AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SRS THE FIRST 'PIATILETKA' (FIVE YEAR PLAN) JANUARY 20, 1956 - JANUARY 20, 1961

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01445R000100360001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 92
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 27, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Senior Research Staff on International Communism
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SRS
THE FIRST "PIATILETKA" (FIVE YEAR PLAN)
JANUARY 20, 1956 - JANUARY 20, 1961
JOB NO.9Q-.-159
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TOTAL DOCS HEREIN _L
27 April 1961
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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TABLE OF, CONTENTS
Introduction
SECTION I
Concept and Mission of the Senior Research
Staff on International Communism
SECTION II _ 15
The International Communist Movement'
SECTION III 50
SRS Estimative Judgments on the World Situation
Means of Countering Communism'
APPENDIX I
History of Non-operational intelligence work
on International Communism
APPENDIX II 67
.Third International Conference of Sovietologists
APPENDIX III
SRS in the Academic Field
APPENDIX IV
List of CIA/SRS Reports
69
APPENDIX V 74'
Selected List of Memoranda prepared by SRS/DDI
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W141 lu"I
SUMMARY
During the early 1950s there was growing concern in
CIA and the intelligence community over the extent of cover-
age being devoted to International Communism considered as
a movement. As the teeult of an investigation conducted in
195455 by Mr. Richard Bissell - then Special Assistant for
Policy Coordination to DCI - the Senior Research Staff on
International Communism was established, beginning its
work on 20 January 1956. The Senior Research Staff (SRS)
was intended to fill a gap existing between the basic - country
by country - research conducted in Department of State (OIR-
INR) and the operational reeeaarch carried out in CIA (DDP/
CI/ICD). Its function was described as the speculative stuff
of International Communism and means of countering it This
mission was further characterized as an attempt to view the
activities of the Communists "through their own eyes, " i. e.
a projection into the thought processes and habits of the Com-
munists themselves. By this stipulation SRS was in effect
enjoined to apply critical judgment to generically "Western"
interpretations of all aspects of the movement. This it has
consistently endeavored to do.
The Staff was deliberately kept small - six senior
research officers, three research assistants and two admin-
istrative and clerical assistants. In order to ensure organiza-
tional flexibility and freedom from the constraints of coordin-
ation, the Staff was attached to the office of the Deputy Direc?-
for/Intelligence, with provision for close working relations
with the operational elements of the Agency. It was encour-
aged to cultivate extensive contact with other parts of the
Government and with academic institutions, foundations and
non-governmental experts in the US and abroad.
SRS activity and production has been of broad scope
and variety including major studies with wide distribution,
memoranda on special topics, advice and support of opera..
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tional programs, delivery of outside speeches or lectures, and
participation in academic meetings and symposia. Individual
staff members have attended and helped to organize domestic
and international conferences devoted to the study of Commu--
nism. They have published articles and reviews and have lec-
tured or conferred in leading universities.
The substance of SRS thought has been consistently in-
formed by its charter injunction to t-:'y to see and understand
the Communists in their own terms. This has generally led
to the attachment of great weight to Marxist-Leninist ideology,
conceived not as a sterile doctrine but as the creative inter-
action of theory and practice, developed to use Khrushchev's
favorite language by the forces of "history" and of "life it-
self. " This does not mean that SRS views this ideology as ob-
jectively "scientific" or "true. " Our papers have, however,
imputed to it a profound dynamic quality, even though it may
be often a purely subjective one. We have tried tope rsuade
our readers that Communism is a "secular religion, " im-
pelled by an inner energizing principle which cannot be sep-
arated from the dialectical framework of its doctrine and world
outlook. We have not of course neglected the other factors
which contribute to the power of Communism, especially its
genius for organization, nor have we denied the existence of
those differences tending toward Marxist-Leninist contradic-
tions, which have, especially in recent years, generated acute
perturbation in the movement. We have, however, emphatically
warned against the optimistic and even complacent tendency,
endemic in the Free World, to view these differences as lead-
ing the movement fatally toward disintegration.
Although our coverage has been global, we have concen-
trated our primary attention on the relation between the two
giants of the movement - USSR and Communist China. We have
sought through language and area study to develop in ourselves
the basis for a joint discipline centered in the Sino-Soviet
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relation. In addition, we have constantly propagated the claims
of this discipline throughout the intelligence community and in
wider academic circles. One of our staff members was inst7,-u-
mental in organizing the Third International Sovietological Con-
ference in Tokyo, September 1960, which may properly be de-
scribed as the most important gathering of scholars and experts
devoted to this field which has yet been held. Plans have been
approved for a fourth such conference in 1962. The seminal
influence of SRS "missionary work" in promoting Sino-Soviet
studies has been acknowledged by several leading universities.
The thought tissue woven in five years with strands of
fact add speculation is described in summary version in this,
our intellectual "autobiography. " A synoptic view of this
thought is presented in the following paragraphs.
Communism, as the overtowering challenge of our age,
is the embodiment of an ideology in an organization, both in-
formed by a unique principle of human dynamics, the unremit-
ting pursuit of world revolution. The main source of power in
this combination is its rigorous application of dialectical
materialism. Much of the frustration which the Free World
has experienced in its confrontation with Communists in action
springs from its failure to impute credibility to their invoca-
tion of the dialectical principle, especially the doctrine of
"antagonistic" and "non., antagonistic" contradictions.
International Communism is in fact a movement, a
whole which is greater than the sum of its parts. Its inter-
ests transcend those of the individual nations, Parties, lead-,
ers, cadre and rank-and-file which compose it. Its cohesive-
ness enables it to withstand crises such as those which shook
the movement in 1956 -, de-Stalinization, Poland, Hungary
and to restore general stability.
In an effort to resolve the dialectical contradiction
between national and international elements in the movement,
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the CPSU has increasingly emphasized the concept of "com-
monwealth" (sodruzhestvo), a free association of equal,
sovereign nations united by bonds of friendship (druzhba) and
mutual assistance. We have pointed out that, although it
still lacks concrete organizational form, this concept can be
vested with such, and that it contains the potential of a
"socialist" or "Communist" antithesis to the United Nations,
already ominously signaled by Khrushchev.
In our treatment of the "vanguard" of the movement,
the USSR and the CPSU, we have frequently found ourselves
holding what seemed to be also a "vanguard" - at times isolat-
ed - judgment as to their actual and potential power and threat
to the Free World.. During the crisis of the Stalin succession,
especially in 1956 and 1957, we opposed the prevailing tenden-
cy to over-estimate the role of the "collective leadership" or
the factional elements. - political, technological, military -
arrayed against Khrushchev. We have made significant con-
tributions to the evolving appreciation of Khrushchev as a
leader in the great tradition of Lenin, Stalin - and Mao. In
general we have emphasized the prospect of stability in the
Party leadership which can be expected to surmount future
crises, including that of succession.
Our judgment of the potential of Soviet power has been
more somber than that which has generally prevailed in the
Free World. We have not addressed ourselves to the field of
military estimation, but we have suggested that in economics
and even in science, the prospect of unguessed "sputniks" is
as yet imperfectly apprehended.
Our. principal object of consideration on the USSR,
especially during the past three years, has. been the "transi-
tion to Communism. " Heralded at the XXI CPSU Congress
(January 1959),. this theme.will dominate the XXII Congress
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scheduled for October 1961. Inevitably it becomes the "roof"
over all research and speculation on the future of Soviet and
world Communism. We are attempting to outline for ourselves
a broad program of study on the "transition", and are encour-
aging others to do likewise..
The key to the "transition" is the simultaneous crea-
tion of a "mighty material base" and a "new Communist man. "
We have pointed out the mounting emphasis on the slogan of
"socialist humanism, and the latent contradiction which this
concept, coupled with increased emphasis on material bene-
fits and relative affluence for the individual Soviet citizen,
appears to be generating in the still impoverished Chinese.
We have forecast the application of appropriate sumptuary
measures to meet the criticism of the latter, and to provide
a sufficiently austere "consciousness" for the prosecution of
the "world revolution. "" We have stressed the seriousness
with which the CPSU views its education and indoctrination
program for the "new Communist man. "
Our work has been less comprehensive on Communist
China than on the USSR? but it is now progressing rapidly
with the development of a wider linguistic and research base,
among ourselves and our consultants. As in our interpreta-
tion of Soviet affairs, we have applied the dialectical analysis
of "contradictions, " of which Mao is the undisputed master.
We have sought to differentiate traditional elements, such as
Confucianism, and Han imperialism and xenophobia, from
the Marxist-Leninist ideology which the CPC claims to be
applying to "concrete Chinese conditions. " In maintaining
the balance between "proletarian internationalism" and "na-
tional interest, " we believe the Chinese leadership to be firm
on the goals of the world revolutionary movement. For this
reason, we have maintained a conservative appreciation of
the Sino-Soviet controversy, affirming that considerations
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UVIII IUL-M II TL_
of unity, developed through "comradely criticism" and stubborn
bargaining, will prevail over the undeniably bitter issues of
dispute. We do not share the optimistic view of those who
believe that the two major partners will break over these or
any predictable issues, least of all those which the Free World
attempts to create or to exacerbate by propaganda or political
action.
Our study of the internal development of China has
emphasized the particular "style" which Mao, master Cacti
c.iai:-and strategist of revolution, has. imposed upon it. We
have pointed out the consistent, if not always predictable,
alternation of "right" and. "left" tactics, and the importance
of Mao's characteristic principle "imbalance-balance-imbal-
ance" in launching such fuddamental moves as the establish-
ment of the communes. As in the case of the.USSR, our estim-
ate of China's economic and scientific potential is higher than
that which generally prevails, and we anticipate that the CPC
will eventually enter into "comradely emulation" with the
CPSU in the effort to create the archetype of the "new Com-
munist man."
We have made an important contribution to the study
of the East European satellites, stressing the theme that.these
have been and remain satellites. We have shown that the flare-
up of "national Communism" in.1956 has been successfully con-
trolled, with the result that the "orthodox, " i. et,. the interna-
tional elements in the Communist Parties are firmly in control.
We have noted the need for more intensive research on eco-
nomic developments, and.their interaction.with popular atti-
tudes toward the regimes.
We hold that Yugoslavia constitutes the only authentic
example of "national Communism, " and as such must remain
anathema to the "world socialist system. " Hence we view
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OUVOINFRI QLJ EPIPAL
differences between the CPSU and the CPC over the correct
attitude to Yugoslavia as evidence of dialectical interaction
rather than radical contradiction.
Although we have not treated the Communist Parties
of the Free World in detail, we have maintained the proposi-
tion that they are all essential tools of International Commu-
nism, no one of which, however insignificant, will be sacri-
ficed foi- tactical expedience. We have emphasized their col-
lective role of authority, as vital elements on the occasion
of an ecumenical council of the movement, strikingly dis-
played at the Moscow Conference of November-December
1960. We have highlighted the tremendous potential, of the
mass Parties, especially the Indonesian and Italian. We
have called especial attention to the leading role in the West
of the PCI, whose leader Togliatti is the author of the con-
cept of "polycentrism" which underlies the sodruzhestvo or
commonwealth.
We have given close attention to the CPs of the under-
developed countries, stressing their high potential for sub-
versive action. At the same time we have pointed out that
the decision whether to outlaw a given CP raises many ques-
tions and problems, not always . correctly appreciated by the
regime in power. In connection with Latin American Com-
munism, we have surveyed the Chinese Communists' grow.-
ing interest in the area and speculated on possible competition
of Moscow and Peking for influence in the national Parties.
The SRS charter includes, in addition to research and
speculation on the nature of International Communism, the
responsibility of providing suggestions on means of counter-
ing it. We recognized that, since CIA does not have a policy
function, it would be inappropriate for SRS to make specific
policy recommendations. Nevertheless it seemed both feas-
ible and appropriate to speculate on certain aspects of US
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posture and foreign activity insofar as these would be reflected
in the reactions of Communism itself. In other words, our
research and speculation automatically had an obverse side
which could perhaps be described as an implicit contribution
to the policy making process.
We have contributed to several studies of Soviet and
Communist vulnerabilities in general. Our central theme has
been a cautious and pessimistic one derived immediately from
our analysis of the nature of Communism. We have examined
a considerable number of the commonly cited vulnerabilities,
especially those of the Soviet Union in its relations with Com-
munist China, and have found that in most cases the objective
existence of a potential for Western or American exploitation
was questionable. SRS has not, however, taken a defeatist
attitude toward all attempts at exploitation of vulnerabilities.
We have recognized that in certain cases opportunities would
arise from the very fact of taking action. Nevertheless, we
have strongly urged that careful research was necessary,
considering the long-range repercussions of any divisive or
provocative action on our part, measured against the contin-
gencies of either success or failure.
In connection with the conduct of political and propa-
ganda action against Communism, we have called attention to
the fact that the Communist system itself does not recognize
a qualitative distinction between policy and propaganda such
as is basic to our system of government. We prepared for
the Sprague Committee a paper on the Amalgamation of Policy
and Propaganda in the Soviet system, coining (by analogy with
"agitprop") a new phrase to describe it, "politprop. " "Polit-
prop" represents an integral approach to foreign action in
which the general lines of policy are fully meshed with the
means and media and themes of propaganda.
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Among general themes for positive action we have
stressed the importance of various forms of international
activity to develop the economies and polities of backward
nations. We called attention to the importance of concentrat-
ing greater effort and attention on the UN in a period when we
still had a strong political preponderance in that body. We
have also suggested that US support for regional organizations
could advance stability and thus build barriers against Commu-
nism. Some proposals along these lines were embodied in a
paper entitled "The Promotion of Constitutional Stability in
Afro-Asian Countries: A Weapon in the Battle Against Com-
munism" (November 1957). On a less comprehensive scale
we have proposed the desirability of enlightening the intellec-
tual elites in Asian and African countries on the nature of
Communist imperialism, suggesting among other means the
convening of regional seminars or symposia.
We have felt that the Democratic Socialist movement
has a potential which should be exploited in our contest with
International Communism. Some views on this subject were
set forth in a memorandum, "The New International Commu-
nist 'United Front' Offensive and the Position of the Socialist
Parties" (Z3 April 1956). As one aspect of working to dimin-
ish the power of a major Communist Party, we have consistent-
ly urged a positive approach to the Nenni Socialists (PSI) in
Italy, where the sharpening polarization of the extreme right
and left remains a grave danger not only to that country but
to the Western European integration movement.
During the first half of 1958 we noted the danger that
Communist propaganda would exploit tb our disadvantage the
problem of the disposal of nuclear waste. We came to the
conclusion that until this problem was solved the West and
the US were running a grave risk in propagandizing the advent
of the agerof nuclear plenty. There is evidence that the Com-
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munists are building a case against US disposal practices
which, although they may not be worse than those of the USSR,
are likely to create grave alarm when their full significance
becomes apparent to public opinion here and abroad. We have
also suggested the need for better international coordination
of fuel and power planning among the major Western countries
in order to face the growing Soviet and Communist entry into
world markets, to help deficient areas like India to break out
of their inefficient practices, and to meet the complaints of
producing states in the Middle East and Latin America.
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AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SRS
THE FIRST "PIATILETKA" (FIVE YEAR PLAN)
JANUARY 20, 1956 JANUARY 20, 1961
Introduction
By any standard, the five years of SRS's existence
constitute an unusual chapter in the history of the Agency.
In attempting to summarize them, our task falls into a num-
ber of overlapping aspects: clinical report on an organiza-
tional experiment, profile of an evolving doctrine, apologia
for strongly held and sometimes "offbeat" views, and appeal
for greater recognition of these generally pessimistic views.
For this reason we venture to title our Five Year Report an
autobiography. In essence it is the story of an intellectual
endeavor which can be surveyed and evaluated independently
of the circumstances under which it has been conducted. In-
deed, it is possible to read Sections II and III of this report
which deal with our principal themes, in full abstraction from
Section1, which provides a background of organization, his-
tory, and modus operandi.
SECTION I
Concept and Mission of the Senior Research Staff on Inter-
national Communism
The Senior Research Staff on International Commu-
nism was the outgrowth of a series of discussions and organ-
izational experiments during the period from 1950 to 1954.
(These are summarized in Appendix I).
The basic document which grew out of these earlier
efforts was the letter of Mr. Richard Bissell, then. Special
Assistant for Policy Coordination (SA/PC) addressed to DCI,
9 November 1954, entitled "Production of Intelligence on
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International Communism. " This memorandum distinguished
three types of intelligence production activity on International
Communism:
1. "Production of finished intelligence of a level of
generality useful to policy makers, organized for
the most part in the form of studies of institutions,
situations, and developments in particular countries,
including most contributions to NIE's and the NIS, etc. "
2. "The provision of operational intelligence in sup-
port of FI and CE activities and of specific and de-
tailed information on Communist organizations, com-
munication nets and personalities, including much
unclassified specific detail useable for propaganda
and other PP purposes at home and abroad. "
3. "Continuing basic and operational research on,
and speculative study of, Communism and the means
of countering Communism. "
Observing that (1) was performed by OIR in State,
and (2) by DDP/CI/ICD, the Bissell study recommended a
substantial increase in the slots or funds available to these
two existing elements. With respect to the third function,
which remained to be created, the Bissell memorandum
made certain specific recommendations as to size, range,
caliber of personnel, and location within CIA. In general,
and with certain modifications such as the assignment to
DDI rather than to DDP, these recommendations have been
carried out.
The most important part of the Bissell memorandum
was the description of the type of activity which the SRS should
perform. This has been so fundamental to the approach of
SRS that it seems advisable to quote it in its entirety.
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PiFI~ITlTM4~
"The work should be carried on by a small group
of individuals of high professional competence, chosen
or developed as specialists in the practical study of
Communism, who would not be burdened with the task
of turning out finished intelligence in its more familiar
forms. They should be allowed to spend more of their
time than is usual in the Government on fundamental
research, that is, on thoughtful investigation and analy-
sis which would be expected to yield neither certain nor
prompt results in the form of useful intelligence, but
their work should, as the foregoing characterization im-
plies, be oriented toward the possibilities for operations
and considerations of policy. It may be asked how the
activity thus defined differs from "the production of
political, social and economic intelligence" on Commu-
nism, The answer is that, as a practical matter, exist-
ing intelligence production staffs do not do what is here
proposed, would not do so even if their work were ex-
panded along the lines of current proposals (e. g. the
prospectus for additional sections on Communism in the
NIS), and that their organization and activities could not
be readily modified to permit them to do so. Basically
what would be expected of the individuals engaged in this
work would not be more information or even better analy-
sis of Communist developments so much as more pene-
trating insights into the nature of Communist phenomena,
greater perspective in judging their probable evolution
and more originality in the consideration of the means
of countering Communism. Thus the activities of these
individuals would be deliberately extended beyond the ''
limits of the intelligence function. Their function would
include that of a 'red team' in war planning, which tries
to reproduce the enemy's mind, and that of policy plan-
ners who weigh both enemy capabilities and those of their
own side, in judging possible courses of action. What
would really differentiate the function from those nor-
mally performed in the intelligence community would be
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25X1A1a
The Bissell recommendations were acted upon as
1. A substantial increase in slots for DDP/CI/ICD;
2. A subsidy of a year to OIR for
recruitment of Communist experts in support of
various country desks; and
3. A draft notice to the IAC (IAC/D/99) announcing
the intention to create a Senior Research Staff on
International Communism (August 1955). The IAC
took due notice of this document and the initial mem-
bership of the staff was recruited in the fall of 1955.
Obtaining space in the office building assigned to
ORR/FM, SRS was officially launched an 20 January
1956.
25X1A9a 25X1A9a
was designated Chief;
follows:
the concentration of a combination of certain intelligence,
evaluation, and planning responsibilities with respect to
the broad but by no means all-embracing subject matter
characterized above, in the hands of a single small group
of people. "
Deputy. Chief; and the other senior members were
25X1A9a
the n- ' ddle of
;and
had been recruited; 25X1A9a
25X1A9a
had returned to DDP, and was transferred 25X1A9a
from OCI. Gradually three research assistants were re-
WWMWW s of the Administrative Assistant,
who has been with SRS from the begin-
i
ning, were supported by a GS-5 clerical slot through which
three individuals have been rotated. left SRS and25X1A9a
the Agency in August 1958, and was replaced as Deputy Chief
by 25X1A9a
ofiaGaw"
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As must be expected on the creation of a new and
unorthodox element in the Agency hierarchy, there was little
enthusiasm on the part of e:cisting elements to provide per-
sonnel. In effect there was barely sufficient choice to fill
out the available. T/ O. In spite, however, of this lack of a
broad panel to choose from, the Staff was singularly fortun-
ate in finding that all those who were available were eminent-
ly suited to the work.
In..1958 the T/O was stabilized at the eleven slots
occupied by present members of the Staff. In general there
has been a high degree of continuity with small turnover, a
factor which has contributed to the consistency of the SRS
viewpoint in the production described below. This in turn
has been an important factor in maintaining esprit de corps.
A high degree of dedication to the work and loyalty to the
Staff as an entity have been characteristic throughout. One
of the strongest points of SRS personnel, which has been cul-
tivated continuously during these five years, has been know-
ledge of languages. With respect to Far Eastern and Euro-
pean languages SRS is possibly unique among substantive ele-
ments of comparable size and function in the Agency. As a
result it has been able to utilize a large number of books,
journals, and newspapers from key areas of International
Communism in the original,
Furthermore, SRS has continually emphasized both
internally and to outside elements the high priority to be at-
tached to language study. This has been particularly true
with respect to Chinese and Russian. In May 1959 the Chief
of the Staff delivered a speech to the graduating group of the
Russian Research Center at Columbia on the importance of
cultivating Chinese in addition to the Russian discipline. In
June of the same year, attending an interna-
-5- Mi6i6YE&
25X1A9a
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tional conference at the University of Southern California,
Los Angeles, on the subject of Sino-Soviet training, defend-
ed the same line of approach. There is reason to believe
that this missionary work of the Staff - subsequently ex-
tended to most universities having area centers in these
fields - has made an important contribution toward the crea-
tion of a sound and growing corps of Sino-Soviet specialists.
General Activities of the Staff
After some exchange of views with other Agency
elements, especially GI/ICD, a charter for SRS was estab-
lished in mid-1956. The text of the charter itself is, how-
ever, of less importance than the spirit in which it has been
carried out. Because of the obvious possibility of overlap
on one hand with DDI elements, especially ONE, and on the
other hand with DDP elements, especially GI/ICD, there was
an initial period - perhaps as much as two years - in which
the scope and indeed the jurisdiction of SRS remained in flux.
The firm consolidation of the jurisdictional and substantive
scope of the staff may be said to have been achieved in mid-
1958, at which time the Inspector General's office conducted
a thoroughgoing review. Despite certain lingering reserva-
tions as to the appropriateness of the SRS function in CIA,
and suggestions that it might better be performed in an aca-
demic rather than a government environment, it was decided
that the experimental stage had been successful and that SRS
should be regarded as a permanent and useful feature of the
Agency.
Before discussing the heart of SRS's activities,
namely its substantive production, it should be pointed out
that the Staff from its inception was called upon to carry out
extensive liaison and contact work. This had been clearly
specified by the original Bissell instructions. Within the
Agency itself SRS speedily assumed a certain bridgelike role
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between DDI, to which it was attached, and DDP, a primary
customer. Previous association of several SRS members
with DDP facilitated this and helped to bring about other
types of fruitful contact bearing on Communist operations.
Outside the Agency an extensive network of formal
and informal relations. was developed, in the first instance
with OIR (later INR) Department of State, and IRI/USIA.
Gradually extending these relationships, SRS has become
well known to elements of the Department of Defense, and
the individual military services; to USIA, the NSC Staff, etc.
It has maintained contact with the Policy Planning Staff of
the State Department.
The original Bissell concept of a Senior Research
and Planning Staff was later modified and the planning func-
ti-on dropped from its title and charter. Direct and frequent
contact with the NSC, with the right to submit substantive
memoranda to it, which Mr. Bissell had originally recom-
mended, was tacitly dropped, in view of the fact that a natur-
al channel existed through the DDI.
.Academic Liaison
Perhaps one of the principal foresights of the Bis-
sell memorandum was that a major function of the new Staff
would lie in developing close intellectual relations with the
academic world. This, in fact, has been a major activity
conducted in one form or another by all of the senior per-
sonnel. It takes many forms, not always immediately asso-
ciated with the primary SRS mission. In general, SRS mem-
bers make a practice of attending important national and
international scholarly conferences bearing on Communism,
and in one major instance, have played a key role in organ-
izing. such a gathering.
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As a result of this systematic approach, SRS, its
personnel and its views are well known in such academic
institutions as the Harvard, Columbia and Indiana Russian
Research Institutes, the RAND Corporation, the Council on
Foreign Relations, the Center of International Studies (Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts), etc. This type of activity has:been
coordinated with the External Research Division, State De-
partment, which in turn has provided valuable substantive
assistance and administrative support in the form of "light
State cover" for foreign travel.
Steps have been taken to achieve bona fide standing
in the academic world by the publication of articles and re-
views, by consultant work and briefing of foundations and
universities. (See Appendix IIX.) As a result of this planned
and methodical activity it can be said that SRS personnel are
widely known and accepted as equals by American and foreign
scholars and our key ideas have exerted an important seminal
influence. On a more limited scale, SRS has attempted to
stimulate cross-fertilization between government and scholars
through the mechanism of symposia (small dinners held at the
Cosmos. Club) to which distinguished research authorities have
been invited, along with representatives of other components
of the Agency and government.
Consultants
Because of its broad scope, it has been impossible
for such a small Staff to conduct all necessary research on
its own resources. Accordingly, an effort has been made to
recruit competent consultants. At present the Staff has the
following:
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1 A5a1
All of these individuals work together. informally and
have brought to SRS a widely diversified expertise on many
aspects of the Communist bloc.
Approach
During the period of the initial recruitment of the
Staff, numerous discussions were held as to the proper ap-
proach. In amplification of the generalized description from
Mr. Bissell's Memorandum quoted above, we were told that
in a certain sense we were to function as a "conscience" of
the Director and the intelligence community in matters of
International Communism. Without construing this as a
directive, we have found it a stimulating and at the same
time a sobering consideration. It appeared that almost by
definition the SRS was elected to state certain uncomfortable
and even unpopular propositions. As the five years have
unrolled, we have frequently felt ourselves to be in a pos-
ition less assured than that of the inspired voice of conscience.
We have found ourselves regarded by others as a Cassandra,
a Geist der stets verneint, a gadfly, an,.''.enfant terrible, and
9& en a bete noir. We have found tt po?bib1e to ;lives*it x all
of.these.alightly disagreeable imputations and even on occ-
asion to relish them, rationalizing our situation in a par-
aphrase of Voltaire, as that of an entity which, since it did
not previously exist, "had to be invented. " It is true that
at times the curse of Cassandra - that prophesies though
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true should go unheeded - has been onerous. But the sat-
isfaction of being vindicated by events has occurred with
sufficient frequency to provide confidence in our ability to
yield a steady current of clairvoyance.
It has sometimes been suggested, even by friends
and well-wishers, that SRS, in its effort to induce a state
of empathy with Communism, has fallen into a certain-
pro-fessional and possibly even personal deformation of outlook.
Our consistent pessimism, our muted Jeremiads, scoring a
complacency which so often appeared to have .been the be-,
setting sin of the West in its affluent days, has not in.ou.r be-
lief been an artificially self-induced defeatism. Rather it
has seemed to us to correspond with the "bpirit of the times",
a voice which, during the past five years, has become steadily
more articulate and dramatically in consonance with the
world around us. On the not infrequent occasions when we
have been invited to present our views to outside groups,
the frank assumption of a pessimistic standpoint has general-
ly been greeted with unmistakeable appreciation. It is our
profound hope that the necessity for such persistently somber
views will abate as our second five years unfold. To put it
bluntly, SRS does not enjoy proclaiming trouble, but it can
do no other. "
The Policy of the Communist World and the Task of SRS
From the outset, it was determined that SRS should
not focus its attention on individual countries outside the orbit,
nor concentrate on minute, day-to-day tactical movements of
the Communists. The first was to be done by State, the sec-
ond by ICD. SRS was to observe Communism on a global
scale and, within the Orbit, to focus its attention on the
fountainheads of Communism, first in Moscow and second
in Peking. Close attention was also to be given to the satellites
as components of the "world socialist system. "
In the judgment of SRS this approach highlighted
the distinction between traditional political research and
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analysis and that dedicated to the exploration of world
Communism as an all pervasive essence. In order to rec-
ognize the policy motivation and strategy and tactics of the
movement, not to mention its basic objectives, knowledge
of Communism as an organic whole comes first. Without
it, a sound appreciation of intentions and capabilities is
next to impossible. Since the policies of the movement are
based upon Marxist-Leninist concepts of life and matter,
since they are, in effect, not so much national as Lnternation-
al Communist policies, SRS regards the exploration of the
motivation of these policies as its primary task. It has
therefore studied the application of Marxism-Leninism in
both the USSR and Red China, as well as the relations be-
tween these two, with particular attention.
Modus Operandi
Because of certain unique elements in its charter,
especially its mission of viewing the actions of Communists
through their own eyes, its freedom from responsibility for
coordination, its placement at a high level outside the juris-
diction of any specialized office, and above all the character
of its personnel, SRS has consistently sought to function on
the basis of a harmonious mixture of discipline and informal-
ity. Each member is highly individualized, yet, aware of
the impelling need for cooperation, each has elaborated
his own approach to that part of the field which was assigned
to him. Having only a handful of individuals to cope with a
protean global phenomenon, it was necessary for us to estab-
lish broad areas of geographic and functional competence.
In some cases these conformed naturally to the professional
or linguistic background of the individual. In others special-
ization was taken on as an arbitrary assignment to which
he must train himself. The degree of mastery achieved,
for example in dealing with the satellites or the underdev-
eloped regions, inevitably falls short of that which could be
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achieved by a lifetime of limited professional specialization.
On the other hand, it has proved feasible to develop a degree
of competence which has made discourse with such special-
ists possible on an equal intellectual plane.
The Staff has, generally speaking, worked on what
may be called the total. intelligence "take. " We have received
for all areas and aspects of International Communism essen-
tially everything which would go to a specialist's desk, wher-
ever located. The volume of this material inevitably has
been large, and has required a rigorous screening. The re-
search assistants have learned to eliminate items containing
only minor factual information, such as would be filed, say,
by a State Department country desk, but at the same time to
build up substantial files of our own from which all the signi-
ficant elements of International Communist activity within a
given area could be thoroughly studied. Both by charter and
by sheer necessity, we have winnowed out the mass of detail
- personnel of minor sections of national CPs, routine travel
of functionaries - whit.,. retaining key documents, speeches,
organizational tables, and other necessary information on all
countries.
The daily reading load of each member has been
large, perhaps occupying as much as a third to a half of his
time. In addition to this, efforts have been made to keep up
with the most important journalistic comment and with active
scholarship, learned journals, new books, reports on confer-
ences, etc. No member of the Staff would feel that he has
been able to do full justice to this abundant flaw of ephemeral,
medium range, and fundamental documentation and literature
which has confronted him.
The problem has been how to combine what may be
called working level familiarity with detail in many fields
and broad perspective on the inter-relationships of the move-
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ment as a whole. This has been an exacting discipline which
none of us would claim had reached its fulfillment. And yet
in the process, a certain degree of mastery has been achieved.
Perhaps the most valuable aspect of .the SRS approach
and method has been its internal cross-fertilization. Because
of its smallness and its freedom from deadlines and pressure
of coordination, the Staff has been able to achieve a high de-
gree of versatility. Each member is to some extent a cell
functioning separately, to some extent an autonomous center
of activity, existing as part of an organic whole. This "hol-
istic" nature, which was developed in part spontaneously and
in part as a result of plan, seems admirably suited to the task
of dealing with International Communism, itself an organism
which is something more than the sum of its myriad parts.
In organizing our thought and writing our papers we
have sought to maintain both individuality and collectivity.
There is::.an "SRS point of view. " It is not a doctrine or a
monolith, however, nor even an ideology. There have been
active internal controversies between individuals and points
of view. On some of the most fundamental problems of
analysis and interpretation, notably the classic controversy
over the national and international elements of world Com-
munism, there is no absolute SRS consensus. Over months
and years of internal debate and discussion, however, a sort
of SRS "dialectic" has been evolved, our own version of these
"contradictions" which Communists universally recognize and
proclaim as a source of strength to their movement. In our
own microcosmic effort to reproduce the Communist macro-
cosm, we have gradually learned how to "handle" these con-
tradictions.
Production
The production of SRS falls into three main cate-
gories:
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a. Major studies, reproduced in a numbered
SRS series (Appendix IV) and distributed rather widely
in the intelligence community and in other government
offices dealing with foreign affairs and national security.
Most of the SRS series have been given supplemental
distribution through DDP and OO/ C to field stations,
where they are sometimes used for liaison and contact
purposes; on occasion a separate unclassified version
has been prepared for unattributed use.
b. Substantial memoranda for more limited dis-
tribution; these may be in response to particular re--
quests, e, g. in connection with a speech of the Director
or one of his deputies, an operational requirement from
a Division of DDP, or a request from other government
elements such as the former OCB or the Sprague Com-
mittee. Others have been self-generated, often serving
as a prelude to a, more intensive study in the SRS num-
bered series. (Appendix V).
c. Ad hoc memoranda on a great variety of sub-
jects. (The more important of these are included in
Appendix V).
d. Comments on papers and answering questions
of various government offices on problems of Commu-
nism.
One might add a substantial category of purely internal
documents, ranging from casual comments to detailed discus-
sion among staff members, frequently involving controversy.
In general it has been the policy of this Staff to aim at
the lowest possible classification for all its output.
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SECTION II
The International Communist Movement
In attempting to review the varied activity of the
Staff during the past five years, one is confronted inevitably
with a difficult problem of selection and highlighting. In a
closely knit group such as ours, intellectual activity takes
many forms, ranging from the published works and memo-
randa cited in the attachments, to an endless stream of notes
and marginal comments on the thousands of documents which
flow among us. Even the underlinings may take on significance
in an emergent pattern of ideas. It would be literally impossi-
ble to recapture the myriad stages through which the structure
of our thought has grown. It has seemed better, therefore, to
attempt an act of complete detachment, seeking to see the woods
rather than the trees.
What then has been the contribution of the Senior Re-
search Staff? Reverting to the two principal injunctions laid
down by Mr. Bissell, the contribution seems to lie in the ex-
tensive use of speculation and the application of that faculty
to the task of penetrating the Communist mind. If we were to
seek to crystalize this in a single formula, we might say that
SRS has succeeded in achieving a "voluntary suspension of
disbelief" in the reality of Communist dialectical processes.
We have sought to achieve a certain empathy with the men and
the institutions who make up that world movement which is
dedicated to our destruction. This effort has called for im-
agination and objectivity. The conclusions we have drawn may
be said to be at once both intuitive and scientific.
The lessons which we feel have been learned from
them are neither reassuring nor terrifying. Rather, they
add up to a challenge which in our judgment has been imper-
fectly apprehended and inadequately faced in the Free World.
Inevitably, as intelligence officers, students, and citizens,
we have often experienced during these past five years a pro-
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found sense of frustration. Not, of course, that we have
been alone in our grave concern. With the growing body of
Americans who have come to recognize the ineluctability of
the Communist challenge, we have watched the slow growth
of hope and confidence that it can be met. I
In the following summary we have selected the broad
themes which have governed our research and speculation and
have sought within each to isolate the specific element which
has been unearthed by the application of the approach "through
Communist eyes." Presenting a synthetic rather than an ana_
Cyti:cal picture, we have attempted to tie each specific element
to something we have written. It has not seemed practical or
useful, however, to make specific reference to the numerous
papers and memoranda listed in Appendices IV-VI. In the
great majority of cases, these have been given circulation
ranging from one addressee to hundreds on general distribu--
tion. In a few cases the theme or idea has remained within
the staff, either because its dissemination was deemed inex-
pedient or inappropriate, or because it had not been fully
elaborated. In a number of key instances such themes may
be regarded as unfinished business of SRS, high on the pri-
ority agenda for the second "Piatiletka. " We may hope that
the act of broaching such themes here may constitute a step
toward future elaboration. By way of highlighting this con-
tinuity of past and future we have subdivided our subject mate
ter in broad rubrics, stated in the form of propositions. In
the discussion of each, we attempt to do justice to the shad-
ings of interpretation which such propositions require.
1SRS writings have on occasion been criticized as being too
"intellectual." .It has been suggested that the discourse is
either -too abstruse or too scholarly for the "busy policy mak-
ers" to grasp. We have been reluctant to accept this view of
our leadership, holding to the belief that all persons actively
concerned with Communism must, and can devote their full
resources of thought to it, and that these, within the Agency
and Government, are generally of a high order.
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A. The Nature of Communism
our age.
1. 'communism is the overtowering challenge of
I
$RS has done little else but read, analyze, speculate,
and theorize on the nature of Communism. We have produced
no systematic, comprehensive study of it as a "thing in itself.
We have taken it on the one hand as a datum; on the other hand,
as an unknown quantity: unknown to us, as to most Western
students, because only a person who has actually been a Com-
munist can credibly claim that he fully knows what it is. We
have carefully examined the psychological and sociological
analyses which others have made. We have abstracted from
these and from our own studies the conviction that Commu-
nism is a "secular religion" engendering in. many individuals
a type of personality whose motive springs of action, whose
outlook on the world and history, and whose very perceptions
of reality are other than ours. We have sought to measure
its intensity of fanaticism, its dynamic of confidence, dedica-
tion, and indeed its messianic zeal. At the same time we
have noted the "human, all too human" weaknesses in the
prophets, leaders, and would-be supermen of the Marxist-
Leninist cult. From it we draw a certain parallel with the
history of the great churches, the inspirational force of the
doctrine, the abiding sense of destiny and mission, and the
conclusion that the institution transcends the individuals -
even the greatest - who compose it.
2. Ideology is the motive force of Communism.
We have undertaken to understand and appraise the
ideology of Communism, pointing out that its force within
the movement is too little appreciated by those who are out-
side. It has been gratifying to note the gradual dilution of
that strong current of Free World skepticism which sees in
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Communism one and only one spring of action, the naked
drive for power. We of course have never minimized this
spring, but we have held it to be only one aspect of a com-
plex. Moreover, in company with a small group of scholars,
we have pointed out that ideology is not mere dogma, but is
a, compound of ;theory and practice. To use the language
which Khrushchev never tires of repeating, it is "life itself.
Thus seen, ideology stretches from the top to the bottom of
Communism, from generality to particular, from strategy
to tactics, from goals to methods.
3. The key to the understanding of Communist
ideology lies in the application of dialectics.
Within the sprawling, luxuriant growth of Commu-
nist ideology - sometimes .jungle, sometimes thicket, and
rarely a verdant plain - we have devoted our closest scrutiny
to the field of dialectics. This tough and repellent doctrine
in our judgment has been systematically neglected - not of
course by scholars - by men whose task is to evaluate Com-
munist courses of action and intentions. It is here that a
deliberate effort is required if one is to pl netrate the think-
ing and action processes of Communism.
It is easy to demonstrate that the theory of dialec-
t:?,cs as elaborated by Marxists is logically incoherent, de-
rivative in nature, and generally absurd. Nevertheless,
having accomplished all this, the student of Communism is
left face to face with the reality of a world conquering
1
In the course of its efforts to propagate the habit of view-
ing International Communism dialectically, SRS has encoun-
tered considerable resistance. In the midst of a serious
group effort to interpret the Sino-Soviet controversy and its
culmination in November-December 1960, SRS was urged
"not to mention 'dialectics' again. " This struck us somewhat
as though a member of the NSC Planning Board had said "I
don't want to hear the name 'Khrushchev' again. "
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principle. How is one to isolate the living element in dia-
lectics ? It has seemed to us that a partial key is found in
the theory of contradictions. Mao, and before him, Lenin
and Stalin have developed the doctrine of contradictions, the
so-called unity of opposites, which is expressed in the clas-
sic triad - thesis-antithesis- synthesis. It has been our con?-
tention that this is neither a sterile abstraction nor a child-
ish game. Rather, it emerges as a powerful, vitalistic logic
which sees in the never-ending clash of opposing elements of
man and society an impelling principle of progress. We have
concentrated on this theme particularly since the beginning
of 1957, and have produced a running fire of commentary and
illustration ever since.
4. Organization is the key to the power of Commu-
nist ideology in action.
In addition to being a faith, an ideology, and a
method, Communism is of course above all an organization.
Here there has been considerable spade work for SRS to do.
Although the scholarly works on-Communist Party organiza-
tion are numerous, there has been a persistent need to re-
affirm the reality of its pervading power, and above all its
capacity for self-purging and r-newal. There is a perennial
wishful theme in Free World .thought - the theme of erosion,
the "mellowing of despotism, " the "erosion of revolutionary
fervor" and other quasi- sloganistic reassurances which we
administer to ourselves from time to time. The $RS chrono
file displays a running obbligato of dissent to this dominant
theme. Jde, of course, no more than other historically
minded students deny the theoretical and practical possibil-
ity that Communism will change its nature or decline as a
result of its own inner contradictions. It too may prove
another of those waves of ltitr o lwhich reach an alarming
height on the beach of history and then recede. But we hold
that its high tide is as yet unreached, and the ebbs which we
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note from time to time are, in Communist parlance, "re-
treats for further advance. It As in the case of spiritual
religions which have shown immense energy for conquest,
notably Islam, Communism combines the motive forces of
individual impulse with a supra-personal dynamic. The
genius of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao is merely the acme
of those forces of organization which convert the mission of
the isolated Messiah into an ecciesia militans. Even the
"pragmatic" Khrushchev, in his tough Russo-Ukrainian
peasant soul., seems aware that he as an individual is noth-
ing - the movement is everything.
B. The Nature of the International Communist Move-
ment.
1. International Communism as a iofovement tran-
scends the interests of its individual national components.
Having satisfied ourselves - if not all of our asso-
ciates - that the ideology and the organization are vital com-
ponents of Communism, we have found ourselves challenged
by the question whether the international movement is also
a primary reality. This too is a classic question among
sovietologists; it usually has taken the form of the debate
between those who stress the purely national interests of
the Soviet Union, and those who believe that there exists
an entity with transcending interests. Not only is the de-
bate perennial; it is seemingly irreducible. The recent
climax of development within the movement which culmin-
ated in the Moscow Statement of December 1960 has, if any-
thing, hardened the controversial positions among Western
scholars.
We have even found it necessary to "bloom and con-
tend" on this subject in our own midst. There is no SRS
unanimity on the proposition that the goals and intere sts of
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the movement transcend those of its constituent members.
This may seem somewhat ironical, in view of the very title
and function of the Staff - Research on International Commu-
nism.
During its five-year study of the International Com-
munist movement as a whole, SRS has developed three major
themes. Analyzing the profound crises which shook the move=
ment in 1956.- de-Stalinization, Poland, Hungary - SRS pre-
dicted at the time - contrary to the prevailing view - that these
would not destroy nor even set back the movement. Counter-
ing the widespread and almost exultant expressions of confi-
dence that Communism had been mortally wounded, SRS pre-
dicted in 1957 the eventual success of the already visible ef-
fort of stabilization. The second major theme has been the
emergence of the movement from the turmoil of the 1956
crises and the ensuing stabilization process into the develop-
ment of the concept of the "socialist commonwealth. It Final-
ly, in an effort to provide a rational description of the recur-
rent cycle of crisis and stabilization which could be projected
against future developments, SRS began in 1957 - as noted
above - the elaboration of the theory of dialectical contradic-
tions as the key to an understanding of relations between the
components of the'World socialist system, "and, particularly,
between the USSR and Red China.
2. The relationship between the USSR and the move-
ment as a whole is dialectical.
Leninism prescribes a balance between the doctrine
of nationalities and proletarian internationalism.. This is
expressed in the classic formula: the respective components
of the USSR - and by extension, of. world Communism - are
states which are. "national." ' in form, socialist in content. "
It is well known that in the case of the Soviet Union, the
"multinational state" par excellence,. there have been per-
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sistent and as yet imperfectly resolved "contradictions"
among. the dominant Great Russian element, the secondary
Slavic nationalities, and the numerous non-Slavic minorities.
The contradictions at times have approached "antagonistic"
proportions. The end is not yet in sight, although presum-
ably a "melting pot" type of amalgamation will gradually
prevail.
On the broader Bloc and world scale, SRS has con-
tended that the historic evolution of Communism was impel-
ling the movement toward the global application of the Lenin-
ist formula. We believe that this was expressed sincerely
and authoritatively by Khrushchev in his speech at Leipzig,
March 1958, in which. he said that national frontiers will
eventually be absorbed in world. Communism. We do not,
of course, predict that this will be an uneventful, uniform,
least of all an inexorable process. In any case it will be
subject to ebbs and flows as yet far from predictable.
in. the last analysis the forecast for the national
internationalist dialectic rests on an intuitive judgment.
We have never affirmed that our interpretation is logically
demonstrable. We have, however, systematically opposed
the general view that 19th century types of nationalism, pro-
jected in varying forms into the present era, have remained
immutable forces. Even in the Free World these forms
show signs of fundamental modification, especially in. West-
ern Europe.
The essential point for research and speculation
seems to lie in the question whether the so-called "mes-
sianic imperialism" drive of Czarist Russia is being con.-
verted into a movement transcending the cultural life and.
the material interests of the Moscow centered nucleus. How
will this now mighty surge of the "Rus" empire emerge
after its interaction with the Phoenix-like revival and trans-
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25X1A9a
25X1A9a
formation under Marxism of a decadent oriental xenophobic
empire which once prided itself on being the Middle Kingdom
of the world? Will Han, clashing with "Great Russian chau-
vinism" prove the validity of the thesis that nationalism is
the ultimate and centrifugal driving force of Communism?
3. The concept which is being evolved for the future
resolution of this dialectic is that of sodruzhestvo (common-
wealth).
In an effort to penetrate deeper into this complex
of forces and to understand the rationale of what Communists
now call the "world socialist system, " SRS has devoted an
intensive study to the concept of a "commonwealth of Social-
ist nations. Ili In this study we demonstrated that the term
sodruzhestvo - since 1955 - has played a mounting role in
Communist statements on the relationship among socialist
countries. 2
1SRS- 10 - "The 'Socialist Commonwealth of Nations':
Pattern for Communist World Organization. " The SRS study
on sodruzhestvo is our only major work which has been pub-
lished - in a sanitized version - outside the government
This analysis has
been received with attention and respect among experts
throughout the world and has influenced the conceptual ap-
proach of several recent scholarly studies on the organiza-
tion of the Communist Bloc. It has not so far received the
attention which it deserves in the intelligence community.
2Originally translated as "commonwealth" in official English
language Soviet texts, the term has recently been somewhat
blurred by such renderings as "community" or "comity" of
socialist nations. This shift may be in part a reaction to
Chinese sensibilities; at any rate, the Chinese rendering of
sodruzhestvo as the "big family" of socialist nations is also
frequently adopted in Soviet pronouncements.
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4. The sodruzhestvo concept is pregnant with organ-
izational form.
The significance of the sodruzhestvo as a matrix for
future organizational developments, not only within the social-
ist "camp" or "bloc" but in the vast underdeveloped areas in
which Communism is making such powerful strides, must not
be overlooked. It offers a rationale or at least a slogan for
free and flexible association among equal sovereign states,
within which an impetus toward socialism and ultimately Com-
munism would be established. It also provides a theoretical
organizational concept which can be set up as a counter to the
existing UN, a dialectical opposite which under certain circum-
stances the Communists might indeed choose to bring to reality.
The recent threats of Khrushchev against the UN have brought
home to the West the all too distinct possibility that a "social-
ist commonwealth" might indeed emerge.
The analysis of this concept has become especially
timely in connection with the recent Moscow meeting and
Statement. This point will be discussed later under the head-
ing of Sino-Soviet relations. It is sufficient here to suggest
that the Moscow conclave was an unprecedented manifestation
of the sodruzhestvo in action. The two mightiest parties and
nations of the world socialist system locked in serious con-
tradictions have criticized each other and "self-criticized"
themselves before an assemblage of some 80 at least theoret-
ically equal parties. The fact that the two are richer in
"equality" than all the others did not diminish the impact of
this demonstration that in world Communism the "whole is
greater than the sum of its parts. "
SRS over the past five years has thus satisfied itself
that the initial premise on which it was founded is correct.
There is an International Communist movement which, within
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a shifting dialectical pattern, is advancing beyond the era of
the national state. It has suffered even within the five years
of our existence a major crisis which it successfully stabil-
ized. It has passed through a second dialectical phase - the
resolution - on the surface at least - of a number of profound
contradictions between its two senior members. It professes
to face the future, not in the illusion that crises and contradic-
tions are forever overcome but with a high degree of confidence,
resulting from the Moscow demonstration, that the dialectic
does work. In the eyes of Communists - and we repeat that
our effort has been to see through their eyes - the resultant
of all the divergent pulls and thrusts of these turbulent years
appears to have been a unilinear advance. We shall later ex--
amine the resultant of the forces of the Free World which are
seeking to contain this progress.
1. Since the death of Stalin, and particularly since
1957, the leadership problem has been resolved on the basis
of a dialectical balance between collectivity and one-man rule.
This problem first became acute in 1956 before the
final emergence of Khrushchev as the undisputed head of the
Soviet State a,nd the CPSU. It will be recalled that at that time
there was a strong tendency to view the party's professions of
collective leadership as authentic. Even as late as the spring
of 1957 one of the most influential Soviet experts of the US gov-
ernment expressed the view that Khrushchev would not be able
to exploit his position as First Secretary of the Party to create
a political machine which would enable him to achieve top per-
sonal power. It was only a matter of months before this view
was disproved by the ouster of Malenkov and the Anti-?arty
group. As early as mid-1956 SRS had questioned the immut-
ability of the collective leadership principle and had recommend-
ed caution in attempting to apply historical analogies - the
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Venetian Doges - to the Soviet situation. I
SRS's subsequent views on the relationship between
collectivity and one-man rule have evolved with the course
of events and the analysis of Khrushchev's actions. At pres-
ent we still accord a major role to consensus and community
of purpose among the CPSU leaders while laying emphasis on
the very real personal leadership which Khrushchev is able
to exercise.
2. There is no visible focus for any effort to over-
throw the party's control. The science - or pseudo-science -
of Kremlinology has continued to flourish, especially among
journalistic "experts. " SRS, while recognizing the occasion-
al value of this type of speculation, especially when anchored
in metidulous "indications analysis, " has generally been skep-
tical of the existence of any factions or power groupings with-
in the Soviet leadership which could effectively challenge the
control of the party. In September 1957 we warned against
overestimating the possibility of a take-over by the military;
the purge of Zhukov in October 1957 underlined this point.
We have also generally opposed the attribution of special sig-
nificance to the other non-party hierarchies, especially the
so-called technological or managerial elite which has some-
times been portrayed as in sharp contradiction to the dom-
inant party hierarchy. We have pointed out that the few
scholarly analyses made in this field have demonstrated the
absolute precedence of the Party, thaintained by personnel ro-
tation between it and the economic, military, scientific, and.
25X1A9a 1Probably the only expert who actually called the turn in 1957
was whose "indications analysis" clearly fore-
cast as ear y as March 1957 the outcome of the Malenkov-
Khrushchev struggle. Unfortunately,_findings were held
up until June and did not achieve the credit for correct pre-,
diction which they deserved.
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cultural hierarchies. We have persistently refused to be im-
pressed by the perennial speculations on the existence of a
rival Suslov power position.
3. Khrushchey as a man and a leader has been
generally strong.
SRS has been struck by the need for a thorough psy-
chological and political study of Khrushchev and has urged
that such a project be undertaken. The efforts in this field
so far have done little more than scratch the surface. We
have attempted our own summary characterization of Khru-
hhchev, emphasizing the complexity, vitality, and power of
the man. We have also discussed his "style of leadership, "
bringing out the protean qualities derived from his back-
ground and environment as a Russo-Ukrainian peasant and
proletarian, and from his discipline in Marxist-Leninist
ideology and in the ittern crucible of war and Stalinist terror.
On the ideological side we have been exploring
Khrushchev's position and status in relation to Mao, the
creativity of the latter being at present in question. 2 In
general, we have expressed a high appreciation of Khru-
shchev's native intelligence and even of his intellectual qual-
ities and have been opposed to overweighting the widely cur-
rent "pragmatist" tag.
1We have circulated an unclassified paper by one of our
consultants on the role of khamstvo or "boorishness" in
Khrushchev as a formidable political weapon and a factor
in determining the aggressiveness of Communism.
25X1A5a1 Current investigation by of OCI, now work-
ing casts doubt on Mao's originality
and suggests that claims for his initiative in. ideology - on
.contradictions - are based on fraudulent dating of his two
chief contributions" On.Practice,"and''On Contradictions."
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4. Internally the Soviet regime has been stable
throughout the period since mid- 1957 and will probably re-
main so.
It is generally agreed that the most important factor
in promoting stability has been Khrushchev's modification of
Stalin's coercive methods and his substitution of a more re-
laxed and beneficial policy toward the Soviet people. Although
the coercive apparat is still maintained on a substantial scale,
its application of "terror" and the visible activities of the in-
formant system have been x6duced:icthysiderably. We have
been devoting our attention to the application of the new psy-
chblogical principle of "positive reinforcement" as opposed
to terror - which is designed to create a "climate" contribut-
ing to the development of loyalty and even enthusiasm for the
"system. " We have pointed out that Khrushchev himself has
sought by a wide variety of means to achieve popularity, ex-
ploiting his natural traits to create the image of a man of the
people who at the same time embodies the universality and
comprehensive widdom. that had been attributed to Stalin.
The dynamic of Soviet successes coupled with the
sentiment of "Soviet patriotism" has engendered growing
confidence in the future. We have called attention to such
factors as the subtle efforts to transform Czarist Pan-
Russianism and "mess:ianism" into a positive loyalty to the
"multinational state, " the internal sodruzhestvo of the USSR
which becomes a pattern for the wider international "com-
monwealth of socialist nations. " We have given a high eval-
uation to such psychological factors as the lure of the new
Soviet "frontiers" - Siberia, the virgin lands - coupled with
the unfolding career opportunities for the intelligentsia and
the rapidly growing educated element of the populace through-
out the numerous hierarchies of the regime.
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5. The growth of Soviet power during this period
has. steadily outstripped basic Western estimates. SRS has
not officially entered into the field of military estimation
but has set forth a number of largely intuitive Judgments in
the economic field. In January 1958 we suggested that exist-
ing.estim:ates of long-range Soviet economic potential were
too conservative - by a factor comparable to the earlier mil-
itary under-estimates - being based on an extrapolation of
isolated factor curves without sufficient cumulative aggrega-
tion. This view was discussed with specialists both inside
and outside the Agency, meeting initially with only limited
acceptance, We believe, however, that this pessimistic
judgment has been vindicated by what appears to have been
mounting appreciation of the tremendous potential of the Sov-
iet economy.. We have recommended that economic analysis
within the Agency set up a purely speculative examination of
the hypothesis that economic production, especially in the
industrial field, may advance by a factor considerably in
excess of that which present analytical tools forecast. We
have also suggested that the long-range potential for a dras-
tic rationalization of agriculture is good. The current set-
backs which have provoked sharp criticism from Khrushchev,
in our judgment, merely heighten the prospect that the prob-
lem will be vigorously tackled and eventually solved. In any
event we have predicted that during the 1960s there will be a
steady rise in the efficiency of Soviet agriculture, resulting
in the release of many millions of workers to industry with
a corresponding rise in productivity of the latter branch.
6. As in the case of the economy, the Soviet Union's
scientific potential is probably still underestimated.
SRS has found itself less at variance with the scien-
tific than. with the economic. estimates . This may reflect the
fact that the former have been generally realistic and have
been projected with due regard. to the cumulative effect of
measures taken in the organization and rationalization of
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scientific research, especially the Academy of Sciences
system. It would appear to us, however, that popular opinion,
despite the impact of sputniks and other Soviet triumphs, is
still unprepared for what may be major breakthroughs in the
future or at any rate for a sustained rapid growth on a com-
pounding basis of Soviet science. Noting the mounting role
of cybernetics, especially in the so-called human or behavor-
ial sciences, SRS has maintained close contact with the OSI
25X1A2g Task Force - and has contributed the full-time services
of a senior officer to it. Although we have been unable to
conduct independent substantive research on scientific topics,
we have been active in propagating the findings 25X1A2g
organizing symposia and arranging briefings b members of
25X1A5a1 ^ the task force. In a number of speeches at 25X1A5a1 ^
the office of Civilian Defense Mobilization,
Chief, SRS, has attempted to combine an overall appreciation
of Soviet policy with an evaluation of the prospects in the field
of scientific organization. The generally pessimistic tone of
these speeches has apparently elicited favorable reaction.
We have also stressed the importance of intelligence research
in the field of cooperation between the USSR and China, a
subject which will require an unusual combination of language
and scientific discipline on the part of the analysts who approach
7. The "transition to Communism" provides a
powerful lever for the party's exploitation of the dynamics
of the Soviet system.
SRS has consistently urged that the "transition to
Communism" be regarded as a roof topic covering all research
on current and future social and economic developments in
the USSR. Although we have not as yet published a general
treatment of this topic, we have outlined heads of research
on many aspects of it and have attempted to obtain contributions
from research consultants and to stimulate interest in academ-
ic circles. Our provisional judgment is that this program
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is largely a slogan at this time, but one which is pregnant
with. significant development. It may have been seized upon by
Khrushchev, partly as an answer to the growing challenge of
Communist China for co-leadership in the application of
Marxist-Leninist theory to the practice of revolution, The
program is widely discussed by Soviet internal propaganda,
and certain specious steps have been taken toward actualizing,
it notably in the field of law enforcement and discipline e. g.
the so-called comradely courts and workers militia. Never-
theless the need to push the economic buildup of the USSR to
a much higher plane has compelled the leadership to dwell
on the principle of material incentive which is in dialectical
contradiction to the impulse toward social production which
is supposed to arise spontaneously and as the result of
intensive conditioning in the "new Communist man. " We
anticipate that the 22nd Party Congress, now scheduled for
October 1961, will place this theme at the top of the agenda
for internal development of the Soviet Union and may arrive
at programatic formulations which will have a dynamic effect
on the international movement as well. We are preparing
the lines of research.for this program when it materializes.
8. The concept of "socialist humanism" is a key
point in the "transition to Communism. "
Coupled with the creation of the material base for
the "transition", the development of the theme of "socialist
humanism" has figured prominently in internal Soviet agita-
tion and propaganda. SRS has noted the importance of this
theme, arising somewhat in parallel to that of sodruzhestvo
or "commonwealth" withinSoviet propaganda on the relations
among socialist nations. There was some initial Soviet ret-
icence toward adopting the term"humanism", because of its
classic role in Free World ideology and its recent romantic
and somewhat individualistic interpretation at the hands of
Poles. There has also been a little noticed but apparently
serious contradiction with the Chinese, who appear to be
highly uneasy over the Soviet theme. The Chinese have
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repeatedly attacked "bourgeois humanism" by implication
paralleling it with "modern revisionism, " which they have
also attributed obliquely to Khrushchev aiid the Soviet lead-
ers. In any event Khrushchev repeatedly emphasizes the
highly "moral" and even "spiritual" virtues which will be
developed in the "new Communist man" and sets forth a
concept of synthesis between individualism and collectivism
which may prove to be the central approach of education
and indoctrination in the Soviet system during the coming
years.
A bright, almost Utopian goal is being set for the
not too distant future. This deserves close scrutiny by our
research. The Soviet regime is involved.in a serious
contradiction over the pace and degree of benefits to the in-
dividual from its present and projected vast economic ex-
pansion. It became apparent in the second half of 1959, ap-
proximately at the time of the Mikoyan-Kozlov-Khrushchev
visits to the US9 that a new drive was in the making to im-
prove the lot of the Soviet consumer. SRS called attention
to the remarkable provisions of a number of Central Committee
decrees, reaching a high point in a decree of January 1960
which if carried into effect would introduce an "Americanized"
system of production and distribution of hitherto virtually
unknown foods such as frozen fruit juices and sugar-coated
prepared cereals - advertised by television! In our most
recent analysis (SRS-l5), we suggested that this :solicitude
for the consumer has become a major theme of contradic-
tion .with the Chinese, who must view in this drive a bourgeois-
ification and a softening of sumptuary austerity, inimical to
the physical and moral health of the revolutionary movement.
9. Party lindoctrination is struggling with the
problem of inspirational guidance to overcome sterility,
boredom and stereotyping of ideology.
Parallel to the decrees on benefits to consumers,
the Central Committee of the CPSU, has expressed serious
concern over the decline in efficacy of party indoctrination.
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This reached its height in a major decree of Jani ary 1960
which calls for a creative revitalization of propaganda and
indoctrination throughout the USSR. In our discussion of
this decree we opposed a tendency observable in the West-
ern press to interpret it as evidence of the inherent futility
of the entire indoctrination program. We suggested that
ideological and other pressures exerted on the party cadre,,.
would probably have a stimulating effect on Agitprop which
would be heightened by competitive pressure of the Chinese.
D. Communist China
SRS output on Communist China has been relatively
slight in volume although considerable in thoroughness of
analysis. We have been greatly impressed with the need
for continuing research in Chinese language publications
of which the volume available in translation is considerable
but still far from adequate. Enlisting the help of outside
consultants, we are preparing the base for fuller treatment
in the future. The present section deals only with a number
of central themes which.we have utilized in various connec-
tions but have not presented systematically in a single paper.
1. The essential characteristic of the Chinese
communist regime is its combination of orthodox Marxist-
Leninist ideology with features of traditional nationalism.
The Sino-Soviet controversy culminating in the
recent Moscow meeting has cast Mao in a role '"plus cath-
'oliquo= que le pape. " The implication of the Chinese polemic
has been that:i hrushchev is an incipient heretic, a poten-
tial "modern revisionist. " Although the Chinese have been
careful not to claim explicitly that Mao is the leading ideo-
logist of contemporary Gbmmunisrn, by their emphasis on the
study of his "thought" they have clearly attributed to it an
exemplary value not only for the Chinese but for the peoples
of other countries entering on the path of revolution. We
have taken note of the nationalistic factors, the xenophobia
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which goes back deep into Chinese history, the irredentism
over Taiwan and the outward -thrust toward the ancient Han
imperial boundaries. The pertinacity of Mao in defense
matters, such as the refusal to accept Soviet naval bases
and other military installations on Chinese soil, has suggest-
ed comparison with the position of de Gaulle in NATO. All
this, however, we have held to be a dynamic phase of nation-
al self-assertion which the leaders consciously subordinate
to the forces of the future binding China firmly to the inter-
national movement. We have noted the reticence with which
the Chinese have handled the Soviet theme of sodruzhestvo
and their preference for a looser and more figurative ex-
pression of the relationship among socialist states - that
of the '."sig fariirky.'" Their consciousness of the transcend-
ing importance of the movement came through clearly at
the Moscow Conference.
2. The internal development of China must in
Mao's own terminology be viewed as a tissue of dialectical
contradictions.
Since the function of SRS is to attempt to view
Communist actions through their own eyes, we have attached
considerable significance to Mao's frequently picturesque but
deliberately chosen slogans. We have endeavored to consider
such internal programs as the "great leap forward", "walk-
ing on two legs", "the entire nation a chessboard", not to
mention the international catch phrases such as "paper tiger"
and "east wind prevails over west wind", as living realities.
We have repeatedly noted the dialectic alternation of rightist
and leftist factors in Chinese economic programs, but we
have been generally reluctant to view this 4::;as. some very
sophisticated Western analysts do -, as reflecting sharp
conflict within the leadership. We were particularly cautious
in evaluating the "rectification campaign" of 1957 and the
"hundred flowers blooming an1d' contending!! js. logan which
preceddd it.'.. At a time when responsible analysis was
imputing substantive reality to this professed liberaliza-
tion, we specifically warned that it was in fact a device to
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entrap critics and deviatioriists. 1 Noting the excesses and
the scarcely concealed criticism by the CPSU of the commune
movement, we recalled the basic operating principle of Mao
Tse-tung summed up in-the triad: imbalance-balance-imbal-
ance. We suggested that this pattern, observable earlier in
the launching of the cooperatives and the socialization of ur<
ban enterprises, corresponded to the revolutionary nature of
Mao himself and represented a realistic calculation of the
drastic steps necessary to transform the highly rigid patterns
of Chinese society. We suggested that the opposite approach
has been characteristic of the Soviet leadership, at least since
the late Stalinist period, and has inevitably involved contra-
diction with the Chinese "style of work. "
3. As in the case of the USSR we believe that the
long range estimate o the Chinese economy is still too con-
servative.
Here the pattern indeed is different, since the two
economies are at radically different stages of development.
Nor can it be said that the tendency of Western analysis is to
belittle Chinese achievements, especially in the industrial
field. Nevertheless even here we feel that in the popular
consciousness of the West and to some extent in the minds
of the more sophisticated political leaders there is still a
tendency to seek comfort in China's backwardness, in the
allegedly grudging or inadequate nature of Soviet support,
or even in basic shortages of natural resources. For our
part we have defended the view that Soviet aid has been
adequate to the situation and has been properly appreciated
by the Chinese. The fact that it has been promptly paid for
1This view was acknowledged to be correct by Secretary of
State Dulles at a press conference some six months later.
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by shipment of agricultural and light industrial products has,
in our judgment, been evidence of the principle of business-
like comradely mutual respect and self-respect which the
ovement professes to regtAi a of its members. This is not
to say that there has been no contradiction, no sensitivity nor
hard bargaining between the two partners in the course of the
past decade. Like any economic association, it is marked by
sharpness and by inherent tendencies to forward individual
rather than mutual advantage. We have noted the seemingly
ambivalent attitude of the Chinese toward CEMA, reflected
in their decision to maintain observer rather than participant
status, and the corresponding caution and correctness with
which the USSR has accorded the Chinese a specific exemp-
tion from the principle of international specialization of labor
- i. e. satellization - within the 'World socialist system. "
China, in other words, alone in the Bloc has been granted
the right to comprehensive total economic development
We have canvassed a number of other specialized
themes without always being qualified to conduct the neces-
sary basic research in them. Among these we may mention
the role of science in Communist China, especially the co-
operation with the USSR in joint programs such as the atom-
ic project at Dubna. We have called attention to the high
quality of American trained Chinese scientists who have re-
turned to the mainland and who in such fields as cybernetics
are fully on a par with their Soviet colleagues.
E. The Sino-Soviet Relation
Since we have already indicated the general lines 1
of our view on this relation and since our latest publication
sums up this view, we may confine ourselves here to a brief
1
CIA/SRS-15, "A New Program for International Commu-
nism: The Statement of the Moscow Conference of Repre-
sentatives of Communist and Workers Parties (December
1960)" 17 February 1961.
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overall .-statement. The Sino-Soviet relation must be studied
under varying lights and with a high. degree of intellectual de-
tachment and humility. Until a joint discipline has,emerged
in which the specialists command both halves, including lan-
guage, in relatively equal balance, the estimation and analysis
of this relation is bound to be fluctuating, with.a tendency to
one side or -the other according to predilection of the individ-
ual analyst or the extent of his specialization in one or the
other components. Anticipating, as well as we can through
speculation, some of the lines which may emerge in a later
and balanced analysis, we are struck with the need to consid-
er the relation in.dialectical terms. We have suggested that
the doctrine of "contradi.ctions," as developed by Mao on the
basis of the classic Marxist-Leninist theory,provides an im-
portant clue not only to the earlier controversybut to persis-
tent elements of opposition which have already been noted
since the Moscow Conference. In a number of papers we have
suggested that every resource of the potential "art of the pos-
sible" is being applied tothe?..task of preventing these contra-
dictions from becoming antagonistic,. utilizing the techniques
of "comradely" criticism and. self-criticism to revolve them.
In.this position, as we have noted above, we have been gen-
erally questioned by some of our learned colleagues in the
Agency who have viewed.this insistence on following the dia-
lectic approach with suspicion and. even with a certain 'West-
ern form of "antagonism. "'. Outside this immediate environ-
ment, however, the presentation of this-thesis has met with
considerable interest and agreement, both in the US and
abroad.
We have been careful to avoid anchoring this inter-
pretation purely in doctrine or theory. We recognize that
the Sino-Soviet relation is based on-an association of human
groups. which is. subject to the vagaries of traditional alliances,
the quarrels, jealousies, conflicts of interest, irrational im-
pulses . and even. destructive intrigues inherent in all collective
actions. We have therefore attempted, especially in our most
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recent analysis, to bring out the subjective factors, the latent
mistrusts, the unspoken outraged feelings, and to balance
them with the positive and constructive elements of "socialist
emulation. " Applying Mao's principle of the "unity and nega-
tion of opposites" we have accorded both national and "prole-
tarian international" factors comparable iaal ence and have
sought to isolate the synthesis which may be expected to
emerge from their interaction. We have given high weight
to such negative factors as shared hostility to the "imperial-
ist camp headed by the US, " the fear of nuclear destruction
and the disastrous effects on their common interests which
would result from a break. At the same time we have bal-
anced these against positive factors, also jointly shared,
especially devotion to the ideology and goals of Communism
in the world movement. We have tried to take account of
naked power factors, setting them against impulses of ideal-
ism and zeal and even downright utopianism which are not
lacking among Communist leaders, especially Khrushchev.
All this presents a very complex pattern which has
been emerging slowly and empirically during the past five
years and which is as yet necessarily somewhat imperfectly
formed. We believe, however, that we have laid the founda-
tions for a sound interdisciplinary analysis within our own
Staff and have made an important contribution to promoting
this joint discipline in the intelligence and academic com-
munie.s.
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F. The Soviet Satellites
1. The Satellites have been and remain satellites.
One of SRS's major productions has been a series
of six studies on the East European satellites. These studies
have covered the period since the death of Stalin and have
traced both the government and party aspects of their history
up to 1959.
With the exception of a special paper on the effect
of the Sino-Soviet dispute on the satellites (SRS -14), we have
refrained from further comprehensive studies of the situation
in the satellites as it developed from 1959 onward, since we
believed that by then it had become clear that the "national
Communist" flare-up of 1956 had been successfully controlled
and that the "orthodox, " i. e. "international, " elements in the
Communist parties were firmly in control once again, and
that there was little to add to that. On the other hand, in our
view, the degree of acceptance by the non-party masses of
Communism combined with foreign rule can not but be close-
ly related to economic developments in those countries, that
is, to their degree of success in providing a measure of com-
pensation by means of an improvement of the standard of liv-
ing. Unfortunately, serious objective research in this field
(except perhaps in the special case of East Germany, which
is of course closely watched by the West Germans) is too
inadequate to permit any sound conclusions to be drawn. 1
This is all the more regrettable since the Communists
25X1A5a1
1The first results of a CIA-financed project at
25X1A5a1 started in 1957, are not expected before the end
of this year. Inexplicabl~, Rumania (the second largest
satellite) and Albania, are not included in the program.
Neither is Yugoslavia.
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frequently assert that ideological conviction is an indispen-
sable ingredient of successful Dmmunist economics, and. it
should therefore be possible to draw interesting conclusions
from comparisons between production and consumption fig-
ures for the different satellites, the USSR, and Yugoslavia,
as well as for free economies which have progressed rapid-
ly during the same period, West Germany, Japan, and Italy,
for instance.
There certainly is an interaction between the pop-
ular attitude toward Communism - itself affected by its
origin, native (as in the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslo-
vakia) and foreign (as in the other satellites) - and econom-
ic developments, an interaction from which valuable con-
clusions might be drawn, eventually inter alia for propa-
ganda purposes, and which would seem therefore to be well
worth a more intensive study. We have made repeated at-
tempts to spur interest in this subject.
G. Yugoslavia
Although we have studied and speculated on the role
of Yugoslavia, we have dealt with it only occasionally in our
publications. Our general view has been that the Tito regime
constitutes the only authentic example of "national Commu-
nism" and as such must remain anathema to the "world so-
cialist system. " We have suggested (SRS-6) that Soviet
policy would fluctuate 'between efforts to reduce Tito to the
status of the "forgotten man" and more positive initiatives
designed to exploit his natural tendency as a Communist to
keep his foreign policy views inconsonance with those of
the USSR and the socialist camp. We have beendisinclined
to view the Chinese and Soviet attitudes toward Yugoslavia
as being in radical contradiction but rather in a state of
dialectiwal interaction to advance the general tactical line
of the movement.
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H. Free World Parties
SRS has maintained. files and studied all the Commu-
nist parties of the Free World. We have not, however, pro-
duced any major or systematic publication on them. The
following general theses have informed our study and thought
in this field:
1. The de-Stalinization crisis of 1956 shook the
Free World parties severely but was quickly stabilized.
This was the essential theme of SRS-6 and also of a
memorandum (dated 7 February 1957) warning specifically
against the widespread anticipation in the intelligence commu-
nity and elsewhere of a serious decline in the French and
Italian parties.
One of the principal continuing theses of SRS con-
cerning Italy is that the PCI has a good chance eventually of
polarizing and seriously damaging the democratic process
in Italian politics unless a stable Democratic Socialist alter-
native can be established to the power monopoly of the Chris-
tian Democratic party and its minor allies. Since 1956, we
have consistently urged the exploration of amodus operandi
with Pietro Nenni and his Italian Socialist Party (PSI) with a
view to breaking the unity of action pact with the PCI. This
matter is still current. We have pointed out that it is not
merely a concern of internal Italian politics - which in itself
would still be of great importance - but bears upon the entire
Democratic Socialist movement in Europe, on the health of
the Second Socialist International, and ultimately. on the via-
bility of Western European Linity.
Z. All Communist Free World Parties, no matter
how insignificant in size and power, must be taken seriously
as tools of International(pmmunism.
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There is a perennial tendency in the Free World to
dismiss the minor CP's. During the post-war period this
tendency was especially apparent in Western Europe where
many of the parties declined sharply in membership and po-
litical influence. Thus, especially in Scandinavia and the
Netherlands, some of the Communist parties have come to
be regarded as "ridiculous. " It has even been suggested
that the international movement itself would be willing to
sacrifice them in the interest of a "peaceful coexistence" or
other foreign policy tactic of the USSR. We have repeatedly
contested this view and have insisted that no Communist
party will ever be sacrificed or allowed to go under, no mat-
ter what short-range advantage might result for Soviet foreign
policy. . We have recognized that most Western European CP's,
including even the still. mass-based French Party during the
deGaulle period, have been rather-effectively isolated in cur-
rent parliamentary practice, but we have also insisted that
both the underground illegal apparat and the overt party it-
self contained the ever-present potential of rapid escalation
in the event of crisis. Perhaps the most striking example
of this was the vigorous role played by the previously insig-
nificant Belgian CP during the strike of December 1960 and
the Congo crisis.
3. The Communist Parties in the under-developed
areas must be considered in every case to contain a highly
dangerous action potential.
The parties of the underdeveloped areas range from
the mass to an almost sectarian and cellular level. We have
commented on them in a variety of contexts. Perhaps our
strongest theme has been the formidable threat of the Indo-
nesian rty (PKI), the largest mass-based party outside the
bloc with the exception.of the Italian. The PKI is led by a
young, dynamic, Moscow-disciplined and trained group which
has learned all the techniques of legal and illegal action
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the USSR and.Communist China could teach it for the take-
over of crisis-fraught Indonesia. Building solidly on the
grass roots in.local issues., exploiting the strengths and
weaknesses of Sukarno, guided by a vast international plan,
the PKI stands perhaps closer to the threshold of a major
victory for world Communism than any other Party. We
have consistently stressed the danger of political collapse
in.Indonesia. While we, of course, have not been alone in
our alarm over this prospect, we have perhaps been more
consistent than others in -concentrating attention on the main
thrust of the PKI and denying that the alleged Sing-Soviet
rift would inhibit its march forward.
The Asian Situation
The Communist menace has been particularly
serious in the underdeveloped areas of Asia, Periodically
during these five years we have sounded.our own notes of
foreboding concerning the entire arc stretdhingfrom Seoul
to Rangoon. -Here,;,:too,->Lwe;have:invt been alone in this
sense of impending disaster, but we have at least focussed
primary attention on the active and aggressive action which
International Communism, working as a.movement through
the local parties, has played in the area. We have suggested
that every link of the chain.in this vast arc of Southeast A sia
is weak and that the chain under Communist tension will prob-
ably yield at one or many points. . Specifically, we have warned,
ever since 1956, of the dangerous situation in South Korea, re-
sulting from the arbitrary and often corrupt regime of Syngman
Rhee. We pointed out that this was playing directly into the
hands of the North Koreans and the Communists in general,
and we suggested that in the event free elections were held,
it was by no means certain that they would go in favor of South
.Korea. We periodically urged that appropriate measures be
taken to discipline Rhee and to reduce the swollen size of the
ROK army to which our military assistance. program had so
heavily contributed.
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Ever since its inception SRS has been concerned over
the situation in Taiwan. We have been alarmed over two
major developments: the growing opposition of the Taiwan-
ese against the KMT regime and the reluctance of the latter
to accord adequate political representation to the native
forces. Observing-the conduct and attitude of Chiang Ching-
kuo, son of the Generalissimo, we have raised, along with
others, the question as to the possibility that Ching-kuo may
have anti-American sentiments. He studied in Moscow and
has a Russian wife. He is reported to have been at least
partially responsible for the anti-American riots of May 1957.
His backing of Indonesian insurgents and the Chinese irregu-
lars in Burma, while ostensibly anti-Communist in purpose,
has been a major element in promoting anti-American senti-
ment in Indonesia and Burma. Even though these suspicions
may be unfounded, and they are not shared by many who have
been in close contact with him, it is not unreasonable to con-
jecture that Ching-kuo, in the event he acceded to power after
his father's death, might yield to pressure to make a "deal"
with Peking.
Elsewhere, throughout Southeast Asia, we have been
greatly alarmed by the Communist threat, and the inadequacy
of US political and economic measures to counter it. We have
repeatedly warned of the consequences which might arise from
the arbitrary conduct of Diem in South Vietnam and the danger
that guerrilla penetration would lead to rapid sapping of the
strength and stability of his regime.
Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the prospects are
equally grim. With respect to Laos we have generally fol-
lowed the pessimistic estimate that Communist pressure would
mount and that at a minimum the division of that already min-
iscule kingdom could be achieved. Red China's treaty with
Burma will give that country a strong taste of Chinese pen-
etration; the resistance of the military against neutralist
policies already has caused U Nu to initiate purges which
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might eliminate leading officers friendly to the United States.
The events in Laos have greatly disturbed the Thais, and
while that country's. sentiments are generally anti-Communist,
unchecked advances of Communist forces. in. Southeast Asia
will bring out strong isolationist attitudes, in Bangkok. Even
the Secretary General of SEATO seems to tend toward neu-
tralism.
We.have for some time advocated active US measures
to promote regional federation in Southeast Asia, but the
recent attempt of the Malayan government to create just such
federation has not been. successful, and it is doubtful that
Burma could be moved to participate so long as U Nu remains
.in the saddle.
Our views. on Japan, the only fully developed.country
in Asia, have been both optimistic and pessimistic at the same
time... We noted the strong pro-Western elements in Kishi's,
policy and. urged, well ahead of time, tthe need. for enlightened
revision of the Security Treaty. On the other hand, we have
pointed out the JCP's penetration.of the labor movement, Sohyo,.
and its control of the left wing teachers' union which in turn
heavily dominates intellectual life in the islands, together with
the ambivalence of the Socialist Party and the disruptive nature
of Japanese Trotskyism, especially among students. (Z. enga-
kuren) all serve to reinforce the strong under-current of neu-
tralist sentiment in the population.
IIn our memorandum. of 13 May 1958, "Proposal for a World-
Wide Survey of Anti-Americanism" (see below, p. 56) calling
for an appraisal of anti-American sentiment throughout the
world, we had in mind such specific situations as, that which
led to the cancellation of the Eisenhower visit in 196.0.
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b. Latin America
During the period of this report the potentialities
of Latin American Communism have been revealed in impres-
sive fashion. The speed and thoroughness with which the
Cuban Communists have come to dominate what started as a
reformist-nationalist revolution indicate that all parties in
the area deserve to be taken seriously as threats to hemi-
spheric security and the hope of orderly progress. The front
organizations of labor unions, students, journalists, women,
and other social and professional groups are increasingly
active in promoting Communist aims.
SRS has published one major study dealing with the
Latin American situation. That was SRS-13, "The Chinese
Communists and Latin America. " It drew attention to the
increasing scope of Peking's interest in the Latin American
scene and to the propagation of the Chinese "model" for coun-
tries of allegedly similar characteristics - agrarian, illiter-
ate, semi-colonial. The study attributed the Chinese Com-
munists' campaign of propaganda, exchange visits, and trade
offers to a desire for diplomatic recognition in a region until
then unpenetrated, to the aim of fostering anti-US sentiments
and weakening the US position in countries of special security
importance to Washington, and to ideological zeal. It dis-
cussed the question of Soviet-Chinese competition for influence
and concluded that the long Moscow orientation of the Party
leaderships would be decisive if ever a choice had to be made.
The study also concluded that Maoism had a strong appeal for
the more revolutionary elements in the Latin American Par-
ties and would probably gain influence among them and in
fellow-traveling circles. An unclassified version of this
report was prepared for DDP utilization.
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The L ft, American parties figured in our analysis
of the problem of legality vs. illegality (SRS-4, "Leg:al vs.
Illegal Status: Some Considerations Relevant to Banning a
Communist Party"). Several of them - notably the Brazilian
and Cuban parties - illustrate the ability of the Communists
to play a significant political role although nominally banned,
The general conclusion of the report was that a broad attack,
involving both positive action and repression, was required
.to reduce a. party's power and influence. Unattributable
copies of this study were prepared for DDP liaison. purposes.
c. The A~, Hcan' Situation
Except for references in such. general studies
as those on the youth festivals, SRS has not prepared any
reports on Africa. One reason has been that most Commu-
ni.s.t activity to date has been governmental and regularly
analyzed in :estimates, ecotiomic reports, and current in-
telligence items. We have, however, followed. African
developments and consider that the area is an important
target of International Communism. Our ix~bs't systematic
view of the African situation was given a.. few months ago in
.a staff member's presentation to an Agency seminar on
Africa. The following paragraphs. summarize that talk:
It appears that the. Communist world has been. sur-
prised as much as. the West at the pace of developments in
Africa. Once aware that the nationalist ferment was wide-
spread and that it offered opportunities to weaken and
divide the "imperialists, the Communist countries moved
quickly to exploit the situation.
They have simultaneously pursued several lines
of action. In the first place, they have. endeavored to col-
lect and organize useful information about the continent
and its-peoples, the estalC%ai:shment in the. Soviet Academy
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of Sciences of an African.Institute under Professor Potekhin
being a notable example of their new interest. Secondly,
they have sought to identify the nationalist cause with their
policies and propaganda lines. This has been evident in the
United Nations and in such organizations as the Afro-Asian
Peoples Solidarity Organization. A third line of action has
been to establish the "presence" of the Communist states as
widely and as prominently as possible through diplomatic
and trade missions, cultural programs, and visits of high-
ranking officials. Finally, there has been the cultivation of
Africans through scholarships, exhibitions, broadcasts and
all other means of contact and influence.
A new phase of Communist action is probably now
starting - one in which state relations will be supplemented
by such controlled instruments as leaders trained in the Bloc,
trade union factions, and front organizations. Reports of
attempts to found Communist parties are few and inconclu-
sive. It is likely that at present the directors of Communist
strategy for Africa regard the penetration of mass movements
and.the followings of charismatic leaders as more promising
than the usual party forms of organization. By the success-
ful manipulation of all lines of influence and control, the Com-
munists probably look forward to the graduation of a number
of African states into the new category described in the 1960
Moscow Statement, thd'national democracy." These countries,
having severed their links with. "Western imperialism, " would
be dependent on the Bloc for trade and arms and would be qual-
ifying for the next stage by "socializing" their domestic insti-
tutions.
I. International Fronts
We have maintained files and systematically studied
the international fronts but have published little on them. In
part this was owing to our recognition that other elements of
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the intelligence community were occupied.with this topic
(Bloc International Activities Division, INR). We have,
however, entered into friendly controversy with those few
who have tended .to deny the importance of international fronts;
we have insisted that they occupy a high priority in the calcu-
lations and thetactics, of the internationalmovement. The
indorsement of united front tactics in the 1960 Moscow State-
-
rnent of 81 Parties and the injunction to Communists to join
witli. all "the fighters for peace, national independence, and
democracy" bear out, we believe, this evaluation of these
international organizations. We recognize that the intensity
of activity of different fronts varies from time to time and
that they often are exposed as tools- of Communist policy,
but nevertheless they are a part of the global apparatus and
can and do? mobilize much non-communist strength behind
the current line.
Our principal contribution has been to the study of
the two*routh Festivals, Moscow and Vienna, on which we
have published two major..studies ,(SRS-5, SRS-8). We were
directly instrumental in bringing about a..modification of; the
State Department. policy of imposing restrictions on Ameri-
can participation in the Festivals and of generally di.scourag-,
ing Free World countries from sending high quality delega-
tions.
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SECTION fl .i;
Introduction
In speculating on means of counteringfaommunism
it is of course necessary to start from basic estimates not
only of the strength of International Communism itself but
of the Free World and the United States. From the balance
of the "gross capabilities" of the two sides emerges what is
called the "net' tinastt4," the resultant of the forces con-
fronting us and our assets and resources for defense against
them. It has not been the function of SRS to prepare such
"net capabilities" estimates for publication and distribution.
Nevertheless, in order to perform its function of providing
suggestions for combatting Communism, SRS has found it
necessary to arrive at such judgments for working purposes. ' f?4;7
A few of these are discussed in the following pages.
A. SRS Estimative Judgments on The World Situation
Although the focus of the SRS mission on:It'nternation-
al Communism forces it to leave out of consideration many
aspects of world affairs, nevertheless we have found in prac-
tice, as indeed was to be foreseen, that virtually no event in
the modern world can be viewed in complete abstraction f rrm
International Communism. For this reason we have not hes-
itated to speculate on a broad variety of topics adding up to a
sort of world estimate of our own.
One of our most significant theses was formulated
in an internal paper prepared in September 1956 under the
title "The US is Confronted with a Probable Era of Internation-
al Lawlessness. " Our primary contention here was that the
advent of nuclear parity had introduced a mantle of mutual
deterrence under which sharp but limited clashes inevitably
would take place invblving not only the bi-polarized nuclear
factions. but also, in unpredictable and dangerous patterns,
the vast areas of economic backwardness and nationalist
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revolution.. We forecast that this age of "international law-
lessness" would generate increasing contradictions and perils
for U. S. and Free World policy. A year or two later, this
view was widely held throughout the public domain.
At the same time, attempting to look even farther
ahead, we began to stress the latent factors working for new
world alignments. Again our thought in some respects was
premature. Thus as far back as early and middle 1956 we
forecast the speedy actualization of the potentiality for eco-
nomic integration in Western Europe which even in the high-
est official estimative and policy circles was given an ex-
tremely low rating.
SRS has speculated widely, although it has not put
out any publication, on the prospect of the modification of
the bi-polar world alignment - USSR vs. US blocs - which
dominated the 1950s. .The erosion.of bi-polarity has become
a popular theme among international affairs experts in recent
years. We have attempted. directly and by implication in the
analysis of the Socialist Commonwealth (SRS-10) and the
Moscow Statement (SRS-i5) to project the Communist reaction
to the globalization of the great revolutionary forces that have
been unleashed by the national liberation movement. Our
thought here is perhaps neither unique nor pioneering in nature
but it has led us to persistence in stressing an important policy
theme, the promotion of Free World regional integration,
which is disc T sed below (pp. 56-57).
Throughout our five years we have given constant
thought to the difficult question of Free World ideology. Pro-
foundly impressed as. we have been by the world-conquering
thrust of the Communist secular religion and the powerful
organizational implements which. Communism has forged for
its advance, we have looked in every direction for an adequate
Free World answer to its challenge. . We have considered
schemes for overt and covert organization along the lines of
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the so-called "Democrintern" and have canvassed many ideas
of our own and others. We have scrutinized such schemes
as "Peoples' Capitalism, " Militant Liberty, Moral Rearm-
ament, and other panaceas, unfortunately finding them want-
ing. We have looked at the narrower scale of opportunity
lying before our own Agency's operational apparatus and
again, unhappily, have found them generally inadequate for
countering Communism on a global scale. Coming reluctant-
ly to the conclusion that no major counter-offensive was.
possible under the state of mind and social-political dispen-
sations of the 1950's, we have turned our eyes toward the
1960's and our second five year plan with sober and restrained
hopefulness.
B. Means of Countering Communism
1. General Observations
We have noted that the SRS charter includes in add-
ition to speculation and research on the nature of international
Communism, the responsibility of providing suggestions on
means of countering it. As we have noted above, this was
originally considered to be a planning function which would
entail close contact with DDP and frequent access to elements
in the State Department, OGB, and the National Security
Council. With the dropping of the word "planning" from the
original title. of the staff, there followed a certain contraction
of attention and focus on operational considerations. It was
recognized, that since CIA does not have a policy function,
it would be inappropriate for SRS to make specific policy
recommendations. Nevertheless it seemed both feasible
and appropriate to speculate on certain aspects of US posture
and foreign activity, insofar as these would be reflected in
the reactions of Communism itself. In other words, our re-
search and speculation automatically had an obverse side
which could perhaps be described as an implicit contribution
to the policy making process.
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This contribution may be divided into two factors -
one negative., the other positive. The negative aspect centered
primarily in the examination of so-called vulnerabilities of
Communism, an exercise in "what not to do." At various times
during these five years SRS was called upon to contribute to
DDP, DDI, and even DCI papers or draft speeches bearing on
Soviet and Communist vulnerabilities in general.
Our centraltheme has been a-cautious and pessimis-
tic one derived immediately from our detailed analysis of the
nature of Communism itself as summarized in the preceding
two sections. Since this analysis strongly emphasized the
general dynamic and expansive force of the movement, it fol-
lowed that the individual points of weakness in International
Communism were by no. means automatically exploitable.
We have examined a. considerable number of the
commonly cited vulnerabilities, especially those of the Soviet
Union in its relations with Communist China, and have found
that in most cases the objective existence of a potential for
Western or American.. exploitation was questionable. We fur-
ther pointed out that even in cases where a. vulnerability ap-
peared to exist, it by no means followed that a direct exploit-
ation of it through propaganda or political action would be
fruitful. Rather the danger seemed to be in most cases that
such action would run the risk of being self-defeating, either
by provoking acounteraction more damaging to us than any
likely. gain or by stimulating remedial measures on the part
of the Communists themselves.
We have not taken a defeatist attitude toward all
attempts at. exploitation of vulnerabilities. We have recog-
nized that in.certain.casesopportunities would arise from
the very fact of taking action. Nevertheless we have strongly.
urged that careful research was necessary, considering the
long range repercussions of any divisive or provocative
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action on our part, measured against the contingencies of
either success or failure.
The present stage of vulnerability studies, especi-
ally with regard to the Sino-Soviet relationship, is somewhat
fluid. The Sino-Soviet Task Force (constituted in September
1960) has been attempting to draft a contingency plan based
on the assumption that Moscow and Peking have failed to
achieve a "genuine" reconciliation of views, even after the
issuance of the Moscow Statement, and that a real potential
for successful divisive activity may be before us. SRS ack-
nowledges the need for such a contingency plan, but has also
recommended the simultaneous drafting of a plan based on.
the opposite assumption, i. e. that the unity and harmony of
action between the senior partners and the other members
of the movement will be enhanced as a result of the Moscow
meeting and the ensuing speeches and documents published
throughout the bloc. We hope to contribute some ideas on
the basis of this contingency assumption.
Another general theme which we have elaborated
deals with the method of conducting political and propaganda
action against communism. . We have started from the prem"n
ise that the communist system itself does not recognize a
qualitative distinction between policy and propaganda such
as is basic to our system of government. In August 1960
we prepared 'the Sprague committee a paper on the amal-
gamation of policy and propaganda in the Soviet system, coin-
ing (by analogy with agitprop) a new phrase to describe it,
"politprop. " "Politprop" represents an integral approach
to foreign action in which the general lines of policy are fully
integrated with the means and media and themes of propa-
ganda. Thus our American concept of a group of "policy
makers" who generate pure policy and then transmit it to
operators for execution or implementation in the propaganda
field is held to be artificial. We recognize of course that
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the full application of the highly effective Soviet concept and
practice would be impossible in the matrix of our democratic
society. We would suggest, however, that a closer and more
nearly reciprocal interaction of the two could be achieved.
In this connection the recent decision to have the head of
USIA attend cabinet meetings seems to be a step in the right
direction.
We have also suggested informally that a high level
inter-Agency and inter-disciplinary group be established to
study and an.lyze current Soviet "politprop. " Such a group
would not be a coordinating body, a super-committee of
representatives of individual agencies, but rather would be
a working team somewhat analogous to SRS itself, in which
experts would be assigned independently of their parent of-
fices to conduct a continuing analysis of Communist foreign
activity, leading to recommendations to the NSC Planning
Board or the President's Special Assistant for National
Security. Such a team, in order to be effective, would have
to be composed.of experts in Communist doctrine, ideology
and practice, with background experience in both policy and
propaganda work.
In connection with our consideration of the means
of countering Communism, we have studied the efficacy of
outlawing a local CP. The results of this study were pub-
lished in.SRS-4, Legal vs. Illegal Status: Some Consi:dera-
'tions Relevant to Banning a Communist Party. Our general
concision was that, although constitutional or statutory
proscription is certainly a measure to be considered in at-
tempts to suppress. Communist power and influence in a coun-
try, this approach needs to be appraised in the light of a
number of domestic factors, such as strength of the party,
efficiency of security services, effects of driving Commu-
nists underground and governmental ability to thwart circum-
verntin:g -actions.
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25X1X4
Our basic premise being that propaganda and polit-
ical action are integral with overall policy, we have naturally
found ourselves speculating on the soundness of policy itself.
Our starting point has been concern with the impact of Amer-
ican policy and the American "image" on those areas of the
Free World where the rpommunist offensive is especially
dangerous. From the very beginning we were struck by the
widespread and almost universal distortion.of that image
throughout the underdeveloped areas. In 1957-1958 after
anti-American actions and demonstrations had begun to mount
alarmingly, we proposed that a serious and objective study of
anti-Americanism be initiated jointly by all agencies of the
government having overseas representation. We specifically
proposed the issuance of a directive to embassies and other
foreign posts requiring objective reporting on such attitudes,
including answers to such a question as whether it would be
safe for the President of the U. S. to visit a given capital.
Proceeding to positive instrumentalities, we con-
centrated on the potential of various forms of international
activity to develop the economies acid polities of backward
nations. Two themes emerged; the first was the importance
of concentrating greater effort m:d attention on
Our second theme for positive US action was the
support and promotion of regional organizations in the
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Free World, aiming toward limited political federation, eco-
nomic cooperation such as common markets and general
social planning. We were aware that US policy has long been
favorable in principle to such activities, but we noted that
constructive initiatives have been impeded by an overwhelm-
ing sense of the difficulties arising from fragmenting nation-
alistic forces. Although it has been our judgment that great-
er zeal could have been shown in promoting regionalism and
indeed was essential if Communism was to be contained in
such areas as Asia, Africa, and Latin America, we recog-
nized that limited actions were all that was possible during
this stage. We canvassed a number of concrete proposals,
one of which seemed capable of immediate and effective im-
plementation. Specifically in May 1957 we urged the estab-
lishment of a regional technological institute for Southeast
Asia. Although this proposal attracted interest among
official personnel familiar with the region, it encountered
objections which necessitated laying it aside. In view of the
immense inroads which Soviet technological aid and instruc-
tion have_.made in certain countries of this area we still feel
that some such step is urgently needed.
In an attempt to arrive at a broad concept which
could bear operational fruit within the Agency's mission,
we submitted a paper entitled "The Promotion of Constitu-
tional Stability in Afro-Asian Countries: A Weapon in the
Battle Against Communism" (18 November 1957). In it we
proposed a number of possibilities for action. Among these
was a long range program for developing a network of unoffi-
cial, high level political advisers for backward countries.
We had in mind the careful and secure recruitment of distin-
guished scholars or experts, with a natural interest and
cover for a given area, including language proficiency, who
could establish themselves on a basis of unimpeachable friend-
ship in higher government and academic circles of a given
country, building up over a period of time the kind of rela-
tionship with the elite which would enable them to work dis-
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creetly but effectively for the improvement of constitutional
and political processes in their host country. A few partial
steps appear to have been taken in this direction, but a so-
phisticated, comprehensive, patient, farseeing program
still awaits development.
We have made other less comprehensive recom-
mendations, especially for South and Southeast Asia. Among
these was a proposal to hold regional seminars or symposia
on the Sino-Soviet relation, drawing on journalists, educators
and other opinion molders from the several countries of the
region. Such seminars could be conducted under the auspices
of local scholarly organizations with the cooperation and sup-
port of Western institutes and foundations. We specifically
recommended
Among a number of other tangible suggestions for
countering Communism we might cite the following:
a. Proposal to strengthen the forces of demo-
cratic socialism as a principal bulwark against Communism.
This proposal was made in a memorandum, "The New Inter-
national Communist 'United Front' Offensive and the Position
of the Socialist Parties" (23 April 1956, 2d, Rev. Edition,
S), which pointed out that the Socialist International organi-
zations of Europe and Asia have been consistently effective
in resisting Communist united front blandishments. We
recommended a general ;US policy line indicating friendli-
ness and approval of Democratic Socialism as a legitimate
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25X1A5a1 F
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political force. In order to support this broad endeavor we
suggested the establishment of a joint DDI-DDP Desk for
Socialist Affairs. We still believe that the work of such a
unit would bring attention to the anti-Communist potentialities
in the Democratic Socialist movement and provide construc-
tive intelligence support for State Department policy and
Agency operations.
In this connection we have consistently urged a pos-
itive approach to the Nenni Socialists (PSI) in Italy (see
above, p. 42). In a series of memoranda going back to mid-
1956 we pointed out that Italian democracy will remain pre-
carious and unstable so long as the Communist Party (PCI)
is able to maintain its hold over the PSI. We pointed out the
strength of the "autonomist" movement within the PSI and of
the very real opportunity of uniting it with the Saragat PSDI,
creating a broad based Democratic-Socialist Party. This
proposal proved highly controversial, especially in 1957 and
1958. The sharpening polarization of the extreme right and
left in .Italian politics remains a grave danger not only to
Italy. but to the West European integration movement. We.
continue to feel that a new policy approach to this situation
is highly desirable. Effective action is still possible.
b. Concerted attack on the problem of the dis-
posal of nuclear waste. During the first half of 1958 we
noted the danger that Communist propaganda would exploit
this matter to our disadvantage. Looking further into it,
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we came to the conclusion that until this problem was solved,
the West and the US were running a grave risk in propagandiz-
ing the advent of the age of nuclear plenty. This hopeful pro-
gram seemed not only risky but positively unwise, in view of
the mounting evidence that it was likely to be economically
unprofitable, if not technically impossible, for a long time
to come. We accordingly recommended and still recommend
that at the highest level cognizance be taken of this problem
and that appropriate policy and propaganda be developed to
dampen false expectations and to prevent possibly cruel ex-
ploitation of them by the Communists. This concern has
been intensified rather than relieved as the result of mount-
ing evidence that the Communists are in fact building up a
case against US disposal practices which, although they may
not be worse than those of the USSR, are likely to create
grave alarm, if not panic, when their full significance be-
comes apparent to public opinion here and abroad.
Speculation on this subject also led us to consider
the general need of international coordination of fuel and
power planning throughout the Free World in order to face
the growing Soviet and Communist threat in this field. We
noted the ominous Soviet entry into the petroleum and naturb.l
gas field via tankers, pipelines, and other forms of export.
We also noted the alarming fact that Western oil exploitation,
especially in Venezuela and the Middle East, has been ex-
tremely profligate in the "flaring off" of the natural gas by-
product. When it became apparent in 1959 that this waste
product could be liquified and delivered in tankers on a
competitive basis with other forms of fuel, we recommended
that the highest priority be assigned to developing this poten-
tial. Specifically, we cited the possibility of combining inter-
national, governmental, and private investment to develop a
massive system for distributing this liquified gas in under-
developed countries such as India, reaching out beyond the
cities and towns into the villages. Aside from the immediate
benefits to the Indian economy this would ry eld ;. important
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psychological advantages, especially in producing countries
like Saudi Arabia, where indignation is mounting over the
wasteful practices of the Western oil companies. We have
also pointed out that such a program would be financially
advantageous to the oil companies in the bargain. At the
same time, reverting to our concern with atomic waste
disposal, we have suggested that countries like India be
encouraged to focus their limited but growing scientific
talent on this problem, rather than on research reactors,
which at this stage, can be little more than prestige play-
things for them.
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History of
Non-operational intelligence work on
International Communism
25X1A9a
In 1948, there was set up within the EE/USSR
Division of ORE, an Internatitab.r.Communism Group (ICG),'
Chief. A Propaganda Analysis Group, creat-
ed a little later, was amalgamated with the ICG in 1949. The
ICG became the nucleus for non-operational intelligence work
on International Communism both as a producer and coordin-
ator. In spite of its being an administrative part of the EE/
USSR Division, it worked directly under the AD/ORE; the
Chief of ICG chaired the ORE Committee on. International
Communism on behalf of the AD/ORE. This Committee also
functioned as editorial board for the ICG publication, Inter-
national Communism Monthly. Furthermore, the Chief of
ICG was the Secretary of the Inter-Departmental- 25X1A2g
Committee on International Communism whose chairman
was the AD/ORE and whose membership consisted of the
State Department, the three services, Joint Staffb FBI and
AEC.
As a result of the Jackson ,reorganization, ORE,
and with it ICG, was abolished in December 1950. The
repnn$lb.'lity for IC intelligence was transferred to State,
OIR, which pledged to set up an International Communism
office with a T/O of twenty. However, due to budgetary dif-
ficulties, this office was never set up. On the other hand,
there was no inclination on the part of the State Department
to relinquish responsibility for this work and return it to
CIA. As a result, the demise of ORE and ICG coincided
with the end of non-operational work on International Com-
munism intelligence for several years. The reasons for
this extraordinary situation were (1) disagreement on
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25X1A2g
25X1A9a
25X1A2g
25X1A9a
whether State or CIA should undertake the work; (2) the
question as to whether work on International Communism
would not overlap general political intelligence, and (3) the
problem of where to put such an intelligence unit adminis-
tratively.
Following the 1950 reorganization, the newly
created OCI set up a group of three or four staff employes
to do current intelligence work on IC, but abolished it a few
months later, Thus, apart from operational intelligence in
CI/DDF, no work on this subject was done in CIA. In the
State Department a unit of about three people sought to main-
tain a semblance of IC intelligence activities. With the help
of an inter-regional Committee, using techniques adopted
from the ICG, it began to issue a successor publication25 (1A2g
the International Communism Monthly. Moreover, the-
Committee slipped into oblivion just at a time when its
Sub-,committee was about to submit plans for intelligence
production of interest to the entire intelligence community.
In-early 1954, Colonel Brown of General Schowos
office, Army G-2, approached as the former
Secretary of - and asked about the status of work on
International Communism. As the answer could only be neg-
ative, Army requested that a survey be undertaken to deter-
mine the status of International Communism intelligence
throughout the intelligence community.
was assigned to undertake this survey for CIA. There fol-
lowed a period of search and numerous meetings, chaired by
Some of these meetings were attended
by and represen-
tatives of OCI and ORR. 25X1A9a
. At the end of that year, to be exact on 9 November
1954, Mr, Bissell summarized his ideas in a memorandum
25X1A9a to DCI, incorporating idea for a Senior Re-
search Staff. Intermingled with the substantive considera-
25X1A9a
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-U O III IiVCTM I T L-
25X1A9a
tions were discussions concerning the locus of IC work.
Opinions continued to -differ sharply. State was still'unwill-?=
ing to give up its claim to primary responsibility even though
it had not provided the machinery to implement this respon-
sibility.
Gradually, the initial tendency of some CIA officers
to have State retain the responsibility for IC gave way to the
conviction that CIA was better equipped to do the job. The
predominant question under. discussion remained the organ-
ubstantive aspects of IC intelligence. Against
MWWplea,_1or centralization .("total integration of
Communist efforts requires total, integral efforts to counter
them"), a compromise solution, dividing the work between
State, DDI and DDP, was adopted in a "Report to the IAC on
Implementation of the Survey of USIA's Intelligence Needs
and Assets" of 5 October 1954 (IAC-D-82/6).. Accordingly,
and following an official letter of General Schow to the IAC
of 3 August 1955 emphasizing the need-for improvement of
IC intelligence, this plan-was spelled out in Tab "B" , IAC
D-99 of 22 August 1955.
It was determined that "finished intelligence of a
level of generality useful to policy makers, specifically de-
velopments in individual countries, should a,emain located
in the DDP' ; furthermore, there was to be "continuing
basic and operational research on, and speculative study of,
communism and the means of countering communism. " This
part of the work was to be carried out by a Senior Staff, at-
tached administratively to the DDI. In order to carr out
these recommendations, a yearly contribution of 25X1A1a
was to be authorized as "reimbursement to the Department
of State for the production of NIS material along the lines of
the outline of a country supplement . . . "; the operational
staff on IC was to be considerably augmented and a small
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staff of senior officers was to be set up to implement the
proposal for speculation on and countering of Communism.
Thus, in 1956, work on.International Communism
began on a decentralized basis. The CI staff charged with
operational intelligence in IC became the International Com-
munism Division (ICD) and greatly augmented its T/O; the
Senior Research Staff on International Communism (SRS/DDI)
began to work on 20 January 1956. Not much change was ob-
served in the State Department, however, and in 1960 the
CIA budget contribution was dropped. Thus actual research
and analysis on International Communism remains quantita-
tively small and relatively fractionalized.
There have been repeated attempts on the part of
the intelligence community to establish coordinated inter
"departmental work on IC intelli ence. The first such attempt
led to the formation of the Committee in 1948, chaired
by CIA. With the 1950 reorganization, this Committee expired
without having been formally abolished. Only at the end of
1955, as a result of Mr. Bissell's initiative in this field, plans
for a new committee were discussed, leading finally to the
establishment of the Committee on International Communism
under State chairmanship in January 1956 (IAC-D-99/2, 24
January 1956). This Committee was set up primarily to
establish. requirements. It was subsequently renamed Corn
mittee on. Intelligence Priorities and Requirements Relating
to International Communism (CIPRIC). In its work, the Com-
mittee reviewed production and capabilities in various US
agencies and created a requirements mechanism for the in-
telligence community on IC.
From 1958 on, after its work on requirements was
completed, State strongly recommended the abolition of the
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Committee. The military service representatives opposed
this step; the SRS representatives believed that the Com-
mittee should be reconstituted and given substantive func-
tions as a service of common concern. Failing this, SRS
and the services argued, the Committee had no reason for
existence. The argument was ended only in 1960 when a
new proposal for the reconstitution of the Committee under
the previous name of Committee. on International Cornmu.
nism was submitted on 17 February (USIB-B-48/3/2). The
USIB approved. However, little progress has been made
since, and the meetings have amounted largely to briefings.
It is anticipated that State will once again propose the abol-
ition of the Committee.
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APPENDIX IV
LIST OF CIA/SRS REPORTS
No, Title
SRS-1 The 20th. CPSU Congress in 13 June 1956
Retrospect: Its Principal
Issues and Possible Effects
on International Communism (C)
SRS-2 The Present Communist Contro- 15 July 1956
versy: Its Ramifications and
Possible Repercussions (C)
$RS-3 "Nationall"vs. International 19 Dec. 1956
Communism; A Comparative
Analysis (QUO)
SRS-4 Legal vs. Illegal Status: Some 4 Jan. 1957
Considerations. Relevant to
Bunning a. Communist Party. (C)
SRS-5 International Communism and 6 June 1957
Youth: The Challenge of the
1957 Moscow Youth Festival (DUO)
SRS-6 Status and Prospects of Inter- 16 Sept. 1957
national Communism: The
Dialectic of Crisis and
Stabilization (C)
SRS-7 Communism in Eastern Europe; 25 Oct. 1957
Post-Stalin Developments in the
Satellites (C)
I From Death of Stalin
to XX Party Congress
II-A - Poland
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VVIII
No. Title Date
SRS- 7 II-B Plftn.g6yt (C .,.y 22 April 1958
SRS-7 II-C, - Fast Germany (C) 16 June 1958
SRS-7 II-D - Rumania (C) 28 Aug. 1958
SRS-8 Between Two Communist World 1 Dec. 1958
Youth Festivals: Moscow-1957-
Vienna 1959 (C)
SRS-7 II-E - Czechoslovakia (C) 31 Dec. 1958
SRS-9 Speculative Observations on the 2 Jan. 1959
XXI Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union
(27 January 1959) (C)
SRS-10 The "Socialist Commonwealth 18 June 1959
of Nations": Pattern for Com-
munist World Organization (C)
SRS- 11 International Communism in 20 July 1959
1965 (C)
SRS-7 II-F - Bulgaria (C) 6 July 1959
SRS-12 The Tenth Anniversary Cele- 1 Sept. 1959
bration of the People's Republic
of China (Peking, 1 October 1959) (C)
SRS-13 Chinese Communism and Latin 26 Feb. 1960
America.(S)
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SRS-14 ..The European. Satellites and 3 Nov. 1960
the Sino,Soviet Differences (C)
SRS-15 A New Program for ante 'na - 17 Feb. 1961
tional Communism: The State-
ment of the Moscow Conference
of Representatives of Communist
and Workers Parties (December
1960) (S)
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APPENDIX V1.'.
Selected List of Memoranda
Prepared by SRS/DDI
Date Subject
6 Feb 56 World Federation of Trade Uniins
9 Mar 56 Invitation to Sukarno to Visit US
6 Mar 56 Khrushchev's Visit to London: Some Proposals
20 Mar 56 Latest Developments of the "Anti-Stalin" Trend
in International Communism; Interpretation and
Possible Exploitation
28 Mar 56 Chinese Communist Reactions to XX Congress
of CPSU
10 Apr 56 International Communism and Parliamentary
Electoral Systems
11 Apr 56 Collective Leadership in USSR - Are There
Historic Parallels?
1 June 56 Proposed Attack uponKhrushchev's Pretended
"Socialist Legality"
1 June 56 Proposed US Attitude toward the Nenni Socialists
19 June 56 Political Situation in Guatemala
27 June 56 Communist Reactions to Releast of Khrushchev's
Speech
30 July 56 Countering the Soviet Satellite Redefection Cam-
paign.
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Date . Subject
14 Aug 56 Conditioned Reflexes as Communist Methods
(Pavlov Dogs, etc.)
17 Oct 56 A European Approach to the Problem of
Tropical Africa
.28 Nov 56 Suggestions .for Exploitation of Nehru's Visit
17 Jan 57 Significance. of "Liberalization" in Communist
Chins
24-Jan 57 Speculative Comments on the Merger Negotia-
tion s of the Italian Socialist Parties.
7 Feb 57 Effects of Soviet Repression in Hungary on
Communist Parties in Italy and France
1. Mar 57 The Moscow Youth Festival: Is American
Participation Desirable?
27 Mar 57 Suggested. Assumptions for. a Propaganda Pro,
gram Addressed to the Intelligentsia of the
East European Satellites
26. 4prxe57 Suggested Topics for Discussioncwith the
Intellectual .Elite of the Satellites
? Z .May 57 Proposed Establishment of an Institution of
Higher Technical Learning in.Southeast Asis.
25 May 57 Speculation Concerning Possible Communist
Roie..of Chiang Ching-k,uo
27 May 57 Speculation on the Advisability of Revising the
US-Japanese Security Treaty
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Sub) ect
7 June 57 . "New Soviet Man"
12 July 57 June 1957 Reorganization of the Soviet Presidium
and the Satellites
30 Sept 57 Proposed. Establishment of an Institution of
Higher Technical Learning in Southeast Asia
9 Oct 57 Reflections on the "Psychological Pearl Harbor"
(re First Sputnik)
14 Oct 57 Possibility of Creation of a New Communist
Roof Organization at Occasion of the 40th
Anniversary of the Soviet Union
15 Oct 57 Suggested.Speech by Eisenhower on World
Situation
25X1A9a 16 Oct 57 Interview with Mrs. Roosevelt
29 Oct 57 Speculation on.Program of the 40th Anniversary
of the Bolshevik-Revolution
29 Nov 57 Suggestions for NATO Conference Declaration
5 Dec 57 Speculation on the Gross: Capabilities of USSR
in Non-Military Field
10 Dec 57 Proposal for an Attempt to Bring About a
Merger of the Nenni and_Saragat Socialists
4 Jan 58 Foreign Policy - Basic Principles and Programs
30 Jan 58 Importance of Words in the Cold War
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QnniWnriliTI11I
Subject
25X1X7
3 Feb 58 Comments on-Working Paper on Soviet
Psychological Vulnerabilities
27 Feb 58 Purpose and_Effects of Moscow Youth Festival
1 Apr 58 Two Proposals for Action in the Italian Election
Campaign
12 U4y 58 Straws -in-the -Wind Kremlinology
13 May 58 . Role of Ideology in. Communist Affairs
13 May 58 Proposal for a World-wide Survey of Anti-
Americanism
15 May 58 Proposal for Action, Regarding the 1959 World
Youth.. Festival in Vienna
23 May 58 Speculation on the Outcome of the Italian Elections
3.0 June 58 Speculation on Si.no-Soviet Tactics toward Japan
18 July 58 Suggestions to Resolve the Middle East Crisis
25 July 58 Proposals for the UN-Summit Meeting
25 July 58 Speculations on Intention of Chiang Ching-kuo
with. Respect.to Indonesia
5 Aug 58 Speculationon Possibility of" Communist Provoca-
tion in the Far East
7 Aug 58 . Expression of Concern.on the Problem of Dis-
posing of Nuclear Waste
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Subject
7 Aug 58 Re Attitude of Peiping vis'-vis Tito
23 Sept 58 The New Journal of International Communism
24 Sept 58 Analysis of the Communist Position in the Taiwan
Straits Area, and.Suggested Course of Action by
the US
30 Oct 58 Pasternak and the Nobel Prize - The "Literary
Hungary"
12 Nov 58 The Eurasian Communist Bloc and the Free
World
4 Nov 58 Role of Military Power in Communist Strategy
21 Nov 58 Proposal for Action to Support of Autonomist
Faction-of the Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI)
24 Nov 58 Suggested Course of Action in West Berlin
Crisis
IT Dec 58 Thoughts on Resignation.of Mao- Tse-tung
30 Dec 58 Proposal to Establish a Special Research Unit
on International Organizations and.Movements
in the Free World
20 Jan 59 Speculative Observations on the Chinese Peoples
Communes
24 Jan 59 Draft of Proposed Ideas for Director's Speech
on the Communist Challenge to Free Government
30 Jan9 Current Status of. Chinese Psychological Studies
wrawr1 P1[1 A~dgWLI A I
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Date
20 Feb 59 Some Reflections on the XXI.CPSU Congress
44,
13 Mar 59 Soviet Vulnerabilities
3 Apr 59 . Dangerous. Implications of Article by Harrison
Salisbury, "Choice for the West" (New York
TM. 3 1959).
10 Apr 59 Suggested Theme for PropAganda against Chinese
Communists
13 Apr 59 Papers on " Tikita.Khrushchev"
14 Apr 59 Proposal for Concentration of Agency. Effort in
the Sino-.Soviet Field
30 Apr 59 Comment on the- Selection of Liu Shao-chi as
Chairman of. the. Chinese People ?s Republic
13 May 59 Proposal for the Exploitation of Liquified
Natural Gas for the Underdeveloped Areas
5 June 59 Desirability of More Complete. Coverage of
Economic Developments, in Satellite Countries
.11, June 59 Proposal to Invite Khrushchev to Washington
6 Aug 59 Suggestions Concerning the Visit of Khrushchev
7 Aug, 59 Draft of iematto DCI "Proposal for a Task Force
on Sino Soviet Relations"
15..Sept 59 Comments. by Staff Members on Khrushchev's
Article in Foreign Affairs
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A
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Subject
24 Sept 59 The "Crisis" in Communist China and the Sino-
Soviet Relations
30 Sept 59 "Areas of Sensitivity Displayed by Nikita Kku-
shchev"
14 Oct 59 Comment on Predictions in the American Press
of a Sino-Soviet Split
Z Mar 60 "The Range of 'Ideology' - The Scope of its
Practical Application"
15.Mar 60 Thoughts on the Pending Khrushchev Visit to
France
30 Mar 60 Communism vs. Religion
20 June 60 Speculative Appraisal of Khrushchev's Power
Position
15 Aug 60 "Dialog Between.Liu Shao-chi and .Mikhail
Suslov"
1 Sept 60 Bibliography and.Suggestions on Teaching
Communism
26 Sept 60 Khrushchev and _UN: Probable Khrushchev
Intentions
5 Nov 60 "Conversation Between Liu Shao-chi and
Mikhail Suslov"
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Occasional ;Papers
Date Subject
:Electoral and Parliamentary i1ractices in t110
L7~i ;h and Poland
13 Nov 57 The Promotion of Constitutional Stability in
Afro-Asian Countries: A Weapon in the Battle
Against Communism
2 Jan 58 Suggestions for Improving the Position of the
United States in the Face of the Communist
Challenge
3 Au; 60 The Amalgamation of Policy and Propaganda
in Soviet Action Abroad
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