JPRS ID: 10298 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10298
3 February 1982
West E u ro e Re ort
p p
CFODU 6/82)
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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, JPRS L~10298
3 February 1982
~ WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 6/8 2 ) �
CON~ENTS
ECONOMIC
FEDERAL REPUBLYC OF GERMANY
Steel Industry 'Ou teiders' Plan Survival Tactica
(Michael Gatermann; CAPITAL, Dec 81) 1
FRANCE
Delors Interviewed on 'Arake on High Salaries'
(Jacquea Delors Interview; L'EXPRESS, 4 Dec 81) 3
POLITICAL
FEbERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Pos~ible SPD Chancellor Candidatee Asaessed
(Martin Bernatorf; CAPITAL, Jan 82) 7
FRANCE
Poll Examinea Att i tudes on International Affairs
(LATITUDE AlIJOURD'HUI, Nov 81) 10
SPAIN
Alleged Plotting Behind 'Manifesto of the 100' Described
(CAMBIO 16, 21 Dec81) . 15
Military~ Reporter s Meet To Diacuse ilifferencea
~ (CAMBIO 16, 28 Dec 81) 20
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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NVK urrll,l,1L u~r. ~11vL1f
� FRANCE
RE~cent Apparent Iltnese of Mitterrand Viewed '
(PARIS MATCH, 21 Nov 81i 23
- b -
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ECONOMIC FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GB'.tMANY
STEEL IND~JSTRY 'OUTSIDERS' PLAN SURV~`"AL TACTICS
Hamburg CAPIT~'~L in German Dec 81 pp 30-31
, [ALticle by Michael Gatermann: "Steel Industry; Those Who Are Declared Dead Live
Longer"]
[Text] In the ailing steel industry, illnesaes are being used to indicate moods.
When reporters inquired about the health of Hoesch boss Detlev Karsten Rohwedder,
whose appendiz has been operated on, his inform~tion office g~.ve this tip: "Consider
= it to be evidence of the degree c~f agreement." The boss of the desired candidat~ for
_ the steel merger, Krupp steel bo:;s l`.ifons Goedde, had had his appendix remaved 6
weeks before.
A third element would.only disru~~t so much harmony. Ernst Pieper, chairman of the
board of the federally owned Sal~gitter concern and supporter of a three-way steel
marriage, remain~ outside. Noa 1'iepe r, ~ust like Herbert Gienow of Kloeckner, must
- give thought to how his company ~:an survive co~raetition with the new gian.t (sales in
1980--altogether 9.7 billion marks, 6 1,000 employees). But the Big Five (Thyssen,
Kloeckner, Salzgitter, Hoesch ancl Krupp) registered losses of approximately 2 billion
marks in business year 1980. Since 19 77, 40,000 st2e1 workers have lost their ~obs
in the Rhein-Ruhr area, and the steel expert of th~ Metal Workers' Union, Rudolf
Judith, had figured out from the firm~' plans, "In the next 6 years 30,000 more will
have to go."
Withdrawals from the umbrella organization, wran~Zlin~ about the timing of a price hike
and rumors about other ~ompetitors accentuate the disunfty in the crisis-ridden
industry. At least Uieter Spethmann would like to demonstrate harmony. At 55,
Spethminn is manager of the rconomic Organization of Iron and Steel and head of
'I'hyssen Inc., the largest German steel company (steel sales i:~ 1980--11.7 billion
_ marks, 69,~00 employees). Thy~isen p ro duces 40 percent o~ all West German stePl.
~s the last genuine "Ruhr baron" (born in Essen) among pure strangers to the Ruhr
area, Spetnmann praises his business as the one remaining steel producer. "The others
have all handed steel over to subsidiaries."
- That does not seem to be good for bus inesa. Thussen is the only company that 'tas
lived through the steel.crisis that b egan in 1971 wiChout substantial losses. 'ihough
annual production is down 28 percent, Spethmnnn is optimistic about the future.
"We can even make a proiit from 12 mi llion tons of steel a year."
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The Thyssen ~oss is annoyed about the accusation that he deliberately ~ostponed the
steel p*_-ice hike planned for October because he could affor.d it. "We~decided that
in our association only on account of our customers," he denies. "Thyssen was always
a pioneer in raising prices." The postponement is costing the companies, says
Spethmann, a total of 20 million marks; there 3,s no point in becoming excited.
Herbert Koehler, CDU deputy and manager of the Economic Organization of Iron and Steel,
of which Spethmann is chairman, estimates the loss of income at 33 million marks.
Gienow, head of the suffering Kloeckner Company (sales in 1980--6 billion marks,
32,000 employees), alleges that the loss of sales amounts to something like 100
_ million marks. Since he left the Eurofer cartel last year, the 55-year-old Hamburger
has been the black sheep of the sector. He is no longer a member of the Economic
Organizatior~, just like Baden steel manufacturer Willy Korf.
For years Gienow has been fighting the production quotas assigned Kloechner by the
~ommon P:arket authorities in Brussels. "The commission's problem in setting quotas
was whether it should provoke a battle with the French Republic and the giant Thyssen
Company or us," he reasons. High interest yates (cost in 1980--258 million marks)
w~re such a severe blow to Kloeckner that in May 1980 Gienow was left with only a
capital cut with subsequent refunding. That put 230 million marks in his treasury,
but in the opinion of experts, this was ~ust enough to last one more year. Then it
would be over for Kloeckner. "Those who are declared dead," Gienow rejectt~ all
prophecie~ of doom and recommends, "You can conclude from my calm what our profit
situation is." After January's price increase he is going to be i~� t:he black again.
A rationalization program will save him 300 million marks a year. "It is not so
easy to come up with something else to improve," Gienow says in praise of the structure
of his company and therefore is not looking f4r a partner at the moment.
However, Ernst Pieper, 52, head of the Salzgitter concern (?..7 billion marks in steel
sales, 16,000 employees) shows tremendous need for support. He desired the
partnership with Hoesch and Krupp Steel because his business seems too~small to him
for real rati.onalization. But h:is marriage proposal was ignored. Therefore, Pieper
has to plan his survival without a partner. He already know how. "We are going to
bring in a business consultant--McKinaey or someone like that--and wi11 correct old
errors." Processing and finishir~g are his priorities. The Sa1zg~Ltter boss sees the
consequences as follows: "There will. be parallel investments of hundreds of mill.ions
af marks."
- The course of tl~e next ruinous competition has been determined.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co.
9873
CSO: 3103/164
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ECONOMIC ~ " FRANCE '
.
DELORS INTERVIEWED ON 'BRAKE ON HIGH SALARIES'
Paris L'E1~RESS in French 4 Dec 81 pp 108-109
[Interview with Jacques Delore, mtnister of economy and finance, by lvoel-Jean
Bergeroux and Patrick Arnoux, date and place not specified]
[Text] [Question] In your opinion, will the purchasing power of professionals be
maintaimed in 1982?
[Answer] If economic growth surpasses 2.5 pexcent, i.t should be poss~.ble to ma:tntaii~
the purchasing power of the vast ma~ority of professionals, except for those with
very high salaries. However, the priority of our economic and social policy remains
to preserve, on the average, the purchasing power of salaried empl~yees. Growth
surpluses and gains in productivi~y should be divided among fina~lcing 3nvestments,
creating new ~obs, and raising low salaries.
[Question] Do you favor tightening up the range of salaries by curbing, or even
freezing, high salaries?
[Answer] For the time being, measures limiting the nom3rtal increase of high salaries
would, in my opinioii, be welcome. Society cannot be changed by decree in this area.
I remain staunchly in favor of contractual policy. If, during this or that salary
negotiation, the unions discuss tightening up the salary structure with management,
then they should come to an agreement among themselvea. But theae annual boardroom
discussions, too infrequent in the private sector, ahould be based on an overall
policy: salary structure and associated benefits, possibilities of internal pro--
motion, work conditions and duration, and employment and training policy.
~
[Question] Today the professionals' mood is more one of discnntent than consensus,
isn't it?
[Answer] I..et me point out firgt that professionals were equally unhappy during the ~
pr~~ceding administration. Thia is an attitude, a concern that has several facets.
The present financial system aeems un3ust to them. Professionals have the impression
that non-salaried ind~viduals don't pay as much tax as they do. I have always thought
it necessary, at equal levels of responsibility and comparability of work, to ensure
+ that non-salaried individuals pay the same tax as salaried workers. The budget min-
ister's goal is to claxify this question. Once this is done, pxofessionals will be
able to concerntrate on their own probletns. Unlike what is happening in other
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European societies, a worker in France can have a good salary, a~very interesting
job, and a high social st3nding. In our firms the management structure is thicker,
that is, denser, than in other countries. In those countries professionals, ~of
course, have possibilities of promotion in an interesting job, but the connection
with the social standing hierarchy and such high salaries is looser than in France.
� In other countries, by the way, professionals pay higher taxes than in France. Some
of these countries have even gone too far, and have eatablished withholdinge that
were too high and that have discouraged some professionals. We have not reached
that point. '
[Question] The risk of discouraging French professionals doesn't worry you?
[Answer] Yes, it does. I am very aware of management psychology, even beyond
that given by union organizations. Their vehemence sometimes seems to me to be re-
moved from reality--personality rivalry notwithstanding--but I know French pro-
f~ssionals well. A small proportion of them think too much of themselves because
they went to the well-known schools, but the ma3ority started out very modestly.
They have benefitted from the breathing room economic gro~:th prov3.ded~ They also
have the feeling that they deserve a relatively high salary, an interesting ~ob,
and everyone's esteem.
The path towards breater social 3ustice, towards greater equality through a different
division of responeibilities, must take p~ace with their agreement and not aga~.nst
= their wishes or with indifference towards their feelings. Those who would do other-
wise would be making a big mistake. Profeseionals must be fully involv~d in the
changes. During my last meeting with the unione I proposed, with the agreement
of the minister of labor, a series of round table discussions to exami.ne these
issues in depth. I am against excesaive elitism in French society, but eight ouC
of ten professionals are not a product of this elitism.
- (Question] You have proposed new rules for salary policy. Aren't they inflationaxy ?
[Answer] The idea is simple. A first step can be taken by going from a price in-
, crease of 14 percent to one of 10 percent, which can be done ~ust by an effort.of
collective temperance. The prevalent skepticiam, caused both by past political
- failures, including thoae of Raymond Barre, and by generalized indexing, which guar-
antees your purchasing power no matter what happens, must be overcome. No one feels
_ involved or concerned by tha fight against inflation; behgvior will have to change.
We have to show that you can live better at 10 percent than at 14 percent, and pr~.ces .
should set the eycample. .T. hope that we will see a slackening in the rate of price
increases as early as the Fourth quarter of 1981, and that this will continue
. steadily and.gradually unt:l a level around 10 percent is reached. This will not
prevent us from attacking tne structural causea of inflation at the same time. But
- during this slow-down phase of nominal movemente we are suggesting a contract fox
= salaried workera, by offering them an advantage to offset this new experience:
~ salaries will not catch up with prices, but there will be an advance estimated on
the basis of an annual price rise of 10 percent. And twice a year we will make
- ad3ustments, thanks to a protection clauae. Salaried workera will have nothing
to lose and tnev will be assured of keaping their purch~sing power. However, this
- new policy must be tried within the framework of free salary negotiations. Its
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success depends primarily on the mood of contractual policy. Unlike my predecessors,
I am not making any startling anno~uncements. about the standards to aim for, and much
- less about the goals.
The ball is on management and labor's side. Union or maragement organizationa cannbt
agree with one hand, and refuse to sign with the other; this would demonstrate theiY
hostility towards freedom of salary negotiation and towards contractual policy. I
- would call on public opinion as my witness, so that everyone's responsibilities would
be well defined.
[Question] How do you envisage the concrete application of this new method?
[Ansker] Agreements will be signed in each firm. In France, the CNPF [National
Council of French Employers], which is always so prompt to denaunce state inter-
vention, is still waiting for public firms to set an example.
In this respect I am happy to note that this new 8alary and social program was the
basis for negotiations held at the SNCF [French National Railroad Company] and the
RATP [Indepenuent Parisian Transport System]. The results that were obtained are
encouraging from three points of view: a positive change within the unions, which
previously have rebelled against this type of agreement; but, in accordance with their
wishes, a widening of the field of discussion to areas not covered until now; and
prudence of the criteria retained for the nominal advance in salariea, accompariied
by Che protection clause. Theae first steps are very encouraging. I hope that labor
and management will use them as a foundation in other areas and in the maximum
number of firn~, where negotiation and contracts should be the rule for new social ~
relations.
This withdrawal cure must be done gradually. It would be best Co initiate the 1981
ad3ustment this coming 1 January and expect the first advance around 1 March so that
the system doesn't cause any telescoping.
[Question] Does the INSEE [National Institute of Statisti.cs and Econom:Lc Stud~,es]
index seem to you to be a good measure of price increase at the present time?
[Answer] Frankly, the scientific quality of this index is admired by experts the
world over. If, for reasons o� trust between labor and management and the state,
- it seemed necessary to discuss it technically, I wouldn't be opposed to it. But i.t
is very well done. Of course, the day will come when it will have to be updated.
It is in our interest not to mix apples and oranges: on the one hand a perfectly
clear index established by independent experts (INSEE); ancl on the other hand, dis-
, cussions on income, salaries, and purchasing power, which are conducted equally
clearly on the basis of ob~ective data from the economy and from firms' performances.
[Question] You stated you were in favor of a pause in the announcement of refox~sas.
In your opinion, does this pause ~eopardize financial or national health service
reforms?
[Answer] Not. at all. I simply said that we should, through pat~.ent work, initiate
three structUral reforms: expansion of the publis sector ancl, based on this, an
industrial policy and a reform of our credit system; decen;ralization, which aims
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to "put democracy within hand's readh"; and the implementation of an active employ-
ment p~licy (solidarity contracts, ~ob sharing, flexibility in the ~ob market, pro-
fessional and social integration of youth...). Here are three exciting tasks for
attacking the challenges of the new industrial rev~lution and the basic disease of
unemployment, and,~or promoting a better division of responsibility. This will not
prevent us from ad~rr_ing our fiscal policies (starting with the professiona? tax)
and the national he~.l.th service structure in order to improve it gradually and
fundamentalZy. That is the role of a government action which is careful to explain
future directions.and to determine precise rules of the game.
t~PYRIGHT: 1981 s.a. Groupe Express
9720
CSO: 3100/180
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- Nl/R ONFICIAI, USH: C)NLY
poLrric~ ~n~ a~r~c ~oa c~
poss~Lr s~ ~~oa c.~~~s lssrss~n
g,c~mmurg QAPITAL i~n Ge~au Jan 82 pp 16-~17
~ ~lrtiale by M~?t~tin Bernstorf: "dltemativ~e Sss~riw"]
'1'eut] S~r since the ~h,ancellor ~ e he~rt silment beoame
knotiin, the coalition peuctiee liave been fbcu~ing on fi~e ara-
aial qn~stion o! a aucoensor. Only t~he FD~' has a real oaadi-
date to offers Haae-~ietri,ch G~nsohor.
I,eat Septe~ber~ Helmat Sabmi.dt chsor~ully oallod his own etate of ~ealth "terri-
- f'yii~Iy g+ood." He vss feeliag "so xell t~hat it rould h4v~e to terrify Mr gohl."
' Bat 3 tieee~ later it aae not Helmat KoYil ~rho vss terrified. The Jlsaacellor~ in
morta]. dang~er for brief period oY ~ime it eeene~ t~ae ta~osn to 8 hoepital
where aoctore imp3~atea e~ hba~t pacemaker.
' 3 uTe~ko before hs collspsed, he ha,d ~aid he xae liloe~y to rma for oheaael].or
a~i.n fn 1ga4, "~nd if I do run again," he ssid~ "the ODO/FSII t~ill onae stigaia
loae the'~' Q~.eo~ion." ~ ,
?n the meantime, tt~e poilsters fsnd tbat on~y 33 peroent of the po~nx].ation
~ would ~rote for the SPD~ if electio~s Mer`~ held nez~ Sunday."Sf~iae he oauaot be
elected directly, ~he ohancellor ero~;.d Y~ardly be able to olo~e the wide, ~p
- betxse~n t~i~e lo~ popalaritq rating sad l~ii sb~olute ma~ority far the aaatition-
i~a epite of the atill high eateem in xhioh h~ personslly ie held.
gohaai,clt ~ e uacertain ~ta~e of health anr'. the poor SPD ratings have given rise
to liv~e:.y speou].ation in Bonn. There as~o '~?o ba~ia soeriarioet ~'he chaaoellor
might reeig~a dnring this legislsti~re seaeion, tl~at is prior to the 19e4 el~c-
tione~ for laealth raaeona or becauee he has loet hie tsete tor running ~he
g~cv~ern~ent. (It hae~ in faat~ el~noet beco~e cue~oms3.y ~or him to aaaounc~ hie
reeignation.) Or~ he doee ruu a8atn in 19e4 tyut reei~ne hia poat ~aoon there-
af~er.
Bo~h eaenario~ are predicated on the assumption that the coalition `ri11 hold,
that the SPD (and the liberals) Nill r?in the 1984 el~ctian again and will be
cal~.ed upon to head the g+ov~ernment. Speaula~iona whioh a~:a no~ ae nrg+ent cen�
- ter around ~he questioa of a ner? 3PD candidate for chauoellor in oaee the co-
alltion breaks up arid the SPD leaves the government.
~ 7
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For yeace, this issue did not aeem to be a problem. TiIIee aad again at least one
of the leading SFD politicians was being tonted as a succeasor to Scbmidt. And
thie even xhile the chance?lor appeared to be in g~ood health and certainly in
good ~pirits--the chipe rrere not do~ra by ar.y etretch of the imagination. Now
that the chipe ~lmoet were down, no one of "ahanaellor caliber" ie eitting on
the bench. 5chmidt's politioal foater eon Hana Apel hae incuri~ed the wrath of
the left wing of the paxty not only becauae of mismauag+ement of the finanaing
arrang~ements for the "Tornado" supes~fighter but also, most likely, beoauBe of
hia uncondition4l allegiance to NATU. Ever eince the left wing+ere booed him in
Hambvrg~e St Jamee churah he no long+er qualifies ae a aompromise candidate ~he
entire party mi8ht agree on. ~'or some time, former minister of ~ustiae H~ne-
Jochen Vogrel figured to bg the aearet top c,hoice after 5chmidt. But now that
Yogel obeyed the party's aall to g~o to Berlin in order to eave the SPD cause
- ae lord mayor and lost the election in�~tead~ he no long~er hae muah appeal,
either.
That leaves Hane I+lgtthoefer a~ong thoee moat often mentioned. Chanaes are, he
wroulcl be Schmidt's firet choiae at thia time. The fact that the finaace mini.eter
could be identified with the series nf budget defiaite z~uuiing into the billiona
does not bother the cha~e~llor, who ehares this political reeponeibilit~, very
- much. F'o~ that matte~, he is impreased Frith the elegaut xay in whiah Ma~tthoefer
ma,nagea to deearibe ever aew budget ehortfe?lls as the most natural occurences
in the world.
There is only one pereon ~?ho opeake against Matthoefer ae a suceeesor to Sahmidt
and that ie Matthoefer himaelY. Like Schnidt, he $uffere~ Yrnm arrhythmia oaca-
eionally. And he say~ he waate to be a g~ood fin,ance minister ead nothing elee.
But what he does not mention ia tY~?t he would hate to lead the 9PD a~ ahanaellor
to certa3n defaat in the 19e4 eleetion (aa things look todsy). Ti1e intensirre
search for a guaceesor to th$ ahaneellor become� 411 the more diffieult once
the three men mentioned drop out of the raae. The few I,sender still gcmerned by
the SPD boaet of almoet no reeerne personnel. In Hesee, upright Holg+er Boerner
_ haa aroused ths ire of a11 left ving+ers. In Bre~en, Hane Koeabnick h~e been
cutting a rather weak figure as hesd of the aity g~oves~rnaent. Hs.mburg is burned
out to auoh an extent that Bonn had to eend in lord ~ror Klaus von Dohn~e~ri
to try to put out the fire.
That leaves only one atrnng SPD baations North 8hine-~leatphalia whose miniater
president JQhaunee Ran is beginning to look like the partq~s last hope b~y now�-
- or rather ie being touted aa snch. To be enre, aau, tcc, h~ a budget de~icit
which ruag into the billione ~ad Dueeeeldort opposition lead.er Kurt Biedenkopf
i~ eaying 't,Y?a,t he doee not hesve "a alear vie~+ oi thinge." But moet reoently, ~
Rau hae de~v~eloped into a~ovial pop~l.ar le4der~ a kind of beucgsin basement
WilJ.y Hrandt.
In Bonn~ voet eoeial de~ocratA epeak vell of Rau. Party oha,irman ~cnd~ like~ him
for re48one of el.eative a.ffinity. Part,y mana8er Peter alotz-xho ia emaster
than a11 the othe~'baudidgtea" but hae not scqui=ed enoo~? etature ae yret--
eings the pra,ieee of "A,arines rrho oa~n tell a~o1cA better thaa ~rone." Hannee
as a model oS int~~tion-~e could be a con~enane chaaoellor but doee he a1-
ready ha~ro enQn~ ezpertise to hold dorm euch a~ob ?
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FOR OFFICIE .
At ~~ste, . coming direotly trom the ahaaasllar~e hoep3t~7. roos, he r~a received
by Leonid Bxashne~ ia the Kremlin l~at Oatober. ~or that satter, Rau hae a lot oY
forei~ trsv~el behind him. "He wonld certainly do ae vell as Kohl w~dor a~r air-
cametauces," a Bo=m SPD functioaary s~qa. 3ut, ae in MatthoeYer'a caae, he himeeY!'
_ pate ths brakes on epeaule~tion. 8an, who ie deeortbed by ~abar~ o~ the cabinet
as "~ti~-~,?ork bat a b~arcl drinker," daos not want the ~ob of ahaaoellor.
Q~ at lAaat not qet. 8au, +oo, oaa see s aotuitry-~wide SPD sleation usfeat aoming
sa 1 gs4. For himself, he is hopi,ng For a kind of 8PD ''x~etitn$ion v3ctory" in
Nor~h 8hi,ne.~eatphalia one year later. With t'~at undc,r hia belt, he would-+~?ith
more e~cperienae--no doubt r~ant to unseat the CDII/CSII ( g+ov~srnment in 1988. By that
tim~e~ Rau would likely have become SFD aha.irnasr~--~hi`~;sh is eaid to be ~?het Willy
Bs~andt xoul,d liks to see-~nd aould at long laat retmite both poste in one maa.
The point beir~g that it rras Sahmidt ~ s mietak~e ne~rer to haw sought the ahalz~man-
- ship.
Underatandably, Johanne~ Rau would not xant t;a destroy thio well-laid plau by
an ur,neaeseary early atart. On the other ban~l~ Ftau conld haucdl~r turn the party
dann, if it called ont to him in gre4test nsc~s~. If euah an emsrg~ency did ariee,
the paxty might have to overlook a~eat mar~p? thin8s. It might have to srrallow
hard and accept someone Zike Apel or Yog~~ in the end. lih~atever reaervatfons
might now apply, a deciaion wou].d have to be ~ade in a real-11fe ~etting the
aa~aal featnree of Mhich ca~mot be foreeeen 'by aayone.
D1o matter What the ciraumetanaea were uader whioh the chanoellor Would have to
be replaced~ the FDP Would play ita role having tied its p~?rticipation in the
government to He7.ffiut Scl~midt peraonally. And eo, on that fateftil day the tMo
pari,y ch,airmen Braridt and Genecher night eit dor~m togethsr uad agree, for the
sake of holding on to the aoalition~ that one of then wonld have to bear the
croes. And if the SPD wonld tolerate it--~ne-Dietriah Geneahor wonld not hesi-
tate for a seaond to aaeu~e the poat of chancellor.
COPYRIGSTs 1982 Graner + Jabr aG da Co.
9478
cso: 3103/210
9
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POLITICAL FRANCE
POLL EXAMINES ATTITUDES ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Paris LATITUDE AUJOURD'HUI in French N~v 81 pp 1.1-13
[Report on a French Public Opinion Institute-LATITUDE exclusive poll: "The French
People and Foreign Policy," based on questians asked of 2,~59 persons, 18 years
- old and;over, from 15 to 22 September 1981]
[Text] Worry over the American monetary policy, which comes before Soviet expan-
sionism in the concerns of the French people. Continuation of the pref~rent~al
ties with the Federal Republic of Germany, whose chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, is
regarded as "th~e most likable" of the three NATO leaders. Rapprochement with the
Third-World countries, especially t~he ones in Africa or Latin America.
These three main topics of the exclusive IFOP [French PubZic Opinion Institute]-
LATITUDE poll--"The French People anci Foreign Policy"--should comfort Francois
Mitterrand in his analysis of internatiorxal problems. They are, in fact, an out-
right approval of Che policy being conducted by the president of the Republic since
25 May, going back, from this point of view, to the sources of Gaullism.
At the start, a remark. This poll offers a new fact: the French people are much
more concerned over international problems than is sometiaes said. And they are
. more aware. A small third of the persons polled did not pronounCe themselves on
France's bilateral relations with a given nation. But only 17 percent find no
special concern among the three propoaed conczr~s.
East-West~Relations: Partisan Divisiona PredominaCing
France is in no way safe from tlie neutralist temptation whose manifestations, violent
at times on the other side of tlie Rhine, are being observed at present. Of the
persons interviewed by the IFOP, 43 percent believe, in fact, that America's monetary
p~licy is more dangerous than Soviet expansionism. Only 24 percent make the oppos~te
choice. On the other hand, t~ie yellow peril causes little worry: 16 percent of
the persons polled place Japan's economic policy at the head of the perils.
United States President Ronald Reagan reaps personally the unpopularity of his
interest rates: only 29 percent of the French people find him more likable than
~lelmut Schmidt. At the same time, almost one Frenchman out of two (41 perrent)
belives that Franco-American relations should be more independent.
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- liu~ ti~~ i~lUl'uct~~ ul~ riic i~r~iich ~~~~u~~lu wlth regr~rcl Cu lhc Ut~tt~~ Sl~tes--or ;.ts
cuunterUalance to the Soviet Union--is not uniform. On th~ other questions (re-
lations with Germany or the Third World).,~a real consensus that disregards parti--
san differences emerges, as will be seen. On the other hand, the nature of the
East-West relations is perceived different~y depending on the domestic partisan
- options. '
Thus, Soviet military policy worries 39 percent of the UDF [French Democratic Union]
voters and 32 percent of the RPR [Rally for the Republicl voters, compared with
18 percent of the socialists and 7 percent of the comm~unists. As a consequence:
52 percent of the Eollowers of Giscard d'Estaing (but only 42 percent of the Gaul-
list voters) believe it necessary to strengthen France's ties with the United .
- States. And half the opposition voters (RPR, 54 percent; UDF, 49 percent) want
France's policy with regard to the Soviet Union to be more independent. On the
other hand, more than half the majority voters (PS, 52 percent; PCF, 56 percent)
= want a little distance to be placed between France and Uncle Sam. In the opinian
of 46 percent of the communists, the USSR would even become a completely sixitable
replacement. ~
. Depending on whether you are a communist or a follower of Giscard, a socialist
~ or a follower of Jacques Chirac., the eyes of Chimene [heroine of Corneille's "Le
Cid"] will gleam on America or on Russia. On the other hand, the gaze 3s less
passionate--or, at least, passion is common to a whole people--when we come back
~ to Western Europe or when we take off for the poor countries.
Continuation of the Franco-German Axis
It is known that Francois Mitterrand, as held of the French opposition, did not
have the best relations with HeLmut Schmidt. Since his election, on the other
hand, he has continued and even developed the ties between France and the Federal
_ Republic of Germany. The French people approve him enthusiastically. Franco-
German relations, regarded as very s2tisfactory by one Frenchman out of two, should
be strengthened. Even the Gaullist voters appear to advocate this agreement (64
percent), but the communists do not lag behind (51 percent). And by an overwhelm-
_ ing majority, they consecrate the West German chancellor as the most likable ch3ef
of state.
Relations With the Third Worl~: Between Generosity and Commercialism
The chapter of France's relations with the Third-World countries seems marked by
several contradictory feelings. First of all, pardon. Th~ rancor created by de-
colonization and especially the Algerian War seems to be softening with time. In
fact, almost one Frenchman out of two wants ties with the Maghreb to be
strengthened.
Second feeling: generosity. Over half of the persons polled want cooperation
to be developed with the countries of Latin America, Africa and India. This feel-
ing is more pronounced among socialist and c~mmunist voters.
Finally, the import of France's economic interests is not absent from answers by
- the persons polled. This was already perceived in the concern with regard to
American aconomic policy. It is still more noticeable in the desire to see our
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relations with the Arab oi.l-producing countries strengthened. Half of the persons
_ questioned (slightly fiewer ~iscard followers) want to see ties with the Persian
Gulf developed and improved.
Final remark: the relative indifference displayed with rega.rd to countries as
different as Japan, Ira~n (45 percent of the persons polled.did not express an opin-
ion on relaCions with the cc.~untry of the ayatollahs), or even Israel. With regard
~ to Israel, a third of the persons polled believe that relations are satisfactory,
a third want to improve them and a third are indifferent about them.
Therefore, three lessons to be drawn from a reading of this IFOP-LATITUDE poll.
A certain amount of interest in foreign ~roblems, requiring increased information
by the citizens. LATITUDE will apply itself to that, without demagogy or 3argon.
A great concern over economic matters: the tie between outside causes and domestic
causes is, therefore, established in apprehension over the economic crisis.
Finally a desire to see France make the voice of the poorer countries heard.
Question: For each of the following Question: And for each of these groups
different countries or groups of coun- of countries, do you want France, in its
tries, do you think that the relations foreign policy, to be more independent
maintained with them by France should toward them, or to strengthen its ties
l~.e improved, or do you think that these of cooperation?
- relations are satisfactory at present? [Key: 1. overall; 2.'Left Radical.Move-
[Key: 1. o~rer~ill; 2.~iLeft Radical Move- menti; 3. more independen~.; ~trengthen
ment; 3. impxove relatfot~s; 4. relations its ties; 5. no opinion]
satisfactory; 5~~ .no ~opinion]
The French People and the Great Powers �
. 1 2 .
ENSEMBLE P.C. PS/MRG RP.R U.D.F. ENSEMBLE P.C. PSlMRG R.~.R U.D.F.
UNITED STATES: ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Z'~ ~T~~' ~ ~ ~ % ~
3~ Ameliorcr I~s relations. ~f0 36 41 50 55 Plus indEpendan~e 41 56 52 37 31
_ Q~ Relations satisfaisanta 40 49 47 36 33 Rentorce sa hens. 35 29 32 42 52
~ S~- Ne K prononcent pa~ 20 I S 12 14 12 5 Ne se prononcent pas ?A I S l6 21 17
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1t10 100
CHINA: CHIJ~A:: ~
� Ameliorcr la rclations. 41 53 49 44 43 � Plus indEpendante 27 32 26 28 28
� Relations satisfaisanta 27 23 28 29 34 � Reafora ses liens 38 43 46 45 40
- Ne se prononcxat pas 32 24 23 27 23 - Ne se prononcent pas 3S 25 28 27 32
100 100 100 l00 100 100 100 100 100 100
USSR: S. R:
� Ameliorer la relations 37 51 43 38 34 � Plus indtpendante .43 35 44 54 49
� Relations saastaisanta 33 28 37 38 35 � Renforce ses liens 26 46 31 24 24
- Ne u prononcent pas 30 21 ~ 20 24 31 - Ne se pronanant pas 31 19 25 22 27
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
The French People and Europe
GKEAT ENSEMBLE P.C. PS~MRG RP.R U.D.F. GREAT ENSEMBLE P.C. PS/MRG RP.R U.D.F.
3RITAIN: ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ R~$AidTi ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
_ � Amfliorer la rclauons. 46 A2 SS 54 54 � Plus indlpmdante 31 31 32 30 34
� Relations satis(aisanta 33 40 34 28 33 � Renfora ses liens 43 47 50 49 46
- Ne se pronoacent pas 21 18 I 1 18 13 - Ne se pronoacent pas 26 22 18 21 20
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
W ~~t~+N~ WEG
� Amdliorer ~s telations. 32 26 35 35 43 � Plus indEprndante 73 29 24 18 23
� Relati