SENIOR RESEARCH STAFF ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM BETWEEN TWO COMMUNIST WORLD YOUTH FESTIVALS: MOSCOW 1957- VIENNA 1959

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01445R000100130001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 111
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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N?
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Senior Research Staff on International Communism
276
BETWEEN TWO COMMUNIST WORLD
YOUTH FESTIVALS:
Moscow 1957 - Vienna 1959 .,.. SA=01445 C~
I
13
CIA/SRS-8
T G AL
&C?r
-t
1 December 1958
W
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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 1~~3Z
DP80-014U9~00100130001-3
Erratum
CIA/SRS-8 - BETWEEN TWO COMMUNIST YOUTH
FESTIVALS
Paragraph 17, page 11. To read: The Latin American
delegations, in the view of Western observers at the
Festival, were generally more 'enthusiastic' than the
delegates from other areas . . . .
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Senior Research Staff on International Communism
BETWEEN TWO COMMUNIST WORLD YOUTH FESTIVALS:
Moscow 1957 - Vienna 1959
CIA./SRS-8
This. is a speculative study which
has been discussed with US Gov-
ernment intelligence officers but
has not been formally coordinated.
It is based on information avail-
able to SRS as of 7 November 1958.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
. Page
i.
INTRODUCTION
1
A.
Scope and Cost of 1957 Festival
1
B.
Propaganda Aims of the Festival
3
Ii.
SOME BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE FESTIVAL 5
A. Size and Political Make-up of Delegations
by Areas
The Soviet Bloc Delegates
Organizational and Professional
Representation
Political Make-up of Free World
Delegations
B. The Physical Setting and Main Events
III. SOME SIGNIFICANT EXPECTED AND
UNEXPECTED HAPPENINGS
A. The Ideological Overture to the "Non-
Political" Fe stival 13
B. The Vocational Meetings, Seminars and
Special Get-togethers 14
The Philosophy Seminar 16
The Economics Seminar 18
The US Participants - Surprise of the
Festival 19
Summary of the Soviet Public
Reactions to the Americans 25
The China Visit of the US Par-ti-
cipants . 26
The Intrepid Polish Delegation:, Effective
Critics of the Kremlin Orthodoxy 30
The Hungarian Delegation: Most. Puppet-
like at the Fe stival 34
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Page
F. The Israeli Delegation: Jewish Solidarity
Spotlights Dilemma of Soviet Hosts 35
Fervent Response of Moscow Jews 36
Soviet Countermeasures 38
Some Significant Afro-Asian
Delegations 38
The Egyptians and Syrians 38
The Iraqi 41
The Iranians 41
The Black Africans 43
The Ghanians 45
The Nigerians 45
IV. GAINS AND LOSSES FOR INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNISM FROM THE FESTIVAL 46
A. In Imparting a Benign "New Look" to the
Soviet Union 46
The Soviet View 46
Free World Views 47
Soviet Gains 49
Soviet Losses 50
B. To Help Recoup Soviet Prestige Among
Communist-Oriented Youth of all Countries
as Part of the Campaign to Stabilize
International Communism 50
Soviet Gains 51
Soviet Losses 54
C. In Obtaining Support for Soviet Foreign
Policy Aims 55
For the "Peace" Campaign 55
D. Extension of Soviet Influence in the Afro-
Asian and Latin American Areas 56
Soviet Gains 57
Soviet Losses 58
E. To Curb Dissent and Bolster the Faith
of Soviet Youth in the Strength and Wisdom
of the Party
Soviet Gains
Soviet Losses
60
60
61
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Page
PREVIEW OF THE 1959 FESTIVAL 63
A. Vienna as the Setting for the First Festival
to be Held in the Free World 63
Why Was Vienna Chosen? 63
Austrian Opposition to the Seventh
Festival 65
B. The Preparations 66
Fewer Delegates, Fewer Student
Seminars 67
The Vocational and Study-Interest
Meetings Proposed 70
The Propaganda Aims and Probable
Themes of the Vienna Festival 71
Solidarity with Youth of the
Colonial Countries 73
Campaign Against The "Atomic
Menace" 75
To "Disseminate Culture" among
Youth 75
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 76
A. Success of Festival from Soviet Point
of View
B. Lessons for the Free World Bearing
on the Next Festival
Appendix
Most Frequent Questions Asked the American
Participants in Moscow, and Typical Answers.
General
Economic Questions
Political Questions
Questions on Hungary
Social Questions
Cultural Questions
Questions on CPUSA
88
a&
99
91
95
97
9&
99
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Foreword
The Sixth World Festival of Youth and Students, held
at Moscow 28 July - 11 August 1957, was the largest, costliest
and most spectacular youth gathering in history and as such
must be regarded as a world political event. of major signifi-
cance. A critical review of the event leads to the conclusion
that it probably achieved most of the propaganda and organi-
zational aims of its Communist sponsors. Nevertheless,
Soviet youth - and presumably the Moscow citizenry as well -
had been exposed, as the head of the Komsomol, Alexander
Shelepin, admitted, to the "penetration into our midst of an
ideology, morals and habits that are alien to us. "
After several months of hesitation, while the results
of the Moscow Festival were assessed, the International Com-
munist youth front organizations canvassed a number of pos-
sible sites in both the Bloc and the Free World and finally
decided to hold the Seventh Festival in Vienna from 26 July
to 4 August 1959. This will mark the first occasion on which
the Youth Festival has beep held outside the Soviet Bloc. Ap-
parently sensitive to the criticism that the Moscow Festival
was too ambitious and long-drawn-out, the sponsors have
decided to reduce the length of the gathering by five days and
the size of the delegations by approximately 50 percent, i.e.
to a total of about 17, 000. There is no reason to believe that
the Communists attach any less importance to the 1959 Festi-
val than to previous ones, but they probably have concluded
that Communist control could be better maintained in a non-
Communist setting if the size of the delegations is not too
large. The attitude of the Vienna authorities who requested
that the Festival be kept within modest limits so as not to
interfere too much with the normally heavy midsummer tour-
ist traffic may also have affected the sponsors' decisions.
Finally, the need for reducing the cost, as compared to the
heavy expenses of the Moscow event, may also have been a
factor.
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In weighing the risks involved in holding the Festival
outside the Iron Curtain, the sponsors presumably have faced
the fact that although the official delegates will mostly be under
tight Communist discipline, there will undoubtedly be present
a larger percentage of non-Communist youth as visitors and
observers than on previous occasions. While this dilution
will support the pretence that the Festival is "non-political,
it will also raise serious problems of maintaining Communist
control over the proceedings. Furthermore, the Festival will
be exposed in all likelihood to hostile criticism and even to
attempted sabotage by anti-Communist elements, especially
emigre groups.
Recently (Fall 1958) the initial self-assurance of the
Festival organizers appears to have given way to moods of
anxiety over the extensive opposition encountered from Austri-
an youth organizations, non-Communist political parties and
the local press. There is no clear indication at this time,
however, that the Communists will be sufficiently discouraged
to pack up their tents and move to a Bloc site, the most logical
of which would seem to be Prague. Nevertheless, the possibil-
ity of such a switch should not be ruled out. On balance it
appears probable that the Communists will continue to count
on the discipline and manipulative skill of their youth cadres
to contain the Festival within acceptable limits even in the
traditionally relaxed atmosphere of Vienna. Whether or not
developments between now and July 1959 will vindicate the
judgment of the Communist leaders, they are surely aware
that they are assuming unprecedented risks.
The selection of a neutral Western country for the site
of the Festival provides a counter-propaganda opportunity to
the Free World which should not go unchallenged. It is the
purpose of this paper, through an analysis of the Sixth Festi-
val, to point toward a concerted course of action which might
turn the Vienna Festival to our advantage.
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BETWEEN TWO COMMUNIST WORLD YOUTH FESTIVALS:
Moscow 1957 - Vienna 1959
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Scope and Cost of 1957 Festival
1. Contrived as a spectacular advertisement of
the Kremlin leadership's "new, look" of benign political toler-
ance and reasonableness, the Sixth World Festival of Youth
and Students, through its endlessly repeated theme of universal
"pease and friendship, " was also designed to serve as a proto-
type for peaceful coexistence on a mass scale. It was, in fact,
the largest international gathering ever held in Moscow and
the first of its kind within the Soviet Union (all previous Festi-
vals were held in satellite capitals). It provided fourteen
event-packed days for 35, 000 delegates - more than half from
outside the Soviet Bloc - for an additional estimated 70, 000-
100, 000 youthful "guests" mostly from within the USSR, and
for great crowds of enthralled Muscovites. In size and scope
it surpassed. even the epochal 40th Anniversary celebration of
the Bolshevik Revolution, held in Moscow some three months
later. According to an experienced Western observer, the
latter event would have been a "mere anti-climax" to the Festi-
val had it not been for the glamor of the Sputnik successes.
2.. The 1957. youth fete was probably as impres-
sive a success as its sponsors had hoped and as its Free World
opponents had anticipated. 1 In evaluating its significance, we
must recognize that the Festival was not an isolated event,
designed to achieve a single impact. Like all major Commu-
nist undertakings, it must be envisaged as part of a political
and propaganda continuum, a never-ending series of efforts
conducted by the vast network of "International Fronts. " The
1
The prospects for the Moscow Festival were discussed in
SRS-5, International Communism and Youth: The Challenge
of the 1957 Moscow Festival, 6 June 1957.
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sponsoring organizations, the World Federation of Democratic
Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of Students (IUS)
play interacting roles with the other adult fronts, especially
the World Peace Council.(WPC) and the World Federation of
Trade Unions (WFTU') Within this centrally directed frame-
work, the Moscow Festival provided the impetus for a new
series of regional and local follow-ups which exerted a stim-
ulating effect on Communist organizations throughout the world,
especially in the Afro-Asian and Latin-American countries.
3. The money, time, and effort expended on the
Festival by the Soviet Government, by the two international
Communist youth fronts and their affiliates were of a colossal
order. 1 Estimates of the cost run between a minimum equiv-
alent of 100 million and a maximum of 150 million US dollars. 2
The bulk of this sum was provided by the Soviet Union, with
token funds raised by local contribution campaigns, lotteries,
and other special events. The global organizing efforts for
the Festival covered the better part of a year and involved
varied and complicated operations and logistics. The assem-
bling, transportation to, within and from the USSR; the hous-
ing, feeding (including the preparation and serving of a great
variety of national dishes) and other care of thousands of young
visitors from almost every part of the earth presented a man-
'The Italian Communist Party Organ L'Unitt admitted the
high cost of the Festival in a front-page story August 6, 1957,
headlined: "The Festival Costs Many Millions of Rubles but
Much less than a Single Day of War. rr
2
Such estimates are necessarily somewhat impressionistic.
They may not take account of the fact much of the outlay result-
ed in permanent improvements of the city, such as stadia,
concert halls, and other buildings.
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agement problem of major proportions. Arrangements for
the hundreds of daily cultural events, sports, entertainments
and exhibitions were carried out with remarkable precision.
4. The massive publicity barrage for the Festival
by Radio Moscow exceeded that for any event since Stalin's
death, with the single exception of the 20th CPSU Congress
(February 1956). During the period of the Fe-stival, 56% of
Moscow's broadcasts in all languages were devoted to the
general meetings and other events, and to interviews with
participants and the press. This was a much higher percent-
age than for previous Festivals. In all, some 1, 966 extensive
Soviet radio items were broadcast as compared with only 279
during the 1955 Warsaw Festival. Moscow's broadcasts were
beamed worldwide. Foreign audiences heard, in addition to
the more general coverage, detailed reports on the particular
activities of their own delegations.
B. Propaganda Aims of the Festival
5. The major propaganda aims of the Commu-
nist sponsors of the Festival were:
a. To impart a benign "New Look" to the
Soviet Union. The foremost propaganda objective
was to impress the world with the new course of the
Soviet leadership in the warmth of the post-Stalin
"thaw, " a movement away from dogmatic orthodoxy
and intractability toward a seemingly benevolent polit-
ical tolerance, objectivity, and "reasonableness" which
would permit opposing views to be expressed even in
the citadel of Communism itself. The creation of this
impression was essential in making friends and influenc-
ing people, particularly in the vast uncommitted areas
of the world. The unprecedented permission for thou-
sands of young non-Communists to swarm over Moscow
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and give vent to "alien" opinions and ideas probably
never heard before within the USSR would also serve
as vivid demonstrations of the confident strength of
Khrushchev and his associates.
b. To help recoup Soviet prestige among those
youth of the non-Communist world, who in the past had
been amenable: to Communist influence but who had be-
come disillusioned by the ruthless repression of Hungar-
ian youth in the uprising of 1956. Ever-conscious of the
role of youth, particularly students, in the development
of World Communism, the Kremlin regarded the re-
winning of the cadres of leftist youth groups in other
countries, particularly under-developed areas, as a
prime objective in its effort to stabilize the Communist
movement, preparatory to new international initiatives.
c. To induce mass support of Soviet foreign policy
by the youth of non-Communist countries, in particular
of (1) "peace" and disarmament programs advantageous
to the Soviet Union, and (2) the extension of Soviet influ-
ence in the main target areas, i. e. the Middle East,
Africa and Latin America.
d. To curb dissent, bolster the faith and spur the
efforts of Soviet youth on behalf of the Party and the
Soviet state. The intellectual ferment and resentment
among a sizeable sector of youth within the USSR had
given the Kremlin admitted cause for concern. The
Soviet leadership hoped that by showing its ability to
attract thousands of youth from Free World countries
to Moscow, despite the unpleasantness in Hungary,
and by permitting relatively free contacts and exchanges
with them, it would impress Soviet youth with the wi;--
dom and strength of the Party.
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II. SOME BASIC FACTS ABOUT TH1 FESTIVAL
A. Size and Political Make-up of Delegations by
6. Estimates of the total number of youth and
student delegates at the Moscow Festival are obtained from
two sources: the "official" counts and estimates of the Festi-
val managers, and the separate reports from Free World
sources of the number going from each country. The figures
from both sources are generally consistent as to the world
total; about 35, 000 attending': delegates (as distinguished from
"guests, "a many of whom were invited onlookers from within
the USSR, totalling some 120, 000). Approximately half of
the delegates were fromthe 12 Soviet Bloc countries. There
is some discrepancy in the figures for w;arld:area and individ-
ual countries which, if added up, amount to. more than the
overr.-.aiLtota1. Thus, in some of the figures cited below it is
necessary to indicate maximum and minimum estimates.
7. West European and non-Bloc Last European
representation at the Festival totaled between 14, 0.00 and
15, 500. A discrepancy between this and the several country
totals is attributed to the number of persons.who at the last
moment filled vacant slots in the original ,allocations, or who
went to Moscow not from their home countries but from other
countries where they were studying or. traveling. The largest
of the European delegations were: France (2, 000), Italy,
(1, 900-2, 300), Finland (1, 600-2, 00.0), Great Britain (1, 650),
West Germany (1, 100-1, 300) and Austria (1, 000). In each
instance these numbers were as great as, or greater than had
been targeted by the Festival sponsors, as were those of most
of the other European delegations. The Greek delegation was
one of the most disappointing to the Festival planners. Only
80 Greek youth participated, compared to an original target
of 2, 000 and a later much revised estimate of 250. The Yugo-
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slav delegation, numbering about 200 as anticipated, was the
first group from that country to attend a World Youth Festival
since 1947.
8. The Middle Eastern delegates, especially
sought after in the light of the Festival's propaganda objectives,
numbered 2, 300 to 2, 800. They came from 18 countries and
included a minimum of 1, 500 Arabs. African representatives
(all parts of the African continent) totaled 440 to 460 from 40
countries and territories. India sent 450-600, 250 of whom
were students in Europe. Seventeen Far Eastern non-Commu-
nist countries sent a total of 520-660. Latin American delegates
numbered 850-1, 000 from 32 countries or regions. North Amer-
ican participants numbered 360, of whom 200 were from Canada
and 160 from the United States.
The Soviet Bloc Delegates
9. The delegations from the Soviet Union and the
satellites (17, 000 total) were, as usual, representatives of the
various official Communist youth and student organizations of
their countries. However, perhaps because it played the role
of host, the Soviet contingent appeared to be far less politically
sectarian, more cordial, and often more open-minded than at
other Festivals, although the regime issued several sharp warn-
ings against too much camaraderie with Westerners. The Pol-
ish delegation (1, 250) turned out to be one of the most pleasant
surprises - from the Western point of view - of the entire pro-
ceedings. It was in many ways the liveliest, the most inquiring
and searchingly critical of any Bloc group that has ever appeared
at a Festival. The Czechs- (1, 200), Rumanians (1, 000), East
Germans (1, 200) and other Eastern European satellite delega-
tions were generally dutiful and quiescent, according to form.
The Hungarians (over 1, 000), largely young secret policemen
and Kadar stooges, formed the nWst orthodox and puppet-like
Communist delegation. The Chinese Communist delegates,
estimated at about 3, 000, were described by the Chinese Com-
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munist press as the largest and most representative group
ever to. go abroad from China.
Organizational and Professional Representation
Among other statistics cited by the sponsors, the
following are of particular interest:
10. More than 22 international and over 1, 000
national organizations (many of them.' "paper" groups) were
represented, about half of which were not affiliated with. WFDY
and IUS. Some 4, 150 athletes from 49 countries took part in
the Third International Friendly Youth Games and some 2, 000
from 40 countries in the Festival sports program. There were
two separate series of athletic events held during the period of
the Festival. About 2, 000 newspapermen according to Soviet
claims - twice as many as expected, including 743 foreign.cor-
respondents (many of whom. were from Bloc countries) repre-
senting 200 newspapers for 47 countries and all major news
agencies, radio and television networks from all over the world -
covered the events at the Festival. More than 7, 000 representa-
tives from all continents attended the 23 professional and trade
meetings. More than 2, 0.00 young artists from 47 countries
took part in the International Art Exhibition in which 3, 500 paint-
ings and objets d'art were exhibited.
Political Make-up of Free World Delegations
11. The 1957 Festival had a far larger proportion
of non-Communist official participants in attendance than had
ever appeared before. This was -undoubtedly the result of the
special effort made by the sponsors to persuade youth groups
in the Free World that this was to be an open, non-political
event. Many young people who had not the slightest interest
in. Communism but who were curious to see Moscow, looking
forward to a good time for two weeks at very small expense,
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decided to attend. In addition, some anti-Communists saw
the first real chance ever offered at any international Com-
munist youth gathering to carry out some effective counter-
Communist propaganda. In the past, delegations to the Festi-
vals had been overwhelmingly made up of young Communists
or fellow travelers.
1Z. The Western European delegations contained
a large. number of non-Communists. British sources estim-
ated that almost two-thirds, or over 1, 000 of the 1, 650 Brit-
ish delegates, had little or no sympathy for Communism. The
French and Italian groups (about 2, 0.00 each), representing
the Western countries with the most powerful Communist
Parties, included one-third to one-half non-Communists. The
Italians were reported to be the most ill-behaved of the Free
World delegates. 1 The West German delegation (1, Z00) was
heavily non-Communist, or certainly behaved as though it
were. Its one mission appeared to be to undercut or at least
to neutralize the Communist-dominated East German delega-
tion. In the opening parade, when the East Germans appeared
with a "Germania" banner, the West Germans did likewise; in
general they gave their Communist co-nationals little opportun-
ity to assert any claim that they were the "true" German repre-
sentatives. It was reported that both of these delegations were
quartered and dined together and that the West Germans suc-
ceeded in doing some effective propagandizing, while them-
selves remaining immune to Communist appeals.
13. The US _Participants (they refused to let them-
selves be described as "delegates, ") who as discussed later
became the focus of attention of the people of Moscow, num-
1The Italians were said to have refused to pay taxi fares, to
have complained about food and service, and to have taken
many items in their hotel rooms as "souvenirs. "
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bered a mere 160. On. their own initiative they had come to
the Festival in spite of the strong official discouragement of
the Department of State. The remarkable fact about them -
in the light of the Communist domination of such groups in
the past ? was that not more than 20% were Communist-
.oriented, and. even the greater part of those were reported
to have acted like "good Americans":by the time the Festival.
ended. They had an effect on the Muscovites and the Soviet
youth with. whom they came in contact far in excess of their
numerical strength and in spite of the lack of political sophis-
tication of the large majority who were primarily interested
in the opportunities for a good time.
14. The Middle Eastern delegations varied widely
in their size, composition and attitudes toward the Festival.
The Egyptians and other Arab delegations, the favored. proteges
of the Festival sponsors, received the most.care and adulation
in the parades and other big events, in. their privileged housing
and feeding, and in. their leading positions on the various porno
mit?ees and sub-committees. In addition, they were provided
with official Soviet Government sea transportation to and from
the Festival.. Estimates of the number of Egyptians who showed
up at the Festival range between 550 and 663, including 150 girls,
students at the University of Moscow, and several newspaper
correspondents The Syrians numbered 450-500, including a
member of the Syrian parliament and ten news reporters. The
delegation was led by a senior official of the Syrian Ministry of
Education. On the other end of the scale, the Israeli contingent
was composed of two delegations of about 100 representatives
each, one Communist-and the other non-Communist. Both were
united in their loyalty to Israel and were equally discriminated
against by the Soviet authorities. The Festival managers did
almost everything conceivable to subordinate and block off, by
obvious intent and by subterfuge, the activities of the Israelis
in Moscow. Nevertheless the response of the Moscow Jewish
community was so fervent in seeking out the young Israelis
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that the Soviet Festival leadership was taken aback and
appeared not to know quite how to cope with the situation.
The Iraqi and other Arab delegations, although courted by
the Soviet sponsors, were offered fewer inducements and priv-
ileges than the Egyptian and Syrian groups, and their reaction
to the Festival was less enthusiastic.
15. African delegations, also prime targets of the
Festival planners, were the objects of about as much attention
- and perhaps even more public curiosity - as the Arabs. Mos-
cow propaganda featured the meetings, dances, tete-a-tetes,
between African negroes and white delegates from all over the
world. One humorous note for Westerners was the exhibition
of black clothing dummies in the Moscow shops to demonstrate
Communist racial "equality. " The actual number of delegates
from each African country or territory is difficult to ascertain.
It is known that from several of the colonial African countries
few if any delegates appeared, largely as a result of the local
governmental restrictions placed upon them and the difficulties
experienced by the Communists in reaching the kind of youth
and students who would be "representative. " Free World
sources estimated that no more than 460 delegates came from
the entire African continent. Nevertheless, the WFDY claimed
officially that a "great number" of African representatives
came to the Festival and that the "number of participants from
Africa, Asia and Latin America is almost twice as big as that
of previous Festivals I" The WFDY claim is inflated and
probably overlooks the fact that a large part of the Afro-Asian
delegations consisted. of students who were studying in Europe
(including the USSR).
16. The delegates from non-Communist Far
Eastern countries numbered less than half the number anti-
cipated by the Festival organizers. The regional target was
between 1, 950 and 2, 000 but as previously indicated the
estimate of actual attendance was 520-660. The largest
-10-
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Asian delegation was the Indonesian, totaling 200 (of whom
about 50 were students in Europe) as against a Communist t-
target of 190-350. The second largest was the Japanese del-
egation (155-260), one of the greatest disappointments to the
Soviet sponsors who had made plans for 500. The Burmese
representation was even worse from the Communist point of
view, numbering only 12 as against an original target of 500
and the much lowered anticipation of 50. Actually Australia
(110-150) and New Zealand (25-40) were the only countries in
the area to send about as many delegates as had been antici-
pated.
17. The Latin American delegations, in the view
of Western, observers at the Festival, were generally more
'' unenthusiastic ' than the delegates from other areas, except-
ing possibly the Middle East, and certainly more than those of
Western Europe. In general the Central and South American
representation included the largest proportions of Communists
or Communist- sympathizers of any non-Bloc groups at the
Festival, even though there were highly articulate critics of
the Soviet Union. among the delegates. The largest delegations
from Latin America were Brazil with 225 members; Chile,
195; Argentina, 165; Mexico, 85; and Uruguay, 71. Total
participation from all Latin American countries was claimed
by the Festival sponsors to have numbered 958 or nearly twice
the number who attended the Warsaw Festival in 1955.
B. The Physical Setting and Main, Events:
18. Advance notices of the preparations for the
Festival indicated that the Soviet sponsors were so eager to
put on an impressive show for the mass of expected delegates
and visitors that they had transformed Moscow into a vast
Potemkin village. As far as possible, the usually drab ap-
pearance of the Soviet capital was dressed up to look shiny
and gay. But the facade thus created was not altogether false
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and temporary. It is true that the quickly-potted plants and
hastily dug-in trees, and the thin veneer of new'a.aint on some
old landmarks did, in fact, provide a Potemkin touch. But
much of the face-lifting of Moscow, and certainly the building
of new stadia, concert halls and housing facilities and the re-
moval of antique traffic bottlenecks were of a more solid and
lasting character. Reports from correspondents and other
observers indicated that the Moscow citizenry was quite en-
chanted not only with the gay and colorful festivities of 14 days,
but with the cleaning up and modernizing of whole sections of
the city, such as had never been seen before. Many Musco-
vites expressed the wish to visitors that the Youth Festival
could be repeated every year.
19. To foreign visitors, particularly Westerners,
however, the bare, drab and slummy spots showed through
and exposed the generally unappealing aspects of the city.
Yet even the most critical were willing to -grant that an ef-
ficient job had been done in housing, feeding and transporting
the delegates. The Americans reported that their q:rters,
although not the choicest - the best were saved for the Arab
and African delegates - were adequate and compared not un-
favorably with older college dormitory space in the United
States. Bus transportation was frequent and free to all parts
of the city and to all Festival events. Haircuts, laundry and
cleaning were also free. Food was plentiful and adequately
prepared with attention given to the preparation of national
dishes, especially for the more exotic tastes of the Arabs,
Africans and Orientals. Pocket money was provided many
of the delegates.
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III. SOME SIGNIFICANT EXPECTED AND UNEXPECTED
HAPPENINGS
20. The organizing ability and painstaking care of
the Communists in creating and engineering international polit-
ical activities are nowhere more evident than in their planning
and carrying out the world gatherings of their international
front organizations. In the youth and student areas, the Festi-
vals have always been notable, and the Sixth was, as the Com-
munists intended it to be, "the greatest ever." As already
noted, the programming and scheduling down to the last detail
were a striking performance, even from the point of view of
critical Westerners. However, what made this Festival dis-
tinctive in comparison to others was the proportion of happen-
ings which were probably unexpected, or at least different than
expected, by the Communist sponsors. The planned events
illustrate the true political and propaganda nature of the Festi-
val. Most of the unexpected events demonstrated the -whys in
which Free World youth on their own initiative were able to
take advantage of the temporary lifting of the Iron Curtain to
deliver some telling thrusts against Communist theory and
practice.
A. The Ideological Overture to the I'Mn- Political"
Festival
21. Behind the elaborate trappings, the ingratiat-
ing arrangements, lay the hard political' r ealities. These
were disclosed as early as the great opening session in Lenin
Stadium, 28 July, at which 60, 000 spectators were present
and which followed the vast parade of all delegations to the
Festival. At this ceremonial overture, virtually all the lead-
ers of the Soviet Communist Party were present to give com-
plete Party sanction to the proceedings. Led by Khrushchev
and Voroshilov (who was the main speaker), the following mem-
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bens or candidate-members of the CPSU Presidium officiated:
Belyayev, Brezhnev, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Zhukov, Ignatov,
Kirichenko, Kuusinen, Suslov, Furtseva, Khrushchev, Shvernik,
Mukhitdinov, Pospelov, Kirilenko, Mazurov, Mzhavandze and
Pervukhin. Moscow Radio in an international broadcast report-
ed that these leaders were greeted by the crowd with "tempestu-
ous and prolonged applause.
22. Voroshilov, on behalf of the Party and Soviet
governmental hierarchy, made a fully orthodox Communist
(i.e. Marxist-Leninist) ideological opening speech. After a
formal note of welcome and the usual platitudes about the "con-
tribution to . . . the cause of consolidating peace and friend-
ship on earth . . ., " and emphasizing that "we have never im-
posed nor are we going to impose our ideas or our views on
anyor}e, " Voroshilov concluded: "And if the great ideas of
socialism triumph in the course of historic development and
even more countries and peoples take the road of socialist
development, that of course, is not a matter of propaganda.
It is a law governing tlce historical development of soiciety,
for socialism is the most progressive social. system, the one
most suited to satisfy the needs and aspirations of the peoples
B. The Vocational Meetings, Seminars and Special
Get-togethers
23. Apart from the great parades, pageants,
sports events, concerts and dances, much greater stress was
laid in the 1957 Festival than in previous ones on the get.-
togethers of delegates on the basis of common vocational,
hobby and intellectual interests. The vocation or "profession-
al" meetings embraced a large number of trades and profes-
sions, including dockers, miners, journalists, builders, rail-
roadmen, engineers, printers, teachers, salaried workers and
other groups. Agend.ar were prepared in advance and a vast
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amount of pre-Festival literature was mailed out describing
details of these meetings. Similarly, meetings of different
hobbyists stamp collectors, radio amateurs, hikers, photo-
graphers were held. The number and variety of student
seminars in 1957 exceeded that of any previous Festival, At
the close, the International Committee stated that there had
been Z4 vocational and professional meetings, hundreds of
meetings between delegations, numerous regional and nation-
al meetings, and 2:0 student seminars.
24. This battery of meetings represented the
serious program of the Festival. In them the political and
propaganda purposes of the Communist leaders were speci-
fically but subtly developed. The vocational meetings pro-
vided the opportunity for influencing the younger people in
the various arts, crafts and professions which are practiced
in most countries. These were part of a continuing program
of the WFDY and IUS, followed up by a number of other voca-
tional meetings organized during each year between the Festi-
vals to tie the work of the youthful auxiliaries into that of the
adult international fronts. The student seminars, organized
by the IUS, are designed to appeal to the particular intellec-
tual, economic and social interests of students as against
those of youth generally, who are the province of WFDY. As
one Soviet writer remarked: }`Festival meetings have not been
arranged solely to allow the delegates to embrace one another,
exchange badges, and sing songs and dance. They are arranged
so that they can talk things over soberly, debate and discuss
problems. "
1The elders in the various vocational fields are approached
through the various specialized Communist front organizations
such as those covering scientific workers, lawyers, doctors,
journalists, skilled and unskilled labor.
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25. At past Festivals and other international youth
group meetings, the Communist propaganda content and tactics
had often been obvious and heavy-handed. At the 1957 Festival
there was a much greater appearance of objective discussion.
In several instances, since more non-Communists had come
to the Festival than had probably been anticipated, there were
some surprisingly forthright exchanges of views. In a number
of notable instances the Soviet positions on an issue were open-
ly attacked by Free World delegates. To this extent the Soviet
sponsors exposed their youth to the "contamination" of non-
Communist ideas. Having declared that these meetings were
"open to all" regardless of political orientation, the Commu-
nists often found themselves faced by embarrassingly strong
counter-arguments. In such cases they had to marshal their
forces quickly so as to prevent the dissemination of facts and
ideas which might become subversive to the Communist cause.
Two examples of such meetings were the Philosophy Seminar
and the Economic Seminar.
The Philosophy Seminar
26. This seminar, held at Moscow University, was
attended by 500 delegates and was presided over by the Secre-
tary of the Festival Preparatory Committee, an indication of
the importance of the event. Advance copies of the lecture by
T. I. Oyzerman, Moscow University Professor of Philosophy,
were handed out, together with propaganda pamphlets present-
ing the Soviet line on Hungary. The introductory speaker was
another Soviet professor who summarized the main speaker's
thesis that the development of human society is based on sci-
entific laws and can accordingly be predicted. Professor
Oyzerman then summarized his opus orally.
27. In the morning session, anti-Marxist speakers
predominated and were applauded spontaneously by the audience,
a majority of which seemed to be non-Marxist. The Commu-
nists apparently went into a huddle during the noon recess, for
the temper of the afternoon session was decidedly different.
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Communist speakers heavily outnumbered non-Communists
only a West German and a Pole held forth against ten pro-
Communist speakers. The latter also dropped their intellec-
tual or pseudo-intellectual armor in favor of highly-charged
emotional appeals aimed principally at the non-European
audience. The Communists were well-dispersed in the aud-
ience and used the organized=claque method of applauding the
demagogic utterances of party-line speakers and of showing
disapproval of opposition speakers.
28. Of the apparently anti-Communist speakers,
the most effective were two Poles, an East German professor,
an Italian and a West German. A non-Communist speaker
from the Cameroons served to belie the appearance of mono-
lithic Afro-Asian solidarity with the Soviets. The East Ger-
man speaker provided the greatest surprise, even though his
heretical views were properly coated with Marxian sugar. The
Poles were the best prepared and in their quiet way the most
dangerous to the Communists. One of the Poles argued that
the questions posed by Professor Oyzerman demanded certain
set answers, which was not a proper philosophical approach.
After six straight party line speakers had all but turned the
"seminar" into an apparent Communist propaganda victory,
one of the Poles had the temerity to challenge the validity of
Marxism itself as the basis for interpreting events. Accord-
ing to an official Western report the Pole stated:
The theory of Marx'.is inadequate because
it does not indicate how one can tell which theory,
which prediction, is really proletarian. Both Yugo-
slavia and the Soviet Union, for example, claim to be
Marxist, but who can deny that contradictions exist
between them. In the past, it sufficed to call any
theory bourgeois in order to preclude discussion. If
a new theory was to be introduced, it was labeled
proletarian and had to be accepted by them as scien-
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tific theory. After the war, the accepted theory was
that an economic collapse would occur in the West,
but this did not happen. Some people say that only
their theory is scientific but this is not true. Science
consists of the interaction of many conflicting theories.
. . . In a creative discussion, the scientific truth (or
lack of truth) of a statement would be determined on
the basis of objective scientific examination. Dog-
matic, literal interpretation of Marxism cannot be
valid. Marxism may remain valid for the future if it
is taken as a general undogmatic approach, but not
otherwise.
The Economics Seminar
29. During the International Seminar for students
of Economics, a British delegate told Communist participants
that their use of the word "capitalism" was completely emo-
tional. He said that they judge British public opinion by such
papers as the Daily Worker, whose readers represent only
one-half of one percent of the British population. The dele-
gate went on to discuss the merits of the British economic
system, which he termed "dynamic. " Britain, he said, had
found a happy mean between the power of the state and the
individual.
30. Another speaker, a French delegate, de-
plored the tendency to emphasize only the negative aspects
of "colonialism. " He pointed out that colonial powers had
contributed a, great deal in laying the foundations for further
advance in underdeveloped countries. Both the British and
French delegates were applauded by the seminar participants.
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C. The U. S. Participants - Surprise of the
Festival
31. About 160 Americans (ages late teens to late
20's) arrived in Moscow for the Festival, despite official dis-
couragement by the Department of State. The Department's
policy had been based on the position that the event was patent-
ly a Communist propaganda show and that the presence of young
Americans would tend to lend dignity to the occasion and would
be exploited by the Communists as evidence of tacit US approv-
al of the Festival. This, it was felt, would be undesirable,
particularly after the recent violent suppression of youth in
Hungary. It was not foreseen at the time that the propaganda
intent of the Soviet sponsors would backfire in two important
respects: (a) that Soviet youth and large sections of the Mos-
cow public would be exposed to facts and truths about the US
and the West which they had not known before, and (b) that
the discussion and contacts with the Americans would dis-
close in the full glare of world publicity some of the genuine
doubts and questionings of Soviet youth.
32. The American group was not trapped into hav-
ing itself labeled as a. "delegation. " The Festival managers
wanted the group to carry a banner in the big stadium parade
reading "US Delegation for Peace and Friendship, " but the
majority insisted that the banner should read "US Participants
Salute, World Youth. " Aside from being definitely "unofficial,
f'
the small American representation was also largely unorgan4 ,
ized,:1eaderlessa' unbriefed and'-tznorieizted. . As notod previ .-
ously, despite the fact that the preparations for the Festival
were under Communist-front auspices, knowledgeable observ-
ers estimated that no more than 15% of those who arrived in
Moscow were young Communists or sympathizers. The re-
rraining 85%a were non-Communist and some were militantly
anti-Communist. They came from varied backgrounds, and
from widely diverse educational and social levels. Most of
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them admittedly went for the sheer curiosity of seeing the
famed capital of the "major enemy" and for the fun provided
by the vast carnival of parades,. dances, sports shows, con-
certs, and exhibitions, not the least aspect of which was the
opportunity of meeting and observing young people from strange
and exotic lands. This large majority were as politically un-
sophisticated and as unaware of the subtleties of Communist
propaganda as most ;people of their age who have not paid par-
ticular attention to the world ideological conflict or who have
not been especially briefed on the subject.
33. There were, however, a few - perhaps a
dozen or more - who had chosen to go to Moscow for more
serious purposes. Among these were graduate students of
Soviet affairs and Russian language, of history, political
science and economics, and some who were interested in
music, fine arts and other cultural aspects of the USSR. It
was this handful of advanced students and observers- who, on
a voluntary and individual basis, took advantage of every
opportunity to present effectively and directly to Soviet audi-
ences the Free World and the US point of view on a host of
previously "forbidden" issues. They also observed and re-
ported publicly for the benefit of Free World readers many
significant discuslsiens with Russian students and other Sov-
iet young people.
34. The extent and variety of the many unexpect-
ed experiences of the undirected American participants may
be illustrated by the following:
a. They had no trouble in meeting and talk-
ing to large numbers of the "men-in-the- street" in
Moscow. In fact, most of them wherever they went
were the objects of special attention and at times
were engulfed by crowds of eager, curious and
friendly Muscovites of all ages. Usually the conver-
See Appendix for most frequent questions and typical replies..
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sations would begin with two or three questioners,
with more and more people joining in until large
gatherings had assembled. The type of questions
and of responses are illustrated in an appendix to
this study.
b. The more knowledgeable of the American
visitors made a. special point, whenever opportunity
offered, of communicating to the listeners the content
and sometimes the specific language of the report of
the UN Committee on Hungary. This condemnation
of the Soviet Union was previously unknown to the
listeners, since communications relaying the Report
had been jammed or censored. In one dramatic
instance an American graduate student who ventured
into Red Square on the rainy first night of the Festi-
val was buttonholed by curious Soviet youths and
asked a number of rapid-fire questions. When he be-
gan to read the UN report the crowd grew to about a
thousand. "We began to block traffic in Red Square,
he reported, "and the police moved us on, so I went
over to the Lenin Mausoleum and began talking to the
crowd below. At least a thousand people were there
and I had four or five volunteer interpreters from
the crowd going at once. People would rush up with
coats to protect me from the rain. I talked for hours.
They disputed many of the things I said about Hungary
but,at the same time they wanted to hear more and
more. They wanted to listen to what I had to say.
This was really the beginning. We suddenly realized
how important this was and how much we could really
accomplish by such conversations. How anxious, how
incredibly, insatiably curious the Soviet citizens were,
how desirous to talk to Americans to find out all there
was to know about the outside worlds "
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c. On another occasion the Moscow crowd
kept the speaker talking until about 2:00 AM. When
the gathering broke up, the American found that since
all streetcars and buses had stopped running, the only
way he could get to his quarters (some miles away
from the center of Moscow) was by taxi. He discov-
ered that he had no money with him. When the linger-
ing crowd learned of this, they "passed the hat" and
collected more than enough rubles to pay his fare
home !
d. Similar responses were experienced by
other American students in Red Square, at Moscow
University, and in other parts of the city. On sever-
al occasions they were heckled by young party activ-
ists but these in turn were told in more than one in-
stance by others in the audience to "shut up, we want
to hear what he has to say. " The only police interfer-
ence they encountered (and the Moscow police was out
in full force to maintain order during the Festival)
was when the crowds caused traffic jams, as in the
case mentioned previously, and the Americans were
merely told to move along to some other less crowded
spot. In one case a tired policeman in the late even-
ing stood patiently by and asked "Don't you Americans
ever get tired of talking? I'm working over-time and
want to get home. "
e. Various US visitors were approached by
informal groups of Moscow University students for
discussions on many important issues, in particular
those concerned with controversies in the field of
literature, the fine arts, and music.
1The Americans reported that the Soviet students of Amer-
ican literature knew only a relatively few American
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35. As against the tangible success of the informed
young Americans in "getting through" to the Soviet youth and
general public either by speeches or by answering questions,
the Soviet authorities made many quite obvious attempts to
exploit the presence of the Americans for their own purposes.
These took the form of planted radio and press interviews
with the few American participants who were pro-Communist
or with those who were especially naive in their reactions to
the doings in Moscow, and of sharp denunciations of state-
ments by non-Communists. Likewise, small or trivial inci-
dents were exaggerated to "show up" the contrary Americans.
36. Examples of the arranged interviews were:
a. Several broadcasts from Radio Moscow
for home consumption, for broadcast in English to
North America and, selectively, in other languages
to other countries quoting American participants as
being "impressed" with the Festival and with Moscow,
thanking their hosts for the privilege of being present
and repeating the need for "peace and friendship";
one l9-year-old American student was quoted as des-
cribing Khrushchev as "fatherly."
b. Special broadcasts on pin-pointed subjects
such as "US Youth says USSR Right on Hungary" and
excerpts from the speech of an American participant
in the Hiroshima Day rally, in which the American
was quoted as saying "we readily join with all the
youth of the world who denounce all, the horrors of
war" and who argue in favor of the elimination of
atomic weapons..
authors. Among those mentioned several times were Mark
Twain, Jack London, Dreiser, Hemingway, Steinbeck and
Howard Fast. The latter had been extolled to the students as
a great American "proletarian" writer. The Soviet listeners
were apparently amazed to find out that Fast had parted com-
pany recently with the Communist Party, USA.
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c. Great radio and press play was given the
incident of a young theological student with a camera
who, attempting to shortcut his way to a Festival
gathering, climbed over a factory fence and walked
across the factory grounds. He was arrested and de -
t,ained for several hours by the Soviet security police.
In a broadcast of August 10, Moscow Radio gave a
lengthy account of the incident, alleging that the young
"priest" had taken pictures of a "plant working for
defense" and quoting him as saying that he had taken
the photographs at the behest of the "consular Section
of the American Embassy. "
37. Other Soviet broadcasts and press stories
announced that "US Press Admits the Youth Rally a Success"
and quoted liberally from a number of prominent American
newspaper and news services. They did not fail, however,
to denounce certain American correspondents (including
Mr. Daniel Schorr of the Columbia Broadcasting System) for
"distorting" the news about the Festival and they claimed
that the Americans participating in the Festival were "annoyed"
byways in which activities were treated by the American core -
respondents.
38. The concern of the Communist leaders over
the disturbing influences brought into the Festival by the Amer-
icans and others from capitalist countries was vividly demon-
strated by the statement of Alexander N. Shelepin, secretary
of the Central Committee of the Komsomol (Young Communist
League). Writing in Komsomolskaya Pravda after the closing
of the Festival on August 17, Shelepin said:
The task of Komsomol organizations, of all lead-
ing Komsomol organs is now in an organized manner
to assess the results of the festival, to examine what
was good and what was bad, thoroughly to analyze
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everything that took place at the Festival and to draw
the proper conclusions. We must be critical of what
we saw at the Festival for we cannot agree with and
fully accept what some delegations from the capitalist
countries showed at the festival. Komsomol organiza-
tions must in the future also struggle against the pen-
etration into our midst of an ideology, morals and
habits that are alien to--us . . .
Summary of the Soviet Public Reactions to the Amer-
icans.
39. --A wide variety of reports indicates that the
reaction of the Moscow public to the American delegation
must have given the Soviet authorities considerable grounds
for concern. -
a. The citizens of Moscow and the youth of
the city appeared completely genuine in the warmth
of the welcome which they gave the Americans. While
this cordiality was extended to other Western delega-
tions (notably the British) and while there was probably
greater curiosity concerning the more exotic delega-
tions from Asia and Africa, the Americans seemed to
be the focus of the greatest interest. This may be
attributable primarily to the fact that these were the
youth from "the other great power, 11 the great - and
envied - rival of the Soviet Union, the major target
of incessant hostile Communist propaganda.- The
Muscovites visibly enjoyed the Americans and ap-
peared to admire their frankness even when some of
the visitors: made statements highly critical of the
Soviet regime. They wanted to be "liked" and res-
pected by the Americans, and many times expressed
the wish that more Americans had come to the Festi-
val.
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b. Soviet University students were search-
ingly curious about the United States, culturally and
economically as well as politically. By and large they
were deeply ignorant of this country, reflecting the
biased teaching and information they have received
about it; but they showed an eager desire to learn more
of the fact and realities about the United States, its way
of life, its outlook and its policies.
c. On a more superficial level, many young
Russians appeared enthusiastic about the "gayer"
aspects of American life, in particular American jazz
and other popular music. All Soviet listeners were
pleased when an American spoke Russian, even poorly.
There were very few evidences of animosity and a great
manifestation of personal friendliness toward Ameri-
cans in general..
The China Visit of the US Participants
40. One of the largely unanticipated results of the
American group's participation in the Festival was the invita-
tion extended by the Chinese delegation on August 9 to all the
Americans present to visit Communist China. Free trans-
portation with all expenses paid for 15 Americans was part of
the offer; others were asked to pay a token of $100. 00 each.
41. The invitation caused a bitter rift among the
American visitors to Moscow. They were well aware of the
policy of their government toward the travel of any US citizens
to Communist China and the invalidity of their passports for
such a tour. Reports from participants indicate that the 160
Americans debated the proposition all night. The official pos-
ition was re-emphasized by the American Embassy in Moscow
when one young American delegate on August 10 reported to it
the nature and circumstances of the offer. Nevertheless, 41
of the 160 Americans present in Moscow chose to go despite
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the disapproval of their government. Reports indicate that
virtually all of those known to be pro-Communist (about 25)
were among those who elected to go. Thus more than half
of -,the delegation to China, were presumably favorably dis-
posed toward the regime of the country they were visiting.
The rest were merely curious and gripped by a sense of ad-
venture in the presence of an opportunity to see the legendary
and forbidden Communist China at first hand (and at small
cost). Several amateur photographers and professional news
correspondents saw a rare opportunity to make names for
themselves and earn money. A number actually did obtain
assignments from newspapers, wire services, magazines,
or television networks, but two or three were expelled from
China on the grounds of improper activities.
42. Aside from a dbzen.or so }'impartial," non-
politically oriented tourists, the group which went to China
included some three or four militant anti-Communists who
were motivated by the idea that they could help to offset the
pro-Communist or "leftish:" majority by rendering an objec-
tive report of the visit. Two of these walked out on the dele-
.gation, as a sign of protest before the group's tour was com-
pleted. These and a number of other members of the group
were interviewed by Free World press representatives after
they left China (two of them exited at Hong Kong) and after
they got home. The Communist press and radio, both Chin-
ese and Soviet, as might be expected, played up the activities
of the group to support Sino-Soviet Bloc propaganda lines.
43. Among the highlights of these interviews
may be mentioned:
a. The group's itinerary included Peiping,
Changchun, Dairen, Tientsin, Wuhan, Nanking,
Shanghai, Canton, and back to Peiping. All travel
was by train except for a boat trip from Wuhan to
Nanking. Altogether the group covered 7, 500 miles
and stayed in China six weeks.
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b. The whole trip was a conducted "Cook's
Tour, " although the Americans were given the im-
pression at the start they could "see anything they
wanted. " In fact, they saw a great variety of cities,
towns, and villages; they talked to hundreds of work-
ers, farmers, students, intellectuals, and the alleged-
ly "richest capitalists" in the country who gave parties
for them. They visited many Chinese industries
including steel, auto, textile and silk factories.
c. The entire group had an interview with
Chou En-lai. They asked many questions and received
what purported to be "frank" answers, coupled with
some obvious "brainwashing" propaganda. All the
Americans who reported this interview felt that Chou
was "smooth" and would be most persuasive to the
naive or to those who know nothing about the back-
ground of the Chinese Communist regime.
d. 'T'hey received a "warm welcome" wher-
ever they went but it was not comparable to that given
by the Muscovites.
e. The pro-Communists regarded the living
conditions of the people and industrial progress as
"much higher than you might expect"; the non-
Communists as generally "no worse than was expected. "
All agreed that there was no comparison with the stand-
ard of living in the West.
f. From the point of view of the Chinese Com-
munists, the tour was a fairly effective propaganda
show, although the consensus appeared to be that no
new "converts" were made. Thus, those already
oriented in favor of Communist China may have been
confirmed in their views but those unfavorable to it
did not have their basic opinions changed.
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g. Non-Communists. agreed that greater
efforts should be made by the Free World to reach
and to influence the students and other young intellec-
tuals of Communist China. Some believed that the
educated young Chinese are more amenable to values
and concepts of political and social freedom. than their
Russian counterparts who have been under a Commu-
nist regime for a much longer period, although there
were others who were ready to. dispute this view.
Cooperation Among--Nan-Communist ,English Speak-
ing Participants..
44. The non-Communist American participants
at. the Moscow Festival found ready and friendly collabora-
tion not only from their fellow North Americans, the Cana-
dians, but from the large British delegation and to some ex-
tent from the Australians and the New Zealanders. Without
advance preparation, these unregenerated youth, who enjoyed
a common bond of language and traditions of free speech and
debate, formed a tacit and useful alliance. They lent moral
and vocal support to each other in the large public meetings
and, wherever opportunity offered, in the smaller get-
togethers and seminars.. There was general. agreement
among these participants that far more effective results
could have been achieved if collaboration among the non-
Communists in all Free World delegations had been planned
and organized in advance.
45. The British delegation, 1, 650 strong, was
one of the largest and seemingly the most articulate Western
group at the Festival. British reports indicate that more than
a thousand were neither Communists nor fellow-travelers.
Of these a large number were university graduate students,
.instructors, and other mature young intellectuals, and as
many as 50 or 60 were especially well-briefed on the Soviet
Union, on International Communism, and on the intent and.
program of the Festival. These and other British visitors
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demonstrated that they could debate effectively with Soviet
speakers at pre-arranged meetings, and with questioners and
hecklers in the Moscow crowds. At the close of the Festival
the leader of the British delegation expressed the view that
while it is recognized that the Government must
condemn the youth Festivals . . . (it is hoped) that if
there is another . . . their expressions of condemna-
tion will be framed in a way calculated to have a less
discouraging effect on non-Communists who wish to
go, and that the organization of parties of briefed
individuals will be carried out on a bigger scale and
more comprehensively . . .
D. The Intrepid Polish Delegation: Effective Critics
of the Kremlin Orthodoxy
46. The large Polish delegation (1, 250 members)
was the surprise of the youth rally on the Bloc side. It was
well led, well organized, and highly articulate. It had been
expected that the Poles, reflecting the relative liberalization
which followed the events of the Fall of 1956, would be less
rigid and orthodox toward the Party line set for the Festival;
but it was not anticipated that they would so openly and deftly
thwart the immediate intent of the Soviet sponsors, nor that
they would so repeatedly "needle" their hosts.
47. Among other manifestations of independence,
the Poles showed continual friendliness to the Americans
whenever they met. They arranged for a joint meeting of
the US, British, Canadian and Polish delegations on August
10, which the Americans attended in force. The Russian
interpreters assigned. to this - and indeed all - interdelega-
tion meetings repeatedly tried to break up conversations 'be-
tween the Poles and the Westerners, particularly the Amer-
icans; but apparently much friendly and informative conver-
sation.-got through.
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-nNTt'TTlL'TILT IrT A T
48. The United States Information Agency reportedl
that the Polish press wrote extensively on the subject of ideo-
logical discussions between the Polish youth delegation and the
Russians. One article frankly noted: The discussion was
ardent and sharp. rr One meeting between Polish delegates and
the representatives of the new French "left-wing" People's
Movement was devoted to a discussion of workers' councils
and trade unions in Poland. This discussion proved difficult
to control, and Polish reporters indicated that whenever the
current political situation in Poland was debated, the Poles
were usually challenged not only by the Russians but also by
other Bloc participants.
49. Polish and Soviet Writers Meet - The USIA
also commented on the fact that among the Polish delegates
were a number of young writers, who were invited to an in-
formal meeting of the Soviet Writers' Club under the chair-
manship of its secretary, S. Surkov. The meeting, despite
the friendly informality stressed by the hosts, revealed a deep
ideological cleavage, rendered all the more striking by.the fact
that the two groups represented two generations. The Poles
were in their 20's; the Russians mostly belonged to an. older,
middle-aged group. The latter evidently expected that their
guests would follow the Party line in spite of recent articles
which had been published in the Polish press indicating dis-
illusionment with Communism.
50. The following point's emerged at the meeting:
a. The rift existing between the Poles and
the Russians was recognized by both camps.
b. The Russians voiced vigorous objection
to Polish assertions that no creative literary work
"Communist Media Developments,
30 August 1957.
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had emerged from the Soviet Union during the 23 years
since the Soviet Writers' Congress in 1934.
c. The Soviet writers tried to defend the
theory that Socialist realism as a base for literary
work was fully compatible with free development of
creative writing.
d. The Russians accused some of the Poles
of having nothing in common with Marxism.
e. One of the Polish delegates said plainly
that in his opinion the theory of class struggle is i:n-
compatible with full freedom of artistic creation.
f. The Poles and the Soviets disagreed on the
analysis of the works of Gorki.
51. The meeting ended on a note of apparent recon-
ciliation introduced by the Soviet writers. The leader of the
Soviet delegation expressed his approval of the discussion and
its frank nature. Similar exchanges of views, if started earli-
er, he declared, could. have avoided misunderstanding between
the Poles and their Soviet colleagues.
52. Surkov wound up the proceedings with the
announcement that he intends to write a book on the recent
events in Poland. Yet, in spite of the conciliatory tone of his
remarks, the observers of the meeting reported that both the
Poles and the Russians left with a feeling of embitterment.
It was difficult, if not impossible, to find a common ground
between the young Poles, who were enjoying a period of polit-
ical and cultural liberalization at home, and the old-time Com-
munists who accepted the rigidity of the Party line in literature
as a matter of fact. The Poles invoked Mao Tse-tung's doctrine
of "a hundred flowers" in building their case.
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53. The activities and attitude of the Polish dele-
gation seem to have evoked a responsive chord among some
of the other satellites. The Czech monthly Kyeten. in its post-
Festival issue (October 1957) carried a 3, 004-word article by
Jiri Sotola reviewing the artistic performances. of Cgecho-
sl.ovaks and others. Commenting on the contribution of Polish
youth to literary discussions during the Festival, Sotola.
observed:
They did not always speak cleverly, but their
passionate defense of and propaganda for the young
and younger Polish writers such as Roszewicz, Hlasek,
Drozdowski, Bialoszewski and Harasymovicz not only
was sincere and won sympathy but also was evidence
of the fact that young Polish writers are well known in
their country (at least among students) and that they
have many ardent defenders.
54. The Soviet press and radio either did not
report the controversies involving the Poles. or, if it did,
passed them off as examples. of "true freedom" and intere
change of ideas at the Festival. After the Festival, however,
when the "thaw " began to give way to a new intellectual freeze,
Soviet journals leveled attacks on Polish writers in variz us
fields, alleging, "unhealthy tendencies" and "revisionist" in-
fluence. Although much of the propaganda against the Polish
revisionists seemed intended to press them to mend their ways,
it. also appeared designed to counteract the attraction of Polish
views for those Soviet intellectuals who were aspiring toward
greater freedom in their respective fields. For example, the
Soviet philosophical journal Questions of Philosophy in an
article entitled "Is this Marxism? it offered an elaborate crit-
icism of Polish views in the fields of philosophy and natural
and social science.
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55. On October 3, Moscow broadcast in Polish
a Komsomolskaya Pravda article by Kudryavtsev attacking
the Polish writer Slominski for throwing "a whole bucket of
dirt" on Soviet literature and art while on a visit to Japan.
Along with implied warnings to Soviet intellectuals not to
imitate the Poles, Pravda and Moscow radio gave renewed
publicity to the intensified Chinese drive against "rightists,
the sequel to Mao Tse-tung's "contending schools" policy.
This publicity was probably intended to discourage Soviet
intellectuals who were looking upon Mao's doctrine as a
counter to the regime's demands for strict adherence to
orthodoxy.
E. The Hungarian Delegation: Most Puppet-Like
at the Festival.
56. In sharp contrast to the Polish delegation,
that of the new repressive Kadar regime of Hungary .appears
to have been composed largely of young security policemen
and hard-core young Communists. By all accounts, it was
the most obedient and orthodox of any group at the Festival,
including the Soviet delegation itself. The Hungarians were
highly organized and had been intensively briefed for two
weeks before leaving for Moscow. They were equipped with
literally truck~oad.s of printed propaganda upholding the new
regime rand the Soviet intervention at the time of the up-
rising, and denouncing the "Fascist counterrevolutionaries.
57. The Hungarian Party daily Nepszabadsag
on July 23 indicated that the delegation of 1, 100 members was
well prepared for any difficulties which might arise during the
Festival. The Party paper reported that a "dress rehearsal"
was held in Budapest before their departure azd that the mem-
bers were in a camp for five days "where they were informed
about the detailed program of the great event. " It added that
"the Hungarian youth prepared themselves also politically for
the Festival since already the delegations of 50 countries have
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expressed their desire to meet the members of the Hungarian
delegation. " The article also mentioned that:
The delegation will take to Moscow 22-112 tons
of information pamphlets in view of the great interest
expected. Not only do the members of the delegation
want to tell people what happened in our country in
October of last year, but also with the help of books
in many languages, they want to show the truth about
the counter-revolution, and how we continue to build
the country after the great shock.
58.. On.August 6, a pre-arranged meeting was
held with the American participants. According to reports
from Americans, the Hungarians engaged in a. "filibuster"
which was intended to prevent the Americans from voicing
any opinions in favor of the young Hungarians - students, and
workers - who had led the revolt against the regime and been
so bloodily suppressed. The Hungarian delegates handed out
large numbers of pamphlets and pictures of the "atrocities"!
committed by the rebels, in particular pictures taken from
LIFE magazine, showing the shooting of AVH (secret police)
members by the rebels.. Two of these AVH men, who claimed
to have "miraculously" recovered from their wounds, were
paraded as. the heroes of the Hungarian delegation. The Amer-
icans. present at the meeting became so disgusted with the
"offensive'' propaganda and manners of the Hungarians that
they walked out in protest. Had the Americans been prepared
an-d::skilled in debate, they probably could have held their own
much better against the carefully indoctrinated Hungarians.
F. The Israeli Delegation: Jewish Solidarity Spot-
lights Dilemma of Soviet Hosts.
59. Of the two Israeli delegations of about 100
members each, one was definitely Communist sponsored.
The other was equally clearly non-Communist and was com-
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posed of nationalistic, Zionist youth organization representa-
tives. This situation presented two dilemmas for the Soviet
authorities: First, in view of the intensive propaganda effort
being made by the Soviet sponsors to show special favor to the
Arab delegations, the presence of 2,ny Israeli representatives
offered a ticklish problem, particularly in such matters as the
place and status of the Israelis in parades and other big events,
and housing and feeding arrangements.. Too much cordiality
shown the Israelis might offset the red-carpet treatment which
was reserved for the Arabs. Second, while it might be rela-
tively easy to control a Communist delegation or even a mixed
political group in which the Communists could play a leading
role, it would be difficult if not impossible to keep a strong
non-Communist delegation in line. To suppress it, on the
other hand, would be to negate the propaganda boast of the
sponsors that the Festival was intended to be truly open to
all regardless of their political, racial and religious nature.
60. The welcome accorded the Israeli delegates
by their co-religionists surpassed probably anytJng antici-
pated by the Soviet leaders and caused them to take stringent
measures which served to expose their hand far more than
they probably desired. Although the Communist press of other
countries (L'Unitl in Italy, L'Humanite"in France, The Daily
Worker in the USA, and others) reported that in the great par-
ades Arab and Israeli marched "arm in arm, " the Soviet press
kept silent on the subject; and well it might, for the Israeli re-
ported that they were at all times kept away from the Arab youth
and rigidly segregated in their housing and feeding arrangements.
Fervent Response of Moscow Jews
61. On the other hand, wherever they went the
Israelis were besieged by fervent Soviet Jews who wanted to
know the facts about Israel and Jewish culture and progress.
Many of them asked if they could be helped to emigrate to the
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"homeland. " Eyewitne s-s reports state that there were emo-
tional scenes on the Moscow, streets and that spontaneous
demonstrations occurred repeatedly. "From dawn till well
after midnight, ?" a first-hared report from British sources
states;
. . groups of Jews crowded around the living quarters
of the Israeli delegation although it was far out of town,
at the 'Timiriazev Academy' It was a virtual siege and
every young Israeli leaving the building was immediately
surrounded by throngs of Jewish youth, with innumerable
questions about Israel.. The same performance repeated
itself again and again in the streets of Moscow. The peak
of this experience was reached when. the Israeli delegation
visited the Moscow Synagogue. Many of its members were
asked to read the weekly portion from the Bible, and the
thousands of worshippers, with tears of Joy in their eyes,
gave vent to their emotions and expression of happiness
which overwhelmed them at the sight of these young men,
who came to them from t1e Jewish state, and at the sound
of their Hebrew as a living language . .
62. Another report published in the London
Observer on August 9, 1957, stated that:
At the first Israeli concert of the Fe,stival, performers
and listeners alike broke into, tears over the music, and
afte rwards the applauding audience refused to disperse.
It ended with a triumphal march around the hall with the
Israeli flag in the lead. It is clear that it took only the
general license permitted during the Fe stival and the
presence of genuine Israeli representatives to unleash
thTt deep-rooted nationalist sentiment .simmering just
beneath the surface of Soviet Jewry. ''
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Soviet Countermeasures
63. Apparently fearing the spread of the "Zionist
danger, " the Soviet authorities during the second week of the
Festival took a number of measures to minimize or neutralize
the effect of the presence of the Israelis. These included:
a. Last minute shifting of scheduled perform-
ances to out-of-the-way places;
b. Arbitrary issuance of tickets to cultural
events where the Israeli delegation were likely to appear;
c. Assignment of extra contingents of police
to control crowds which gathered around the delegation;
d. A request to the delegation to stop distrib-
uting information pamphlets on the ground that they
constituted "Zionist propaganda";
e. Deceptive measures to conceal the time
of departure of the Israeli delegation and police control
at the railway station to avoid any demonstrations. At
the end of the Festival, all the Israeli delegates were
hurriedly shepherded out of the country. They were
placed aboard "sealed" trains in the middle of the night
at isolated stations. It is reported that somehow, even
here, a sizeable crowd of Moscow Jews showed up to
bid them farewell.
Some Significant Afro-Asian Delegations
64. The Egyptians and Syrians: The Favored
Become Troublesome. As was anticipated, the intensified
Soviet drive - both political and economic - to achieve great-
er influence in Egypt: and Syria led to the delegations from
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those countries being both the largest and the most specifically
privileged of any from the Middle East and Africa. The Egypt-
ian representation is estimated, according to various reports,
to have been between a minimum of 550 and a maximum of 663,
including 21 Egyptian students, at Moscow University. Fifteen
Egyptian correspondents covered the Festival. The Syrians
numbered between 450 and 500. Ten Syrian correspondents
accompanied the delegation. According to reports from ob-
servers of various nationalities the Egyptians and Syrians were:
a. Transported to and from the Festival in
Soviet ships (at least 8 in number) and provided with
all accommodations free of charge while they were in
Moscow.
b. Given favored and spotlighted positions in
the parades and major Festival events.
c. Placed in positions of leadership and prom-
inence in many committees and organized activities of
the Festival.
d. Given especially prominent notice in the
Soviet press and broadcasts.
e. Given "red-carpet" treatment in housing,
feeding, entertainment.
Generally speaking, most non-Communist observers at the
Festival were of the opinion that the majority of the Egyptians
and Syrians appeared thoroughly taken in by the Soviet flattery
and, among all the groups, were the most ardent .and infatuated
in their emotional pro-Soviet reactions.
65. However, a number of reports indicate that
there were sour notes even within this Communist-induced
harmony. Thus; the Egyptians embarrassed their Soviet hosts
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at the start of the Festival by carrying a huge picture of Nas-
ser in the big parade in the Lenin Stadium. According to the
practice dictated by the Communist sponsors of previous Festi-
vals, national delegations were not supposed to feature the
names or pictures of their leaders unless they were Commu-
nists, and evert these were proscribed at the Sixth. Festival in
order to maintain the non-polit.cal illusion. The Egyptians
also were reported to have acted like precocious and spoiled
children, demanding favors, and complaining repeatedly. One
of the leaders of the group protested because he had to share
a room with two other members of the group and also objected
because the hotel to which he was assigned was "primitive and
not very clean. "
66. lndincations of more serious critic.! sm of the
Soviet Union were reported by one of the Egyptian delegates
after he left Moscow. He was of the opinion that the propa-
ganda effects of the Festival were considerably offset because
of the dismal living conditions which were so evident in Moscow.
He felt that Egypt, although a very poor country, had achieved
a generally higher standard of living than the "mighty" social
ist state. He attributed this backwardness primarily to the lack
of "liberty" in the USSR. He further commented t_ e%t many vis-
itors to the Festival sold their clothing in the black market
before they left, even shabby clothes bringing high prices; that
the people of Moscow were truly hospitable and that he could
not understand how the Soviet people could continue to endure
their poor economic conditio:rn.s. Noting that Communism is
illegal in Egypt he wrote home after leaving the Soviet Union
that Communists now in prisen should be released and deport-,
ed to Moscow. How much this delegate's views reflect those
of others in the Egyptian delegation has not been ascertained,
but he implied that a goodly number shared his opi_t?lon. A re-
port from another source indicated that the Egyptian delegates
expressed mass dissatisfaction with the conditions and accom-
modations on the Soviet ships which took them home.
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67. The Ir " is Young Communists Defy their
Government's Ban. The Iraq government, conscious of the
fact that plans for sending delegates to the Festival were
under the direction of the local Communist Party, prohibited
its youth from attending. Nevertheless, a considerable num-
ber of Iraqi appeared. Observer estimates vary as to the
actual number, ranging from 35 to 130; the Festival sponsors
claimed 165. Perhaps the most reliable report was' contained
in. a Baghdad broadcast of September 9, 1957, which stated
that the. Iraqi security authorities had revealed that, the Soviet
Embassy in Damascus had recently furnished visas to 98 per-
sons who went to the Soviet Union from Iraq via Syria. and that
the Embassy had arranged for the Russian ship "Azaria" to
take them. to the USSR via Latakia. The broadcast. stated that
17 of this. group had been arrested upon their return to Iraq.
68. According to observers, the Iraqi delegation
was: predominantly made up of young Communists or pro-
Communists. They did not distinguish themselves particularly
at. the Festival but served to strengthen the numerous Arab and
?'anti..colonialist" gatherings. According to the Arab News
Agency, the Iraqi government felt strongly enough about the
flouting of its prohibition against attendance to try 12 of the
delegates before the Baghdad Criminal Court on. October 19.
The Court gave them sentences ranging from fines of 200
dinars to a. year's imprisonment. Three of them had con-
fessed that they went to Moscow with the aid of the Soviet
Embassy in Damascus. Five others accused were discharged
for lack of evidence. On October 26. the head of the Iraqi dele-
gation and three other members were arrested.
69. The Iranians: Some Sharp Questions about
the Soviet Regime. The Iranian government, also, banned
attendance of its youth at the Fe stival, yet some ten Iranians
arrived in Moscow, certainly. not all Communist sympathizers.
Two Iranian students, one of whom spoke Russian, manifested
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a sharply critical attitude toward the Soviet regime. At their
meeting with the Soviet writers, the Iranians taxed the latter
with the crimes of Stalin and demanded to know how the cult
of personality could have arisen in a Marxist-Leninist society.
The replies to this and subsequent questions asked by the
Iranians merit verbatim repetition:
A - The cult of personality was a deviation from Marxism-
Leninism, and had resulted from the strained interna-
tional and domestic political situation of the time.
Q Why was Stalin denounced only after he had died? Were
those who had worked with Stalin in leading positions
not cowards for having failed to oppose him during
his lifetime?
A - During the war Stalin had personified the Russian nation
and it was impossible to take any action against him.
Q - And after the war?
A - The International situation again became strained.
What are Soviet writers doing now to fight the cult of
personality?
A - This is not a subject on which one can write a. disserta-
tion. However, the film "The Fall of Berlin, " which
portrayed Stalin as a genius responsible for winning
the war cinglehanded and ignored the role of the Party
and the Army, has been taken off the screens and
nothing like it can appear again.
70. The questioning mood reflected i^. t.' is ex-
change probably cannot be taken as symptomatic of the gen-
eral attitude of Iranian youth toward Communism but it is
significant that at least two of the delegates had the courage
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to. express themselves so openly. Recent reports indicate
that the Communists are still trying to win converts among
Iranian youth but that they are not making notable progress.
A report from a Baghdad Pact committee on. Communist sub-
version among students states that:
pure. Communist ideology jas lost much of its
power among students, at least for the time being,
and the Tudeh Party is trying to regain it by various
means, the main one being nationalism of the extreme
and negative type. The connection between Commu-
nism and this kind of nationalism is not obvious, but
it is a fact that International Communism is relying
very much on it, probably because of its: strongly
anti-Western. tendency and also because of its nega-
tive and destructive character.
The report estimates that among Iranian students in. Europe
as a whole not more than 10%a should be regarded as. Comrnu-
nist sympathizers. This does not mean, however, that the
Communists. may not make further headway among Iranian
youth in the future, and the fact remains, that Iran is regard-
ed as a priority target country for Soviet propaganda.
71. The Black Africans.. Mixed Reactions.
No precise count or reliable estimate of the total number of
delegates from Black Africa - like the Middle East, a major
target of the Communists - is available. Even the totals
claimed by Festival sponsors are contradictory. In late June
1957' the International Preparatory Committee claimed to have
established "direct contact'# with 1.8 of the 20 countries in
Africa and that "289 youth and student organizations" had ex-
pressed their desire to send representatives to the Festival.
.Komsomolskaya. Pravda of July 13, 1957, claimed that 305
delegates from Black Africa and the French Antilles would
attend. However, subsequent Soviet broadcasts admitted
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that little information was available about preparations in the
African colonial countries and that political restrictions made
it "tremendously difficult" to establish contact with youth and
student organizations in Africa and stated that "126 lads and
girls from colonial countries of Africa are expected to arrive"
at the Festival. Scattered reports from individual Free World
observers at the Festival indicate that the total number of par-
ticipants from Black Africa turned out to be somewhat more
than the low estimate of 126, but considerably less than the
305 originally targeted.
72. The Black Africans were accorded royal
treatment in public, on TV and radio, and in the Soviet arld
foreign. Party press. Photographs were featured showing the
negro delegates arm-in-arm dancing with Caucasian girls,
swapping autographs, and otherwise intermingl?ng cordially.
A large exhibition was opened in Moscow devoted to African
literature. The relatively few Black Africans were, as might
be expected, given conspicuous positions in one of the Festi-
val's major political. shows, the "Rally in Solidarity with the
Youth of Colonial Countries" (August 2).
73. The Sudanese were by far the largest dele-
gation from the area. It is estimated that they numbered at
least 100, including some 60 who were students in Western
Europe and in Soviet satellite countries (East German youth
sponsored the travel of several of the Sudanese delegates).
The Sudanese Government decreed that participants in the
Festival would be prosecuted under the law, although the
Ministry of Education had allowed five students to accept
scholarships offered by Soviet universities. The Arab News
Agency reported in November 1957 that the Sudanese govern-
ment was taking measures against 60 persons who had defied
the government's prohibition against attendance at the Festi-
val. According to various reports, the Sudanese and many
of the other Black Africans who did attend were impressed
by the treatment they were accorded. An official American
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observer noted that "the impact on the individual delegate
from these countries must have been considerable. r' In this
connection an. African representative remarked that "In the
West children run. from me, whereas here they run to me
asking for my autograph or just wanting to touch me."
74. The Ghana delegates numbering a mere three
h wed, however, that not all African representatives at the 25X1 X700
25X1X7ed Fsfesstival were taken in by Communist propaganda.
the Ghana trio "behaved admir-
ably. a' At the anti colonialist meeting they defended Britain
against attacks from other delegations and said that. "Ghana's
independence proved that Britain voluntarily gave independence 25X1X7^
to its colonies when they were ready for it. "
25X1X7 the Ghanians became "thoroughly disgusted" with
the continued Communist propaganda and went home two days
before the end of the Festival.
75. The Nib delegation numbering no more
than ten did not speak up as, did the Ghanians but, according
to an official Nigerian report, they also were not, taken in by
the Communist appeals. A warning by Nigerian Federal
Commissioner, Mr. M. T. Mou, concerning the exploitation
of students from overseas who took part in the Festival, was
quoted in the Nigerian West. African Pilot (August 26). He
declared uncompromisingly:
The Soviet campaign to exploit young people in
the non-Communist world for its own ends is, one of
the most sinister aspects of Moscow's long-term
strategy. Young people who went from Nigeria
realized that a. special ovation is given to delegates
from colonial and under-developed countries, whose
sympathies: the Communists are anxious to enlist,
and were not deceived.
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IV. GAINS AND LOSSES FOR INTERNATIONAL COM -
MUNISM FROM THE FESTIVAL
In attempting to draw a balance sheet of the Festival
we shall present Soviet gains and losses under the five head-
ings of Propaganda Aims, set forth in Section I. B.
A. In Imparting a Benign. ,New Look" to the Soviet
Union.
The Soviet View.
76. Official Soviet publications leave little doubt
that the Soviet leaders felt that the Festival had been a success.
Shelepin, head of the Komsomol, despite his previously quoted
warning to Soviet youth, said after the close of the Festival:
The Festival answered the slanderous inventions of
reactionary propaganda about our country and will
undoubtedly contribute to the spreading, among the
youth and population of foreign countries, of the truth
about . . . the truly popular nature of the Soviet social
and state order . . . of the flourishing of culture.
The Festival's International Committee, summing up the re-
sults of the Festival, stated:
We met at the Festival in order to discuss in a friend-
ly manner many vital problems which are agitating
young people, wherever they may be, whatever polit-
ical and religious views they may have, and whatever
nationality they may belong to.
77. An even more explicit affirmation of the pos-
itive achievements of the Festival was set forth by Khrush-
chev. 1 In response to the question "Do you consider Youth
lInterview with V. Sindbaek, editor of Danski Folke styre,
Danish Youth Magazine, published in Pravda, January 15, 1958.
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Festivals the ideal way for young people of East and West to
meet? " Khrushchev replied in part:
The World Youth Festivals have very great
merits . . . One still hears that the World Youth. Fe qti-
vals are a 'Communist undertaking'. It is said that
many of the participants in the Moscow Festival were
at first inclined to be wary, but on closer acguaint-
ance they understood that there was nothing to fear.
No one wants to impose his ideas or way of life on
anyone, all want only one thing - to. live in peace and
friendship,. enjoy the benefits of science and culture
and help peoples to move along the road of progress
and prosperity. People of different countries have
different ways of life and thought. Two different
systems exist today - socialist and capitalist. And
for people living in these states there is no way out
except to live peacefully side by side with one another,
to respect each other's opinions. It seems to me that
the World Youth Festivals, in bringing together repre-
sentatives of the younger generation of different na-
tions, contribute to this understanding.
Free World. Views.
78. Hundreds of reports giving impressions and
evaluations of the Moscow Festival, both from official observ-
ers stationed in Moscow and from the vast press corps, present
a widely divergent picture of the propaganda effects. There was
a large measure of agreement, nevertheless, that the "new face"
of the Festival was highly specious. Thus, the Hamburg inde-
pendent journal Die Welt noted (August 13, 1957):
. . . this year's magnificent Youth Festival, in Mos-
cow, which would be impossible anywhere else in the
world on this scale, and with this make-up served,
not least, to advertise the Soviet Union and its Com-
munist social system . . .
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The London News-Chronicle (August 7) in an editorial head-
ed "The Moscow Circus, " commented:
The high jinks in Moscow make agreeable reading.
Hatred seems to have taken a back seat and the young
people drawn from nearly all the nations of the earth
appear to be finding a unity which their elders seek
in vain. The underlying tension and hostility between
the West and the Communist worlds persist. The
Youth Festival has a political purpose to fulfill. The
News Chronicle believes that contacts between-those
living under Communism and people from the outside
world does more good than harm, even if the intention
of the meetings is to make Soviet propaganda. But we
must not ignore the fact that to the Kremlin the Youth
Festival is a weapon in the cold war.
The London Socialist Commentary (September 1957) wrote:
. . . The reasons for the generosity of the Soviet
Government are not far to seek. After the perform-
ance of Soviet tanks in Hungary, a far greater price
would have been worth paying to make of Moscow the
Mecca of a Peace and Friendship pilgrimage. The
Kremlin needed this sign of support not only to break
through the ring of disgust with which events in Buda-
pest had surrounded Russia, but also to present to
their own youth the picture of a world which sees in
Moscow one place where Peace and Friendship blos-
som. This the Soviet leaders achieved, But they
paid for it not only with roubles. Among the 'dele-
gates' from the democratic West were some who were
determined to tell the Russians how people really live
when they are free, and from all accounts it appears
that the Muscovites eagerly listened to them. For all
the noise of the official propaganda trumpets these
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i"~TTTT TTTTTrrT A T _
small voices of truth may have left a lasting effect
on the minds of those Soviet people who came in con-
tact with non-Communists from. the West.
Soviet Gains
79. The Soviet leadership's desire to create an
atmosphere of liberality and friendliness Was greatly facil-
itated by the genuine enthusiasm and cordiality of the Moscow
citizenry. The manifest spontaneity of their welcome to fore
eigners evoked a warm response even from seasoned non-
Communist observers, and perhaps served to modify some-
what their conviction that the Fe stival was intended to be
entirely a rigged Communist show. The whole show of rela-
tive moderation and tolerance exhibited during the Festival
probably created a number of "missionaries of goodwill" who,
even though not Communists or consciously influenced by
Communist appeals, would speak well of the Soviet Union
upon their return home.
80. The appearance of open-mindedness and
"humaneness" probably did far more than any direct propa-
ganda about Hungary to dull the memory of the agony of
youth in Budapest. The ways in which the Poles spoke up
and generally were permitted to behave in unorthodox ways
was also impressive to many Free World as well as Bloc
participants.
81. Above all, the new air of freedom kindled
hopes among many sincere, idealistic, non-Communist youth
(and perhaps even among Soviet and Bloc youth) that they were
truly observing an augury of better things to come . The will
to believe the best about the Soviet regime, and to live peace-
fully with it, and the hope that it will ultimately achieve con-
sistence between its professed ideals and its evident prac-
tices, are still strong among many people, serious adults
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as well as youth. Americans are not alone among well-
meaning Westerners in hoping that the Soviet Union will
become "more like user and develop into a freer society
and a force for peace in the world.
Soviet Losses
82. In some aspects the show of liberality was
rather heavy-handed. Although the police did not interfere
with non-Communist speakers, they did conduct surveillance
and interrogation of a number of Soviet citizens who had con-
tacted Westerners. It was quite apparent in some of the
specialized meetings that the Communists would permit
free discussion to proceed just so far and then would use
their customary tactics of taking over and shutting off any
undesirable speeches. or questions. Some of the student
seminars and the meetings with Soviet writers and econom-
ists did much to dispel the myth of the new freedom and open-
mindedness within the Soviet Union which the Festival spon-
sors had tried to create. However, only a relatively small
number of delegates attended these meetings.
83. On balance, and considering the effects on
the great mass of attendants at the Festival, it would appear
that the gains for the USSR exceeded the losses and that the
"new look" propaganda aim was probably advanced more
successfully than any of the other propaganda objectives.
B. To Help Recoup Soviet Prestige Among Commu-
nist Oriented Youth of All Countries as Part of
the Campaign to Stabilize International Com-
munism.
84. The achievement of this aim may be con-
sidered from three points. of view, i. e. the extent to which
the Festival helped the Soviet Party leadership to (1) rewin
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the loyalty, devotion .and respect of youth within'other Com-
munist countries; .(2) re-establish itself as the leader, guide
and mentor of Communist-oriented youth in the Free World,
and (3) bolster the sagging.status among world youth of the
controversy-ridden major international youth front organi-
zations, the WFDY and the IUS. The gains and losses listed
below are set forth in terms of these three objectives.
Soviet Gains
85. The record-breaking attendance of some
35, 000 youth from 131 countries and the world publicity
given the more glamorous aspects of the Festival undoubted-
ly succeeded in creating within the Communist world an im-
pression of resourceful initiative and organizational mastery
on the part of the Soviet leadership. The fact that more than
half of the visiting delegate 5T were from Free World countries
- and that a high percentage of those were non-Communist -
created an added impression of confident strength. The Sov-
iet leaders demonstrated that they were willing to take the
chance, unprecedented in Communist circles, of allowing
the political heathen to express themselves openly within the
shadow of the Kremlin itself. The fact that the Poles were
allowed previously unimaginable leeway in criticizing certain
aspects of Soviet life and tendencies within the Communist
movement must likewise have eased - at least momentarily
some of the tensions which have been, building up among sat-
ellite youth since the Polish break from Stalinist orthodoxy.
The great show of camaraderie at the Festival also probably
tended to black out memories of the agonized cries of Hungar-
ian youth.
86. The impact of the Festival on the Western
European delegations appears to have been neither better nor
worse than the Communist sponsors probably expected. Quite
clearly few new converts were made from the ranks of the
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non-Communists but on the other hand, judging by post-
Festival reactions and events, few of the faithful were lost
to the cause. More positive gains were evidenced among the
Arabs, Asian and Latin American delegates.
87. The WFDY, which had shown signs of a
weakening in its hold over youth, particularly among its Free
World affiliates, was no doubt reinvigorated by the outward
success of the Festival. Of all the Communist fronts, the
WFDY had perhaps suffered the greatest losses in prestige
and membership in the latter days of Stalin. After Stalin's
death it had attempted by various tactical innovations to ap-
peal to non-Communists without changing its highly central-
ized and authoritarian character. In the aftermath of the
20:' Party Congress it had "liberalized" itself and loosened
its hold over its national affiliates. The reverberations of
the Hungarian revolt threatened an irreparable split in the
organization, forcing the WFDY to adopt an unprecedented
policy of decentralization, placing greater emphasis upon
bilateral or regional liaisons initiated by national organiza-
tions and subordinating its own role as the dictating, central
authority. This reflection of the general "thaw" in weld
Communism, however, was only temporary. The WFDY's
role in organizing the "non-political, open to all" Festival
probably helped restore its standing in international youth
circles. The IUS, which had been torn by inner dissent
particularly after the Hungarian revolt, also must have found
a badly needed restorative in the activity of the Festival.
88. The continuing process of exploiting the
Moscow Festival was demonstrated by the follow-up meeting
of the Fourth World Congress of the WFDY held in Kiev
(16-23 August 1957). One of the directives of this Congress
prescribed that correspondence contacts be maintained with
all persons who had attended the Moscow event or taken part
in any of its preparatory activities. The special emphasis
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placed by the Communist leaders on the need for extending
the influence of WFDY and IUS in the Afro-Asian area is
further evidenced by the decision of the Cairo Afro-Asian
Solidarity Conference (December 1957-January 1958) to estab-
lish a regional organization for youth with affiliates through-
out the area. The WFDY and IUS were officially represented
at this conference and have subsequently contributed to the
implementation of the Conference?s decisions. The WFDY
now claims that it has a total of 94 affiliates in Afro-Asian
countries with a combined membership of 35 million young
people. (It is assumed, however, that the Communist coun-
tries of the Far East are included in this total and probably
provide the major part of the total).
89. Preparations for the next Festival in Vienna
are likewise being utilized by the WFDY and IUS to strength-
en themselves organizationally. Many local, national and
regional "preparatory" committees for the Moscow Festival
have been kept in being and are now renewing their efforts
as committees for the Seventh Festival. It is quite likely
that these have, in effect, become permanent bodies. It is
significant that the WFDY and IUS began their organization-
al preparations for the next Festival much sooner after the
last one than ever before in the history of their co-sponsor-
ship of these events.
90. The success of the Moscow Festival as a
stimulant to future organizational efforts among world youth
- and also, significantly, as a source of recruitment of
activists for the International Communist youth movement -
was proclaimed explicitly1 by N. Mikhailov, USSR Minister
of Culture:
Novy Mir, No. 10, October 1957.
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From the results of the 6th Festival, from its scope
and breadth, there must also be drawn the conclusion
that among the young people there we trained remark-
able cadres of organizers and propagandists capable
of rallying millions of young people for unity under
the banner of a fight for peace and friendship among
the peoples. (Underlining added).
91. Complaints were heard from satellite dele-
gations (in particular the Bulgarians, the Rumanians, and to
some extent the Czechs) that they were discriminated against
at the Festival, i.e.. given positions of less prominence than
they deserved, less favored housing, food, etc. This is not
the first time that the "captive" satellite delegates have been
slighted at Festivals. It appeared to be a necessary conse-
quence of the major effort to court so many other delegations,
notably those from the Asian-African areas. Another com-
plaint - from the Bulgarians at least - was that they were
'Pput through the wringer" by their own security forces before
they were permitted. to go to Moscow, and were made to feel
like political suspects rather than faithful supporters of the
regime.
92. The Poles, while perhaps breathing more
freely for the moment, because of the leeway given them in
Moscow, certainly did not become any more convinced of the
need for a return to orthodoxy. The-. much publicized riots
over the suppression of the Polish student newspaper Po
Prostu - which occurred about two months after the Festival
- suggest that the open show of tolerance at the Festival may
have stimulated the already seething heterodoxy of Polish
youth.
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C. In Obtaining Support for Soviet Foreign Policy Aims
For the "Peace/?Campaign
94. The most obvious political objective of the
Festival centered in the theme of "peace and friendship. "
The end purpose was to persuade world youth that the Soviet
Union was the true champion of peaceful coexistence, nuclear
disarmament and the cessation of nuclear tests, that the United
States aggression is the major threat to peace, and that youth
in all countries should campaign militantly against Western
air and missile bases and-the collective defense arrangements
between the Free World nations. The peace motif had pre-
dominated in past Festivals but in Moscow it was intensified
and dramatized by endless repetition. The opening speeches
of the Communist leaders, the banners carried and the slo-
gans chanted in every parade, the major mass meetings such
as the Hiroshima Day rally, the ubiquitous white doves - real
and symbolic - and the massive publicity in print and over the
radio and television, all proclaimed the peace theme.
95. This saturating propaganda effort strikingly
illustrated the ways in which the International Communist
front organizations supplement each other. In this case, the
WFDY and IUS as organizers of the Festival effectively car-
ried out on a large scale among youth the program primarily
assigned to the World Peace Council.
96. The impact of this effort would appear to
have been greatest among the Communist-influenced youth
of the uncommitted countries. Their will-to-believe in the
Soviet Union as a force for peace, as against the allegedly
imperialistic and war-mongering Western powers, was prob-
ably reinforced temporarily by the Moscow display.
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97. It is probable that the peace propaganda also
affected some of the non-Communists at the Festival, even
among those who readily recognized the appeals to youth as
Soviet political propaganda. Many indicated that they were
bored by the trite and repetitious slogans. However, the
yearning for peace and for surcease from the anxiety over
nuclear war probably caused some of the more naive and
idealistic to leave the Festival with the feeling that, after all,
the Free World powers should make stronger attempts to
"meet the USSR halfway." The achievement of even this mixed
effect would be a gain from the Soviet point of view. The Com-
munist leaders do not expect to make full converts to their
ideology through the Festivals; partial persuasion is a suffi-
cient accomplishment.
D. Extension of Soviet Influence in the Afro-Asian
and Latin American Areas
98. The pervasive anti-colonialist and anti-
imperialist programs and the special treatment accorded the
Arab, Black African and Asian delegates and as a close second,
the Latin American representatives, were carefully planned
phases of the intensified campaigns to extend Soviet influence
in the underdeveloped areas.
99. The major Soviet objectives in the Afro-
Asian area are to give support to national liberation move-
ments; to foster political neutralism; to encourage the kind
of Afro-Asian unity in which the Communist Bloc countries
of Asia (including the USSR which claims to be an Asian coun-
try) would be accepted as full and equal partners, entitled to
preferential political, cultural and economic treatment; to
promote nationalization of foreign-owned enterprises, to
create suspicion and if possible outright enmity toward the
West and particularly the United States, and to develop eco-
nomic and cultural ties with the Soviet Union. In middle
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Eastern and African countries the youth front organizations
are of major importance, supplementing the activities of the
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the World Peace
Council and the organizations it inspires such as the Afro-
Akan Solidarity Conference (Cairo, December ].957-January
1958). The Soviet purposes in Latin America are essentially
the same, although the fostering of suspicion and enmity is
even more specifically aimed at the United.States.
100. Since the Moscow Festival, renewed efforts
have been made by WFDY and IUS to increase the effective-
ness: of their programs in Latin America. The programs,
exploiting the recent student demonstrations against the United
States in several countries, call for solidarity between the
Latin American and Afro-Asian areas in resisting. "colonial-
ism" of the United States. This theme will undoubtedly be
stressed at the Seventh Festival in Vienna.
Soviet Gains
101. Upon return to their homelands the Afro-
Asian,, in particular the Egyptian and the Syrian delegates to
the Festival, agitated for grater efforts on the part of their
local youth organizations on behalf of Soviet political objec-
tives, particularly the exacerbation of anti-Western national-
ism. The WFDY Congress at Kiev, after stressing the import-
ance of the Moscow Festival, outlined as one of the "main paths'
for the activities of the WFDY the rendering of "assistance to
young people of the colonial countries, " and called for "common
action" iin favor of "rights of self-determination, freedom and
national independence." The Congress, reaffirming its adher-
ence to "the principles: of the Bandung Conference, " empow>
edits Executive Committee to organize collectives in all
countries for the enlargement of the international solidarity
fund and otherwise to "lend assistance to youth organizations
in. the colonial countries. ""
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102. Bruno Bernini, Communist President of
WFDY, summing up the results of the Festival and the Kiev
Congress, stated that one of the distinguishing features of
these gatherings "was the high activity displayed by the dele-
gates from the newly independent countries and colonies"
(New Times No. 35).
103. The Latin American delegations, upon their
return home, redoubled their efforts to expand or create new
units of the WFDY and IUS, soliciting the membership of non-
Communist individuals and organizations.
104. Propaganda themes of the Soviet Union., of
a kind not ordinarily printed in the local non-Communist.
press, were published extensively in the newspapers and mag-
azines of many Afro-Asian and Latin American countries as
a result of the world focus on the Festival. News reports
and interviews with: returning delegates frequently stressed
the "great progress" of the Soviet Union, the "great" city of
Moscow and the "magnificence" of the Festival. Among the
other post-Festival WFDY-IUS activities in the Asian-African
area were the sponsoring of youth and student conferences,
congresses, seminars and local "festivals" variously in such
countries as Egypt, the Sudan and Senegal. Meetings of this
type are regarded by the WFDY and 1US as important "bridges"
enabling them to make contact with leaders of non-member
organizations in target alas and as a means of propagandiz-
ing the "identity" of WFDY-IUS objectives and policies with
those of the bona-fide national youth organizations, thus pav-
ing the way for the kind of united front desired by the Commu-
nists.
Soviet Losses
105. Despite extensive Communist penetration
of the delegations from the "underdeveloped" areas, there
was a strong note of anti-Communism. We have mentioned
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above the critical, sometimes caustic,, comments of delegates
from Egypt, Iraq, and Iran; and the questioning Attitude of the
Qhana delegates dramatized by their walkout. from the Festival.
Several of the Latin American delegates, previously regarded
as pro-Communist, upon their return expressed sharply crit-
ical views. Thus, a Brazilian state deputy - a delegate to the
';,Festival who had been regarded as pro-Communist - in a speech
before. the Sao Paolo Assembly, criticized the Soviet economic
system, _ citing the long hours of work and the lack of consumer
nods.. Another deputy said that after visiting the Soviet Union
am today more. convinced than ever that Brazil. despite every-
'thing i,s,still a paradise. -t The President of the Pernambuco
Assembly-and three others, annoyed by the pre-Festival propa-
ganda and pressures upon: the Brazilian delegation, gave up the
trip in Prague,' returned to West Germany and then. Went home.
Another- deputy, returning to Sao Paolo, gave a series of half-
hour broadcasts on the local radio uncomplimentary to the Festi-
val. and its sponsors. Members of.the Brazilian Bach Chorale
Scxciety publicly criticized the- Soviet regime after their return.
A Sao Paolo political columnist known. for "leftist" views ad-
mitted that he was disillusioned with the "marvel" of the Soviet
Union after attending the Festival.
106. The flattering attention and the repeated
protestations of Soviet friendship and concern for their coun-
tries, undoubtedly evoked a considerable emotional response
in the delegates from the underdeveloped areas. However,
the realities of life in the Soviet Union which were readily ob-
servable behind the glittering Festival faiade must have raised
doubts in the minds of visitors who, though from countries
which are "backward". from a West European or American
point of view, in many respects still enjoy a standard of living
superior to that of the average Soviet citizen. To the delegates.
from the more advanced Latin American countries the contrast
must have been even sharper.
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107. :any delegates from the underdeveloped
areas talked and made friends with Western non-Communist
delegates, perhaps for the first time in their lives. These
person-to-person contacts were in sharp contrast to the rigged
meetings and the staged propaganda of the Communists.
E. To Curb Dissent and Bolster the Faith of Soviet
Youth ni . the Strength and Wisdom of the Parma
Soviet Gains
108. The Festival provided a colorful, glamor-
ous and "harmonious-" environment in which to deliver special
exhortations to Soviet youth not only to act as exemplary hosts
at the Festival and as leading participants in the various events
but also to press on to greater work achievements. In this res-
pect the Festival was designed to have the same inspiriting
effect as a gala convention in the Free World. The speeches
of Voroshillov (and later Khrushchev), Shelepin and other Com-
munist leaders were directed as much to Soviet youth as to
the delegates from foreign, countries. Throughout the Festi-
val the Soviet delegates were under strict discipline and guid-
ance.
109. The ability to attract some 35, 000 young
people from more othan 130 countries wag calculated to - and
probably did - impress the Soviet Union's own youth with the
lasting appeal that the regime has abroad (despite the ugly
Hungarian business), with the aplomb of the leaders it going
ahead with the Festival in a time of troubles and with the con-
tin-ui.r g efficiency and dispatch of the party in orga zing, and
conducting such a vast and varied enterprise.
110. The show of bonhomie toward So many young
men and women from all over the world, the unprecedented
freedom given non-Communists to speak their minds and to
mingle with the crowds in Moscow (although : t was known that
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the police were always lurking in the background) must have
at least momentarily confused some of the questioning Soviet
youth and caused them to wonder if this was truly a sign of
better things to come.
1.11. Soviet patriotism rode high from the initial
great opening ceremony at Lenin Stadium through the ballets,
concerts, exhibits and the big sports events. The Soviet lead-
ers must have attached great weight to this manifestation of
national pride and to itsafter-effects
Soviet Losses,
112. As indicated in_Shelepin's strong warning to
Soviet youth against contamination of "alien ideas, habits and
customs," and in subsequent admonitions by other Communist
spokesmen, the regime itself admitted the incursion of some
1One of the most explicit admissions by the Soviet regime that
dissent exists within the ranks of its students is contained in an
article "An Important Political Task - Upbringing tf Students"
by Professor A. D. Alexandrov of the USSR Academy of Sciences
.and rector of the A.A. Zhdanov Leningrad State University in
Vestnik. Vyshei Shkoly No. 3, March 1958.. Repeating the theme
that "this intelligentsia must be completely devoted to the cause
of Communism" and. that "criticism of defects in our work" is
essential in achieving that goal, the university rector admits
that "the general enthusiastic activity of the students is some-
times accompanied by unhealthy phenomena. indicating insuffi-
cient social consciousness on the part of some of the students
. . Such students: often . . . raise political questions without
tryin to quire a serious grasp of them; when they talk of
literature and art, they chase after originality; and they pass
judgment on matters left undone without any idea of the work
already accomplished to overcome the omissions. Extremes
are encountered - the grossest violations of order, amoral
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unwelcome and "dangerous" manifestations at the Festival.
The counter-infection, spread primarily by the Western dele-
gates, but also by those from such countries as Iran and Ghana,
was of a cultural and social as well as a political character.
The strictures of the Party, Komsomol and educational lead-
ers during and after the Festival appeared to have been as much
directed against the potentially subversive impact of freedom in
the arts (abstract modernism versus "socialist realism") and
of individualism in literature as against "bourgeois" concepts
of political freedom. It also reflected alarm over the corrupt-
ing influences of American jazz and natty Western clothing
styles upon the "stilyagi, " who are constantly denounced as
"idlers, loafers, hooligans and delinquents. r1
113. Soviet youth were also exposed to corrosive
effects of apathy and ideological impertinence manifested by
some of the other Bloc delegates. The Bulgarians, Ruman-
ians and Czechs appeared to be strikingly indifferent. The
Poles, as noted above, were bold, independent, sharp ques-
tioners whose views at times bordered on heresy. While the
behavior of their satell.te neighbors may not have been dam-
agingly subversive to Soviet youth, it could scarcely have
passed unnoticed and may well have remained in the conscious-
ness of the more perceptive individuals.
acts. Such instances it must be said are uncommon (and)
one can deal with harmful talkers and violators of order by
administrative measures. The chief thing is that the students
themselves do not always rebuff such unhealthy phenomena . . .
Contact with the astuderts means reliance upon the student or-
ganizations . . . above all through the Young Communist League.
I
A new word has been coined for another category of Soviet
youth, the cynical and the bored: the "nibonicho. "
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114. On balance, it would appear that the Festival
as a force for.bolstering the morale and loyalty of the Soviet
younger generation was less effective than desired by the Com-
munist leadership. Indeed, the generally negative results
might have been far more apparent had they not been offset
by the burst of pride which resulted from the post-Festival
scientific and technological successes symbolized by the sput-
niks.
V. PREVIEW OF THE 1959 FESTIVAL
A. Vienna as the Setting for the First Festival to be
Held in the Free World.
115. After considerable vacillation the Commu-
nist leadership of the WFDY and its partner the IUS have de-
cided to hold the Seventh World Youth Festival in Vienna from
26 July to 4 August, 11959. Peking and Prague had previously
been proposed, and Colombo, Ceylon, was considered as the
first Free World capital for the event.. Subsequently Vienna
was selected, and negotiations were opened with the Austrian
Fi deral Government in order to make the requisite plans and
arrangements. The City of Vienna objected strenuously on
the grounds that the mass influx of youth delegates in mid-
summer would adversely affect the prosperous tourist trade.
The views of the Federal Government seem to have prevailed,
however, and preparations are now being made for the hold-
ing of the event in Vienna.
Why Was Vienna Chosen?
116. Apparently the Communist leadership of the
international youth front organizations first promoted Vienna
as the scene for the Seventh Festival through the affiliated
Austrian Communist youth organization (FOEJ) which held its
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Fifth Federal Congress in Vienna on 7-8 December 1957.
Subsequently the WFDY held a conference in Vienna, decided
to accept the "invitation" of the Austrian youth organization,
and recommended that an already-scheduled meeting in Stock-
holm in March 1958 discuss the preparatory work and select
an international festival committee to be responsible for the
preparations.
117. Experienced Western observers of Commu-
nist sponsored youth festivals offer the following reasons why
Vienna was preferred. for the 1959 Festival:
a. The Communists want to "legitimize" the
festivals and their sponsoring front organizations by
maintaining the impression that they are cultural and
nonpolitical in nature and are "open to all. " The Kiev
Congress of the WFDY urged "cooperation with all youth
organizations, both national and international, " stated
that the activities of the WFDY "are open to all forces
desiring to take part in them" and instructed its Execu-
tive Committee to continue or undertake during 1958-9
measures that would promote "acquaintance and cooper-
ation between youth organizations of countries with dif-
ferent economic and social systems. "T The Communist
leadership undoubtedly feels these aims can be achieved
with greater plausibility if the next Festival is held
within the Free World.
b. A neutral country will provide a suitable
psychological environment for the repetition of the
a"peace P1 themes which are predominant in Soviet f6regn
poll cy propaganda.
c. For the Soviet view a small neutral and
nearby country such as Austria is amenable to Soviet
pressures and flier fdre'.-is= a;ot likely to tie, or to per
-
mit, any strong actions against the Festival.
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d. More youth representatives from uncom-
mitted countries may be induced to come to a free,
neutral country like Austria than would be the case if
the Festival were again held behind the Iron Curtain.
There would also probably be fewer restrictions placed
by Free World governments on the travel of their youth
to Vienna as against a Bloc capital.
e. The danger of contamination by Free World
ideas will be limited to the relatively few official and
well-indoctrinated delegates from Bloc countries, where-
as larger masses of youth might be affected - as in
Moscow if the Festival were again held in a Commu-
nist country.
f. Vienna of all Free World capitals has been
willing to permit the maintenance of the headquarters of
Communist front organizations, and has perhaps been
more amenable than any other to Soviet pressures. If,
however, the Austrian authorities - influenced by polit-
ical parties and youth organizations opposed to the Festi-
val - should decide to cancel the invitation, the Commu-
nist sponsors could readily shift the event to nearby
Prague.
Austrian ?pposition to the Seventh Festival
118. Since the Government's decision to permit
the holding of the Festival in Vienna, Austrian political parties
and youth groups have expressed strong opposition. The Social
Democratic Party has forbidden, its members to participate: in
the event. Deputies of the Freiheitliche Partei Qesterreichs
criticized the Government in Parliament for permitting Vienna
to become the site for the event. In reply the Austrian Chan-
cellor said that as a free and democratic state Austria could
not have refused.
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119. At its Congress on 6 May 1958, the Austrian
National Union of Students voted to maintain strict avoidance
of contacts with Communist-dominated youth organizations and
not only to boycott the Seventh Festival but also to undertake
definite steps against it. Subsequently the NUS formed a united
action committee with the various Conservative and Catholic
youth groups to plan for peaceful but positive counteraction.
120. Despite these sentiments, there appears to
be the same kind of difference of opinion among non-Commu-
nists in Austria about the wisest course to be taken toward the
Festival that is evident in other parts of the Free World. While
the Catholic newspapers of Graz and Innsbruck were demanding
in "indignant tones, B1 according to the Communist Volkstimme
of 18 May, that the Government should throw out the organizers
of the Festival, the more important Catholic journal, Die Furche,
editorialized that the West ought to be glad ff the opportunity
afforded by the Festival to show Western achievements to the
tens of thousands of youth coming to Vienna from Eastern coun-
tries.
B. The Preparations.
121. The Stockholm conference selected a prepa,-r-
atory committee (list of names of members is given in the Ap-
pendix). Perhaps the outstanding feature of this preparatory
committee is the strong emphasis once again placed on repre-
sentation from the Afro--Asian and Latin American areas. The
proportion from these areas is considerably higher than was
the case in 1957. Of the 115 committee members of all nation-
alities, 63 or about 55% are from the African, Asian. and Latin
American countries combined, as against a total of 73 or
slightly less than 50% of the 150 on the Moscow Festival's prep-
aratory commission. On the 1959 commission, 27 of 115, or
about 23%, are Latin Americans, whereas in 1957 there were
25 out of 150, or only about 17%, from South and Central Amer-
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ica. The percentage from the Afro-Asian countries remains
about the same for the Sixth and Seventh Festivals. This
representation would appear to indicate that appeals to the
underdeveloped areas will be as much or more a feature of
the Vienna as of the Moscow Festival.
Fewer Delegates, Fewer Student Seminars.
122. While the general pattern of past youth festi-
vals will undoubtedly be followed in the forthcoming one, there
may be some changes in its scope and emphasis. As previously
noted, the 1959 Festival will be shorter and smaller than the
Moscow event (nine days as compared with fourteen; 17, 000
delegates from 124 countries instead of approximately 35, 000
from 131 countries. The Communists have not as yet offered
an explanation for this reduction. As previously indicated,
however, it can be conjectured that the complaint of many del-
egates at the Moscow gathering a including some from the Bloc
countries - that the events in Moscow were over-extended and
produced a feeling of ennui among the participants has been
heeded by the sponsors. Repetition and dragging out of the
same themes, slogans and stimulated enthusiasm can defeat
their own purposes if carried too far. The cut in delegates
is probably in part a .response to the plea of the Austrian author-
ities that the Festival not be the cause of, crowding out any more
of the regular summer visitors than is absolutely necessary.
The decision to reduce the numbers is also probably the result
of the Communists' belief that they can now easily control and
manipulate the fewer delegates in a foreign environment.
Recent information indicates that the Western delegations will
be cut more than proportionately in order to make room for
larger groups from the underdeveloped areas. Finally, it is
believed that finances must be a factor. Even if the 6stmated
cost of the Moscow Festival of about 100 million dollars is re-
garded as somewhat high, nevertheless the expenditure by the
Soviet Union was still a huge one. Since much of the expense
of the Vienna event will probably have to be paid in Austrian
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currency rather than in rubles, it would put an added strain
on the Communist treasury unless the total cost were to be
substantially reduced.
123. The commission has also decided that the
experience of the past Festival shows the need to reduce the
number of seminars. (It will be remembered that the student
seminars in Moscow proved particularly troublesome to the
Communist leaders). The committee at present intends to
limit the student seminars in 1959 to the following:
a. On methods of higher education.
b. On, the problems of technical progress
and its relation to social development and technical
education.
c. On the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
d. On the problems of the economy of colonial
and under-developed countries.
e. On the role of students and their organ,;-
eations in the public life, of independent and colonial
countries .
The only one of these topics that is similar to those at the
1957 Festival is the one on the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
It would appear significant that such outstandingly well-
attended seminars as those in Economics, Philosophy, and
Literature at the Moscow Festival will not be repeated in
Vienna, presumably because these were the "controversial"
fields which gave too m ich opportunity for challenging the Com-
munist line. The faculty meetings included in the Moscow pro-
gram have been re-named 'fstudy tours, " and while recom-
mended by the commission, the terms betray hesitation and a
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deliberate vagueness of approach. There is a long list of
seminar topics which include biology, mining, electricity,
astronomy, music, films and others, but there are no indi-
cations of the form or length of the meetings, people who
would conduct them, or their purpose other than, to facilitate
an exchange of ideas between students engaged in the same
type of studies.
124. According to USIA, the growing importance
of the seminars as propaganda vehicles is evident fr?orr}':`the
proposed agenda for Student Day. 1 It is to reach a climax
at, the opening of the seminar on the role of students and their
organizations in the public life of independent and .colonial
countries. Besides perennial anti-colonial slogans, the sub-
jects will probably include the condemnation of Anglo-Amer-
ican intervention in the Middle East and the role of students
in the anti-Nixon demonstrations in Latin America. Two
other seminars, described as "important" without further
specification, are also to be initiated on that day.
125. The IUS is in charge of planning all the
student activities. The seminars and study tours are to be
held in the International Student. Club, which the preparatory
committee envisages aq~..a permanent center, presumably to
be left in.Vienna as a memento of the Festival. The club is
to include a special student restaurant, a lecture hall, an
information center and rooms for private discussions. The
program does. not indicate whether IUS contemplates erecting
a new building for this purpose or acquiring an existing prop-
erty. In either event, the Austrian authorities, who in the
past have taken pains to expel other front organizations, will
have the final word. The establishment of a permanent IUS
center in Vienna, under whatever auspices. or label, may
USIA: IRI/FI Briefing Note, August 1, 1958.
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prove to be more than neutral Austria would see fit to tolerate.
The Vocational and Study=Interest Meetings Proposed.
126. The committee has proposed that the voca-
tional meetings be arranged so as to attract more students and
not merely the journeymen practitioners in the various fields.
Meetings between students engaged in the same studies or tak-
ing an interest in the same questions are stated to be "very
desirable." The commission suggests that the IPC should,
consider, in the light of the possibilities at the venue of the
Festival, organizing the following vocational .and professional
meetings:
Biology
Geology
Chemistry
Agriculture
Medicine
Mine s
Electricity
Mathematics & Physics
Architecture & Building
Astronomy
Inter-space Travel
Organization of Economy
Theology
Philosophy
Law
History and Archaeology
Teaching
Literature and Philology
Music
Plastic Arts
Film
Foreign Trade
Physical Culture
and Sport
Student Cooperation
127. Preparations for the cultural and sports
events appear to be following the programs of past Festivals
very closely. The Soviet Government will send the Bolshoi
Ballet and other dance troupes. Thei:e will be exhibitions in
the fine arts and the usual contests in all the arts. Hobbyists
will again be provided with special attractions.
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128. The program planners can be counted on to
assure the customarily large number of regional and inter-
delegation: meetings. At the Warsaw (1955) and Moscow Festi-
vals, the Soviet delegation performed the formidable feat of
calling in person on practically every non-Bloc delegation.
The Chinese delegation performed similarly in Moscow, and
other Bloc delegations were also assigned to call on Free World
representatives. Much of the important political business of the
Festivals is conducted by means of the inter-delegation meetings.
A striking example at Moscow was the visit of the Chinese dele--
gation to the American participants at which time the invitation
to tour Communist China was extended. The acceptance of this
invitation and the subsequent events were cited by the Soviets as
constituting one of the real "successes" of the Festival. (The
Americans were also called on by the Soviet, the Hungarian,
and the Polish delegations).
129. It should be emphasized that all meetings at
the Festival, no matter how innocuously nonpolitical they may
appear to be - such as the vocational, artistic, hobby and even
the sports get-togethers - are designed by the Communists to
have an. ideological and propaganda content and to lead to the
adoption of proposals for action. Free World participants in
such get-togethers should be aware of this Communist intent
so that they will not be taken in.. At the same time, they
should be prepared to take advantage of any of the open dis-
cu,ssions or question periods which occur at such meetings.
The smaller meetings, in fact, offer far greater possibilities
for opposing voices. to make themselves heard. They are not,
and probably cannot be, so completely rigged and controlled
as the large mass meetings at which few or any get a chance
to speak.
The Propaganda Aims and Probable Theme s of the
Vienna Festival.
130. At this time there are indications that the
organizers of the Vienna Festival are still somewhat uncertain
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about the precise content of the program for the event, and
they appear to lack their usual confidence regarding its ultimate
success. As late as September 1958, dispatches of the IPC to
organizing committees throughout the world betrayed concern
about existing opposition, particularly that of the Austrian youth
organizations, pled for stronger support, and implied that plans
have not progressed as well as they should have. The risks in-
volved in choosing a Western country for the Festival apparent-
ly are making themselves evident early in the planning phase.
131. From the propaganda standpoint, it is clearly
the intent of the organizers to serve essentially the same aims
and to repeat the same basic themes as in the case of the Mos-
cow Festival, although there will probably be several changes
in emphasis and :refinements in detail. The language of the
preparatory committee's early general announcements sounds
almost identical with that of the Sixth Festival. The committee
in March 1958 stated that there was unanimous agreement that
"The Seventh Festival must be an event devoted to friendly
meetings and mutual understanding for 'peace and friendsh?.p'"
and that it "should be open to all organizations and to all young
people without discrimination as to their religious or political
opinions, race or nationality. No political, philosophical or
religious tendency should dominate the Festival. " This also
echoes almost verbatim the language of the directives of the
WFDY's Kiev Congress and is very similar to the substance
of the CPSU's most recent slogans directed at united front
efforts and at the role of youth. The statement confirms the
view that the major motifs of the Moscow gathering m "peace"
and the attempt to create an atmosphere of open-minded inter-
national togetherness -- will continue to predominate in. Vienna.
1That the ?Cha~-d" and the B9soft?P line represent a continuum of
tactics in the youth, as in other fronts, was sharply demon-
strated by the IUS Congress at Peking, 4-13 September 1958,
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132. The more specific propaganda themes of
the Vienna Festival will also be in large part a repetition of
those of the 1957 Festival, updated and tailored to serve the
current Soviet and Communist Chinese political ends. In
view of the resolutions of the WFDY Congress and of the
recent statements about preparations for the Seventh Festival,
the major Communist propaganda efforts in Vienna will be
directed toward well established targets.
(1)
"Solidarity" with Youth of the Colonial Countries
133. Appeals to the young people of the colonial
and other underdeveloped areas (including the Middle East,
Africa, Asia and Latin.-America) will be one of the most in-
sistent features of the Vienna Festival. The WFDY Congress
proclaimed that "the existence of colonialism is dangerous to
all humanity and there is need for agreement between all
youth organizations for the purpose of expediting its abolish-
ment. " The Congress instructed the Executive Committee
"to support or launch measures to advance the struggle of
the young people in all colonial countries. " As previously
stated, the Executive committee was also directed to organ-
ize collections in all countries for the international solidarity
fund to help finance WFDY activities in the Afro -A s ?+ an. area.
Undoubtedly WFDY expects a substantial amount to be col-
lected at the Festival for this purpose.
the most shrill, blatantly political IUS meeting since the 1950
Congress in Prague. Most of the time was spent in denounc-
ing American "imperialism, " calling for the "liquidation" of
Western military bases and the withdrawal of Western troops
from foreign soil, propagandizing for such immediate Com-
munist Chinese aims as the evacuation of the offshore islands
and organizing noisy mass demonstrations against US Secre-
tary of State Dulles, the US Seventh Fleet and the American
convoying of supplies to the offshore islands.
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134. Current issues of WFDY and IUS publica-
tions, looking toward the Vienna Festival, place primary
emphasis upon the colonial issue, WFDY's official journal
World Youth (No. 7, August 1958, in its lead article "East is
East and West is West") states:
The world has changed considerably since Kipling
cynically wrote: 'East is East and West is West,
never the twain shall meet."' It was, of course, im-
possible for the twain to meet in friendship when col-
onialism came to the East as master - not friend.
However, it was and still is wrong to think that this
West would always be master and the East would eter-
nally remain. slave. Also, the barrier between the two
people could not continue forever . . . The Youth Festi-
vals are now one of the best accepted forums for youth
from all countries to sing, dance, play and meet each
other in an atmosphere of cordiality - a place where
thousands of young people from all over the world
gather together. East and West meet here - if not in
the geographical sense, in the spirit of it. It is the
duty of all of its to see that they meet this time in
Vienna - at the Seventh Festival being held there in
1959 - in an atmosphere which would surpass all
previous meetings of this kind. Youth dreams of a
situation where it will not be East remaining east
and West as west but the 'twain' meeting in a friendly
embrace with joy and love - with no shadow of gu.n4
and slavery. u' (Underlining added).
135. Inextricably interwoven with the cause of
colonialism will be, as in the past, the playing up of racial
intolerance in the West, particularly in the United States.
It is hardly likely that mention will be made by the Commu-
nists of the recent US Supreme Court decisions ordering de=-
segregation but it can be expected that the Festival program-
mers will make every effort by word, print and picture to
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emphasize the unpleasant incidents surrounding attempts to
integrate the schools in some parts of the United States. The
recent and unusual race riots in London will probably like-
wise be featured.
(2)
Campaign against The-,"Atomic Menace, " for "Secur-
i'ty.isarmarer s and Peace"
136. The "peace" line in, Vienna, probably re-
garded by the Festival sponsors as especially appropriate
for world meeting in neutral Austria, will be a continuation -
and perhaps an intensification - of the type of peace propaganda
seen in Moscow. The WFDY Congress' number one resolution
indicated the nature of the peace motif: "The basis for cooper-
ation can be agreement between all youth organizations for
joint action for the immediate cessation of tests and for pro-
hibition of thermonuclear weapons. " Although attacks on the
United States. and other Western powers and on such treaty
organizations as NATO and the Baghdad Pact may be toned
down. because of the general Communist intent of creating a
friendly, urbane impression in Vienna, the peace propaganda
will probably include at least oblique references to the need
for eliminating Western air and missile bases, the elimina-
tion of the "aggressive" treaty organizations and the with-
drawal of foreign troops.
(3) To "Disseminate Culture" Among Youth
137. A propaganda aim more clearly defined
than at the Moscow Festival is to promote seminars, study-
groups and exchange programs in and for all countries, for
the ostensible purpose of improving the culture of youth. At
the Vienna Festival, the WFDY and IUS, according to the
directives of their Congresses, will presumably initiate a
large amount of organizational work looking toward (a) "ex-
change of delegations and experience between cultural
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organizations of youth of various countries, and bilateral
agreements for international tours of artists, for exchanging
scholarships to academies, institutes, art centers, " and
(b) "international contests in creative endeavor and perform-
ance, in various fields of art and culture. " This stepped-up
cultural campaign represents the more sophisticated approach
of the Communist youth front organizations in appealing to
students and other youth with cultural interests. The ideo-
logical and political purposes are basically the same as in
the more forthright propaganda appeals, but they are clothed
in academic and artistic garb in order to make them appear
to be impartial, nonpolitical, and humanistic. (Throughout
the current appeals of the WFDY and IUS the "spirit of
humanism" is emphasized as underlying the purposes of
their programs).
138. Thus it becomes quite apparent that, al-
though in Vienna the Communists may encounter more oppos-
ition than they did in their Moscow Festiva, they will work
unremittingly for essentially the same propaganda purposes.
If anything, they will drive harder and more trenchantly,
combining direct attack with more subtle approaches to
achieve success.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Success of Festival from Soviet Point of View
139. In sheer number of participants and in the
amount of world attention accorded it, the Sixth World Festi-
val of Youth and Students was probably all that the Commury
ni st sponsors expected it to be, although they were probably
disappointed that they did not get more mandated delegates
from Free World youth organizations and from some of the
African and Asian nations. As the largest international meet-
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ing of any kind ever held within the Communist. Bloc it called
for the heaviest expenditure of effort and money ever devoted
by the Soviet Union to a mass gathering.
140. The extent to which the Soviet leadership
really felt that its large investment paid adequate returns is
a matter of conjecture. The fact, however, that the Commu-
nist Youth leaders are going full speed ahead with plans for
the next Festival in 1959 would indicate that on the whole they
were satisfied with the results of the 1957 event. Officially,
leading Party spokesmen such as Khrushchev, Shelepin 'and
Voroshilov have proclaimed the Moscow event an unparalleled
success. N. Mikhailov, Minister of Culture of the USSR,
stated that there was "no doubt that Sixth World Festival of
Youth and Students was one of the greatest events of our time, r"
and that among other favorable results it had proved to be a
fruitful recruiting and training ground for young "propagand-
ists and organizers. 11 Somewhat more specifically, V.I.
Popov, First Deputy Chairman of the Committee of Youth
Organizations of the USSR, in a public lecture. at the Poly-
technic Museum in Moscow on 6 March 1958, gave the follow-
ing as. successes achieved by the Festival:
a. Moscow was spotlighted as the center of
the world ,peace movement;
b. The freedom given foreigners, including
Americans, of all shades of political opinion was proof
of the liberality of the Soviet regime;
c. The trip of 42 American youths to China
damaged the American policy of refusal to recognize
the Peking regime;
d. The "good side" of Soviet life was shown
to young people from all over the world, and
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e. The Festival demonstrated that "there is
no need to fear Communism. "
141. The real propaganda aims of the Festival
were readily determinable prior to the event. The happen-
ings at the Festival and their aftermath have confirm?d the
nature of those aims. In a balance of the gains and losses
for the USSR in attempting to achieve its four major propa-
ganda goals, the following conclusions are reached:
a. The Festival was instrumental in convey-
ing to many of the delegates and onlookers in Moscow,
and to some extent to the outside world, an impression
of a new political and cultural liberality on the part of
the Soviet Union.
b. The show of more tolerance than would
have been imaginable in the past, and its implication
of confident strength on the part of the Soviet regime,
also helped partially to restore Soviet prestige among
the youth of the Communist world and thus to aid in
stabilizing the International Communist movement.
While the reverberations of the Hungarian uprising
were not entirely stilled, they were effectively damp-
ened by the Festival. Youth from the satellite coun-
tries - except for the Poles - were generally passive
and obedient, although there were some grumblings
that Bloc youth was discriminated against in favor of
delegates from uncommitted areas. Polish question-
ing and dissent, while a striking feature of the Festival,
was kept within the tolerable bounds of ideological
family differences.
c. The propaganda aim of enlisting foreign youth
and youth organizations on behalf of Soviet foreign
policy objectives was achieved only in part. The trans-
parent and often heavy-handed attempts to obtain mass
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youth support at obviously Communist dominated
"peace" rallies, and the constant dinning of the "Peace
and Friendship" theme tended to repel rather than to
attract the non-Communists.. They also appear to have
bored large ninbers of the faithful party-line followers.
The Hiroshima Day anti-nuclear-weapons rally (a fix-
ture at youth festivals) may have made some impres-
sion on newcomers but according to foreign observers
did not evoke the fervent response hoped for by the
sponsors,
d. The second Soviet foreign propaganda
objective, the extension of Soviet influence in the Afro-
Asian and Latin American areas, appears to have met
with considerable, but by no means uniform, success.
The Afro=Asians as a whole responded favorably to the
welcome accorded them in Moscow and to Soviet blan-
dishments, but there were several instances of dis-
content and criticism. Furthermore, the Communist
organizers must have felt a sense of frustration that
so many of the African and some of the Asian "dele-
gates" had to be co-opted from among students resident
abroad rather than being genuinely mandated represen-
tatives of the youth of their countries. The walkout of
the Ghana delegation was symptomatic of the fact that
not all black Africans were taken in by the studied
flattery. Furthermore some of the Arab delegations,
notably the Egyptian and the Syrian, embarrassed their
hosts by exaggerated nationalistic behavior in an environ-
ment primarily intended to idealize a world "brotherhood"
of youth. The adulation shown the Israeli delegates, Com-
munist and non-Communist alike, by the Jewish community
of Moscow was also embarrassing to the Soviet hosts. The
regime's sharp discrimination against the young Israelis
(because of the need to curry favor with the Arabs) served
perhaps more strikingly than any other aspect of the Festi-
val to cast doubt on Moscow's claim to impartiality in its
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treatment of all participants from abroad. In fact
these incidents show that the Communists do not always
possess the unerring foresight often attributed to them
in organizing their propaganda shows, for if they had,
they would have taken steps to prevent such embarrass-
ments.
e. The domestic propaganda intent of the
Soviet leadership to utilize the Festival as a means of
bolstering the morale and curbing the dissent of Soviet
youth appears to have resulted in at least as many neg-
ative as positive results. The gala events no doubt
evoked sentiments of national pride and patriotism
among the young Soviet participants and on-lookers.
This tonic effect, however, was probably more than
offset by the exposure to forbidden "bourgeois" ideas
and beliefs expressed by scores of visiting non-
Communists, by the evidences of apathy among many
of the satellite youth, and by the near-heresy of their
young Polish comrades.
142. One of the greatest Soviet gains from the
Festival's Afro-Asiair.i program was the stimulus it gave to
new organizing efforts in that area on the part of the WFDY
and YUS affiliates. Their cooperation with the Afro-Asian
Solidarity Conference in Cairo at the end of 1957, their assist-
ance in implementing its decisions and their setting in motion
of other meetings and activities among African youth demon-
strated vividly the tactic of following up the Festival with sup-
porting operations.
143. The Latin American delegates were predom-
inantly seasoned young Communists or fellow-travelers but a
few dissenters were present, making themselves heard, if not
at the gathering itself, then immediately after their return
home. No significant: regional youth conferences followed the
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Festival but there is strong evidence that Communist organi-
zation and infiltration. efforts among the students of Latin
America were intensified and that they have played an effec-
tive role in. the wave of recent student demonstrations in Argen-
tina, Uruguay and Panama.
B. Lessons for the Free World Bearing on the Next
Festival
144. The Moscow Festival offered convincing
proof of the USSR's continued mastery of publicity and man-
agement_.techniques applied to mass political activity. To
attract and to monitor approximately 359 000 young people
from more than 130 countries at a time when the Soviet pres--
ti.ge among word youth was at its lowest ebb since the signing
of the Nazi-Soviet pact and the Soviet invasion of Poland, was
no small accomplishment. It demonstrated in other respects,
however, that the CPSU is not infallible and that its propaganda
is not always as effective as it probably likes to believe or as
the Free World tends to fear.
145. The Moscow Festival conclusively pointed
to the need for greater perceptiveness on the part of Free
World countries, East and West, of the true aims and objec-
tives of the international youth festivals, and for the develop-
ment of a common attitude and carefully planned counterac-
tions if the Communists are to be prevented from utilizing
such occasions to score repeated political propaganda suc-
cesses. The deadly serious purposes of these gatherings
held in an atmosphere of combined carnival
enlightenment and simulated peace and friendship, must be
more fully recognized and publicized, particularly in coun-
tries where a considerable part of the youth may be naively
impressed with the specious, idealism of the Festival's aims.
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146. The experience of the Moscow Festival and ' .
the evidence concerning the nature and aims of the 1959 gather-
ing point to a number of considerations which should be taken
into account in the formulation by Free World countries of
sound policy and effective action against the Vienna Festival:
a. Since all previous. festivals have result-
ed in net propage-nda gains for the Communists and
since the specific propaganda aims of the forthcoming
Seventh Festival are readily discernible, it would be
better for the Free World if the event could be pre-
vented altogether, or at least if the Communists could
be denied the advantages of holding it in a Free World
country. Since, however, it does not at this time ap-
pear likely that either of these desiderata will be real-
ized, the Free World must proceed on the assumption
that the next Fe stival will be held as planned in Vienna
and determine what kind of measures will be most
effective against it. The fact that this will be the first
youth festival ever held in a Free World locale, while
offering some propaganda advantages to the Commu-
nists, will also open up unparalleled opportunities for
exploiting Communist vulnerabilities.
b. Whatever measures are devised by Free
World countries mist be designed to steer between two
extremes, either of which would redound to the benefit
of the Communsts: The first would be to take action
which, instead of deflating or debunking the Festival,
would tend on the contrary to play up or build up the
event. Such actions would include encouragement of
Free World youth and student organizations to send
official, mandated representatives to Vienna. Any
attempt to organize large scale counter-attractions
a r'competing?l youth festival in effect - would only add
luster to the Communist-sponsored gathering. To the
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delegates and the spectators, prominent events intend-
ed to serve as counter-attractions might well be indis-
tinguishable from the planned Communist program and
would serve to add to the entertainment and glamor of
the occasion, thereby benefitting the Communists. The
featuring of noted Free World singers, actors and other
artists, of large shows and musical productions, or of
prominent athletes and sports teams, would all probably
be welcome grist for the Communist mill. On the other
hand, militant counter-demonstrations or any forceful
attempts to "take overt" the Festival also would proba-
bly boomerang against the Free World, giving the Com-
munists the basis for a propaganda claim that hooligan.
lire actionaries"t were disrupting a. peaceful, friendly,
non-political gathering of youth. The other extreme
to be avoided by the Free World is to do nothing or to
take measures so relatively weak and ineffective that
the Communists could laugh them off.
c. Thus it would appear to be a wise course
of action for Free World countries to urge an organiza~
tional boycott of the Seventh. Festival by youth and stu-
dent groups whose presence in Vienna would add pres-
tige to the occasion.. On the other hand, the experience
of the Moscow Festival indicates that it would also be
the better part of wisdom not to prohibit or discourage
"unofficial, " voluntary attendance at the Festival by
well-motivated, politically sophisticated, articulate
young people who could ably express the points of view
of the Free World in the discussions, on. international
political issues which will inevitably be raised by the
Communists at the Festival. The Moscow Festival
demonstrated the effectiveness of such person-to-person
debates and contacts. The personal meetings proved to
be an effective means of "reaching" the Communist Bloc
youth. It is much more difficult to. impede individual
conversations during a large and "open" gathering than
to jam radio broadcasts or censor reading matter. In
Vienna it should be even more difficult for the Commu-
nists to control such contacts than it was in Moscow.
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d. The need for well-grounded, politically aware
Free World youth will be even greater in Vienna than
in Moscow. The reduction by about 50% in the total
number of delegates will, according to announced Festi-
va1 plans, fall most heavily on the Bloc delegations.
This means that the Soviet Bloc representatives will be
a smaller, tighter, more cohesive group than in Moscow
and will undoubtedly be selected from among the best-
indoctrinated and the most reliable young activists in
the entire Communist orbit. Thus it will require great-
er skill and better preparation on the part of the non-
Communists to cope with them. It should be remembered
that the delegations from the Afro-Asian and Latin Amer-
ican countries, even if not preponderantly pro-Communist,
will contain a sizeable proportion of youth with biases of
anti-imperialism, neutralism and militant nationalism.
Hence, it is important that not only Western nations but
the uncommitted countries make every effort to assure
that of those who do go to the Festival, as large a pro--
portion as possible are aware of the Communist aims,
organization and modus operandi, and are ready and
willing to expose and counter them. It should be re-
membered, also, that the effect of reasoned counter-
statements by non-Communists at the Festival will be
felt not merely by the participants but by the youth and
general citizenry back in their own countries. Broad-
scale international newspaper and radio coverage will
undoubtedly be given to the Vienna festival.
e. The Moscow Festival also demonstrated that
the presence of qualified Free World individuals could
be effective not only in the informal contacts but in the
important and pre-planned vocational, professional and
regional get-togethers and in the interdelegati.oi meet-
ings. There was little advance planning for the Free
World participation in such meetings in Moscow, and
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~T MT h T
sop
a number of opportunities for effective counter-
activity were probably lost. Nevertheless, the spon-
taneous expression of dissenting views by individuals
from Free World countries was apparently so disturb-
ing to the Communists- - especially in the cases of the
Philosophy and Economic seminars - that the planners
for the Seventh Festival have eliminated all sessions of
this type. As indicated above, the preparatory commis-
sion for the Seventh Festival has reduced the total num-
ber of seminars and intends to limit them to seemingly
innocuous subjects which, of course, still have their
political purposes. The other types of get-togethers,
however, remain essentially the same as those held in
Moscow.
-f. For these reasons it would appear that the mis-
sionary value to the Free. World in permitting politically-
conscious youth to .attend the next Festival would out-
weigh the limited propaganda advantages the Communists
might gain by claiming that their presence is proof of
Free World approval of the Festival. At the same time,
every effort should be made by Free World countries,
particularly those of underdeveloped areas, to limit the
attendance of impressionable and susceptible participants
who , by swelling the numbers of their delegations, would
add to claims of Communist success in their ability to
appeal to the youth of the world.
116. In addition to measures designed to assure that
Free World youth who do attend are knowledgeable and compe-
tent, other counter=activities in Vienna could iliclude: (a) book
exhibits and giveaway programs, featuring paper-back editions
of books which have been proscribed by the Communist author-
ities in their own countries (e. g. Pasternak's Dr. Zhivago and
Djilas's. The New Class) and free copies of magazines of special
interest to youth and students; insofar as time and expense would
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permit, the book giveaways should be translated into the more
important Bloc languages; they should also be made available
to youth of the underdeveloped areas in languages known to
them; (b) film showings, especially pictures not normally per-
mitted behind the Iron Curtain; (c) concerts, particularly of
the smaller chamber-music and "jazz-combo" type, in con-
siderable numbers at various locations in and around the Festi-
val, making sure that they are identified not as part of the
Festival program but as a contribution from Free World youth;
likewise in as large numbers as possible, Western recordings
to be provided in listening booths and some also to be given as
gifts or sold at a very low price (in Moscow these were avidly
sought by Bloc youth and commanded large prices on the black
market); (d) organization of "Kaffeeklatsch" meetings in the
Vienna cafes, open to all Festival delegates but again clearly
earmarked as Free World youth's contribution.
117. Such efforts would have the distinct advan-
tage of appealing to youth both from the Bloc and from the
remoter parts of the Free World without being either exces-
sively expensive or creating too much of a publicity built-up
for the Festival. They would represent the kind of subdued
but effective measures which could help to offset the massive
Communist propaganda efforts at the Festival and to exemplify
the Free World's interest in honestly informing and trying to
help the youth and students of the world. Insofar as possible
these should be undertaken on a private basis, enlisting the
aid and the contributions of business firms, foundations and
other organizations in order both to avoid any implication of
governmental participation and to demonstrate to world opin-
ion the willingness of voluntary groups not directly involved in
the cold war to help thwart the hugs. Communist propaganda
effort.
118. In summary, any policy and measures of the
Free World countries in relation to the Seventh Festival should
be governed by the following aims:
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(1) They should serve to counteract or neutralize
the propaganda impact which the Communists hope to
achieve through the Festival. In so doing they should
avoid playing up and adding prestige to the Festival.
(2) They should exploit to the maximum the vul-
nerabilities inherent in the location of the Festival in
a Free World city and should utilize the Festival's
platforms and meetings to propagate positive Free
World values, principles and ideas, rather than nega-
tive anti-Communist themes.
(3) They should serve to discredit the Communist
leadership of the Festival and of the two international
youth, front organizations which are its immediate spon-
sors. The experience of the Moscow Festival indicates
that effective Free World counteraction at Vienna is
feasible provided imaginative planning and energetic
effort are developed well in advance.
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APPENDIX
MOST FREQUENT QUESTIONS ASKED THE AMERICAN
PARTICIPANTS IN MOSCOW, AND TYPICAL ANSWERS
The questions asked the American participants on the
streets, in the parks and at the various meetings, whether
challenging, inimical, or relatively friendly, gradually fell
into a repetitive pattern. It is believed that these questions
and the kinds of answers given them by the Americans are of
sufficient general interest to merit repeating as composites
of the current thinking, state of knowledge and curiosity of
the young Soviet questioners. Some of these questions will be
recognized immediately as typically provocative Communist
propaganda queries, usually asked by a party activist assigned
to the task. Others, parroting the party line, may have been
asked innocently by young Russians who knew no better or who
sincerely wanted an answer to what had been taught them for
years. The answers were not always as clear-cut or as suc-
cinct as they are put down here. Some of the less sophisticated
Americans simply did not know the right answers. The answers
cited are essentially and "typically" those given on several occa-
sions and at various places. The Americans at the Festival had
not in any planned way anticipated the questions or worked out
any standard replies. Yet among the best of them there grew
out of their separate experiences a remarkable unanimity about
what to say and how to say it.
Q - Will you be punished by your Government for coming to
the Festival?
A - No. Our Government did not want us to come in view of
the Soviet actions against youth and students in Hungary.
But since we chose to come on our own, we will not be
punished in any way.
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Q - When did you learn to speak Russian?
A At the university. (Some learned Russian at home).
Q - How do you like Moscow? How does. it compare with New
York?
A We enjoy being in Moscow. It is difficult to compare it
with New York which has a much larger population and
which has its unique individuality even among American
cities. (Some of the Americans had brought picture--
postcards of New York and other American views which
they would pass out among the audience).
Economic Questions
Q - How much does an unskilled worker earn?
A - That depends upon the type of work and the strength of his
union. There is a minimum wage law in. the United
States.. On the average an unskilled worker would earn
$50475 per week (astonishment when the listeners trans-
lated this into rubles).
Do the workers have real unions?
A - Yes, indeed. Some of the unions are very powerful and
have succeeded time and time again in getting higher
wages and shorter hours for the workers.
Q How much does a skilled worker earn? An engineer?
- ;Again, that depends on the type of work, the strength of
the union and demand. In general a skilled worker
gets about $80-$100 per week. Engineers are very
much in demand and are paid an entrance salary of
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$5, 000-$6, 000 per year when they are just out of col-
lege. From there on they range to $10, 000-$15, 000
and more, depending on type of engineering, and the
individual ability of the engineer.
A - This depends on the individual states and communities.
In the USA there is no uniform national system of pub-
lic schools but each locality determines its own pro-
gram, teachers' salaries and curricula. Most Amer-
icans feel that their teachers are still relatively under-
paid. At present the average for the coutw.try is probably
in the neighborhood of $3, 000-$5, 000 for elementary
teachers and about $5, 000-$8, 000 for high school teach-
ers. Other questions in the pay-and-price field which
received varying answers from the Americans were:
How much does a. meal in a restaurant cost?
How much does a week of meals cost?
How much do you pay for living accommodations?
What proportion of a person's earnings go for an
apartment?
Do most people live in apartments?
How much does a television set cost?
How many people are unemployed in the United States?
Does a person get paid for his days off?
Does he get paid more for overtime work?
How much does an automobile cost?
How much is a pair of shoes?
(One of the American interlocutors, well-versed in American
consumer economics, bewildered his audience of Soviet stu-
dents and workers when he told them the average monthly pay
of an industrial worker in the United States would be enough
to buy about 10 suits of clothes or 47 pairs of shoes. Mexn-
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bens of the Soviet group admitted that the average. Russian
industrial Worker has to work about two to three months to
buy one. mediocre suitand could buy no more than 5 or 6 pairs
of shoes with one month's pay).
Political Questions.
Q - Why is the United States against elimination of nuclear
testing and disarmament?
A - We do not and cannot represent the US Government in any
way so we cannot speak for the official policy of our
country. But it is our impression that the United States
does want nuclear disarmament, including an end to
nuclear. testing, and the establishment of an effective
inspection system. But this action cannot be unilatezal.
There has to be agreement on many matters. involving
world disarmament. You must know and. believe that
the American people and our Government genuinely
want world peace and have proved it by their actions
in the past. .
Q -'If you really mean that you do not want war with us, why
do you maintain a ring of air bases all around the Soviet
Union? Why don't you take your troops out of Europe?
A The US maintains: its. bases only because of the constantly
menacing attitude of your Government. You have. elim-
inated Latvia, Esthonia and Lithuania. as independent
states; you have maintained troops in Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria since the war. You
tried to blockade Berlin. You instigated the Korean
war and your leaders still want to communize the world.
This is why the United States: and the rest of the Free
World regard the Soviet Union with apprehension and
why we maintain a defensive perimeter around you.
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Q - If America is not really imperialist what does she want?
A - The United States wants a peaceful and free world. By
peace we mean a state of affairs in which no country
wants to conquer or dominate another, or generally to
use force to settle international disputes. By "free"
we mean that every country should decide for itself by
free voting the kind of government it wants. You do
not permit the Eastern European countries under Sov-
iet control to decide for themselves the political and
social system they want but impose upon them a Soviet
Communist regime.
Q - Is there any ideological difference between your two major
parties in the United States?
A - As you think of ideology as meaning a set of "class" ideas
and purposes opposed to those of another class, no.
The Republicans and the Democrats are both committed
to the idea of democracy within a republic. They both
have moderately "left" and "right" elements. But on
important national and international issues they offer
strong opposition, one to the other. The absence of
bitter class struggle between the two is what provides
the relative peace and stability of American politics.
if, in recent years, there has been a basic philosoph-
ical difference between them it is that the Republicans
are somewhat: more in favor of allowing as much lee-
way as possible to free enterprise while the Democrats
are more' inclined to advocate governmental regulation
or control of the economy. (Several variations of this
answer were given. by various young Americans who
were asked the same question but the one cited above
appears to be the most typical).
Q - Why (lid you execute the Rosenbergs?
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A - Because they were convicted of espionage against the
United States. They had an open and fair trial lasting
two years, in the best judicial tradition of our courts.
The case went all the way to the Supreme Court before
the final decision. (Two or three American speakers
who had learned to anticipate this question compared
the Rosenberg's trial with the purge trials in the Soviet
Union and with the more recent execution of Lavrenti
Beria. Apparently this comparison helped carry con-
viction with the Soviet audiences who seemed to be im-
pressed).
Q Why don't you permit people from the Soviet Union to
travel in the United States?
A - Who says we don't permit them? We have delegations
from the USSR coming all the time, such as agricul-
tural workers, technicians, cultural groups. The rea-
son that more don't come is that your government won't
let them.
Q - Isn't that because you insist on fingerprinting our visitors?
A - That is probably an excuse. It is true that we require
fingerprinting but it is also true that once in the coun-
try the Soviet visitor, like any other, can. go anywhere
he pleases without constantly showing, or turning over,
his passport at hotels or reporting. to the police. Fur-
thermore, we have no internal passports as you. do here.
(This answer was given before the fingerprinting require-
ment was eliminated by the US Government).
Q a In general, what do the American people think of the Soviet
Union?
A - This, of course, is the most difficult kind of question to
answer. It is not possible for any one of us to speak
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for 170 million of our countrymen. There are many
different views and feelings among so vast a popula-
tion and there are undoubtedly large numbers of people
who are so preoccupied with the daily business of mak-
ing a living that they don't give much thought to the
problems of world politics. But if one could generalize
about the opinions of the more interested and aware
Americans who follow world events, their views might
be expressed as follows: First, there is a tremendous
reservoir of good will for the Soviet people. There has
never been a serious conflict between Russians and Amer-
icans; historically we have been friends, not enemies,
although we have never known enough about each other.
The heroism and sacrifices of the Soviet people during
World War II are still fresh in American memories.
Second, there is a tremendous desire to live in a friend-
ly and peaceable way with the Soviet Union. The enthusi-
asm and cordiality shown the few visiting groups you have
sent should be proof of that. It is a positive kind of friend-
liness, not mere courtesy or formal politeness. The vast
majority of Americans would cheer if there could be sin-
cere genuine collaboration between our countries, not only
to prevent the horrible mutual destruction of a nuclear war
but to work together for the benefit of the rest of the world.
Third - and this is the other side of the question - they do
not trust the motives and the aims of your Government,
particularly in view of its role as being the "vanguard"
of World Communism. They wish your leaders could
genuinely adopt a. policy of "live and let live" instead. of
what seems to Americans a constant stirring up of trouble
and a menacing attitude. (This question and its answer
would often be made up of several sub-questions and with
respect to particular aspects of US-Soviet relations).
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Questions on Hungary
Q - Why hasn't the United States been willing to accept the
Soviet Union's policy of international conciliation?
A - Because, frankly, it does not believe that it is a true
policy of conciliation. For instance, the Soviet policy
toward Hungary was hardly conciliatory, even though
Mikoyan promised Imre Nagy that it would be so.
Q - What do you mean?
A - Do you mean to say you know nothing of Mikoyan'S visit
to Nagy during the Hungarian uprising? (Murmurs
from crowd: "No, tell us about it. '')
Well, what is. your version of how the uprising began?
A - It was the same way as in the Soviet Union when. Dudintsev
and other writers began to protest against ideological
restrictions. l1` Hungary the writers of the Petdfi Club
called a. meeting to demand freedom for writers. They
were joined by students and were supported by the indus-
trial workers who chose the occasion to protest their
miserable living conditions. What was at first a mild
protest blossomed into a real revolution.
Q Why did the counter- revolutionaries join them?
A - There were no counter-revolutionaries in the sense that
you use that term. The only counterrevolutionaries
in the true sense were the AVH (secret police). The
students, workers and other people were unarmed.
They marched to the broadcasting studio unarmed.
Not a shot was fired at first. Not even the Soviet
soldiers fired. Later many of the Soviet troops gave
their arms to the people after the AVH started firing
on the crowd. Did you know that? (Apparently the
crowd did not).
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Q - If this demonstration was spontaneous, how is it that they
marched with such deliberate intent to storm the radio
station?
A - Do you know who taught therx :to march on the radio sta-
tion? You did. You compelled them to read Lenin and
to learn Communist revolutionary tactics. The actions
of the Hungarian insurgents were right out of Lenin's
"What Is To Be Done" and "A Tale and Revolution. "
Q - Didn't the Hungarians obtain arms from the Americans?
The Americans sent balloons ostensibly with medical
supplies but these really were used to parachute gu:n.
Q - Didn't the Hungarian government request Soviet armed
assistance?
A - This is the truth of the matter: When the Soviet Govern-
ment saw that it was losing control of Hungary it sent
Mikoyan with proposals to Nagy for a compromise sim-
ilar to that reached in Poland. An agreement was signed
with Nagy, officially recognizing the Nagy government as
legal. After Mikoyan left, the Soviet government be-
trayed its agreement and ordered fresh Soviet troops
into Hungary to replace the less reliable troops on duty
there. Nagy fled to the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest.
Kadar was installed in his place and the Soviet army
proceeded to dfrown the Hungarian uprising in blood.
Nagy was lured out of the Yugoslav Embassy by prom-
ises of immunity and was then seized by the Soviet
secret police. This is the way the Hungarian revolution
was suppressed and the way in which Nagy was betrayed.
(After this statement, there was an extended back-and-
forth discussion but no especially new points were made
-96-
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by either side. The Soviet listeners appeared quite
amazed at the speaker's recital of the facts about Hun-
gary).
Social Questions
Q - Why do you discriminate against negroes in the United
States?
A It is true that there still is discrimination against negroes
in some parts of the United States; but, for the country
as a whole, great strides have been made in lessening
discrimination and in some places and occupations, it
has disappeared entirely. The Supreme Court of the
United States has repeatedly reaffirmed the basic, equal
rights of- negt'oes, notably in its recent decisions calling
for an end to seggation in the schools. (Some of the
American speakers took advantage of this question to
raise the issue of anti-semitism in the Soviet Union.
Most of the Soviet listeners denied that there was any
discrimination against Jews but some tacitly admitted
that there was, "at least in Stalin's day. ")
Q - How can. you have so much class discrimination in the
United. States and claim to be a democracy?
A - We have relatively little "class" discrimination in the US,
perhaps less than anywhere else in the world, includ-
ing the USSR. In fact, we don't tend to think in terms
of "classes. 11 Economically the spread between the
bottom and the top people is constantly narrowing and
we have a great majority of middle-income people.
What you would call our "working" class is generally
enjoying a comfortable "middle-class" way of life.
You in the Soviet Union, on the other hand, have been
developing more and more of class differentiation.
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(The class question, asked many times in various
forms, gave several of the more knowledgeable Amer-
icans an opportunity to "take off" on the relative class-
structure of the USSR and the USA, much to the enlight-
enment and surprise of the listeners).
Q - Can a poor youngster get a university education?
A - He certainly can. We have many virtually free state
universities and our big, rich private universities are
heavily endowed so that they offer many free scholar-
ships to able and deserving persons no matter how poor.
(Some Americans turned the question to ask how and by
what criteria university students are selected in Russia).
Q - How much is the scholarship or "stipend" of a university
student?
A - (Answers varied, according to the college experience of
the speaker).
Cultural Questions
Q - Do Americans read Russian literature? How about Soviet
authors?
A - Of course, as part of the world's great literature: Tolstoy,
Dostoyevsky, Turgenev, Pushkin, Gogol, Chekhov,
Soviet authors are perhaps known to fewer people;,' but
Sholokhov's And Quiet Flows the Don is very popular,
and among the well-known are Leonov, Gladkov, Pan-
ova and Zoshchenko.
Q - Do you listen to Russian music?
A - And howl Many of the most-played, best-known symphon-
ies , concertos, and other compositions, are Russian
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such as those of Tschaikovsky, Rachmaninoff, Glinka,
Mussorgsky and Charkovsky. Also, there are the
works of Soviet composers such as Prokofiev and
Khatchaturian.
Q Why didn't you bring an. American jazz band?
A - Because we came as individuals. We could not "bring"
orchestras or bands with us. Do you like American
jazz?
Answers from the listeners - We certainly do, and regard it
as the "original" jazz. We know Armstrong, Elling-
ton, Benny Goodman, Stan. Kenton. We listen to your
jazz over the Voice of America. We now are . getting
a lot of '-'rock and roll. " (A young Amen can college
instructor was approached one evening on the streets
of Moscow by a friendly group of young Russian stil-
yagi - "zoot- suite r s" or "he.pcats" - and asked if the
American jazz band leader, "Dizzy" Gillespie, was
coming to Moscow. When the American said he didn't
know the name the Russian youths were amazed at his
ignorance, and began to suspect that he wasn't an
American after all!
The Russian listeners did not seem to know much, if anything,
about more serious American music.
Questions on CPUSA
Why do you persecute the Communist Party in the United
States?
A Who says we persecute it?
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Q - Well, why did they arrest the leaders of the Party?
A The leaders were convicted of conspiracy to overthrow
our form of government. Still, under our Constitution
the Communists had the right to appeal, which they
exercised. The Supreme Court, ever zealous to pro-
tect fundamental constitutional liberties, reversed the
lower courts and ruled in favor of the defendants.
Q - Then. why did they remain in prison so long?
A - They stayed in prison only long enough for the appeals
process to be followed. Even when they were in jail
they continued to write articles, and the Party con-
tinued to exist. Didn't you receive the Daily Worker
for all that period of time? The Communist press
continued to function and. Dennis even completed a book
while in prison.
Q - Is the Communist Party popular in the United States?
A - No, hardly anyone pays attention to it. Why should they?
The Communists. raise false issues, alter the facts to
suit themselves, and talk a language largely incom-
prehensible to the American public, particularly to
the workers to whom they try to address themselves.
They talk about mass unemployment when there isn't
any, or when unemployment is relatively small. They
try to worsen :race relations when the Government and
the mass. of the people are trying hard to find peace-
able and evolutionary solutions to the problems of
racial discrimination which we frankly admit still
exist in some parts of our country. They call the
United States "imperialistic" when we all know from
the simple facts. of the record that this is not so. They
try to persuade people that all parties but their own in
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the United. States are creatures or puppets of Wall
Street, which we all know is an antique and unfounded
clichb . They work to reduce the defenses of the
United States in the name of "peace" but which, by
weakening our position, would only make war more
likely.
Q - What do you mean by saying that the Communist Party of
the United States, takes orders from Moscow? It is an
independent though "fraternal" party.
A - It is no secret to anyone that all Communist parties. are
subordinated to the CPSU Central Committee in Mos-
cow. Don't take my word for it. Read Lenin. Read
his. speeches at the Eighth through the Eleventh Party
Congresses. It's all there. He sets forth very clearly
the lines of organization and subordination. That is
why there have been repeated schisms in the CPUSA
and why there is a particularly bad break now. This
is why even so ardent a.Communist as Howard Fast
left the Party, although in his case it was not merely
his disgust with Moscow domination but his. revulsion
against the growth of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union.
(Knowledgeable American speakers never lost an oppor-
tunity to tell their Soviet listeners about Fast's defection..
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