JPRS ID: 10415 WEST EUROPE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040061-5
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 61
• Content Type: REPORTS

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- JPRS L/ 10415
- 26 March 1982
W1/est E u~o e R e o rt
p p
(r=0U0 19/82)
.
Fg~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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JPRS L/10415
26 March 1982 -
WEST EUROPE REPORT
- (~OUO 19/82~
CONTENTS
ENERGY ECONOMICS
BELGIUM
Problems of Natural Gas Supply Viewed ,
(Pierre ~honon; POUR.QUOI PAS?, 11 Feb 82) 1
- ECONOMIC
ITALY
Labor-Law Expert Discusses Union-Management Relations ~
(Gino Giugni Interview; IL MONDO, 5 Feb 82)
S~AIN
1?82 Ec onomic Improvement Expected g
(C~,MBIO 16, 25 Jan 82)
POLITICAL
FR,AN CE
'Blind' Europe Sees USSR Peaceful Intentions,SWFeb 82~Negotiate��� 1~
(Cornelius Castoriadis; P.AR.IS MATCH,
Policies~ Backgrounds of Mitterrand Advisers Examined 17
(S~y Cohen; POWOIRS, No 20, 1982)
_ a _ (III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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Reasons for Improved PGF-Chinese Relations, Other Policies
(K. S. Kaxol; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 13-19 Feb 82) 29
ITALY
Colombo Urges More Contacts Among NATO Allies
(Emilio Colombo Interview; CORRIERE DEI~LA SERA, 3 Max 82) 32
1 .
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ENERGY ECANOM:ICS BELGIUM
PROBLEMS OF NATURAL GAS SUPPLY VIEWED
- Brussels POURQUOI PAS? in French 11 Feb 82 pp 14-15
LArticle by Pierre Thonon/
1Text/ Our energy independence is not for tomorrow. If all
goes a~. well a~ hoped by tne IDGS ~nstitute for Development
of Underground Ga~ificatiu~, a sort of public reseaxch bu-
reau financed 4Q percent t>y EEC and 60 percent by the Belgian
and German governments, practical exploitation of gas extrac-
ted from our deep coal deposits will not be possible oefore
19go.
And even so, not at Thulin. Rather in the Campine, and possibly in the Black
Country. But surely no~ in the Liege basin, ar.d only in slight amounts from
the Borinage. The problem is purely technical. As of now, the only indus-
trial user of coal gas is the USSR. The technique is perf ected for deposits
at ground level or barely below it. Our deposits are too deep; their gasifi-
cation requires a very sophisticated technology whose cost is justified only
for enormous and contir.uous veins.
Mereover, it will never be anything but a poor gas, weak in heating power: in
the 2,50C to 3,000 Kcal/m3 rar.ge, which could possibly be raised to 12,500 by
special and necessarily more costly treatment.
The Birth of Ein.stein
Then why all the great beat of tomtoms orchestrated la~t week to mark the "take-
off" of underground gasification at the '~'~~ulin ex~,erimental site? Mere hot
air?
One tYiing is certain: the doubting Thomases who came to the site saw nothing.
They were a~ked to believe that something was going on about 900 m down. At
the end of a drill pipe, an electrical firing coupled with an injection of
compressed air so as to bore a channel allowing the gas subsequently extracted
fz~om the coal to reach the outlet--in this case another drill pipe. It is not
certain, however, that it will then follow instructions. If everything hap-
- pens according to the calculations of the Belgian and German engineers, that
pasz~xge will exist a good month from now. But not before May will gas final-
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~_y reach the :~urface, to be lighted with a match and finally seen burning--as
oil is seen bursting from the ground and fai.ling on the engineers in the final
- scene of films on the epic of black gold. ~
~~Newspapers of the time were not in a position to announce the birth of Einstein
or Mozart," said the secretary of state for energy to his guests at the prema-
ture "inauguration." "Toda.y we are perhaps witnessing the birth of a new na-
tural resource for our country...."
It is true that if it "produces" it would indeed last several dozen years, if
not one or two centuries: deep coal reserves in the Belgian subsoil exist in a
proportion of about 10C to 1 compared to reserves exploitable by traditional
methods, which have made the prosperity of industrial '~Jallonia for more than a
century.
Meanwhile, we must still keep our feet 900 m above the level of the deep veins.
Al1 the mor�e so--and let us keep this well in mind--since coal gas u~ill proba-
bly never be suitable for all-round use, but will only have limited applica-
tions such as, for example, supplying certain electric power stations of modest
demand.
Dependence on Others, a~ for Petroleum
So for general use of ga~ in our energy supply, we car. count only on natural
- gas, and this is certainly also true for the next gerleration. Looking ahead {:o
the exhaustion of the Dutch resert~es which have supplied us for several decades,
we shall ther,. lagse into a dependence of the petroleu~ri type vis-a-vis the sup-
pliers, Algeria and the IISSR, neither of them being particularly reassurin~ or
dependable because of their distance on the one hand, and their political re-
gimes on the other. Other foreseeable suppliers are Canada, Cameroon, Nigeria,
Tr~inidad, an3 Qatar.
A't the mor~ent, only one contract is concluded, with Algeria.
~ A contract for which we perhaps bid too high in vain. When we concluded and
~~onfirmed it, by authority of M Claes ~vice premie~, we wished to show such
good will that we not only offered a higher price than any other natural gas
buyer in the wor?d, but then enhanced it by pegging it to oil prices. Today
- socialist France ha~ just struck the same sort of bargain, for a greater fig-
ure, matched in addition by a"political premium" which is added to the price
of the gas proper. Such blandishment instantly won for the former colanial
oppr�essor preferential treatm~nt as a newfound elder brother, especially in
view of the advantageous.economic quid pro quos of the contract itself, such
ac, contz~ibutioris to Al~er. ian industrialization.
_ Already hampered by delays encountered in starting the program (on both sides:
'Leebrugge with us, and the liquefaction plants in Algeria), our handsome and
costly contract reverts on that ground to second rank among Algerian priorities,
which already amply demonstrates the precariousness of this sort of energy de-
pendence.
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- But the essential does not appear to be again at issue: an annual supply of
2.5 billion m3, corresponding to a quarter of our 10 ~illion m3 yearly con-
sumption.
Finally, the Methania Sails
In principle, the first ~elivery should even reach us this fall via the oil
port of Saint Nazaire. The Methania, that celebrated supertanker specially
built to bring us Algerian ga~, will thus be able to leave the Norwegian fjord
' in which it has :.een languishing at the modest cost of Fr 500 million a year
for inactive maintenance, after having cost Fr 5 billion to build.
With regard to the other large future supplier, the USSR, we are preparin.g to
Follow cautiously the path laid down successively by the GErmany of M Scr~midt
and ttie France of M Mitterand: by negotiating a long-term contract for an an-
nual supply of 3 billion m3, or approximately 30 percent of our needs (which,
ati. is the case for our neighbors, comes to only 5 percent of our primary ener-
~y needs. As M Knoops confirmed in response i;o a parliamentary question a feo~
days ago, events in Poland have not called into questic,n again, with us either,
"the principle of contacts with the Soviet Union."
They will serve, on the other hand, to justify additional investments f or stor-
age, which is at present limited to one facility under aquatic dome at Loenhout
(Wuestwezel) and two facilities in old mines at Anderlues and Ressaix--whieh
only goes to show we always come back to coal.
For in the face of the truly alarming precariousness of our~~supply lines, a
government at such a loss as ours in fact YLas n~thing better to do than what
a mother cf a family has done at every alert since the Kerean war. Henceforth
M Knoops will not rest until we have ttiie same permanent "strategic" stocks of
� gas a,~ we have of oil--to ho~d out th.ree months. Thanks, papa.
COPYRIGHT:1982 Pourquoi Pas?
~
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cso : 3~ oc~/372
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EC6NOMIC ITALY
i
LABOR-LAW EXPERT DISCUSSES UNION-MANAGII~NT RELATIONS
Milan IL MONDO in Italian 5 Feb 82 pp 11-13
[Interview with Gino Giugni, socialist, professor of labor law, author of work-
er's statute, by Vittorio Borelli: "Watch Out, the Boss is Firing." Date and
place of interview not given.]
[Text] The industrial relations' model which characterized the 1970's suffered
a crisis in the fall of 1980 due to the FIAT controversy. In 1981, in fact,
the hard line policy of Cesare Rom~ti and the Agnelli brothers quickly encom-
passed the whole Italian industrial structure and is now beginning to affect
even the superguaranteed public employment. Perhaps the most emblematic sign
that the rigid system of guarantees built by the unions after the hot autumn of
1969 is crumbling, lies in the relative ease wit,h which firms can now lay off
n~nessenti2l workers.
What does all this mean? That we are shifting from the all-powerful trade un-
ion to the all-powerful management? That the much talked about statute of
workers' rights soon will be substituted by a statute of businessmen's rigtits?
What model wi11 eventually characterize the industrial relations of the 1980's?
IL MONDO discussed this ussue with Gino Giugni, famous scholar, tenured profes-
sor of labor law at the university of Rome, socialist author--together with
Giacomo Brodolini--of the workers' statute. .
Question: Recently Felice Mortillaro, Federmeccanica's director general, im-
plicitly discounted the workers' st~tute affirming that firms can lay off
workers today because the general balance of power shifted in their favor.
What do you think of that?
Answer: Mortillaro is not completely wrong. The statute, on the other~hand,
never prevented collective lay offs, since it was conceived to prevent abuses
against individual workers. It is also true that the unions were the first to
interpret the law in far-reaching fashion, thus contributing to the creation
of that job security culture which is exactly the opposite of a modern indus-
trial culture, but this has little in common with the spirit and letter of the
statute. Only farsighted union leaders like Bruno Trentin realized since
_ 1974-75 that, in the long run, the job security culture would have harmed those
same workers. Be it as it may...today things are pain'~ully changing, even
theugh cases like that of the 150 transfers blocked at Italsider in Genoa show
that there is still a long way to go.
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- Question: Therefore, are lay offs in order when necessary and justified?
Answer: Let me make it clear; it is only just that society tend to guarantee
the continuity of work for all. The error lies in the belief that the continu-
= ity must apply to a specific position held.
Question: How do you assess the uni~n's initiatives in the areas of job place-
~ ment, professional training and mobility?
Answer: Let us recognize that the unions never had a policy in these areas.
The reason is linked to their structure; In Italy unions exist within the fac-
tories, not in the market place. Therefore, they limit themselves to protec-
� ting what they have also when they get involved in the market place. A case in
point is the law on mobility which is being discussed in Parliament for 3 years.
Well, even amid many incongruities, there was an attempt to give more room to _
nominative calls in former bill 760, which never became law, introduced by the
then minister Vincenzo Scotti, but the unions opposed it. On what basis nobody
- knows, since surveys made by the unions show that over 90 percent of hiring
takes place outside of placement channels. And the funny thing is that diffi-
dence toward the placement system created in 1949 concerns employers as well as
~ workers.
Question: Your party, PSI, [Italian Socialist Party] recently introduced a new
- proposal for a labor agency. Is it a proposal complementing the old 760 or is .
it something entirely different?
Answer: Entirely differettt. There are two positions within PSI on this point.
The first says: Let us pass [bill] 760 as an experiment and let us switch to
the [labor] agency at a later stage. The second, which I share, says instead:
- bill 760 is a mess, if we pass it we will never manage to introduce the labor
agencies which take in account a much more advanced system of controlling mobil-
ity. It must be said, however, that on these topics among all parties and the
unions as well some confusion reigns. Amid the chaos of opinions I fear that
the line of compromise at the lowest level will prevail, namely that of experi-
menting with [bill] 760.
Question: With regard to laws and magistrates: in the 1970's the judiciary
intervened several tiines in labor disputes. However, you criticized rather
vigorously the so-called hardline judges...
Answer: First of all it is only fair to recognize that had there not been
judges capable of discerning the elements of innovation and progress in the
workers statute, the social conflict would have been even greater. Therefore,
I do not criticize the judiciary system in itself. I criticize, instead, the
sma11 group of magistrates who, through the statute, pursued political objec-
tives. Some sentences have been used as ideologi.cal-political weapons to de-
stroy the capitalistic system. Some judges, in final analysis, wrongly be-
lieved that there could be a judicial way to socialism.
And it must also be added that, with regard to this problem, management's be-
havior was self-destructive and childish; instead of reacting, it hid behind
- the most absurd sentences complaining that factories had become unmanageable.
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Question: -Getting back to the unions. Don't you believe that the joh ~ecurity
culture is also fruit of an antiquated analysis of class compos.ition? In otli~r
words, is not the workers' doctrine also the expression of the culture of mass-
. workers, of~those of the large factories of the 1960's?
Answer: To avoid being prisoners of the most simplistic sociology, we must
recognize that ongoing changes were already vi.sible 10 years ago. Unions, not
only the Italian anes, understood with great delay that the old working class
was d;sintegrating. Also in the United States unions have for some years been
paying a very steep price for having walled themselves inside the factories.
The workers' doctrine, in a situation whereby the working class is numerically
a minority and politically burdened with different interests, comes out sterile
and a loser. Let's be careful, however; if on one hand it is right to give up
the old concept of workers' centralization; on the other ttre role of factory
workers in a political strategy of renewal cannot be underestimated. It would
be extremely foolish to counterpoise trade unions of a tertiary nature to work-
ers' trade unions. In number, unity and tradition factory workers are an essen-
tial element for an innovative alignment.
Question: Several surveys showed tnat also the workers' culture is changing.
Today the number of workers being a subjective antagonism toward their plant is
getting smaller...
Answer: With a concise and perhaps pessimistic expression one could say that
today the taajority of workers are somewhat absentee-proned and samehwat indif-
ferent. But ~this is also fruit of the many defeats endured by unions and of
the strategic weakness of left wing parties.
Question: As far as the new class composition is concerned, what do yau think
of the intermediate rank movement?
Answer: The ranks have been a relaity for years and it was about time that
everybady became aware of the:n. With this premise, I say, frankly, that their
movement is still characterized by great improvisation and great confusion. An
example is the request to modify article 2095 of the civil code. Th~ ranks
legal recognition will be (since all except PCI [Italian Communist Party] are
now in agreement) a purely formal act which wi11 not alter at all their situa-
tion.
Question: I agree, but what are the confederate unions offering as an alterna-
tive?
Answer: Historically confederate unions have associated ranks with symbols
(labor centralization, class unity, etc.) in order to cheat them on salary with
the line on equalitarianism. The ranks' diffidence is understandable.
Question: The idea of union unity appears worn out and, perhaps, forever com-
promised. In the meantime autonomous unions have gone to pieces as well as the
- ranks movement itself. Don't you believe that in this picture of disarray,
CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor], ICFTU [Internationa~ Confedera-
tion of Free Trade Unions.J, and UIL [Italian Union of Labor] could each come
back, as in the ~950's and until 1968-69, for a fair share of the movement?
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Answer: Unfortunately this could really happen...UIL as the union for. public
. employment, CGIL as the union for workers and ICFTU as a little bit of both.
Personall~ I think that union unity could be reaffi,rmed by adhering ta an inter-
classist political proposal, like in France and in Greece. On this, perhaps,
Bettino Craxi is unconsciously right: in his policies there are no c~asses.
In the final analysis the examples of Francois Mitterand and Andrea Papandreu
~ show that left wing parties can go to the government even without entering into
an iron pact with the unions. Only the Gerrian Social Democrats are still tied
- to a pact with the unions, but it is not said that they could not do without it.
Question: You are very critical of unions. How about business leaders? How
do you assess the hardline policy which is emerging within the General Confed-
eration of Italian Industry?
Answer: I don't think that a true hardline policy is involved. And much less
I believe, as often said, that Agnelli are the leaders of this forward wing.
The more knowledgeable managers are well aware that a modern economy does not
live in permanent conflict with the unions. I rather think that industrialists
_ are trying to obtain all they can out of the crisis of their natural inquisi-
tors. It is obvious that in a moment like this avenging temptations may also
emerge.
Question: From more parts it is being affirmed that the crisis of large indus-
tries has also caused the crisis of the reformative culture outlined over 10
years ago in the famous Pirelli document...
Answer: That large industries are in crisis, is a fact, that it is an irrever-
sible crisis, I am inclined to deny it. On the other hand, I believe that it
is from FIAT itself that the signals of a political counteroffensive have been
launched. In the final analysis, I do not believe that one could do without
the contribution, not only financial, of large industries. Who, if not large
industries, has the means to cor~pete at the international level in the ever
more decisive areas~of research and new technologies?
Question: Within EEC [Europeati Economic Cot~ununity] the participation of work-
ers in the management of firms is being discussed at length. Do you think that
in Italy as well we could switch fr~m a grievance and struggle-oriented union
_ to one with a greater degree of participation?
Answer: I wouldn't know; it will depend on many things. What I know for sure
is that the union is being confronted with a decisive chaice; either it moves
along the path of participating in the decisions that are taken daily at the
center and at the periphery (which does not mean giving up autonomy and struggle)
or it will remain in the area of grievance redressing. In this latter case I
believe that its wekaness will continue. We shall see with the forthcoming con-
tract renewals..with a strategic retreat, perhaps unions may recover.
COrYRIGHT: IL MONDO 1982
9758
CSO: 3104/128
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ECONOMIC SPAIN
I 1982 ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT EXPECTED
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 25 Jan 82 pp 40-45
- ~Text~ Spain and the Western economies have entered 1982, the ninth ~ear of the
crisis, with an outlook that is moderately optimistic. All indications are that
the worst is over. That we are coming aut of the tunnel. And that we must face
the future with a changed attitude: It is no longer a question of survival, of
standing firm against the lashings of the crisis, but rather of starting to move,
. to function again. But with new rules, with new aims, with new instrumentalities.
_ The nev~ economy is in the course of being born.
_ This optimism begins beyond the Pyrenees. All the world's industrialized nations,
from Europe to the United States, including Japan and Canada, expect the economic
crisis to subside definitively in 1982. Initially, the improvement had been ex-
pected to make its appearance during the first menths of this year; but the U. S.
economy has not recovered as mucn as had been anticipated, so that the improvement
cannot be expected to get off the ground now until near the end of the year. But
one thing seems clear: This crisis, which has battered these countries since
1974, is dead. And arising from its ashes is a new approach to enterprise, to
competition, to capital formation, to work and to development.
This current of optimism, while not yet one to set the bells ringing, has reached
Spain.
According to the OECD, which brings together the 24 most developed Western coun-
_ tries, the Spanish economy will improve during 1982, and the year-end should show
better results as regards its overall growth, prices and unemployment. The OECD's
forecasts indicate a growth of 2.5 percent, a much higher one than tha average
growth they project for the OECD counties as a whole (1.25 percent), the highest
of all the countriES except Japan, and equal to that of France. These forecasts
indicate a 12-percent rise in prices, a foreign trade (current account) deficit
of $4.5 billion, and a slower unemployment growth rate than in prior years.
The OECD finds that there was a recovery of economic activity during the second
half of 1981, based on a continual rise in investment and a resurgence of exports
that extends to tourism as well, all signs pointing to a consolidation of this
recovery in 1982, which in turn will produce a slight drop in overall unemploy-
ment concurrent with the virtual doubling of the country'~ economic. growth over
that ot- 1981.
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Another body, the IMF, has developed a slightly more negative projection fror~ the
results of the checkup on the Spanish economy it has just completed, although it
underscores "th~ substantial achievements attained by 5pain in recent years in
adapting to the new circumstances arising from the crisis, its economy having '
tra.~sformed itself into a more flexible one."
A month ago, Juan Antonio Garcia Diez stated in the ~ongress: "Our objective is
a 3-percent growth in 1982. This rate can be attained and, clearly, it is much
less than the Spanish economy would need to ensure its health." Bearing out this
view, the economy was already on its way to a 3-percent growth by the start of
the new year.
To achieve this level, Garcia Diez is relying on a budgetary policy (public
- investment), monetary controls on inflation and maintenance of credit levels to
the private sector, energy and industrial restructuralization policies, an inter-
national economic rowth, and above all on compliance with the ANE ~National Em-
ployment Agreement~.
In the view of our government economists, 1982 trend will take an unmistakable
' turn in the direction necessary toward a solution of the economic and social
problems that ase plaguing the Spanish economy, although we will stil). be a long
way from a definitive solution. All signs seem to indicate that 1982 will be
the year of cast-off from the crisis. In 1980 and 1981, the Spanish ecanomy
undertook a number of very important energy, wage and salary, industrial and
staff organizational adjustments and a public investment effort, that wi.th the
help of a favorable international situation are beginning to bear fruit?" said
Anselmo Calleja, director general of economic policy, to CAMBIO 16.
There can be no doubt that we are actually on the road to improvement, when
Carlos Ferrer, president of the CEOE CSpanish Confederation of Business Organi-
zations~ and a man who has for the last 5 years been making pessimistic statements
(some of them very hard-hitting), has just indicated that this year "The economic
situation will improve. Unemployment will continue rising, although, we expect,
less than in 1981. Inflation will be lower and production will increase slightly.
As a result of all of this, private investment will grow."
- Revival Already Under Way
This is good news, if we consider that private investment has registered negative
growth rates over the past few years. Abounding in this optimism, Jose Luis
Ceron, chairman of the ~conomic Commttee of the CEOE, holds forth his expectations
for this new year: "There are already trends that have not as yet surfaced and
that, if not disrupted, point to a certain revival: A revival in the buying of
investment securities, the effects of public investment the impact of which did
not begin to be felt until near the end of 1981, positive trends in the export
sector, the ANE and even the World Soccer Championship Games."
- As seen by Jose Luis Leal, former minister of economy, the future looks promising,
but not to the extent of warranting joyful proclamations. "I do not think our
economy will grow more than two percentage points in 1982, which means that the
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.
: ~ = -
ti
~ 1 ~ - ' ,
~ ' ~ , ' 1 � V'~;~ 3..~`F~
m.
;~"i.' '�'ri.' `~Y
~ ~2~ Pisl . . � � l4)
~ roduco~n ( ( 3) Evolucibn n� de Parados Op
p,~rnento P~rcentual P (M Ec3nomia) O~ . ~CP Op~ p4~
O ,LO� ,LO ~~04'
1,4 ~.5 1,3 o~CDEI
1,1
(CEOE)
79 80 81 82 79 80 81 82
/ ` . ~ � (6)
� ` 5/ recios (1PC) , r tu m~nt~. net
~~'mdlo~ d� ~y oun~ma! rrv~c
o5
porcentaje aumento de p
+~�~Z~J .monrtecmnes
y lrartlnnnoaa
14 - -f-
15,6 15,2 14,5 79 -
12
79 80 81 82 -4.993 -4.500
~ (7) � � ' ~ ~ (8)
. bruta ~
e Crecimiento i~versi8n 5 � enual
porcentai r~veda) pa~~entales Vef~a~~b~
(pObl~ca V P 2~3
1,9 ~
1,3 ~'S ~.5
-0,5
- 79 80 81 82 79 80 81 82
Key: 1. Factors indicating cast-off.
2. Growth - Percentage increase in 6. Foreign trade deficit - Current ac-
GDP rGross Domestic Product~. count (exports minus imports plus
3. Economy -(OECD), (CEOE). tourism, services and transfers).
4. Unemployment - Evolution in Investment - Percent total invest-
numbers of jobless. mentment growth (public and private).
5. Prices - Percent increase in 8. Private consumption - Percent annual
prices (CPI ~Consumer Price variation.
Index~).
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unemployment situation will deteriorate further, though at a slower rate than in
1981. Inflation may also be expected to abate and our foreign trade deficit to
show some improvement. In sum, a situation that will still be difficult, similar
- to that of the other European countries," he commented to CAMBIO 16.
- There is certaii:'_y no lack of prescriptions. According to Julio Rodriguez, PSOE
CSpanish Socialist Workers Party~ economist, a number of steps must be taken if
the Spanish economy is to be reactivated and hitched to the 1983 international
~ recovery train: A moderate wage increase, steps favorable to improvement of the
entrepreneural climate, stabilization of social security costs, a reduction of
tax fraud and an increase of indirect taxes, actualization of real increases in
- public investment, containment of inflation, moderation of interest rates, more
stable financing facilities for the purchase of homes, a realistic energy pricing
policy, productivity increases, streamlining of public-sector expenditures, and,
above all, adherence to the ANE.
At the other extreme, Abel Matutes, of AP ~Popular Alliance~, lays down three
conditions for attaining an effective and lasting growth: An increase in savings
and investment, an improvement in our foreign trade balance (above all, as regards
exports), and containment of inflation. He also puts much stress on containment
of public and deficit spending, tax incentives to investment, more efficiency in
the social security sector, liberalization in depth of the economic system, and
development of the "locomotive sectors" of the economy (housing, public works
projects, as well as energy and transportation).
A factor on which he does not touch, namely, revival of private investment, is
one of deep concern to the government, which knows that public investment alone
cannot resolve the unemployment situation and the crisis. Anselmo Calleja, direc-
tor general of political economy in the Ministry of Economy, made the following
- comment to CAMBIO 16: "Two t.hings worry me that T consider basic to a substantial
improvement in the economy. One is the need to revive investment, above all in
the construction sector. The other is the threat of being swallowed up by the
public sector. This ferocious tiger that devours everything placed before it
must be tamed. We must make a start with regard to transfers of funds to the
public enterprises and the streamlining of social security, despite the fact that
dealing with these issues is difficult and even unpopular."
There are also prescriptions originating abroad. Thus, the IMF has just recom-
mended the liberalization of the Spanish economy by "correcting structural rigid-
- ities." The IMF suggests increasing competitiveness, developing exports, bring-
ing labor costs down still more, liberalizinq the financing system in depth,
containing the public deficit, improving the tax collection system, and reforming
social security.
Our Unemployment Burden
A serious problem hovers over this optimism and casts its continuing pasl over the
_ Spanish economy as it enters 1982: Unemployment. Two million Spaniards are job-
less and 150,000 youths are entering the available work force every year. During
November, 1,500 newly unemployed workers per day entered the rolls of the jobless.
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One chilling statistic alone suffices to measure the gravity of the problem:
The number of persons registering in Employment Offices--the number of unemployed
is actually higher--is running 10 persons per available job.
"The struggle against unemployment," says Carlos Romero,assistant director general
for employment in the Ministry of Economy, to CAMBIO l~, "is not a one-year objec-
tive. It is a high-priority issue that must vertebrate economic policy in its
entirety; it is not a matter of just a few job programs. There are no short-term
miraculous solutions, and it would be a major achievement if only the number of
unemployed by year-end 1982 could be made no greater than that at year-end 1981."
It must be remembered that the government's objective in signing the ANE was to
create 350,000 jobs between June 1981 and December 1982. "It is a very difficult
if not impossible objective to attain," our magazine was told by Crisanto Plaza,
economist. "During good years, back in the 1960's, the net number of new jobs
created annually by the Spanish economy was averaging 105,000, and from 1970 to
1974 it averaged 180,000. The economy would be doing well to create half the num-
ber envisioned by the ANE. The important thing, as I see it, is to change the
trend."
- It is Carlos Romero's view that the unemployment problem can be gainfully attacked
on various fronts. One line of advance could be that of distributing existing
employment: agreed early retirements, increased overtime pay, an attack on moon-
lighting, above all in the public sector (incompatibilities), and in-depth com-
- pliance with the ANE. Another would be that of limiting "dou~ile-dipping," reform-
ing the social security system, continuing the wage-moderation polict~, and lower-
ing of business financing costs. And, easing the contracting terms for new jobs,
making fuller use of the ANE. "Liitle use has�been made of part-time and on-
the-job-training contracts."
"Besides," he adds, "there is a whole array of ineasures to stimulate public and,
above all, private investment, as well as those of a general economic policy
nature: Development of sectors of the future, industrial reconversion, a plar, for
modernizing agriculture and the food farming sector, technological developmen~,
and a a suitable professional and occupational training policy. "If the planned
growth objectives become operative, the time will have come to develop a broad
complex of ineasures and make of employment our major national objective," said
Carlos Romero in conclusion.
Dispelling UncerLainties
But for the scheme to become operative, there must be a genuine revival of private
investment. Uncertainties will have to be dispelled (the �act that 1982 is a pre-
- election year does not help things, and much less will it do so if there is a risk
_ of early elections), incentives will have to be greatly increased, particularly
as regards exports, new contract terms will have to be eased, and, above all, the
cost of credit to business will have to be reduced. "Jose Luis Ceron, business-
_ man and "economic brains" of the CEOE, says, "The problem of the price of money
continues unabated, while others are improving."
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The possibility that the central bank may be able to reduce the price of money,
as the workers have reduced their wages, is still not in sight. Recently, Juan
Jose Torribo, former director general of monetary policy and a member of the
board of directors of the Banco Urquijo, said: "Foreseeably, interest rates in
Spain will remain high during 1962, since the deficit in the public sector wi11.
rise, thus generating pressure on the Ba~co de Espana." Other i~anking circles,
for their part, add that t:iey do not di~card the probability of a tight credit
market this year, with insuffica.ent credit to be able to guarantee a low infla-
tion rate--a problem that did not arise in 1981 because there was scarce demand
for credit \n the part of business.
- COPYRIGHT: 1982, Revista y Informacion, S.A.
9399
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POLITICAL FRANCE
~BLIND' EUROPE SEES USSR PEACEFUL INTENTIONS, WILL TO NEGOTIATE
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 5 Feb 82 pp 96-97
~Article by Cornelius Castoriadis: "The West is Already One Battle Behind"]
[Text] Philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis is one of those
. most familiar with Marxist thought. He established the once
legendary periodical SOCIALISME OU BARBARIE (1449-65), which
was a veritable intellectual crucible of critical reflection
aimed at Soviet imperialism in the name of socialism.
_ Castoriadis has just published a book whose title seems to
us to have sadly prophetic current application: "Faced With
- War."
The main ally of the Kremlin is the stubborn blindness of the Western
peoples. This blindness has to do first of all with the real strength of the
L~SSR. Still today and despite the hullabaloo about the SS-20s (and as if they
were the only issue), people continue to believe that because the United
States has the most powerful industry in the world, it is also the strongest
in the military sense. But strength is not the total of military hardware and
soldiers alone. The USSR enjoys a privileged geostr~=~gic position, with a
central location which allows it to "operate on the basis of internal lines,"
and to deploy its forces in the necessary spots speedily. The Westerners are
always running to catch up following the actions the USSR undertakes where it
wants and when it wants. The USSR has political and military unity of com-
mand. Its forces are truly "integrated," unlike those of NATO. Its political,
military, diplomatic and propaganda activities are also integrated, unlike
_ the perpetual cacophony in tha West. Russia actively exploits the social,
political and other crises which occur in the sphere of the Western nations.
The r.everse is not true. Soviet society as a whole is or~anized on the basis
c>f the goals of the regime, a situation which is inconceivable in the Western
cotinrrics. Young Americans halted the war in Vietnam, and demonstrations by
paciEists and neutralists in Europe have just recently rallied hundreds of
thousands of persons. After the crushing of Hungary there were only five
demonstrators in Red Square. After the same thing happened in Czechoslovakia,
there were seven, and after the similar events in Poland on 13 December 1981
none.
The leading Soviet circles are concerned with nothing other than the expan-
sion of the empire, and they are professional government leaders. Western
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poli.ticians are sometimes only "amateurs" whose main concern is in many cases
reeiection. The leaders of the USSR have only one motivation: the expansion
of their power. The Westerners, for their part, dream of maintaining a shaky
"status quo." In the end, as a result of all this, the Soviet Union can have
and does have a long-term strategy and policy. The Western regimes have none
and can have none. Their blindness has ~_o do also with the Soviet regime, its
nature and its intentions. Even when they realize that it has nothing to do
with socialism or the workers class, people do not see that the USSR is not
a country like others, since the Soviet regime is not a regime like others,
less liberal or more harsh, but a new historical animzl. This regime has not
created a new breed of inen, but it has created a society without historic
precedent, Laith its own blind dynamics, for all practical purposes incompre-
hensible to Western man, whether "liberal" or "Marxist." Each of the 270
million citizens in the USSR is a human being like you and me. But taken
together, and placed under the yoke of the regime, for as long as that lasts,
they are something else: mechanical limbs of an imper.sonal golem which ex-
tends a jointed arm fr.om time to time and seizes something.
Blindly, people cling to a belief in the "peaceful" intentions of the Soviet
Union or its "willingness to negotiate." Each time it has negotiated, the
USSR has ended up with the main advantage, and each time it has suited its
whim, it has calmly violated the agreements it had signed, and no one even
dares to call it to account. We never cease :-.o hear about Yalta: the agree-
ments called for free elections in the Eastern European countries. When and
where have such been held? In Hungary in 1956, after the failure of their
first invasion, the Soviets withdrew their troops, promising that they would
leave the country alone. This was done in order to bring up reinforcements,
with which a few days later, they massacred the Hungarian people. The agree-
ment signed in Moscow in 1968 with Dubcek (who had a gun at his head) was
violated immediately afterward. Now they are 'oeing accused of violating the
Helsinki Accords in Poland. But these agreements called for the free circula-
tion of individuals and ideas. Go and see the Berlin wall, and count the
Soviet tourists you see in the streets of Paris. Many Americans claim that
the Soviets did indeed violate the SALT I treaty but even that is not the
isaue. The SALT I agreement gave them nuclear parity with the United States,
which they did not have previously. This was not enough for them. During the
decade between 1970 and 1980, they undertook a fantastic production and de-
ployment of all other weapons. Rest assured that if the agreements were
' signed on Euromissiles in Geneva tomorrow--or'even on intercontinental
missiles--you would hear a few months or years later of great Soviet advances
in other military reaims. Rest assured also that if the Soviets succeed in
"normalizing" Poland, a new peace campaign will be launched and everyone will
believe in it, yourself included.
- The case of Poland provides an admirable and tragic illustration of all of
this. There is no need to emphasize that the Polish affair has been a tremen-
dous setback for the Kremlin, and a matter which has not yet been concluded.
By means of a 40 percent reduction in the standard of living (price increases
of up to 400 percent), Jaruzelski is attempting to break the Polish people,
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to bring them to their knees. It is not certain that he will succeed, much
less that this will advance an economy ruined by 35 years of a communist
~ regime. But see how the Kremlin, caught in this trap, has nonetheless been
able to maneuver skillfully, while the Western politicians argue. Caught in
a terrible bind, it was able to choose the means and the time in Poland, pre-
paring its move for months and converting the Polish affair into an addition-
al bone of contention among the Western "allies," and bringing the fear of
war into play again (aided by Brandt, Schmidt and Chevenement). It was also
able to transform it into a new, chilling and bitter demonstration to the
_ peoples of the other Eastern European countries that rebellion is useless.
Forty days after a state of war developed in Poland, Western bankers, with
the blessings of their governments, were preparing to finance the survival of
the regime.
Why this obstinate blindness? Let us set aside the idea that it would be
difficult to learn the truth. Everyone knows what has happened. The data on
the superarmament of the Soviet Union is to be found everywhere, and is less
difficult to memorize than the membership of the soccer teams competing for
the World Cup. The main thing is first of all that people do not want to
think about what is extremely disagreeable. It is in error that, in man}
- languages, a characteristic which is absolutely typical of human beings is
imputed to the poor ostrich. The fact is that acknowledgment would also
oblige people to do something--to take responsibility f.or their collective
life. And so the fear of war itself becomes a factor which, confirming the
- Soviet Union's belief in its own impunity, contributes powerfully to increas-
ing the probability of war.
This pertains to people in general. The situation with the "intellectuals"
and the "leftists" is clearer still: apart from the outwork Marxist ideas of
which their heads are full, they are forced to camouflage the situation,
since none of their schemes provides an answer to it, and they are in danger
of having to admit that, faced with this situation, they have nothing to say.
The leading circles in the West, entirely disorganized, s e to their short-
term interests. Businesses and unions think of "exports," bankers of their
- credit, and politicians, naturally, of their schemes. "Detente" was promised
- by Nixon and Kissinger i.n order to get the American voters to swallow
Vietnam, the Cambodian invasion and Watergate. Kissinger today, wearing
another hat, is trying to sell himself as the spokesman of a"hard line"
policy. In fact, the Polish affair has been transformed, where politicians of
all hues are concerned, into a weapon of guerrilla warfare among the majority
parties as well as those of the opposition.
The harsh reality is that one can expect nothing of the Western regimes and
governments. Only an uprising by the people, here as well as on the other
side of the iron curtain, can halt the race to.ward war. This is why aiding
the poles in their struggle is more than ever a vital necessity if catas-
trophe is to be avoided. This is why it must be remembered that in this
affair, the blindness resulting from the fear of war is likely to lead both
_ to war and to enslavement.
COPYRIGHT: [1982] par Cogedipresse S.A.
5157
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POLITICAL FRANCE
POLICIES, BACKGROUNDS OF MITTERRAND ADVISERS EXAMINED
- Paris POUV~IRS in French No 20, 1982, pp 87-100
[Article by Samy Cohen, researcher at the National Foundation for
Political Science (CERI) and director of research at University
of Paris I: "The Men in the Elysee!']
[Text] Is there a'~Mitterrand style" permeating Elysee operations,
governing the choice of his staff, and tk~e assignments he gives each
of them? (1)
- Quite apart from the fascination the prince's advisors hold for the
collective imagination, the presence of the president's "entou~age'~
poses a basic constitutional question. In the system of "unequal
. diarchy" which has been the Sth Republic~s experience, these men are
one of the important f actors in the division of power between presi-
dent and prime rriinister. Thanks to the information they gather and
pass on to the chief of state, and to the dossiers they put together
for him, these men make it pract.ically possible for him to guide and
direct government action. Given a pri.me minister who controls the
civil service apparatus, the police, and the military, the absence
of such staff would considerably weaken the president~s role. In--
versely, installation in the Elysee of a powerful apparatus capable
on its own of preparing and implementing important decisions would
weaken that of the prime minister. It would cQnstitute one more step
toward presidentialization of the system.
The first three presidents of the $th Republic all had men about them
who were numerous enough and competent enough to enable presidents to
lay down major policy lines and monitor their implementation, but ne-
ver gave them the opportunity to establish a real "second government"
in the Elysee itself. Intervention by the president's men in the
operations of the ministries was frequent particularly under
Georges Pompidou and Giscard d~Estaing but their effectiveness de-
pended largely on the character of the ministers. A prime minister
opposed to a presider~tial decision could hamper its implementation
under the critical but powerless gaze of the "Elysee people."
Experience has shown that the prime minister haslteld enough trumps,
under certain circumstances, to force concessions from the presiden.t.
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The president, on tiis part, lcnew that it is often less costly, poli-
tically speaking, to humor one~s prime minister than to fire him. We
tend too often to forget the role Georges Pompidou played in May
I968, the reforms Jacques Chaban Delmas pushed through in the teeth
of presidential hostility and that of ~he presidentts chief advis~r~
Pierre Juillet, and the various economic measures Raymond Barre got~
through, not to mention his important role iii the composition of
cabinets. (2)
Has the election of Francois ~.tterrand as president ma~cked a break
with the past? The experience of his first 6 months in office shows
- that there is no clear answer to that question. Three areas must be
surveyed and separated:
the one where the change is radical: the choice of inen;
the one where the change fits comfortably into the con-
tinuity: the internal functioning of the presidency;
the one where continuity is all: the weight of the
Elysee apparatus in the decision-making process.
I. Tr~e Choice of Men ( 3)
When General de Gaulle first moved into the Elysee on 9 January
1959, one of his very first acts was to put together his own team of
personal staff . A maj~ority of his recruits were high officials in
whom he had complete conf idence, and some of who had already served
on his staff in London, in Algiers, or in the Provisional Government.
' As for the Ra11y of the French People (RPF), of which he was leader
for several years, only a handful of party stalwarts came to the
Elysee with him. Intellectuals, businessmen, organized labor, and
members of the professions were barred. The main idea was that only
liigh off icial::~ those who serve the State possessed the quali-
ties of devotion, discretion, and competence required to deal with
~ "affairs of State." Georges Pompidou and Giscard d~Estaing, also
~ leaders of the party, stuck pretty much to the same line of thought.
Pompidou took along the staff he had assembled at Matignon when he
was prime minister. Giscard brought with him mainly those who had
been closest to him at the Finance Ministry. In all three cases,
the men were not very different from one another in origin, age, or
background. Their diff erences stemmed mainly from the values they
: held and from the ties of personal fealty that bound them to their
leader.
The "Mitterr.and style, " though, is quite another thing . It reflects~
first of all, the "pa.rty activist tone of the Elysee." The inner
core of the Elysee team is made up of personal staffers who have
- worked for the first secretary of the Socialist Party and who, in 1981,
were almost all part of his "campaign cabinet," headed by Jacques
Attali, who today is spec.ial adviser to the president. Men used to
working with Francois Mitterrand. � Their backgrounds are as disparate
as may be. They are almost all members of the Socialist Party or on
its fringes. Aside from Jacques Fournier who comes from the trendy
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(;eiitr:r i'or� (Socialisl;) Si:udies, Research, and Education (CERES)
and Francois-Xavier Stasse a Rocard man they are indeed
Mitterrandists to a man.
Francois Mitterrand has also found room for his personal friendss
Andre Rousselet, a businessman, is currently his chef de cabinet;
Francois de Grossouvre, a farmer who runs his own operations, is
charge de mission to the President; Guy Penne, a physician, keeps
tabs on Af rican a~f airs for the Elysee; writer Paul Guimard is in
char~e of cultural affairs. Francois Mitterrand has also made it a
point to pay homage to two of his deceased friends, Pierre Soudet and
- Georges Dayan, by finding a place on his staff for the widow of the
former, Laurence Soudet, and the daughter of the latter, Paule Dayan.
The team will be rounded out by'two people from organized labor:
Jeannatte Laot (member of the executive commission of the CFDT), and
Robert Cheramy (co-secretary-general o� the SNES)� There will also
be a couple of high officials, including one counsellor of State
(Jean-Louis Bianco), a diplomat who was one of the very f irst members
of the C~nter for Analysis and Planning at the Foreign Af�airs Min-
istry (Pierre More1), an engineer from the Bureau of Mines who is an
expert on energy questions (Gerard Renon), and an administrator from
the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE),
(Christian Sautter).
All in all, Francois M~tterrand has provided himself as president with
the most heavily "political" team in the history of the 5th Repubiic,
but also with the one least homogeneous. (5) His is the one on which
high officials are least in evidence (they account for only about a
third of the team). It is also the one on which graduates of the
- great schools are fewest (they number about a fourth, whereas they
accounted for two thirds under Giscard d'Estaing, half under Pompi-
dou, and only two-thirds during the final years of Charles de Gaulle1s
presidency).
The man who best symbolizes the change in political staff around the
~lysee is Pierre Beregovoy. For the first time since the birth of
the Sth Republic, the secretary-general of t:~e Elysee is not a high
official. He is a graduate of no great school not ENA, not Science-
po, not the Ecole Normale Superieure. P�ierre Beregovoy is a self-
taught man. B~rn to a f amily in modest circumstances, he began hia
working life