THE INTERACTION OF POLICY AND PROPAGANDA IN SOVIET ACTION ABROAD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01445R000100330001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 25, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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kiL
DRAFT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Senior Research Staff on International Communism
25 July 1960
THE INTERACTION OF POLICY AND PROPAGANDA
IN SOVIET ACTION ABROAD
Introduction
This paper attempts to describe and evaluate
certain aspects of the Soviet counterpart to what is being
investigated for the United States Government by the Sprague
Committee. We believe that this field is not adequately
defined, in the Soviet case, by the term "Information." Nor
is it purely propaganda. Rather, as we shall argue, it is a
confluence of policy and propaganda in an integral or total
effort, which - by analogy with AGITPROP - we suggest call-
ing PROPOL. We believe that this integration - although not
unique - has been carried further by the Soviet regime than
by any other government or system in history.
We recognize, of cou.rse, that this amalgamation of
PROPOL has been possible only because the Soviet regime
is totalitarian. We do not, therefore, suggest that it be
copied in the United States. We would, however, raise the
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question whether our present system does not suffer from a
less than clear recognition that policy and propaganda con-
stitute a single entity. We believe that, without abandoning
our own system, it is still possible to adapt this lesson from
the Soviet Union.
This paper, which is to be regarded as a first essay,
rather than a detailed elaboration, concentrates largely on
the intangible components of PROPOL. It leaves aside, for
separate treatment, such important tangible components as
the organizations and media - Party, State, International
Fronts and diplomatic installations - through which the
system operates. We make no effort here to construct a
total "profile, " but confine ourselves to sketching a few of
its more striking traits.
A. The Basic Concept of PROPOL
The Communist - and specifically the Soviet --
conduct of all, foreign activity is based on a conscious inter-
play of both internal, and external propaganda and policy.
This paper, however, deals only with the latter, reserving
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the discussion of its interaction with the former for separate
treatment.
Our working hypothesis attributes to the Commu-
nists the following premises:
1. The process of "world revolution" is total; it
combines "revolutionary theory" with "revolutionary prac-
tice." Its advance, though subject to setbacks, is inexor-
able, being ordained by "history, " by "life itself."
Z. That which maximizes the power of the Commu-
nist party is moral and just, because it advances the Inter-
national Movement toward the ultimate goal of the perfect
['communist society."
3. Marxism-Leninism provides a scientific ration-
ale, which makes it possible for the Party to delineate the
goal, chart the course toward it, and cope with the obstacles
interposed by the "enemy. "
4. Integral to this rationale is the principle of
dialectics, specifically the doctrine of "contradictions. "
Defensively, "contradictions" must be recognized and re-
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solved - to prevent them from becoming "antagonistic"
within the "world socialist system. Offensively, they must
be detected and exacerbated within the body of the "enemy"
- their latent "antagonism" must be made actual.
5. All events must be analyzed and all courses
plotted dialectically with a clear discrimination between
tactics and strategy.
On the basis of these, and other secondary premis-
es, the Kremlin has developed the concept and technique
which we suggest debignating as PROPOL. This is nothing
less than the total amalgamation of the process by which
policy is determined together with the specific lines through
which it is implemented in action and described, defended
and advanced in words and other forms of communication.
We believe that, in effect, the communists have
developed a new discipline, transcending and potentially
destroying traditional diplomacy. By their unwavering ap-
plication of the dialectical principle they have achieved a
cross-fertilization of ends and means which yields a revolu-
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gageomemor
tionary force of unprecedented power.
B. General Objectives of PROPOL
The integrated propaganda-policy activity of the
USSR is conducted to serve two principal objectives. The
first is to advance the interests of the USSR as those are
conceived by the Presidium. It is obvious that the nremlin
leaders believe in a restless, aggressive, purposeful assault
nn the non-communist world, however much they may preach
"relaxation of tensions." By constant probing, instigation of
disorder, and manufacture of crises, they seek to further
the decisive shift in the balance of world power," which
they claim has already taken place. In these efforts they
regard the fortunes of International Communism as being
indissolubly linked with those of the Soviet Union. Thus,
whatever advances the national interests of the USSR, bene-
fits the cause of "proletarian internationalism."
The second PROPOL objective is the instruction,
direction, and stimulation of the worldwide communist appar-
atus. Although Marxist-Leninist ide ology provides a common
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frame of reference for reactions to particular situations,
the Communist parties and the front organizations need
tactical guidance on propaganda themes, on political action,
and on timing of moves. These Moscow undertakes to supply,
in coordination with its own actions and propaganda. The
constant activity directed by the Kremlin - protest meetings;
national, regional, and world congresses; strikes and demon-
strations; the publication of tracts, overt and clandestine -
maintains the militancy of the party members. The total
range of this objective and the methods used by the commu-
nists to fulfill it are beyond the scope of this paper.
C. The Marxist-Leninist "matrix of reality. "
In attempting to fathom the enigmas which PROPOL
regularly presents us, it is essential to remind ourselves
that the Communists - quite literally - do not see the world
as we do. Not only their ethic, but their intellectual formu-
lation and their logic are radically different. This explains
the widely noted phenomenon of semantic incongruence -
they use the same words as we, but the meaning simply is
not the same.
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The Marxist-Leninist "matrix of reality" has been
derived from the "founding fathers" (Marx and Engels),
endowed with a revolutionary methodology by Lenin, consol-
idated by Stalin, and "creatively" adapted to modern condi-
tions by Khrushchev. This matrix informs agitation, propa-
ganda and policy. It is the subject of exegesis in thousands
of books and tens of thousands of articles in the official or-
gans of the party and their offshbotv.
It is sometimes claimed that the Communist gospel
is entering eclipse, that it no longer inspires revolutionary
fervor but only boredom. To be sure, this tendency exists,
and it is recognized by the Communists themselves as a
danger to be vigorously combatted at all times. But it would
be unwise for us to derive from their own, often sharp, inter-
nal criticism, the reassuring conclusion that the leaders, or
even the cadres, have ceased to think and act within the
matrix of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Not only are they com-
mitted to it by deep vested interests; they see in it the root
and cause of the innumerable successes which they are
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achieving. The psychological impact of an unremitting in-
doctrination tinctures their lives with a fervor akin to
religious fanaticism. Seeing world events through a doc-
trinal filter, which is never removed from their mind's eye,
they have come to identify their insights with dialectical and
scientific certitude, enabling them to predict and to hasten
the doom of capitalism and the victory of Communism. The
rigidity of this matrix does not however preclude flexibility
in PROPOL manipulation.
D. The Soviet Estimate of the Situation
Let i.t be said at the outset that we are greatly .handi-
capped in determining the basic estimate of the world situa-
tion which is held by Khrushchev and the Presidium leaders,
if we approach it in purely Western terms. About all that
we could infer is that it is a compound of objective informa-
tion and subjective interpretation. We have evidence that
there exists a regular channel for undistorted, factual re-
porting on world events, the so-called Red Tass. This
differs from what is generally believed to have been the
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highly slanted intelligence and information flowing into Stalin.
We know that Khrushchev reads Western papers, and on this
score there appears to be little restriction on top officials,
even well down into the apparat. Thus there is probably an
undistorted core of fact at the center of the PROPOL arma-
ture.
We believe that if we make an effort to project our-
selves into the reasoning of the Kremlin leaders at least twr_ee
basic propositions may be imputed to their general estimate.
1. There exists a deterrent balance, resulting from
the perfection of nuclear instruments of destruction by both
the USSR and the US. Officially this is denied, and the super-
iority of the Soviet striking and retaliatory power is affirmed.
In view of his insistence on the necessity of "peaceful co-
existence, " however, one must assume that Khrushchev
actually accepts the permanence of a balance, sufficiently
stable so that general war is irrevocably ruled out. One may
also speculate that the Chinese leaders largely share this
estimate, though overtly disputing it. If this is the case,
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the outward controversy between the two Bloc partners may
in fact conceal elements of a profound deception.
2. Although PROPOL procliaims that there is an
inexorable rotting of the "capitalist system headed by the
United States, " we believe that the sober estimate of the
Presidium is that the disintegration of the free world econo-
mies, especially that of the US, is not imminent. Rather,
a long "peaceful competition" will ensue, the ultimate out-
come of which is not in doubt but which will have its ups and
downs. This competition will be played out in the world
arena, with the underdeveloped countries in the dual role of
spectators and lesser protagonists. In this the Communists
see many opportunities. For the present, however, the
determination of the capitalists should not be "tested by
force."
3. On the other hand, the Presidium may serious-
ly estimate that the capitalist polities are weaker and more
vulnerable than they seem. This would presuppose that the
"ruling circles" the bourgeoisie of bankers and industrial-
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ists, as opposed to the petty bourgeoisie - have lost their
grip, their confidence and above all their "operational code, "
which is in important respects identical with that of the Com-
munists. In other words, they would have ceased to be
"serious. "
If the Presidium had in fact made such a funda-
mental judgment, the consequences for PROPOL would be
profound. It would then be possible to predict a speedy col-
lapse of the enemy, and the approved maxim "despibe the
enemy strategically, respect him tactically" might become
parallel in both its members, Nevertheless, the fact that
the theme of "contempt" has recently been played by both
Peking and Moscow does not mean that it has already become
strategic. The PROPOL motives behind it are almost cer-
tainly limited and tactical, and may even be concerned pri-
marily with smoothing the relations between the two centers
of communist power. There is probably still a strategic
basis for the professions of "respect" which Khrushchev,
seemingly without irony, delivers to such "serious" capital-
ists as Rockefeller and Harriman.
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All that we would suggest here is that the Soviet
estimate may be in a state of tactical flexibility, perhaps
waiting to ,see what may develop in the United States after
the elections, in Europe as it moves toward economic, and
even political unity, and in the "former colonial areas as
their independence progresses and they react to the appeals
of a Free World "Commonwealth." The Kremlin will adjust
its estimate and its PROPOL as these unfold.
E. General Themes Derived from the Estimate of the
Situation, and Policy Objectives
. Triumph of Communism is inevitable. In the
latest version of the new Communist bible, FOUNDATIONS
OF MARXISM-LENINISM (1959), it is stated (Chapter 26)
that "the building of socialism means the universal historic
victory of the workers. This is merely one of the innumer-
able assertions which embody the prediction that the laws of
historical materialism will make the triumph of socialism"
inevitable. Khrushchevism is distinguished from its prede-
cessors by the intensity of its effort to translate the doctrine
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into practice. In the current view, Soviet society is approach-
ing the transition from socialism (which has been achieved in
the USSR) to Communism. This is possible not only because
of the tremendous progress in creating the "material-techni-
cal base" for such a transition, but also as a result of the
formation, since 1945, of the "world socialist system" or
"socialist commonwealth." In other words, the doctrinal
forecast of a Communist world-wide victory is now, in the
opinion of the Soviet leaders, being implemented on the basis
of the actual and potential power of the bloc, a vast camp of
nearly one billion people.
On the other hand, the certain decline and fall of
capitalist-imperialism, also forecast by the priaphets of
dialectical materialism, will occur with a speed proportion-
ate to the increase of Communist power and influence. Al-
though the Kremlin does not deceive itself - as Peking seems
to do - about the might of thv Western world, nevertheless
the growing strength of the socialist camp indicates to Com-
munist ideologists that the "decisive shift" of power in their
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favor is well established. Thus both in theory and practice,
the Communist leaders are confident of the evOntual triumph
of Communism; they are not worried about the factor of time,
because they are convinced that it is on their side.
2. Western 'ruling circles" are the obstacle to a
peaceful, prosperous world. In the Soviet view, and out-
wardly to a greater extent in that of the Chinese Communists,
the intentions of the imperialist "class states" are not of a
peaceful nature. Since a capitalist economy without an arms
race would deteriorate, and since the "ruling circles, " i.e.
the "Pentagon" and "Wall Street" are the principal usufruc-
tuaries of profits from arms manufacturing and the exploita-
tion of workers, no genuine peace can be expected while these
"circles" continue in power. Fearing that disarmament
would eliminate their profits and topple their economic sys-
tems, they oppose the Communist demand for converting
the arms industry to peaceful ends. This is at the bottom of
their hatred toward Communism, whose growing prosperity
they "frantically try to undermine. The "people" of the
capitalist states, however, are "peace-loving" and they are
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prevented from seeing their true interests only by the decep-
tive practices of their class masters.
3. Strength and Unity of the "Socialist Camp."
The strength and unity of the 'world s-ocialist system is, in
the Communist mode of expression, "calculated by its char-
acter to facilitate the fastest possible development of all
countries entering into it." They may build socialism
"independently" but they are also assured of fraternal assist-
ance from the other members of the "camp." The nations
of the "socialist commonwealth" are not in competition with
one another but all strive to achieve the common goal. The
fiction of individual sovereignty is maintained in interna-
tional relations. Internally, the economies rest on another
fiction, that not individuals but the entire society controls
the means of production. The identity of ideological belief
postulated for the system" is thus supplemented with the
identity of political and economic interests. Such mono-
lithic purposefulness, the Communists feel, makes the
socialist "camp" stronger than the capitalist "camp;" it is
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fully capable now of stopping the imperialist warmongers
from aggressive action.
4. "Socialist countries are disinterested friends
of the under-developed world. While the Western colonial-
ists remain attached to their principle of exploitation, the
"world socialist system" is only interested in helping the
former "colonial and semi-colonial countries to achieve
their national aspirations and to raise their social and econom-
ic standards. Against the Western profit motive, the Eastern
position is solely one of altruistic and benevolent interest.
Association with the Bloc means identification with the forces
of "peace, " whereas alliances with the 'f,riarmongering West"
can only serve to continue the cold war. Imperialism will
always try to re-enslave the newly liberated countries
politically or economically, airl to draw them into aggres-
sive "military blocs" such as SEATO or CENTO.
5. "The greatest good for the greatest number."
Communism, free from profit motivation, has no reason
for tolerating the exploitation of man by man. It seeks to
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achieve a state of happiness for all people on earth. It has
none but selfless motives and is confident that it is endowed,
through Marxism-Leninism, with the tools to reach its objec-
tive. This goal, however, cannot be attained immediately
but requires certain previous stages of development. The
initial stage of "building socialism" is imperative; without
it the "transition to Communism" is impossible, since the
material-technical base would be inadequate. Peace, of
course, is a conditio sine qua non, and thus it is incumbent
on all peoples who aspire to happiness to break with imper-
ialism and to frustrate its inherent greed and warlike inten-
tions. Furthermore, it is necessary to follow Soviet
guidance in "socialist construction" since only the USSR has
had the "rich experience" to qualify for leadership toward
Communism. (A limited but important guidance role is also
prescribed for China).
F. The "Operational Code."
Among the intangible factors which govern the con-
duct of PROPOL, we may cite the complex of attitudes, habits
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and working principles which Nathan Leites has called the
"Operational Code.1" In large measure, as Leites has
shown, this code is a heritage of Lenin and Stalin, but it has
undergone important modifications, to the present day. These
will be alluded to - necessarily in somewhat speculative terms
- in our discussion.
We believe that such a code exists and that it estab-
lishes a general consensus among top communist leaders as
to how to approach the difficulties growing out of "objective
situations. " Its development and application may be modi-
fied by the "working style" of the top leader, but its general
1
The Operational Code of the Politburo (New York, 1951) and
A Study of Bolshevism (RAND Corporation, 1953). Leites
may be described as the Machiavelli of Bolshevist political
theory - unlike Machiavelli, observing from the outside. The
first, short work is the counterpart of The Prince; the second,
monumental work, rich with illustrative quotations, is the
counterpart of the Discourses. It would seem desirable that
Leites work, which covers only the period to the death of
Stalin, be extended to the era of Khrushchev. We believe
that the former at least, and ideally the latter, should be the
livre de chevet of all persons professionally concerned with
the interpretation of Communist PROPOL. Our discussion in
this section leans heavily on Leites' concepts, but goes beyond
them in several lines of speculation.
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content displays a high degree of continuity with the classical
era of Bolshevism. Probably the chief general feature of its
latter-day development has been the increasing differentia-
tion between its "exoteric" and its "esoteric" aspects. 1 There
is a marked tendency toward secrecy as opposed to Lenin's
- but not Stalin's - "frankness." This in turn opens up the
possibility of deception, which can be practiced on the masses
of the socialist countries, on the lesser Party cadres, and on
the "enemy. '12 Despite the "frankness, " which Khrushchev
also professes in his working style, " the operational code
certainly enjoins the use of "misinformation and "intoxica-
tion. "
1In a different - primarily internal - frame of analysis, this
distinction is explored by Hadley Cantril: Russian Leaders
and the Human Image, Institute for International Research,
(Princeton, N. J., 1960). He categorizes the principles of
the leaders as "explicit" and "implicit. "
2We believe that the role of deception in Communist PROPOL
constitutes the area of our deepest ignorance. Intensive study
is necessary on this subject; even the current "ideological
controversy" between Communist China and the Soviet Union
should be considered under the hypothesis that it may, contain
important elements of deception.
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Among the many iniportant principles of the "code, "
we shall single out a few which bear especially on the effective-
ness of Soviet PROPOL.
1. The Tear of Annihilation." History "teaches"
that the "capitalist-imperialist" and the "communist" systems
are locked in mortal conflict. Lenin taught that one will des..
troy the other. There is no other possibility. Until the ul-
timate victory of "communism, there will always persist
the danger that the movement may be completely destroyed.
Consequently eternal "vigilance" is prescribed as the price
of "advancing revolution."
It may be questioned, in the light of the Communist
"estimate of the situation, "whether the present Soviet lead-
ers entertain the same lively apprehension on the score of
annihilation as their predecessors. Nevertheless, there is
no reason to suppose that they have lost their general respect
for the death-dealing capacity of the enemy, at least in the
military if not in the political and economic fields. Hence
we must assume that their PROPOL continues to prescribe
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prudence and the avoidance of "adventarism." There-may
be a difference in judgment between the Chinese Communists
and the Kremlin leaders as to the acceptability of risks in
given tactical situations (Taiwan, Berlin), but it is difficult
to foresee a contingency in which either would pursue un-
controlled "brinkmanship. Slogans such as reactionaries
and all imperialists are paper tigerst are in the nature of
provocative taunts rather than confident cries of present
victory.
2. Pressing to the Limit -of Strength and Ability.
The Soviet "estimate of the situation" is predicated on con-
fidence of victory, and. dynamism in its pursuit. At the same
time it probably imputes some loss of these qualities: to the
enemy. PROPOL is at all times forward pushing. Vacuums
must be penetrated; opportunities, no matter how small,
must be seized and exploited. There is a restlessness
which works down from the Presidium through all the instru-
mentalities of propaganda and acti n. At times, even pur-
poseless activity seems to be enjoined. This may be a
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preventive against the rust of inaction, against the atrophy
of the cadres, which is always a danger 'in situations -
Such as Western Europe - where the possibility of revolution-
ary work is apparently foreclosed for a long time. It would
seem that we must sometimes abandon the search for a real
motive in a particular communist initiative, and rest on the
assumption that it may be intended to "keep the franchise"
or to "flex the muscle." Conversely, we should not be mis-
led by prolonged talk of"relaxation. " As recent events in
Italy show, "clistensione" can be converted to violence during
the course of an evening of Togliatti with the Presidium
leaders in a Moscow dacha.
3. Advance and Retreat. The principle of "two
steps forward, one step backward" is too well known to need
elaboration. What we would suggest in the Western analysis
of PROPOL is careful attention t the circumstances under
which an aggressive line of thrust is halted. All too often,
when the 'heat is off," there is a tendency to assume that
There could scarcely be found a more classic example of
PROPOL than the selection of the Neo-Fascist issue to dis-
rupt the rapprochement of the Center and the non-Communist
left.
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it will stay off. "Thank God that is over!" But it would be
imprudent to assume that either Khrushchev or - let us say
- the "Laos Desk" in the Foreign Section of the CC appar-
atus, ever puts a mere "localized" operation intondeep
freeze." It may go on the "back burner, "but it still "cooks, "
while the "Cuba Desk" or the Congo Desk" boils up.
It is possible that the present Communist leaders
have a different attitude toward setbacks from their prede-
cessors. Holding that there has been a 'decisive shift in
the world balance of power" in their favor, they may believe
that they can continue to advance boldly on all fronts, sub-
ject of course to judicious variations in the line of thrust.
Nevertheless, it seems more likely that Khru-
shchev still believes in the classic Leninist-Stalinist doc-
trine of historical ebb and flow. Some setbacks may still
be conceivable to him which could seriously postpone the
day of victory, though probably few, if any, are conceiv-
able shich could bring annihilation.
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Ifffleffiefilifill**/*Pit
4. Pacta (non) Sunt Servanda. While there can be
no question that morality remains that which is expedient
to the power of the Party, current Communist doctrine may
have evolved from Lenin's view of treaties as "pie crust,
made to be broken." There may be a diminishing return in
the process of violating international agreements, which
even Khrushchev could not accept indefinitely. This would
suggest that he is not likely to allow a negotiation to issue in
a treaty which the logic of communist interest would later
compel him to violate. A disturbing corollary of this would
be that in most cases negotiation would not lead to agreement
at all. The experience of the past few months (summit,
Berlin, disarmament) seems to bear this out.
Accordingly, we may infer that a new tactical, if
not strategic attitude toward international negotiations and
treaties is emerging. On the one hand, the institutions and
practices of international comity continue to have authority
and currency. On the other hand, a certain diplomatic
iconoclasm is being cultivated. The Monroe Doctrine is
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GIMITIMPIPPIPPAPAP
challenged and a "Bolshevik doctrine" counterposed to it, a
challenge so outrageous that it can only be regarded as
provocation. Even the United Nations is being "needled, '1
not g o deeply as to produce a revulsion within it, deeply
enough to continue the tactic of partial discrediting which
Khrushchev and the PROPOL apparat intermittently pursue.
There is some evidence from communist sources
that the "world socialist system' under Moscow's-?leadership
may be preparing a "commonwealth" matrix within which a
rival - and in their calculation a successor - to the United
i
Nations could be created. 1 This s a long range gambit,
and Khrushchev may seek no more from it now than forcing
the admission of Communist China or perpetuating the divis-
ive effects of its exclusion. But his UN maneuvers display
a versatility which suggests that he views himself as having
a winning hand. Even when he is most preposterous -
1
SRS- 10, The Socialist Commonwealth of Nations, (July 1959).
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1 .L .L .LJ
charges of U-2 "aggression, "the Congo - he is careful to
balance his PROPOL with gestures of respect.
G. "The Style of Work"
This characteristic and frequently used communist
term is applied to the activity of the entire party apparatus.
At the basic cadre level it is used to prescribe the desired
type of internal relation with the masses: close contact,
sincerity, avoidance of rudeness, freedom from the abuses
of bureaucracy and arbitrary action. At the top level, be-
sides exemplifying the same internal virtues, the "style"
reflects an image of the leadership in action, as it seeks to
present itself to the external world. This image is integral
to the conduct of PROPOL. We know what this implied in
the case of Stalin. In the case of Khrushchev, the "style"
needs further analysis, a searching psychological and polit-
ical study of the man, such as has not yet been done. We
may cite a few aspects of his "style" which have an import-
ant impact on the conduct of PROPOL.
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The most striking quality of the Khrustichev style
is its dynamism. This is a composite of physical vitality -
rendered "human" by visible brief punctuations of fatigue -
zest for "life itself" and restless energy. This is commun-
icated through his personal impact to PROPOL which is
represented as the activity of a surging, buoyant, intense
nation and society, "pressing to the limit."
From this inner dynamic radiates the aura of con-
_
fidence. A key to Soviet PROPOL is the 'habit of success, "
the inexorable drive to world mastery, which impels doubt-
ers and laggards and frightens the proponents of the status
quo.
The "style" is also represented as being popular.
In this, there i.s of course a sharp divergence from that of
Stalin. The sheer personal magnetism of the leader is im-
printed on the "consciousness" of the Soviet people, and
this' in turn is propagated abroad in innumerable forms,
immensely energetic and engaging ballet and folk dance
troupes, "slick" magazines with smiling,active faces from
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-III II III
all racial and social groups. These are intended to establish
an identity of the regime with the multi-nationai peoples of
the Soviet Union,which will lend force, credibility and impact
to its manifold activities in all part s. of the world.
The style purports to be humane. This aspect of
the image is presented in .lofty theoretical projections of the
"transition to communism in which the material, moral,
spiritual and.cultural worth of the new Soviet man will afford
.a model to all man.kind. It is translated into action down to
the lowest level of demonstrative "baby-kissing" on Kh.ru-
shchevrs foreign tours. At a more serious level it is repre-
sented by such cultural. diplomats as Ehrenburg, whose
eulogies of France and Italy rank among the most penetrat-
ing and "sincere" appreciations of foreign criti.cs. Even
Khrushchev is careful - on his travels and after his return
home - to include a note of praise for the climate, the, natur-
al beauty ani the art forms of exotic lands - coupled, usually,
with an occasional disparaging note (a "modern" statue at an
Austrian dam, the craft s of Bali).
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61919911,419?Williklibmi
The style is Efficient. As far back as the '20s,
Stalin held forth the ideal of "American practicalitytt as a
trait to be appropriated, the more so since the Bolsheviks
regarded its opposite as a congenital vice of Tsarist Russia.
In this sense, a TU-104 making its first appearance at a
New York airport - met by a landing ramp several feet too
short - becomes a symbol of American inefficiency, serving
the broad interest of PROPOL. The generally businesslike
performance on technical projects - in spite of a few short-
term failures - supports the claim of a potential to surpass
th "working style" of capitalism in building up the under-
developed countries.
On the other hand, the style is hard. Khrushchev
does not attempt to present himself like his predecessor as a
man of steel. But he constantly emphasizes that he is firm,
blunt, a man of "no- nonsense." On occasion, and by deliber-
ate calculation, this trait becomes intensified - the khamtstvo
or boorish brutality of the Russian peasant. There is an
important secondary doctrine of the Bolshevik code --'-udeness
pays." It protects the perpetrator from being "sucked in" and
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"used." It disarms the antagonist, and lowers him in the
eyes of bystanders, especially if he "can't take it." At the
same time, a dialectical balance is maintained. If the
offended person "stands his ground, especially if he "hits
back, " Khrushchev invariably switches to a bluff, jovial,
tone of admiration (the Nixon encounter in Sokolniki Park).
In the case of weaker individuals, especially if they are in
no position to retort (Chancellor Raab), an ironic depreca-
tion of rudeness completes the cycle of provocation.
Finally, an aspect which penetrates all others is
versatility: "Anything you can do, I can do better" - or at
least "well enough"! Khrushchev delights in demonstrating
this in himself, the image of a Bolshevik uomo universale,
different from Stalin in "style" but not in virA. This man-
ifests itself in many ways, his physical resilience, his
mental elasticity, his calculated change of mood. Even
when talking about an internal subject such as the change
of priority from hydro- to thermal-electric power stations,
or the advantages of square cluster planting and of hybrid
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41.1991IMISEPPPIRM
corn (with a nod to Garst), he la consciously making a con-
tribution to the immense fund of PROPOL images, a man
heading a party, a government, a nation and an international
movement, which can do anything.
H. Manipulative Principles and Methods
The "estimate of the situation, the "Marxist-
Leninist matrix, " the "working style" and the "operational
code" provide the intellectual and psychological climate for
the conduct of PROPOL. It remains to touch on a few of
the techniques, devices and methods which are used to the
end of manipulation. These obviously require much more
thorough treatment at the hands of psychologists, social
scientists and practicing operators in propaganda on our
side. This aspect of our discussion of necessity deals more
with the PRO and less with the POL, but even here they are
inseparable.
1. The Big Lie is not a Lie! The engineers and
artisans of PROPOL are well acquainted with Hitler's tech-
nique of the Big Lie. They utter it every day. And yet,
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there is a profound difference, because for them, it is
instrumentally a lie only in the eyes and ears of the capital-
ists. To the communists, it is constructive truth, pravda.
Within their concept of the "secular religion, that which
advances the power of the party, and thereby the goal of
world communism, is by definition both true and just. The
classic example - and it is pure PROPOL - is the case of
Hungary. The "revolution" had to be destroyed because it
was 'counter-revolution. " Absurd as this proposition may
seem to Western eyes - and in the eyes of the United Nations
- it is not a falsehood to the Communists. It is an "obJec-
dye" verdict.
2. The enemy can be disintegrated by scientific
p ychological manipulation. A simplified statement of this
technique has recently been developed by British and Amer-
ican psychologists on the basis of Pavlov s experiment on
dogs. On a more sophisticated level, it has recently been
shown (by CIA/OSI) that advanced cybernetics techniques
are being applied to the study of psychology with the aim of
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influencing and conditioning education and behavior in ways
which will bring about the emergence of the "new Soviet
man.' There is evidence that this line of research - directed
by the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat and its offshoot,
the Academy of Social Sciences - is also being brought to
focus on the conduct of international relations.
Although it would be premature to speculate on the
extent to which this scientific manipulation technique will
prove effective, it is possible to say now that planned, delib-
erate manipulation is basic to PROPOL. Perhaps the most
clearly perceived objective is the creation of a neurotic
situation, floating between extremes of anxiety and security.
A striking example, of course, is the alternation between
professions of peaceful coexistence" - itself a manipulative
device - and nuclear sabre-rattling. Over the past three or
four years, it is as though the Kremlin had established a
fund of apprehension, especially in Western Europe and
Eastern Asia, in which a stream of increments have been
deposited. These draw compound interest, an the fund
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has reached such proportions that its very existence could,
during a severe crisis, cause runs on the banks of confidence
in the Western alliance.
3. The use of economic reinforcement." Here,
too, principles of scientific psychology work hand in hand
with simple economics. The primary technique is one of
"positive reinforcement, "the conditioning to planned favor-
able responses by the judicious distribution of material re-
wards. In this form of manipulation there are also techniques
of withholding, building up economic attachments which can
then be turned on and off with tantalizing effect, either to
crush resistance or to create new commitment. There are
negative approaches, such as disparaging Western economic
aid, both as to quality and as to the motives of its dispensa-
tion. These are coupled by positive presentation of Soviet
assistance - not 'hand out" aid, gifts which corrupt and
destroy self-respect, but businesslike loans and investments,
"with no strings attached." It needs little argument to prove
that this is one of the most powerful techniques of PROPOL.
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4. The judicious use of provocation. Leites argues
convincingly that the fear of being provoked is an important
feature a the Bolshevik code. Being successfully provoked,
signifies that the victim has lost control of his own actions
and is being "used." In the classic period of the code, ft
a similar attitude is imputed to the "serious bourgeoisie."
Whether Khrus.hchev believes that present day "ruling circles
of capitalism are as wary - and successful as Lenin, and
presumably Stalin, thought them to be - is moot. But it
does seem clear that the current practice of PROPOL utilizes
the provocative tactic. One aspect of this is the "mouse trap"
(LI-2); another is the use of demonstrably absurd charges of
aggressive intent (Cuba, Congo), designed to elicit an angry
denial which inevitably results in some of the mud sticking
where it was thrown. The nimble use of provocation in-
evitably puts a more sedate or encumbered enemy at a dis-
advantage.
5. The Deceptively Simple. A technique of great
effectiveness in Communist PROPOL is the advocacy of
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deceptively simple solutions to complex international prob-
lems. Since World War It, Moscow has originated a succes-
sion of these proposals - "Ban the bomb," "Dissolve aggres-
sive military blocs, " "Abolish foreign bases, "Sign a peace
treaty -with Germany, ""Total diSarrnament. These have
relatively little impact among the politically influential
groups in?Western countries, but they appeal strongly to
the less sophisticated leadership in other parts of the world
and are applauded by the untutored masses. They sound
practical: all that is required, as the communists point out,
is the supersedure of the "riding (circles, " "warmongers,
and "revanchists" in the centers of "capitalist imperialism."
6. Complicating the Problem. Traditional
diplomacy seeks to limit international controversies, both
as to number of parties and as to matters in conflict. It
hopes thereby to focus the issues and reduce them to diplo-
matic adjustment. The communist practice, however, is to
involve as many states and interests as possible and to com-
plicate the questions in dippute. This practice in its simplest
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.T15111,INSIMINML
form may be seen in the repeated attempts of the Soviet
government to expand the membership of international con-
ferences or to play the numbers game in the United Nations.
Even if unsuccessful, the communists can claim to be the
champions of the unrepresented countries. If successful,
they have greatly complicated the task of the Western nego-
tiators. The Soviet representatives, maintaining a fixed
position and unaffected by the addition of other "socialist"
governments, can play on the rivalries, vanities, and con-
flicting interests of their opponents. A corollary practice
is connecting the unrelated, the bringing in of issues and
problems for the purpose of arousing fear, prejudices, and
antipathies among as many parties as possible, The tech-
nique was well illustrated in the Soviet declaration of 13 July
on the Congo. Besides condemning the actions of Belgium,
the United States, Great Britain, and France, disparaging
the efforts of "the American Bunche and the UN, and prais -
lug its own anti--imperialist record, Moscow got in licks at
NATO, Chancellor Adenauer, foreign military bases, US-
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British intervention in Lebanon and Jordan, and the ''plunder-
ing methods" of the imperialist powers in Latin America and
Asia as well as Africa.
Conclusion
It is clear from our discussion that we place a high
evaluation on the effectiveness of Communist policy and
propaganda. We do not, of course, argue that it is infallible,
or even that it is destined usually to get the best of us. The
principal aim of this essay is to suggest that a continuing,
intensive analysis of PROPOL is necessary, and that it
should balance the purely Western approach with a perspec-
tive derived from Marxism-Leninism itself.
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