opinion of the German command authorities would prPvent the conduct of large-
scale offensive.operations.
The Soviet ;.ommand autY~orities, estimating the situation, decided to utilize the
opportun~ties which had risen and, in epite of the unfavorable climatic conditions,
to execute witn the forces of the Firat, Second, and Third Ukrainian fronts the
second stage of the strategic operation to liberate the Right-Bank Ukraine.
The General Staff began planning the operation in February. "An analysis of the
- strategic situation ~..t the front," writea A. M. Vasilevskiy," the status of the
enemy's troops, and our country's steadily growing resources gave the Supreme
- High Command reasoz~ to conclude that it was both possible and advisable to continue
_ the offensive of tY,e Ukrainian fronts without any lull, in order to split the
- German-fasc~st troops with simultaneous massive attacks on a wide front from ttie
Polesye to th~ mouth of the Dnieper and, annihilating them pieceme~l, to complete
liberation of the Right-Bank Ukraine."8 In other words, this plan gave practical em-
bodiment to those ideas on which planning of the offensive in the Right-Bank Ukraine
in December 1943 were grounded (Diagram 20).
The First Ukrainian Front would mount the main attack in the direction of
Proskurov, with the troops of the 13th, 60th and lst Guards armies, the 3d Guards
and 4t1. Tank armies, reinforced by the front's entire artillery. Each combined-
arms army would penetrate the defense in a separate sector. In addition, two army
, thrusts would be executed on the left side of the front, in close coordination with
the forces of the Second Ukrainian Front.
The Second Ukrainian Front would penetrats the defense in two sectars, mounting the
main attack with the forces of the 27th, 52d, and 4th Guards Combined-Arms armies
and the 2d and Sth Guards Tank armies. Two armies, with flanks adjacent to the
sector containing the main axis of advance (40th and 53d), were assigned the mission
of establishing on these flanks forces consisting of 5 rifle divisions each and,
taking advantage of the breakttirough on the ma.in axis, to mount attacks to support
the front's battle group on r.he right and left, to enlarge the breakthrough sector
toward the flanks, close up the enemy's defense opposite the frontage of their
troops.
A subsidiary attack was to be launched 150 km from the main attack, by the adjacent
flanks of the 5th and 7th Guards armies.
= The Third Ukrainian Front was assigned the following mission: utilizing bridgeheads
- on the Ingulets River south of Krivoy Rog, launch a main attack with the forces of
the 46th and 8th Guards armies, a mounted-mechanized group and tank corps in the
_ direction of Novyy Bug. The forcea of the right side of the front the 57th and
_ 37th armies were to launch an attack with the ob,jective of pinning down the left-
- flank combined units of the German 6th Army. The 6th Army and the 5th Assault Army
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were to advance in the direction of B~ereznegovatoye and Snegirevka, with the mission
o� crushing the right-flank combined units of the German 6th Army, acting in co-
ordination with the 8th Guards Army and the mounted-mecha.nized group. The 28th Army
was assigned the mission of advancing along the right bank of Dnieper in the general
direction of Kherson and r?ikolayev.
Thus nine offensive thrusts were planned in this strategic operation, breaking
i through the defense in 14 sectors. The frontage of army breakthrough sectors
- ranged from 5 to 13 km. Breakthrough frontage was 25 km for the 60th Army, and 17 km
for the 8th Guards Army. The breakthrough sector on the main axis of advance of the
- Second Ukrainian Front was 25 km wide.
We should note that while the strength of the First and Second Ukrainian fronts was
~ adequate for a rapid breakthrough in several sectors, the Third Ukrainian Front
would have difficulty penetrating in four sectors with its reduced strength, es-
pecially mobile forces, and short ammunition aupply. It could have been reduced to
two breakthrough sectors, which would allow better massing of personnel and weapons,
and therefore more rapid penetration of the enemy's defense with fewer casualties.
Enemy forces could be immobilized on the secondary axis, with the enemy possessing
limited operationalreserves and concentrating them for the most part opposite the
First and Second Ukrainian fronts, by feigning preparations for an offensive, for
it was quite sufficient to hold these forces for only 24 hours.
In spite of a serious shortage of combined units, high troop densities and consider-
able superiority over the enemy were established on many axes by concentrating the
efforts of large battle groups in narrow sectors.
The commanding general ot the fro:it accomplished a large-scale redeployment of
troops in conditions of the spring season of muddy roads, forming large force
groupings, positioning them opposite a weak sector in the enemy's defense, and
taking up a threatening position opposite the enemy's main force in the Right-Bank
Ukraine. Combined units of the 60th and lst Guards armies and part of the forces of
the 18th Combined-Arms and 3d Guards Tank armies were shifted 80-120 km westward.
- The 4th Tank Army was moving out of the Kiev area, and would be executing a 300-
kilometer march.
According to the plan of combat employment of artillery, artillery preparation was
scheduled to run 45-56 minutes on the First and Second Ukrainian fronts, and 15-
30 minutes on the Third Ukrainian Front. Support of the assault phase was
provided by a moving barrage and sequential concentration of fire.
Airstrikes were to be delivered with the ob~ective of destroying anemy aircraft on
the ground, breaking up rail traffic on the main lines, and disrupting command,
control and coi~unications. During the period of tactical penetration and deep ex-
- ploitation, supporting air was to destroy enemy weapons and troops ahead of the
- advancing forces, to provide the troops with cover against air attack, and to sup-
port engagement of mobile combined units into the gap. One division apiece of
ground-attack aircraft and fighters were alloca~ed to the tank armies for perform-
_ ing the latter mission.
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The principal mission of the engineer troops was to keep the troops moving across
the muddy ground, especially in crossing the Goryn' and Gornyy Ti.kich rivers.
The tactical order of battle of the fronts and armies wat~ for the most part single-
ech~l.on. But the front had strong mobile groups consisting of three tank armies,
and the Third Ukrainian Front a mounted-mechanized group. The combined-arms
armies kept one or two divisions in reserve. The corps were also disposed in a
single echelon, and the divisions in two echelons. Th3.s arrangement proceeded from
the fact that there was a serious shortage of combined units, that the enemy's
defense was shallow and inadequately fortified, and was aimed at achieving a power-
ful initial thrust which, according to the concept of the front`s command authori-
ties, should ensure penetration of the enemy's entire tactical defense on the first
day.
We should particularly discuss engagement of the mobile groups. The 3d and 4th Tank
armies contained 730 tanks and self-propelled guns, while the 2d, 6th and Sth Guards
Tank armies had about 600. They were all engaged at a shallow depth: the 4th and
3d Guards Tank armies at a depth of 6-8 km, right behind the 4th Tank Corps the
60th Army's exploitation echelon and the 2d and 5th Guards Tank armies at
1-1.5 km. The lst Tank Army had been brought up to strength and was en route; it
c~uld be engaged in the course of the operation.
Building up the offensive drive by tank armies in the course of breaking througk~
the main defensive zone made it possible to execute pene~rration without a halt,
to penetrate at a rapid pace, and to bring the fighting to operational depth in
short order.
Hq SHC and the command authorities of the Ukrainian fronts made a great effort to
achieve the element of offensi.ve surprise. The most important measure taken by
Hq SHC was to designate a time for the operation to commence which the German-
fascist command authorities considered impossible for the conduct of a large-scale
- operation. "We decided to exploit this unwarranted calculation," �~arote Mar G. K.
Zhukov, "and mount a number of crushing at`acks on the enemy."9 tn the zone of the
38th Army the command authorities of the First Ukrainian Front conducted extensive
preparations for a large-scale offensive: activities included commander's reconnais-
- sance, artillery ranging, phony concentration of a tank army and a rifle corps with
support weapons and, finally, on 2 March a partial attack. Strict camouflage,
concealment and deception procedures were adopted to ensure undetected execution
of the redeployment. All this made it possible to keep the forthcoming operation
secret for quite some time. Only 3 or 4 days before the offensive began did the
enemy obtain certain information on the imminent attack by the forces of the First
Ukrainian Front from the Shepetovka area. And although the enemy decided to move
5 panzer and motorized divisions as well as a brigade to the sectur under threat,
- half of these forces had not yet reached that area when the front's forces launched
the offensive. At the same time the transfer of large forces to the right side
of the First Ukrainian Front weakened the enemy's operational defense opposite the
Second Ukrainian Front, which facilitated penetration on the Uman' axis.
Effective camouflage, concealment and deception were organized on the Second and
Third Ukrainian fronts, and troop redeployments along the front were reduced to a
minimum.
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The troops of the First Ukrainian Front were the first to begin penetration, on
4 March, in conditiona where the enemy, convinced that he would not be able to
hold firmly to the threateaed axis, undertook to withdraw his forces to depth. Ar-
tillery fire was delivered on the rear guards. Smashing their resistance, the
troops of the 60th and lst Guards armies were in control of the entire main defen-
sive zone by noon. The tank armies which were engaged conducted offensive ex-
ploitation and advanced up to 30 km by evening, while the combined-arms armies ad-
vanced up to 15 km. The enemy's defense had essentially collapsed; there was now a
possibility of reaching a line Ternopol'-Proskurov that night or the following day,
to where enemy reserves were advancing, and to defeat them in detail without a halt.
But the extremely muddy ground made it difficult even for the tank armies to move.
In addition, the tanks of the 4th Tank Army were down to their emergency fuel
reserve, since they had been only half-fueled when the penetration began.
Advancing along muddy roads and destroying the enemy in strong centers of resistance
sited in large villages, on 5-10 March the main force approached a line running
between Ternopol' and the Southern Bug, where the enemy was hastily setting up a
~ new defensive line, on which the efforts of 10 panzer divisions and 6 infantry
divisions were being concentrated. Attempts to break through this defensive line
without a halt led only to the capture of bridgeheads and deep penetration of the
enemy's defense by units of the 3d Guards Tank Army and lst Guards Army.
- In directives dated 12 March, Hq SHC assigned the First and Second Ukrainian fronts
the mission of commencing a general offensive on 20-21 March, in the course of which
they were to complete penetration of the enemy's operational defense, envelop the
main forces of his lst Panzer Army, and carry combat operations beyond the Dnestr.
Although the First Ukrainian Front had a week before launching the general offen-
sive, the actual time which the arn~ies could have for preparing for the offensive,
in view of repelling enemy counterthrusts and strong counterattacks, did not ex~eed
3-5 days. This amount of time is very short in conditions of execution of com-
plicated troop redeployments.
Organization and penetration of the enemy's operational defensive line were most in-
structive in the lst Guards Army. This army contained 6 corps. Four corps were to
be redeployed from the army's left to its right flank, a distance of 65 and 80 km,
in order to attack a we�k point west of Proskurov. Together with the corps of the
3d Guards Tank tlrmy, they~ comprised a battle group, which was to penetrate the
- defense in a 14-km sector (Diagram ?1).
The tank corps took up an attack position directly behind the rifle corps, so that
they could engage when the strongpoints in the first position were breached, over-
take the infantry at a depth of S-6 km, and advance swiftly to operational depth.
A mechanized corps and rifle corps the armies' support eche3ors were to en-
gage on the second day with an exploitation mission.
~ The tr.oops of the lst Guards Army launched the attack at 1220 hours on 21 March,
following 40 minutes of artillery preparation. Although the exhausted and neutral-
ized enemy attempted to offer stubborn resistance, by 1500 hou;s the first posi-
tion was completely overrun. The small Ploska River, flooded 'by the spring thaw,
' delayed the troops' advance. But by 1700 hours the enemy's entire operational
defensive line was penetrated.
k
8 tr
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On the following day the troops of both armies advanced 15-20 km and commenced
pursuit.
Penetration was equally successful in the zone of the 60th Army, where the lst and
4th Tank armies were engaged to exploit the breakthrough. Their advance to opera-
tional depth and their swift actions, especially those of the fresh lst Tank Army,
led to total disruption of the enemy's plans, an effort to withdraw his forces
beyond the Dnestr. Army Group South was cut off, whereby its 4th Panzer Army was
pushed westward and its lst Panzer Army eastward, where it soon found itself in a
state of operational envelopment.
The battle group of the Second Ukrainian Front launched an attack on 5 March. Air-
craft were grounded by dense fog. Our attack took the enemy by surprise. The in-
fantry and forward detachments of the tank armies, with artillery support, quickly
smashed enemy resistance in the first defensive position. An important role in the
breakthrough was played by close support gune, of which the armies had from 20 to 30
per km of frontage.
Following penetration of the first defensive position, the main forces of the 2d
and 5th Guards Tank a~ were engaged at a depth of up to 1.5 km from the enemy's
forward position. By evening the 2d Tank Army had reached the Gornyy Tikich River,
having advanced 14-16 km. In order to exploit thie advanc~:, the commanding
general of the 27th Army engaged the 78th Rifle Divieion f~~om his reserve. This
enabled the troops of the 27th Army as well to reach the Gornyy Tikich River by that
night.
- Combat engineer units, assisted by the combat troovs, had set up crossings by
morning. Combined units of the 2d Tank Army crosse3 the river and proceeded to ad-
vance toward Uman', moving into the zone of the 52d Army. Soviet tanks appearing
to the enemy's rear forced him to begin a hasty withdrawal in the zone of the 52d
Army as wel~.
In order to exploit the advance of the 27th Army, the 6th Tank Army was engaged in
its zone by orders of the commanding general of the front.
A somewhat less successful penetration was achieved in the zone of the 4th Guards
Army, where the Sth Guarde Tank Army was engaged.
In order to intensify the offensive drive, in the evening of 5 March and on the.
morning of 6 March the commander of the 4th Army sequentially engaged the 41st and
62d Guards Rifle divisions. This made it pos~ible ~o complete on 6 March, through
combined efforts with the Sth Guards Tank Army, breakthrough of the enemy's tactical
zone of defense, to reach the Gornyy Tikich River, and to place forward units
across the river on 7 March.
On 8 March, when the enemy's operational defense was shattered, the 5th and 7th
Guards armies launched an attack. They successfully penetrated the defezse and
began offensive exploitation in the direction of Pervomaysk.
85
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The weather improved on the morning of 9 March, which enabled the 5th Air Army to
fly a number of airstrikes on the enemy's forces and to assist the ground troops in
- their successful advance.
- The enemy was forced to hasten the withdrawal. Soviet forces initiated pursuit~
The troops advanced to a depth of approximately 70 km in 6 days, in conditions of
muddy ground caused by the spring thaw. With the crossing of the Southern Bug, the
way was opened up to the Soviet-Romanian border.
Penetration was somewhat more difficult on the Third Ukrainian Front. Low artillery
densities, with very brief artillery preparation, made it impossible reliably to
neutralize the enemy's defense; during the course of the day the enemy was offering
stubborn resistance, especially in the villages. The Soviet advance began to slow
_ by the evening of the first day. A mounted - mechanized group was engaged at 2130
hours at 6 March, in bad weather. Its attack took the ~nemy by suprise and
predetermined penetration of the defense to full operational depth. On the
morning of 8 March the mobile group captured the town of Novyy Bug. The front of
the German 6th Army was split open.
The mighty drive southward and southwestward by the First and Second Ukrainian
fronts, and development of the Bereznegovatoye-Snigirevka Operation of the Third
Ukrainian Front into the Odessa Operation led to the forming of a strategic gap in
the enemy's defense in the Southwestern Sector. Development of strategic pursuit
here made it possible to liberate most of the Central and Western Ukraine, to ad-
vance to the Prut, and to reestablish part of the Soviet border.
* * *
The winter campaign of 1944 enriched Soviet art of warfare with experience in
penetrating the enemy's defense in conditions of development of one campaign into
another without a pause. A shortage of force.s and a certain underestimate of the
firmness of the enemy's defense in the Right-Bank Ukraine at the beginning of the
campaign prevented Soviet forces from breaking through the defense with cleaving
attacks along a wide front. Mounting a number of sequential operations along the
front, the Ukrainian fronts shattered the enemy's operational defense and sub-
sequently crushed the strategic front with deep, splitting attacks mounted in the
difficult conditions of the spr~ng thaw.
In the Right-Bank Ukraine more than 70 en~my divisions were routed, and the enemy's
defense was penetrated in a zone 650 km wide and to a depth of 450-500 km. In
order to restore the strategic defensive front along the Carpathian foothills and
the lower r~::ches of the Dnestr River, the German-fascist command authorities were
forced to transfer 40 divisions and 2 brigades from Germany, Western Europe, Romania,
and Hungary.l0
The operations to liberate the Right-Bank Ukraine were characterized by employment
of diversified forms of operational penetration:
mounting a number of attacks with the aim of deeply splitting the defense
and the enemy's force groupings (Zhitomir-Berdichev, Proskurov-Chernovtsy, and Uman'-
Botosani operations);
86
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penetration in two sectors with exploitation along converging axes, with
the objective of enveloping and annihilating enemy forces (Kirovograd, Korsun'-
Shevchenkovskiy, Nikopol'-Krivoy Rog operations);
penetration by cavalry corps, exploiting a gap in the enemy's defense, and .
a f rontal attack by combined-ax~s large units (Rovno-Lutsk Operation);
penetration in a number ~f sectors along a wide front, with the objective
of breaking up the enemy's defense into separate parts, subsequently linking the
br eakthroughs into a single large penetration (Bereznegovatoye-Snigirevka and
Odessa operations).
Such a great diversity of forms of operational penetration attests to the innova-
tive approach of the Soviet command authorities in selecting forms of penetration
taking into account aesigned missions, grouping of forces and character of the
enemy's defense, as well as the atate and grouping of friendly forces.
Proceeding from the fact that as a rule the enemy's defense was shallow, was in-
adequately fortified, and was constructed for the most part as a system of centers
o~ resistance and strongpoints, in the ma~ority of front operations penetration
- was accomplished in 3-4 or;more sectors. Of the nine operations, for
example, the fronts penetrated as follows: in 2 sectors three operations; 3-
4 o r more sectors in six operations. The breakthrough sectors of the fronts on
the main axis of advance ranged from 18 to 28 k.m, and usually the efforts of 2-3
combined-arms armies would be concentrated in these sectozs. The width :;f army
breakthrough sectors ranged 3.5-13 km, and as muc h as 17-25 km only in certain
instances, when breaking through a weakened defenae.
The tactical order of battle of the fronts, armies, and the majority of combined
� units and units involved a~ingle echelon, aince what was primarily needed to
break through a shallow enemy defense was a strong initial drive. Such a tactical
order of battle was also determined by the fact that all fronts in the Right-Bank
U kraine contained large tank combined units and formations. During an offensive
in conditions of the muddy ground of the apring thaw, the absence of or a limited
number ot close-support tanks and diminished combat capabiliti~a~ of rifle com-
b ined units, on each ~ccasion they took part in completing penetration of the
enemy's defense and subsequently were the lead force during pursuit.
In view of the fact that the tank troops were greatly under strength, front com-
mand authorities sought to concentrate on the main axis of advance the efforts of
several tank arinies, tank and mechanized corps, which made it possible to employ
th em in a m _ � 49/~
_ ~ HanpaeneNMa ypapoe no aaMdcny . 78na
onepauNN / 2~
~
flono~eHwe cTOpoN H NOauY Nqllp 1942r. �
- ~'~Ilono~eN~e cropow H4~oNUY aerycra
~Z~ 1942r.
Diagram 6. Concept of the Rzhev-Sycheuka Operation (August 1942)
Key:
1. Legend 4. Position of opposing sides at
2. Axes of advance according to end of August 1942
aperation concept 5. Kalinin Front
3. Position of opposing sides at 6. Western Front
end of July 1942 7. Volga
182
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Diagram 7. Composition of Battle Groups, Width of Breakthrough Sectors and Their
Spacing in the Counteroffensive as at Stalingrad
Key:
1. Southwestern Front 3. Stalingrad Front
2. Don Front 4. Stalingrad
183
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Diagram 8. Combat Actions of Combined Units of.. the 5th Tank Army During
Penetration (November 1942)
Key:
i. Legend 2. Position of troops
3. By evening on
184
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iuaNC~wN onepapNN sA
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ISdCTOpHI`HCIIOM onepayNN (4
Diagram 9. Forms of ~perational Breakthrough in the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh and
Voronezh-Kastornoye Operations and Composition of Battle Groups
Key:
1. Legend 5. Bryansk Front
2. Position of troops on 6. Voronezh Front
3. Axes of advance in Ostrogozhsk- 7. Southwestern Front
Rossosh Operation 8. Voronezh
4. Axes of advance in Voronezh-
Kastornoye Qperation
185
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- 39
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Diagram 10. Concept of Operation "Mars" (1942)
Key;
1. Kalinin Front 2. Western Front
3. Smolensk
186
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V
Diagram 11. Forms of Operational Breakthroughs in the Cour.teroffensive at Kursk
and Composition of Battle Groups
_ Key:
1. Legend 6. Axis of advance of 10. Steppe Front
2. Po~ition of opposing sides at 60th Army when 11. Voronezh Front
beginning of counteroffensive launching g::neral 12. Southwestern Front
3. Soviet battle groups offensive 13. Army Group Center
4. Points of engagement of tank 7. Western Front 14. Bryansk
armies 8. Bryansk Front 15. Army Group South
5. Position of fronts at end of 9. Central Front 16. Khar'kov
counteroffQnsive
187
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Diagram 12. Penetration of Enemy Defense by the 8th Guards Rifle Corps (July 1943)
Key:
- 1. Legend 2. Position of troops on morning
3. By evening
188
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lliagram 13. Actions of Tank Armies When Exploiting Penetration in the Belgorod-
Khar'kov Operation (August 1943)
Key:
1. Legend 2. Position of troops on morning
3. Position of troops by evening
.89
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Diagram 14. Penetration of Enemy Defense by Troops of the 60th Army (August 1943)
Key:
1. Redeployment of
190
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Diagram 15. Penetration of Enemy Defense in Kiev Operation (November 1943)
Key :
1. Kiev 2. Dnieper
191
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Diagram 16. Splitting Attacks on a Wide Front in the Zhitomir-Berdichev Operation
Key: '
1. Axes of advance of troops 3. First Ukrainian Front
of the First Ukrainian 4. Kirovograd
Front
2. Counterthrusts by German-
fasc~st forces
192
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Diagram 17. Penetration of Enemy Defense in Kirovograd Operation (January 1944)
Key:
1. Second Ukrainian Front 2. Kirovograd
193
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Diagram 18. Penetration of Enemy Defense in Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy Operation
(January 1944)
Key:
1. Counterthrusts by enemy 3. Second Ukrainian Front
forces 4. Kirovograd
2. First Ukrainian Front
194
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Diagram 19. Offensive by Forces of Right Side of Firat Ukrainian Front in the
Rovno-Lutsk Operation (January 1944)
Key:
1. Belorussian Front 2. Independent units
~ 195
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Diagram 20. Penetration of Enemy Front in the Spring of 1944
Key :
1. Second BeZorussian Front 7. Kishinev
2. First Ukrainian Front 8. Chernovtsy
3. Kiev 9. Army Group South
4. Second Ukrainian Front 10. Army Group Northern Ukraine
5. Third Ukrainian Front 11. Army Group A
6. Army Group Southern Ukraine
196 ~
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- 'Diagram 21. Formation of Battle Group of lst Guards Army for Penetration of
Defensive Line During Operation (Mar,,.h 1944)
i' Key :
' 1. Proskurov
~
1'
- 197
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Diagram 22. Penetration of Enemy Defense in the Belorussian Operation (June 1944)
Key:
- 1. Army Group North 6. Army Group Center
2. First Baltic Front 7. Minsk
3. Third Belorussian Front 8. Lublin
- 4. Second Belorussian Front 9. Penetration of enemy defense
5. First Belorussian Front on left side of First
Belorussian Front
198
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Diagram 23. Penetration of Enemy Defemae by the 18th Rifle Corps of the .i5th Army
in the Bobruysk Operation (June 1944)
Key:
1. Position of troops at beginning
- of operation
199
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4
Diagram 24. Breakthrough Plan of ~ommanding General of the First Ukr.ainian Front
in the L'vov-Sandomierz aperation (July 1944)
Key:
1. Position of troops at beginning of 5. First ~elorussian Front
operation F. First Uk~-ainian Front~.
2. Objective of combined-arms armies 7. Army Group Northern Ukraine
for second day of operation 8. L'vov
3. Objective of �ront's troops for
fifth day of operation
4. Point of engagement of tank armies
200
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Diagram 25. Concept of Hq SHC and Progress of Penetration in Iasi-Kishinev
Operation (August 1944)
Key:
1. Position of troops at beginning 5. Kishinev
of operation 6. Army Group Southern Ukraine
2. Second Ukrainian Front 7. Bucharest
3. Third Ukrainian Front
4. General Bakhtin's group
201
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~ Diagram 26. Penetration of Defense and Engagement of Tank Armies in L'vov-
Sandomierz Operation
- Key:
1. First Belorussian Front 2. First Ukrainian Front
3. Corps Group C(up to 8 divisions)
202
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Diagram 27. Concept of Hq SHC for Penetration of Enemy Strategic Front on Berlin
Axis (January 1945)
Key:
1. Baltic Sea 7. Army Group Center
_ 2. Third Belorussian Front 8. Warsaw
3. Second Beloruasian Front 9. Army Group A
4. First Belorussian Front 10. Berlin
5. First Ukrainian Front 11. Dresden
6. Fourth Ukrainian Front 12. Prague
203 .
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