JPRS ID: 10401 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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~ JPRS L/ 10401
19 March 1982
~ Vlrest E uro e Re ort
p p
CFOUO 18/82) .
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1?OR l ,
JPRS L/10401
19 Mar~h 1982
WEST Et1ROPE REPORT
c~ouo is/s2~
CONTENTS ~
POL~TTCAL
FRANCE ~
~
Relations of PSF DAputies, Presi,dent, Part~ Fxamined
(Pierre Avri 1; P~WOIRS, No 20, 1982) 1
Leftist Author on U.S., French, Soviet Th~.rd w~rld Palicy
(Cornelius Castoriadis Tnterview; LE NOWEL OSSERVATEUR,
~ 2-8 Jan 82} 13
MILTTARY
FRANCE ~
Sales, Production Statistics for Military Aircraft Updated
(AIR ET COSMOS, 20 Feb 82~ 2~+
Pruduction, Sales, Plans for New Naval Missiles Detailed
(Pierre Langereux; AIH E.t' CO5MOS, 20 Feb 82) 30
Aerospatiale Sells Record Number of Tactical Missiles .
(Pierre Langereux; AIR ET COSMOS, 20 Feb 82) ~+0
Briefs
Ra~~et ~ngine far Misaile 41
- a- IIII - WE ~ 150 .FOiJa]
- ~'nu nFCtrr ~ t r rec narz v ~
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POLITIC~L FRANCE
RELATIONS OF PSF DEPUTIES~ PRESIDENT, PARTY EXAMINID
Paris POWOIRS in French- No 20, 1982~ ~p 115-126
~Article by Pierre Avril~ pro~essor of public law and political
science at the University of Paris X: author of "Le Regime Politique
de la Ye Republique," 6 ed., 198~
~ex~ Born again like the Baptists, the Fifth xepublic emerges from
the second ballot of M~,y-Juae 1981 not quite the same, nor quit~ diY-
ferent, which creates bewi~derwent and sometimes ~renzy: the politi-
cal coll~ction o~ tales is enriched with an expression~ 1'ancieThe
re~ime~l whose absurdity has no doubt a~unction of exorciam.
stage o~ readjustment which the regim~a was undergoing since 1974 has
just ended in conformity with the institutional logic which was sum-
marized as ~ollows 3 years ago: "The return to universal suffrage
by the combined e~fect of the presidential election and dissolution
directs actions towards this formation of a majority." The spring
balloting offered a strxking illustratio~} of it and in this connec- ~
tion the Giscardian episode is end~d,2 since the majority nature o~
the regime is reestablished and with it presidential dominance, "key-
stone" o~ the in~titution, is confirmed more than ever. But the
Pifth Republic's return to orthodoxy took pla,ce through a new phe-
~.ZOmenon: a real party. There is, no doubt, the main novelty of the
Septennate, emphasized moreover, by Francois Mitterrand himselfs
It is the first time in the history of the republic th~,t a pa,rty
- itsel~ ha~~an absolute majority of the seats in the National
Assembly.
A Not Very Secret Chief ~
For the semiparliamentary' semipresidential structure of the Fifth
Republic to maintain,itsel~, the majority of the deputies must sup-
poTt the policy and even the person of the chie~ of state. "Presi-
dent of n.ll the French," as Fr~,ncois Mitterrand de~ines it a.n his
~ message to t:~e congress members in Yalence, "he could not be the man
o~ p~.rty;n but he maintains~ with thase who support it, a relation-
ship which, because it is semiofficial, is no less decisive.
General de G~.uiie~ who had re~used to see for a long time in this
bond~ anything but a sort of subjective coincidence,4 ended up by
1
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admitting the need ~or it in his ress conference of 27 No ember
67~6 when he greeted the UNR ~ion f or the New Republicy/ -~T
~emocratic Union of Labo~ Congress in Lille. The message to the
svcialist congress summarizes history to a certain extent.
This bond results first from a situation: The m~,jority candidat~es
pxesented themselves to the voters as the president's candidates.
The Socialist Party~ reorganized in 1971, developed afterw~,rds around
its first secretary and Mitterrand's victory brought in its wa.ke that
of his comrades (additionally~ the rescue o~ the survivors of the com-
munist group). The effect of the enthusiasm whicn is the origin of
' the new majority creates a somewhat unique solidarity of its members
with their leader. It is fownd a~gain in all the elections since
1963--with~the exception o~ 1978� But the novelty of 198'1 is due to
the fact that this solidarity shows~ in addition~ an objective
- nature. The meanin~less allegiance to which it was reduced until
then was replaced by joint membership in an organization and support
of the presidential.promises expressed in the form o~ a contract made
by the president with the French people which elected him~ but ~,lso
by the deputies ~ho made use of his name. Francois Mitterrand re-
minded the latter of it, in a signi~icant way, in his message to
parliament on 8 July 1981:
"I have said several times that my promises are the charter o~
govArnment operation. I will add, since uni~rer~al suf~rage was ex-
pressed twice, that they have become~the charter owers which lthetive
action...The prime minister will ask of you the p
national le~islature has at its disposal~ so that the contra.ct which
binds us to the Frennh people~7 since last 10 May and 21 June, may be
faithfully executed.
Thus there are justi~ied in advance the measures through which the
President of the Republic will demand of the deputies that they re-
spect the "contract" which they have supported but which they did
not write. This po litical restrici~ion on parliam~entary autonolf it
not without an analogy in the "reserved domain" of the past:
does not show its value of exclusion it limits the assembly's8 field
of initiative ~,nd preserves presiden~ial ~reedom as the call to order
ma.de to the council o~ ministers on 23 September 1981 sugg~sts:
"~tegarding my promises, it is my duty to see that they are carried~~
out, more particularly regarding the schedule for their execution.
Nevertheless~ the Elysee does not have institutionsl relations now
with the assemblies9: Consequently a leadership as diste,nt needs
reserves and~ Yrom this point o~ view, the leadership of thia secret
chie~ is exercised in a manner which is both conventional and
creative.
First, the liaison is insured by men whom the president trusts and
- who make up an inner circle analogous, if not similar~ to th~,t which
2
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Jean Ch~,rlot had examined in the UNR; the most influential o~ them
enjo~y a status which one would be tempted to compare with that of
the 'barons" of Gaullism, since it is based mainly on a loyalty shown
a11 during the wandering in the w~.lderness of the Fifth Republic,
the seniority of the trade guild can, nevertheless, be made up ~or
by the promotion of new talents through the party branches whose
organization supplies an instrument for selection which hardly ex-
isted before. The PS organization~ divided into factions, creates a
networlc for recruitment of holders of responsible posii;ions, based
on membership standards and one has thus observed that th~~ important
positions in the Palais-Bourbon were occupied ma,inly by members of
faction A, that is to say, of "the fol~.owers of Mitterrand" (the chief
of state does not like the adjectiv~, but he did not completely re-
ject it in his press conference of 24 September 1981): the chairman-
ship of the assembly, that o~ the group~ the chairmanships of the
committees, or, in lieu of them, the assistant cha,irmanship charged
with politicaY responsibility insuring "organizational" loyalty in
the control of the parliamentary machine.
On the other hand, it is well knoWn that the chief of state is vexy
vigilant about the party whose leadership he has conveyed to the suc-
cessor chosen by him. Mr Jospin is a regular visitor ~o the Elysee,
whose attendance was observed, for ex~,mple, at the bxeak~ast which
brought together on 15 September the president and the prime minister
- just before the latter's declaration to the assembly. In this re-
spect, it should be pointed out that with Pierre Mauroy not belonging
to faction A, the majority PS leadership protects what General
de Gaulle called the Fifth Republic'sl~ "lack of armor" by insuring
the chief~of state again~t the independent whims of a prime ma.nister
who would attempt to rely on the socialist deputies.
Consequently the P5 is an instT~ument of power, Mitterrand watches
over its development and the cc~ntrol of its ~.pparatus: he declareii
"the PS is a remarl~able reserve which can intervene at any time.
The rela,tions ~~rhich he maintains with his leaders reproduce, on
another level, those of the president of the republic with the prime
minister and show an almost constitutional parallel which helps to
shore up the written constitution: the makeup of the le~,ding organiza-
tions, executive committee and secretariat has it not been resolved
at the ~lysee with the f irst secretary in the same way the govern-
ment's composition had been decided in agreement with the prime
minister12~
As for the rest, that is regular political discussion, he lets it~
continue within the limits he has ~ixed~ assuring himself that they
are resPected: is he not eiected for 7 years, as he reminde~. e~?phati- �
cally on 24 September 19g1? Having at his disposal the term and. the
means, he does not hurry to govern systematically like tiis prede-
cessors, anxious to control everything and even in detail, because
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they did not have the same guarantees...That without prejudice to
speci~ic interventions and sovereign removals.l3
"P1ay the Parliamentary Game F~lly"
The chief o~ state~ whose domina,nce is well established~ intends to
"put each institution in its place"14 and thus e,ssure an institu-
tional ~unctioning more in con~ormity with the constitution, a,s he
conceives xt. This implies in particular that one strives to "pla,y
fully the parliamentary game.t015
'She first result of this concern is observe~l in the intense activity ~
of the assemblies; it corresponds to the legislative implementation
of the presidential promises,but als~o expresses the interest in
associating the national representation more ~losely with the govern-
ment's e~fort: the new resort ~o a vote o~ con~id~nce on a particular
aspect of this policy, energy (6 October) is symptomatic. The enthu-
siasm of a newly elected majority was thus able to give itself free
rein and win the satisfaction o~ going a little bit further than the
government imagined~ even than the ~1ysee wanted16; the executive
did not impose its point of view any longer systema,tically, it even
resignesl itsel~ to some dra~ts wtiich did not quite satis~y it~ pro-
vided the essential was preserved: the assembly i.s henc~e~orth freer
regarding governmen~ bi11s, since the only restriction imposed on it
is outlined by the presidential promises (but the latter are evalu-.
atecl without appe~,l by the chie~ of state~ as mentioned above.)
When the threshhold is reached~ the government regains control of
things, gets the group to conform and as was the case regarding the
~ree radios 24 September and once again~ energy on 6 October. In
these ~wo circi:mstances, however, tY~e governmental positions included
serious "in~lexibilities" regarding the candidate'~ 110 proposals.17
nut the more active participatxon of the national represente,tion
mainly concerns the.assembly~ while the Senate finds itself again in
its position be~ore 1974; it risks again experiencing "adversity,"
according to Jacques Geoigel's expression e,nd one can expect to see
the deputies make the decisions more o~ten by virtue of Article 45~
paragraph 4. In the assembly itselt, the bene~a.ciary is the social-
' ist group because of its hegemony. Institutional continuity has in-
- volved in this respect a sp~ctacular chaage of roles~ with the new
majority adapting quite naturally -~he behavior o~ the old one, es-
pecially when the new opposition discovers the deli~hts of procedure.
Moreover, this continuity is combined with a political schism which
irxesistably evokes the beKinnings o~ the Fifth Republic: the ingen-
uous Manichaeism of the "newly elected," their aggressiveness, their
tactlessness all this rec~,lls 1959 and activist core o~ the JNR19
"ran~;ers." ~uch a situation obviously does not fa,vor the expanaion
of minority rights, despite the good intentions proclaimed. You
might as kell say that they turaed sharply and a,mong the latter~ the
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main innovation (which, moreover, was not new, since the same sce-
_ nario has repeated itself since 1973 at the beginning o~ ea~ch legis-
lature) consisting in sharing the chairmanships of the committeeg:
it collided with political reality.20 Under the pressure of the
socialist group, strong ia its big battalions~ one even went be,ck on
_ equal sharing of time for questions to the government~ which had been
set up in 1974 and the ineident indicates perhaps the new trends. In
the Anglo-Saxon concept of ma3ority parliamentarianism, the majority
expresses ~.tself through the cabinet's vote~ since it governs; } ut
thia model had never been completely adopted in the P~,lai.s-Bourbon
because the institutional structure of the Fifth Republic maintains
a separation which is not only legal but physical between the govern-
~ ment and the deputies~ although the majority~ while supportin~ it,
did not identify absolutely with the presidential executive. Hence-
forth the mta,jcrity will demand an autonomy which it asserts with re-
sFect to the ministers, but which it mobilizes once again against
the opposition.
The socialist group is, in fact, relieving the government in the con-
duct of the pa,rliamentary battle; all during the summer debates, we
- have seen the chairman of the socialist group replace the minister
responsible far relations ~rith parliament to direct tactic:~, speed
up the examination of documents, organize the development ~~f the
meeting and i~ Mr Defferre was anxious to be the assiduous spokesman
of the deputies in the discussion of the decentralization proposal~
- it is the chairman and recorder of the committee who bore~ with the
support of Mr Joxe, the brunt of the burden of nationalizations.
' This reserve allowed the executive to let the ~elationshi~ of forces
shiYt in the cha,mbe~ while wielding his constitutional weapons; thus
he w~,s not able to deny too fast the diatribes made against the ob-
structed vote ~.nd against Article 49, Paragral~h 3, avoid resorting
_ to i-c in his turn (but will he be able to do it for lon~?20~) and he
takes cheap credit for respecting parliamentary procedure.
~ Fiowever, this practice has some drawbacks because if the government
refrains from using, under its responsibility, its constitutional
prerogatives, the clarity o~ the discussion suffers from it and the
majority is especially tempted to replace them with other restrictive
procedures: thus for the first time, it seems, since the beginning
of the Fi~th Republic, cloture o~ the discussion of an article was
- applied (Article 57 of the regulation)21.
Consequently the plan ~vhich is outlined is based on a controlled
autonomy of parliament; the deputies are no longer as strictly sub-
jected to government tutel:~ge and their agitation can superficially
recall the Fourth Republic, but the ~unction of leadership r~nd con-
trol, in conformity with m~.jority logic, appear mainly returned to
the group: This sort of devolution is conceivable because there is
the party behind the group.
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"The Link"
'Phe socialist party seems to have the mission of idaint~,ining the
cutting edge of the ideological cleavages which the exercise of power
' tends to blunt. Far from seeking appeasement in the symbolic debates
- like that on nationalizations~ its deputies in emulously re~erring
to the class struggle and "schism" are playing a dv~al role.
The, help, on one hand, to keep the communist party in the humiliated
status it has known since ld May, in pressing it in its Pield (the
socialist deputies cou?d not expose themselves to the charge o~
moderation or compromise with the right, without o ening a breech in
- which the communist party would charge immediately~ and in locking
it in the dilemma of submission to majority discipline or solitary
~ adventure (its defection would have no e~fect on parliamentary arith-
metic): that is it for the left.
They have, on the other hand, a role in the presidential arrangement
in mimicking the image o~ "ra.dicalization" o~fered by Mitterrand as
the only alternative to his policy and as the inevitable consequence
of his ~ailure: That is it ~or the right.
Freed .from these burdens, the executive can then ~naintain its posi- ,
tion ~,iid preserve the langua.ge of ~onsensus (mystifying word with a
dreadful hypocrisy before 10 May...). At Valence, the orators de-
voted themselves to a happening with a ba,ckground of cut off heads
while the prime minister reassured e somewhat disconcerted opinion~2
a,nd on the next da,y it was the president o~ the republic who recalled
on his return from C~,ncun "the right measure": "it is necessary that
all the French, whatever they t~ink, whether they ~.re ~or or against
my policy, ~eel really secure in the framework of the republic.n23
Consequently the Fr~nch can ~sk the question? It is not v~ery easy to
reconcile the policy about which the chief o~ state said in his press
conference of 24 September that it was "based on the union of the
French" and the celebration o~ the cla,ss strug~le. But these: a~ter
all, are.only the two faces of a Janus ~olicy? and this sharing of
roles which General de Gaulle had practiced with Debre regarding
Algeri~, is probably due les5 to a delibera,te scenario than to the.
logic of situations. The novelty is that it puts on tho stage an
actor who h~.s been absent until now in the distribution of the main ,
roles: the party.
The reception of this phenomenon by the institutions of the Fi~th ~
Itepublic posos a problem~ both ~or the administration as well as ~or
the PS, as Jospin declared at Valence: "I hear it constantly sa,id
tht~t the party must swing between the state--PS--it then bee~omes .
a colonizer--or the hobnailed boot party--it then becomes colonized. .
Let us not create contusion between the party and institutions."
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The ~aarning is not unnecessary. Article 4 of the constitution
assigns the function to the parties of contributing to the expression
o~ suffrage, which means that their constitutional role is essen-
tially electoral and th~t consequently they must not, as such, inter-
fere in the activity o~ public authorities: it was a deliberate break
with the practice before 1958 which considered the parliamentarians
and even the members of government, a.s the representatives of their
parties, subordinate in this capacity to the decisions of the leading
org~.nizations of the latter. Moreover, this concept did not proceed
without disagreements and we know that the repeated coa~flicts which
it created between the parliamentary group and the SFTU ~reMCh Sec-
tion of the Worlsers Internationa] Executive Committee 2. As Por
the government, the chief of state settled things as early as the
first council of ministers o~ his 7-year term 2b, but there is a
temptation ~or the deputies, indicated by the initiative of the YS
Executive Committee on the accasion of the discussion of the draft
bill on immigrants. The executive committee h~.d ordered a deputy
- from the North, Derosier to amend the text to bring it "as close as
possible to p~.rty positions" from which it consid.ered the bill too
distant; the minister had to negotiate not only with the reporter
and the deputies, but also with the party executive committee. It is
true that after this display of doctrinal vigilance, the latter
adopted a draft acceptable to Defferre, but the fact remains th~,t in
inter~ering in the government's relations with the assembly~ it had
demanded t~. role which the constitution did not grant it 27.
No doubt, it will be objected th~,t it is a question there of a quite .
juridical ~valuation and that this point o~ view is based on fiction:
does not everyone know hat the parties are the decisive variable in
parliamentar regimes 2~~ Membership in the latter determines the
behavior of ~he actors it takes into a,ccount their solid~,rity--and
also their rivalries 2~. But the objection is not relevant for it
ignores the significance of what it treats as fiction; the distinc-
tion which the law ma.kes between the public authorities and the fr~e
associations which are the parties ("the PS is not a cogwheel of the
state, it belongs society, Jospin observed quite rightly), does
not aspire to describe all the facts, nu more than it does not claim
to deny an obvious solidarity between the participants: while reserv-
ing to eonstitutional procedures and organs the approval of this
solidarity~ it merely excludes confusion o~ types.
To explain the problems of the majority party in the institutions oP
the Fifth Republic, we must no doubt go back once again to origins,
to the period where 1'ir Chalandon rzssured the ivnpatient Gaullist mili-
tants that the UNH would play the role of "link.".30 It does not
~ matter tliat the image was based more on a wish than reality: the
intention will be resumed ~~ith more probability and authority by
Mitterrand in the message to the members of the congress at Valence
where he stated clearly the PS'~ mission 31.
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As "guardian of the program,'' in the words of its first secretary,
the P5 occupies with respect ~o the government and the parliamen-
tarians the position of an ideological pressure group32. In pro-
v~iding the deputies with the re~erence Yor t;~ program, it exorcises
the specter o~ the "hobnai~ boot"33 since their acti~rity tt~kes place
within a broader perspective than the mere execution ofl presidential
promises: Their role is not reduced to being the agents of a purely
instrumental officialdom, it is connected with a joint enterprise of
Which the party is in some way the witness and the guarantee. Its
existence ,-justii~ies t~ie legitimate questioning of an author3ty which
they do no~ identify with,even if they are bound up w?.th it, so that
these deputies reproduce in their relationships with the government
the relation typical of mass parties, of inembers with elected members.
Reassuring for their convictions, this situation has~ however, a
centrifugal potentiality which brings up all tk~e more keenly the
question of authority in the party.
As an organization, the PS is an instrument for the mobilization of
the deputies it includes as members and whose discipline it apprones
as elected members. Parliamentary per~ormance and the votes of each
elected member "are answerable to the group, the executive con.._~.ittee
and the national convention," states Article 52 of the by-la~s,
while Article 17 of the group's internal regulation provid~s that
"every member of the group who will have broken voting unity will be
referred to competent PS authorities." And the first secretary re-
minded tha.t if he did not claim to play the role of an arbitrator
between the deputies and the government, the group chairman could
appeal to the executive committee "in case oP a probler~ among the
parliamentarians" (see note 27). Since then~ the strategic tactor
has been control of the apparatus. The "Mitterrand supporters" domi-
nate it completely, so much so that the demarcation betw~een the
field of the party a,nd the public authorities, which places the
former outside the latter, is practically erased by ~the so2t oY "per-
sona,l agreement" wh~.ch is effected by the presence on the administra-
tive committee~of the secretary general and the assistant secretary
general of the Elysee, as well as 14 government members and on the
executive committee that o~ the chairman of the National Assembly and
the group chairman.
The existence o~ a genuine majority party is going to create an in-
flexibility in the operation of the Fifth Republic whose extent is
_ not yet foreseeable. This presence will contribute not only to pre-
serving, but also to reinforc~.ng the main variables in the regime;
however, it introduces an element of uncertainty which s~e,tes the
dilemma of Mr Jospin: "State--PS or hobnailed boot party." Between
the two which tendency will win the day? It could be that th~y will
mutually strengthen each other, popular support and democratization
of a political discussion restricted until then, charac~erized by the
practice of the spoils system and institutionalized clien+,elism; it
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finally depends on presidential arbitration provided for in Article 5
af the constitution whether the price to pay to establish this new
phenomenon and complete the poli.tical modernization of the system re-
- mains wii,hin the limits o~ "the right measure"--if not o~ the golden
mean.
Footnutes
1. The expression even escaped a chairman of the meeting ~,nd one had
him observe that "we are still within the 4ramework of th~ con-
stitution of the Fi~th Republic," Mr Nucci agreed with good grace:
"You will excuse the old history pro~essor, which I am, for having
made this s1iF" (AN ~lational Assembly~ debates, 29 July 1981,
- p 485). A deputy of the new majority even Went so far as to speak
~ of the "decadent regime:" (same~ 27 ~ctober 1981, p 2633).
= 2. It is not very ~ashionable to crush the vanquished. Let us re-
peat then wh~.t was observed in this same Na 9~ namely tha.t
Giscard d'Estaing's 7 year term leaves a positive institutional
heritage with respect to law ans freedoms,with the innovation of
the control of the constitutional �council by the minority and the
considerable development of the control of constitutionality
which results from it, thanks in particular to the initiatives
o~ the socialist group (see Mr Charasse, control the constitu=
tional council, POWOIRS, No 13). May one wish that on this
- point it does not involve an "episode�?
3. "Gambettia. and de Gaulle, he added, had carried away and covered
with their name and their prestige~ what, i~ reality, was a co--
alition of parties," LE MONDE, 2 July 1981.
"But if I am no longer among you~ in the par.ty, I remain
with you, with our ideas and our hopes," LE MATIN, 2 July 1931.
5. This is why Chalandon, then UNk secretary general, described
General de Gaulle as our "secret chief,'~ LE MONDE 19 N'1ay 1959.
6. Speeches and Messages, V, Plon, 1970 p 247.
7. AN p 46. On tliis idea o~ "contra.ct" see remarks of Mr
de Lauba.3ere, w.lio publishes the text of "110 proposals for Fr~,nce"
adopted by the Con~ress of Creteil 24 January 1981, AJDA ~xpan-
sion unknown7, 1981 p 419.
8. "If it was necessary to go further than the commitments made,
the messa.ge of 8 July continued, it could only be after the peo-
ple, consulted again, had sriid the last word." In short, ex-
cesses and higher offers a,re excluded.
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- 9. Its distinguished ~rom the precedin~ presidency, there is,never-
theless, at the secretariat an adviser~ assisted by two asso-
ciates, who has rela-~ions with parliament ~.mong his responsi-
bilities. ~
10. ~uoted by A Peyrefitte, the French Sickness, Plon, 1976, p 355.
11. LE MONDE 13 October 1981
12. NOUYEL OI3SERVAT~'UR 31 October 1981
13. For example~ regarding the large scale Parisian city planning
operQtions, the "striking presidential move" cancelling the
defense vangu~,rd project (LE MONDE, 19 September 1981), or the
tax?ng of works of art (same, 31 October).
- 14. Press conference of 24 Septeraber 1981: "I �ould like to put
each institution in its place again: the government governs,
- the parliament legislates and participates in discussion, with-
out restraint o~ any kind."
15. The idea is ~iitterrand's on returning from Cancun, quoted by
LE ;~UOTIDIEN de Paris of 26 October 1981.
16. Thus the Yierret amendment on gifts-shares:on.16 July, the~�
Suchod amendment of the amnesty bill on the 29th. Contrary ~o
a discipline of amendment, the government upheld the elimina-
tion of the student quorum in the university elections,
although the text adopted by the 5enate would have offered it
the opportunity to correct an~innovation considered un~vise in
the Elysee (16 September and "last word" on 2 October); it
finally negotiated with diff iculty the regulations about~ex-
pulsion of foreigners on 30 September.
17. The term is Jospin's. LE NOUVEL OB5~~;RVATEUR 17 October 1981.
18. The chairman of the communist group; Mr Lajoinie~ complained
several times about the privileged relations between the
socialist ~roup and the government: such an "arrangement" is
"a not very recommendable and unconstitutional practice"
(LE MATIN 2 October 1981); we must avoid "limiting dialogue to
a single group," LE MO~TDE 15 October 1981.
19. The reconciliation was made by aeorgea I~4amy, LE NOUVEL
UBSERir~TEUR 31 October 1981.
20. The committees prepare the le~islative decision which is set
down in a policy; when the ideological gositions are strongly
_ opgosed, it is hardly practical to entrust to the minority the
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duty of di~cecting the work of the ma3ority and the German ex-
ample which is always invoked, is both eRCeptional and irrele-
nant, with nine-tenths of the laws developed under these con-
ditions being adopted unanimously by the Bun,destag (Mr Fxomont~
POWOIRS, No 16, p 148): Only such a consensus allows the
association of the minority with the responsibility of legisla-
tion.
2pa. This article was dra,wn up be~ore recourse to the regulations of
Article 38.
21. 23 October 1981: see ~he "French Constitutional Chronicle� Pol-
lowing.
22. "I will not take any action, I will not take a~y initiative which
may threaten our national communit}r," asserts Mauroy, LE NIONDL,
27 October .1981.
23. L~ QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS 26 October 1981.
24. On ar~ embodiment of our traditional schizophrenia which W~,ldeck-
Roussea,u already observed: "We have two brains: one very
bold, ~ery adventurous. We have another one, very ref lective,
very calculating" (speech of Saint Etienne, 11 March 1895).
25. See the LE JOURNAL DU SEPTENNAT of Y,Auriol, A.Colin, 1949,
p 349 and 388
26. Constitutional Chronicle, POUVOIRS No 19, p 183.
- 27. LE T10NDE, 1 and 2 October 1981. Jospi;l had ta correct fire by
declaring that the party executive committee does not act as an
arbiter between the parliamentary group and the government. It
is not resorted to by the chairma,n of the group, except in case
of a problem between the parliamentarians. Then it is the
executive committee which decides. The PS is not a cogwheel of
~ the state, it belongs to society...~ LE NOWr:L OBSERYATEUR
17 October 1981.
- 28. J.-C1. Collia.rd, Contemporary Parliamen~ary ~tegimes, PFNSP, 1978.
29. Including ~aithin a same group: one knows about the deals between
the PS factions, which the formation of committees has given
rise to in the assembly in July 1981 and the ordeal to which it
ha,s subjected ttie arbitration authority of the group chairm~,n.
_ Moreover, the cleavages are re~lected in the government with ~he
- conferring ofl the title of secretary of state on the leaders of
these factions (without ~orgetting the PCF representative).
3O. LE MONDE 14 February 1959.
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31. "~Iain ~orce of change~ it must be capable of explaining~ clari-
fying the government's decisions and convincing. But it also
- must convey to the government the message it receives from the
social classes where it has been able to establish its roots~
express their demands~ their ~ears~~their hopes. It must
- finally mobilize the popular masses so that they all take their
place in the movement," LE MATIN 26 October 1981.
32. And sometimes corporative: the ~irst secretar confirmed that
the PS was opposed to the quota ~or UNIDIC expansion unknown,~
officials, LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR 1? October 1981.
33. "Th~ hobnail boot is a fine and good shoe." Chevenement ob-
served, however at Valence, in comparing it with "dancing shoes,"
LE riATIN 26 October 1981.
COPYKIGHT: Presses Universitaires de France, 1982
849~J
CSO: 3100/348
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POLITICAL FRANCE
LEFTIST AU~THOR ON U.S., FItENCH, SOVIET THIRD WORLD POLICY
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 2-8 Jan 82 pp 14-19
[Interview by Louis-Bernard Robitaille with Cornelius Castoriadis, author of "De-
' vant la guerre"; date and place not specified]
[Text] The day a~fter this interview took place, General Jaruzel-
sg3~8 tanks fanned out over Warsaw--an extremely caricatural il-
lustration of the theses of Cornelius Castoriadis. In his view,
~ indeed, the party is an historical cadaver in the Soviet empire:
" it is the army that holds both the reality of power and its ideo-
logical extension. One can easily imagine that such thinking is
far from unanimity on the left. But ~astoriadis is us~d to being
a lone rider: in 1945 as today, he has asserted himseTf as a rev-
olutionary intellectual and has denounced t:ie buY�~aucratic t.otal-
- itarianiam of the USSR. The review that he suhs.equently founded
with Claude Lefort bears a name that is famous today: SOCIALISME
' OU BARBAR~~,. ~ philosopiier, psychoanalyst, economist and director ~
of studies at tna Practical School of H~igher Studies, he has just
published a book with a provocative title: "Devant la Guerre"
[Before the War].(Volume 1, Fayard), in which he analyzes the
- "stratocracy," the enormous military machine that aims at nothing
less than "domination of the world." He explained to Louis-Bernard
Robitaille the political extensions of his analyses.
[Question] You have just published a book with tfie title "Devan~ la Guerre." A
bit alarmist, isn't it?
[Answer] I started from a very important and quite real fact: the invasion of Af-
ghanistan at the end of 1979, following shortly after the collapse of the shah's
regime in Iran, all of this manifesting a nearly total breakdown of American policy
on the world scene. lbegan b~y writing an article for the review LIBRE, which pro-
voked violent discussion in the committee and caused stoppage of publication. But
the thinking I had begun with regard to that article led me to go back over all the
analysis I had done on the USSR for long years, since I started working on the Rus-
sian question in 1944. I have always considered that it is the key to understand-
ing of cont anporaxy b,~,~tory. How could a revolution that began as a socialist revo-
- lution have engendered this regime that I call total and totalitarian bureaucratic
capitalism? And also: how does it happen that such a regime can perpetuate itself?
[Question] In what way did the invasion of Afghanistan radic~ally change the pic-
- ture?
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[AnswerJ It brought to light, in a striking manner, not only the Sc.:iet Union's
military capacities but also its poa.i.tical-strategic capacities. It brought to the
forefront this phenomenon: that this country that showed such power on the military
level was the same one that had not managed to solve, on the domestic level, some
basic problems which, more or less, some countries so poor at the outset artd
so poorly run as Greece or Spain have nearly solved. Ho~~. then, can this country
produce enurmous ultramodern equipment capable of rivaling that of the world's No 1
industrial power, the United States?
[Question] That is to say: how does it happen that there is a shortage of butter
in Moscow; the tractors are always breakii3g down on th~:kolkhozes, etc, but the USSR
produces and can put into operation ultrasophisticated military materiel?
[Answer] Exactly. It is also astonishing '_hat the thousands of o�ficial Sovieto-
logists paid by the taxpayers of the West have practicaZly never raised the ques-
tion.
[Question] But the reason is probably that great quantities are involved. There
is enormous waste in production.
[Answ~r] I reject the wastage theory--in other words, that they make 10 computers,
- throw away 9 of them and keep 1. If you apply this thinking to Russian armament,
it is really a lot, and it would have to exceed the world's production of steel.
That is not possible. It is therefore necessary that in the military-production
sector there be a productivity, an output, on standards totally different from.wha.t
_ one finds in the other sectors. Which led me to go back over my entire analysis of
Russia, in the economic and sociological areas--and, for example, to examine this
phenomenon, known but passed over i:n silence by the Sovietologists: that of the
closed, secret enterprises, placed under the control of the army. There are two .
distinct economies: the first, incapable of producing enough wheat or shoes of ac-
ceptable quality; and the second, mass-producing ultrasophisticated materiei, the
hundreds of thousands of spare parts necessary, the high-precision machine-tools,
etc. Which presupposes, upstream and in parallel, a veritable military society
that has its privileged and motivated workers, its own technicians and scientists.
Which l.eads me to speak of stratocracy.
[Question] You mean to say that betiind.a thin facade, that of the Communist Party,
the arniy has finally taken over power in the USSR?
[Answer] No, it involves a new phenomenon. The USSR is truly a new historical an-
imal. In effect, this military society--employing perhaps.some 25 million persons
--has a dominant position in a country in which the party has become an historical
cadaver. Since the demise of Khrushchev, that last deluded illusionist, the party
has had no more to say, nothing to propose to society. Not about achieving the
- earthly paradise or even about "outstripping capitalism," as Khrushchev proclaimed.
The only ideology that can still be proposed to the populations--or rather the only
imaginary one that survives--is nationalism, incarnated precisely by the army. The
aim of power, of world domination. Under cover of the "triumph of socialism," o~
course.
- [(~uestion] Your second major observation is the fact that world policy will be
dominated in the coming years by the Soviet-American confrontation. That c?oes not
seem a particularly new phenomenon. ,
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_ [Answer] Of course not. In 1949, in SOCIALISME OU BARBARIE, we were already ana-
lyzing this reality and we evoked the possibility of a world war between the two
systems of exploitation. At bottom, we were right. Also as regards the liberation
struggles that followed in the Third World--confiscated, for the most part, by the
Russians. Also as regards the great social movements in the West. These phenomens
that for a time helped to mask the essential fact of this confrontation. But here
it is again t~day, and at a far higher level. This perspective shapes all the reFt
today. To such an extent that the entire problem of the Third World, as monstrous
as it is, is annexed by it, becomes a subsidiary, a chapter of this confrontation.
_ This is an observation of the first importance, and one which appa~ently is not
self-evident--at least to the people who are close to me, who have a leftist past,
who continue to take the point of view of a radical transformation of society.
~ They are swimming in a soup of illusions concerning the countries of the East and
Russia in particular. They refuse to see that we have before us a new social-his-
torical formation, a new historical animal. They are still trying to analyze i.n
the light of the past: worker state degenerated by the Trotskyites, state capital-
ism, etc. Or else they stay with the "classical" concept of totalitarianism, which
is entirely inadequate for understanding the Rus~ia of today. Others--liberals,
for example�-are counting on a flexibilization, a"moderniazation" of Soviet soci-
ety through trade and economic exchanges. This haa absolutely not proved out. It
is for that public that I wrote my book. And unfortunately, I fear that it remaine
- completely deaf.
[Question] Why?
[Answer] Because even when it has been granted, �or the sake of conversation, that
the USSR is not socialism, there is difficulty in conceiving that it is a regime of
domination such as has never before existed in th~e history:of. humanity. For the
first time in history, there is a regime without faith or law, not even for its own
citizens or subjects. This has never been seen before. The Mongols doubtlessly
did not have either faith or law when they invaded, pillaged, occupied foreign
countries. But for themselves, they had their religion, or rather they had 14 suc-
cessive ones. All conquerors have always said "woe to the vanquished!" But for
themselves, they preserved a faith and a law. From this point of view, Russia con-
stitutes a new historical phenomenon.
[Question] Should lack of imagination be quite simply added, then, ~o ill-digested
deception?
[Answer] Yes, but there is another factor, one that makes the moral atmosphere
- heavy and that is probably the most decisive one. The people who view themselves
~ as militant, lucid, continue to function in a theological-Stalinist mode. They are
not interested in knowing whether /that/ is a pack of cigarettes; they begin by
looking around and they say to themselves: if one grants that /that/ is a pack of
cigarettes, one comes to that conclusion. But /that/ conclusion is very disagree-
able to us and we do not want any of it. It is not that it is false; it is that we
do not want it. Therefore: it is not a pack of cigarettes but a degenerate work-
ers' state! God knows but that such reasoning has had a hard life. If you say
that God does not exist, then anything is permitted. Intolerable! Therefore, it
is necessary for God to exist.
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rux vrri~awL u~~ UNLY
Another example: one does not like the idea of a Third World War. And the entire
left is disarmed by that question; and if it were true? What position would one
have to take? The people of the left have nothing to say on the subject. The only
thing that enables them to go on prattling is to say that there is an American im-
- perialism, warmongering, and furthermore that it is the strongest, that the Rus-
sians are in a defensive position, etc. Which frees them of the obligation to face
up to the actual situation.
[Question] There is refusal to see this new animal--a rather maleficent one, you
say. Which means: at bottom, things were much better when the United States had
absolute supremacy in this world-scale confrontation. I conclude from this that in
the present debate, you believe that the United States, the West, should rearm in
the face of the Soviets. .
;Answer] I have never said, I will never say that the West should rearm. First of
all, it is not my role~ to say to the capitalist governments what they should or
should not do. With that point made, no one ever thought, when the United States
- ha.d absolute supremacy on the nuclear level--for some 20 years--that it was going
to nuclearize Russia "before it was too late." No one ever thought so, and ri'ghtly
--except for a few bizarre personages, of course, who urged it and had no chance of
being listened to. Why? Not because one attributes superior moral qualities to
the Pentagon. Quite simply--and this is where traditional Marxism becomes a fan-
tast~ic machine for wrong thinking--because the United States is not simply a cap-
italist and imperialist country. I call it a liberal oligarchy. That means some-
thing: it means that there are contro.is, a budget, a public procedure,.a public
opinion, actions and reactions by the population. It means that those who govern
cannot do just anything at any time. One forgets a little too quickly what stopped
the Vietnam war: it was public opinion, the American people, the students, the sol-
- diers who chucked grenades into the officers' messes. This situation is still
there, in the United States--as in West Europe. But it absolutely does not exist
in Russia. The decision whether or not to unleash a preventive nuclear attack is
- entirely in the hands of some 10 or 20 persons who run the Russian establishment,
_ who do not have to account to anyone and who fear nothing domestically. ~
[Question] In short, as between the Soviet "stratocracy" and the American "oli-
garchy," the former is the more dangerous.
[Answer] Most people of the "left" are dominated by the Marxist theorization by
which a regime is defined essentially by its economy. That is: the Western coun-
- tries are only capitalist; everything that might happen on.the political level is
secondary, it is decoration, sauce, mayonnaise. There is a class structure, there-
fore these regimes are to be fought unconditionally. This position is a.false one.
What is the reality? From the point of view of political theory, these regimes are
effectively oligarchies. But if o~~e: speaks of the societies, one has to admit that
they are not capxtalist societi ~ pu~,re and simple. If they were truly capitalist,
this would be the world of Chai~:: Chaplin's "Modern Times," it would be a totali-
tarian regime inherent in the organization of the capitalist factory, extended to
the whole of society. But this is false. Why? Because these societies are his-
torical bastards, generated both by the development of capitalism and by all the
liberation, emancipation movements that were already beginning in the European
= cities in the 14th century and that took on all the �orms that we know of, includ-
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ing the form of religious movements. There were th~ revolutions--English, French,
American--and the workers' movements; there has been the great revolutionary demo-
_ cratic movement that is lasting for centuries and that means that these societies
have not been able to become simply what their economies were leading tt~em toward~.
They have not been able to be purely capitalist societies, which would have m~Ant
totalitarian societies.
(Question] You say, on the contrary, that chere are two or more logics operating.
[Answer] Precisely. There is on the one hand the logic of the capitalist economic
institution of society, and on another hand, the lc~gic of the revolutionary demo-
cratic movement that has always been there.
[Question] Furthermcre, it ~s this contradiction that creates the weakness of
these societies.
[Answer] Ah! Of course, if for these societies it were a matter of waging a war
against a regime which fo~ its part ~s purely and simply totalitarian-buresucratic,
it is obvious that that would creat: a situation that is not a simple one. These
countries have found ti?emselves, sinee the end of the last war, in a phase o.f de-
composition, pr~gressive and accelerated. It happens, for example, that these
"oligarchies" are incapable of defining a rational and coherent policy--even from
the strict point of view of their long-term interests. This is a phenomenon that
the Marxists, here again, refuse~to recognize, for they are living in the mythology
- of a rational capital that pulls all.the strings, which would be perfectly ration-
al. In fact, there is a fantastic incoherence--at the level of relations between
states, for example, or in the so-called Atlantic Alliance, which is anything but
an alliance, or at the level of American armaments policy, which is also of a fan-
tastic incoherence. Tt is made up of fits and starts, under the var~ous pressures
of the military-industrial lobbies, without its corresponding to any military and
strategic rationality.
The Western societies are like thick soups in which swim some pieces that are a
little thicker than the others: in particular, the lobbies. The o�ficial "work-
ers movement, Ehe institutionalized "workers"' movement, is itself one lobby
among others, without any overall political platform.
[Questio~z] At what moment--let's speak of the United Stat~es--do you place this
process of decomposition?
[Answer] The point of cleavage is in the 1960's, with the considerable ambiguity .
of the results of the great social movement (blacks, young people, women, etc); but
one that was nut followed through all the way. That movement modified the Western
societies, it shook them. But in subsiding, it left them in this state of decompo-
sition, without any real sequel. Today there is no longer any movement going for-
ward and wanting to transform society. The movement of the 1960's shook the domin-
ant point of view without managing to impose its own.
[Question) In situating ~he problems at so high a level--or in diving so deep--you
you do not mak~ it possible to perceive much in the way of solutions.
[Answer] But it is because the question is really difficult. One has to see that
there is no reason to defend these Western regimes. But there are not only the re-
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r~uss ur~rt~~A~ u~~; uNLY
gimes, there are also the societies, and they contain what remains of the great
democratic and revolutionary tradition of transformation of society, and that is no
small thing, and it does not go without saying. One does not know whether this
tradition continues, in an underground way, to exist in Russia. Therefore, entire-
1y independent of Reagan, the question of the defense of these societiea against
the Russian stratocracy could arise. In a sense, it has arisen. It is a moment of
reasoning which, of course, the Marxists and others will object to, crying "Sacri-
lege!" This is a point that has to be given close attention: first of all, it is
not true that there is no choice to be mgde between the Western societies and a
Russian-type regime.
(Question] Between two gangs, theii, one must in effect choose the lesser....
_ [AnswerJ No, it is no longer a matter of gangs but of societies. Let us not~ in
passing the hypocrisy of all these people: I see no one applying for a visa to emi-
grate to Russia. I've never seen such a thing! But the question is that; on the
one hand, this is not the role of the people who presume to give advice to the gen-
eral staffs, still less to Reagan, who takes the bread from the mouths of old women
in order to make weapons which, for that matter, serve no useful purpose. And on
ti~e other hand, that the soeieties are not alone in the world. There is the wtiole
Third World, and to begin with, the Third World where the Russians have not yet en-
tered. ~
- [Question~ In your judgment, is that where the game is being played, andcrucially?
_ [Answer] Yes, that is the main arena of the confrontation. And what is happening
there? Many of those countries are under the direct influence of the Western coun-
_ tries, the United States in particular. And what is the U.S. policy? To support,
in practically all cases, the most reactionary, the most suthoritarian regimes. We
note in passing Mrs Kirkpatrick's subtle distinction between totalitarian regimes
and authoritarian regimes: actually, it is not false. Indeed, the regimes of the
Third World are rather "authoritarian" than "totalitarian." And so? Is that a
reason for aligning with governments that support all the dictatorships of Latin
America wherever they exist, who train torturers in the CIA camps in the Uriited
States and who now are doing what they are doing in E1 Salvador? Who not only are
incapable of solvang the problems of the Third World countries but are also system-
atically suppo�eting regimes of authoritarian dectatorship?
[Question] But what strategy for the West, then? What had to be done, what has to
be done, in Nicaragua, in E1 Salvador?
[Answer] The idea of the third way, as it is presently being advocated in France,
is illusory. These are pious wishes, in the present state of affairs. For it is
not by chance that the United States has this irrational policy, from the point of
view, properly understood, of the American imperialist interests themselves. While
it is not entirely true that the Americans pushed Cuba into the arms of the Rus-
sians, it is true that they are in the process of pushing Nicaragua into their
arms. This is not by chance; it is the very result of this decomposition of Ameri-
can society. There is no body in the American regime capable of rising up against
what a Marxist called the point of view of the general interests of the dominant
system.
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- What prevails is United Fruit, it is the military lobbies that sell airplanes,
. train colonels, etc. It is this or that company, it is the vari-~us CIA clans who
each have their preferred dictator, etc. Take South Africa--5 million whi~ps, and
18 million blacks kept practically in a state of slavery. A sort of immense con-�
centration camp for the blacks. There is a black movement, that has its ups and
downs but seems to be getting more important. One day or another, these blacks
will rise up--at least one has to hope so, desire so. =i.~~ will rise up. :'ne
whites are armed to the teeth and more. These blacks will need we.ipons. Who will
supply them?, The American administration is aligned with the Pretoria government
- more than ever. What will happen? The blacks will ask for weapons from the Rus-
sians, who will be delighted to supply them. The Cape as a Russian military.base--
now that is worth something in the relationship of world forces! When that moment
comes, we will be asked, in the name of defense of democracy and liberty, to sup-
- port the Pretoria regime against the blacks because they have Russian weapons.
This is flne of the reasons why I refuse to go into tlie question of whether an abso-
lute war effort by Che West has to be supported.~ Contemporary war is a total phe-
nomeno~.~: what does that mean? For example, in France, for a logical military lead-
ership, it means indexing 40 percent of the population. Because about 40 percent
of the French have at one time or another been members of the Communist Party, or
their wives or sons have.
This would mean, in a series o� European countries (Spain, Italy, etc), transform-
ing them into semitotalitarian regimes, with a~oreign policy to suit, in order to
fight another totalitarian regime. This is absolutely absurd, untenable, unaccept-
able.
[Question] Don't you have a tendency to pose the dilemma or impasse zn an absolute
way? Couldn't there qnite simply be, for the West, a technical responae that would ~
consist, on the level of hardware, in filling in the most obvious gaps in the rela-
tionship of military forces--and first of ~all, the question of the SS-20's in Eu-
rope? We are a long way away from an all-out war effort.
[Answer] But here again, the confrontation is not going to evolve in the conven-
tional way. The Americans had already managed to learn nothing in Vietnam. As if
they had never heard of the Algerian war. They mad:: war in Vietnam as if they were
~ doing uitratechnologized maneuvers on the great plains of the Middle We$t, but in
the Vietnamese jungle where one couldn't see 2:meters in front of oneself.
[Question] Could--or should--things have happened differently in Vietnam?
[Answer] I don't know. That ie not my problem. They could not in any way hold
Vietnam. And what.were they getting their noses into in Vietnam? What I want to
- say is that the Americans thought it was possible and intelligent to carry on an
industrial war in Vietnam, by ceassive injections of materiel and dollars. And to-
day they think it is sufficient to pass budgets, produce new tons of hardware,
whereas the confrontation is essentially social-political. Hardware will not make
war, but rather people and societies--with, for the Third World, the national in-
gredient. ,
- [Question] And communist ideology.
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rux vrri~iwL u~~ un~Y
(Answer] Yes. This communist ideology, which is completely bankrupt in Russia,
which no one believes in for a second, this ideolog;, at the same time that the or-
ganizational model of the militarized party, oreat creation of Lenin, still
continues to be of value in the expox�t markets. And first of all, of course, in
~ the countries of the Third World. Why? Because if you go to Latin America, fdr
- example, the most stupid, most lifeless, most idiotic versions of the most primary
Marxisms are veri�ied.directl}r. There are rich and poor, the poor drop from hun-
ger and the rich are very rich, they have the means of production and they expro-
priate the few lands that the peasants have. The state? What state? The local
police are totally under the orders of the local landowner. The local priest--he
has been changing a bit for some time, but for centuries, his line was: "My chil-
dren, keep calm, the poor will inherit the kingdom of heaven!"
- [Question] A verYtable caricature, in short.
[Answer] Yes. The most asinine caricature of the most insipid Marxism seems to be
verified there. Into this exp~losive mixture you throw a few copies of the Marxist
catechism, you throw a few erizymes of an organizational model....
[Question] Then in the last analysis, and whatever its motives, the USSR finds it-
self playing a progressive role in those countries?
[Answer] But in order to do what, in the last a,nalysis? What is happening now in
Vietnam? A totalitarian bureaucratic society t:hat is not solving the population's
problems. Of course, these Third World populations are desperate, they have an en-
emy, a solution appears in the form of a national front manipulated by the commun-
ists or supported by the Russians (because they are the only ones to give it aid).
The struggle begins. The Americans, of course, support the opposite camp. Anti-
Americanism, already existing, develops to the point of paroxysm. This is entirely
natural. The people do not know what is coming afterward. But we--we know. Some
say it is better. I do not agree. ~
, [Question) The question is this: for Cuba, ~~as Castro or Batista better?
[Answer] What is the situation in Cuba? There is u fantastic number of people in
the prisons. The material conditions--despite the e?~ormous subsidies that the USSR
gives--are miserable.
[Question) Your point of view appears both pessimistic and disheartening: no al-
- ternative for the Third World except the status quo or Sovietization.
[Answer] ls it pessimistic to observe an suto accident or a natural catastrophe?
Nothing that the Western countries are doing or can do is going to change the situ-
ation.
[Question] Isn't it a little facile to decree in advance that no policy for devel-
opment of the economy and of democracy exists for Latin America?
, [Answer] But listen! Give me an example in which the Western countries have suc-
ceeded with this "third way" policy! Kennedy made the Alliance for Progress: what
was its fate? Even Carter--it is entirely right if he did not intervene in Nicara-
gua! Why?~ Because when one starts talking about a different po'licy, there are
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airplane and tank manufacturers who block the t,r~cess. Or within the countries
themselves, ruling classes who block things and find support, in the CIA or else-
where.
[Question] But all the same, isn't it worth the effort to try, as Mitterrand did
in a way, to push for a solution in E1 Salvador?
[Answer] But it is very well to find a solution on paper. Linking economic aid to
the democratization process, etc. But concretely, France has no clout in~Central
America. It has in Africa. But what does Mitterrand do? He supports Mobutu! It
is not that he likes Mobutue, to be sure, but he does not have the means for any
other policy. There or elsewhere, there could thearetically be something else, but
that is not going to happen with the present Weste.rn regimes and with tPie policies
they are conducting. The situation therefore remains essentially the following:
Russia is trying to penetrate the Third World, and the Third World is an excellent
terrain for penetration. Even if it sometimes suffers a setback, as in Egypt. One
cannot conduct an enterprise of. world domination such as the USSR is conducting
without suffering setbacks from time to time. And it will auffer more. Already in
Afghanistan, it is not a Criumph for them, it is obvious.
[Question] What is the scenario that you conceive?
[Answer] I don't do futurology; but let us examine an hypothesis. Let us imagine
one crisis or another in such-and-such country of the Third World. The Russiacs or
a pro-Russian regime is installed, or simply a regime that the Ameri~ans perceive
to be such. Sooner or later, there will come a situation that will be objectively
critical or considered to be such.
[Question] For example, Iran.
[Answer] It could be Iran, or ~outh Africa. It could be Africa, if Qadhafi were
not so weak as he is and if there had been a real descent of the Libyans toward the
heart of Africa. All the African countries except for one or two are in a fantas-
tic state of instability. They are pasteboard states, Mobutu is kept at arm's
length by the Westerners, etc. Therefore, at a given moment, the Pentagon, the
United States will react. If they do not react--for example, in an absolutely de-
cisive matter such as the Gulf--it means capitulation. If, in a key country, there
is an upheaval and an Islamic-popular-nationalist-revolutionary government declares
"I am keeping my oil!," Europe shuts down in 24 hours.
The United States would no longer have any choice but to react or capitulate in
fact and withdraw to its own territory. Or else they react: ultimatum, military
action, etc. At that moment, effectively, the European front becomes important.
The Russian general staff knows quite well that if things turn bad, the principal
.place of confrontation becomes Europe. If South Africa is at stake, then you can
suppose that there will be an attack on the Elve.
[Question] But you say in your preface: "The Russians do not want war, ;�hey want
victory." What does that mean?
[Answer] That the Russian general statf is not completely mad. Even i� human
lives are not accounted for as they are in the West--as was seen in the course o~
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WW II--it knowa quite well that total war means 100 or 120 million Russiar. dead.
~ Even for them, that is a lot. What they are aiming for is victory--that is, the
- internal collapse of the ~thers, under maximum pressure. This is the explanation
_ for the Russians' fantas'-ic overarmament--an overarmament that cannot have only the
effect of putting Russia "under shelter." For on such an hypothesis, now that con~
ventional supremacy is crushing and overkill has long since been achieved, why con-
tinue this enormous military production? Why a constantly growing fleet, when Rus-
sia does not need it for its defense? Because this overarmament has a decisive
psychological value in the confrontation. The Westerners, though armed, will find
- themselves in the position of a man facing an adversary who pulls out a knife, then
an axe. Next you discover that he also has ~6rass knuckles and a revolver and
that he is a karate champion! That's quite a bit; so then you capitulate. One
should not have any illusions about the American deterrent force. Imagine that
there is a Russian first strike: the only possitile American response would consist
in hitting the Russian cities, which would in turn lead necessarily to destruction
of the American cities. Now apart from the extreme cases (Hitler in his bunker),
who is the person in a position of political responsibility about whom one is sure
that he would take such a decision? All this, as Herman Kahn said, is to "think
the unthinkable." But in this perspective, one has Co think about a"victory with-
out war."
(QuestionJ In the face of this situation, it is impossible for you to avoid this
question: is it really necessary to h~ve a st~ategy for the United States, for Eu-
rope, for the West?
[Answer] We do not have to put ourselves in the shoes of the politicians, who take
decisions in accordance with their own logic. Nor give advice to Reagan, who does
- not know what he is doing and does it poorly. Rearmament, in the form it is pres-
ently taking, is an absurdity and does not interest me. I am not a"pacifist." I
consider the present European pacifist movement politically absurd and morally ab-
ject. What do the pacifists say? "Denuclearize, from Poland to Portugal!" Whir,.h
means: the Russians and the Americans can nuclearize to an extreme, who cares, s~~
long as our precious little hides are ~aved! This is politically imbecilic and
morally unacceptable.
_ My point of view is that a popular movement must be organized for universal and to-
tal disarmament and for allocation to the Third World of the $500 or 600 billion
spent on armaments each year. It doesn't matter how. Not to the profit of the
local petty tyrants, psycopathic demagogues, in order for them to build armies in
their turn, but for development of agriculture and infrastructure.
[Questionj All the same, I gather from your book that you consider the present im-
balance totally irreversible. Which seems enormous.
[Answer) It is unthinkable that the United States could cope with the military-
political-strategic challenge without restoring the draft, abandoned under Nixon.
But that is politically out of the questian. At present there is a volunteer army,
insufficient on the quantitative level--the warships are short of personnel--and on
~he qualitative level: the recruits, essentially unemployed persons, are not well-
qualified enough. Secondly, people are reasoning by the criterig of the 1939-1945
war, when the United States effectively built up a formidable war industry in 2 or
- 3 years. If there is a confrontation and serious crisis in the present era, the
time will not be counted in days, weeks or months, but in hours.
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[Question] Many maintain that the United States, with its fantastic indus~rY~~ po-
tential, would in fact have the means to bring the Soviets to their knees, by im-
_ posi,ng on them an armaments race that their economy could not support.
[l~nswer] This would suppose, on the part of the United States, an armament effort
that seems to me, for the time being, entirely improbable. On the Russian side,
the sums devoted to armaa?ent are already estimated at between 15 and 20 percent of
GNP. And at present, these expenditures are increasing by 5 percent per year~in
real terms. Even in the face of an enormous American effort, the Russians would
have the means for coping, with additional expenditures that would represent less
than 1 percent more of their GNP. And they will do it.
[Question] Don't you think, in view of the population's already miserable standard
of living, that in the event that more blood is drawn out of the civilian economy,
there could be a gigantic revolt?
[Answer] I do not think that the quantity of blood drawn off would really make the
difference. With that point made, what is o� capital importance for the future of
our world is to know whether or not there are democratic traces left in Russia. Of
this, we are totally ignorant. It is true that Russia'.s internal situation is one
of the most explosive there is: none of the problems pased under the old regime has
been solved--that is the least that can be said. But at the same time ther.e is a
leaden blanket that pin.s society down. Even apart from the Stalinist terror, the
regime has perfected a fantastic system of repression. Even though I do not share
his conclusions at a11,Z~nov'yev was correct in stressing this "homo sovieticus,"
a new species of human, in a way, cynical, indifferent to the.shabbiness of his
lot, to the future of society--provided th~t he be given his peace, more or less.
The whole question, for the future of Russia--and to a great extent, ours too--is
whether the dissidents are the tip of an iceberg or the representatives of a disap-
pearing race.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 "le nouvel Observateur"
- 11267
CSO: 3100/337
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MILITARY ' FRANCE
SALES, PRODUCTION STATISTICS FOR MILITARY AIRCRAFT UPDATED
Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 20 Feb 82 pp 15, 17, 19, 20
[Article: The Programs of French Industry"]
_ [TPxt] In order to inform its readers better a'bout the nature and magni.'~ude of the
production of the French aerospace industry, AT~4 ET COSMOS ~presents ~elrnr Pive tables
that suramaxize this activity. These taBlcs give tFie p'rincipal industriel and comanercial
characteristics of the programs for aircraft (civilian and military sirplanes and
helicopzers), for engines and for missiles in whiEh the national industry is signi-
ficantly involved, for which mass production has already been started or is still
in progress, or on which potentially impor~ant development is being done. These
data make it possible to quantify these programs and to present their status in
terms of orders, deliveries, rate of production, clientele, exportation.
- Complementary data:
--1980 aerospace turnover: Fr 35 billion (consolidated); Fr 43 billion, not con-
- solidated;
--1980 exports: Fr 20.5 billion;
--order book as of 31 December 1980: Fr 91 billion;
--export orders taken in 1980: Fr 27 billion;
--direct jobs: 110;000 persons; ~
--indirect jobs: 120,000 persons.
Principal personnel strength (as of 1 June 1981): SNIAS [National Industrial Aero-
space Co] (group): 39,000; SNECMA [National Aircraft Engine Design and Manufactur-
ing Co] (group): 19,800; Dassault-Breguet: 15,800; SNPE [National Powder and Explo-
sives Co]: 6,500; Turbomeca: 4,400; Matra: 3,500; SEP [Eur.opean Propellant Co]:.
2,500. .
Notice: For each proggam, the principal information is given as it is known to the
editorial staff of AIR ET COSMOS as of the "situation" date given. In addition,
- there may differences of definition from one manufacturer to anottier (for example,
- is "delivery" made at the end of the assembly line, upon delivery to a subsidiary
or to the end-customer?, and so on). Finally, publication of certain data may be
restricted for reasons of industrial secrecy or for national-defense reasons. ~This
- means that the information presented below may be incomplete or indicative only�of
orders of magnitude.
These documents will be updated regularly by the AIR ET COSMOS editorial team.
24
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Pume
Turmo�~II C4, Turbomoteur � (e) 2~~ ~ Sup~r Fr~lo~
_ 4A, ~B. ~C . . . . ~ 1 ~ ~
[Table concluded and key supplied on following page]
27
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TM 333 Turbomot~ur � - - - ~ 2 prototypee
~17~
~ TRI d0 � Tu?bord~cteur Microturbo 150 + 100 5 � Ml~sils~
� � � � mllitairt 14
~
TRS 18 Turborlecteur � 100 + 200 9 8 4 . Mi~sll~e et svlone
16 20
(1) options possible. (2) + mean upward; = means stationary; - means downward.
(3) Most recent date on which at least one of the elements in the line was updated.
(4) Marbore: more Ehan 5,700 sold, in all versions. ~5) 78 to be delivered.
(6) 192 to be delivered. (7) 108 to be delivered. (g) 30 to be delivered. ~9) 38
~ to be delivered. (10) Not communicated by the manufacturer.
~ Key:
1. Gas Turbine Engines 11. Situation Date
2. Program 12. Notes
3, Function . 13. civilian
4. Manufacturers 14. Military turboject
5. Orders�(firm + options) 15. Propeller turbine engine
6. Delivered 16. Turbojet
7. Month.ly rat~ 17. Impulse turbine
8. Trend 18. [expansions unknown]
9. Number of countries 19. Otomat sea-to-sea missile
~ 10. Export x(as number) 20. Missiles and sirplanes .
: c 1~ MIS~IL~S TA~TIQUES c 5) c 6~ c�> c s~ c~ t ~o
g . ~ ~ ~ c~z~
(2) ~3) ~4) ~ ~ t ~ ~ t~�nWaws
~ v
Proanmm~ Fa~ctlon Construct~un ~ ~ r~- ~ : ~
c3 0
15 ~ ~.s > >.o -ax
gg~~~Ag� Antl.chsrs ABroeoatiale ~78~ a7SIe2 250
gg~yASt2 . ABrosoetl~ls 9514 8873 AO - 28 78.3 1-0t-82
HOT � AbroeaatlNa 3t 087 900 ^F 13 88.5 1-01~82
MILAN � AirosDStids 158a58 118288 1850 � 26 71.9 1-01-82
Rol~ed ~ort~-Ak~ee A~roeostf~l� .17 2?2 3 798 ~00 ~ 7 71.1 1-01~82 �
Cro1d~ � Th.-CSFYM~tn ~ 10 68 1-0i-82
3 377
gh~IM . Th -CS51Matn + 1 100 1-01-82
SATCP � Matn ' ' + 1-01-82 ~22~U ~sonpl9BBnt
[Table concluded and key supplied on �ollowing page]' .
28
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Exoe~t MM 30. Antl-Nevlrei ~ A6rosoetlale 1 238 1 088 8 r 18 86.5 1-01~82
. A6roeaetiale ?A 5 +(121 10 99,2 1-01-82 ~ 23~ivrelson fIp 1981
Exx~t MM 40.
~ ExocN AM 30. � Adroepstlale 271 152 b ( 8) 7 BB.E 1-01-82
~ ~ + ~ ~ � En dbve~opp~ment
3~ . Abrosaatlals ( 22~ Livro~eon 1982
Mstro/0T0 100 1-01-82
Otom~t ' Mstero
Airo~aetlels � � t' ~.p~.g2 ' En d6velopp~m~nt
ANS . . . . ' ~ 22 ~ Livralaon 1998
18 ' En divsloaPame~t
A816TT AIM1SurFace A6ro~Datlele 20p' � + 1 100 1-01-82 Llvro~eon 1984
~22~
� Fln d~vslopDemsnt
AS ~0 Lu~r . � ABroepstlels � � + 1 0 ~-0~~ ~ Z~,~~~rolson 1983
Bomb~ Las~r � Ms~ ' ' 1-01~82 25t En diwloppament
J
Belupa � Matro 2240 81 1-01-82
19 ~ 100 1-01-82
Dunndd AMI�o~stes Matro 5328
9uo~r S30 'Alr�Air Matra 900 2B 1-01-82
560 MMie � Mlstro 809D 70.5 1-01-ffi
CT 7p EnalmCiDR~ A~ro~aetiale 1~69 1 443 1 5 20.8 1-01-82
~-0~~ � En dWelopp~ment
C ~ . ABro~oetlele ' ' + 2 2 ~ Livnl~on 1983
Bomb~s Fnl� AArooortb 1 Metn 18900 ~
nN~ ~.1.3.~.
L~na-?oau~tb~ ~ Matrs 4120 90 1-01-8?
~e m~ i~4)� `
Key:
1. Tactical Missiles 12. Notes 23. Delivery end
2. Program 13. Braked bombs of 1981
3. Function 14. 68~mm rocket-launchers 24. End of devel-
4. Manufacturers 15. Antitank opment; deliv-
5. Ordered 16. Antiaircraft ery 1983
6. Delivered 17. Antiship 25. Under develop-
7. Rate per month 18 Air-to-~surface ment
8. Trend 19. Antirunway
9. Number of countries 20. Target missile
10. Export % 21. Airborne
11. Situation Date 22. Under development; delivery
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982
_ 11267
CSO: 3100/383
29
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MILITARY ~ FRANCE
- PRODUCTION, SALES, PLANS FOR NEW NAVAL MI~SSILES DETAILED ~
Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 20 Feb 82 pp 43, 45, 47, 51, 54
- [Article by Pierre Langereux: "New French Naval Missiles"]
[Text] France is one of the most advanced countries as regarda naval weapons sys-
~ tetns. The Masurca, Malafon, Martel, As-12 - SS-12-M and other As-20 and AS-30 air-
to surface missiles developed in the 1960's and 1970's are preaently in service in
�several dozen foreign countries.
But some new French naval missiles have made their appearance in recent years: the
"naval Crotale" and Exocet and Otomat antiship missiles, which have already been
ordered by some 30 countries.
Other missiles are also under development for the 1990's: the SATCP tSurface-to-Air
- Very-Short-Range) missile and the AS-15-TT and superaonic ANS light antiship mis-
siles.
"Naval Crotale" Antimissile Missile
The "naval Crotale" of Thomson-CSF [General Radio Co), the missile part of wtiich
was developed with MATRA [Mechanics, Aviation and Traction Co], is a short-range
(more than 10 km) all-weather surface-to-air weapon system capable of intercepting
aircraft flying at low altitutde, with also a certain interception capacity against
the "sea skimmer" antiship missiles. ~
The "naval Crotale" is presently in operational service in the Navy, which has
planned to equip more than 10 ahips with it: C-70 corvettes, F-67 frigates, etc.
- It has also been adopted for the four F-2000 frigates o� Saudi Arabia, which is
~ presently the only country to have acquired the three versions of the system:
The weapon system,.in its Crotale, "naval Crotale" and Shahine/SICA [expansion un-
known] versions, is presently on order by 11 armed forces of 8 countries, including
France (2 systems), Saudi Arabia (3 systems), South Africa, Egypt, Libya, Pakistan,
the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi), and Chile, which is the most recent customer.
More than 1,800 Exocets .
- To date, more than 1,800 of Aerospatiale's Exocet antiship missiles have been or-
dered by more than 26 countries, including France, presently the only country that
has adopted all versions of the miasile: the MM-38 sea-to-sea, ttie AM-39 air-to-
sea, the SM~39 submarine to sea, and the MM-40 long-range sea-to-sea.
30 .
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The navies of 18 countries, including France, have ordered 1,236 of the MM-38 sea-
to-sea Exocet to date, to equip 178 ships (see table below). Aerospatiale has al-
ready delivered nearly 1,100 MM-38 misailes and has done more than 110 development
and evaluation firings of it since it was placed in service in January 1974. The
missile is manufactured under license by Great Britain, which has adopted it for
itself.
The long-range--more than 70 km--MM-40 sea-to-sea Exocet became operational in the
French Navy in February, after two successful validation firings, one of them at
the hull of the decommissioned escort vessel "Le Basque" at ~ distance of 65 km,
from the experimentation ship "Ile d'Oleron."
The first French ship to be equipped with MM-40's is the A-69 dispatch boat "Prem-
ier Maitre 1'Her," which will be fitted out in the spring of 1982. The 1~f-40 is
also to be put on five other A-69 dispatch boats and seven C-70 antiaircraft and
antisubmarine corvettes; it is also planned, in the longer term, for it to replace
the MM-38's on all the Navy ships already equipped, beginning with the three F-67
Tourville frigates.
But the MM-40 has already been in service abroad for a year. To date, 307 MM-40
missiles have been ordered by 10 countries (see table below), including France,
which adopted it more than a year ago (cf AIR ET COSMOS, No 824). The MM-40's or-
dered will arm a total of some 50 French and foreign ships.
Among the foreign countries, it should be noted that six new ~xocet customers have
ordered the MM-40: Abu Dhabi, Bahrein, Kuwait, Qatar, Tunisia and Colombia (order
not confirmed). As can be noted, the MM-40 has made a remarkable breakthrough
among the Gulf countries in the last 6 months.
Qatar, in particular, has ordered three Combattante 3M patrol boats, each armed
with eight 1~4I-40 missiles. The first two u~its will be delivered in August and Oc-
tober 1982, and the third in January 1983.
One Gulf country, already equipped with AM-39's and MM-40's (on board ship), is al-
so the first customer for the coastal-batter version of the MM-40. This version,
mounted on a Berliet GBD 6 X 6 all-terrain vehicle, will be operational in 1983.
Firings of NII~i-40 missiles (engine-driven mockups) have already been t8king place
- since the beginning of 1981. A firing of a complete MM-40 missile in its coastal-
battery version is planned for mid-1982.
The AM-39 air-to-sea Exocet is an improved airborne version, with range varying
from 50 to 70 km, depending on the type of aircraft--helicopter or airplane--and
the firing altitude. The adaptation of the AM-39 was completed in February 1982
_ (after five firings, four of them successful) from the carrier-based sirplane Super
Etendard, and it is in progress on the Atlantic NG airplane, for France, where the
AM-39 will be operational this year. But the AM-39 has already been in service
abroad since 1978, particularl~ on helicopters: the Sea King in Pakistan and the
Super-Frelon in Iraq. Furthermore, the Iraqi Navy is reported to have sunk two
Iranian patrol boats and one frigate with the aid of AM-39 missiles fired from
Super-Frelons (cf "Flottes de Combat" [Combat Fleets] - 1982). In the export
field, the adaptation of the AM-39 for the Agusta SH-3D helicopter (the Italian
versi~on of the Sea King) has a2so bee:t completed, and it is in progress for Aero-
31
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Exocet MM-38 Missiles (18 Countries)
I ( 3 Nombn do
( j~ Pnn 1 N~vlna 1 ( 2~ CI~~~~ Mi~dla
~!}~lwint p~r unlti~
FRANCE :Ie~j.~. ~~cs,a~::m�a~.:~~,~t~ti:sbz.::` ~~e;. a+
Croissur .?.Y~......... . . Colbert ~ 4
Pone h6lfcoD) bree~.~.~ leanne d'Arc 1 0
Fr6aate~ .~.l~J Tourvlll~ 3 S
E~coReur Dup~rri 1 4
FrApetes ~ Suffr~n 2 4
Corvettes ` Ciwrp~ Lsvpu~~ 2 4
Avisos ...~.LQJ Cdt RIvIMe 8 4
Avlsos A99 4 (1) 2
P~tioullleun .~1~~��~���~��������� Suo~r P~t?~ 6 2.
ALLEMAGNE ~ra~xw~r.~..rr . -ws~ r~r~a.w: ~ ,.nu~s
D~rtrowr J ` Hsmburo 4 ~
P~troullleun `~~1 g 148 20 4
P~troulll~urs S) g 1~3 10 4
P~troulll~urt S 149 A 10 4
ARGENTINE u~e~+~~or,~w.� �
De~trowr . . . . . . Comodo~o 1 ~
~ Dsetroven . Seow $ 4 '
FNpahs ~�8.~ Drummond 9 2
BELGIOUE r~~'~~~
Fripstes ~.H.~ We~thindar 4 ~
BRESIL ~ 15 ~
frlaetee .~.5.~ Con~tituCao 2 4
w
BRUNEI ~w�Mss~� ~ -
Petrouilleurn ~ . Waapadd 3 2
CHILI ~~`~;~~~xarfn~�a:cs>~r;;.;.r~r',rw. -~r,va~ar ^
Oestrovers Almirante�Riveros 2 ~
Dsstrov~n Condell 2 4
COREE DU SU va+.ac$�~r � ~
Patroulllsuro ~ . � � . � PKM 121 2 ~
EOUAT[~lA ~~~i:?3:'eu~ Y~
Corvsttse . . Esmeraldes 6 ~ (2)
P~trouuleun i l)
. Oweo 3 4
GRANDE�BRETAONE ~~.*d.~ �
D~~troWrt Cou~tv 5 4
Fr6p~t~~ Npe 22 S$ Bro~d~worth 7 4
Fr6p~t~s tvpe 21 . : Am~zon 5 4
Frbp~t~s tvpe 12 ~ La~nder 6 4
GRECE w~~~~~~,:+-~~~z~rra~uru� s~areracxr+~a wu~w
Patrou+~leurs .S.~ 1lj Antiol~ercos Lsscoe 4 . 4
Pstrouilleurs .`.1 1/ Komidis 4 4
INDONESIE ji i~~v~ru~rmc mm
Fripste~ fatahill~h 3 ~
P~trouilleurs .~.1.~~ Renaono 2 4
MALAISIE ~q~ '~,:~eK+~:e.M. ~aaplr~'~ ~',w
Patroullleurs lt}) Fl~ndslsn 4 4
P~troullleurs ~ 1 I! . S~ranq 4 2
MAROC �w:,, ar=r~:si~ax+~+M �:~~�~.~mwvaa~rss ~rs^>a +~ts,:W~~ ;
FNa~te ~ , . , D~scubierq 1 4
- Petroullleurs C1.1.~..~ Cormonn , 4
NIGERIA ;,'�:'~�,.4~ta,,~rotv,�m.Ya ~.wHrww+arr,.�asww. mr~n!a+c
P~trou~lieura ~..1.~ . Siri 9 4
OMAN e~,.,~