ELECTORAL AND PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICES IN THE USSR AND POLAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01446R000100040006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 1998
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 9, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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9 August 1957
ECTORAL AND PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICES
IN THE USSR AND POLAND
Introduction
c overnme
of constitutional system. and politic
however,
a wide diversity
s. The groat majority,
d as belonging to one of two principal types:
the parliamentary-responsible cabinet type or the presidential type. The
characteristic feature of the first is a plural executive1 formed from, and
responsible to, a democratically-elected legislative assembly. The states
of the British Commonwealth, most of the cowtries of Western Europe.
and Japan in the Far East, are examples of this type. The second major
type is characterized by an independently elected and powerfully endowed
chief executive, called a president. The United States of America and
most of the Latin American republics exemplify this type. The political
systems of a small number of countries, such as Turkey and Lebanon,
embody featuree of both types.
Common to all democratic governments is the existence of a
parliamentary body which has one chamber at least choien by a broad
elect Fate. Besides serving as the assembly for the de
nact
ment of national laws, the parliament invariably has powers of control
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and
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ervision *1 the executive.In a political system of the paxUa-
y-?e*pon$ible cabinet type, powers are numerous and are
questions to ministers, debates on policy.
leg elation d financial programs and through votes ofconfi.-
md censure Parliamentary control of the ere
the presidedial type exists, but it is considerable and important
bat
less direct
is ez.rdsed through the financial power a of the leg'
tature, the bearings d investigations of legislative corandttees, and
special checks, h as the confirmation of appointments and
the cation of treaties. Impeachment may be provided for as an ulti-
mate
*span of control.
From the experience of many countries over long periods of time.
number of principles with respect to the composition of a parliament
and the rotations b. wean the legislative and executive organs have
become recognised as indispensable etertteate of democratic gsvernnient.
These principle* constitute criteria by which the right of a political system
to be classed as democratic may be judged. Judynents in such matters
must be liberal, because, human nature being what it is, practice even
in the most respected democratic states does not always meet the sten
expressed in the essential criteria. Nevertheless, observance of both
the form and the substance must be continuously sought for and realise
to a high degree.
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the ormal p
a
democratic government, one mat consider
Autd the political practice in the USSR and
Peland and arrive at judgments about the right of their regimes to be
cLassed as democratic. The criteria listed are a minimal numb.r1 being,
believed,it is ones which almost all students of democratic government
could accept as valid. Information concerning Soviet and Polish ra.ctice
is derived fr
and procedures of the two Communist countries and from their official
statements and press accounts. The discussion is arranged in the order
Parliamentary Union.
scholarly studies of the political institutions
the question staire of
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US
The Composition and Or,
of Parliament.
A. Composition.
Grits rim: The suffrage must be broad.with Ii:
In law.
To
have at least one chamber chosen by PA electorate that ix composed of
a substantial proportion of the adult citise of the country. Both chambers
of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet
of Nationalities, are directly elected, and the suffrage is broad, extend-
a democratic body, the national parliame
defined
ing to all, citizens who are eights.
the Soviet Union compares
years of age. In this respect.
most advanced democratic
countries. The only persons excluded are described as thoie who have
been convicted by a court of law for criminal offense., with deprivation
of electoral rights, as well as those who have been found. in a manner
prescribed by law, to be insane". The exclusion of criminals and the
deficient is commonly practicfed in democratic countrie
How-
category of criminals is undoubtedly much broader in the USSR
than In democratic countries. because it includes persons serving
nte
this pipopulatIon
anti -state offenses, i.e. political prisoners. What the use
Is no one outside the USSR knows, Estimate*
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with a fair degree of reliability
as ranging upward from ee
probably pri ri-of-war and deportees fro
ed the flu
the a
re:
but the
PS
vast majority are undoubtedly Soviet citizens. As long as citizens may
be deprived of voting privileges as well as their liberty, by conviction
on politica charges, then their rights of suffrage do not possess the
protection required in a democratic society.
Criterion Voters must have the right to organize, nominate
candidates, and conduct campaigns.
Since the direct participation of a private citizen in the councils of
government is only practical in very small communities representative
institutions are necessary. For theseinotitutions to be truly represen-
tative, certain prior onditions must obtain. These include the right of
citizens to or tantse with persons of similir views, the right of such
organized citizens to choose a candidate, and the right of the candidate
and hie supporters appeal for votes. The electoral activities of voters
may be temporary and informal, only coming to life just before an elec
tion; or, as in most democratic countries, they may produce permanent
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parties which nit. like minded voteri, brg forward candidates,
and conduct campaigns for votes. Whether parties are temporary
movements or continuing organizations, they are essential to the demo-
cratic
oth way can the single citiaen make hisinfluence
felt and obt*in a choice - the essence of d
SSR. U not
of deraocr
The coast
deny these basic propoa
to the right to organise.
states that;
y.
ct
In conformity with the interest, of the working people, and in
der to develop the organisational Initiative and political activity
of the masses of the people, citizens of the USSR are guaranteed
the right to unite in public organizations: trade urdalts, coopers-
societies. youth orga3aisations, sport and defense organizations,
cultural, technical and scientific societies; and the most active and
politically-conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and
Other sections of the working people unite in the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks). which is the vanguard of the
working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the
socialist system and is the leading core of all organizations. of
the working people, both public and state." (Article 126)
This article, of course, implicitly accord* the Communist Party
*poly in the field of political organisation. Lest any other inter
pretation be drawn, Stalin removed it in his speech explaining the draft
constitution before the ztraer4lnary Eighth Congress of the Soviets of
the UStR on November as, 1936. He said:
'Sward parties, aid, bons ociue ntly, freedom for parties. can exist
only in a society In which there are antagonistic classes whose
interests are mutually hostile and irreconcilable which there
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etc.In the USS}
PO*S**L whose
are, on the cent
the USSR for the
for freedom for
only one party.
St
Comm
ublic or
cultural
and work. is.
*ants, etc. But
as the capitalists, the lastdlo
re are only two classes, workers and
rests - far from being mutually hostile
friendly. Hence, there tine ground in
Utica of several parties, and consequently,
parties. In the USSR there is ground for
ommuniat Party.
have consistently maintained this rationale for the
onopoly of political right*.
rgasdeation and activity are re ved to the
Len of candidates to the Supreme Soviet is extended
tons and societies of the working p Communist
unions, cooperative*, youth organisations and
le 141). Any liberality this provision might
t that there can be only one candidate in
La pontaneously? proposed in the press, or
suggest is nullified b
ach election district.
pr
izatione
the nom
canaist
sting of voters. Often the local party organisation is the
sometimes tit honor taIls to one of the other 'public organ
iOcleties". Whoever brings forward the andidar.e e name,
ni e immediately closed, and the campaign for votes
roup and individual tributes to the chosen one.
uncommon La democratic states, b cirasse of historical or
us for a *tin district or a whole area of the country
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Otte
The
r de
d or
Oe
party is mob
of the ruling
Even the travelers
_Utical party. The 'SoIid
has been a
ted States for almost a hundred years. In Canada,
tionaly Liberal. while Ontario is Conservative.
tituencies which regularly elect either Conservative
be Rouse of Commons. However, as states the old
e else
usually offered an
c
primary that counts, there
ass, and in the election
date althaugh his chances
ch
they can register dissatisfaction either by abstaini
Lnirslid ballot. The first would certainly draw attentlo
dUe attitude. The election for the Supreme Soviet oc
day and the whole propaganda apparatus of state and
d to make the occasion an overwhelming indorsement
to
It would be a brave voter who would act ivwlifferent.
excuse. Ballot-bagas are provided on long
distance trains, and the passengersdutifully cast theirvotes as they ride.
The ballots are counted and added to the results of the voting in the district
through which the train is passing, which may or may not be a voter's
re idenc e
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Very few voters invalidate their ballots by striking out the single
can date's name or by substituting another. They scarcely register
among e sweeping majorities compiled by the "Bloc of Communists
and arty roan". 1. e. the approved candidates. In the 1950 election
for the Supreme Soviet: 99.98% of the electorate voted and 99.73% cast
ballot, for the official candidates. The vote for the candidates of the
Soviet of ationalities was 99.72% of the total. In 1151 in elections to the
ti of the Union Republics similar unanimity was achieved.
percentages for the then-labelled Stalinist Bloc were
The folio
pUblished:
ESESR 9976
White Russian SSR99. 92
itatakh SSR 99,82
Aserbaddling SSR 99. 96
Mcddsvian SSR 99.89
Kirghiz SSR 9977
Armenian SSR 99.94
Estonian SSR 99 . 85
Ukrainian SSR 99.91
Usbek SSR 99.92
Georgian SSR 9999
Lithuanian SSR 99.90
Latvian SSR 99.95
Tadjik SSR 99.95
Turkmenian SSR 99 . 89
Karelo-Finnish SSR 99.52
t recent election for the Sijpreme Soviet in 1954. 99.98% et the
total electorate of 120.150, 816 voted.and
by the estate of 99.79 for the Savisto
Soviet of Nationalities. Figures of this kit
fill vacancies in the Supreme Soviet. For
Bloc candidate
Union and b
liPPr
for the
epeated in by-elections
the Credentials Committees
of the chambers announced ten such elections at the opening of the sixth
sessionin February 1957. The lowest candidate received 99.7314 of the vote,
and two were elected wienimou ly.
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uc1i remarkable unantmfty occur. y of many racial and
language minorities of t geographical expanse. and of numerous
occupational groups Erea if one accepts the Communists claim abou
the etilarkadell of class distinctions, the democratic politician may be
pardoned for being a little incredulous.
Critersecrecy and
Democratic states
tact the secrecy and honesty of the electoral process. The purpou
legislation is to prevent the Intimidation, bribery or subversion
antee a fair count to all candidates. Some countries
a considerable body of law dssigraad
er
have been more successful than others in protecting the purity of the
electoral process; non. has been entirely ire. from instances of fraud.
The conititutlon of the USSR provides that "Voting at elections of
deputies is stecret". I 140). Soviet laws condemn the usual threats
to the orderly and honest conduct of elections. The adniinistration of
and the prevention of abuses are in the hands of a hierarchy of
action committees, reaching from the voting precinct to the union
republic. Th.... committees ar composed of representatives of the
organizations which nominate causdidatee - the Communist Party, trade
ans youth groups. collective farms and so on. The mmbers are
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selecte4 by the same kind of spontaneous nomination se are candidates
for e iu?me soviets.
There is no evtdence to indicate
technically honest. This is not surprising
by the Communist Party end the absence of any contest. AU the
motives which operate to produce intimidation, bribery, and fraud in
deznocr tic ocieties are purposeless in the kind of grand plebiscites
conducted In the Soviet Union. A non Communist observer may wader
how the
ate, bu
sures to
the press reports that a candidate for an obscure village soviet failed to
receive a majority of all valid ballots and thus a second election was
rep$red. A student of Soviet affairs believes that these are instances
where "tb. Party anted to have a few show cases for the purpose of
illustrating the d of the Soviet electi s".* If so, this is fraud
with a reverse twLst
The conclusion on this principle must be that the secrecy and
honesty of Soviet elections cannot be app d by the standards pr.vaU
ins in, democratic countries. In the latter the
blocat always receives between 99.50 and 100% off the tot
these
figures can be believed given the many pree
the vote" and the lack of any opposition. Occasionally
, The Soviet Regime (
%wily gen
1954), p. 145,
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contendling for important staes, and the Wmptations to win even at
the Lek at violating the law are sometimes strong. In the Soviet Union.
these temptations must occasionally affect party members when they
meet o select candidates. If such veteran Communists as Molotov
and Malestkov can be guilty of anti-party activities, it would be surpri sin
if lesser atztrade ot affected from time to time. The secrecy of
party business however, veils such violatiozts of 'socialist legality" as
occur.
Critorlon Seats La the parliamentsdistributed so that in
at least one chamber there is a correlation between seats and
A parliament:cannot be regarded as a representative tnatitution
unless there Is an equitable distribution of seats throughout the country.
It it generally opted that democratic practicere4uirea the distribution
for at least one ckainber to be on the basis of population. The other chamber
may be, and often is, posed of representatives of the major political
or territorial unita? of the ountry1 or it may reflect socIal and economic
tnterests The constitutions of democratic states uattally provide for the
periodic redistribution of seats, a process often accompanied by a geod
deal of bickering between the parties studies to gain and those to lose
seats in a new allotment.
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The constitution of the USSR provides for the distribution of seats
in the SupremeSoviet. Each deputy in the Soviet of the Union represents
300, 000 citizens, and electoral districts are determined by the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet before each election. Seats in t,he Soviet of National
ities
2,5 deputies from each union republic, 11 from each autonomous republic,
5 from each autonomous region, and 1 from each national area.
As a technical exercise of apportionment, the population of the USSR
ix as fairly represented in the Supreme Soviet as are the citizens of
most democratic states in their national parliaments. Electoral districts of
300, 000 compare with the approximately 370, 000 in a congressional district
in the United States and the some 60, 000 in a British Parliamentary
constituency. in the Soviet of Nationalities, the smaller territorial unite
d according to a constitutionally established formula
of the USSR are over-represented in comparison with the RSFSR, but
ir"cife
probably base so than , say, Nevada and New Mexico in the United States
Senate.
Where the Supreme Soviet fails to meet democratic standards
respect to representation lies in the monopoly of power by the Communis
Party. The great majority of the deputies of both chambers are party
rnembe;rs. in the Supreme Soviet elected in 1950, for example, they
numbered 1099 of the 1316 deputies. The minority of non-rnembere are
faithful adherents of the party line; if they were not, they would not have
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been
Thus. in pr ce the members of the Supreme Soviet represent the
seven to eight million membersof the CPSU, or about 4% of the popula-
tion of the country. Only if one believes that interests and zapiratioos
ening given all candidates.
I the whole Soviet population are identical
of"the vanguard ",
the cor ". or "the nucleus", as the Communists claim, can the supreme
viet be regarded as a presentative democratic aa,ambly. In the
absence of any test of this laim, the foreign obeerver mutt remain
skeptical.
Criterion The parliament mu
ble at re
ed time..
During the time when mQderu d.m ratic government was develop-
cally
chs was to postpone or evade the assembly of their par
Bourbon kings of France succeeded in ruling without a
more than 150 years, and the Stuarts in England tried inter-
to do likewise. Constitutionalists,
in England and Western Europe
Inclined x
laments.
parlismei
favor'
tac
ay
qui
I for the regular meeting
MS emntisl feature of democratic goverr
ion of the USSR is expltdt in this regard.
let of the USSR are convened by the Presidium of the
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t.
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USSR twice a re
the 1300-odd na
46).
fl
Their meetings. however, are vs
ass than a week as a rule.
and during that time they transact an amountof public business that would
seem formidable for a parliament which sat almost continuously. The
of this efficiency lie La the fact, of course, that the Supreme
Soviet meralV ratifies, and -away* umud ?ugly. decisions taken elsewhere
by the real rulers of the pantry.
Criterion: Members must possess a minimum list of'
Long experience Lu many countries with democratic government has
?stsbUshed the necessity of granting to parliamentary members a number
of personal immunities, particularly freedom from arrest and freedozu of
speech within the legislative chamber. Without such protection the individual
member in liable to intimidation and hsraaement in the performance of
Idi duties..
ArticLe 5Z of the coastitation
of the Supreme S
at
Supreme
during nut
USSR may not
Pr
Soviet of the USSR, or, w
"A member
arrested without
Supreme Soviet
esaion without the consent of the Presidium of the
Nothing is said about freedom of speech
Soviet.
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The
There is
ing him :
famoussi
appraised agthst the background,of practicethe US
instance, so far as is known,. of a deputy's immunity protect-
the avenging wrath of the party leaders. Khrushchev in his
ch before the aOth Party Congress stated that 98 of the 139
members and candidate member. of the Central Committee elected at
the 17th Congress of the CPSU were arrested and shot on Stalin's orders.
The sarcie fate 'befell 1108 of the 1966 delegates to the Congress. Just
how many of these were members of the Suprema Soviet it is not possible
to tell, but & large number certainly were, since there is alvtays a
iderable duplication of party and governmental positions in the USSR.
Although
shock at the
alarm over
ualy, there
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are customarily deputies in the Supreme Soviet.
eh contains meaty references, furthermore, to Stalin
are of the secret police and judicial authorities to
ides whom be had labelled "enemies of the p
hey d many other Communists have ere
dons from the "norms of party c
iens of constitutional immunities ha. been uttered.
of the USSR do not appear to take these guarantees
is no reason for the foreign observer to do so.
*P
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hick it perfor
ct to constitutional limitations, the legislature
contrcl its organisation
tions.
procedure. through
,A parlitunent can only fulfill its rcle if it ha. the a
its organization and the conduct of its business. In demo
some features of parliamentary organization and procedure are usually
prescribed in the constitution but others are established by rules of order
and legislative custom, Their purpose is to insure the orderly and
deliberate considers of parliamentary business, respect the interest.
to c
of individual members,
d strike a balance b.twson tlerights of the
ity and opposition parties.
Chapter III of the constitution confers on the Supreme Soviet certain
r over its organization and procedure such as, for
is the
right of each ber to elect a chairman and four vice-chairmen
(Articles 42 and 43). B rule and custom various other officers corn
mitte
and
and procedures e provided for. In fact, the Sitpr e Soviet
organised parliamentary body.
superficially the internal organization
us of its procedures seem similar to the
parliament, fautdarnental contrasts exist bectuase it i
the assembly, a place where & C01104111161111 emerges from
Soviet
tic
elib a-
even
conflicting. points of view. The Supreme Soviet is essentially a meeting to
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reports and explains
of decisions taken e
decisions in the form of draft *Ulutee a e the pr
hick meet between as well as during sections
but these bodies are in reality instrumentalities of the Cornumolet Party.
delegated to exprees in the proper statutory language the de
of the party leadership. Committee chairmen when presenting draft
statutes frequently mention the source of authority, a resolution of a
party congress or of the Central Committee. The deputies who speak
merelyate on the need for the proposed legislation, usually docu
menting the case wtth local examples and experiences. Some of their
are often critical of the bureaucracy, and even ministers do not
Co
s,
escape. Yet the whole co ideration of the matter by the Supreme Soviet
to within the framework of a decided policy which is eminently correct.
approval always follows.
Thus, the rpases for which parliamentary organiastlon and
procedures have been devsIop.d in democratic countries have little
relevance to conditions in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. There is no
need to provide for stages through which a bill mud pass, because the
lengthy deliberation and debate of a democratic pal:lament have occurred
in the Presidium or the Central Committee of the COMMA/Xi at Party.
Rules and conventions to protect minority rights are unnscessary; there
is no opposition to be heard. Therefore, in its orgardsation and procedures
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The deputies'*nod
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Soviet exhibits an outward conformity to the practice
parliaments, but the tUe which animates these bodies
ainkaratus of the Communist Party.
art U. The Legislative Function of Parliament.
law fo
pow e r
/no e conunonty,
iastrume
t be the principal source
ed with broad and c
at system it is axiomatic that law should
representatives of the people. A national
ha indispensable institution.it may be, I
Leoxettc.11)r supreme.
and the sanction of the a tactical; or,
grant of powers prescribed in a con-
angement is necessary U the state
be a division of power between the
The national par
t be endowed with responsibility
country as a whole. These almost
for there
t andtha m
be federal or
de s
Ii
by custom,
Ion . fiscal policy.
and the postal system. The list
foreign
ngthe
complex and interdependent societies of this
era require more and more legislation.
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Supreme
constitue
a
d legs
The Supreme Soviet of the USSR 1 declared
the constitution to be "the highest organ of state power (Article 30).
its legislative competence extends to all matters of feder
JL
diction,
a collection of functions and power. more comprehensive and extensive
than. is the c
and controls of communist system (Article 14).
When examining the degree to which the SupremeS ac
at federal states becauseof the pervasive plannin
on
ad
the national legislature of the USSR. the observer
again
g
the gap between theory and practice. All the formalities
with a functioning parliament are present. The right to initiate
is eyed by individual deputies as well as by almost every
in the USSR - a tong list in a Communist country.
distributed to deputies. They may be considered
y call upon ministers and outside experts for
port to their chambers through rapporteurs. nd-
committees or be advanced from the floor. Some
nation-wide discussion and in many cases to the
t of the union republics. Bilis pass the
cent1tutional amendments require a
It Of the Union and the Soviet of 14U
e pr
thee ?
cc
e a
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Erse over a proposed measure, IR conciliation commission of
members from each chamber is appointed to try to And an agreed
solution. if the commission fails, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
olves the chambers and orders new elections.
Through this parliament pa
of great import
example, in 1957, the budget of the USSR (covering all governments
federal,1 state, and local), the economic plan, an amendment of the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the USSR, a reorganisation of the
provinces and territories under the union republics, and the planned
decentralization of the economy. Yet the weighty agenda of the Supreme
Soviet is completed in a few days, usually not more than a week. As an
instance, the called to consider and pass the "Law on Further
Improving the Organisation of the Management of Industry and Construction"
performed the task in the period from May 5-10, 1957. It also adopted
a long list of constitutional amendments necessitated by the industrial
decentralisation program. Measures of this magnitude would almost
certainly involve & democratic parliament in weeks of debate.
The air of unreality surrounding the sessions of the Supre
is increased b the fact that all proposed Legislation is adopted unanimously..
No deputy, be he Great Russian. a Georgian. or a Lithuanian, a party
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constituents would be so dispiesaed with a bill as to vote against it.
There has been no recorded instance of disagreement between the two
chamV.rs, so there has been no need to utilise the procedure for
Wing disputes of this kind. And, of course, parlian2entary deadlock
has never forced the Presidiurn to dissolve the Supreme Soviet and
order new elections.
it is obvious that the serious discussion and the settlement
controve sial issues have occurred before the Supreme Soviet has
convened it has simply ratified decisions taken by the party leaders
or put the stamp of official authority on the work of legal tocb.nicians
as in the ease of the constitutional amendments. Some of the members
of the Supreme Soviet have participated in the real discussion and
decision-taking,but they have done so by virtue of their place in the
party orgairatlon. Their work was firdshed before the hundred* of
other deputies descended on Moscow.
Part Ut. The Budgetary and FinsncL
Criterion: The parliament must have ultimate control over
ere of Parliament
d expenditure of public
y.
Historically, democratic government has developed through
cial powers wielded by representative assemblies. The power
'urea has been the key opening the door to the control and super-
of governmental functions. Consequently. every democratic
ZZ
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rity over
y in the parliament.
The Supreme Soviet of the USSR, as the "highest organ
state power, " has the formal financial powers set forth in the constitution
as: "Approval of the consolidated state budget of the USSR and of the
port on its fulfillment; determination of the taxes andrevenues which
go to the Union, the R ADUCalio and the local budgets. (Article 14).
The annual budget of the USSR is an extremely complex document. It
Includes not only the items of revenue and expenditure common, to all
national states but also the financial operations of the other govermnental
units and the industrial and commercial enterprises of a communized
country. The problem of maintaining "control over such vast financial
would pose a formidable task for any parliament.
The Supreme Soviet discharges its responsibility, after
receiving the budget from the Council of Ministers, through budget
committees hick report to the two chambers and through speeches
by individual.deputies. The budget committees apportion the work to
dozen or so subcommittees. The Committee members familiarize
themselves with the part, of the financial program assigned to their
respective groups, and they can then give explanations to their fellow
deputies. The discussion of budgetary matters in the chamber. largely
takes the form of criticisms of bureaucratic shortcomings in ministries
or state enterprises. There is no debate of the great issues wiskelt
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Union
such as
ation af
of res
between
various parts of the economy, the amount to be spent on national
defeat., tea policy, tate loans, and the control of inflationary pressure
These are problems for determination by the highest party councils. and
decisions have been taken before the budget reaches the deputies.
IV. The Controlling Function of Parliament
The parliament
dit executive
or
The degree of control over the executive possessed by
parliaments:in democratic countries varies considerably. At one
extreme is a constitutional system like that of France where the znini
is frequently changed as parliamentary opinion fluctuates. The execu
is dependent upon and subservient to a parliamentary majority. At the
other extreme are governmental systems of the presidential type in
which the executive has an independent mandate from his popular election
and has constitutionally founded powers which the legislature cannot limit.
In between is the British type with a ntttistry dependent on a parliamentary
ing powers, notably dissolution, of keeping that
majority
triajekrity ?olid and reliable. Regardless of the constitutional relationship
between the cutive and legislative organs, democratic principles
require, a* a m.tnlmum the right of the parliament to obtain information
from the executive and to audit executive performance. The statutory
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out customary mea
countryr to country,
trust conferred by
No parliamentary body has In ii
Supreme Soviet of the USSR. It elects all
of providing these nir4umxn controls vary from
hatever they are, the parliament its exercising
functions as
re power than the
tpat officers ef the
dhun of the Supreme Soviet collegiate body which
of state) the Council of Minister
Court. and the Procurator-General. The Council of
before the meeting of a new Supreme Soviet and then
e e
*tat sitting of
the two chamber Invests a Chairrs at the Council and approves his
appointarsentsto ministerial office. The Supreme Soviet can dismiss a
minister or the entire Council. Information can be demanded from the
Council or from individual ministers by the Supreme Soviet, its
committees. or any deputy. The Supreme Soviet, and its committees
within their special competence, can investigate breaches of the
constitution and law by any public authentic,.The Supreme Soviet
can appointi.uvestigating and auditing commissions to inquire into any
rnstter. All told1 a tremendous plenitude of paw
Ther
d shows no exercise of these ers excel
most al sense. The Supreme Soviet approves decrees of its
Presidium appointing and dismissing ministers, but these ad One mere
record decisions taken by the Presidium of the CPSU. The sequence of
events in the June 1957 shake-up In the Kremlin is illustrative of the
actual method of "appointing and disanissing" reinieters. mai
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curred in the Party Presidium. TheParty's First Secre
Khruehcitev, transferred tt to a hastily summoned meetizii of the
Central Committee where his supporters outnumbered those of his
opponent*. The losers, charged with anti-party activities. were
removed from their party offices. Then the chief victims. Mess
Malenkov, and Kaganovich, were duly dismissed by the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet from their ministerial positions. The
decree of dismissal will be approved. unaairaously, when the Supreme
Soviet meetS again. M1 the changes in high governmental poittion.
since the tion of the constitution in 1936 have occurred In like
dictatedmanner by Stalin while he lived and settled now by the relative
strength ott s heirs in the Party Presidium.
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Conclusions
practice
respect.
standards
lit
party.
ocr
preme Soviet of the USSR in its composition.
can be portrayed from constitutional provisions
an almost model democratic parliament,
at it fails to merit that title in scarcely any
in
of the criteria that represent minimum
ernment. To summarize:
The suffrage is brood, but effective participation in politics
bars of the Communist Party.
The Communist Party controls the p
election to the Supreme Soviet.
Secrecy of the ballot and honesty In t
tance when there are no
4. Seats in the Supreme Soviet are e
rttory of the USSR, but a small rain*
y represented in both chambers.
5. The Supreme Soviet meets regularly but
6. Parliamentary immunities have no meaning In a. state that
-party actirity with treason.
7. The organization and procedures of the Supreme Soviet,
ally parliamentary, are maaipulated by the single, controlling
e for nominating
Ct of elections
candidates.
r buted through-
unist Party,
ye.
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8. The Supreme Soviet purporte
actually it approves, always unanimously and
draEtad bills and decreesissued in the name of it, Presidium.
9. While the budget of the USSR is approved annually by the
Supreme Soviet, the real debate and decision-making in financial matters
occur the top organs of the CPSU.
10. Although the Council of Ministers is nominally responsible
ys, pre
bi
Soviet, the latter has
of enforcing that responet -
tore are actually appointed and dismissed on orders from
the Piesidiurn of the party.
The question nit=
ythe C
the Soviet Union bother with the formalities eta parliamentary system
of government. Every four years they set up, nation-wide the machinery
for casting, counting, and reporting millions upon millions of ballots.
Twice a year some 1300 deputies assemble in Moscow and for a few days
hear and make speeches, sit on committees, and approve laws and
decrees.
All this activity ea
sits although it has little
elevanca to parliamentary gov =anent am practiced in
countrtee. When the constitution as proclaimed 121.1936 it undoubtedly
gave an aura of legitimacy to the Conan:mist dictatorship, and the
Supreme Soviet probably continues to have value within the USSR as a
symbol of cceastitationalism. Moreover, the constitution was publicized
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by the Kremlin and foreign C
democratic govereurtent. Stalin declared.
for
g.
'It will be a &gen:newt testifying to the fact that what
millions of honest people in capitalist co ntrics have
dreamed of and still dream of has already been realised
in the USSR. It will be a document testifying to the fact
that what has been realised in the USSR is fully possible
of realisation in other countries also. But from this it
fellows that the international significance of the new
Constitution of the USSR can herd!y be ezaggerated. "
of Communist leviers have destrorsd any illusions that
slit have, had concerning the development of democratic
on the basis of the constitution of 1936 but the abandonment
of the parliamentary forms it establishes would probably be considered
harmful in propagating the picture of * "democratic" Russia in Asia
and Africa.
practical benefits which
end the meetings of the SupremeSoviet. The
occasion to stir up the faithful and to remind
of Owlet rule. They justify an immense program of Interi
The meetings of the Supreme Sari
seders and the local party organisations. While the 4epu
have many responsibilities of a parliamentary nature, the
opinions current in hundreds of le *I areas to Moscow, and they carry
blessing
aPagands.
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back the explanations and 11.2'
pDdium. In other words, the pie 'dozy sy serves
as an alternate apparatus for the collection ofinformation and the
diesereinati of the party line. It la so controlled and manipulated that it
pose* no threat to the monopoly of the pszty1 and it gives a lot of minor
flanctionarlea the malefaction of being part of the ruling elite.
livered from the Xrernlin
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Poland
The Polish constitutional system,
other
upeoplets democracies", Lollows closely the Soviet model. There is a
single -chamber national Diet (the Ss ) composed of 459 deputies elected
for terms of four years. The Diet elects a collegiate head of state, the
Council of State. It also appoints and dismisses the Premier and the
other members of the Council of Ministers.
Until recently the Soviet paternity of the Polish electoral and
parliamentary system was clearly evident in practice. Elections to the
Diet i-
trailed by the Communist Polish United Workers Party
(PZPR), and parliamentary actions merely ratified decisions taken by the
Communist leadership. However, for more than a year the changes
that have been occurring in Poland have been reflected in the govern-
al system. A new electoral law
Pr
ulgated on October 24,
d on the basis of this law a Diet was elected on January 10, 1957.
The following discussion, organised according to the
criteria by which the Soviet system has been appraised, is based upon
the new law and what is known of current practice. Judgments must
be tentative, for Polieh conditions are obviously in a fluid state. It
is questionable whether there will be another election similar to he
last, and the role that the Diet is expected to play in Polish affairs
is probably as uncertain to the Poles as to outside observers.
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. The Composition and Organisation of Parliament.
A. Composition
Criterion: rage must be broad, with lintitations
defined in law.
The Polish electorate is composed of eli citizens eighteen
years of age and older. Only the mentally deficient and those persons
convicted of crime are deprived of the right to vote. These are
universally recognized disqualifications, although the second probably
ocratic
Perhaps
more important than the total number disfranchised by judicial
convictions ii the practice of arresting opposition leaders in order to
brand them with a prison sentence. The opposition is thus intimidated
and rendered leaderless.
disfranchises
people in Pol
mtries where political offense
d than is thee
are unknown t
candidates.
. Voters mustbave the rthttoor
t compel,
The Communist regime in Poland has differed from the
Soviet model in permitting the continued existence of parties beside
be PZPR. Two of theucthe United Peasant (ZSL) and the Democratic (SD),
purged remnants of the former organisations bearing those names, home
been political allies of the Communists. The constitution authorizes
political activity by social and cultural organisations, but no challenge
to the established order of the Polish People's Republic is allowed.
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fiction of January 20, 1957, some 60. 000 nornina
were made by poiitic.1 parties, trade unions youth organizations, and
even by religious groups. These names were screened and reduced to
about 10, 000 by local commissions composed of representatives of the
three parties forming the National Unity Front, the PZPR. the ZSL. and
the SD. A central commission of the Front then selected 720 candidates,
apportioning them as follows: PZPR, 50%; ZSL, 25%; SD 10%; Non-Party
and Catholics, 15%. All candidates in a constituency ran on a single
list but there were about seven
es for every four seats to be elected.
The majority of the candidates were supporters of the National Unity
Front, and they were favored by being put at the
head of the list in each
electoral district. Some of those at the bottom of the lists were evidently
irslord.ts
one suspected of hostility to the regime. Gornulka
sufficiently convinced of theIr attitude to make a fervent radio
appeal on January 19th for ballots without the deletion of top names, thus
insuring the election of Front deputies. The Catholic Church organization
quietly supported hi plea. for it believed that the election of a large
number of non-Front candidates might well produce the fate he predicted,
that Poland would disappear from the map of Europe.
Thus, for the election of 1957, the Polish people had a limited
right organize in political parties nominate candidates, and conduct
campaigns in their behalf. Certainly the parties are not independent in
the sense that such organisations are in a democratic state; their
c ntinued existence depend* upon their willingness to cooperate in the
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Com led National Unity Front. The nominating process is
controiie& but the Front finds it necessary to offer some candidates
who
a restricted choice is permitted by listing more candidates than seats
to be filled. The ability of non-Communist groups sndcandidatea to
appeal for votes is greater than in other states of the Soviet Bloc but
still closely limited by the restraints of a dictatorial regime. This
was brought borne to candidates who took too literally the promise of a
new democratic order. Before the January election a resolution of
the Consultative Committee of Political Parties instructed local
cornm Satan, to remove from the ballot the wanes of Front candidates
who revealed "weakness of character, lack of responsibility in their
activities , as well as failure to observe the principles of the program
of the National Unity Front and the discipline binding members of
political parties." Several were removed.
patently tame captives of the Communists. Moreover,
proceduz
t insure secrecy and
The electoral laws make provision for secret balloting
and honest counting of votes. The degree to which they are observed
and enforced is difficult to judge. The claims for voter participation
- 95.03% in 1952 and 94.14% in 1957 - are high by the standards of
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most democratic countries but less remarkable than the virtually
100 recorded for elections in the USSR. There are good grounds
for believing that the election resultsjust after the war were
deliberately deified, and local official. have probably continued
to be roue to Front candidates. The announced results of the
1957 elections, however, have a certain verisimilitude. While 447
of the 452 Front candidates won, the Communists were not always
the leaders in the voting. Except for Clornaka and Spyeb.lski1 every
Politburo and Central Committee secretary received fewer votes
than oppoeing non-Communist candidates. Twelve of 22 Catholic
candidates were elected. There were marked differences in the
percentages of votes received by the Stalirdat" Communists and the
Gcmullc.s Communists, the former being much less popular. in some
violas, prominent Catholic laymen and leaders of the United Peasant
and Democratic parties got between 95 and 100% of the vote cast in
their constituencies. Thus, although the result accorded with
Gomulka's plea to the electorate, his victory appears to have derived
from the voters* appreciation of the realities of the Polish situation
rather than a wholesale rigging of the election.
Criterion:
St
in the p&rUsment must be distributed so
er there is a correlation between seats end
The Polish parliament
ber, and the seats
are apportioned to districts of relatively equal population by the Council
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app
evidence of unfairness in the geographical
Organization
C rite ron? The panl
The Diet ordinarily holds two seaaton, annuilly. and it
determines its own time of adjournment. Until the present year,
Dna were not much longer than those of the Supreme Soviet of the
about two *eke At the most. The first session of the current
has listed much longer, and it is taking its role as the national
iment with some seriousness.
Criterion: Members xmist possess.
Immunities.
By provisions of the Polish constitution, membersof the
Sejrn have the same kind of immunity from arrest given deputies of the
Supreme Soviet in the USSR. There is no special guarantee of freedom
of speech in the Diet. As in the case of the Soviet Union, the Polish
provisions on parliamentary immunity fall short of the usual democratic
practice The extent to which freedom of arrest is truly guaranteed
depends upon the interpretation of "eocialist legality" current in
Poland from time to time. M present, the interpretation appears to
be a more liberal one than in the JSSR or the other satellites, and it
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t of
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their fellow Marxists. However that may be, many
or example. have been ar ragged and
d ia jail without thinking it worth while&see the
rliarnentary immunity. The Sejrn has even deprived
a deputy of his immunity several years after his arrest, ignoring
his absence up to that time.
ion: Subject constitutional limitations, the
have the right o control its organisation and the
its functions.
procedure. through which it
The Sejm chooses its Presidium consisting of a president
and three vice-presIdents a Council of Elders, and the membership of
a number of committees. The Diet and its committees are served
by a secretariat (the Bureau). it adopts its own rules of order. All
this is in. conformity with the usual rights and act!ons of a democratic
parliament Where the Sejm has differed from the
de
of
ountries Is in the purposes for which they are respectively
CMS d. The latter exist to give expression to the national will,
and their organisation and procedures are designed to insure that
this occurs effectively and fairly. The Sejrrs on the other hand, has
registered publicly and with a show of technical legality the policies of
a self-constituted ruling party, the PZPR. This was admitted in a
Radio Warsaw broadcast. of January 31, 1957. The speaker declared:
"We in Poland are on the eve of a great political
season... The previous Sejrn ... constituted a
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nt concealing the vary undemocratic
political life. . . the new Sejrn will be
r position."
flibern
*rise. from an article in the
(February ZO, 1 which s
of the Diet is still more shadc
author said:
U.
"democratic ornament"
dal party organ, Trybulut Lu,du
sts that the democratic character
than substance. Tb.e article
PZPR has axi absolute rnajority;
resat . . the Partyts leader
ship is not based on the above. If. . .it was possible
for the PZPR to gain only 40-odd persent of the Sejm
mandates . . would then the Party's leadership be in
danger in our country? No. Because PZPR leadership
cannot depend on a formal majority in the Sejm
!TV must be based on something else . . .
"I
mean by this that the PZPR deputies should be a
driving force MDT/ to persuade other Sejni deputie .
This persuasion, based not on the position of strength but
on right, would not meet with basic opposition because
the ZSL and SD, although they are independent political
movements, do not constitute a structure/ opposition to
the PZPR, but on the contrary, are also fostering
ocialist development, as well as are non-Party deputies
? . Neither the multi-party system nor the different
logAes in our Se 3m endanger the socialist system in
and and the leading role of the PZPR."
ds, the PZPR must dominate, regardlese of votes.
y for a democratic assenly.
PS
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Cr
ri
and continuing pow
The parliament rnst be the principal source
e nation as a whole, and be endowed with broad
to that end.
The Polish Sejrn has met these principles in only a formai
sense., It has ratified the decrees of the Council of State and passed
the' blUe ?posed by its Communist majority. A more responsible
and vigorous. role for the Diet has been promised by Gomulka and
the deputies y enjoy in the future a somewhat greater initiative
and fredam in proposing legislation, debatin& and voting. The
deveLopxent of a truly deliberative assembly is unlikely, however,
as tong as the Communist Party dominates the whole political proce
Part ILL The Budgetary and
. The
=Pe
itutioi
Pa
ra to basically sound
ol
y practice. One is faced *getup however, with the
e between form and substance. While the budget submitted
by the gove
form, the c
nt is con idered by the Diet and emerges in statutory
of the deputies over financial policy is no more real
than kinds of legislati
rests in the Poll uro of the Communist Party.
Responsibility actually
39
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ouin
Parliament
. The parliament must have the power to obtain
dit executive performance.
The Polish constitution provides for
cutive in the ways customary in county
a
sponsible
cabinet form. of government. The Sejm appoints and dismisses the Council of
of Ministers as a group and Individually. it can put questions to
ministers and. r.? a reply. It 1. entitled to receive and debate
reports on the ezecutton of the national budget. Ministers or their
epresentatives are required to appear before Diet committees and to
answer questions. Besides holding the foreign minister responsible for
the conduct of Ms office, the Sejm may debate James of foreign policy
and adopt resolutions embodying its views. AU the methods and
techniques of responsible parliamentary government are provided for.
The Sejm eXiST4111?111 these powers but its &uthority ie
hollow for it does not control the real government of Poland, the
Politburo of the Communist Party. The Premier and his ministerial
colleagues are undoubtedly influential officials, but behind them and
controllin
the First Secretary and the men who suppo
at the top of the party organisation. Moreover. two subjects of public
Interest, namely the secret police and Polish relations with other
Communist countries, have never been con idered as suitable for Diet
inquiry or debate.
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The esilty of the Se
in recent promises to strengthen cont
in his speech to the October 1956 Pies
Committee said:
ecutive.
PZPIk Cent
The Se,jrn should ezercie large-scale control over the
work of the government and of th, state organs To
insure thie, the introduction of certain the
Constitution is indispensable.
control over the executive organs of state power should
be exercised by an institution subordinated directly to
the Sejrn and not to the government, as has been the case
up to now, The Supreme Chamber of State Control,
subordinated to the Sejrn, should be restored.
"1 also hold that the Sejrn should have the right to
exercise control over our trade agreements with
er Estee. . . The Sejm should also have the right to
orse all our treaties with other countries, concluded
government and ratified by the Council of State."
So far, these constitutional changes are not /mown to have
been made. The problemof ma g the actual correspond to the
theoretical situation, under which, in Gornulka's words, "the
foremost task of the Seim is to exercise the highest legislative and
controlling power, is revealed by the following passage from his
peecir,
"A sensibledefinition of the powers of the Sejm and
even extension of these powers beyond the limits
envisaged in the Constithtion, accompanied by a sensible
definition of the tasks of the Party toward the state
;apparatus, do not lead to a collision between the Sejrn
and the political substance contained in the thesis on
the leading role of the Party.
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A body which has to submit to the leadership of another
can .csce1y be considered the "highest power" in a state.
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Un
1956, P
different from th
besides the Communists, the United P
Pr
Ceti
ties
had a titular existence all p?Uticd power was effectively concert-
trated in the PZPR. It controlled the nomination of candidates and
the .iectoral machinery, and it manipulated the Diet as an instrumen-
tality of the party. In law maidng the Sejrn was in no sense a deliber-
ative *ssembly, and its financial powers were 2/01:C4Mal. The majority
of the deputies, being party activists, had no interest or desire in
attempting control the executive, which was already being directed
and supervised, by the Central Committee and its functional departments.
The Sejm, therefore, wasutilized to maintain the illusion of a
ntary democracy and to serve propaganda needi from time to
time.
consider
eduree use
last
prese
ion of the usual. Comimmist plebiscite. The
PZPR and its Front. allies could not..e failed to win a majority in
the Diet, but so many'revisionists" and non-Front candidate ould
well have been elected as to endanger Communist control. The
possibility of such an outcome, however, does not justify calling
the electoral system democratic. Polish practices will only meet
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that standard when there are really independent parties. free to
nominate candidates and appeal for votes.
The Sejrn elected in January is somewhat less of an
artificial parliament than Poland hag been accustomed to since
becoming a Communist state. it is meeting in longer
debates are less perfunctory, and a minority vote is sometimes
recorded. And yet it cannot rise above its source. Until Poland
has a genuinely free election, as the democratic world understands
that term. its Diet cannot approach in organisation or functions the
standards of * true parliament.
The dilemma of the Incompatibility Communist
doctrine parliamentary democracy rerilitille. Poland has yet
to ref;
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Cc
CONFIDENTIAL
411 illteer"01.401111
116
The Suitor Research Staff on international Co
tad ganisatiotsally directly aft the Office of the DOI
TA or gimp but a pzmaent strength or *ammo officers two ruceoreh
Mantes and dee otearetary
b. Origin
(1) The
nut 1*s been & matter or
to the i.
in 194 the IM ertebliebed the
to be a pareancet illteralkeptiC7 body to plan
etion of into33.1gence on international Communism.
rave to be porticularly effective in dealing with
(2) In
25X1A2g
at the time of amajor reorganisation of tho
to of CIA, the Secretary of State accepted
usreh international Commies.
study was conducted of the intelligence
Information Agency. This report recommended
continue to do ?march on interrational
Commies for a small group of top-lavel experts
to dows3,qp a *tz*tia Insight into the nature of Coma= sad to
propose methods or emktering it. It proposed the creation or a,
sorrasuant 1AC subcommittee OM interoatiomal Communism As & result or
this study, the Special Assietimit to the Director for Planniog ant
Coordination an 9 iimatiber 19454 PrOosedi the creation at a &slier
Research Staff OR iliterttlit tonal COMUckiSal ?
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(4) Oa 3 Anipast 1955, the Dsatr Assistant claw of Koff,
0-2 of the Army* addresse4 a memosantem to the Intelligence advisee,'
Committee moccasies concern an the production laid hemdling of intel-
ligence information on international Communiam. The Army said it
felt there was a lick of ill adequate program for the probation of
bode intelligence, and a lack of comelinatice of the total eollecti
an4 production effort am international Commies. The Army suggested
the (treaties of a special asemelto dela with the euhiwet
(5) on 4 depot 1955 the 5A/PC persduced. a paper entitled
'Organisational Proposal for the production of Intelligence on inter-
national Communiim.w This pmper proposed that the Degariment of State
continue to do research co international Comtism in import of
National Inte].lieie Estimatesftesal Intelligence Surveys and
oa
Current Intellipme. Is CIA,
was to be enlarged to do research Commist
orsemisatiots, netts ant personalities. In additlans it proposed that
a Senior Research Staff should be created to mew is week dewerthea
ac pert?' intelligamet part estimating mad part epeculaticat on policy
? emiLthasis on imposing the *ma for the Dated States Government
to counter Comeamism.
(6) To implemema this recommenlation it vas recommended
"that in lieu of formally establishing at this time a Senior Researth
and PlAnning Unit as proposed in the paper of Mover 9, 1954, tee
or three senior officers be assigned to devote themselves to the Lind
of mark described in the recommends,tion. They should be administratively
aseigned to the DOA, encouraged to develop saitually stimulating
**moose
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/CI and peirticularly
such we rational int
These research awl planning oftuporo *fault
responsibilities cr the noragenent of research
ve the th,jectivitt expected of intelligens:*
they shoat be eacessible to operational pericenel
operational problems) they should not become in-
responsibilitiee. They should have overt status
easy comsultation with policy officers in other
sat academic institutions and with iL-
of oceattrise. This prcgosal reflects
Levelt at a Sealer Research ant Plaening Unit
paper ant be *volitionary since it.
will depend won the quality sal per...
ti41# in it "bat the fierder Roomers* and
rcpc*M in. this resommendation be selected by the
Agency On. the basis of individual merit free any
itie and that they be assigned Melanie-
they have free access to senior
rts of the Anc3r.The aesigraent or *maitre to
in itself hews the *frost of encouraging promising
bsckpwt4 in this field to devote themselves over
osculation on international
exceptievapOn lb
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be naked. The Chief, CI Staff, Ws
of the creation of a Motional
ni to to lasetsi directly water the
ting and eentralising severneent
at oral rot. This. cow-
the &C la that that the Chief
COMMIS& Vida
of pertinent i
Infeatestion en the object
Serrices. It would also have far
intelligence comeamity lacludixw
cossittoes of the Cowes. such as the
Activities and the Internal Security ihb000tittee of the lomat* adielary
eognintes. It wodd deal with such organisations &Aside the Now meat
as the American Legion, universities aad research institutes, end the
large body or individuals who are "professional anti?Commnists.- This
plan is siallar in Noy rewrote to the aforsmentioned 042 piano end the
abortive effort at former TAI-seen Ladd. and Tracy to *et cp an anti
Conaueist library seater. Obviously the ambitious proposals of the
Chief CI envisaged CIA developing into the national fool point on
all *Mete agallest Colaunisa.
gEoppapkimigiotwapa
(I) The IRS me luterestioes1 Caesunine vas arsonised
in Jarancy of 1556 awl wood its offices at
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I:reaped working eonliticas prevail but in
concept in keeping the MS isolated from
i. An uesvoidshle biandiesp regarding its
tent sacess to library facilities nbich
acquiring reference maderial fat essential
scalar research
Currently on
Chief and Deputy Chief
or the above ten individuals
authorised on the titta table of arniatton. Two of the ceniar red.
F
officers are on Iola; one from MIR sal one from 0U Both are carried
in slots provided toy theft coteponorts
(3) The organisational pee/time of ARS wi
is the result of coagevoiee between locating it in the
thin the BD/P. it is currently ceder adainistrative
of RiZ rat the stipulation that it maintsin close rele
and operatioval elements of DrIft and with
the
4. Prodaftiron
(1) dibl bee
seIf generation. The Staff
Iron OD and CR rot intelligence reverts through
to national setirettes This material is read* clipped aid
filed so as to provide a basis for a an study on the effect of
national Coneuniaz in its broadest aspects on say eenetri in the wee'24.
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to its on of pthlished material* the SKS Staff,
to keep in touch with other experts Ca
the i*telliieeee eommenity?
(2) lite research approach of MS is in part determined by
its Staff la relEtion to the field to be covered, sod in
need to achieve diffeion from that 1 research
5
a
in the some field eoqpecially MR and
Kowever
made to absorb and synthesise the baste research
concerning sane deveioent
A ease in point was the rat
the role of the Menai
view end the Cl Staff snoth
bas been on the question of
Party
in the field of international Causuniea.
extemded debate within the Ad4037 egl
iste in /taly, wherein the SKS took one
r. Another issue between these two units
the legality or illegality of the Communist
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Challenge of
ape: Post
thtertis1Comacnism
the cso of it. tan rare of existences INS las
asveii 4! studies, plus same 60 imemarands. ou
The following titles are
Commutian and Youths
1957 *new Festivals Vommunime is Diatom
Developments in the Satellitess "The Promotion
of Constitutional Stability in Afroillsisn Countries: A lamp= in the
Battle Against Comommices" allIgnifisanee of Libualisation in Cammaist
Chinas' "Soggested Topics for Diasussion with the Intellectual Mite
of the Satellite*, ?Proposed teb1a14nt of an Institution of
Zig*: Technical learning in South last Asia,' "Possible Change in
Chinese Companist Strategy TowardU. S. 'First Get Taw Sputnik.
(6) In order to put 2tli work in perspectives it
ftlaAgcLa noted that during 1957
produced about 116 reports ranging from briefs book
4iitth.s, andseam for =elusively CIA wee internelly to handbooks
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25X1A8CONF1DENTIAL
tba pabliaatieoes same 23 were Latxibuted to
GUcr U. t agencies, dills about 113 ewe puma to foreign
with wham the Clianiestina Semiotic are in
The =Ipablirationa included such %Mae as "Cmmuniat
25X1A8a
Organismbian amiMtivlty 1954-1956," ?thine*,
rty Influence ow Latin brarlean Comamiat Parties,
on of sputniks" "Phases for Soviet/Satellite
Partetioa of CP Tedmical Apparatus." Afro-
Cairo Ant 26 DeceMoer 1957 Jearary
4ea tine Net tar International Comunist Cormunicationas?
Deceptions "Paaaible ?Writ Pores Views
?Titoism and Soviet
Officials Pellowin4 the
?treads la ilari000?111 ?rotas&
Os/
nriAlta "
*ad nor cool*
tba two units
be exiseted
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weekly
(2) MUM&
(*) Amster 24kerfri4 stir (zeft) livel
Cb with maniate to mike policy recomandatioas
(11) 2tTii.ce.Lst....Cmrreat Znt,1 en (TDA) prepares
tit3e4 Itelmuldsrt Prollatimila in Policy Perspective.*
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also occasional srticles far weeklies.
25X1A8a
(0)
mphasis an agerstimeal aspects at clandestine Comm/Art
eativities; premiss pert et ICES Sevplement Bo. Wax *Iciternational
Cammcniem.*
(6)
fr)
(3) q5tal4s 444
(a) SIVILaslaWaliinenk (Mute)
prepares Supple/scent TI, *Comminisa.* of the *Wawa Intelliiremce
Surma which deals with the Communist appanaus in Individual
countries.
(b)
al undoubtedly is done in OralleIRS commada
in the 1957 report by representative* of the Surma or the budget on
Germay as an area *bare CIA could supply reports.
(a) BEE = uttie Cr no original research.
(d) The *Mae or Special lavestigations is
particularly intereatel in reports ea areas where major installations
located overseas. e.g.. Spain aad Macioce?.
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?ccp)-kvaps fats wiersitatirautp#
(1) ?los following conclesicas and rescrseradatices
regard to the Senior Research Starr atIsternatiocal
(b)
bast
original concept of the ostablisisrent of
iztti within CIA as visualised by- the
actual jesetice. ?here are several
to this failure
then being received, with full
concerxsd, SRS has been viewed with
areas where cooperation is. Important.
ire to effect full coordination at
not exclusivel,y a Arun of
beir4 issued as representingtbe Aeeey'c
great bulk of the niterial produced Iv
rather than being in response to
coninsiers
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(e) There is DO qeestion as to the value of a Senior
assesenth Staff on International Communism with a charter to speculate
au policy provided it is meagerly located and properly used. There is
question as to whether it is either edvisible or appropriate for CIA
to hove a unit endowed in this type of policy pliannleg. Whereas huh
level research an international Communism is one thing, extendieg
thmt into recommemdstions for U. S. action in the brood foreign policy
field emdaabtedly tienseresses into the area of Pal/ay Planning Staff
at the Depertmeut at State. Perther, critics of CIA are comstantly
alleging that it proposes policy.
(d) There is basically very little that SRS does
today that could not be done outside of the Agency, particularly if
arrsegiments could be mode for such a unit to bundle classified
esterisl. During this time when the Agency hes reached its maximum
sise end must use all personnel slots for high priority activities,
it vould appear that this is a unit ribose functions could actually be
trsusferred to a research foundation or university under contract to
the Agency.
(2) It is
Recommended that:
25X1M0 be *vended to include a Senior Research Staff
on latermetional Communise. Cfkis can be secompliehed with
little or no increase in the Agency's budget forM25X1A5a1
die missions and functions of SRS be transferred
25X1A5ato and thst SRS within the Agency be Aboliebed.
(c) The personnel of SRS be given two alternatives (1) Unit
if they desire to transfer elsewhere in the Aiwa* and there is
25X1A5S1ceed for their services, be permitted to do so; (2) that
they be transferred to and fran staff to contract status
25X1A5aat islariee line withstandards, with the contract pro-
tocting the retirement and other benefits of the employee.
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