JPRS ID: 10284 JAPAN REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500020053-6
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 53
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10284
26 January 1982
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JPRS L/10284
26 January 1982
1
~
~ JAPAN REPORT

i
(FOUO 5/82)
CONT~NT~
- MI I,ITAI~Y
Socialist, Scholar, Former General Discuss Defense Issues
(Masatsugu Ishibashi, et al.; HOSEKC, I~Tov 81).......... 1
- SCIENCE AND TECHNOIA('Y
Developmen+, of IndependeY~t Space Ir~dustry Said vifficult
(TOKI NO I{EIZAI, Nov 81) 19 .
Auto, Auto Parts, Semiconductur Makers Vie in Minicar War
(Yukio Suzuki; CHUO KO;.ON KETEI MONDAI, Winter 19$1) 23
Themes, Enterprises SPlected for 10-Year Technology Pro~iect
(DENIff uHIMBUN, 10 Sep 81) 35
~
- - a - [III - ASIA - 111 FOUO]
r~~+ nr-.~.i.. . . . '
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MILITARY
,
SOCIALIST, SCHOLAR, FORMER GENERAL D~SCUSS DEFENSE ISSUES
Tokyo HOSEKI in Japanese Nov 81 pp 86-103
[Statements and debate by ttiree experts--Masatsugu Ishibashi, socialist, Hiroharu
Seki, University of Tokyo professor, international politics; ~oro Takeda, f..ormer
- chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3elf Aefense Forces: Parts 1& 2: "Defense
Debate: Neutrality Without Armament?, Antinuclear Canpaign?, or Deterrent Force?"]
[Text] Is Japan threatened by the Soviets or Americans, or is there another threat?
A heated discussion by three contemporary participants on the strategy for defense
or peace in the new nuclear age!
Part I. Statements by the `fhree Participants
Masatsugu Ishibashi: It is unrealistic for Japan to try to defend itself militarily
against the U.S.-USSR nuclear strategy.
Last year I wrote a book entitled, "Neutralit~ Without Armament," and in it I
repeatedly ~tated that there is no course toward an absolute security guarantee.
It is stxictly a relative matter. Concretely, the question is whether to rely on
_ military power to defend national security or t~ use nonmilitary means, mainly
diplomatic measures, such as to establish friendly reldtions with various countries,
particularly neighboring countries, so as to create an environme*~t which dissipates
the distrust or anxiety about attacking or being attacked. Needless to say, I
- think that the latter course is preferable. The spirit and the stipulations of the
present Constitution, whic:~ incorporates strong promises emanating from the
experience of de�eat i~ war, aptly points toward that course.
However, there are ~oubts that it is easy to maintain friendly relations with all
countriPS. I, myself, have recently gained greatly increased confidence on this
- point, because there is proof of a positive achievement before our very eyes. That
is none other than Japan-PRC relations. At present, the potential enemy is the USSR.
Nardly a day goes by without the Soviet threat being mentione~. However, looking
back to 10 years ago, what was the situation? Although the military might say that
the PRC threat and not the Soviet threat was strongly emphasized.
- When the U.S. Government changed, the Japanese Government changed and the Japanese
people changed. Japan-PRC friendly relations materialized. Wasn't it possible?
Even with the Soviets, wouldn't it be far better to establish relationships such
as those with the PRC at present than to try to oppose them by increasing the
military strength?
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First of all, is it possible for Japan to think that it can defend itsel� by means
of military power? As you are aware, Japan is a trading nation and depends on
foreigr. countrie~ for raw materials, energy sources and even foodstuffs. How can
it be possible for such a country to think of conducting a war? ~ven without the
experiences of World War II, it can be said that security of the maritime
transportatiori route is absolutely impossi~~le.
Is It Certain That the United States Will Come to Our Aid?
I have never hearl the opinion that Japan can defend i.tself alone. Since Japan is
an independent country, it is only natural that it should defen3 itself. This
argument sounds fine. However, when you probe into the matter, you learn that you
- are not going to defend yourself alone. Those who advocate increased military
stren~th inevitably insist on the necessity of the JaFan-U.S. Security Treaty. In
other words, they are saying that Japan is helpless alone and that Japan's national
securiey must be guaranteed through strengtheninn Japan-U.S. relations. Therefore,
the argument is not acceptable. This being the situation, Japan cannot complain
even if a submarine hits and runs or cuts the net of a Japan.ese fishing boat.
Then, is Japan secure as long as it has the security treaty with the United
States? The question has been raised as to whether the United States is certain
to come to the rescue in the event .:apan is attacked and invaded. I have no
confidence at a11. on this point. I cannot entertain such easy-going expecta~ions
that the United States will. hurry to Japan's aid if it expects its own homeland to
- be devastated.
~ Next, even if we should make oreat concessions and assume that the United States
would rush to Japan's aid, there is still the question of whether Japan could hold
out alone until then. National Defense Council Secretary-General IC~ibara, who was
- once called tha "emperor" wher: he was at the Defense Agency, wrote: "If the Soviets
attack, the Air Self-Defense Forces [ASDF] will be wiped out in 10 mimstes, while
the Maritime Self-Defense Forces [MSDF] and the Ground Self-Defen~e Forces [GSDF]
might be able to function as organized units for ~-3 days and 3-4 days, respective-
ly." In this connecCion, when I interpolated him in the Diet, Kanemaru, the
director-general of the Defense Agency, replied that "we can hold out for 1 or 2
. weeks." Even if this is somewhat exaggerated, if they can hold out alone only for
ttlat limited period, wil]. U.S. rescue arrive on time?
I,e::'s make another big concessiot~ here. Let's assume trat the rescue would arrive
~ ~n time. IE the United States and the USSR used the Japanese homeland as the
- battle~;round, what would be left? Only mi~lions or tens of mil..ions of casua~ties,
c~r ~~eople starvinK and despondent, destruction, etc. G?hat would re_ally be pro-
tecced? It tlie United States and the USSR should engage in warfare, it would 'oecome
a nuclear war, and therefore a desperate situation such as that destribed abave
would have to be expected. In other words, a defense that is dependent on military
strength is not reatistic.
- Another matter that should be kept in mind is that military power ~.s always
self-prol.iferating. Military m~n will r_ever consent to the argument that more
- troops are unnecessary, that only a few troops ar~ needed, that modern weapons
are not cieecled, that this or that action is restricted, that you cannot possess
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tliis, etc. Civilian cuntrol i~ casually mentioned, but the military will not
, accept the control that "this is the limit and nothing more is required."
If there is a restrainc �=n the proliferation of military power, the most effective
_ restraint is the economic or financial power of that country. This applies to
Japan. If there were no Peace Constitution and if we did not have the power to
insist that Article 9 be o~eyed, Japan's military strength would not be limited to
seventh (some say eighth) place in the world toduy. Since the GNP is third highest
in the world, it can be said that the military power would be certain to be
comparable, i.e., third largest in th~ world.
Mr Takeda, who will speak later, stated in a magazine (HOSEKI) that "Military
power equivalent to 1 percent of the GNP is not useful but power equivalent to 3
percent would be effective." I think that that i~s a natural demand if you assume
that military power is necessary. At the same time, if you take the positi~ . hat
_ military strength is required, it is only logical to think of establishing d
conscriptior. system, enacting secrets preservation and emergency laws, setting up
a nation,31 mobilization system, placing controls on the economy and also on the
transpor;.ation system. It is natural to have comprehensive planning. The reasoning
that military power is needed but not a conscription system or a secrets preservation
law is illogical.
Please think about it. Out of consideration for the constitution, Japan has a
_ passive defense. Since he is a military man, Mr Takeda stated how difficult a
strategy passive defense is and warned that if only passive defense has to be reliad
upcn, t:1e people must be prepared to expect a rain of bombs and be temporarily
- occupied. I do not have confidence in passive defense, but if that is the fact~ia~
casE, tne battleground will alwa;~s be Japan and I do not think we can relay upon
the Self-Defense Forces [SIFJ to fight alone. Whether or not thera is a conscription
system, unless there is determination of the natfonal populace of 100 million persons
tn carry arms and fight, the strategy will fail.
In ether words, althougli thE milirary is necessary, civiliar~ control is impc~~ible
if there are limitations as to ~our actions or ther~ are constitutional restrictions,
etc. It is true that the systPm itself might be considered flawless but I do n~~t
_ think that that alone makes control pos~ible.
To mention another item, I think that if military strength continues to be
, self-proliferating, the course will lead directly to Japan~s becoming a boundless,
great military power and similarly, if the necessity of the security treaty is
- recogni:.ed, it is only natural that it will lead to a military alliance. Through
_ Prime Minister Suzuki's visit ta the United States, the word "alliance" was
mentioned for the first time ~n a~oint communique, and I think that this is only
natural. ihe 1in.e of reasoning will not hold forever that the security treaty is
necessary and Japan wants aid in case of emergency but that it wil~l not concern
itself with any warfare that the United States conducts elsewhere. While t'ae
United States was overwhelmingly strong militarily and could boast of its :iational
stren~;ti~, tl~e si:.uation coul.d be overlooked. However, at present, when the United
States has lost its superiority, it .is desperate to regain it through combined ,
power with an allied country. The United States is not willing to Iet Japan have
its own way and is proposing that the treaty be made one of mutual responsibility.
: Japan has ao agreed, and this situation :Ls reflected in the new "alliance" which is
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actually progressing rapidly. Also, preparations are being made to alter the
' constitution, if possible, t~ officially recognize the right of collective def_ens~:.
- Then, without a constiturional revision, is it impossible to dispatch troops
overseas? That is entirely false. Even in this respect, developments are rapidly
advanci.ng. Last year's RIMPAC--a joint r,~aneuver of countries rimming the Pacific
Ocean--is a concrete example. Another fact which must be mentioned at this time is
the fuct this is the nuclear age. It is said *hat with the United States and the
USSR as the central powers, atomic bombs equivalent to over 1 million of the bombs
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki are now available. Strangely, people who claim
that "there is such a possibility as an unlikely emergency and one can never tell
which country might attack," do not have any doubts `hat there is the possibility
that over 1 million atomic bombs might be used and that mankind might be wiped out.
Efforts for Total Arms Reduction and Disarmament
_ I personally think that if the chances are 10,000-to-1 that a country with which
Japan tries earnestly to become friendly would stage an unreasonable attack, then
the chances of a nation being destroyed by atomic bombs are 1,000-to-1 or 100-to-1.
Recently, ttiere has been u lot of talk about tt~e neutron bomb. This is a weapon
- which links up conventional weapons with the so-called hydrogen bomb, thus making
it easier to use the hydrogen bon?b. You are aware that Western countries in which
they are to be placed have become sensitive and are opposing the action.
W}:en one considers all these factors, it must be said to be wishful thinking if one
believes that by acknowledging military power centered on hydrogen bombs, one is
assuring not only the national security of Japan but the continued existence of
mankind. No matter how difficult it is, there should te complete arms reduction
- internationally and disarmament domestically. I firmly believe that we cannot
- abandon our efforts toward the realization of this end.
However, this does not mean that if the JSP should take over the reins of government,
there would instantly bE neutrality without armament. A conservative par*_y has run
the government for a long time and created unfurtunate conditions, such as adopting
_ hostile p~licies toward the USSR, withhalding dip:io~r3tic relations with the DPRK up
to now, etc. In the event that we take over the realities of such existing inter- '
n~itional relations and abolish the SDF immediately. The initial action we should
- take is, as I said at the beginning, to improve Japan-Soviet relations to the level
_ c>f the present Japan-PRC relations. This is the priority item. Even with the
.1~~:~ii-U.S. Sec?~rity 'frezty, it is not simply a matter of unilaterally nullifying the
~reuCy on ttie basis of Article 10. We want to cut off military relationships, but
- fricncily rel.ations ~~ith the United Stutes should cantinue to be carefully nurtured.
lri other words, I want to make it clear here that we intend to utilize diplomatic
means, as well, in carrying out our plans.
With tl~e Increase in the Risk of Limited Nuclear Warfare Faced Today, the National
Security Policy of the Past Is Not Applicable
Iliroharu Seki: I want to focus my remarks on the issue of the realities of nuclear
weapc,ns and the national security of Japan, and point out that at prESZnt, Japan
Cc>~;eth`r with Europe is being placed in an extremely dangerous position.
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- The basis of the classic pattern of national security policy of the past has
- noticeably weakened, and because of that, advocates of the so-called "hawk" iaction
have appeared in great numbers. The classic national security policy of Japan was
to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and to try to get by with small-scale military
strength. This is the typP of thinking typical of Inoki Masamichi, out no~a the
nasis for such thinking has become dubious. Speaking frankly, this means that Japan
_ has come to the crossrQdds regarding whe~her to possess nuclear armament or to
switch completely to the diplomacy of peace.
- Within Japar:ese political circles, although in small numbers, forces have begun to
infiltrate which think that the "three" non-nuclear principles should be changEd to
"two and a half" to permi.t limited entry of nuclear arms, or who advocate "two"
non-nuclear principles so that nuclear weapons can be emplaced within Japan. I
think that is a very dangerous development. I think that it is necessary to consider
why such a situation has occurred. .
I believe that Mr Inoki, who has been called a"dove" withi.n the "hawk" faction, is
being severely criticized because very recently the classic national theory has
become extremely unrealistic. In that sense, there is some truth to the arguments
of those who advocate nuclear armament for Japan. However, what is the truth? At
this point, I would like to analyze this point in detail.,
As you are aware, Japan was defeated in the Pacific War. Japan's final defeat was
brought about by the atomic bomb disasters of Hlroshima and Nagasaki. The
destructive power of the atomic bombs at that time was approximately 13 kilotons.
- However, by that single blast, 80,000 persons died instan*_ly, and eventually a total
of 200,000 persons suffered death. What would happen if the po;aerful nuc~ear
weapons of today, e.g., a 1-megaton-class bomb, should be dropped on Japan with its
- dense population. Accordin.g to my calculation, with about eight bombs, nearly 30
million persons would die. In World War II, Japan surrendered after suffering
1 3 millian casualities. Would it have been possible to start a war if it had been
known th.at the risk was the death of 3 million persons? That national security can
be guaranteed is doubtfut. Rather, it can only be said that the best course is to
" abolish war.
The present national security policy is fundamentally mistaken. It seems that the
_ Defense Agen~.y is planning a strategy based or. the assumption that such a nuclear
attack wzll n~ver be made on Japan. If strategy is based on the condition that
nuclear ~ttack is possible, the director-general of the Defense Agency cannot be
_ thinkin~ ~C such easygoing strategy.
7'he llan~;erou5 Race lor Lmplacemenr oE Nuclear Theater Weapons
- f.ookin~; at the overall situation today, I think that the risk of nuclear war has
increased tremendously. The reasons are that the accuracy of nuclear weapons has
improverl and nuclear theater weapans [NTW] have appeared. A race has begun for
emplacement of NTW's between NATO countries and Soviet-controlled countries.
Against the Soviet SS-20 and Backfire aircraft, NATO has decided to position over
100 Pershing-2's, which possess the same destructive power as the Hiroshima-type
bomb, in five Western European countries, al~ng with 460 cruise missiles. The
_ cruise missiles are oF tt~e 200-kiloton class, so they have over 10 times the
stren~;th c~f ttie Hiroshima-type bomb.
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- If these weapons are emplac~d and their accuracy is good, what does it signify?
Europeans are beginning to think seriously about this matter. Japan, which
experienced the disasters of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, conceived the progressive idea
of "neutrality without armament" which Mr Ishibashi advocates. However, that is an
- idea that is difficult to sell to peoples of the world. The various countries of
the world have not tried to imitate Japan and attain neutrality without armament.
Therefore, the Japanese Government claims that it is foolish for Japan alone to
make such a statement, that it is unrealistic, and therefore, Japan should follow
the rest of the world. To follow the world means to adopt the logic of guaranteeing
national security by incre~sing militar.y strength. The Japanese Government is
suggesting that Japan do likewise. The United States is putting strong pressure on
Japan, but because Japan is following such reasoning, it cannot help but receive
such U.S. pressure.
- However, the world situation today is completely the reverse of that of yesterday.
_ Europe has Uegun seriously to learn from the atomic disasters of Hiroshima and
_ Nagasaki. In Europe, for the first time in history, antinuclear opposition
movements t~ave begun to increase. The reason is that they have begun to feel
personally the seriousness of the risk of becoming the battleground of a limited
nuclear war.
The agitc~tion started in northern Europe and spre,~d via Netherlands and Belgium to
West Germany. There was a rally of 100,000 persons in Hamburg, West Germany. Will
only the Germans be annihilated by a nuclear war or will they survive? Are nuclear
weapons to be positioned even at the risk that only West Germany will be destroyed?
Confronted with these sober questions, Chancellor Schmidt was placed in a diiemma.
That is to say, in the age of limited nuclear war, only those places where nuclear
weapons are placed will be attacked. The present U.S.-Soviet strategy is steadily
moving in that direction. The U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was
concluded in 1973 and it was at that time that both parties first realized, to a
certain extent, that both countries would be destroyed if all-out nuclear attacks
were launched against each other. The concept then developed that the United
States anc! the USSR alone should be made sanctuaries. The position was then taken
th~t nuclear theater weapons cuuld bP built, and as confidence in their accuracy
clevcloped, the United States and ttie USSR could mutually oppose each other
strategically in a limited nuclear war, using other countries as the battlegrounds
f~r nuclear war. The United States took the lead in adopting this strategy.
7'h~it ac~tion would still have been tolerable if it had been the detente period when
in[E:rnational tension was eased. Changes in military capabilities would not
ncr.~ssarily have led to the start of a limited nuclear war. However, since 1979,
international politics have reCrogressed. The situation is the same as the period
when the cold war started. Without re~ard to the impression he might create,
Yresident Reagan be~;an to increase nuclear strength. As you know, President
Reagan's administration has again started nuclear arms expansion and is clearly
stating that it would be victorious in nuclear warfare. By victory, it is talking
of a limitecl nuclear war. We can no longer rely on the United States because it
has become extremely dan~erous.
~
~ If Japan were to introduce nuclear weapons, it would assume the same risk or even
~i t;reater risk than Lurope of becoming a battleground. Non-nuclear and antinuclear
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movements have increased in Europe. How about Japan? As is well known, the JSP,
which would become the leader, had the record of f irst advocating a non-nuclear
stance and because of its influence the "three" non-nuclear urinciples were passed
by the Diet. In spite of such a past glorious achievement, the JSP is floundering
at this most crucial time. Even with Mr Ishibashi beside me, I can boldly say
that I cannot stand watching the JSP. Now is the time for the JSP to spread its
network worldwide and work for peace....
As a whole, the Japanese people are not alert to the changes taking place in the
world situation. Within the faction that advocates the strengthening of milira~y
power, some echo the national security policy drawn up by the U.S. Pentagon and have
increased their attack on people who favor the policy of peace through diplomacy.
As part of the attack, those who advocate the classic national security theory
mentioned at the beginning, i.e., the "doves" within the "hawk" faction which
_ believes in relying on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and in maintaining a small regular
military power, are being isolated and coming under criticism.
- Create a New National Security Policy
Then, how should we think in these dangerous circumstances? First of all, the
Japanese people must completely discard the Pentagon-made national security theory
and create a new policy based on Japan's historical traditions. The Japanese should
- have that much intelligence.
Japan has become a powerful economic nation and, except for military science and
technology, is the world leader in the Sb.T field. Utilizing this S&T knowledge and
_ economic power, Japan has the capability to bring peace to the world. Unfortunately,
that capability is not being used toward the right goal. This capability must be
diverted, somehow, ~oward a new direction, and I want the JSP to strive to assist.
The time has arrived for the SDF and the JSP to work together. If those in th~
SDF truly think of their country, I do not think that they will join hands with
- those in the "hawk" faction who talk of military threats. It is not strange for
them to join hands with the JSP. I think that now is the time when the Japanese
populace should rise above political parties and work for peace through diplomacy.
- The time has come when it is necessary to unite with the "do~ve" faction of the
Liberal Democratic Party and think carefully about what type and how much of an
effort is needed for negotiations for arms reduction.
The activity of the Palme Committee is an example of the type of arms reduction
eC.Forls ~zbout which we are thinking. Mr Palme, who was formerly the prime minister
c~f Sweclen, has createcl a secretariat in Vienna, in nzutral Austria. That office
(s workin~; ~~n a new arms recluction plan in preparation for next year's UN arms
reduction special assembly. There is a movement afoot now in Japan to have a
member of the [Palme] committee hear the statements of Hiroshima victims, to have
the commmittee sponsor a roundtable discussion in Hiroshima with citizens regarding
nuclear problems and to have ttie comments included in the proposal by the Palme
Committee. Hiroshima city, United Nations University and Hiroshima University are
jointly working on this plan. These movements must take place everywhere.
Various ideas are needeci to establish a new pace and simply to halt the movement
tc~warcl mi:litary expansion. How can such ideas be cultivated? Such concepts must
be researched mainly at universities. To do that, a peace department is needed.
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ruK urr~~.tnL u~h. ~~NLY
There is none yet in Japac~, but in the UK there is a Peace Department at Bradfor.d
University. In Japan, education toward peace is conducted by a limited number of
teachers oi: the elementary, middle and high school 1e.vels. However, education
- toward peace is har3ly carried out at all in universities. There is an urgent
need to consider what is best for establishing an education toward peace in
universities. At the next stage, there should be a citizens' college--i.e., it
is necessary for us citizens to voluntarily Astablish a new university. Under
those circumstances it would become possible to establish a meaningful, new
education toward peace. Ultimately, peace is something that has to be created.
Peace Will Not Come Through Prayer Alone; SDF and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Are
Deterrent Forces
Goro Takeda: To create a world wnich will abolish war and which will not resort to
force to solve international conflicts is the hope of manki_nd, as the two previous
speakers stated. This is not a new development but the ideal and prayer of manlc~.nd
from the past. In any country in the world, there are probably no people who say
that they like war. In Japan, there is the Peace Constitution, and efforts ~are
being made to preserve peace. I think people in general believe that "we should
depend on the justice and faitn of those who love peace to protect our security and
existence" and that "no country must think only of itself and ignore other
countries."
However, even if the wish for peace is important, I do not think that the real
world is that idealistic. Uuring the 36 years since World War II, 72 bi~ or small
wars have occurred. Even now, conflicts are raging constantly in the Middle
East, Southeast Asia and Africa. At present many people in the varieus EC countries
reportedly are fearful of a third worZd war. Everyone loves peace but wars still
continue. This is a fact. I think it might be said to be the "inevitable deed" of
mankind.
Ttiere are over 160 co~ntries in the world today, but each has its own sense of
value which difCers from others, and all countries pursue their own national
iilterests. Even if utmost efforts are expended on attaining peace threugh diplomacy,
sad tv say, in the pursuit of national interests, conflicts arise between countries.
Histary shows that even in the midst of cooperation, confrontations have taken
place. If there is for certain a sure way of preventing such confrontations--and
of: course, we must try ourselves to conceive such a method--we will naturally abide
' by such means. However, there is no brain trust which can immediately think up
tiucli a~;ood method, and sad to say, the reality is that cooperation and
rc~nt.-roiltations have continued.
(:c>nfrontations havc been tl~e c.?use of conflicts, and conflicts have developed into
wurs. In t}~e pursuit of national interests, there is the temptation of aggression
if the gains seem large compared with the efforts expended. Therefore, countries
in the world place priority on building up their defensive power to protect
themselves and to prev~nt aggression. Jai~an is now thinking of national sacurity
in terms oL overall national security policies, including nonmilitary means, but
iF there should be an unfortunate im~asion, military power would be the decisive
f.actor.
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lleterrent ~'orce Capable of Countering Aggression
Both previous speakers stated that it is important to halt aggression, but even if
efforts are made to stop invasions from occurring, world history proves that
aggression can occur. It is necessary to possess the power to counter such an
- invasion, if it ~hould occur. The strength to counter aggression serves as a
deterrent force. I think that e~~phasis should be placed on that point in our
thinking.
Now, in surveying Japan's surroundings, the neighboring countries are the tJSSR,
the ROK, Taiwan and the PRC. Among then, I think that the country posing the
~iggest threat and making us feel uneasy is still the USSR. Why is that? First
- of all, the sense of value is different. In advocating communism, it extols the
communization of the world and continues to follow expansionist policies. Since
World War II, the USSR has acquirpd a huge territory of 500,000 square lcilometers,
and Japan has the bitter experience of having the Kuri3.es Islands occupied. The
recent increase in military strength is shocking. During the past 20 years,
defense expenditures have amounted to 11-13 percent of the GNP. According to one
reference, it has reached 14 percent. Not only nuclear weapons but the ground,
naval 3nd air forces have been greatly strengthened, and from the standpoint of
quality and utility, the forces have changed from the defensive to the offensive
type.
If military poaer increases to such an extent, i.t can be said that the Soviets now
possess the power to act simultaneously at several Flaces in the world. Using
detente as a mask, the USSR is advancing to various parts of the world, supparted
- by this enormous military force. As you are aware, the Soviet strength has
_ gradually infiltrated into the vacuum areas created by the withdrawal of weakened
Western forces, suc}i as the United States, Europe, etc. Starting with Angola in
1975, there are a number of cases such as Ethiopia, Yemen, Afghanistan, etc.
' 1,et us consi3er the Far East situation, and in particular, Soviet strength in the
Far East. Regard:ing nuclear weapons, the Soviets have placed or~e-third of all the
weapons they possess there. In 10 years, the army has doubled its previous
strength. In the past 3 years the navy has added 270,000 tons. Since the total
strength of the Japanese MSDF is 200,000 tons, one can realize what the figure of
270,000 tons means. The air force has 2,200 aircraft, of which over 800 are attack
- aircraft. It is a fact that the Backfire supersonic heavy bomber has already been
stationed in the Far East. As the Soviet Far isast force increases its strength, it
is only natural that its activities become mors intense in the vicinity af Japan.
At present, the number of warshiFs which pass through the Soya, Tsugaru and
- Tsushima straits number no less than 400. The number of large aircraft which
approach Japan proper is 200. There have been in~idents in which aircraft armed
with AS-6 missiles, with a range ~f over 200 km, approached to within several tens
of kilometer.s of the Not~. Peninsula in broad daylight and approached to wi~hin 100
= km of the coast of Shakotan, Hokkaido. Hereafter, if MiG-23's and SU-24's are
- ~tationed in the Kuriles, all of Japan will cr~me within the attack range of these
aircraft.
IE t}~e ~oviet Far East forces are strengthened to such an extent, what should be
_ c'~one to protect Japan? It is questionable whether Japan can really be defended.
As mentioned earlier in this discussion, Mr Kaibara has stated simply that Japan
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w~~~~lcl be crutihecl. True, that mi~;llt tiapp~n if, in tYie present situation, war should
st~?rt tomc~rrc~w. The basis oF my thinking is tE~at efforts should be made to avoid
just such a situation. Basically there is no policy without faults, as Mr Ishibashi
pointed out earlier. I think that out of a number of proposals, the one with the
most advantages and the least defects should be adopted as Japan's policy. This
appiies to defense policy: the one with the least disadvantages should be selected,
and the government should strive to decrease these disadvantages as much as
possible. Simultaneously, the government sho~ild recognize as risks the defects
that remain, and I think that it is important th~t the people be thoroughly informed.
The Four Piliars Which Protect a Country
What measures are available to protect Japan? I think that there are only the
f.ollowing four measures. If there are other better ideas, I would like to be
_ inEormed, from Mr Seki, too. The four are: 1) neutrality withottt armament;
2) armed neutrality; 3) join the Soviet camp; and 4) defend the country with the
SDF and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The best measure should be chosen from
among these. First, regarding neutrality without armament, I read what Mr Ishibashi
wrote and there were many points with which I could agree. However, after reading
it ttiroug}~, I could not help but experience the following doubts: If it is such a
~;ood method, some cou~ztry in the past or some country now should be depending on
neutrality without armament to protect the country's security and making progress.
Regrettably, no such case exists. No matter how intelligent and outstanding a race
the Japanese are, it is a bold adventure and a test to try a method never used by
_ any country or without any precedent. I cannot approve it. The Japanese people
are not necessarily in favor of neutrality without armament. According to a survey
made only 3 years ago, only 6 percent were in favor of this. Data also appeared
- st~owing that some in the JSP also had doubts about the theory of neutrality without
armament.
Next, let's consider armed neutrality. Since this will lead to the conscription
system and nuclear armament, and since defense expenditures might reach staggering
atn~?unts, it cannot be adopted. Join the Soviet camp. This measure is nct
= acceptabte to the Jal~anese people.
- 'I'hen, althou~h there are many flaws as well as doubts, the only means left for the
~~resent is reliance on the SDF and the Japan-U.S. Security Tre2~ty. I think that
ttlis E~olicy has the greatest deterrent effect and that the reliability of the
cieterrence is the highest. As I have said repeatedly, everyone has the same
I~cetint; oE liatred ~f war. Huwever, peace will not come simply through prayer.
WhiL squarely fac ing reality, we must think of policies which will not create
_ war, but wi11 deter war, and in the event of aggression, measures that will repel
it and preserve our independence. In that sense, I think that to protect our
cuuntry now, the following four pillars must be firm~y implanted. The first is
_ the minimum necessary defensive power. The second is a reliable Japan-U.S.security
setup. The third is the preparation of the domestic organization. There might be
problems involved, but if the fighting is to take place in the homeland or within
the vicinity of Japan with the homeland as the base, preparations of a proper
clomestic order are necessary. I would like to see a draft prepared on this item
- and ~lioroughly debated in the Diet. As for the fourth point, and this is the most
impc~rtant, it is the will ot the people to defend Japan by themselves. Since those
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we are going to Iight are our enemy, there ia no one else except the Japanese, in
actuality, to stand in the way of the invaders.
When I make these statements, there might be those who think that the minimum
- necessary defensive power might become one of preposterous proportion and that
Ja~an would beccuie a great military nation.
A while ago, what I wrote in the periodical HOSEKI (March issue) was misinterpreted,
- and there were some who thought that I suggested that a defense expendizure of 3
percent of the GNP was necessary and that 1 percent was meaningless. Actually,
- that is not what I really meant. If one read the entire text of my statement in
HOSEKI magazine, the misunderstanding should be corrected. What I wanted to say
was that to defend Japan, locking up the doors was necessary just as we protect our
homes. If burglars should enter the neighboring villages or towns and commit arson,
" naturally the local government councils, vigilante groups or police would conduct
- night rounds and increase the number of streeet lights. In that sense, i.e., to
associate equally, we must contribute an appropriate share. The United States and
_ European countries are contributing from 3 to 5 percent, in spite of their
� difficulties, and from the standpoint of "equal association," I mentioned earlier
that 3 percent might be proper and that 1 percent might be too little. I do not
think even now that 3 percent is neces~aiy. To me, the main problem is always the
most important.
The foregoing is my thinking regarding defense and to summarize, I think the
foremost problem is to prevent war. Of course, for that purpose, we must exert
all-out efforts for peace through diplomacy and try other means. However, in
spite of that, emergencies arise. I think we should prepare the minimum power to
counter such emergencies and that power will contribute to the deterrent effect.
I do not think that will become such a burden that the people cannot bear it nor
will it become a threat to foreign countries.
Part II. Defense Debate
Japan Cannot Be Def ended With Your Strategy
Takeda: I wish to ask a question of Mr Seki. Abolition of nuclear armament must
certainly be carried out, and it is a fact that in democra~tic countries, since
there is freedom of speech, the outcry for nuclear elimination is getting stronger.
ls the previously mentioned Palme Committee even thinking of staging a demonstration
in the Moscow square? I think that to advocate it only in democratic countries is
a simple matter.
Seki: In fact, tlie Palme Committee recently held a meeting in Moscow. When it
holds the next meeting in Japan, it will have a representative .from Moscow. For
tl~e Unitecl States, former Secretary of State Vance is also a member. That is to
say, both the United States and the USSR are represented on the Palme Committee.
Because of such members, the items discussed can be upgraded to policy level. '
Therefore, rather than demonstrations, the formulation of definitive policies is
the most important function.
It is a fact that when it comes to freedom of speech, it does not exist in the
communist sphere. However, even countries which we have chosen as allies, such as
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~ the ROK and the Philippines, cannot boast of such freedom. Essentially, to protect
freedom of speech, there are many political conditions which are required. To make
the communist sphere free, international exchange is needed rather than a race for
military expansion.
I would like to turn to Mr Takeda. Although you saic? that there is no country in
the world with neutraility without arma.ment, actually there is such a country.
_ Costa Rica is one. You might say that it is a very small country but it has even
_ established a Peace University.
Ishibashi: I would like to have a correction made, f irst of all. Mr Takeda said
that the people supporting neutrality without armament was only 6 percent, but I
would like for him to read a recent newspaper. The ASAHI SHIMBUN, which conducted
the survey, discovered that those supporting neutrality without armament had been
only 6 percent but that the rate had since increased to 30 percent, and was
surprised and came to us for comment. I should like to ask that the newest figures
not be ignored pur.posely.
Also, he said that there is no one who likes war, but I do not think you can say
that. True intentions and official stances must be differentiated, and although
it says that no one likes war, isn't the current Japanese political powers and
government creating a trend which favors a prowar atmosphere? This year's "Defense
- White Paper" will be decided upon at the cabinet meeting day after tomorrow, but in
it, an increase in defense awareness and patriotism have begun to be stressed
- strongly. The social climate from which we suffered before and during the w~~r is
again beginning to overwhelm us. What I really wanted to question Mr Takeda about
is how he views the 15 years of war, i.e., the Pacific War. Does he think it was
inevitable, after all, for the sake of Japan's security and defense?
What To Dc if There Is an Invasion
Takeda: I know that, as Mr Seki stated, there are about 12 countries now that try
to protect their countries through neutrality,without armament. For example, there
are countries such as Costa Rica, Monaco and Liechtenstein, but these are consider-
ably ctifferent from Japan. Their positions in the world, geographical factors, etc,
differ, and I do not think Japan can be compared in the same light.
Next, I agree with Mr Ishibashi ttat neutrality without armament is still an
- idealistic idea. In reall:y, what would we do in case of aggression? Naturally,
we should try to prevent it. Everyone wishes this. However, if it should happen,
what should we do?
lsiiibas}~i: Please lnswer my question first. How do you view the 15 years of war,
the Pacific War?
Takeda: At times, war cannot be prevented, even if one wants to do so. However,
there might still be the accusation that in the name of "defens~," actions lead
to "aggression." It is true that the Great East Asia War could be interpreted in
- that way. However, I consider that there is something inexplicable about wars. I
- chink we must consider the public opinion of that time, the development of events
in past wars and the result of being forced into it. As compared with the
Sino-,Tapanese and Russo-Japanese wars, however, I think that the last war appeared
- to be mucti more aggressive on our part.
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~
Oshibashi: I think that only by frankly admitting that it was an aggressive war can
one begin to reflect and adopt the proper attitude. Since you unexpectedly admitted
that there wa~ the appearance to some extent of aggressive warfare, I will say no
more.
You ask what we should do in case an invasion takes place, but as I have said
repeatedly, I cannot imagine at all that there will be aggression if ~apan makes
the utmost efforts to establish friendly relatzons.
If there is to be aggression against Japan, the only reasons would be the formation
of a military alliance with the United States, sanction of U.S. military bases and
the creation of a prowar atmosphere by assuming that the USSR is a potential enemy
and clamoring daily about the Soviet threat. If these problems are resolved, I
cannot imagine that Japan would be attacked.
Specifically, I am most worried about the talic about the three straits that came
up earlier. There is much discussion gcing on about closing the Tsugaru, Soya
and Tsushima straits, but if that is done in compliance with a U.S. request, what
would happen? I think that we would be faced with a great crisis. That is because
the Soviet Navy would be like a"mouse in a trap."
We must become worried only if we cornmit such actions, and if we do not, there will
be no aggression.
Furthermore, I would like to ask specific questions. According to the intentions
and official stances of the security treaty, "the United States will come to our
aid if Japan is attacked. However, Japan will not participate if the United States
sliould be engaged in war elsewhere. Through the mechanism of prior consultation,the
entry of nuclear arms can be prevented. In case there is prior cons~3ltation on
starting warfare, Japan will say 'no."' Would such selfishness be tolerated?
While stating that Japan cannot be defended unless Japan and the United States
- conduct joint warfare, it is claimed that the unified command cannot be implemented
because it is unconstitutional. However, men in uniform say after their retirement
that Japan will not be able to defend, nor conduct 3oint maneuvers without
considering the constitutional issue. Which do you think is correct? I would like
to know which are the real intentions and which are only official stances.
Takeda: Before that, I would like an answer to my question on what we should do
in case of an invasion. Although you stated that it would not occur....
l.shibashi: It will. never occur. If we eliminate the causes that I mentioned.
Takeda: Although Mr Ishibashi says so, he has visited various foreign countries
ar.d talked with many VIP's but I believe that none of them agreed with the theory
= of neutrality without armament....
Ishibashi: Then, has Japan ever been invaded?
Takeda: I am talking about the future.
Ishibashi: No, there has been no case in which all of Japan has been invaded.
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_ 'P;ikecla: '1't~ere has been no suclti case in the past. I think that because of the
Japan-U.S. Security Treat~ setup and the SDF, no such aggression has taken place.
Ishibashi: I am talking about what has happened since the Sino-Japanese war. Since
the Sino-Japanese war, the Russo-Japanese war, World War I, the dispatch of troops
- to Siberia, the 15-year war and the Pacific War...has there ever been an occasion
when Japan was invaded? In all the wars, Japan was the aggressor.
Takeda: Events are decided by power relationships existing at the time, and Japan
had military forces then. If events had transpired without the Sino-Japanese ox
Russo-Japanese wars, I think that Japan wouJd naturally have been invaded. I
think that we took action first.
Ishibashi: It is useless to talk about "if" in history. What is important is the
facts.
~
Seki: I want to bring up a point here. The question has been raised as to what
Japan would do if it was invaded, but has any thought been given to the event of
Japan becoming involved in a limited nuclear war?
_ Takeda: I think that Japan would be annihilated if there were nuclear warfare.
Seki: Then, I would like to ask why you don't discuss such possibilities, and only
take up cases of invasion without nuclear involvement.
Takeda: Just because you possess nuclear armament doesn't mean that it would
_ lead immediately to nuclear war. Conventional warfare would take place first, and
then it would escalate.
Seki: I am saying that you are behind the times. At present nuclear theater
weapons are being emplaced, and hasn't the threat of limited nuclear war increased
- with the Reagan administration? Furthermore, isn't he saying let's have a nuclear
_ war. It is strange that you are not aware of this. You have no qualifications as
a former responsible official of the Defense Agency and you should have resigned.
You are not thinking seriously of Japan's national security. We cannot entrust
Japan to people like you.
Takeda: I do not think so. Conventional military strength is needed so that
nt~clear weapons need not be used. Because there is a great possibility of
conventional warfare escalating to nuclear war, we should have the capability to
cope with conventional warfare.
Views on the Introduction of Theater Nuclear Weapons
Seki: That is a basic mistake. Conventional and nuclear warfares are interrelated.
Because of the close ties, if the introduction of nuclear weapons is gradually
permitted, eventually a nuclear war will envelop everyone. Furthermore, at present,
because of the introduction of theater nuclear weapons, the danger of nuclear
w:irfarc has never been so ~reat. I would like to ask what your views regarding the
introcluction of theater nuclear weapons are.
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Takeda: With regard to nuclear weapons, the countries which possess them know best
their fearfulness, and they want to use them, first of all, as political tools and
- only God knows what will happen. I believe that they do not truly want to use
nuclear weapons. There is nothing absolute about defense policies and as I have
said from the beginning, the important factor is what measures should be taken to
prevent nuclear war. The final measure, I think, is the abolition of nuclear
- armament.
Seki: If nothing is absolute, you should consid~r that Japan has not be2n invaded
- hypothetically. Isn't that the same?
Takeda: No, I don't think so. The past histury proves that.
Seki: Since Japan has never been invaded in the past, isn't it all right to think
- of it as a theoretical question? Then, why do you only bring up the instance of a
possible invasion of Japan and not consider the possibility of a nucl~ar attack?
A nuclear attack against Japan would occur because of the Japan-U.S. Security
Treaty and because Japan is part of the U.S. nuclear strategy system. Japan co~uld
become ir.volved in a limited nuclear war.
Unless you consider such problems, I think that you are a complete failure as a
' responsible official of the Defense Agency. You do not have the capability to bear
the responsibility for ~Japan's national security. You are a complete failure. I
_ want to become the director-general of the Defense Agency. I am so inclined.
Takeda: Then, if you were the direc:tor-general of the Defense Agency, what measures
_ would you take?
Seki: I would clearly proclaim Japan's diplomacy for peace and open up a new path.
I would adopt an entirely new course.
Takeda: Speaking concretely, what steps would you take?
Seki: First, I would tie up with the "dove" factions of northern Europe and other
European countries. It is necessary for Japan to open up foreign diplomacy by
following a diplomatic course which is close to that of northern Europe. That
should be the very first step.
At the U:~ arms reduction special assembly, a plan should be drawn up that would
make possible an across-the-board arms reduction. On that subject, an exhaustive
- symposium should be }ield with U.S. political scholars. Before the UN special
assembly is held, with the UN University as the center, the sons of all the world's
- politicians should be made to live in Japan as hostages. Then neither the USSR,
the United States or any other country could attack Japan. The funds for such a
purpose must be created. Then, a peace department should be established in all
Japanese universities. The contents of the Civil Service examinations must be
completely changed, and more "peace warriors" must be nurtured in Japan. The SDF
would be totally switched to that program.
As for the UN peace maintenance forces, unlike the JSP, I am willing to send some
Japanese troops. However, in order to do that, Japan must become neutral and pursue
a peaceful policy. It is a fundamental error to dispatch the SDF to the UN peace
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maintenance forces under the present Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. This is not
neutrality. To remain neutral in such conflicts is the least we can do, blit at
present there is practically no case where neutrality can be maintained in such
conflicts. As a rule, unless we become neutral, we cannot transfer our SDR to the
_ UN peace maintenance forces.
~ Takeda: From what you have just said, I agree heartily that a UN university should
~ be established a.nd foreigners should b~ invited to Japan. However, I do not think
that such actions would make defense capability unnecessary.
_ Groping for World Arms Reduction
Seki: Haven't you ever thought of gradually decreasing defensive power and
eventually bring about nonarmament or arms reduction?
Takeda: That is because reality is not so.
Seki: Then, why don't you work toward it?
- Takeda: Naturally, I'm making the effort.
Seki: You have never tried it. The SDF has done nothing about it. It is
proceeding in the reverse direction. You are advocating that it go in the opposite
direction.
Takeda: That is not the function of the SDF; its duty is to increase the power
that it possesses. Such general plans must be considered elsewhere.
Seki: That is why we should not head toward military expansion. At least, we
should stop.
Takeda: I do not think so.
Ishibashi: I want to return to the previous question. As a policy, "when we f ight
together with the United States, a unified command is not possible because of the
constitution." Those in uniform are asking how we can f ight under such circum-
stances? I think that it is proper as a military theory. Mr Takeda, which course
are you choosing? Are you saying that the constitution should be ignored and that
since victory takes precedence, a unified command is absolutely necessary, as the
men in uniform say? I think that is the proper argument for the military men.
}lowever, if you are determined to defend the constitution, then you should defend
it completely, as we are saying.
~ ~s for the 1 percent or 3 percent question, while you were saying earlier that 3
~>ercent was necessary, you are now becomix~g vague about it. If I were a military
man, I would think it only natural to advocate the 3 percent.
Takeda: I do not think so.
Ishibashi: Then, you were saying 3 percent was necessary just to be sociable?
_ 'I'akeda: I already spoke my piece earlier.
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Ishibashi: All NA10 countries are expending from 3 to S percent of their GNP.
If you are going t~ :{eep company, the United States and the EC are saying to pay
out as much as other countries. Only Japan is making the excuse that "No, 1 percent
is enough," and not keeping up with the other countries. I think that the military
men's argument should be: "Please pay as much as the other countries. Please
assist us financially, as we shall try our best militarily." However,.because of
the constitutional problems their true intentions might be that, but they can only
make sociable arguments. I think that this is not right for military men. What
are you going to do with such halfway military power? If you are going to defend
~ a counrry with military power, then let us strive for completeness in armament,
strategy and other aspects. This is the proper attitude of the military. I insist
on an answer to this matter.
In connection with this subject, there is a question I would like to ask of you
military men. I do not say that all are involved, but when the higher ranking
_ officers resign, they enter the armament industries. The arms industries and
high-ranking officers seem to have a strange relationship of interests. What do
you think of this setup?
Is Military Power Self-Proliferating?
Takeda: First, I want to express my views regarding the constitution. I want it
understood that I am speaking as ar~ individual and not as the former chairman of
the Joint Chief s of Staf f.
_ As far as the constitution is concerned--and probably all laws are the same--but
even if there is a defective law, as long as it is recognized as the law, I think
that it must be obeyed. I hope this viewpoint will not invite further misunder-
standing.
However, laws are made by men and as the world changes, various distortions take
_ place. Therefore, a lot of research and discussion are needed on defects in the
law in their problem areas. It was pointed out that there are a number of problems
- concerning the constitution. There should be further discussions, and based on
the talks, the people shou].d be asked whether it should be changed. I am sure that
there are certain problems connected with it. However, I believe that as long as
_ the law is in effect, it must be obeyed. In essence, the constitution exists for
the sa�ety and development of the country.
Next, there was mention of prof.essional military men accepting other jobs in the
private sector after retirement, and that is a fact. I believe there is a
considerable number of such men. However, they are not all in operations divisions.
- They are not in special positions wtiere they are asked to diwlge intelligence
information ar to speak on military affairs. The truth is that they are treated
as casual consultants. '
Ishiba5hi: Mil_itary power is self.-propagating. Once military strength is acc~pted,
a country ~radually becomes a great military power. Especially, military men's
logic works in that way. I do not want to mention his name but I talked to another
chairr~ian of the Joint Chiefs uf Staff and he revealed his true intentions by saying:
"We should have our cwn nuclear armament." I believe that military theory will lead
_ to that conclusion. On the basis of such thinking, the possibility becomes strong
17
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- of following the erroneous path of militarism. For the moment, with ~ur political
. power and party responsibilities, we must put a brake on those who try to build up
- a big military nation through self-propagation.
I want to conclude by saying that the most effective restraint is to say repeatedly
that we should protect our constitution and not be so boastful; after all, i.t's
our constitution and we should try our best to comply with it. That is our only
restraint.
Seki: It has been learned recently, as a result of scientific research, that the
national securit~ theory of the present military experts, i*~cluding the Defense
Agency, has been completely mistaken. I want to mention the most concrete example.
- The United States has made an effort toward military expansion to defend its own
_ country. However, thz end result is that in the past 36 years since the ei~d of
World War II, the safety of the United States has never been in such a dangerous
position vis-a-vis the USSR. In other words, as a result of an increase in
military power, national security has fallen into a crisis. The cause is not the
Soviet threat.
Furthermore, according to various studies, when great pow..rs confront each other
with mil.itary power, in i0 percenr the cases war has rrsulted, according to
history. T}ie casualties amou,?~ to 70 percent--that is a terrible disease. The
fact is that the military expansionists theory has been proven fundamentally
wrong.
Thus, what is necessary for Japan is to resist the demands for an increase in
military strength by the Reagan administration. We should give all our considera-
_ tion....
Takeda: Self-proliferation of military power--possibly, history will verify such
tendencies. Particularly in Japan's case, such a tendency appeared in World War
II, but the military organization is not the same today. At that time, the military
had an independent command authority and could act alone, but at present I think
y there can be civilian control. In the future, I believe that if we reflect upon
the past and make an effort, the good conscience of the Japanese will be able to
_ solve the problem.
COPYRICHT: Kobunsha 1981
9 I 34
(:SO: 4105/15
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~ -
SC:LENCE AND ~~,CHNOLOGY
- DEVELOPMENT OF INDEPENDENT SPACE INDUSTRY SAID DIFFICULT
Tokyo TOKI NO KEIZAI in Japanese No 302 Nov ~1 pp 33-35
- [Excerpt] It is true that with the success of the space shuttle, space industry
has achieved reality, but in what ways will it develop hereafter? ~
There is ci report concerning this ("A vision of spacE industry") prepared in April
of this year by the Round Table Conference on the Fundamental Problems of the Space
Industry, which is a persanal adv~sory organ of the head of the Machinery Information
- Industries Bureau of MITI. This is the first time the Japanese space industry has
_ been treated systematically as an independent industry.
A One-Trillion-Yen Market in the 90's
According to this.report, the space industry is "a power~ully creative, knowledge-
intensive industry, and it is expected that there will be a resulting broad spin-off
of technology." Emphasizing its spirit of growth, the report forecasts that the
space industry in Japan will in the 5-year period of 1981-85 reach a level of about
1.1 trillion yen, and in the S-year period of 1986-90 about 2.1 trillion yen. tts
also predicts that annual production, presently at a level of 100 billion yen,
will in 10 years reach 500 million yen; by the middle of the 1990's it will be on
a scale of 1 trillion yen. Incidentally, this report estimates that the size of
the world market for the period 1986-90, taking all 5 years together, will be 36
billion dollars (about 7.6 trillion yen). It is estimated tYzat Japan will obtain
a strong one-fourth share of it during ;.his period. Exports for the 5-year period
1986-90 are seen at about 650 billion yen.
However, in order to achieve such goals, it will be necessary ~or Japan to solve
numerous problems.
One is to establish an independentl.y developed technology. In the case of
"Hima~rari 2," which is said to be the first working satellite launched into station-
ary orbit independently by Japan, the ratio of domestic production of the N-II
rocket used for the launch was 49 percent and that of the satellite itself 28 percent.
In fact, more than half of it was dependent on foreign countries.
- Certainly, the percentage of domestic production is increasing year by year. When
we considered that the "Himawari" launched by the United States in _1977 was only
11 percent domesti uses in automotive parts, and new developments can be expected when
yuality and performance teciinology is built up and the cost is reduced through
mass production.
lmproved Productivity
The major issue is how to quickly put new products that meet the user's needs on
the market and at the same time build efficient cars.
- Here is a comparison of the labor productivity of Toyota, Nissan, GM and Ford.
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_ Based on 1979 figures, there is a great discrepancy in the numbers of cars pro-
duced per worker per year, with 71 for Toyota, 46 for Nissan, 11 for GM and 12
for Ford. If annual productivity is compared on a value-added basis there is
still a gap: $53,000 for Toyota, $39,000 for Nissan, $33,000 for GM and $27,000
for Ford. However, a simple comparison cannot be made because: 1) the U.S.
companies produce their own parts and have a higher rate of internal production,
and 2) Toyota differs from Nissan in having a separate sales company (Toyota
Motor Sales Co).
Even though a strict comparison cannot be made, the important point is that in
terms of the number of vehicles, the productivity of U.S. manufacturers has not
increased at all (see Figure 2). According to a study by the ITC (U.S. Inter-~
national Trade Commission), the productivity of the U.S. automobile industry
remained unchanged from 1975 to 1979, at a level of about seven cars per thousand
manhours. Wages increassd 9.4 percent per year during this period, more than
could be covered by price increases. The same study found that the average hourly
wage in the U.S. automobile industry was over $16/hr in the first half of 1980;
this is 30 percent higher than the average for U.S. manufacturing indu~tries and
50 percent higher than Ja~:3nese wages.
One more point is the difference in labor-capital ratios (acquisition basis)--the
amount of equipment per employee. Using the previous basis for comparison, there
is a large gap: $115,U00 for Toyota, $82,000 for Nissan, $29,000 for GM and
$29,000 for Ford. Again, it is not possible to make a simple comparison because
of different ratios of overseas production and production by subcontractors. For
all four compan~.es there was steady growth (on a nominal basis) in the labor-
capital ratio during this 5-year period: SO percent for Toyota and Nissan, 30
percent for GM and 40 percent for Ford.
In 1977, U.S. manufacturers began to greatly increase investment in facilities.
They plan to invest $80 billion in the 6 years from 1980 through 1985; the average
annual investment of $130 billion is more than double that of the past 5 years.
If overseas investment is excluded, the 10 major Japanese automobile manufacturers
will also nearly double their investment.
As for a breakdown of facilities investment, the greatest emphasis has been put
on new products aimed at the need to conserve energy, but greater effort has also
begun to be put into making the production system more efficient. The basic goal
- is to move ahead with a flexible manufacturing system (FMS) which is automatically
adjusted to production of different models. FMS actively involves highly flexible
technoloby so as to achieve high production efficiency while quickly responding
to model changes and changes in demand.
, Because of this, there are prospects for a major advance in the introduction of NC
(numerically controlled) machine tools and industrial robots. Orders from automo-
tive manufacturers to Japan's machine tool industry have increased sharply. Orders
received in 1980 were up 50 percent from the previous year, and the 1981 workload
has been assured all through this year. Accordingly, dependence on automobiles
for domestic orders will rise from ~he 30 percent of the past to 40 percent next
year. Ttie proportion of NC tools within the total production of machine tools in
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1979 was 42 percent, double the figure for 1976. As FMS progresses, there may
well be a sharp rise in the use of numerical control for single-purpose machine
tools .
Industrial robots have also begun a period of growth. Rather than automation of
single-purpose facilities, there is a generalization of automated machinery with
a diversity of computer controlled functions. This will bring a reduction in
labor costs and improvement of working conditions. High-performance machinery to
meet such needs is being developed. Robots will be adopted in large numbers for
body welding and painting processes.
With progress in technological development, the use of robots is expected to
extend to appropriate parts of the assembl,y process. The adoption of new mate-
rials and changes in production methods to make lighter cars will increase dem~nd
for die-casting and in~ection molding equipment.
An increase in exports is also expected. For the tool manufacturers which support
Japan's superior minicar production technology, there is much room to develop
demand in the European and U.S. industries, which are undergoing a facilities
investment boom. Thus, the various machine tool manufacturers involved can be
expected not only to contribute to the strengthening of the Japanese automobile
industry's ability to compete internationally, but also to be active in the world
ma rke t .
Moving Into the Overseas Market
- Trade friction among automobile producing countries has taken on a complicated
aspect as minicar competition between Japan, the United States and Europe has
intensified. The automotive industry is a strategic industry which occupies an
- important position within the national structure of major countries like Japan,
the United States, West Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Canada. Automobiles
made up the following percentages of total national exports in 1977: 18 percent
for Japan, 10 percent for the United States, 14 percent for West Germany, 12 per-
cent for France, 7 percent for Britain, 8 percent for Italy and 21 percent for
Canada. In all seven countries, automobiles have the top export volume within
the machine industry.
The issue of U.S. import restrictions is coming to a climax, and trade friction
witli Europe is also becoming increasingly severe.
According to a survey by EUROFINANCE, the European automobile market at 10
hi.llion vchicles per year is about the same size as the U.S. market, and in 1983
ttie t~alance between imports and exports is expected to turn to an import surplus,
in terms of number of vehicles.
And so even though competition among Japanese, U.S. and European automobile manu-
- facturers is becoming more intense, the winning and losing companies will no
longer be decided just on the basis of former conditions of competition. As a
result, the major Japanese automobile manufacturers face the necessity of bring-
ing into their company strategies in response to the difficult task of "seeking
tlie path of coexistence while maintaining competitive relations." In this
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instance, provision of technology and capital in the broad sense will be funda-
mental. It will be important to foster international cooperation while joining
together capital and technology through technical agreements, licensed production
. or through local production using joint ventures, capital participation or 100
percent direct investment.
M~ves in this direction have already begun. Examples include: 1) Honda's pl~n
to produce passenger cars in the United States and the licensed production with
Britain's BL; 2) Nissan's production of minitrucks in the United States, its
capital participation in Motor Iberica (Spain) and its passenger car joint
venture with Alfa Romea {Italy); and 3) the idea of joint passenger car produc-
tion by Toyota and Ford. "
While Japanese automobile manufacturers are expanding procurement of parts from
overseas, foreign manufacturers have also moved to enhance their own competitive
positions by making use of companies in Japan's automotive industry. GM, Ford
and Chrysler have invested in Japanese partners (GM owns 34.2 percent of Isuzu
Motors, Ford owns 25 percent of Toyo Kogyo and Chrysler owns 15 percent of
Mitsubishi Motors), and are trying to purchase ma~or parts for minicars. Isuzu
Motors provides GM with minicar diesel engines and manual transaxles (MTX) for
FF cars. Toyo Kogyo exports MTX for Ford's FF minicar (Erica), and is also to
begin providing automatic transacles (ATX) and diesel engines. This year
Mitsubishi began exporting engines for Chrysler's FF minicar (K-car). Of course,
this will expand the demand of these three companies with respect to companies
which manufacture automotive parts.
There has been an increase in cases of parts manufacturers themselves exporting
directly to automobile manufacturers. Worldwide passenger car production is in
- excess of 30 million cars per year, so if there is a shift to minicars, there is
potential for expansion of the market for Japanese automotive parts. U.S. manu-
~ facturers are actively engaged in intexnational parts procurement with an empha-
' sis on quality and performance, and there are many deals with Japanese parts
manufacturers.
, Japanese companies are eagerly exporting parts which can be used in their own
product lines with existing technology, but there are many parts manufacturers
which are wary of exporting new products developed jointly with automobile manu-
facturers.
As seen by parts manufacturers, the overseas market falls into three categories.
Illustrating with the U.S. market, there are: 1) the large after-sales market for
Japanese ccirs, with ownership expected to pass the 9 million level, 2) the new
market for parts supplied to U.S. manufacturers which are switching to minicars,
and 3) the parts market for Japanese cars built in the United States, if Japanese
manufacturers do decide on local production. If a certain level of demand in
these markets can be guaranteed, it will be quite possible to advance into them.
For example, the U.S. plant of Nippon Oil Seal Industry Co is aimed at U.S. auto-
mobile manufacturers, and NGK Spark Plug Co is looking at the after-sales market
for spark plugs.
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Within the Nissan group there are plans to build up Mexican operations by sending
in such subsidiaries as Nippon Radiator, Atsugi Automotive Parts and Kinugawa
Rubber Industry Co. There are also parts manufacturers such as Akebono Brake
Industries which hope to play roles as partners with U.S. parts manufacturers
rather than sending in wholly owned subsidiaries and which are considering enter-
_ ing the U.S. market through joint ventures or licensed production.
Thus the overseas strategies of parts manufacturers are taking a variety of forms,
but they are becoming more concrete.
New Long-Term Strategy Necessary
It is said that a period of 4 years is required to develop a new car. Recent
improvements in computer-assisted design (CAD) technology may allow the develop-
ment period to be shortened somewhat. But if 4 years is taken to be the model
cycle in principle, it will be some time yet before models using the technology
being developed now will appear on the market. All-out competition with U.S.
minicars will reach a climax in the middle of this decade when the new models
are lined up.
West Germany's Volkswagen (VW) has unveiled the concept of a VW 2000 passenger car
in the 1990's. It cannot be called a complete departure from the Golf, VW's lead-
ing model at present, but the company is pursuing long-term research and develop-
- ment with a clear ob~ective. Moreover, a distinction is made between research and
development, with the development division responsible for cars to be produced in
the 198G's and the research division tiandling car concepts for the 1990's. This
point is not limited just to VW; it is seen in automobile manufacturers throughout
the world~
If peripheral industries are to find new market opportunities in the automobile
_ industry, it is important that they become involved in the�early stages of research
and deveiopment and develop needs into actual products. The research and develop-
ment system of automobile manufacturers has gone full cycle and now depends to a
great extent on the development abilities of related companies which have superior
technology. As seen in the examples of car electronics and new materials, it is
necessary to synthesize from basic technology. Representative Japanese companies
witti the ability to syntllesize should be able to take a greater part in the devel-
opmen~ of new Lields in the automobile industry. Microcomputers, high tensile
- strength steel sheets, NC machine tools and industrial robots all show that
improved technology in related fields works to strengthen the ability of Japanese
automobile manufacturers to compete.
On the other hand, the present automotive parts manufacturers will have to try to
escape from tlie "number of vehicles slide." That is, parts manufacturers have
poor prospects for growth ~f they are completely dependent on automobile manufac-
_ turers in the sense that their own sales can slide up only with increases in the
- number of automobiles produced. Even if the competitive strength of the Japanese
automobile industry, which is forced to mainCain a competitive interdeFendence,
is further de~nstrated, it will be almost impossible to bring about the steady
t11~I1 export growth seen in the 1970's. It will thus be necessary to further
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rationalize in order to enhance the competitive position of the group and to aim
for profit and growth supported by independent product development. -
The course will differ from one automotive parts manufacturer to the next. The
courses can be roughly categorized into two groups: 1) improvement of product
performance and development of new parts within the automobile industry, with its
1.6-trillion-yen scale of production; and 2) diversification away from the field
of automobiles, using the production and development technology fostered within
the automobile industry. Few companies have taken the second course in the past;
the reason has been the high growth rate of automobiles. The key will be the
possibility of developing overseas markets and opening up new automotive fields
as fuel-efficient cars are developed. It is important for automotive parts manu-
facturers, which are highly group-oriented, to upgrade their status within the
group while developing markets outside it. In fact, such moves can be seen very
clearly in companies such as Nippon Denso.
The worldwide automotive industry faces a period of change. Related industries
have also entered an era af opportunity for growth and of severe trial. It is
hoped that steady implementation of new long-term strategies will make a success
of the 1980's.
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--Technology---Technology sharing and licensed production
Trade friction--~_
Capital------Joint ventures, capital participation (takeover),
direct local production
-Safety
-Emission Controls
Export expansion -Comfort
~
Ilnternational Miriica~{--Product improvement- Development of Fue
~ Competition ~ and differentiation Efficient Cars
U.S./Eurbpean minicar Market hologeneity Improvement of
strategy production
technology
Changing competitive-------------
conditions
--Minicar production--Design
scale investment
--Style/design Productivity--Promotion of
universal car
--Quality/performance Procurement
of funds -Automation
--Fuel consumption
-Flexibility
--Price competition
-Precision
-Marketability
---Industrial robots
---CNC (computer
numerical control)
Fig. 1. Framework of. International Minicar Competition
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-Electronics
-Improved combustion efficiency--
-Diesel
-Engine - -Reuse of waste energy--Turbochargers
efficiency
- -Improved mechanical and transmission efficiency
-Front wheel drive---Transaxle, ball 3oint
-Smr~ller-- - -Material conservation (design changes)
_ lighter -High tensile
~ cars -Alternative materials--New materials-- strength steel
-Engineering
plas tics
-Composites
-Fiber rein-
forced plastics
-Carbon fiber
reinforced
plas tics
-Ceramics
('-Air resistance (styling)
-Reduced-----L
road/air -Rolling resistance (radial tires)
resistance
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I.UC"
~ annual settlement, .19C~)-19)
_ Gi,~ ,
_ rn `
~ 1 f"Urcl
~ `
� >
li> I 'I ,
Q. I . . ',1
c. (';'ISSdII 1~~~~O~;a
~ . , ~.f -
w �---�.._r
N u I'~ d~i ~U :~0 ~..i ~u
\
(l
I'roduction (cars/~�~urker)
n
Fig. 2. Prod~ictivity of Major Japanese and U.S. Automobile Manufacturers
Total added value Vehicles produced
- Labor productivity = Vehicles produced X Workers - Added value per
_ vehicle x vehicles produced per worker
COPYRIGHT: Chuo Koronsha 1981
9601
CSO; 8129/0418
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
THEMES, ENTERPRISES SELECTED FOR 10-YEAR TECHNOLOGY PROJECT
Tokyo DENKI SHIMBUN in Japanese 10 Sep 81 p 5
_ [Text] MITI Unofficially vecides on Enterprises To Develop Next Generation Basic
- Industrial Technologies; 10-Year Contracts To Be Signed in Early October
On the llth, MITI will convene a meeting of the Industrial Technology Council's
Next Generation Industrial Technology Development Department (chairman, Isamu Yamashita,
vice chairman of the Federation of Economic Organizatiuns), and determine the plans
to carry out the Next Generation Basic Industrial Technology Research and Development
System, which will begin during ~che present fiscal year. Prior to this, however,
it has unofficially decided on the enterprises which will be commissioned to work
on the R& D for this project. It had previously announced the recruitment of enter-
prises, and it recently concluded the evaluation and selection of the principal enter-
- prises based on three developmental areas: new materials, biotechnology, and new
function elements. The contracts will be signed as early as the beginning of October.
- Already the enterprises have established associations or foundations in order to
carry out their research smoothly. For the next 10 years the enterprises will be
involved in the development of basic technologies essential for advanced industries,
while maintaining close contact with national research agencies.
Three Areas of New Materials, Biotechnology and New Function Elements
MITI's Next Generation Basic Industrial Technology R& D System established this
fiscal year is part of its overall efforts to renovate technologies through Japan's
independent technologies, something which it had previously neglected. MITI's aim
is to waste no time in carrying out R& D on advanced basic technologies essential
for the establishment of next generation advanced industries, in particular, the
space, nuclear power, marine, new energy and biochemical industries, i.e., those
wtiosc tull development is expected in the 1990's.
Originally, MITI selected a total of 16 themes in the three areas--new materials,
biotechnology, and new function elements--as basic technologies common to the next
generation industries, and planned to budget about 120 billion ,yen for 10 years of
R& D, However, because at the time when this fiscal year's budget was being set
- up the Ministry of Finance disclosed a severe assessment policy due to financial
_ difficulties, the budget for the first year of the pro~ect was cut down to about
- 2.7 billion yen (requested amount, 5.2 billion yen) and the number of themes was also
'reduced to 12.
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FOP. ON'F'ICIA1. USt: ONLti'
Because of this, the technologies applicable to tr~e presant system are: six themes
in the area of new materials: 1) fine ceramics, 2) highly efficient separation mem-
brane, 3) conducting hi~.'~ particles, 4) high crystal high particles, 5) high per-
formance crystal cor.t.rol alloy, and 6) compound materials; three themes in the area
of biotechnology: 1) application of volume cell culture technology. 2) application
of gene splicing technology, and 3) application of bioreactor tech~~lology in en-
gineering; and three themes in the area of new function elements: 1) super lattice
electronic elements, 2) tliree dimensional. electronic elements, 3) environmental
hazard resistant devices.
In line with tnese 12 themes, MITI has established a"Next Generation Department"
within the Industrial Technology Council so as to consolidate the,promotion structure
nationally, and in order to promote participation of the private sector it has con-
solidated the preparations to consign research work to private enterprises. Recently
it announced recruitment of the consignees.
On the 9th, as a result of its evaluation of the applicants, MITI unofficially de-
cided on the enterprises shown in the table below. As soon as MITI tnade its
announcement, these enterprises began establishing associations and foundations to
handle the consigned projects; it will be these organizations that will in fact pro-
mote the research activities.
- The newly established organizations are: a High Particle Basic Technology Research
Association, a Fine Ceramics Technology Research Association, and a Next Generation
Compound Materials R& D Association (foundation), all in the area of new materials;
a Biotechnology R& D Association in the field of biotechnology; and (foundation);
and a New Function Element R& D Association, in the area of new function elements.
- The contracts with the enterprises are expected to be concluded by early Cctober,
- at which time a 10-year research on basic technologies aiming at the 1990's will
begin in conjunction with the national research agencies. Since the development
themes are focused on 12 topics for the time being, the consigned amount is expected
tc~ total. about 80 billion yen. A meeting of. the Industrial Technology Council's
Next Ucneration Department will be held on the llth, at which time actual plans
are expected to be revealed.
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FUR ONFICIAI. IISI: UNI.ti'
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~ r.~ r.~ E:t ~
n �~e ~ ~~>t i. ~ x ~
~ , ~
, fi) % . ~f ? ~~t' #~n~7
i:7~ ~?N i!f ra f"1 I~k 8i ~ Sji 4fi
1ti "~~Ej J Se t C i1E % ~2 ~
' I ~'b r- ~ ~i 1 ~ ~~ai ~ ~ ~
- ~
Table. Technological Themes, Enterprises, and Major Organizations Commi.ssioned Under
the Next Generation Basic Industr~al Technology Research & Development System.
- 1. Technologies
2. Enterprises commissioned
3. Major organizations responsible for development
4. New materials ~
S. Highly efficient separation membrane
6. Toray, Teijin, Asahi Chemical, Kuraray, Toyobo
37
- FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500020053-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500020053-6
- NOR ON6'ICIAL USE ONL.Y
7, Conducting high particles
8. Sumitomo ~lectric, Daisel Chemical, Asahi Glass, Mitsubishi Chemical
- 9. High crystal high particles
10. Toray, Teijin, Asahi Chemical, Sumitomo Electric, Sumitomo Chemical
11. High Particle Basic Technology Research Association
12. Fine ceramics
13. Toshiba, Kyoto Ceramics, Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, Kobe Steel, Showa
1)enku, Sun~.itomo Electric, Asahi Glass, Denki Kagaku, NGK Insulators, NGK Spark
Plub, Kurosaki Refractories, ~oyoda Machine Works, Shinagawa Refractories,
Inoue Japacs Research Institute, Toyota Motor
14. Fine Ceramics Technology Research Association
15. High performance crystal control alloy
Compouncl reaterials
16. 1) High performance crystal control alloy--Hitachi, Kobe Steel, Daido Steel,
Mitsubishi Metal, Hitachi Metals, Sumitomo Electric, Ishikawajima--Harima
2) Processing technology development--Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Fuji Heavy
Industries, Toyota Motor, Toshiba Machine, Ishikawajima-Harima, Mitsubishi
~lectric, Kawasaki Heavy Industries
3) High particle related compound materials-- Toray, Teijin, Mitsubishi
Chemical Industries, Nippon Carbon
17. Foundation, the Next Generation Compound Meta1 Materials R& D Association
18. Biotechnology
:19. Large volume cell culture technology
20. 13ior.eactor
2l. Gene splicing technology
22. Asahi Chemical, Ajinomoto, Kyowa Hakko Kogyo, Takeda Chemical Industries,
Toyo Jozo
23. Kao Soap, Daisel Chemical, Denki Kagaku, Mitusi Petrochemical, Mitsubi.shi
Cas Chemical, Mitsub ishi Chemical
24. Sumitomo Chemical, Mitsui Toatsu, Mitsubishi Chemical Life Science
Research Institute
38
FOR OFF[C[AL U~E ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500020053-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500020053-6
FOR OFFIC7Al. USE: ONLY
'L5, lilc~tecliiic~lu~;y llevalopmental Technology Research Association
26. New function elements
_ 27. Super grid elements
28. Fujitsu, Hitachi, Sumitomo Electric
29. Three-dimension circuit elements ~
30. Nippon Electric, Oki Electric, Toshiba, Mitsubishi Electric, Sanyo
Electric, Sharp, Matsushita Electric
- 31, Anti-environment reinforcing elements
32. Toshiba, Hitachi, Mitsubishi Electric
33. Foundation, New Function Elements Research and Developmental Association
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Denki Kyokai 1981
9711 ~
CSO: 4106/1
- 39
FoR ~FFr~ra~. r?.~F nN?.v
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500020053-6