JPRS ID: 10697 WORLDWIDE REPORT TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080071-0
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10697
29 July 1982
~
- ~ rldwide Re ort . ~
Wo p
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY,
~ RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
~ CF~UO 16/82)
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERViCE
U
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' JPRS L/10697
~ � ~ 29 July 1982
WORLDWIDE REPORT
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY,~~RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
, (FOUO 16/82) - ,
. CONTENTS .
ASIA
JAPAN
NTT Family's Uncertain Future
- (Kenichi Komahashi; SHUKAN TOYO KEIZAI, 24 Apr +~2) 1
- NTT Labor Union's View
(Kazuo Uikawa; EKONOMISUTO: 27 Apx. 82) 9
View of Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications
~ (S~NTAKU, May 82) 16
~ Impact of NTT Reform Discussed
(NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBiJN, 11-13 May 82) 22
~ USSR
'Orbita', 'Ekran' dnd 'Moskva' Satellite Television Broadcast Systems
(D. L. Zaytsev and L. Ya. Kantor; TEKHNIKA KINO I TELEVIDENIYA
Apr 82) 31
_ a _ [ III = WW 140 FOUO]
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JAPAN
NTT FAMILY'S UNCERTAIN FUTURE
Tokyo SIiUKAN TOYO KEIZAI in Japanese 24 Apr 82 pp 82-85 .
jArticle by reporter Kenichi I~omahaLshf]
[Text] The situation in the Nippon Telegraph and Telephon~ P'ublic Corporatinn
~ (NTT) h,~s changed greatly di~.ring the pas~ year so, w~th liberatioa of mater-
~al procur~ment as of 1 January and changes made by the new president, Shinto,
who todk over his new post on the same day. 'Ihe effect of the r~ugh waves is
surging toward the so-called~"NTT family" of~approximately 300 firms which
supply equipment to NTT.
The NTT family is also called the "mighty closed sncfety." Communication ~
circles have been up~rading their technological know-how through ~oint re-
search with NTT. Specific manufacturers are giv~en orders through private
contracts. Outsiders are able to achieve o�ficial status in NTT through the
reco~nendation of the business concer~ed. It an extremely difficult feat
for a new participant to break into this bastion_
It is a fact that in achieving a quick reconstruction of th~ Japanese telephone
aetwork, which was devastated by the war, it was more efficient to concentrate
orders with specific firms. In the actual contracts today, the first order
depends on the degree of contribution in the joint development. The alloca-
tion of next year's orders is decided after the assessments have been made as.
to the quality of goods, conditioa of conservation system, delivery time, price
offer, and management situation, includiag the previous year's performance.
In other words, "The principle of competition is working, to a certain degrae,
and there is absolutely no allot~ent of an entire order to one single manufac-
turer. In addition, member3 of NTT do not take 'gifts.' In that sense, things
aze working well" (according to a party connected with NTT). Nevertheless, a
"coquettish structure continues to thrive in the long closed society. Even
the cost of telephones is set by the "accumulative sys~em" of adding the cost
of parts of rigid quality standards and a fixed profit margin. Home apgliance
manufacturers say that telephones "can be made much cheaper."
:~Ioreover, the "rights" of the four members--consisting of NTT, the Minis~ry of
Posts and Telecom~unication3, the postal group, and private enterprises--have
been functioniag. Thus, the power to crush the family never developed fram
within. In the final analysis, the door was finally opened by "external
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Leadiag NTT Demaads, Telecc~unications Machinery Industrial Association
x~y :
(1} In 100 million yen (5) Civilian demands
(2) Total orders NTT
(3) Other governmeat (7) NoCe: Broadcasting equipment,
(4) External demaad~ . radio equipment not iacluded .
pr~ssure," through the participation of foreign eaterprises made possible by
the governmeat-level procurement negotiations at the Tokyo round of GATT.
- This changed the whole situation.
Time-Consumiag Overseas Procurement .
Through an agrea~ment betweea Japan aad the United States, the material prozure-
- ment a:ethod was divided into three stagea, of Tracks I, ZI and III,
Track I iacludes those [items] which are ~t directlq connected with the tele-
com~unication network, but bids ~aa be placed for readily usable goods on the
marke t Which can be worked into the network. Biddiag and purchase of about
one-half of the annual procuremeat, or abaut 1.5 billion doL'.azs including
papPr aad peacils, can be made according to GATT. An annual purchase of
- over 44 million yen will be anaouaced in the official gazette.
Track II refers to ehose products on the market chat require slight chaages.
These will be annouaced ia the official gazette, and purchase can be made
through a private contract with. a manufacturer selected frvm arplicants for
j o ia t development (with NTT) .
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These new methods are well received by the U.S. Embassy and USTR, but procure-
ment fram foreign enterprises has not progressed substantially.
Specification study of 56 products and 258 companies under Track I was com-
pleted at the ead of March. Among these were 15 foreign products and 27
foreign companies. Bids for 45 produ cts by 54 companies totaling 19.5 billion
yen were received, but [bids for] only 9.3 billion yen for 9 products by 11
companies were from foreign firms, and many were for magnetic tapes and exper-
imental LSI manufacturing equipment.
Oa the other hand, tre only product announced in the official gazette under
Trac!c II was the digital echo suppressor. A Japanese fix~ was selected. As
for Track III, 10 products were anaounced. A bid for automobile telephones by
M~otorola and a bid for satellite-use echo eliminators by the U.S. ATT were
re~eived. An examination for select~on is being made in each case, but the
fact is that the number is ~uch smaller than anticipated. (Motorola was
approached for the sale of pocket bells prior to the liberation of procure-
~ ment, and [Japan] will purchase 2 billion yen worth during this year.)
10 Best Procurement Fiims for JFY 1980 (ia 100 million yen)
Nippon Electric Company Ltd 1,274
Fujitsu Ltd 844
Oki El~ctric Industry Co Ltd 483
Hitachi Ltd 415
S~anitomo Electric Industries Ltd 174
Furukawa Electric Co Ltd 156
Fujikura Cable Works Ltd 156
- Iwatsu Electric Co Ltd 146
~ Dainichi-Nippon ('ables Ltd 140
Tamura Electric Machinery 113
However, all the products cannot be announced i~ediately, and it requires
time to rewrite the specifications. Among the 101 products for Track II,
slightly over 60 percent of those expected for announcement have been co~
pleted. The plan is to announce all the products by December. The situation
with Tracks II and III is: "Normally, the time required from re~earch to
testing and test manufacture is 1 to 2 years for short-term items and about
5 years for long-term items. Procurement takes time." (Sh~ro Matsuo, chief
of Materials Bureau)
An orientation for U.S. firms, held in Tokyo last June, drew 56 participating
- firms. Application forms were simplif ied, andthrough the ir~struction of
President Shinto, bidding instruc~io ns and specifications werE translated in-
to English and distributed fr.ee of charge. Those coaveniences by NTT were
rather unusual. Since then, over 100 f irms have arrived to make inquiries
or a sales pitch through the Japanese firms or by other means.
However, there is no denial that "fo reign manutacturers do not fully un~er-
stand the procedures." (Ichi~ Kada, chief of the interaational procurement
room, Materials Bureau) There is a plan to send mail directly to com~unica-
tion equipment manufacturers for double PR work.
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On one hand, under the instruction of President Shinto to "take positive steps
to buy good products cheaply," a study group was dispatched to the United
States in.the middle of March. Tha group visited ITT, GTE, Bell System (ATT),
and others to find ways to participate more readily in the Track II and Track
III levels.
"Exemplary manufacturers have made a thorough study of NTT's procedures,
but they do not understand fully the patent rights know-how in Track III"
(Kada); therefore, e~planations Were made about this. As ~ result, ATT
placed applications for Track III, showing some progress.
On the other hand, problems also exist within the foreign maaufacturers them-
selves. Especially, smaller U.S. com~unication equipmenr manufacturers tend
to submit applications without changing specifications or configurations, as ,
they have been doing with local telephone con~panies which do not possess their
_ own technology. There is also a~difference in the way they make their sales
pitch to NTT.
Talks with various companies are moving along, however, and there is a gradual
understanding. A good exa~aple is the approval of private switchboar3s af ter
a year of negotiation with the Rohn Company.
In any case, an improvement in getti.ng good results through PR takes time.
"Full-scale participation of foreign manufacturers will exist from here oa."
' (Kada)
Stringent Envirotnmental Changes for Smaller Manufacturers
Whether there are gains in p rocurement from foreign manuf actuers or not,
small and medium-size manufacturers will be affected the most from the
liberation. This was visible even before the liberation.
The bidding for facsimile equipment last fall is a typical case. Up to then,
Nippon Electric Company and Matsushita Denso had made deliveries through pri-
vate contracts, but t;~e bids last fall were based on Track I. Over 10
companies responded, and Toshiba won orders for 570 electrostatic high-speed
equipment and 5,520 thermal-sensitive medium-sgeed equipment items, while NEC
received orders for 1,900 thexmal-sensitive high-speed equipment items.
However, the problem was in the prices of the successful bids, which were con-
siderably lower than the market price. A certain source said, "Toshiba set
the price at one-fourth to one-fifth of the market price in order to make in-
roads into the NTT market, and NEC e~ulated them." There is a nmmor that
":VTT's responsible persons have ma,de inquiries ragarding the excessively low
price." (N'FT has denied this)
Toshiba disregarded this, saying, "Delivery to TNT does not require distribu-
tion costs or inventory charges. Since a fixed quantity was assured, mass-
product~on efficiencies can be utilized to lower the cost."
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Regarding the above, executives of inedi~-size manufacturers could not conceal
their bewilderment, saqing, "We believe competition is the flow of time, but
large companies which can produce in volume hane ~he advantage in making bids.
If they keep this up to become the price setters, smaller companies can only
throw up their hands in despair."
In actuality, the trend in achievements of inediimm-size communication equipment
manufacturers shows a conspicuous difference between the top-level and lower
level companies. NTT's investment was reduced to cut down on telephone inven-
tories which in turn cut down on orders for telephones.
The top-level companies, which were able to read this situation early, made
gains by exporting pushbutton telephones or by succeeding in diversification
into other fields so as to decrease their dependence on NTT. In contrast, the
medium-level companies, which were unable or were too late in getting into the
right track away from the NTT's projects, show a trend toward stagnant sales
and profits due to depressed NTT investment.
Moreover, the all-out review of material procurement and construction invest-
men~ under the instruction of President Sh~nto has added to their apprehensions.
In a normal year, a primary contract for 60-70 percent of the next fiscal
year's budget is drawn in January and a contract for the year is concluded in
August after the budget is completed. However, through the recent reconsidera-
tion, contracts were not concluded even in February, when the budgets should
have been fixed by the manufacturers, and it is already April.
The result is the suppression of equipment, for example, by reducing the
installation of new public phones, according to the slowdown in real income
growth rate, instead of adding new phones.
In contrast, new equipment such as autophones and pocket bells has increased.
Orders were switched from the old family enterprises to new manufacturers.
Moreover, the main object of the review is on INS (high-level information com-
munication system). What can be accomplished now is to change to a digital
system and promote a more efficient investment. However, many small and
mediimm firms cannot keep up with the new digital technology, and a maldistri-
bution of orders to majors is unavoidable.
In like manner, the structural changes of using LSI in equipment or moving
into a nontelephone line have pushed the smaller f irms into a rather austere
environment. A certain trend in the iatroduction of new technology corres-
ponding to the technological development of middle and lower-level firms has
been seen, but such a luxury is no longer admissib le.
Moreover, as seen in the facsimile case, NTT must compete for price in the
event of a sales competition between NTT and private firms. Procurements are
to be made by the lower market-oriented price, rather than by the purchase
price set by the sqstem of adding-on, as was the case previously. Soon,
"cheaper products can be sold by competitive bidding even though private
contracting continues." (Matsuo)
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Under these variaus factors, crustal m4vements are rising within the small
and medium manufacturers of co~unicationa equipment
Dissolution of Cooperative Group Af ter 9 Years
At such a time, the cooperative group of middle-size eaterprises dissolved at
the end of March. This cooperative group had been established in May 1970 to
support medium-size manufacturers threugh cooperative production of rotary
dial phones, or the so-called black phones, bq transferring the production
from the majors.
The group consisted of six compaaies: Meisei Deaki, Taiko Electric tiJorks,
Tamura Electric Works, K~nda Tsushin, Nakayo Teleccm~unication Works, and
Hasegawa Electric and Engineering Compaay. At the time, none of these c~~
panies had the capability to produce a complete set. Under the guidance of
NTT, each company supplied different parts (not sales) to be assembled and
delivpred to NTT. This method improved their productivity and technology.
However, when the pushbutton phones became praducable by a single company, the
cooperative group became meaningless. In contrast, closer ties with new
affiliated firms would only hinder their progress. It was decided that it
would be better not to rely on the cooperative group, in order to ~stablish
- a firmer administrative base, and this led to the dissolution.
Gp to now, orders have been placed through the group, but starting in 1982, '
individual orders will be placed to the nine companies, which include Iwatsu
Electric Compaay, Nitsuko aad Tokyo Shibaura Electric Campany. Transactions
of parts will probably remain among the former cooperative group m~mbers but
there will be a gradual and stronger move toward iadependence. This will
sweep each comp.any into a more vigorous competitive world.
NTT, on the other hand, has stated soberly, "This will mean that an order cara
be placed or received by an ordinary person, and NTT is no longer in a posi-
tion to provide detailed guidance." (Kada)
However, it does not apply to all small and mediwn firms. Under the GATT
provisions, enterprises with capitalization of less than 100 million yen and
with fewer thaa 300 employees are excluded, and private contracts for small
' parts such as connectors aad fuaes are being carried out. Moreover, over
- 20 percent of the procuremenr is allocated to smaller enterprises, under the
"law on assuring orders for ganeram4ent aeeds by smaller enterprises.
"Although it is said to be small in quantity, they cannot take any more or-
ders because of technological limitations." (Matsuo) Thus, the Co~unica-
tions Institute has decided to offer training in digital ca~unications, etc.,
with a view taward a cooperative association of small and medium enterprises.
The problem is with the lower level medivm-size enterprises. NTT has the
earlier [goal] of "reducing dependence on NTT to 30 percent and striving
toward civilian demands without missing out on the new technology." In
actuality, however, things are not going too well, as mentioned earlier.
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An attempt can be made to follow up the sudden rise in e.xports of electronic
pushbutton phones to the United States during the past 2 or 3 years, but there
is a delay in development, and the market will cool off by the time it is
' completed. Aiming for domestic sales will also result in severe competition
between similar industries, due to delays in operational structure and sales
network resulting from their past dependenc.e on NTT. They also do not have
design specialists for civilian goods.... I~ny problems such as these exist.
There is a strong mc~ve toward seeking protection for the affiliated new firms
to replace the NTT.
However, the envir.onment is turning all the more severe. A wrong move will
produce dropouts. Tt is said that "If a functional, and cheap product is ~
available, we will buy it" (Matsuo), but things are not that simple. flow they
can remove themselves from NTT in the future will be the crucial point in the,
next 2 to 3 years. The "NTT family" which has been glorified in the spring of
our society is being compelled into a complete turnaround at "dusk."
COPYRIGHT: Snukan Toyo Keizai 19a2
9218
CSO: 4106/107 ~
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' JAPAN
NTT LABOR UNION'S VIEW ~
Tokyo EKONOMISUTO in Japanese 27 Apr 82 pp 52-55
[Interview with Kazuo Oikawa, chairman of the All-Japan Teleco~mimunications ~
Workers Union by EKONdMISUTO reporter; date and place not given]
[Text] The Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public .
Corporation (NTT) introduced three proposals regarding
reorganization of NTT to the Emergency Administrative
Group. These show fully the feelings of President
Shinto, who came up from the civilian ranks. On the
other hand, the All-Japan Teleco~unication Workers
Union, consisting of NTT employees, expressed its
basic concept on managerial improvement to the Central
Co~ittee meeting held during March. It appears that
both labor and management are cool toward support of
the NTT system, but what is their intention? Mr Oikawa
was born in Miyagi Prefecture in 1929. He is 52 years
of z.ge, and has served his entire life with the union,
starting as chief secretary of the Sendai Telegraph
Office chapter. He has been in his p~resent position
since 1974.
Return Profits to the People
Interviewer: Both NTT managem.ent and the union have agreed to disavow the
present NTT syste~m in the reorganization disputes. Proposals have been made
for a special companq and a special corporation, resnectively, but the common
point is in the form of management. Is i.t over how it can operate efficiently
as a busiaess?
Oikawa: Yes, that is true. Teleco~unications work is part of an industry
with a promising future, but projects~which should maintain civilian ties
are growing steadily. I believe that if corporate management continues to
place importance only on the public interest, with no regard for business, an
irrationality will develop. From now on, even public corporations cannot
neglect efficiency. Ia the final analysis, the question is over harmonious
promotion of telecommunication's future, expansion, and business and also how
we can nurture the teleco~unication industry in the world market. The
problems lie in the reorganization of the managerial form, based on its role
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a.s protector of the benefits of all the Japanese people and of corporate man-
agement. There are criticisms against this position taken by the union, but
the points to be rectified cannot be rectified if the gover~ent undertakings
continue the way the,y are.
In this sense, I believe the article by Mitsuharu Ito,professor at Chiba
University (in EKONOMISUTO of 2 March, entitled: "Truth or Falsehood in
Talks on Monopolq-Private Management of NTT which adlocates the necessity of
certain "governament control" but opposes completely private management) shaws
a constructive view. ~ `
Interviewer: The unic~n's proposal is aimed toward a special public corpora-
tion financed by the gover~ent and subscri bers, but how are you accepting the
I3~TT`s concept?
Oikawa: Frankly, the most important point is the form of ownership, and there
is a conspicuous dif.fe~;pnce fxom our view. If a special campany in the form
of the Japan Airlines Company is established, many problems regarding stock
ownership will arisEC.
A limited stock ownershlp system may be adopted, but be that as it ~ay, stock
for a new business body can be issued to the public. Even if the government
should be asked to own one-third of the stock [for a while], this stock will
be sold within a certain time. We are opposed to it because it is different
from the Japan Airlines system and can be shifted into a private operation.
It means that pub lic control will be removed completely.
In contrast, we are not proposing stock ownership but a special corporation.
Regardless of how we obtain efficient management, we cannot avoid the public
interest in teleco~unications. Ir~ thE~ management of a public entity, the
effects of the f luctuations of stock prices and dividends should be avoid~d.
Stock ownership means strictly private management, and that is why we are
opposed to it.
A change to private management means selling the present enterprise for pri-
vate capital, but there is no need to sell a prof itable enterprise. Therefore,
we want it to oper.ate profitably for the people and pass the profits on to the
people. This can be accomplished by a reduction in rates, and there is also
a merit of converting the present payment systdn for tax benefit. Perhaps as
a means of financing, a voluntary investment by subscribers is possible, so
that profits can be returned in the form of dividends. In such manner, it is
believed the profits from the NTT operation should be distributed fairly.
There is no reason why the enterprise should be sold wholl} to private capital-
ists and let them benefit alone.
Unclear "Co rporate Proposal" .
Interviewer: However, as shown in the nine electric power system, an invest-
ment by, for example, the Tokyo Electric Power Campany can be huge. A change
to a stock-company does not necessarily make management easier.
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Oikawa: There is that view, but the makeup between electric pawer and tele-
coffinunications is entirely differ~nt. All the electric ~.ower company has to
do, in an extreme sense, is to keep the electricity flowing, or in short, keep
the co~m~odity moving.
However, there are senders and receivers in telecommunications. Moreover,
there is an exchange of information through conversation, and the secrets of ~
individuals and management ~ust be protected. This is where the significance
of going public or expansion can be mentioned, but to pursue a moneymaking
corporation free2y brings out the contradictory side.
I feel that if making money is the foremost ob~ective, going public or expan-
sion will be negated and great confusion will arise...including the problem of
privacy.
Interviewer: It seems that career members of NPT are opposed to the NTT's
proposal fer a special company.
Oikawa: You mentioned career me~mbers, but it is more so among the outsiders
who were appointed into the so-called "NTT family." There are some of the
"A"-class college graduate elite who are def initely opposed to it. In other
words, their goal is for reemployment into the "family"; therefore, the attrac-
tion for NTT as a public corporation or as a special corporation or privately
operated company would not be the same.
Another point is that, no matter what is sai'd, the A-class members in our
corporation are, after all, bureaucrats. Some classmates are in the Ministry
of Finance and some are in the Ministry of Posts and Telecoffinunications.
Bureaucrats have the consciousness of belonging to the first-class bureau-
cratic domain. A change to a private manage~aent would eliminate the future
positions [in NTT] for those who are now, for example, in the Ministry of Posts
and Telecommunications. To state it explicitly, since President Shinto came
up from the private sector, he tries to push civiliaa logic. There are some
who are not happy about this. From our viewpoint, President Shinto is going
too far, and there is criticism over how lon~ he is going to r~nain as a
"civilian" president. He now should act as the president of NTT. We don't
know whether he is forever talking as an "outsider" or as a responsible NTT
mem~; ~ r .
As a good example, President Shinto submitted three proposals (special company
system, private managed system, and reformed ~ublic corporation system) to the
Emergency Administrative Investigation Group, but none is designated as final.
This is on the premise that the decision should not come from NTT. It was in-
tended that "I only submitted the material," but I feel that he is not a person
in charge unless he says to the ianestigation group: "We want to do this."
We did not submit a proposal. We are just offering "our views."
In any case, the investigation group will be issuing reports, but if the NTT's
intention is shown too soon in the Shinto's "three proposals," a free discus-
sion by the investigation group can be impaired. Although the underlying
tone seams to point toward a special company, the goal is for private manage-
ment.
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Interviewer: In the event the union's special corporation plan is to be imple-
mented, will the entire capital of the corporatioa be returned to the gover~ent?
Oikawa: This is a controversial [point]. The goverrnnent says that it invested
18.8 billion yen when we became a public corparation and explains that this
would be 480 billion yen at the present price rate. It can be said that all
one has to do is to return this amount, but the problem is in future investment--
whether to have the subscribers put up the new money or not. It will have to
be done on a voluntary basis.
There is also the problem of capitalization. As for the type of management,
many problems such as the establishment of an investor-represented co~ittee
to decide on intentions, an inspection coffiittee, etc., remain to be discussed.
We are thinking of getting knowledgeable persons together to discuss these
issues. In any case, even after the investigation group issues its report,
the reorganization will not progress immediately because of the pending legis-
lative work. It will probably reach a climax by the ordinary session of the
Diet next year.
Interviewer: The corporation's proposals and the union's proposal for having
the government hold the stock "for a while" seem to agree in the joint invest-
ment portion.
Oikawa: Strictly speaking, there is a difference, but the form of management
is quite similar. In essence, it appears that our views have been incorpo-
rated. Af ter all, we have been ~dvocating reorganization for 8 years.
Off-the-Mark Statement by MPT
Interviewer: Returning to the basics, a truly private company such as ATT in
the linited States is operating quite well. Why not the NTT?
Oikawa: The background is completely different. The size of the land is not
at all the same. In the U.S. case, monopolistic control by a powerful person
is strongly despised. At any rate, if a company is determined to be monopolis-
tic, it is split up bq the Antitrust Law. Moreover, in reality it is imposst-
ble for a single enterprise to cover such a wide territory. Eut the size of
Japanese islands is insignificant.
In the case of Japan, a look at history shows that talks on the private manage-
ment of teleco~unications came up before. It required money and could not
compete as a private entity. Therefore, the decision was that it should be
operated by the government, and it has continued to this day. Because of this
background, it is outrageous to say that the United States can and Japan cannot.
We are against private control, but if it should came about, there is a method
for changing the entire system to private control. In such a case, however,
the Antitrust Law can be applied, and as a result, a split of private control
will be included.
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If it should be split, a new facility will be needed for senders and receivers
of information. This requ~res huge simms of money. Moreover, jthe need for]
different technology to suit regional situations would make consistently good
service difficult. Tn fact, second and third telephone companies are being
established in the United States, and rhis is viewed as an imritation to con-
fusion. For example, telephone rates would rise in the depopulated areas and
be lower in the densely populated areas.
Interviewer: The I~T ha.s been stressing reduction of personnel and rationali-
zation within the f ramework of the present corporation system as part of the
NTT reorganization. Does President Shinto include such "nuances" in his
statement?
Oikawa: The MPT (Ministry of Posts and Telecommunfcations) can be called irre-
sponsible. By and large, important personnel of NTT require first of al.l the
= approval of the ~IPT. Without approval from the MPT, Ministry of Finance
cannot decide on the budget, either.
Such views can emerge if one considers tha* the president has had experience
in rationalization of a private shipbuilding firnt. This is one way to lo~~k at
it in a restricted sense, and it can be viewed affirmatively. But there are
330,000 employees in NTT, and their workload differs according to their place
of employment. In some areas, an absolute value of personnel is lacking.
Frankly, therefore, the rationalization has been carried out through talks
between labor and management in the redistribution of easential personnel
to busier areas. Thus, there shouldn't be any surplus of essential personnel
' to be called lazy. The union cannot accept labor intensification onthe
grounds of working a little harder to become essential.
Rationalization is not simple, but consequentially, they should have cooperated
in the corporation plan. The problem of wages tied to working hours cannot be
worked out readily, because they are regulated by the budget. Despite this,
rationalization has been carried out. It is believed the corporation has
shown its good faith.
Interviewer: It seems that the 1?~T is not aware of such a scenario.
Oikawa: That is correct. Despite many restrictions, negotiations must be
carried out in the live labor and management relationship; therefore, I cannot
understand the seemingly critical statement, though it is a supervisory agency.
There are 330,000 personnel working in NTT, and the president and outsiders
may see other weak points, but in actuality, the workers want to work, and new
services are being pr~posed by labor and management.
However, under the framework of the present system, no.thing can be done with-
out the approval of the MPT, even if they are agreed to by labor and manage-
ment. After going through various deliberation councils and co~nittees, a
reply will take at ~least a year. In same cases, it has taken 4 years. The
world situation can change by that time. That is why I like to say "nonsense"
when a surplus of workers is mentioned.
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Interviewer: Is that the reason the union is proposing that NTT be reorganized?
Oikawa: Yes. At present, weakness depends on the point of view. At any rate,
a reorganization of the system will provide work, which in turn will improve
the enterprise and provide better services to the people. I feel there are
many things which can be put into practice. This is what we think and i feel
that if they can place importance there, the MPT cannot be critical. It is
often said that an enterprise with 330,000 people is too large, but the
issue is tied to inequitable cases. The administrative structure....
Interviewer: Cannot see them....
Oikawa: They occur in a sense from not being able to see, but this is one
view and I believe that it is an indication. However, ~f the split theory is
effected, cases such as these can be prevented through a change in authority.
That is why we are ~roposing decentralization of authority.
Hereafter, leadership from a central office is no longer valid. At the same
time, a change would pravide closer services to the regional subscribers,
since telecoffi?unications will penetrate into the people's lives. Unless deci-
sive authority is given to chiefs of telegraph and telephone stations or to
' chiefs of co~unications departments that will maintain prefectural control,
the needs of the people in the regions cannot be met. It is a good idea, and
we want to go ahead with it, but it must be heard by the head office. A
system where a reply takes 2 or 3 months after going through the co~unica-
tions department, the co~unications bureau, and the main office is hopeless.
Authority should be transferred decisively. The NTT leaders are thinking
along this line, and we have submitted our demands for this.
Repeating the Errors of the NRC
- Interviewer: The reorganization of NTT, the National Railways Corporation
(NRC), and the Japan Monopoly Corporation is said to be the target of "Doko's
investigation group"; therefore, a substantial reorganization can be expected.
Is there a"preparedness" for this at this time? .
Oikawa: If Mr poko were questioned politically, he would probably deal with
the issues on three corporations. Unless a clear-cut reply is made on the
NRC issue, one's ability jto carry it out] will be questioned. Therefore,
the NRC is ntmmber one [issue]. ~
With regard to the NTT issue, there are quite a few bureaucratic outsiders in
the ~'ourth Subco~ittee, which is ia charge of the investigation group. They
will probably take a conservative view, and so I believe that the discussion
will evolve on keeping the present NTT system intact. Those who used people
as a basis will probably counter by taking the stand of split and private
management. The question is for those who are taking the neutral stand....
There are also mass-co~unication people, although their number is small.
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I doubt that any of the mass-cam~unication people feel that the present situa-
tion is ~ood. Whea the problem of efficieacy is taken up, they will insist on
putting the scalpel to the abuse of "having the good government foot the bill."
In that sense, I believe the decision will be closer to the people's viewpoint.
That is the situation...T believe.
The most critical jissue] at this time is on the preseat and �uture of the
telecommunication information industry, as was mentioned at the beginning.
The question is whether the report to be issued will be bav~d on the discus-
sions fram their true meaning.
Interviewer: Whose telegraph and telephone work will it be?
Oikawa: This is not yet a pressing issue. It will be related to the inter-
nd:ional economic activities and industrial activities.
The type of management must be formed after taking a hard look at 5 years to
10 years into the future. .
Under the existing conditions, speculation preaeats the concern that the cor-
poration will be chopped up because of superficial conclusions that there are
too many employees or the scale of the enterprise is too large, or that the
' corporation after all relies too much on the good governmen[ to foot the bill.
Interviewer: It seems that the investigation group is saying that they need
furthe r investigation.
Oikawa: That is in the proposals. The president has n~ot mentioned which of
the three proposals he wants. That point will be quest.Coned. When that ques-
tion is posed, the president should respond clearly as p~~esident. This is
how I feel, irrespective oF whether the proposal will be adopted bv the inves-
tigation group or not.
Interviewer: Earlier, you mentioned the three corporations. Do you sense that
the mistake seen in the case of NRC should at least be avoided?
Oikawa: Yes, I do. If NTT performs the entire work on the national tele-
co~untcation aetwork and lets the private enterprises do the rest, it can
lead to another NRC mistake. [A mistake] also can happen by having the data
co~unications sect~r take over the depopulated areas.
Zn sho rt, by taking over the red-ink portions.... The second NRC mistake is
definite if they say the good portion will be handled by the private sector
and the poor portion by others because of the public interest.
COPYRIGFiT: Mainichi Shimbunsha 1982
9218
CSO: 4106/107
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JAPAN
VIEW OF MINISTRY OF POSTS AND TELECOrIl~BJNICATIONS
Tokyo SENTAKU in Japanese May 82 pP 72-75 .
[Text] The Second Emergency Administrative Im~estigation Group (chairman,
Toshio Doko) has entered the final stage of work toward issuing its basic
report on 10 July. Various subcouu~ittee reports will be consolidated in
mid-May to be reported~ to the Investigation Group. Active intervening ope-
rations" are being developed for this report by the Liberal Democratic Party,
concerned government agencies, business circles, and organizations with their
underlying interests.
Above all, a violent "counterwind" is raging from the Fourth Subco~ittee
(headed by Keio University Professor Kar. [or Hiroshi] Kato), which is working
on "ways of the three corporations aad five agencies." The National Railways
Corporation is the symbolic topic of this subcoum~ittee, but the Nippon Tele-
graph and Telephone Public Corporation (NTT) is pushing for a change in
management structure. From the deliberationa, it appears certain that the
report will favor the private ffianagement line of changing to a special company
aimed towar3 greater mobility of the enterprise aad competency of the persons
involved.
As this line of thinking became apparent, the LDP, Ministry o� Posts and Tele-
communications (1~T), the NTT familq, and even the corporation started blasting
with their counterheadwind. The postal group in the LDP, which is trying to
bend the report, is working on NTT to go against the Investigation Group at
this time. In reality, the postal b�ureaucrats, who are maneuvering to gaia
control over personnel and supervision of NTT in the event of a change in
manag-=ment, the NTT family's enterprises, which are afraid of losing their
rigl:cs and interests, and certain technology firms,~which have been spendianll
development funds extravagantly as part of the NTT technology kingdom,"
have different views. But the "countezwind" has started to gqrate over the
"green" of the Investigation Group. The Investigation 6roup is in a precarious
situation.
Advancing the "Shinto Concept"
"To correct the improper administration."... Under this project, Hisashi
Shinto, who came over from private enterprise Clshikawajima Harima Heavy
Industries), ass~ed the presidency of NTT about 15 months ago. He has
complained, "I accepted the position because I was told to correct the improper
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~ ,
administration. But I have beea drawn into 3 preposterous thing called the
Investigation Group." Hi: reputation up to a year after his a~pointment had
been good.
Through "reporting to work early," he drew the mass media's attention by
straightening out the lax regulations found in the corporation, has drawn the
, union to his side through dialog, etc. His greatest achievement has probably
been the opening of NTT to society by bieaking the secretiveness which had been
NTT's the "special quality." He lef t voluntarily for the United States and
met with Secret~ry of Co~erce Baldridge and Brock, a representative of USTR
- (United States Trade Representation), to raise the overall assessment of NTT
within the U.S. Gover~ent. When the procuremez~t of telecomm~inication mater-
ials was about to become an issue in the U.S. House of Representatives during
the time of increasing trade friction in March, USTR representative Brock and
others reproved the Congress that there is "no problem" with NTT.
NTT was looked upon as a stronghold of the Tanka faction and the Miki faction,
but the Shinto style of operation captured both factions, and persons such as
former prime minister Kakuei Tanaka spurred on "to take the private management
route by providing capital of 1 trillioa yen a:~d support funds of 3 tr:llion
yen." At least from the present si*_uation, leaders of the Tanaka f action, the
*~iiki faction, and of course the Suzuki f action are solidly behind Shinto's
concept of private management.
Up to now, Shinto has refrained from issuing his views publicly on the problem
of changing NTT to ~1 privately managed enterprise. In response to the re-
port, issued last J~uly, "to carry out a drastic review of the forms of manage-
ment, including private management," he submitted three proposals for a special
company, private management, and a reorganized publfc corporation on 26 Febru-
ary of this year. This is merely a way of entrusting the [final] selection to
the Diet, the government, or the Investigation Group.
However, there is no doubt that the intention of Shinto is private manage~ent,
even if it means taking the route of a special company. The basic concept of
Shinto is that "a public co~unications work which can be of service to the
' people and users car.not evolve ia the absence of efficient management." But
in actuality, the prize pupil called NTT has reached its peak in telephone
demands, and the difference between revenues and expenditures has turned to
a 2-3 percent minus factor and carries a long-term�debt of 5.3 trillion yen.
On the other hand, it is being pressed with the problems of rectifying long
and short disparities (presently at 1 to 60) and meeting new needs, such as
an expansion of the data bank and .~her nontelephone services. The INS
(hi3h-level information co~unication systeni) concept, toybe promoted ica1TT
under the 20-year lan with an investment of 20 trillion en, is a typ
example.
Hawever, a situation of continuing persistently with the current rates or rely-
ing completely on rate hikes, as seen in the National Railways Corporation case,
must be avoided. To attain this, efficient management and a stable financial
base are indispensable. Siace Shiato ass~ed his position, "industrial efforts
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such as a reduction of expenses by the monthly settlement of accounts, which
is no=mal in the private sector, increased revenues through sales promotion,
and reduction in t.he interest payment burden have been carried out. However,
NTT is stymied by budget control, the Public Corporatic?*�5 and GovertIInent Enter-
prises Labor Relations Act, the public corporation law, public teleco~unica-
tion laws, etc., all of which create difficulties in the performance of its
own operations. Unless goverYnaent controls are removed and it becomes an
active, self-supporting corporation, its downfall into becom~ng "second
National Railways Corporation" is inevitable. This is the logic Shinto is
using in his concept of private management.
MPT; ~_he Ringleader for Scrapping
President Shinto appears "short-tempered," and his maneuvering for private
management of NTT is rather impetuous. For this reason, there are increasing
signs of "stopping private management in opposition to his hastiness, as well
_ as annoyance at his popularity as the"conclusion of the Im~estigation Group
draws near. For example, MPT-aligned freshmen Diet members are saying, "Shinto
will baw his head to executi~es, but he does not even look at us."
However, as you well know, NTT, along with its family, has built a solid "struc-
~ ture of rights and interests" around the rights and interests of NTT i.n the
30 years since the war. If it changes to a private management system, con-
siderable shaving will take place, and it will be devoid of "sugarly" indul-
gence. The "structure of rights and interests" up to now has been very con-
servative. Eut there is opposition, as suggested, for example, by certain
firms to Diet members that "we can no longer continue to associate if NTT
comes under private management."
Even if this were not the case, the result would be preeminent. This line of
argument has become the center of the "counteiwind." A look into the chorus
of"Stop NTT from coming under private management" arid "Crush Shinto" shows
that the MPT, a supervisory agency, is behind it. Hiroshi Asao, administra-
tive vice minister of the I~T, said at one of the meetings: "We can even have
about one-half of the NTT executives occupied by the m~mbers of the MPT."
This is the underlying intention of the MPT. The MPT feels that NTT is a
subordinate public corporation, but in actuality it does not possess that
much influence. The 1~T and NTT were split fram the prewar Mi.nistry of Com-
munications (NTT was then known as the Ministry of Electric Communications),
and NTT feels that they are of equal level and has resisted strongly the I~T
intervention regarding personnel, labor affairs, accounts, etc. When it is
time to draf t a budget, the I~T sits in as a supervisory agency, but NTT can
only remain silent in the sorrow of being a"third-rate agency." The Inter-
national Telegraph and Telephone Company (KDD) also is embroiled in this situ-
ation. Although it is a private enterprise, it is subjected to thorough
intervention.
In a sense, it is the desire of the MPT to have NTT, in name and in reality,
under its supervision. Additionally, if NTT became a truly private enterprise,
thel~T would lose the 40 billion yen in contract funds received each year from
NTT and may even have MITI take over the supervision. This already is evident
in the problem involving data communications.
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Since the Investigation Group wants to replace postal savings, which is one of
the i~mportant parts of the MPT, there is a fear of losing even this if NTT
turns private. As the mood toward private management of NTT heightened along
with the popularity of Shinto, a sudden change toward counterattack developed.
Its basic strategy is in countermeasures through the Diet and the mass media.
Vigorous countermeasures are being planned by having Norimasa Hasegawa, an
inspector with the Secretariat's Documents Section, in charge of the pro~ect,
with Hiroshi Hamada, deputy chief of the Second Section of the Telecommunica-
tions Policy Bureau assisting. They have made candid requests, such as by
saying, "The private management view given by NTT is peculiar. If you can
print articles to refute this, we can provide you with materials." However,
except for a certain industrial publication, this did not work, probably be-
cause it was too candid.
Vice Minister Asao's attack against NT'!' is also appalling. Ae takes every
opportunity at the press conferer~ce to say, "NTT's view that it is unable to
do anything unless it changes its managerial system is ridiculous. Those who
say that the present budget system is quite elastic yet lacks elasticity do
not know anything about the budget. Labor conditions are better than in the
other two public corporations and agencies. A revenue gain of 3 percent and
an increase of 6 percent in expenditures are wrong. A drop in labor conditions
can reduce the increase in expenditures to under 6 percent. At present,
330,000 personnel are taking it easy and the I~'T is now carryiag out rigorous
personnel managemeat." He becomes indignant about the union's queries. He
also makes statements which betray his personality, such as: "There are voices
saying that there is opposition within the public corporation, and there are
five or six party members who are stuck together in the opposition."
The argument of the MPT, headed by Vice Minister Asao, is that "It can be done
throu;h efforts, even within the current framework," and "your mental attitude
is bad." However, there is an indication of a doubt as to the sincerity of the
MPT's counteroffensive. Vice Minister Asao and other postal executives say
repeatedly, "If NTT becomes privately managed, an enterprise tax and a fixed
property tax will be levied. It would be disadvaatageous." In addition,
MPT Minister Noboru Minowa has stated, "A reevaluation of assets would have
to be made if it were to become privately managed. This would meaa a payment
of 600 billion yen in fixed property taxes each year."
An investment in kind without necessarily a reevaluation of assets can be
made under the present system; therefore, the above statement reveals the
government official's sorrawful lack of knowledge about private enterprise.
Furthermore, there is uncertainty in their basis for calculation. They can-
not give numerical explanations at the press conference and end up apologiz-
ing, to be sneered at by correspondents. Finally, Prime Minister Suzuki
became infuriated by the haphazard figures and prohibited further publication.
Tug-of-War With Postal Group in LDP
A maneuver toward politicians seems to be progressing steadily. ~,fter all,
the MPT is a gigantic family, backed by 16,000 postal offices throughout
Japan. It is not only large in numbers, but there also is much energetic
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young blood. The feature of the postal f~?ily is that each faction has a fresh-
man and second-year Diet member assigned to the comQaunications co~ittee.
Since the popular committees for budget, co~erce, agriculture, and forestry
are usually occupied by members Who have been elected at least four times,
younger me~nbers are sent to the less popular communicati~ons committee, but there
are many who become that much more vocal.
In contrast to the popular committees, the ~ treats Diet memebers on the
communications coffiittee with care; therefore, those who leave the co~ittee
have an indescribable nostalgia and they become easily rekindled backers of
the MPT.
The Telecomnunication Basic Problem Study Group (headed by Tsunetaro Kato)
of the Policy Research Ca~ittee of the Liberal Democratic Party is the body
which is undermining the private management issue of NTT. The group has
forcefully "taken over" the discussion on private manag aaent of NTT which
had been carried out by the Subco~ittee on Telecammunications Work (headed
by Ken Harada) of the Policy Research Cammittee since 2 March.
The "subcoi~ittee" takes the position that the problem of changing the form
of management is "being handled by the Iavestigation Group, and the party
should not express its views," (Chairman Harada), but the "Basic Problem
Study Group" has taken the opposite view--that "the party's views should be
expressed positively to the Investigation Group." (Chaiiman Kato)
The argument of the "Basic Problem Study Group" has many faults, and a slightly
lower dimension is seen, but at any rate it~ distinctive feature is its
thrashing of NTT. Executives of the MPT have stated, "We are politicians, and
we represent the people; therefore, we should express our ii.:entions to the
_ Investigation Group. A takeover of NTT by financial circles is preposterous,"
(committee member Ko Suita), and a"Regarding the problem o." private manage-
ment, a fixed direction established by having the party call in concerned peo-
ple is one thing, but to have the president of the public corporation say that
the trend toward private management is uniform is a problem. It lacks suffi-
cient study." (Diet member Ei~iro Aata)
Moreover, on 7 April a neutral collective view that even Chairman Kato did not
know of spread within the "Basic Problem Study Group." The neutral collective
view of "what form of Iv'TT maaagement should take" is literally an antiprivate-
management proposal. It clearly states, "The majority of committee members
have doubts about privste management and also about the transition to a spe-
cial company and [feel] it should s~~k rationalization and efficiency under
the present public corporation system. There is no positive view on the
transition of a special company."
The grounds for opposition are identical to the doc~ent on "How N'TT Should
Be Managed," put together by the MPT in March, which leads to the suspicion
that opposition views were prepared by the MPT. Recently, this postal group
strongly opposed the private management and split of the National Railways
Corporation and started associating with Kato and transportation group in the
Diet who are trying to stop NTT from becoming private. In addition, Kazuo
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Tamaki and other members of the Souse of Councilors have started to demon-
strate creepy activities. Thus, the moves "to torment Sh~nto" have been
grawing steadily.
At any rate, the MPT and the postal group have achieved a certain success in
the tug-of-war match. Although the Shinto concept may not be squashed com-~
pletelq, the MPT's final goal, upon the Investigation Group~s proposal for a
special coffipany, is to obtain indisputable rights and interests (supervision
of personael), as in the case of the KDD, when NTT is reorganized legally as
a special company. The present administrative reform mavement is nothing
more than the first wave of the reorganization.
Group �or Preservation of Status Quo Regarding NTT
The term NTT family is becoming obsolete, but the annual procurement of over
1.6 trillion yea is still attractive to businessmen. �Iiat about the relation-
ship between the corporation and the family enterprtaes? NTT is not neces-
sarily monolithic. It is said that those who control the Technology Bureau,
the Facilities Bureau, and the Materials Bureau also control NTT. Vice Presi-
dent Yasusada Kitahara and chief engineer Kaisei Yamaguchi are at the top in
building a technology kingdom. Their feelings are to preserve the existing
systen; Yamaguchi, especially, is furiously opposing Shinto's concept. This
corporation support group and the family enterprises will probably mesh
together both openlq and secretlq in the future.
The NTT engineers form a solid group thraugh personnei, materials, and
money but this myth has gradually been crumbling ever since the liberation
of material procurement bp the so-called three-track system. Moreover, the
introduction of monthly settlements and the squeeze on facility iaves tiaents
by Shinto are diluting the "sweet gravy" of~the family. If NTT becomes a
completely independent enterprise, be it in the form of a special corpora-
tion or a private enterprise, rationalization will follow, and the invest-
ment which has been the source of "sweet gravy" aad the procurement orders to
specific firms will surely change. Apprehensions will keep rising among the
family. Large diversified manufacturers of equipment, machinery, and wires
are better off, since they are not totally dependent on NTT, but the con-
struction business, which has to cling to NTT, will be seriously affected.
In any case, it is reported that Shinto was infuriated when certain construc-
tion businessmen brought him money when he ass~mmed the presidency. However,
for the sake of preventing private management, it is not unusual to see money
thrown in the direction of politicians. NTT officials who have been assigned
to the family enterprises are said to have been meeting once a week at the
Imperial Hotel to formulate countermeasures. They denounce Shinto and are
studying a concrete political maneuver.
NTT executives have also participated in these meetings at times; therefore,
with "unexpected enemies," the change in the form of management will not be
easy as believed by the pro-Shinto group. Indeed, Shinto has been maneuvering
among the factions and pulling to his side young administrators and persons
of practical business knowledge who have been cold-shouldered in the kingdom
of technicians. The great current, under the banner of the Icrvestigation
Group, is turning taward private manaaement. The question of the future
effectiveness of the "countexwind" will became the crucial moment for the
popular Shinto.
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JAPAN
IMPACT OF NTT REFORM DISCUSSED
Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIl~UN in Japanese 11-i3 r~y a2
[11 May 82 pp 9-11]
[Text] Impact of NTT Reform (Part 1)
NTT (Nip.pon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporatiotz), a mammoth
organization which can be said to be the "central nerve" of the Japanese
Archipelago, is about to be transformed. The report by the 4th Sub-Committee
of the 2nd Provisional Administrative Affairs Research Council, which report
will be made public soon, is expected to incorporate such reform plans as a
"change to private management" from the present public corporation system,
"se~aration off of some business operation~," and "regional division." As to
~lhether or not these will go as planned by th~~~ R~search Council, we must note
their whereabouts in the future. On the other hand, however, NTT itself
also is showing various moves toward self-reform, in response to the new age.
They are typified by its positive challenge to the field of advanced
technology. Such moves over NTT will have an.impact on the industry circles
in geaeral, at any rate.
Is NTT a Superior Enterprise? ~
In the middle of April, the figure shown by the Postal Services Mi.nistry
varied ~r~atly from that shown by NTT, over NTT's change to private management.
I:i a tentative calculation to see how far expenditures will increase due to
taxes, dividends, etc., when the present NTT is assumed to be a joint-stock
cc+rporation with a capital of ~�1 trillion, the Postal Services Ministry
caiculated the increase as ~600 billion, and judged that it is impossible for
;JTT to be placed under private management. However, NTT asserted that it
c.3n be placed under private managment because the increase can be li.mited to
~F?50 billion.
This is because prior conditions are different between the Postal Services
;~inistry, which puts in question what should be done to conduct manage-
me:~t which is desirable for an enterprise, while paying 10-percent dividends
and securing sufficient internal reserves, too, and NTT which expects 8-percent
dividends (no dividends for the shares held by the Government), the receiving
of ineasures to reduce some taxes, and future efforts for management. As can
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be seen from this example, too, NTT, which is said to be a superior
Government-affiliated enterprise, "is by no means a good company, when it is
assumed to be a private ~ompany" (President Hisashi SHINTO). Moreover,
unrest is beginning t~ be seen as to the future, too.
Future of Telephonea, Which A~e Relied upon, Is�Dxr-k, Too
NTT's income includes that from telephones,telegrams, data communications,
etc. Of these, the income from telephanes accounts for 88 rercent. Moreover,
of the balance between income and outgo (surplus equivaleat to the
before-tax profit) in the case of NTT, amounting to ~�388,100 million,
~538,200 million is earned by this sector. In other words, management is
supported by the telephone sector, with the deficits in other sectors offset.
In the telephone sector, where the income showed an increase of more than
10 percent at one time, growth is likely to stop at 2 or 3 percent in the
future, because the spread of telephones:has run its course. The future of
- telegraph, which causes a deficit of more than ~�100 billion, is quite dark,
and data communications, too, have not grown so greatly as desired, because
~ of the severe competition with private enterprises.
While the growth of income is slowing down, there are many factors for an
increase in expenditures. The financial expenses accompanying the long-term
debts (most of them are NTT bonds, amounting to ~�5,305,900 million as of
thc~ end of March, 1981) account for about 10 percent of the income, and these
expenses will increase further. The increase in the pe~,sonnel expenses for
330,000 persons, which exPenses account for about one-third the total ex-
~enditures, are also a heavy hurden. _When the increase in non-personnel
J expenses is estimated, it is found that the situation of the increase in
expenditures. exceeding that in income is approaching. President SHINTO also
admits. this, saying that "There is the danger that if this situation continues,
NTT will become a second National Railways."
- Under such a situation, SHINTO assumed the post of President,from private
circles (former President of Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industry),in January,
1931. He cynically referred to NTT people's way of speaking, "We will install
a telephone for you," which way was brought about amid monopoly, as "NTT
language instead of the Japanese language." He embarked upon drastic measures
including the reduction of expenses and investments, while inspiring the
concept of a private enterprise in the form of pre-empting the
recommendation by the Provisional Administrative Affairs Resear~h Council.
Reflecting such an intention of the top-ranking leader, the fiscal
1992 budget was epochal. The nwnber of personnel has decreased by 1,000
compared with the preceding fiscal year, and the construction investments have
d.:c^eased by ~�50 billion. Both have fallen below the level of the preceding
fiscal year for the first time since the inauguration of NTT.
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On the otrer hand, enthusiasm about "trade" has budded, too. Last fall,
Toshiba received an order for about 6,400 telephone facsimile sets ~rom NTT,
- accounting for 80 percent of the total. This caused big repercussions in
the industry circles concerned, because Toshiba, which has not so ~ar been
very r"riendly with NTT, received such a big order, and moreover, because
its bidding price was exceptionally low, reportedly one-fourth to one-fifth
the market price.
Familv Has Collapsed?
Such an occurrence is due to the fact that a formu~a of competitive
bidding, in which both Japanese and foreign enterprises can participate,.
has been adopted on a 1~�..�ge scale, from the traditional equipment procurement
system centered on sperific manufacturers constituting the "NTT family."
;'his was occasioned by the opening of the doors for the procurement of
materials, which opening was realized from January, 1981 after the matter
becar~e a political problem between Japan and the US. However, as it occurred
~hen the NTT market itself had become smaller because of the curbi:~g of
inv`stments, it accelerated the intensification of competition among the
manufacturers.
The unrest of the industry circles concerned is not limited to this
~ alone. NTT itself, which has so far been their customer, is about to become
a strong rival. NTT is also engaged in�the sales of such terminal equipment
as tele~hones and facsimiles, which are connected with circuit networks
including telephone licies. However, the share of its equipment which comes into
competition with that produced by private manufacturers is falling steadily,
except for the main telephones (first telephones to be installed for telephone
s~ibscribers ) .
Partly because of the shortage of business efforts, it has become unable
to compete favorably with private manufacturers who move quickly. In the
r'3S2 of telephone facsimiles, ;or example, which are being spotlighted as a
n~w means of communications, NTT's share in the number of those installed in
fiscal 1975 was nearly 40 percent, but it has dropped to nearly 1 percent
� c�ecently.
To vitalize this terminal equipment sector, President SHINTO intends to
~~en main telephones also to private manufacturers, on the one hand, and on
rhe other, he is trying to roll back by estab~lishing an "Inhouse Equipment
~?~~siness Headquarters" where the related sectors are combined, as early as
next year. NTT has no manufacturing sector, and it purchases all equipment
fr~m private circles. However, in the fields which come into competition
+.?ith those of private circles like in the case of terminal units, it is trying
to ourchase products at low pr~ces by issuing orders for large amounts
thrvugh competitive bids, on the basis of its own technological development,
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and stand up against private circles' offensives in real earnest by adopting
the selling-out system and price reductions, too.
At the same time, it is trying to make the data communications sector
more efficient. This sector has continued to have a deficit since it was
started. If NTT's act+vities are strengthened, its competition with private
circles will come to the fore, inevitably. In the report by the Provisional
Administrative Affairs Research Council's Sub-Committee, separation of the
terminal equipment and data communications sectors is scheduled~to be xncluded,
and therefore, it is inevitable that an impetus will be given to such moves.
The stirs of "re-organization" of NTT, which has approached a period of a big
reform, are spreading as big swells, both in and outside NTT.
[12 May 82 pp 10-12]
[Text] Part 2
The "My Frank Account of NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public
Corporation)," which is NTT President Hisashi SHINTO's writing put on sale
in January, became a best seller, and SHINTO, pleased with this, will soon
contribute the royalties to the Japan Scholarship Society, ':c. SHINTO's
views on the management of NTT, which views are included in z'.:at book, are so
bold that they could not have been considered by the NTT Presidents in the
~~ast. However, even President SHINTO was unable to agree to the plan for
"dividing NTT into regional groups." As far as this point is concerned, he
entertained uneasiness as to what conclusion the 4th Sub-Conanittee of the 2nd
Provisional Administrative Affairs Research Council will form.
TakinP over Development from Private Circles
In early May, the Sub-Committee's.plan for reforming Ir'TT became clear.
In this E~lan, the following item was included: "Placing NTT under private
mana~ement should be pushed by dividing it into the central company unitarily
holding the nation-wide key circuit networks and the research and development
sector, and 8- 11 regional companies providing telephone communication
~e:^vices, etc., in various areas." President SHINTO is said to have express-
e~ to an NTT leader his dissatisfaction with the plan for division, saying as
follows: "If it is divided into regional companies, NTT may lag behind in
international technological development."
In regard to division of NTT, not only NTT leaders but also e~ectric
mac~inery manufacturers and university research organs are entertaining
app^ehension, saying, "I wonder if NTT's research and development structure
can be maintained."
This is natural. NTT has Extremely important roles, being the general
' manager of telegraph and telephone services in Japan and at the same time the
general headquarters for Japan's electronic and communications technology.
As to the development of advanced technology, including VLSI's (very large-
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scale integrated circuits), computers, optical communication, and picture
communication, NTT is carrying it out jointly with domestic electronics
manufacturers and influential research organs, and entrusting them with manu--
facture. By so doin~, it is ~>roducing immeasurable benefits for the fostering
of advanced industries in the form of eventually taking over the moving of
advanced technology and expenses for research and development.
Moreover, such technology is on the top level in the world. NTT is
exchanging technology with ATT (American Telephone and Telegraph Corporation),
which is termed the biggest enterprise on earth, and US IBM (International
Business Machines), which is a world giant in the computer industry circles.
This is because NTT has technology ranking with that of these two companies.
Fear of Research Expenses Decreasing
In view of its high technological power and its power of influence on
privatc circles, NTT is called the "NASA (National Aeronautics and Space
!ldministration) of Japan." Such a poeition has been built up by the plentiful
r~search expenses. The expenses for fiscal 1982 are estimated at ~88,500
million, and this is because huge business yields, amounting to ~�~+,166,400
million, are exrected.
However, if NTT is divided into the central company and a plural number
of regional companies, as planned by the Sub-Committee of the Provisional
Administrative Affairs Research Council, the income of the central company,
which has the research and development sector, will decrease, as a matter of
course. Will it be possible to maintain the same research expenses and
*_~chnological level as in the past in such a situation? The uneasiness of
*1TT and electronics manufacturers stems from this.
Anather focal point for private enterprises is the problem of procurement
of materials. As NTT has no manufacturing sector, it purchases most
communications and information-processing equipment from outside, and purchases
the remainder through joint development. The monetary amount of this procure-
ment was ~�776,800 m.illion in fiscal 1980. This amount is so huge as to
exceed by nearly ~�200 billion the amount of sales by Fujitsu, which is an
:~fluential member of the NTT family, in March, 1981. This is by far the
largest among the three public corporations. �
The materials procured by NTT are of the following three kinds (fiscal
1980):~(1) Materials procured by the Head Office (automatic switchboards,
transmission wireless devices, cable, data communications equipment, etc.);
(2)t!~in~s procured locally, on the local communications bureau level (telephone
c:irectories, wood poles, steel strand wires, etc.); and (3) things procured
at actual scenes (consumer goods, fixtures, etc.). The materials procured
bv the Head Office account for 51.5 percent~of the total.
If NTT is divided into regional companies, the items now pr.ocured by
t~e Head Office, excluding the key circuit networks, will come to be procured
by regional companies. If so, "There is the fear that the advantage of
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naking unit prices low by package orders of large amounts of materials will
become small." So saying, NTT leaders knit their brows. As NTT gives big
orders under monopoly, it faces the manufacturers side with a firm attitude,
and there are even voices saying that "NTT is high-handed," at times. However,
if the advantage of collectively purchasing large amounts of materials becomes
extinct, and if the purchasing cost rises as a consequence, this may drag down
~ on the feet of management rationalization, which is the chief aim of placing
NTT under private management.
Intensification of Competition in Biddinq, Too
Conversely, it is possible to take the view that if the authority for
procure~nent is dispersed to local areas, NTT will open its doors further, at
this time when it is carrying out the opening of the doors for the procurement
of mat~rials, and competition, which will become vigorous, will lead to the
low~ring of costs on the part of NTT. Moreover, regional companies will
bacome strict about costs, under a self-support accounting system, and bidding
competition will possibly become severe.
The plan by the 4th Sub-Committee of the Provisional Administrative
Affairs Research Council does not as yet refer to what to do about procurement.
The plan calls for effecting the division within five years, and there still
is enough time. At any rate, it is likely to press the NTT family and the
enterprises concerned for a new posture to cope with the problem.
NTT's Research and Development Structure
Musashino Tele-Communications Research Institute
Located in Musashino City, Tokyo; number of personnel: 1,900
~ cQntents of research: electronic switchboar.ds, VLSI, data exchange,
and memcry devices.
Yokosuka Tele-Communications Research Institute
Located in Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture; number of personnel:
1,100; contents of research: data communication, picture communication,
optical communication, and satellite commtmication�.�
Ibaraki Tele-Connnunications Research Institute
Located at Tokai-mura, Ibaraki Prefecture; number of personnel: 300;
contents of research: optical cable, transmission lines, and civil
engineering. ~ _
4th Research Institute (tentative name)
Located in Atsugi City, Kanagawa Prefecture; contents of research:
VLSI. ~
Note: ~ Includes the personnel at the Research and Development
Headquarters.
Expected to be~opened in the spring~of 1983.
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[13 May 82 pp 3-4]
[Text] Part 3
"A telephone by which what has been spoken in Japanese becomes a foreign
language and what has been spoken by a foreigner becomes the Japanese
language;" "a facsimile which can tra:~smit a message in two or three seconds;"
and "a TV picture which was televis:.d earlier appears on the Braun tube in an
instant, with the pushinc; of a button." If the INS (information network
system high-level information communications system) project, which is
beir.g drawn up by NTT, is completed, such devices will be used at home, and
we will become able to receive various information services. Even working
at home uill become possible.
Industry Circles Also MakinR Vi~orous Responses
This is by no means a dream. From the fall of 1984, the first test
.~Prv:ces are scheduled to be started in the Mitaka area in Musashino, Tokyo.
Wi*_: the surfacing of NTT's future strategy, such influential manufacturers as
NrC, Fujitsu, and Oki Electric Industry have recently established special
oroaniz3tions for INS measures, one after another. On the other hand, some
ent~~rprises have already applied for participation in the testing of work at
home. Thus, industry circles' moves to cope with INS have suddenly become
vigorous. .
Since its inauguration in 1952, NTT has been pushing its business with
these items as its goals: "Telephones which are installed immediately;" and
"t~leph~nes by which people are put through immediately." Now, however, there
are 56 million telephones, and one out of every two persons, including babies,
has one telephone. It has become possible to make a telephone call anywhere
in 1ap~n, ir~mediately, by dialing a number. As far as telephones are concerned,
the dr~am at the time of the inauguration has alr~sdy become real. Succeeding
this, INS is being tackled by staking the existence of NTT in the future.
At the sa~ne time, the INS project includes the aim of correcting the
present fare system on which it is constantly pointed out that "It is not
harmonious." As to telephone charges by distance, they are low in the case
of short distances and high in the case of long distances, compared with actual
costs, partly because of the historical eircumstanees. With the city charge
as 1, the fee for a telephone call to an area more than 750 kilometers away
is 60. However, in the case of DDX (new data network), which is a public
network exclusively for data communications, the ratio of charges is 1 to 12,
and in the case of the network exclusively for facsimiles, the ratio is 1 to
1.5. Thus, the charge systems among various circuits are disorderly.
CharAe System Also Can Be Unified
Under INS, however, it is possible to unify the networks of telephones
~nd data communications, which cannot ride together at present, and to make
all kiads of information pass through the same circuits as numerical digital
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signals. Therefore, it is possible to measure the amount of information
in the same unit (bit the smallest unit of information), and to unify the
char~e systems. .
With the creation of INS, d~uble investments will disappear through the
' uni:ication of the plural number of networks, and the costs per unit of information
Will fall, too, due to technological progress. Therefore, it will be possible
to lower the charge level from the present level. Moreover�, the.difference
~ccording to distance will also fiaally become 1 to less than 10, and all this
will greatly contribute to the promotion of information society. This is
NTT's synopsis. INS is steadily heading toward materialization through the
5rilliant results of research and development by NTT which leads the world, such
as the optical fiber which makes long-distance transmission possible, and VLSI's
(ver}~ large-scale integrated circuits) consisting of about 600,000 transistors
:n a basic plate several millimeters square.
According to NTT's plan, commercial services, covering 10,000 houses,
- will be started in Tsukuba Research and Edu~ation City where a Scientific
ExFosition will be held in 1985, with exper:ments in model areas taken into
account. The networks of telephones and data communications will be unified
in the cities Where the Prefectural Government Offices are located,in 1987,
and throughout the nation by 1995. In the year 2000, NTT is�planning to
unify the picture networks (moving pictures) which require 1,000 times as
much information as that by telephones, and complete all the networks.
In the middle of February, there,occurred an incident in Hokkaido in
which an NTT employee stole information from data communications circuits,
Forged a cash card, and drew out cash. "Cx'ime in Japan has come to
this point." So saying, an NTT leader recognized "maturation" of
information society, and a'_ the same time felt as if he were made to look at
the reverse side of the communication and information society which is
Frogressing limitlessly. �
F.ffects of Divisian Unknown
Vice-President Yasusada KITAHARA, who is a promoter of the INS project,
emvhasizes: "From the standpoint of natural science, including technological
development, we have acquired prospects for the achievement of INS. In the
future, we must tackle the sociological and cultural scientific fields."
There is an incrcase in the number of computer crimes, uneasiness over controlled
society, and information public nuisances. As to problems which are closer
to us, there is such a question as whether or not salaried-men's work will go
weil even if there is "no drink on one's way back" to work at home. Such
problems which are expected when INS society has become real "cannot be settled
only by technology" (Vice-President KITAHARA).
On the other hand, what will become of the INS structure when the
"division into the central company and a plural number of local companies,"
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~~rhich division is scheduled to be included in the report by the Sub-Committee
of the Provisional Administrative Affairs Research Council, is carried out in
the future? As to this, persons connected with NTT are avoiding making any
comment, and it seema that they are unable to gather actual effects, too. There
is also arising the vague fear that the charge systems among various local
companies and their efforts will become uneven, and that this will put a brake
on the construction of INS on a national scale. However, if the theory of
competition works and if management becomes more efficient, as aimed at by the
Provisional Administrative Affairs Researc~ Council, this will become material
for promotion, too.
Of course, apart from such problems as what to do about such "non-
natural scientific" fields and NTT's structure, "NTT has sufficient power to
undertake the information and communications revolution which is symbolized
by INS" (President Hisashi SHINTO). Whether or nct it will be able to display
this capability fully depends upon how NTT itself will tackle self-reform, in
the stream of the NTT reform which seeks greater efficieney.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1982
CSO: 4106/115
- 30 -
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MOR OFFI('IA1, litiM; ONI.Y
USSR
UDC 654.172:629.78
'ORBITA', 'EKRAN' AND 'MOSKVA' SATELLITE TELEVISION BROADCAST SYSTEMS
Moscow TEK~IIdIKA KINO I TELEVIDENIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 82 pp 37-44
[Article by D.L. Zaytsev and L.Ya. Kantor, State Scientific-Research Institute for
Radio]
[Text] Scientists in many countries have long shown significant interest in the
problem of television broadcasting employing artificial earth satellites. Simple
calculations show that a satellite which ~s at a high enough altitude - up to
- 36-40,000 kilometers - can be used to ~ransmit signals, including television, to
huge territories - as much as 1/3 of the earth's surface.
The idea of such transmission was expressed long ago, particularly in P.V. Shmakov's
work.
A real base for this idea was provided after the 1957 launch of the first S~viet
satellite; in the mid-1960s, after resolving a number of technical problems, it
was possible to turn directly to solving the problem of satellite TV broadcasting.
The practical interest in solving this problem is explained by the high economic
efficiency of satellite TV broadcast systems.
Traditional TV broadcasting methods based on the use of terrestrial facilities for
feeding and distributing TV programs - radio relay and cable lines and high-pawer
transmitting stations - cannot provide TV broadcast services for the entire terri-
bory as the degree of broadcast coverage increases, even in the most developed
countries.
This is because practically every state has inaccessi~ie regions where it is diffi-
cult to built TV transmitters and radio rel~; ~r cable lines leading to them.
In this country, the problem of providing TV broadcasting for the entire country
at times convenient for the population, allowing for the long distance from west
to ~ast (11 time zones) and the presence of inaccessible regions with low population
density (less than one person per square kilometer), presents significant diffi-
culties; the resolution of the problem is of special tnterest. Prior to 1967,
this problem was solved strictly through the use of terrestrial facilities - by
building pawerful television transmitting stations (5-50 kW) as well as low power
relays (1-10 W).
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The dynar~ics~ of the development of the terres.trial trans~nitting network in the
USSR [1] shown in figure 1, and the rates at which TV hroadcasting is being
provided t.o the population (figure 2~, indicate that the cons~truction of a terr-
estrial transmission network was an eff~cient approacfi during the early stages;
stations were liuilt in lieavily populated areas of the country, and the introduc-
tion of each of these provided a s~ignificant increas~e in the numlier of TV viewers.
By 1 January 1961 there were 100 high-power TV stations and about 170 low-power
relays. providing television for approximately 35 percent of the population.
Within that five-year plan, i.e., by 1 January 1966, the amount of terrestrial
facilities more than doubled (190 high-power transmitters and 480 low-power relays);
liowever, the increase in viewers was only 20 percent. Then, as TV stations were
put into operation in sparsely populated regions, the efficiency of terrestrial
facilities began to drop sharply. For example, during the next five-year plan
the amount of transmitting equipment increased by 100 stations, but this provided
an increase in viewers of only 15 percent. It became clear that it is not possible
to solve the problem in this manner: at those rates, even to provide coverage for
95 percent of the population it would be necessary to build over 2500 high-power
television stations whicli, in turn, would require significant capital investment
as well as the construction of a large number of trunk lines, and would require a
long time; even so, it would be impossible to provide coverage for 100 percent of
the population.
The employment of satellite systems is now a fully realistic way to solve this
problem within short periods; the co~on use of these systems for transmir zg
television pro~rams in the USSR began in 1967 with the initiation of .rbita"
network of ground stations. TV programs were fed to "Orbita" stations through the
"Molniya-1" satellite in the 1 GHz range; the activation of the first 20 "Orbita"
statio~is provided an increase of more than 40 million television viewers [2].
In tt~e subsequent years, the construction of "Orbita" stations c.ontinued intensively;
stations were built in practically all of the large cities in Siberia, the Far
North, and the Far East; there are now nearly 90 of them. Beginning in 1974,
most "Orbita" stations were switched to the 4 GHz band to operate with the "Molniya-
2" satellite; these stations are now working.with the "Molniya-3", "Raduga" and
"Gorizont" satellites. The table presents the bas ic technical parameters of the
"Orbita" system, and the external appearance of the station is shawn in figure 3.
The "Orbita" station has been described in the technical literature many times [3,4];
therefore, we can limit ourselves here to the most general characteristics. The
station is based on a fully turnable two-reflector parabolic antenna 12 meters in
diameter installed on a round reinforced-concrete building; the building contains
an input low-noise parametric amplifier cooled with liquid nitrogen, receiving
equipment, a system of equipment for progiammed aiming of the antennas taward the
satellites, and a great deal of auxiliary and power supply equipment. The program
received at the TV station is then fed to a local television center or high-power
relay station and sent over the air in the meter or decimeter frequency band.
32
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.
, . . ~vo,, ,
:1 x : 90 90
_
~ r ~ eo ao ~
3 ,
~ ~
. ~ i
o ~0 ~
�~�.`5J a e
~ t e 60 60 =
c =
~ f ~ o
~
~4; . ~
~ a> sa ~
4
c
v /Q0 � T 40 40
~ ~
` ~ JD JO ~
1
�s '
a fQ ~ o
~ ~ TD ?0 ~
~ ~
~ ~ e'
� a !0 t ~ �
~ � ~
e
f0 J9~6 l9bl /966 ;971 ;976 /9s!.
19l6 /90l 1966 /971 /!76 19d1 ~4~
. z(5)' '
Figure 1. Ratea of developIDeat of Figure 2. Rates of coverage of IISSR
traaamittiag television netxork ia USSR with terrestrial television broadcasting
(by five-year plans): 1-lo~pvwer relays; (by five-year plaas): 1--population;
2--pow~er traasmitters; 3--"Ekran~~ statians; 2--territory; 3--IISSR populatioa pro-
4--a~ber of transnitting stations; 5-- vided with television broadcasting,
. qeara percent; 4--qears; 5--area of USSR covered
by televisioa broadcasting, percent
Tfie "Orbita" statioa was the ~orld'a #irst multi-station T9 distribution spate~m;
h,owrever, tl~e space tecfiaolog,~ capa6ilities ezis,ting at that time did not allaw the
creation of pe~erful satellitea: as a result, the cost ef the "Orbita" grouad sta-
tion aras eztremely higfi� Tfie construction of these stations aras justitied econo-
micallp only ia beavily populated regions. "Orbita" stations ~rere actvally also
built ia. relatively sparselp populated areas with populations of 5,000-10,000:
this vas done ia tI~e na~e of, aad for the good of, the Soviet people.
Hoxever, the efficiency of building new "Orbita" stations as a meaas for supplying
T9 programs then dropped slzarplp; the constructioa of stations ia sparselp popu-
lated a=eas (a~rith a fear tbousand resideats) led to costs per viever of thousaads of
rubles; therefore, the development of the network of "Orbita" stations as a means
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, ,
ii':~ K.' ~ , .
,k. Y":t-~~~�,~i5�~. : . .
s." �
wC.~ ~ ~i:.:~ � .
,v ~,t .~ey �
J -~;4 .t r .t +
. 2',~,:9'..'~i i y - .
, r ~
. - } : ~ i k
...Y ~
~ ~ ' ~ ~ I,�.
L ~
~ ~ r
~ri # ~ .
' : �'``'Y.. ` tt~�.. ~ . ~
lY1 1; .
~ : . . ' . Z - ' . - .
�~4.Y. ~ t
~
Figure 3. "Orbita" station
for distributing TV progra~aing was curtailed*.
Technical-economic aspects of creating satellite TV broadcast systems
As was mentioned above, the most important factor which determines the parameters
of satellite TV systems and which has an effect on the choice of frequency band
and technical characteristics is economy: ia the final analysis, economy determines
the advisability aad effectiveness of the creation of systems. Economically optimal
systems are designed on the basis of c~nsidering the cost relationships for the
space complex and the earth stations, as well as the size indicator of the receiving
network on the ground.
Exa~ples of the cost of these compleses as a fuaction of the power of the satellite
transmitter Ps and the Q(sensitivitq) of the antennas of the ground receiving in-
stallations (G/T)g are showa ia figure 4, where G is the aa~enna gain, T is the
equivalent noise temperature of the ground station.
It is apparent from figure 4 that the cost of the satellite and its launching is
a strong function of the power of the on-board transmitter: the higher the power,
the larger and heavier the transmitter, the greater the power conswnption, dimensions
*"Or'
bita" stations are noar being reequipped with transmitting facilities, and the
network of "Orbita" stations is fieing used as the basis for creating and developing
the national duplex telephone co~ani~ations network.
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F(
and weight of the pawer source; in the final analysis, the size and weight of
the satellite as a whole increase, requiring a more powerful carrier rocket.
I p
~
~
E
ti
~
~ f.
~ ~
;5~ y i
T ~
y I
E ~
v ~ I
~ ~
Ufou~MOCme nepeBamvr (6) 3,P6
- 1 ! '
Quanemp aNmeNN ~enNax CmaNC{ut~A,~
Figure 4. Calculation of optimal system parameters (cost): 1--entire system; 2--
satellite and launch; 3--N ground stations; 4--one ground station; 5--system cost;
6--satellite transmitter power, Ps; 7--diameter of ground station antennas, DA
However, the cost of the receiving station on the ground becomes smaller, since the
same reception quality of TV signals can be provided with a more powerful on-board
transmitter with the use of less sensitive, simpler and less expensive receiving
installations on the ground.
We can reach the following basic conclusions from analyzing these relationships:
--an optimal relationship exists between PS and (G/T)g, for which the total system
cost is rninimal;
--the optimal values of Ps and (G/T)g depend upon the number of ground stations N
in the system; as N incr.eases, the optimum moves toward larger values of PS.
The basic optimization principle is thus to select that on-board relay power which
makes the system as a whole as inexpensive as possible for satellite TV broadcasting
systems with mass receiving networks [2]. Of course, allowance must be made for
the possibility of the technical implementation of the relay and satellite as a
whole, as well as the fact that interference may be created for other systems operat-
ing in the same or adjacent frequency bands.
From tt~is viewpoint, the highest acceptab~le relay power or, more precisely, the
highest effective isotropic radiated power (~IRP), is determined on the basis of
the Radio Co~nunications Regulations which limit the radiated power flwc density of
a satellite on the ground W in each of the frequency bands allocated for satellite
broadcasting or fixed satellite service in order to avoid crosstalk between services.
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(3)) r 3{Ili ~2~ ~~TJ'
A, Nn,' 120--- - - s.l/r,1+
~~j u .K_(5) ~ .
- izo ~no e( 8 )
-,yo yo r
~
~vn eo--
7n - - r~~----
-ibo 60�_ ( 5 ) ( 6 ) . . . `
-~so vo , ~7 ~ " so
40
. JO
. ?0
(~lT),1 ~ 10
~ ~ ' Z
- ~ ' ~ ----~~.~.7 ~
- f0
' ~s'lrb " ( 7 ) - _ ?n
~n
� ~S) i 40
~
1
' o,~ ~,3 v n ta'(9)
Figure 5. Optimal parameters of satellite systems: 1--Wsat~ 2--EIRP, db/W;
3--dB�W/m2; 4--dB�W ; 5--"Ekran"; 6--EIRP; 7-- "Moskva" ; 8--dB/k; 9--f, GHz
1
4KHz
According to the Regulations, satellite TV broadcasting in the USSR can be done in
the 0.7, 2.5 and 12 GHz bands; in addition, TV programs within the framework of
fixed services can be transmitted in the 4, 11 and 20 GHz bands (higher frequency
bands are not considered here).
Figure 5 shaws the limitations on W imposed by the Regulations for these frequency
bands, as well as the maximum tolerable satellite EIRP and Q-factors (G/T)g of
ground rece~ving stations needed to provide a given reception quality and calculated
on the basis of these values of W. Also shawn are the values of (Se/T)g, where
Se is the effective surface of the ground receiving antenna, which characterizes its
physical dimensions and consequently its costs; these are more convenient for
economic calculations. The first optimization step thus results in selecting the
basic parameters of the on-board transmitter and the Q-factor of the ground stations
(G/T)~ or (Se/T)g.
In the second optimization step, values of G, Se and T which provide the minimum
cost of the ground station as a whole are selected so as to preserve the required
ratio (G/T)g or (Se/T)g. Ttte discussions here are as follows: tfie greater the
effective service of the antenna Se, tt~e higher its cost; however, it is then
possible to employ a less sensitive receiver (with higher noise temperature) with
accordingly lower cost, and conversely. Obviously, for certain optimal values of
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S~ and T the cost of the entixe ground station, which is. ec~ual to the sum of the
cost of rhP antenna and receiver, becomes minitnal. It must be noted that this
choicc~ is discrete, since tliere are only a few types of input devices (parametric
or transistor amplifier, mi~cer).
90 r Acn
I nnN ycn. ed
I
d0
70
60
f,~~u
Q~ v � >2 20
Figure 6. Costs for creating optimal TV systems in different frequency bands.
These data provided the basis for determining the comparative cost of creating
economically optimal satellite systems in each of the frequency ranges; the results
of the calculation are shown in figure 6. It follows from the figure that in terms
of economy the most profitable frequency band is 12 GHz, where the small limita-
tions on the value of W permit the use of low~-Q, low-cost receiving installations.
Comparable economic indicators can also hold for systems in the 0.7 GHz band;
in the other bands, the cost of creating satellite TV systems is significantly
higher.
These considerations have made it possible to develop a strategy in the area of
selecting frequency bands in determining the optimal parameters of satellite TV
systems of the next generation; the "Ekran" and "Moskva" systems were created in
accordance with these principles.
"Ekran" system
The first satellite in the "Ekran" system was launched on 26 October 1976 into a
geostationary orbit with coordinates of 0� latitude and 99� west longitude. An
experimental network of 60 receiving installations had already been built by that
time. The zone served by the system covers 9 million square kilometers, which
amounts to about 40 percent of the entire country. Included are regions of Siberia,
the Far North and part of the Far East.
The "Ekran" system [5] was created tn complete agreement with the optimization
principles presented in the preceding s~ection; the 0.7 GHz band was selected
which has the advantages of simplicity and low cost of ground receiving devices.
Tt~e c~mployment of inexpensive transistor input amplif~ers, simple multi-element
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"wav~ channel" antennas and on-hoard transmitters with maximum acceptable power
made it possible to obtain the required signal/noise ratio and the required TV
channel performance indicators with inexpensive receiving installations (cf. table).
Bas~ic Technical Parameters of Satellite
TV Broadcast Systems
Parameters System
"Orbita" "Moskva" "Ekran"
Frequency band, GHz 4 4 0.7
Transmitter power fed to 8 40 200
antenna, W
Satellite transmitting 22 30 33.5
antenna gain, dB
Satellite EIRP, dB�W 31 46 56.5
Modulation method FM FM FM
TV signal frequency 9.1 9.1 6.3
deviation (without
sync pulses), MHz
Type and diameter of arabola 12 Parabola 2.5 32/4* sheet
ground receiving antenna, m
Gain of ground receiving 51.9 37.5 30/23
antenna, dB
Equivalent noise tem- 100 200 800/800
perature
Q-factor G/T of ground 31.9 14.5 1/-6
receiving installation, dB/k
Signal/noise ratio at 12.5 12.5 20.8/13.8
receiver input, dB
Signal/weighted noise 53 53 53-55/48
ratio at output of
rcceiver in video channel, dB
Signal/noise ratio at out- 57 57 54-56/49
put of receiver in audio
channel, dB
*Here and below in the table the numbers in the numerator refer to a type-1 ground
station, while those in the denominator refer to type 2.
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Since terrestrial TV facilities also operate in the ~.7 GHz hand, a system service
zone arrangement was selected which provided suf~iciently fiigh power f.lux density
within tfie zone and made it possible to sattsgy the s-tandards for noise field in-
tensitq outside the zoae ~n terr~tories fielonging to neighboring governments [6].
The basis of the system is the "Ekran" s�atellite, which has a transmitter with
unprecedented power (200 W) and a fiuge 3 z 5 meter folding transmitting array con-
- taining 96 spiral radiators. Tfie wtdeiy unfolding wing, wliicfi fiolds solar batter-
ies, provide power of up to 2 kW. A special high-prectsion three-axis satellite
stabilization system ~;olds tfie vefiicle in the requtred position above the earth
and boresights the bea.m cf the transmitting antenna toward the service zone [7]
(the "Ekran" satellite has been exhibited at the VDNRii). T[ie "Ekran" sqstem
emploqs two types of ground receivtng installations. The first type of installation
(figure 7) is used to f~eAd high quality TV siglaals to fiigfi power TV stations which
service fairlq large popvtated areas. These installations are configured with
"wave channel" antennas ~:onsisting of 32 sheets. ZTie receiving equipment consists
of a single rack which �r.~eceives, ampliftes, demodulates and separates the video
and audio signals. T.EiF cost of the fixst type of recetving installation is lower
than that of the "Or.bita" station.
The second type of installation (figure ~j is designed to feed TV signals with
slightly lowt: quality (as compare~? with the first type of installation) to low-
power television relays, or tc a cable distribution network. These installations
use four-sheet antennas and small receiving devices which translate the spectrum of
the 714 + 12 I~iz frequency to the spectrum of a channel ~n the meter band and which
_ convert FM and AM. A recetving installation of the second type costs almost 300
times less thaa aa "Orbita" station. Tn order to provide servicing convenience and
simplify the installation, the second type of receiving systems fiave recentlq been
updated and combined in a single unit with a one- or 10-W transmitting device.
The "Ekran" system has successfully passed tests, and its techaical facilities are
very co~only used under widely varping conditions: large populated areas, small
villages and even individual geological prospecting and exploration parties. More
than 1000 of these systems (cf. figure 1) have now been installed around the country,
which has made it possible to provide television in regions which are practically
inaccessible for terrestrial TV program delivery facilities. The network of stations
continues to egpand, and the equipment is being improved at the same time. For
example, an input amplifier is now being put into use which has a lawer noise tem-
perature; it has been proposed that special antennas be produced for regions with
difficult weather conditions, and that the first type of system be provided with an
additional audio chanasl for supplying radio broadcast programs.
All of the above allows us to assert that the "Ekran" system is an extremely effic-
ient means for orgaaiz~ng TV Liroadcasting in areas of Si6eria and the Far North of
the USSR.
Unfortunately, this system cannot be employed in other regions of the country, since
irradiation of the terri:tortes to the east and west of tfie extsting service zone
would result in exceeding the standards estahlis~ied by the Regulations. This has
required the creatton of tecfinical fac~lities for providi:ng TV programming for the
Urals, Central Asia and the Far East which are comparable in simplicity and efficiency.
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'
-
~
`;~d~-'~~i';~. ~t�
3
' t
w
a=
!ti.. . c ~ ~'yr~..J.
.irt
b
~~sr:;;,~,~;:
~.~fKt:
r,-
~ ` .
~f ;i. F
~'K .
a
r, . J~ _
Figure 7. First type of installation in "Ekran" system.
, _ _ . _ , ,
b
Y 1.s'�/S A^'^:s
c
: ~
. . `
- . . p r~y.,,^xr , -
'~!'C
~ x,
F !
~ f ' ~.+~T~.~ ^w .
,7L~`
~t~~t : ury~ '
,~l~~:~Y~ :(r'
:''t' "Tf'i. ~1 . ' r 'K`.
~ f r.
Figure 8. Second type of installation in "Ekran" system.
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"Moskva" system
In accordance with tfie tasicing, the new "Moskva" satellite TD broadcast system
was developed and put into operation in 1979 in the widely used 4 GHz liand, which
made it possible to develop and introduce the equipment making up the system with;n
short periods. The "*ioskva" system (~tecfinical parameters given in table) is an
addition to the existing "Ortiita" and "Ekran" systems, and opens up possibilities for
almost ca~mplete coverage of the country with Central television programmtng [8].
This system was created liy employing special trunks carried bq the new "Gorizont"
series of geostationary satellites, in wfiich the power fed to the antenna from the
on-board transmitter has been increased to 40 W. In combination with a directional
transmitting antenna, this makes ~t poss~ible to obtain the maximum EIRP which can
be achieved in this frequencq band (:cf. figure 3). At the same time, in order to
observe the standards established by the Regulations for acceptable spectral flux
density (-152 dB'W/m2 in the 4 KHz band), dispersion of the energy of the F~1 signal
transmitted by the satellite by an additional triangular signal at 2.5 Hz has been
introduced which provides additional deviation of f 4 MHz.
_ ~ ' ~ ~ -
yy ~ .
~,^?C. ` t 5' . . ~
~ , ' ~ "
,a ~
r .t , 4z
~ �j- s.x"~ ~ � ~ ~ ; f
, ' , .
' j ~ ~�a~� a
;
~ .
~ . y ^~,,,~.~K,r ~ . �
. D , ~ ~ .
. 1'�~ - ' ) ' �
r ~ , ~i .
* ~y;. 4 �
~r
^ ' r +A: i~� , r'~; ~ i � ` .
~
~ ~ ~ ~
;
.y~' , F: ~e`
~ y. '
N ~J t
.
a ~ `~~Y b y .
w :%~r t
~y.
y't
~f:., ~ t,
; ~ ~
} �.}~~1-~ ~ ~
~
i
I
~ :x;:,, ~
: ~i',':f;::y~ ~ti:::::~~::~ o
' - z ~.ti:. }};ti
, . ~"r;� ' �
Figure 9. "Moskva" station. --~+'i~.,i ~ ,
;
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The dispersion signal is estracted in the receiver with the fielp of a frequency feed-
back device ~~iich controls tb.e frequencp of the local osctllator. Tfie use of a
dispersion signal frequency below tfie video signal spectrum allows tt to be filtered
off and to close the frequencq~feedback device circuit only for tfie dispersioa signal.
The frequency band of tfie receiver is desigaed to pass tfie Fr~ si.gnal modulated only
bq valid intelligence. Tfits treatment makes it possible to avoid noise tolerance
losses wiiich would occur if i:he bandwidtfi of the receiver were increased. The
problem of electramagnettc compati5ility~with existfng terrestrtal and satellite
facilities was resolved in tfiis way~.
The high pawer flux density of the signal near the ground ~as nade it possible to
use an antenaa with re].attvely small reflector diameter (2.5 m) at the "Moskva"
ground receiving station, and to use an uncooled parametric amplifier with noise
temperature of 100 k as the input device; all of tfie other radio equipment is con-
tained in a single small rack similar to the receiving rack of the first type of
station in the "Ekran" sqstem. TEiese technical treatments have made it possible to
create a simple, small station which does not require capital construction and can
be housed in a~r existing butldings or tn special containers. TEie energy indicators
of the co~unications lines tn the "Moskva" system provide the capability of a
single high performance television channel and two audio ciiannels. TEte law frequency
TV video and audio signals fram the station output are input to a transmitter whose
tqpe and pawer depends up~ the required service zone. The cost tndicators of the
"Moskva" station correspond approximatelp to the first tppe of "Ekran" receiving
installations, and are sucFi that the use of this station for organizing TV broad-
casting is economically effective for a large number of populated areas in the country.
Ia order to cover the territory uf the USSR, there are plans to emploq four space
segmeats (high-capacity "Gorizont" satellite trunks), in geostationary orbit at 14�
west longitude, 53'~ 90� and 140� east longitude, ia the "Moskva" system. Tests
which have been completed have confirmed that the technical treatments used are
correct. A network of these stations will soon be under intensive expansion.
Employment of "Orbita", "Ekran" and "Moskva" Satellite Systems
We have thus examined the princfple foundation of the creation of optimal satellite
TV broadcasting systems, and briefly described three domestic systems, two of which -
the "IIcran" and "Moskva" - correspond to these princip~tes and are economically
optimal.
There are some natural questions - why do we need three systems working at the same
time, aad what is their role and prospects for development? The answer to these
questions follows from the for~ulated task of satellite T9 broadcasting - providing
multiprogram TV broadcast coverage for the entire countrp allawing for local time
differences. This problem is resolved by using the Ftrst All-Union Central Tele-
vision Program for distribution to the five broadcast zones* into wfiich the USSR is
*Each bro~dcast zone occupies the territory of approximately two time zones, or 30�
longitude.
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divided, and mass satellite TV broadcast systems ~zith relatively local s~ervice zones -
the "Ekran" and "Moskva". The second All-Union program, wfiich is also produced
allowing for local time differences-, ts distributed m?er the "Orfiita" network [9].
The basic task of satellite TV broadcas-t syste~ms~ is now to deliver TV programs to
the terrestrial distribution facilities (transmitting TV s~tations, television centers
and relays). Therefore, heigfitened requirements for the quali:ty of programs delivered
are imposed on these systems.
In order to satisfy these requir~nents, and in accordance with the Radio Communica-
tions Regulations, the appropriate type of signal modulation fias been selected -
broadband noise-tolerant frequency modu~ation - which makes it posstble to provide
the required performance indicators with the difficult energy situation on the
downlink.
The audio signals accompanying the video in the "Ekran" and "Moskva" systems are
transmitted on a frequency-modulated subcarrier 1'ocated above the frequency spectrum
of the video signal. The total signal (video signat f FM subcarrier audio signal)
also frequency-modulates tfie HF carrier.
Conclusion
Our country has the world's largest and most powerful TV satellite broadcast network.
The integrated use of the "Orbita", "Ekran" and "Moskva" satellite systems, as well
as ground facilities has made it possible to organize TV broadcasting throughout
the entire country and to provide television coverage to 86.5 percent of the popula-
tion of tiie USSR. Central television programs are now transmitted in five copies,
so that residents in any area of the country can watch these programs at convenient
times. It should be noted that with approximately 15 hours of TV broadcasting
daily, five simultaneous TV channels are required to relay just one program.
Television in the USSR is now faced with the pro~lem of providing the same conditions
for all Central television programs; in addition, problems of distributing union
republic TV programr~ing have not yet been fully resolved. Al1 of this forces us to
find new technical facilities, one of which should be a 12 GHz satellite TV broadca~t
system.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Shamshin, V.A. "Status and prospects for development of television broadcast
transmitting network". ELEKTROSVYAZ', No 5, 1977
2. Talyzin, N.V., Kantor, L.Ya., Tseytlin, M~.Z. "'Orbita' ground station for
receiving television programs from artificial earth satellites. ELEKTROSVYAZ', No
11, 1967
3. Kantor, L.Ya., Polukhin, V.A., Talyzin, N.V. "New 'Orbita-2' communications
satellite stations." ELEKTROSVYAZ', No S, 1973
43
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4. Talyzin, N.V., Kantor, L.YS., Tseytlin, M.Z. "'Orbita' system of ground
receiving points". RADIO, No 9, 1967
5. "Basic principles of 'Ekran' system." V.P. Minashin, A.D. Fortushenko, S.V.
Borodich et. al., ELEKTROSVYAZ', No 5, 1977
6. Shamshin, V.A. "From 'Ekran' to television screen." RADIO, No 5, 1977
7. Fedorov; I., Markelov, G. "Space television in operatton." PRAVDA, 1 December,
1976, No 336 (21305).
8. "'Moskva' satellite television broadcast system." L.Ya. Kantor, V.P. Minashin,
I.S. Poveletsk iy et. al., ELII~TROSVYAZ', No 1, 1980
9. Varbanskiy, A.M., "Status and ways for further development of technical tele-
vision broadcast facilities.", ~LEKTROSVYAZ', tio 2, 1981
COPYRIGHT: "Tekhnika kino i r.elevideniya", 1982
6900
CSO: 5500/1020 END
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