LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF THE "ANTI-STALIN" TREND IN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM: INTERPRETATION AND POSSIBLE EXPLOITATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01446R000100060019-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 1998
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: March 20, 1956
• Content Type: MF

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ROOM NO. buILVU.v
Director Central Intelligence
The suggestions in this paper
have been informally coordinated with
DDP, OCI and SR. We are not, however,
in a position to say that they are
fully agreed by these elements.
We would be glad to complete the
staffing on them if you so desire.
Chief, SRS/DDI
ROOM NO. BUILDING
3O4 2210 E St
1 FORM No
EB 55 241
REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
I EXTENSION
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director Central Intelligence
20 March 1956
SUBJECT: Latest Developments of the "Anti-Stalin" Trend in
International Communism; Interpretation and possible
Exploitation
1. The purpose of this memorandum is to suggest an interpretation
of the latest events in the Soviet Union and of their impact upon inter-
national communism (paras. 2-5) and to recommend appropriate political
warfare measures (paras. 6-9). The situation is very fluid, changing
from day to day, if not from hour to hour, and information as yet
available is obviously quite incomplete. The analysis presented here
can therefore only be tactical, speculative and subject to further
revisions. However, the very fluidity of the situation appears to
call for an immediate interpretation, if only as a working hypothesis,
since the opportunities for action which the situation offers might
diminish or disappear, once the visibly ruffled communist camp has a
chance to settle.
INTEPPRETATION.
2. Since the opening of the 20th CPSU Congress events in the
Soviet Union have been increasingly forcing Khrushchev's hand far beyond
his original intentions. Originally, he intended to use the Party
Congress mainly to confirm the policy he had followed ever since he
replaced Malenkov in February, 1955, and to consolidate his own personal
position. In his opening speech, he deviated from certain tenets of
Stalinism, but with a show of reluctance and without attacking the dead
leader personally. Mikoyan's speech went much farther and apparently
aroused serious opposition - at least below the surface of the Congress.
The growth of this opposition forced Khrushchev to make his second,
"secret" speech.
3. We do not yet know whether Khrushchev succeeded in rallying the
1600 Congress delegates to his side by his long and passionate indictment
of Stalin. In any case, he found it necessary a few days later to order
mass meetings of the 8 million rank-and-file party members throughout
the Soviet Union in order to acquaint them with the gist of his indict-
ment. The riots in Georgia, to judge from newspaper and radio reports
thus far received, appear to have been well organized and led as is
indicated by the rather sophisticated reflection of the incidents in
the Tiflis party newspaper, by the request to Chinese Marshal Chu-Teh
to appear in their meeting and by other signs of rather clever political
planning. Current reports that Marshals Voroshilov and Sokolovsky have
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gone to Tiflis, that travel and communications have been restricted,
that some of the Volga radio stations have gone off the air, etc.,
add to the impression that this is more serious than a purely
sentimental and localized reaction of the Georgians against the
vilification of their most famous fellow-countryman.
i+. There is not yet any reason to expect an.__ overthrow of Soviet
rule in the foreseeable future. However, far-reaching changes in the
top personnel, possibly including Khrushchev himself, and growing
ascendancy of the military leaders, if not an outright "Napoleonic"
military dictatorship, are definitely conceiyable. The International
Communist movement outside the Soviet Union is obviously also severely
shaken.
5. Khrushchev's position appears to have deteriorated, though
presumably not yet beyond repair, as a result of his failure to anti-
cipate the full consequences of his anti-Stalin moves. This failure
may be attributed to the fact that Khrushchev is primarily a successful
manager of the bureaucratic hierarchy which rules party and economic
life, and is neither a true revolutionary nor a profound political or
ideological thinker. His impetuousness and self-confidence may have
led him to overlook or underestimate such considerations as:
a. It is impossible to remove a few isolated stones from
the brittle, "monolithic" structure of totalitarian doctrine
without endangering the entire system.
b. By denying Stalin's much-vaunted "infallibility", he cast
doubt on the "infallibility" of the Party itself.
c. Stalin's "father image" satisfied a profound psychological
need of the average Russian who is deeply shocked that this image,
laboriously built up for almost 30 years, is suddenly and violently
shattered.
RECOMMENDATIONS
6. Whether the recent events mark the "Thermidor" of the Russian
revolution or a return from Stalinism to Leninism, they may portend
additional dangers to our security as a result of "Napoleonic" military
ventures or of increasted Soviet-Communist initiatives in the foreign
policy and economic fields. We therefore recommend that political and
propaganda action be taken before the situation in the Soviet Union and
in the international communist movement has a chance to stabilize. Such
action, might take the form of a pincers movement, with one "white" and
one "black" jaw. The objective of both would be to exacerbate existing
diss6nsions and to advance the "debunking" of the Stalin myth.
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7. The "white jaw" of the proposed pincers would center in a
top-level policy statement, to be set forth either by the President,
or by Congress in a joint resolution, or by an appropriate inter-'
allied body, such as the Atlantic Council. In view of the deep impact
of these events upon Europe, we would suggest the last as the most
effective channel, if it is diplomatically feasible. Use of the one
would presumably not exclude use of the others, if properly timed and
coordinated. The themes-dramatically proclaimed by such a statement
would then have to be further developed, repeated and disseminated by
all available communications media of the Western World.
8. The gist of such an overt political offensive, which would
also serve as guidance to our diplomacy, should be: "Now the Communist
leaders themselves admit the evils of dictatorship, admit that Stalin
was just as poorer-mad and irresponsible as Hitler, killed millions of
innocent victims, almost lost the war and committed innumerable other
crimes and blunders. All the Communist claims to a 'scientific founda-
tion' of their policy, and. to virtual infallibility as a model for the
rest of mankind, thereby collapse, deflated by confessions of Stalin's
successors themselves. However, the present 1;=Faders of the CPSU and
of Communist Parties everywhere cannot escape responsibility for this
reign of terror and crime simply by blaming everything on two dead men,
;;tali.n and I3eria. Khrushchev and the others who are now the Communist
Party's 'collective despots' played very important and responsible roles,
already in the days of Stalin. We deeply syuipathize with the plight of
the populations of the Soviet Union but, true to the principle of non-
interference, we cannot tell them how they should call Stalin's surviving
accomplices to account or demand reparations for the evil he wrought.
If, however, the communist leaders expect the Western world to accept
their statements that they have broken with the sordid and violent
traditions of Stalin's reign, they must do much more than merely denounce
the dead. First and foremost, they must enable the free world to believe
in their good faith by beginning to fulfill the pledges in international
affairs which Stalin broke. Especially they must honor the promises of
free self-determination for all the peoples who have come under communist
rule by force."
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9. The line to be taken by the "black" pincer will require careful
consideration. It would probably involve a'multi-pronged series of
approaches, not all necessarily consistent. For example, we suggest
that the main thrust might be the denunciation of the 20th Congress line
as a betrayal of true Communism, as a hateful and dangerous "Thermidor".
At the same time it might excoriate the'"return to Leninism" as fraudulent,
i
si
n
n
ncere a
d opportunistic. It might publish compromising documents
to blacken Stalin along lines avoided at the Party Congress,
at. the same time suggesting that the Communist leaders had deliberately
th
rown up a smoke screen around the ultimate perfidy of the dead t
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Numerous
additional opportunities will unquestionably emerge i we closely follow
developments, not only inside the Soviet Union, but inside the Communist
Parties of China, the satellites and the Free World.
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Chief, SRS/DDI
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