JPRS ID: 10389 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040035-4
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 35
• Content Type: REPORTS

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. JPRS L/ 10389
16 March 1982 ~
Near East North Africa~ Re ort
p
tFOUO 10/82)
, ,
. '
- Fg~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language ,
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are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
ather characteristics retained.
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are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
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mation was summarized or extra:ted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phoner,ically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Word.s or names preceded by a ques-
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Other unattributed parenthetical notes with in the body of an
item originate with the snurc:e. Times within ~tems are as
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JPRS L/10389
~ 1!b March 1982
~ NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
~ c~auo io/s21 ' ~
COtvTENTS
INTER-ARAB AI~ i'
AIRS
Joint Arab Military Coirmiand, Arab Arms Industry
(AL-WATAN AL-'~RABI, 27 Nov-3 Dec 81) 1
' Arab Authorities Still Waging War Against Freedom of the Press
(AL-WATAN AI~-~ARABI, 8-14 Jan 82) 4
Briefs �
Plastics Industry Developing Rapidly 8
GPEC AFFAIRS
Oil Expoxting Countries Sell Gold in Europe
(David Marsh; FINANCIAI~ TIl~lES; 26 Feb 82) 9
AF'GHANISTAN ,
Soviets Seen Using Caxrot-Stick ~Iethod on Afgha~is
(THE ECONOMIST, 27~Feb 82) 11
ALGERIA
Agricultural Policies Examined
_ (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERIiANEENS, 15 Jan 82) 13
EGYPT
Writer Expects No Immediate 5hift Toward Strong Pan Arab
Policies .
(Am;r Iskandax; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 13-19 Nov 81) 16
I,IBYA
Brief s
Czech Road Contracts 21
Development Budget 21
Project To Transport Water 21
- a- (III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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MAURITANIA
1982 Budget Approved, Policy RecoYrmiendations Noted
. (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 25 Dec 81).......... 23
MOROCCO
Lumber Industry Reviewed
~ (MARCHES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERR~ANEENS, 15 Jan 82) 25
SUDAN ~
Brief s
Agricultural Equipment , 27
Petrol aun Products 27
Railway Equipment 27
Transportation Equipment 27
Nile Navigation Projects 28
Textile Study 28
Gum Arabic Production 28
~ Arab Aid 28
YEMIIJ AftAB RFPUBLIC
Brief s �
N. Yemenis Urged To Join Palestinians 29
a ~
-b-
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
JOINT ARAB MILITARY COMMAND, ARAB ARMS INDUSTRY
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI,in Arabic No 25~, 27 Nov-3 Dec 81 pp 28-29
~[Text] Arab relations were naturally the most prominent part of what the preparatory
meeting for the summit studied. The file on these relations contains a~aumber of
memoranda, most of them "top secret," as follows:
1) Memorandum from Somalia demanding inclusion of the flood disaster on the
summit's agenda.
2) Syrian memorandum demanding inclusion of the following four sub~ecta at
the same time:
a) Ara~-Israe~i struggle and its development and the search foi responsi-
ble ways of achieving a strategic balance between Syria and the Israeli enemy.
. b) Action to adopt a common Arab stand on the participation of some
European and other powers in the multi:?ational force to be stationed in Sinai.
" c) Au~erican-Israeli strategic cooperation. . -
d) Arab-American r~lations.
Within the same framework, Sudan submitted a memorandum about the Syrian ;.egime's
striking a blow at Arab solidarity and it salled for the council of the League to
take whatever action it deems appropriate in this connection.
The council of the League presented an independent study on the building of the
League's new hea.dquarters.
~ Libya submitted a memorandum expreasing its view on "the Sudanese regime's violation
of the charter of the Arab League, ~oint Arab defense treaty, and decisions of the
Arab summit conferences by allying itself with the Egyptian regime and atrengthening
relations with it at a time when this regime is suffering from isolation within
Egypt and abroad." Libya urged the Arab governments to recall their ambassadors and
hreak relations with Khartoum.
In the same spirit, Damascus submitted a memorandum condemning President al-Numayri
for disrupting the Arab consensus.
Sudan prepared a memorandum on the Libyan Jamahiriya's providing militaxy bases for
a foreign power.
~ From an examination of the Libyan complaint against Sudan as well ae the Syrian
complaints, then the Sudanese complatins against boy Libya and Syria, one can judge
the extent to which fragmentation and dissenaion have apread among our brothers.
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Joint Command
Let~us now pause to consider the mc,st signif icant matter raised in these memoranda
and refrain from pouring oil on the fire of the know~ Arab diaputes. The most
important memorandum deals with the Arab-Israeli stru~gle and methods of perparing
the people for the fateful.confrontation. We read in the recommendations of the
military a3visory committee made up of the chief'~a;~f staff of the Arab armies, which .
met in the League's headquarters in Tunia 20-29 April 1981 to discuss the situation
in which military security finds itself, about the formation of a 3oint Arab
command. The recommendations are as follows:
1) The joint command will assume the leadership of the Arab armed forces
through the command of the fronts an:~ forces placed directly under its command.
2) The 3oint command will be headed by a supreme com~nander.
3) The 3oint command will prepare military plans to implement the Arab
political decisions.
4) It will direct strategic operations in accordance with the prepared plans.
5) It will furnish the necessary inetructions for operational and administra-
. tive coordination between the subordinate fronta and forces.
6) It will submit an annual budget to meet the needs of the command and the
front commands.
7) The joint Arab command will be directly linked to the 3oint Arab defense
council.
8) The principal headquarters of the ~uint command will be located near the
region of the main threat to the Arab nation.
9) The troops will be moved from the original places to mobilization areas
through the subordinate army commands.
~ 10) T'ne troops will be placed under the direct operational command of the 3oint
command as soon as they reach the places assigned to them and until other orders
- are issued by the command.
The recommendations also require that the supreme commander be appointed by the
council of kings and presidents after the defense council nominates hfm, on the
condition that all Arab states share the responsibility with it. The period of
service in the command is 3 years for all positions, and it can be renewed. Upon
conf irmation of the f ormation of the command, the defense council will allocate a
million dollars for the expenses involved in organizing it, on the condition that
the secretary general work out the financial arrangements.
Military Industrialization
~ As�a step to supplement the creation of the ~oint command, the aecretariat general
proposes than an Arab organization be created fnr an arms industry in order to
limit the dependence of the Arab states on the foreign powers that produce arms and
lessen the foreign pressure on Arab decisions. It is etated in the plan (and it
is top secret) that this measure is aimed at saving the enormous suma epent by the
Arabs on arms, which amounted to about $20 billion in 1979, and bringing about a
large degree of integration of the Arab industrial establishments. It will also
guarantee the maximum employem~nt of Arab capabilities that will result in a re-
- duction of costs over the long term and in the acquisition of experience...and,
consequently, transformation of the Arab statea from importers to exporters of
arms.
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The plan restricts the fields of activity of the new organization to conventional
weapons and equipment, systems of integrated arms, complementary and supplier
engineering industries like specialized electronic and optical indust~ies, and
chemical industry...It adds that the most important prerequisite for the continued
functioning of the Arab organization for the arms industry under all kinds of
circumstances is to secure and protect it against the danger of destruction in
case of armed conflict with any foreign enemy. The most effective way to guarantee
its protection is to distribute it geographically over a wide area and avoid concen-
trating it in any one particular region. It is suggested in this connection that
three forms of distribution be studied.
The f irst is diatribution of parts of the single industrial system to a number of
states and setting up of an assembly line in each one. The second is distribution
of different kinds of systems to the participating states in such a way that each
kind is specifically assigned to a predetermined state. The third involves com-
plete duplication of production lines in more than one place...In the event that at
least 4 states agree, the organization shall be considered to be in existence and
$4 billion will be earmarked to coner the expenses of studies and the necessary
administrative outlays to create the organization.
i
As for military cooperation between the Arab armies in the field of training and
- exchange of information, the study suggests that the task of standardizing combat
and training methods be entrusted to the joint command, which is to carry it out
provided that the technical military terms and military documents are standardized.
The military secretariat will furnish the ~oint command with ample general informa-
tion about the Israeli enemy and other foreign armies in order to organize a
complete archive on Israel for its incorporation into the mechanical information
syatem now being used in the secretariat general of the League. It relies on a
computer to store the information.
As for the building and equipping of headquarters for the secretariat general of
the League, we read in a special memorandum that the total amount required for the
structure has been estimated to be $30 million. The secretariat approached the
Arab Economic and Social Development Fund, the Saudi Development Fund, the Kuwaiti
Development Fund, the Iraqi Fund, and the Abu Dhabi Fund to cover the financing.
The Tunisian-Saudi Corporation for the Promo~ion of Investment and the Iraqi Fund
agreed in principle to share in the f:inancing.
COPYRIGHT: AL-WATAN AL 'ARABI 1981
5 214
CSO: 4404/207
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INTER-ARAB
ARAB AUTHORITIES STILL WAGING WAR AGAINST FREEDOM OF TfiE PRESS
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 256,8-14 Jan 82 p 72
[Article: "An Arab Journalist Disappears L~ery 2 Months"]
[Text] There are two new studies by the General Federation of Arab Juurnalists,
the first about "the responsibility of the Arab 3ournalist in the Arab homeland,"
~nd the second about "the reaponsibility of the Arab ~ournalist in bringing about
, world peace and solidarity." We~will cover ~ust the �irst etudy in~a~quick survey
- of the relationship of the authoritiea with the press in the Arab countries.
- The study says that the campaign by the authorities against freedom of the press
has been unceasing and attempts to replace a dialogue of words with a dialogue of '
~ bullets have been constant. The number of Arab ~ ournalists killed during the past
2 years is higher than at any time in the past or in any place in the world. The
best way to express the preaent state of our Arab press is the response of one of
our ~ournaliat colleagues when he was asked to dis~uss a report by the committee
; on freedom of the presa. Our colleague responded: "What will you say? I suggest
~ that you submit 10 blank sheets of paper."
= Despite all the expressions of sympathy with fre~:dom of the preas put out by gov-
ernments, the facts show that the war against this freedom has not stopped and
- that Arab 3ournalists constitute its primary arena. It should be noted that the
study drew on official information made pvblic by the unions of ~ouraalists or
news agenciea and newspapers and, consequently, is not all the information about
incidents involving attacks on freedom of the press. Also, this study did not
- cover the situation of Arab ~ournalists inside occupied Palestine.
1. Assaesinatione: During the past 2 years, nine Arab ~ournalists have been
killed; this figure is higher than the number of ~ournalists killed at any time in
the past and also is higher than the number of ~ournalists killed anywhere elae in
the world. A number of ~ournalista have been the target of assaesination attempts
and�some preferred to cover them up.
2. Kidnappings: Some have been the target of kidnappinga. Some returned, the '
fate of two ia atill unknown and one came bac~ as a corpse.
So, statistics show that we are losing an Arab ~ournalist every 2 months as a
victim to the climate of freedom and democracy prevailing in the Arbb homeland.
= 4
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3. Arrests and expulsions: Ara.b prisons have received many ~ournalists. A1-
thaugh the bulk of the arrests take place in secret, dozens of ~ournalists have
asked the federation to intercede to save them from prison.
4. A number of ~ournalists ~ave been sub~ected to exile from their place of
residence. In some Arab countries, the suthoritiea have barred ~ournalists from
entering and have refused to grant them visas. .
5. Arab "democracy" has not spared press establishments from closure and confi.sca-
tion. During the past 2 years, the following establishments have been shut down:
The Kuwaiti magazine AL-TALI'AH has been closed three timea. ~
The Kuwaiti magazine AL-HADAF was ehut down. .
The magazine AL-AZMINAH AL-'ARABIYAH (published in al-Shariqah) wae closed.
The offices of the newspaper AL-MUHARRIR in Beirut were blown up.
The pressed of the newspaper A1-SAFIR in Beirut were blown up.
The pressea of the newspaper AL-RA'Y AL-'AI~I in Kuwait were blowa up.
Three newspapera in Tunisia were closed.
The offices and presses of the magazine AL-KIFAH AL-'ARABI in Beirut were the
target of more than one attack.
The union organizations have encountered forms of presaure and suppression all to
prevent them from exercising their democratic rights. This year has witnessed the
heroic battle waged by the Egyptian union and also the attack against the ~ournal-
ists union in Sudan.
The report gives examplES of press conditions in certain countries, including:
The Lebax~ese press: The press of Lebanon used to be given the label "the face of
democracy in the .Arab homeland" because of the climate of freedom that it en~oyed,
in addition to its technical accomplishments. The tribulations of this preas began
at the Riyadh summit conference in 1970 when Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat
accuaed it of being responsible for the civil war. Decree No 1 of 1977 was Che
first step ii: imposing military censorship on Lebanese newspapers and magazines.
The Lebanese ,journalists and press establishments were early victims of the civil
war; during the past 7 years, 80 percent of the press establishments have been the
targets of rob~,ery, looting, bombing, shelling and intimidation. Up to now, the
Lebanese press has given up 40 martyrs, including its late dean Riyad Taha, who
fell a few hundred meters from hie union headquarters. Edward Sa'ab also fell
victim to a sniper's bullet which ended the work of dozens of years and the photog-
rapher, Elyas al-Jawhari fell on top of the tool of his trRde with which he had
been trying to capture this state of decline being experienced by the Lebaneae
citizen. Also in Lebanon fell the Egyptian ~ournalist, Ibrahim 'Amir, throttled
by the blaze of ink and papcr. The Palestinian ~ournalists, Nayif Shiblaq and
Talal Rahmah, fell victim, as did others, brought together by their one profession
and their one Arab democracy.~ .
The declared war against Lebanese ~ournalism usea various forms of coercion, terror
and enticEment and this war has not let up for a moment, even with any halt in the
civil war or with any ceasefire in Lebanon~. The preas in occupied Palestine: The
condition of the Arab press in the shadow of the Zionist occupation can be
summarized as follow's :
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1. Papers published by anti-regime fo~ces, principally AL-ITTIHAD and AL-GHAD.
2. Papers published by puppet and pro-establishment forces, principally AL-ANBA'.
3. Daily papers in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip which have been published in
the shadow of the occupation in Jerusalem, namely AL-SHA'B and AL-FAJR, two
nationalist papers that have constantly been sub3ected to threats by the Zionist
authorities because of their nationalist stands. Then there is the newapaper,
AL-QUDS, which is dominated by a materialistic, opportunistic and political climber
stamp, and the newspaper AL-TALI'AH, which speaks for the Palestinian Communist
Party (formerly the Jordanian).
4. Monthly and serialized magazines specializing in literatur~e, religion, industry,
agriculture and womens' affairs which are aperiodic.
Since 1967, the press throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip has been sub-
jected to various types of coercion. It is sub3ect to the publications law that
was passed by the British mandate in 1933 and which imposes censorship on all
articles aiid advertising material.
This press is deprived of facilities en~oyed by other papers in the occupied
territory, taxes, fees and official announcements, and the newspapers, AL-F?.J'R and
AL-SHA'B are barred from the Zionist ~ails, while Hebrew newspapers and AL-QUDS are
allowed in, on the argument that those two newspapers incite against the occupa-
tion and pose a threat to the nation. All these papers are sub~ect to harsh
military cer?sorship . ~
Palestinian journalists have been the targets of.killings, kidnappings aad expul-
sions. The latest incident was the imposition of house arrest on the editors of
AL-FAJR, AL-SHA'B and AL-TALI'AH.
The Tunisian press: Last.March, three papers were shut down at once for periods
of 6 months to a year.
In addition to consfications and shutdowns, journalists in Tunisia are the targets
of much abuse, such as arrests and prison which have hit many. Egyptian ~ournal-
ists working abroad, namely:
1. They view their struggle as part of the struggle of their colleagues working
in Egypt on the premise that the battlefield for all Arab 3ournalists is a pan-
Arab arena, not a regional one.
2. Their position outside the constraints of the al-Sadat regime permits them to
speak out more frankly because they are free of the extraordinary l~ws under which
the writer inside Egypt suffers.
3. *?pwspapers of the nationalist Egyptian opposition constantly face forcible
shutdowns as happened to a1T opposition papers when a decree closing them was
promulagated last September. ~
4. There are more than 1.5 million Egyptians working in the Arab world outside
the borders of Egypt and they,need information media linking them with their
nationalist and pan-Arab cause.
The activity of Egyptian ~ournalista working abroad is an essential activity
complementing the patriotic work inside Egypt.
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The Sudanese press: President Gaafar Nimeiri has taken an array of arbitrary
actions against the journalists' union. After the union sent a note to the
president last August protesting the law imposing press censorship, the author-
itiQs fired the 3ournalist, 'Umar 'Abd-al-Tam, from his job as a reporter on the
newspaper, AL-AYYAM, and retired three members of the union council.
When the elections of the 3ournalists' unions were held during January of last
year, the elections that resulted in the victory of the members of the opposition
in the old council, the president responded the day after the results appeared by
issuing a decree dissolving the union in his capacity as chairman of the Socialist
Union and forming a committee to reconsider th.a press law of 1977 so as to ensure
that the union would adhere to the political line dictated by the government.
The decree to dissolve the union came as a response to its re~ection of the
regime's policy and its adoption of a clear stance condemning the Camp David
agreements and denouncing al-Sadat's actions in normalizing relations with the
Zionist entity. Also, in its note, the union had revealed the regime's responsi-
bility for the deteriorating economic, political and social conditions and had
denounced its information policy which misled the masses and concealed facts fxom
them.
Hence there have been the attempts to contain the Arab press to 3ustify the
capitulatory solutions which have been a prime ob~ective the conspiracy has been
working to achieve and hence the suppressive mea~sures in various forms which have
been applied against the ~ournalists who have re~ected thes~ capitulatory solutions
ar.d have tried to expose them to Arab public opinion.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
8389
CSO: 4404/269
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INTER-~1RAB
~ BRIEFS .
PI.~.STICS INDUSTRY DEVELOPING RAPIDLY--In 1985, the Arab countries will be able to
export manufactured plastic goods worth $550 million and will export $1.8 billion
worth of these materials in 1990 out of a total production which at that time is
estimated will exceed $5 billion. The Imperial British Chemical Corporation ex-
~ pects Arab plastic producta to compete with European and American.production in
Third World markets. [Text] [Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 256, 8-14 Jan~
82 p 56] [COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-'~RABI] 8389
CSO: 4404/269 .
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OPEC AFFAIRS
OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES SELL GOLD IN EUROPE
PM261637 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 26 Feb 82 p 38 ~
[Report by David Marsh: "Gold Sales by Oil Exporfers Depress Ma.rket"]
[Text] Oil exporting countries, headed by Iran have been selling gold in Europe
in the past few weeks to alleviate balance of payments difficulties c.~used by
the sharp fall in the oil. price.
Persistent sales from the Middle East, combined with offloading by the main
producers, South Africa and the Soviet Union, have been a pri.ncipal factor
driving the gold price down to a 2 1/2 year low this month, according to inter-
national bullion dealers.
Apart from Iran, Iraq is also thought to have~ been selling gold although details
are unclear. These two countries led a string of buyers from the Organisation of
Petrolewn Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1980, when the gold price was about
double its present level of $360-$370 an oimce. ~
A Zurich dealer said last night: "They did not make a very good investment."
Dealers do not rule out the possibility that Libya--which bought a lot in London
at the beginning of last year--may also have been selling recently.
News of the sales has emerged as the OPEC surplus has been rapidly diminishing.
The oil states as a group are now again.net borrowers from the international
banking system.
_ Apart from the falling oil price both Tehran and Baghdad have been hard hit
- tinancially by the 18-month war between them.
The change in OPEC's ~ortunes is having widespread repercussions on financial
markets. Yesterday fears that Kuwait might start selling Japanese stocks because
of its weakening finances were among the factors behind a sharp fa11 on the Tokyo
stock market.
According to one dealer the Iranian gold has been dumped on the market by Bank
Markazi, the country's central bank, in a"rather uneducated" fashion.
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Iran and several other OPEC nations--including Indonesia, ~ahich also made big
bullion purchases in 1980--have been sounding out Western banks about raising
gold-backed credits.
Bank Markazi would prefer to use it~ gold as col.lateral rather than selling it
outright, in ordei to avoid further downward pressure on the price.
Many European banks approached by Tehran have been reluctant to lend because of
fears about the country's ability to repay. The advantages of gold collateral
are greatly reduced when the bullion price is weak.
A London bullion banker said: "I wouldn`t like to be sitting on a pile of gold
~ from Iran. They don't know where their next dollar is coming from."
According to one estimate of the 60-90 tonnes of gold Iran previously had stored
in Europe--some of which was held aC the Bank of England--35 tonnes may have
been used in collateral deals. The rest is being sold, and may be almost
exhausted.
The Tehran government is believed to have at least 200 tonnes more in Iran. But
the country's rulers are not likely to move this "bedrock reserve" to the West
for selling or collateral use unless all other financing channels are blocked.
The large amotmt of gold bought by both offir,ial and private investors in the
Middle East in 1979/80 was seen as a significant prop for the price at the time.
But it is now regsrded by bullion dealers as a dangerous overhang threatening
the market.
A European dealer said: "As soon as they (OPEC) started to buy, they became
pote:~tial sellers."
Another said that the further the gold price went down the more bullion would be
sold by disappointed Middle East holders. "There are certainly investors around
~ wanting to buy--but they are waiting for the price to become cheaper."
COPYRIGHT: The Financial Times Ltd, 1982
CSO: 4400/143
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~ AFGHANISTAN
'
SOVIETS SEEN USING CARROT-STICK METHOD ON AFGHANS
London THE ECONOMIST in ~nglish 27 Feb 82 gp 53-54 .
~ ~Text] .
The Russians seem to be trying new Tfic gucrrillas wcrc active laxt month in
tactics in Afghanistan.. Afghans prepared parwan province, north-wcst of Kabul.
to co-operate with the communist gov- Soviet troops movcd in, bnmbarded vil-
- ernment and its Russian protectors are ~~ges, destrayed crops and carried out
offered a remarkable amount of freedom, summary executions. The area is now
while those who resist continue to bs yuiet. Villages on the Kabul-to-Gardez
punished ruthlessly: The stick and' the road wcre told that for every convoy
carrot is taking over from the stick and attacked a village would be destroyed.
the stick. Most convoys are now getting through.
- Kandahar, Afghanistan's second Iar- ,
That s the stick,~but the Russians make
gest city, has been a particular victim of ~t clear that ~it can be avoided. Villagers
the stick. according to reports re$ching who keep the guerrillas out of their areas .
Peshawar. the refugee centre in Pakistan. ~an choose their oan�leaders, administra-
; Until recently. guerrillas were able to t~rs, even_governors. They can ask for
move freely in parts of Kandahar, occa- money to build mosques and seek advice
; sionally firing on Russian soldiers without on their crops. There have been hints
suffering serious reprisals. However, ' from the ministry of tribes that the Path-
after the most recent attack, when twa ans may soon be given a degree of
armoured cars were knocked out and autonomy. Nealth centres are being
several Russians killed, the reaction was built; so a~e kindergartens, libraries and
fierce. The old city and its bazaars were schools. Consumer goods are subsidised. '
shelled and bombed and several hundred ~e Russians are buying themselves rela-
Kandaharis were reported killed or ~~ve peace in some areas.
wounded. The local people persuaded
the guerr..!las to cease operations and ~-y-,,.r . RUSSII
.
since thc.~ the city has been calm. ~
A few weeks later there was a minor ~M ~,aa. '
guerrilla attock in Herat. Within hours AF~~ AF6HANISTAN ~
the city was surrounded by Soviet troops, ~
who carried out house-to-house searchPs. ,~�y. .
Thousands of inen are said to have been � ~ P~KIEi1M ~
arrested o~ press-ganged into the Afghan . PAKISTIIN
: ~ O MiM ~O
~~rmy. Again thc local po~ulaliun acked '
thc gucrrillax to withdraw. Again ~the The Russians arrived in Afghanistan in
~ucrrilla~ agrced. December, 1979, expecting to be wel-
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comed. They arc now facing reality. This IecKed. Others want �more raids on gov-
week the Soviet army newspaper Red ernment installations and attacks on con-
Star published an unusually frank ac- voys. But the Russians are improving
count of the war in Afghanistan, conced- the'v defences: these days convoys are
ing tl~at Russian soldiers sometimes have usually esoorted by. helicopter gunships.
a"very, very difficult life" there. It said The resista~ce is split between moder-
that "thovsands of bandits" are sent each ates and fundamentalists, who are them-
day.into Afghanistan and~the "blood of selves divided. Throughout the winter
innocent people is flowing". ln one at- high-level meetings have been held in
tack by guerrillas, hostages had been Peshawar to forge some kind of unity,
skinned alive, Red Star's correspondent pariicularly within thc tund~+mcnt:di~is'
said. This week a report reaching Delfii rankr. 7'hey nc~w hevic eme flag and onc
� said that a Russian general had died in a ~)~S;in, and s~on thcy will h:+vc one
helicopter brought down by a guerrilla headed notepaper.
rocket. The fear in Peshawar is that gucrnilas
Some guerrilla groups based in in the tield will go their own way. Alli-
Peshawar are advocating a spectacular ances have been created amnng fighting
operation, perhaps the seizing of a town. men which bear little relation to the
But this would lead to heavy civilian factions in Peshawar, which many com-
casualties for the unfortunate town se- manders regard as simply a source oi
� ~ arms.
COPYRIGHT: The Economist Newspapers Limited 1982
CSO: 4600/2$4
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~
' ALGERIA
AGRICULTURAL POLICIES EXAMINED �
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS in Fr~nch No 1888, 15 Jan 82 p 125
[Text] In early autwan, the Nationa~ Agrarian Revolution Commis>~ion (CNRA) made a
practical evaluation of the agricultural sector. This evalua~ion showed both
significant results and serious deficieacies. ~
Slightly more than 1.5 million hectares were recovered in the first 2 stages of
the agrarian revolution; 93 percent of this area was redistxibuted to nearly 100,000
_ recipients; 132 farm villages were built and 224 are under constructioa. Nine-tenths
of communes have a Communal Multi-Service Agricultural Cooperative (CAPCS).
However, many deficiencies still exist: Except in the governorate of Algiers, where
first- and second-stage operations were completed as planned, survey and demarcation
files are missing or are incomplete, appeal decisions aYe sometimes atill not imple-
mented and too many local officials seem unconcerned about ~r~ agrarian revolution.
The CNRA will therefore continue its efforts for completion of the first and second
, stages throughout the country as soon as possible.
The reorganization of self-managed farms, scheduled to be completed by March 1982,
is reportedly well underway in several governorates (Mostaganem, Annaba, Ji~el,
etc.) and the minister of agriculture and agrarian revolution, Mr Selim Saadi, ia
stepping up inspections. He has given special attention to the problem of supervi-
~ sion in particular: Engineers and technician~s are apparently not always welcome .
in rural areas, where a new organization with differentiated functions must be
achieved for the sake of the public interest. Modern production will require not
only specialists in agronomy and hydrology, but also mechanics; as a result, farm
equipment will no longer be unavailable and each reorganized farm will be required
to outfit its own repair shop.
Mr Selim Saadi did not conceal his surprise that for nearly 20 years there have
been groups organized according to bases tA which no serious thought was given.
He now intends to establieh homogeneous and economically viable entities: For
example, truck farms of approximately 100 hectares and grain farms of about
1,000 hectares.
~ THe minister pointed out that we must not "consider the reorganization only from
the standpoint of land; it involves a group of ineasures which are essential for
reviving the agricultural sector" Unauthorized occupants must be evicted,
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the agricultural infrastructure must be restored, self-construction must be launched,
and workers must be provided with parcels of land to mobilize the family's work
potential. All of this is intended to improve living and working condxtions and
to achieve production that is better planned, making it possible to reach the targets
established by the plan.
Presidential Support
One result, among others, of President Chadli Bend~edid's inspections in.the
governorates of Annaba and Guelma in early autumn was to stress the necessitv of
giving priority in development to agriculture, the "priority of priorities the
true wealth of future generations." A native of the Annaba area, having grown up
in the agricultural community, the president is actually particularly well qualified
to point out the agricultural orientation of the region and to stress, more generally,
the ma~or role which agriculture must resum~ in the Algerian economy.
Thus it has been found th~t despite the wealth of land, in the governorate of Annaba
agriculture has been sacrificed to particularly intense industrialization. The
capital of the governorate, which has become overpopulated and surrounded by shanty-
towns, has drained the rural population, who have been attracted by the prospect
of, steady, and hopefully well-paying, ~obs; the countryside has been deserted, some
villages are almost empty and there is no farm labor available.
The minister of agrieulture and agrarian revolution emphasized the constant reduction
of land under cultivation to the Council of Min~st~rs, which met to evaluate the
results of the president's inspection. In 3 years, fr~~m 1974 to 1977, agriculture
lost 21,000 hectares of irrigated land. Farm area per inhabitant dropped from 0.75
hectare in 1963 to 0.40 hectare in 1979 and if this situation is not rectified,
this figure will be only 0.14 hectaXe by the year 2000. The Council of Ministers
has therefore decided to strictly apply legal measures f~r conserving farmlands,
to eliminate encroachments on the agricultural sector, to provide for the resettle-
ment of people in rural areas, in particular through.the allocation of land for
building, dwellings and self-construction facilities. ,
In some ways, the struggle of farmworkers to prevent their lands from being used
for construction has already begun; such is the case of a farm in the commune of
Cheraga, a portion of which uras allocated to a building cooperative. There is
actually talk in Algiers that the entire Mitid3a may well be buried under a slab
of concrete in 20 years; it currently provides one-third of Algerian production
of vegetables and citrus fruits.
All leaders are now contributing to the agricultural campaign. Opening the Seventh
Congress of the National Union of Algerian Farmers, Mr Mohammed Cherif Messadia,
the regular secretary of the FLN Central Committee, stressed the need for cultural,
political and ideological training of farmers: "The agricultural community must
be turned into a real revolutionary force." Recalling that the agrarian revolution
was aimed particularly at abolishing man's exploitation of man, he concluded: "One
year we will make a profit, whereas another year we will have a loss, but that is
not the most important thing; it is human development which must be considered."
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Mr Selim Saadi stated that in the future, each farniworker will have a parcel of
land to cover his family needs: "This sight must be eliminated in the future:
A farmer returning through the fields to his hoine, carrying a carton of eggs pur- ~
chased in the capital of the governorate."
_ Farmers Will Retain Tax Exemptions
In his "Speech to the Nation" of 20 December 1981, President Chadli BEnd~edid stated
, that "Algeria's future basically lies in the dynamization and development of agri-
culture" by youth, who will be trained to work the land. In this regard, the presi-
dent's tone was optunistic. He said that he believed tha.t the agricultural sector
is undergoing "a considerable improvement" as a result of recent measures: reorgani-
zation of the socialist sector, allocation of material and human resources, particu-
larly technicians and professionals, etc. ?'r.~ growth rate of agricultural production
is now higher than the rate of population gro~rth.
The president expressly confirmed that "the farmer will continue to receive tax
- exemptions and material and financfal services"; the earnings of farmers will not
be affected at all,'~egardless of the ~rofit they make as a result of honest work
devoid of all exploitation, increased production and improved productivity and the
search for new resources in the context of direct or indirect agricultural work
or traditional crafts."
; These remarks give the impression of encouragement for the agricultural sector,
but it is not the only or.e being considered: "These are," the president concluded,
"the ultimate goals of the Agrarian Revolution," in support of which new efforts
; must be made.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
11915
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~
EGYPT
~
~
WRITER EXPECTS NO IrIl~IEDIATE SHIFT TOWARD STRONG PAN-ARA~ POLICIES
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARA:~I in Arabic No 248, 13-19 Nov 81 pp 78-79
[Article by Amir Iskandar: "Future of Intellectual Currents in Egypt"]
[Text] Perhaps talking about *.he future of the pan-Arab current in Egypt entails
considerable risk because any words not carrying the emotional enthusiasm dis-
played by most of the Arab information media in the wake of al-Sadat's assassina-
~ tion or any words that do not follow the orator�y proceseions urging the need of
~ ' Egypt's return to the "Arab ranks" and that at times even hail "Egypt's actual
g
return on the basis of some public press statements, some rumors or some facts
concernin secret contacts and visits--any such words may shock the reader who
dreams of Egypt's resumption of its vanguard role in the Arab procession and who
. hopes that the Arab conflicts may have ended with an opportune strike of fate or
luck.
I want to reassure the reader that this issue is not exactly what these lines
seek to tackle. The series of events that have taken place and that are still
~ taking place in Egypt haven't ended yet. The "scenario" whose implementation
started on last 6 October--regardless of its author or authors--still has chap-
ters that have not been completed yet. Completing these chapters may take some
weeks or some months, regardless of the rsturn of Egypt or of the return of the
Arabs to Egypt in the coming days under the canopy of the existing political and
social given facts. This helps to confirm or to doubt some analyses which assume
~ that the events in Egypt will follow specific scenarioa with the elimination.of
! al-Sadat. The more important ~ueation pertains to Egypt's resumption of its van-
, guard pan-Arab role in the future that ie more distant than the next few weeks'
or months. What are the possibilities of such resumption, what are its internal
and external requirements and what spheres are~open to it?
In fact, this question raises the iasue, or dileanna, of the future of the pan-
~ Arab current in Egypt because this current is the one that was linked, at least
in the past, to the central role which Egypt played insofar as the Arab homeland
~ as a whole is concerned. The defeat of this current has been accompanied by
; Egypt's retreat to within its shell, to ite desertion of this role, or to with-
drawing this role from it, and to the subsequent multiplicity of the centers of
' polarization in the Arab arena.
' From the mid-1950's and until nearly the end of the 1960's, this current was tied
' to Nasirism. The current found in the peraonality of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir the
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practical political leadership that proved its ability not only to crystallize
this political current in Egypt alone but also to extend it beyond Egypt's borders
and to penetrate with it the Arab homeland from one end to the other. Egypt's
Arabism is definitely not of 'Abd al-Nasir's making. Even the very ideology of
Arab nationalism is not his personal innovation. Moreov~r, at the outset of .!Abd
al-Nasir's procession, Arabism was no more than one of three circles through wh~.ch
'Abd al-Nasir believed Egypt had to move. But when the development of events and
the progression of his own thought motivated 'Abd al-Nasir to cons~.der Arabism
the fundamental circle of Egypt and when he threw all his weight and all of
Egypt's weight behind the center of this circle, the ma~or transformation took
place, not only in Egypt but throughout the entire Arab sphere. Egypt consti-
tutes one-third of all the Arabs in terms of population. In terms of the old and
contemporary cultural criterion, Egypt is the most advanced Arab country. It has
a position and a status that have enabled it to be not 3ust an Arab "country" but
an Arab "role." Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir was certainly a great leader. But he would
not have achieved a gart of what he did achieve had not Egy~:t been behind him with
all its historical, geographic, human and cultural weight. The essence of his
greatness lies not only in the fact that he knew how to touch of� all the latent
capabilities but also in his enlightened awareness of the given facts of a spe-
cific historical moment at both the Arab and the international levels.
_ The Arab reality suffered at the time from some sort of ideological vacuum and
lacked the leadership personality capable of uniting the Arab voice. The Arab
reality [world] was a vast and tumultuous ocean seeking a"center." Cairo was
able at the t~me to play the role of the center. It extended its hand wherever
it could to every Arab uprising, movement and spark of struggle. Sparks flew off
everywhere from Algiers to Baghdad. The reactionary forces retreated to their
dark cells and the arena became free for the Arab liberation forces to wage their
triumphant battle against imperialism and ;:oloni.alism. The Egyptian media were
not the only extremely sharp weapon brandished in the face of the nation's ene-
mies. The military ammunition carried by the [Egyptian] military instructors and
advisers [was another such weapon]. On the mountains of Yemen and the hills of
Aden fell thousands of the martyrs of freedom and of enlightenment who had come
- from Egypt. However, it must be said that the historical moment was totally op-
portune at the international level, not only for the Arab homeland but perhaps
for all the Third World countries. It was the moment of exact and prec~se inter-
national balance between the two superpowers and the blocs behind them. The
fires of the Korean war had been extinguished in 1953 and the winds of the cold
war began to blow actively in the international sphere, giving rise to the sharp
~ rivalry between the two blocs--a rivalry which tickled the feelings of the Third
World and whetted the appetite of its national liberation movements to make na-
tional gains through the cold-faced but raging conflicts between the two super-
powers.
It was thus that the world witnessed at the time the birth of Bandung [confer-
enceJ, knew the breaking of the arms monopoly for the first time and heard the
phrases of positive neutrality and independence of the national will from voices
coming from the heart of the old continents. It was also thus that the world
cleared a large and lighted part of its theater for personalities with slark,
black and yellow faces to emerge surrounded by the halos of the struggle for
liberation from the oppression of long centuries o� colonialism. Perhaps it is
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_ not incompatible with the inevitability of that historical moment to say that the
first modern Arab unity found under the canopy of the restraining international
balance its secure way to reaiization and acceptance.
So in one sense, 'Abd al-Nasir, like Lumumba, Sukarno, Nkroma, Sekou Toure and
even Nehru (may we add to them even Tito?), was a natural and logical product of
certain international conditions and certain strategic balances. Naturally, all
this doesn't abolish the individual's distinctive historical role and doesn't
diminish the depth and importance of the popular or mass will. But it places the
current in its true course, with the current's movement being governed by the
distance between the two banks.
The winds continued to blow as the ships wanted them to blow until nearly the mid-
1960's and perhaps to the end of Khruschev's and Kennedy's era, Then the tempera-
ture started to rise with the gradual transforn~ation of the international strug-
gle from the phase of peaceful coexistence to the phase of detente. The curtain
_ began to fall slowly on the successful and exciting acts dur.ing which the skil-
ful players reaped the fruits of their dazzling movements on the tightrope strung
over two abysses. The rope was no longer as strong as it had been and those who
tried to continue their game, being unaware of or ignoring the changes of the new
historical moments, were heard falling hard in Africa and Asia. The dark shadows
of history prevailed over their actual or symbolic ends. ~
Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir did not fall at the time but preparations were being made for
his downfall. Peri~aps it is not insignificant to recaTl now that the famous Mason
mission sent by K~nnedy near the end of his era demanded as the primary U..S. con-
dition that Egypt leadership role in the Arab world be cut down to size and con-
fined to Egypt's geographic borders. Naturally 'Abd al-Nasir refused to bring
about his own end or to commit.suicide willingly. Only 2 yeara later, Israel per-
formed the role and the task for which it had been created and the catastrop'he
occurred on 5 June 1967. The painful catastrophe revealed not only the faulty
internal calculations but also the destructive international calculations. In-
stead of continuing to play it cqquettishly against the two camps, as he had done
in trre past, the most skilful player who had been weakened by his wounds had to
accept reluctantly the pressures of both camps and of the masses themselves who
had suddenly opened their eyes, while still in the trance of their faith in the
historical hero and in the inevitability of the victory, to the debris of the
dream. They also started to exert their pressure to demand their (relatively
significant) and indefinitely suspended role.
The truth is that the historical hero exerted superhuman efforts in the 3 years
, following the 5 June defeat to rebuild his armed forces. He did actually reali2p
an amazing accomplishment whose results emerged 3 years later in October 1973
when along with the Bar-lev line, the myth of the invincible Israeli army was
destroyed. But fate did not wait for the hero to see with his own eyes his forces
move to the usurped bank of the canal. He died at an inopportune moment. That
was not the time for death but for living, or perhaps for regaining life. But
who knows! Perhaps he preferred to depart, having become aware, through his bit-
ter experience and his penetrating perception, that he could no longer continue
to play tlie international game which had brought him at a historical moment the
wreaths of victory from the ocean to the Gulf.
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Did Nasirism end with the end of its hero? Throughout the geriod in which he was
in control of power, al-Sadat sentenced Nasirism to death. He tried to destroy it
completely, holding it responsible for the mista~ces of its domestic actions and
for the sins of its era. A1-Sadat then pulled Egypt's reins, taking it out of
the Arab homeland's broad spheres and leading it back to its isolated cocoon. A1-~
Sadat thus fulfilled all that Mason had demanded before~and carried out the U.S.
conditions in full. He even begged and tempted the United States to impose on
Egypt harder conditions than the previous ones. He turned Egypt into an extremely
pale star rev~lving without any will in the imperialist-Zionist sphere. A1-Sadat
reduced to the point of feebleness Egypt's progressive Arab role. Thus, the
tumultuous ocean lost its noble and influential center and numerous islands re-
volving around conflicting--at times to the point of armed hostility--centers
emerged amidst the waves of this ocean. International polarization then started
to play its ever-present game for further parasitic fragmentation and division.
But if it is true that talking about the modern pan-Arab current in Egypt means,
in one way or another, talking about the Nasirist current, can it be said then
that this current has reached a deadend? The poaing of this question should not
be understood to mean in any way casting doubts on Egypt's Arabi~n or its pan-
Arab, civilizational or cultural identity. It should not be even understood to
mean casting doubts on Egypt's suspended role in the Arab homeland. The question
does not pertatn to the Arabism of the masses or their emotional and intellectual
inclinations. The question pertains to the pan-Arab intellectual current crys-
tallized by Nasirism in a number of ideas, visualizations and concepts and trans-
ferred by.Nasirism from the sphere of thought to the sphere of action, even though
the current, as thought, preceded Nasirism by generations of thinkers and by sev-
eral decades of time.
A1-Sadat is no more. The "family head," as he used to call himself, has died in ~
the middle of his real family--the representatives of the imperialist and Western
interests and of the multi-national companies. But has al-Sadatism ended? Has
Egypt's isolation ended and is the road open to Egypt to regain its pan-Arab role?
The answer to this question is not connected with the hopes and not even with the
~ ~ reports leaked.here and there about secret visits and tacit agreements. All these
[leaked reports] are the highest phase of al-Sadatism, if we may use the phrase.
What do we see at the domestic level? ~The social structure--in its comprehensive
sense--which pro~ected, nurtured and brought to bloom the progressive pan-Arab
current in Egypt in the 1950's and 1960's has been exposed, like it or not, to a
complete domestic coup. The middlemen, speculators, representatives of the for-
eign monopolies and other parasitic groups--which altogether forin the first base
of al-Sadatist regime--have expanded the membership of society's top club. There
are now in Egypt hundreds of millionnaires who have gathered, or looted, their
fortunes in numerous spheres, such as financial firms, banks, tourism, consumer
trade and farms within the framework of the so-called food security. This is in
addition to the monies plundered from the Western aid, loans and grants. Behind
these groups, there are the broader groups of the wealthy rural people who own the
fruit, vegetable and medical and aromatic herb farms. Behind all these, there is
an arnry of bank and tourist establishment employees and workers of the various
service pro~ects which pay high wages and which are connected with al-Sadat's
"open-economy" era. If we add to all these the army of Egyptians working in the
~ Arab countries and the families related to them inside Egypt and including
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millions of inembers, we can ultimately understand the extent of the change which
has affected the Egyptian social structure from within.
Even though emphasis must be laid on this "internal picture," the dimensions a�
the external picture are also extremely influential and significant. With thp
strong international polarization, especially in the Reaganite phase, the emer-
gence of the oil center tied to the West and embodied basically in financial-
banking structures that are tantamount to stations [branches] of the ma~or capi-
talist financial centers--the emergence of this oil center pulls strongly at the
reins of most of the area's countries, bringing them closer together and driving
them toward stronger ties with imperialism and stronger imperialist domination
of their political, economic and ideological fates.
This certainly doesn't mean confiscation of the future because ultimately, history
progresses from its worst sides. But the price being paid by the peoples seems to
be more exorbitant than ever before. The image of the pan-Arab and progressive
Egypt does definitely appear in the distant horizon. But the path toward this
_ Egypt does not rely on a fortunate or lucky strike and is not expected of a new
phase in which, some people dream, history will repeat itself. Egypt's army is
certainly a national and pan-Arab army. But this army alone will not make the
desired change that is compatible with the changes in the world and with the re-
quirements of the phase. The army is truly the striking arm, but only in a body
of forces led by a progressive national and pan-Arab front.
When this is realized, a new Horus will be born naturally and Egypt will regain
its previous heart, its ever-living heart.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
8494 �
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LIBYA
BRIEFS
CZECH ROAD CONTRACTS--The bulletin ECONOMIC DIGEST, published by the Czechoslovak
Chamber of Commer~v and Industry, emphasizes 3n its December 1981 issue that the
construction of highways is one of the areas of collaboration between Czechoslova-
kia and Libya. This job is being done by the Strojexport foreign trade enterprise
in coordination with the Olomouc Transport Construction Enterprise and the Dopras-
tav Transport Construction Enterprise of Bratislava. One of the results of their
co~on efforts is a section of 350 kilometers of road linking the towns of Nalut
and Ghadamea. Other contracts were signed between Stro~export and its Libyan
partners, dealing with the construction of six highway sections with a total
length of a'~out 270 kilometers. The f irst section of 22 kilometers has already
been completed; three sections are in the process of construction and the remain-
ing two sections are in the preparation stage. The work is being done according
to a specific work glan and will b'e finished by the specified target dates, that
is, during 1982 and during the first half of 1983. Czechoslovak and Libyan offi-
cials are looking into possibilities of signing a new agreement under whose terms
the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic would build an additional 250 kilometers of
roads in Libya. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
No 1888, 15 Jan 82 g 133] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Mor+eux et Cie Paris 1982] 5058
DEVELOPMENT BUDGET--Budget for 1982 trimmed. Libya's development budget for FY
1982 will be smaller than the one for the preceding FY, in other words, 2.4
billion Libyan dinars (about $8 billion [as published]), as against 2.7 billion
dinars (about $9 billion [as published]) in 1981. The reduction'of this budget
was decided in view of the prospects of petroleum revenues. Petroleum exports,
which had dropped to 600,000 barrels per day last October, have however been going
up again since then. The sectors that received the most allocations under the
1982 development budget are agriculture (347 million dinars) and the heavy indus- �
try (493 million). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
No 1888, 15 Jan 82 p 133] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 5058
PROJECT TO TRANSPORT WA'rER--Libya is thinking of carrying out a vast pro~ect for
transporting sweet water from the desert xagic~ns of Tazirbu and Sarir toward the
Gulf of Sidra for agricultural production an~t urban food supply. This pro~ect,
- which will be covered by between 100 and 200 contra~tis, is broken down as fol-
lows: equipment for 270 wells (a certain num'~er of which has already been drilled);
interconr.~P,~tion of various wells by means of a pipeline network with a diameter
between 80 centimeters and 3.40 meters, made of prestressed concrete or steel
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(all pipes will have to be made in Libya; bidding invitations will be issued in
the near future for the construction if six plants); construction of tanks; in-
stallation of all necessary s~condary equipment for the generation aad transmis-
sion of electric power, pumping stations, etc. New towns have also been planned
(Tazirbu and Sarir, in particular) as well as roads, schools, hospitals, etc. .
[Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1889,
22 Jan 82 p 193] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moraux et Cie Paris 1982] 5058
CSO: 4519/114 ~
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MAURITANIA
1982 BUDGET APPROVED, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS NOTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1885, 25 Dec 81 p 3424
[Text] Adoption of the 1982 budget, 11.46 Billion Mauritanian Ouguiya 11.3
Percent) ~ .
The Military Committee for National Salvation [CMSN] which met under the chairman-
, ship of the Mauritanian head of state Lt Col Mohamed Khouna Ould flaidalla, has
adopted the state budget for 1982. This Uudget has taken into consideration all
of the recommendations contained in the plan for economic and financial recovery
adopted in 1978 by the CMSN. .
The 1982 budget af 3ncome and expenses amounts to 11,466,329,320 Mauritanian .
ouguiya,~ ar an increase of 1,166,329,320 Mauritanian ouguiya in total value and
11.3 percent in relative value. The increase in anticipated income in 1982 involves
customs receipts and direct taxes.
Placing the tax rolls on a computer, authorized auditing of collection, and im-
~ proving taxation division operations 3ustify an increase in tax revenues. Further-
more, actions will be undertaken to effectively combat tax fraud. ~
Reform of the general tax code tends toward a simplification of the tax base reg-
ulations and to tax relief by raising the income level exempt from general income
. tax from 45,000 to 80,000 Mauritanian ouguiya, lowering the BIC [Expansion unknown]
rate, and lowering the property tax rate on rental properties from 15 to 12 percent,
and on principal residence properties from 15 to 4 percent.
_ Social measures have been taken for 1982. They include a special increase in wages
applying to all wage earners, as opposed to the contractual increases granted in
1980-81 which only involved those warning less than 10,00U and 15,000 Mauritanian
ouguiya.
CMSN: Recommendations on the Economy, Administration and Housing
. During its regular session from 8 to 11 December, the CMSN examined the overall
situation of Mauritania and defined the booad lines of the political, economic and
_ social program for 1982.
The CMSN recommended the immediate implementation of administrative decentraliza-
tion initiated by the gnvernment, the methods for which have been defined by the
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interministerial commission created for this purpose. The committee further
recommiended that the government prepare economic programs of community interest
for the regions and rigorously executed them.
The CMSN was obliged to note the disastrous situation of most public institutions:.
banks and other Mauritanian public companies. According to the committee, the
financial difficulties in which the state companies find themselves are basically
due to laxness and to granting abnormally high salaries and accommodating advan-
tages such as high compensation benefits.~ The CMSN commite the government to take
immediate steps to review the texts dealing with the deliberative assemblies of
national enterprises.
Regarding housing, the CMSN finds, on the one hand, an alarming increase in rent
- from year to year, malcing gradual absorption of the budget deficit more difficult
and, on the other hand, the existence of close to a thousand persons occupying
government or official housing illegally under the terms o~ regulations currently
in force, while thousands of others with lega]. claims are without housing. This
situation is contrary to the CMSN's recommendations and has been since October 1979.
Consequently, Che CMSN requests the government to furnish a study proposing a
final solution to this problem as quickly as possible.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris 1981
- 9693
CSO: 4519/89
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MOROCCO
LUMBER INDUSTRY REVIEWED ~
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1888, 15 Jan 82 p 131
[Text] The Moroccan lumber industry is still characterized by the existence of many
small and mediwn-size manufacturing'plants and some large companies. It is neverthe-
less a relatively developed industry which has growa considerably over the last 10
years, particularly as a result of the expansion of the construction sec~or, which
determines the development of this industry to a large extent. Zn its study of the
~ industry, the Moroccan Foreign Trade Bank (BMCE) lists detailed figures which cannot
be reproduced here. However, the bank's introductory statement contains a summary
of the report, which we have provided in full and which successively describes the
industry's sources of supply, its structure and production, applications and ma.rket.
Sources of Supply .
The lumber industry is supplied primarily by imported timber and secoadarily by
timber produced domestically.
The domestic source of supply is Moroccan forests, with timberland of 5.282 million
hectares. Natural forests cover 4.912 million hectares, or 93 percent of wooded
areas, comprising 2.730 million hectares of hardwoods (cork oak, evergreen oak,
argan), 1.422 million hectares of conifers (thu3as, 3uniper, cedar, pine and
760,000 hectares of minor species (pistachio, tizra Artificially planted
forests cover 370,000 hectares or 7 percent of timberland, with 222,000 hectares
of hardwoods (eucalyptus, poplars) and 148,000 hectares of conifers (pines).
Thi"s sizable potential helps to satisfy only a small percentage of structural and ~
industrial timber needs, since most Moroccan timber is unsuitable for industrial
use, with the exception of walnut used for veneering, eucalyptus used for pitprops
and Zeen oak used for railroad ties. Thus most domestic production is used mainly
to satisfy firewood needs. ~
One result of this situation is that imported timber plays an important role in
supplying the l~ber industry. Such imports amouat to 300,000 to 400,000 tons
annually and include conifers, common woods and mahogany in particular. Thus from
1976 to 1980, Moraccan imports of rough timber rose from 319,311 tons valued at
_ 246 million dirhams (or an average price of 770.7'1 dirhams/ton) to 370,088 tons
valued at 434 million dirhams (or an average.price of 1,173.16 dirhams/ton). This
was an increase of 15.9 percent in weight and 76.4 percent in value. Imported timber
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is subject to a customs duty of 10 percent upon entry, or 48.12 percent ad valorem
with all taxes included, and comea fxom the USSR, Ivory Coast, Spain, Portugal,
Gabon, France and Yugoslavia. ~
Structure and Production
The lumber industry is comprised of the following operations: production of dressed
timber; veneering and production of plywood and panels; structural woodwork; manu-
facture of packing items; manufacture of furniture and padding.
All of these operations combined include 113 manufacturing plants, employ 5,683
persons and utilize the following equipment: conveqor-belt barkers for dressing, ~
_ rotary lathes, slicers, presses and dryers for veneers and plywood, automa.tic staplers
for packaging in wooden crates.
Based on the latest survey of processing industries, the lumber industry uses 56
percent of inechanical production capacity on the average and requires 23,550 dirhams
to create 1 new ~ob, whose apparent expected productivity is 21,260 dirhamslyear.
Lumber industry operations in 1977 had a turaover of 501 million dirhams, production
of 482 million dirhams and investments of 22 million dirhams. This sector is charac-
terized by a high concentration of its operations in large plants. Of the 113 plants
mentioned, 12 companies accounted for 66.7 percent of sales, 65.6 percent of produc-
tion and 64.6 percent of added value. Each of these 12 companies had a turnover
of more than 10 million dirhams.
Following processing, the lumber has several applications. As a packing material,
it is used to manufacture crates of sawn or reinforced lumber and blocks for packing
citrus fruits, early fruits and vegetables and beverages. This market is estimated
at 40/60 million units and is experiencing problems as a result of competition from
cardboard and plastic. In the construction sector, which repre~ents a very lazge
outlet, the liunber is used to manufacture doors, windows, partitions This
market is also experiencing a recovery. Finally, lumber is also used to manufacture
furniture (wardrobes, armchairs, sofas, tables, desks, etc.). This market is ex-
periencing substantial development, with a turnover of more than 188 million dirhams,
accounting for nearly 30 million dirhams of exports.
COPYRIGIiT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
~ 11915
CSO: 4519/103
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~
SUDAN
BRIEFS
AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT--During a visit to the Sudan in.November, a delegation from
the Daimler-Benz Company together with Sudanese authorities studied a pro~ect for
the establishment of an assembly plant for tractors and other agricultural equip-
ment. This pro~ect would be financed by Daimler-Benz, the Gezira Farmers Associa-
tion, the government of the central region, and the Tractors and Agr3cultural
Equipment Assembly Company. We recall that the Massey Ferguson Company in 1980
conducted talks and studies along these lines with the support of the 5udanese
Development Corporation which however did not lead anywhere because of essentially
financial proble~ns. [TextJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
No 1888, 15 Jan 82 p 134] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 5058
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS--NAPCO (National Petroleum Company) distr~.bution activities.
The first of nine service stations of NAPCO has ~ust been opened at Omdurman.
The Sudanese company has also received a loan of $1.5 million from the Spanish
government, intended for the purchas~ of a dozen 8,000-gallon tank trucks which
will be assigned to the transportation of petroleum products between Port-Sudan
and the capital. Parallel to this, negotiations were.started to tr.ansfer the share
of 25 percent, held by the province of Khartum in NAPCO capital, to the General
Petroleum Company of the Ministry of Energy and Mines. The other two stockholders,
the People's Cooperative Bank and Tot~l, will retain their shares of 37.5 percent.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS in French No 1888, 22 Jan 82
p 193] [COPYRIGHT: Rerie Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 5058
RAILWAY EQUIPMENT--Equipment purchase. Among railroad equipment purchases an
' announced in recent months by the Sudanese Railway Corporation, we note the
following:.300 cattle cars (supplied by Belgium); l0U wheat [hopper] cars (Korea);
300 freight cars (Portugal); 30 locomotives (Hanschel, FRG); spare parts from
Egypt worth $813,000. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS.in
French No 1889, 22 Jan 82 p 193] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982]
- 5058
TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT--Equipment purchases. The Shaykh Muatafa al-Amin busi-
ness group, wholesale Sudanese exporters of peanuts and vegetable oils,~negotiated
with the American Mack Company for the purchase of 100 trucks to be used in trans-
porting export products between Ghezira and Port-Sudan. On the other hand, the .
Sudan Ren Chemicals Company is looking for the best solutions far the transport
of basic products for the fertilizer plant located south of Khartum, to go into
production next May. At full capacity, this plant will annually consume 100,000
tons of naphtha and 104,000 tons of fuel imported through Port-Sudan. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS in French No 1889, 22 Jan 82 p 193]
[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 5058
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NILE NAVIGATION PROJECTS--Pro~ects for Jonglei. The Sudanese-Egyptian Technical
Authority for the Nile Water is studying a program for industrial facilities to
be established in the zone through which the Jonglei Canal flows; this canal is
now being improved in the southern part of the Sudan. The pro3ects among other
- things would involve the construction of a lock, a pier, and bridges for a toti~i
of something like $50 million to be financed through the EEC. [TextJ [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1889, 22 Jan 82 p 193]
[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et~Cie Paris 1982] 5058
TEXTILE STUDY--Development of weaving industry. In cooperation with a team of
German experts, the Sudanese Industrial Research and Consultancy Institute is
conducting a study dealing with the development of the cotton weaving industry.
The German technicians belong to the German Institute of Development, an agency
specializing in the industrial problems of the Third World. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1889, 22 Jan 82 p 193J
[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 5058
GUM ARABIC PRODUCTION--Output up, development pro~ects. Sudanese production of
gum arabic should, for 1981, be 10 percent higher than what it was during the pre-
ceding year. We note in this connection that exports of gum for the period of 1?
months from September 1980 to September 1981 came to 39,000 tons as against 35,000
tons for the preceding l~s-month period. Various projects were launched in recent
months in connection with gum arabic. In addition to the two pro~ects financed
by the EEC (Sudanese Gum Belt and North Kordofan), we can report two others. The
first one is f inanced by Finland and involves the introduction of new production
methods in the province of the White Nile. If the results of this experiment are
satisfactory, it will be extended to the entire Sudan. The second one consists of
indirect aid Lor this production effort since it involves food d~natjons undar thc
WFP going to farmers who are interested in cropping gum. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1889, 22 Jan 82 p 193] [COPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 5058
ARAB AID--The Sudan on i5 December obtained a loan of $6.5 million from the Arab
Monetary Fund to make up for the deficit in its balance of payments. Since its
establishment in 1977, the Arab Monetary Fund, whose headquarters is at Abu Dhabi,
has granted Sudan loans in the amount of $70 million. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS in French No 1889, 22 Jan 82 p 193] [COPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 5058
CSO: 4519/114
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~
YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC
,
~ . .
~ BRIEFS
N. YEMENIS URGF~D TO JOIN PALESTINIANS--Beiruty 17 Feb (REUTER)--North Yemen is~
encouraging its nationals to ~oin Palestinian guerrilla groups in Lebanon, North
Yemeni Presid~ent Ali Abdallah Salih was quoted as saying today. President Salih
said in an interview with the Beirut magazine AL-JiJrIIiOUR that a delegation from
San'a' visited Lebanon recently to make arrangemeats for the tranefer of such
volunteers. "In the fact of Israeli intransigence and�repested Zionist aggres-
sion against the Arab nation, it has become crucial that able members of th~ -
, Arab nation should ~ oin the battle of destiny," he said. Travellere in south
Lebanon have already reported North Yemenis manning Palestinian checkpoints.
[Text] [JN171123 London~REUTER in English 0947 GMT 17 Feb 82]
. .
' CSO: 4400/147 END
i
~
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