JPRS ID: 10621 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070067-6
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• Sequence Number: 67
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPr~S L/'~.0621
29 JuNE 1982
- ~lear East I~orth Africa Re ort
~
c~ouo 24~s2 ~
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JPRS L/10621
2~ June 1982
c
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(k'OU~ 24/82)
CONTENTS ~
- INTER-AFRICAN'AFFAI~RS
New ftifts in Tunisian-Algerian ftelations Discussed
(Souhayr Belhassen; JEUNE AFR14UE, 26 May 82).......... 1
ALGERIA
- ~ ' Briefs '
Gas Fxpor~s Ir~creased 3
IRAN
~ Ra3t~vi Calls Khomeyni '~nished Myth' During Interview ~
_ (Mas~ud Rajavi Interview; AFRSQUS-ASIE, 29 Mar 82)
ISRAEL ~ ~
Defense Minister Sharon Views Zebanon Operation
(4ri'el Sharon Interview; PAftIS MATCH, 25 Jun 82).,.... 10
SAUDI AFtABIA
Defense Minister Views Iran-Iraq Conflict
- ~ (Sultan ibn 'Abd al-~Aziz Intervie~r; LE NOUVEL
OBSERVATEUR., ~-11 Jtin 82) 15
SYftIA ~
Akram ~1-Hurani Criticizes Current Regime
. (Akram a1-Iiurani Interview; AI~-WATAN AL-'AF~ABI,
9-15 Apr 82) 19
Plans To Eliminate Opposition At;road Cited
= (AL-WATAN AL-~ARABI, 7-i3 May 82) ......o 26
_ a_ (III - NE & A- 121 F4U0]
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TUNISIA
Tndustrial Projects Launched in Key Industries
(MAR.CHES ZROPICAUX LT MEDITERRANEENS, 21 May 82)....... 32
Economic Cooperation With Gulf States Fxpanded
(Souh~yr Belhassen; JEUNS AFRIQUE, 2 Jun 82) 37
YII~fiT ARAB REPUBLIC
Assessment, Implications of Various Political Parties
(Sa~d Zaghlul Ftii~ad; AL-WATAN AI~-~AR.ABI, 21-27 May 82). 38
-b-
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INTER-AFRIC.4N AFFAIRS
NEW RIFTS IN TUNTSIAh-ALGERIAN RELATIONS DISCUSSED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1116, 26 May 82 p 36
[Article by Souhayr Belhassen: "A New Quarrel?"~
[TextJ Tunis--Against whom is the armaments race in which Morocco and Tunisia
~ are engaging, as well as .*.he strengthening of their military alliance with the
~ United States, directed? This is the question the Algerian press is askir.3 and
it sufficed for the Tunisian prime minister, Mohamed Mzali, to visit Washington
(24-29 April) for tne papers to warn of the imperialist threat. The daily news-
paper AL-CHAAB went so far as to speak of an "infernal plot." The Tunisian
government was r~ot long in reacting: the Algerian ambassador was summoned by
the minister of foreign affairs. This incident is the last in a long series.
To speak the tr~th, the relations between the two countries~ encumbered by the
"Gafsa coup" (January 1980), had improved subatantialll~ since the appointment
of Mohamed Mzali to the post of prime minister. Af tex siding wholeheartedly
, with Morocco in the Sahara affair, Tunisia had assumed an attitude of relative
neutrality, reserving �or itself only the possibility of participating "in a
solution on a regional scale,"
,
- Bilateral talks confirmed this change. President Chadli Bendjedid paic~ a visit
to Tunis, follc~wed shortly afterward by his prime minister, Mohamed Ben Ahmed
Abdelghani (February 1980)e Then Mohamed Mzali traveled to Algeria (September
1981). Similar annual me~etingc had been planned and various joint projects were
- commissioned, such as the bank of the Grand Maghreb (January 1982), established
_ to finance inte.rindustrial projects and to balance trad~e exchange.
~ This has not continued to the~present. Tunisia gets the lion's share, the ratio
being se~�en to one. Its needs would include, among other things, steel, rail-
_ . road cars and spring leaves, but it cannot obtain them from Algeria, where the
d~mestic market absorbs all such production. Tunisian imports are thus leveled
off at about 3 million dinars (about 1.5 billion CFA francs). At the same ~ime,
' 800,000 Algerian tourists represent a considerable cont~cibution to the Tunisian
economy, with an average expenditure of 41 dinars (about 21,000 CFA francs) per
person per half day--as much as ~ European spends in 48 hours.
The 5ituation began to deteriorate in January 1981. The reason? A statement by
Mohamed Mzali referring to "conta~~~ on the highest level'~ among the vari.ous
1
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leaders of. the Maghreb concerning the Sahara. Algeria, which has Always claimed
not to be directly involved in the conflict, termed this indiscretion "clumsy."
Suddenly, Mr Abdelghani, who was to attend the ceremonies to commemorate the
= bombing of Sakiet Sidi Youssef during the Algerian war, canceled his trip.
The impromptu vi~�i.t paid to Tunisia by Colonel Qadhdhafi (again in the month of
January)'and the rapprochement between Tunisia and Libya following his official
visit in the month of February did not settle matters. The withdrawal of
Tunisia ~ahen thp moment came for ~he controversial admission of the SDAR
[Saharan Democratic Arab Republic] into the OAU and the fact that a new com-
mando unit from Libya crossed the Algerian frontier into Tunisia, in the
Kasserin~ region, on 21 March, revealed the tension. Young Algerians living in
Tunisia had a bone to pick with the forces of law and order. A bus carrying 30-
some Tunisian tourists was halted at the Algerian-Moroccan,frontier (JEUNE
AFRIQUE, No 1i14).
It was withiii this context that Mohamed Mzali's trip to Washington took place.
The f.act that the Tunisian minister of interior attended the funeral services
for Mohamed Benyahia, a former minister of foreign affairs for Algeria, in
Algiers on 7 May, is perhaps evidence of the beginning of detente. If indeed Mr
Driss Guiga did not meet with President Chadli, he did hold talks with Mr
Abdelghani and his Algerian counterpart, Mohamed Hadj Yala. In addition, the
new head of the diplomatic servic~ in Algiers made a point of attending the
dinner given for the Tunisian ua~sgation. Mr Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi set forth
- pro-Maghreb considerations.
Mr Guiga, for his part, said that the problem between Algeria and Tunisia lay
in the fact that the declarations of goodwill were not always followed by re-
sults. He also called the reactions of those who see the normalization between
~ Libya and Tunisia as directed against Algeria "nonsense." And so on, reciprocal-
ly. All af these considerations suggested that Tunisian-Algerian relations were
entering a period of calm.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982 ~
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ALGERIA
BRIEFS
GAS EXPORTS INCREASED--Algerian gas supplies to France have increase~,. While
the share of Algerian gas did nAt exceed 13.8 percent oF French consumption in
1981,' it reached 19 percent last March. This iacrease obviously reflects the
lateat gas agreement between Algeria and France. [Text] [Paris AL-WATAN
AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 276, 28 May--3 Jun 82 p 64] [COPYRIGhT: 19~2 AL-WATAN
AL-ARABI]
CSO: 4504/357
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IRAN
RAJAVI CALLS KHOA~YNI 'FINISI~D MYTH' DURING INTERVIEW
- Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 262, 29 Mar 82 pp 8-LO ~
[Interview with Mas'ud Rajavi, leader of Che People's l~jahedin, by Bouzid
Kouza, at Auvere-sur-Oise, France, date not epecified] ~
- [Text] [AnswerJ All right, aince I h~ve to talk about myself.... IC was
just after the riota fn Qum in 1963 that I suddenly became aware. At the
time, I was a high achool atudent in the city of Mashhad.
[Queation] Thia was a turning point that marked the break betwE~n feudal Iran
' and Iran at the threshold of a new atage. The 1960's were also marked by the
- prodigious development of the national liberacion movement in th.e Third World
countries.
[Answer] Yes, and i follcxaed all these issues, not, of course., with the same
acuity as a few years later, but I was already influencad and impressed by
the debates which took p~ace in the national movement, led by Mefidi
~ Bazargano~ The founders of the Organization of the I~o,~ahedin were militanta
in this movement, which th~ey were conatantly challenging and criticizing.
For example, they asked Bazargan: "Ia life a battle~, or is battle a luxury?"
(This phrase aeeme to have greatly impressed Ra~avi, who pauses, as if to
stress ita importance. Next, he tackles the role of Khomeyni, who began to
- gain a certain popularity after 5.Tuly ~.963 with t;he action against the Shah.
He will mention this ayatollah, frequentlyo But for the present, it is a
question of grasping the content of thie opposition on the part of the re-
ligious leadere at Qum.) ~
[Answer] Thia opposition cama from reactionary poeitions. Thus, it was op-
pose.~. to female auffrage and to the distributiar. of land.
[Quest~.on] The Shah's agrarian reform was of no real value....
{AnswerJ That ia not the isaue. Khom,eyni was opposed to the dietribution of
_ land as a watter of principle, interpreting Islam in hie own way.
- *Subsequently Khomeyni~s firet pr,ime ministar.
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[Question] He was not the only one in the religioue hierarchy to develop this
feudal point of view....
[Answer] No, many shared--and still ahare (we will return to this)--this re-
actionary idea that th:e land is eacred.
[Question] Then the opposition grew, and ita atarting point was Qum.
[AnswerJ It reached such proportions that the Shah became alarmed and sent
i~ the police. That was on 5 July 1963, which ma.rked a break in our country'e
history.
_ [Question] A break, or a point of re~erence?
[Answer] Rather, a point of reference. Khomeyni was exiled in Turkey, then
in Iraq. The unrest calmed dawn a bit, and a new transition period began.
The shopkeeper bourgeoisie, newly inetalled with the help of the United
- ~ States, strengthened the Shah's dictatorship.
[Question] Wha was atill on the acene?
[Answer] No one. The traditional parties had been eliminated; Bazargan and
Father Taleghani arrested. The traditional forms of struggle had completely
failed. Something else had to be found; another path had to be blazed.
[Queation] And this is when you appeared....[Interview format interrupted
at this point, as writer providea explanatory background paseage that con-
tinues for next seven paragrapha.] Rajavi raiees his hand as if to say:
not so fact; that took a long time.
Indeed, many were the trials to be endured before he was w~lco~ed on his
release from prison by tena of thousande of Tehran people with arms full of
flowers, crying, like millions of othere, "Khameyni: l~fojahQdin: Shar 'ati:"
But [Ra~avi] gained world notoriety the day he landed at Evreux military
field accompanied by Abolhassan Bani� Sadr, the first president of the Repub-
lic of Iran, removed from offics by the asanmbly on orders from the strongest
members of the Islamic Republic Party (PRI). Up to his'disembarking from the
- Boeing 707 piloted by Colonel Moezi, a militant mu~ahid (of whom there are
many in the army), fera people knew thia man with the dull complexion and the
black hair parted severely on the side. The 3ournalists who had observed the
imperial regime's convulsiona, who had "covered" the first months of the
Tranian revolution, and who were continuing to follow the development of the
situation quickly underetood that of these officials to wham France had ,just
accorded asylum, the real leadar was in f~ct this young man with the unob-
trusive manner rather than the other, although the latter was better known by
_ the media.
Until then, Massud Rajavi's reputation had ecarcely cro3aed the bordera of
- Iran. At the ti~e of our various meetinge, he wae alwaye ineisting at length
that he was anly "one mu~ahid among other mojahedin." And in fact, nothing in
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either his physical appearance, which is voluntarily neutral, or in his
language, his soft and sutiooth voice--a sign of Iranian courtesy and savoir-
faire--evokes at first glance the image of the leader of a powerful move-
ment, capable today or tomorrow of being a solution to the replacement of
the present government. He has already explained the reasona which prompted
the leadership of his movement to send one of its representatives--him--
abroad. It was neceseary at all costa to break the wall of sflence that ~
had been built since June 1981 around thi8 country, which no journalist..
could enter unless he gave pledges of fldelity to the official line. The
Iranian people's atruggle had to be made knawn; the Pharisees, the true
munafiqin, who restored, then destroyed, the February 1979,revolution, had
to be denounced. It was necessary to organize not resistance--that was
being organized and led at home, in the field--but international aolidarity,
and especially to debunk the Khomeyni myth.
The statements and interview~ that he ha.a granted to dozena of international
organs of the media, print ~nd broadcase, are innumerz~le. But the very
first was for AFRIQUE-ASIE. And he agreed to go atill further for us, for
our readers. To get that, we had to overcome his reaerve, to force him to
do violence to his natural modeaty, since what we asked of him was to
give a historical overview of Iran, to talk of his people and the struggles
he had led and, in fact, to answer the question on which this overview is
focused: who are the mu~ahidin?
Massud Rajavi will answer at length, giving many historical and anecdotal
details on prominent figures, dead o~ still living. He will talk about
former political groups, what they contributed as basic el~ments to expand-
ing the revolutionary proceas, and about their limits ae ~~ell. He will
mention his yeara as a high school student, the debates in the student move-
ment, the rebellions, the long reflections and decisions which were mad~ to
- give Iran, its youth and its people, a revolutionary organization capable of
countless sacrifices so ~hat the voice of the disinherited can finally be
raised. This talk took place at his "temporary" reeidence, he 8ays, in
Auvers-sur-Oise.
We are in a small, secluded room of the house which ie closely guarded and
where, in order to enter, one must raise his hands and ~ubmit to a thorough
search. Ztao sofas covered with flawered fabric, two easy chairs, a coffee
table and, in one corner, a television set; a file cabinet completes the
furniture in this small study, where Ra,javi receives vieitors.
_ On the wall, five portraita ahow the world in which he has lived and.lives:
_ Taleghani, the "apiritual father," myateriously dead at the very beginning of
the revolution; l~uesa Khiabani, brother in struggle and hope, whom he has
never stopped mentioning since his death, weapons in hand, against the PRI
forces; Aghraf Rabi'i his wife, a mEi~ahida who was tortured under the Shah
and who also diec~,, weapona in hand, at the aide of Khiabani and his wife,
_ Azar Reza'i;Hanif Ne~ad, the founder of the Organization of the rb~ahedin,
*Cf. AFRIQUE A SIE No 248, 14-27 Sep 8 1.
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also a martyr of the struggle against the Sha.h, and finally Reza Se'adati,
suu~arily executed by the preaent regi.me last July, despite a wave of inter-
nationa 1 protest. [end of background passage)
[Answer] "Yes, that took time," Raiavi continues. "~o founding members of
our movement, Hanif Nejad and Sa'id 1~iohsen, ~had just finished their engineer-
ing studies. They belonged to the opposition wing of Bazargan's movement.
For them, the defeat of the June 1964 movement had just revealed a basic
problem: that of the inefficiency of tha liberation movement's forms of strug-
gle . ~
[Question] Hc;a would you describe thia movement? Nationaliat? Islamic?
[Answer] The basic differe nce between M,ossadegh's National Front and
Bazargan's movement lies in the fact that the latter had an Islamic ideolog-
ical base and for this reason exercised strong inf luence although it dis-
played no revolutionary featureso The young people who belonged to it did not
find their deep aspirations echoed in it. At that time they used to say:
"When you're a student, you're a 11 heart and soul, but once you finish school,
you get ma.rried and that's the end of that."
[Question) So the future moha~edin that you were more or less did everything,
a stint in Bazargan~s movem~nt....
[Answer] Yes, because of his ideology, which was both nationalist and
Is lamic .
_ [Question] And Taleghani?
(Rajavi smiles; his eyes t:xaard the "father's " portrait.)
- [Answer] He was much better known and more progreasive than Bazargan. It was
Taleghani who introduced Hanif-Nejad to the exeges ~s of the iCoran, and it was
he who brought ouC all the progreseive content. But as is known, Taleghani
- was so modest that later he would say, speaking of Hanif: "I taught Hanif
to read the Koran, but it was he alone who understood its essence."
[Question] He was pretty much the antithesis of Khomeyni.
[Answer] Taleghani was never a traditional mullah, and his life shows this:
he spent the last 40 years of his life more often in prison, in exi.le, than
at home. I will talk to you later about the pressures exerted on him not
only by the Shah but also by Khomeyni himself. I would like to talk to you
about Hani�~Nejad, a man of remarkable courage and strictness. One day
there was a m~eting unitin g all the political and religious personalities in
opposition to the Shah. We went there, took the rostrum, and said roughly
_ this: "When people see your preoccupations, your quarrels, and the cars you
drive, the understand that you can do nothing for the people. So close up
shop and don~t waste the people's time," He left the rostrum and left the
hall without any form of courtesy.
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[Question] That was a provocation and an act of war.
[Answer] He didn't stop there. He continued his outright attacks by naming
reactionaries who pretended to speak in the name of the people--for example,
Ayatollah Borujerdi,who at that time (the 1960's) was the highest religioua
authority and who had sent a congratulatory message to the Shah after the
1953 coup d'etat.
[Question] We were zalking about the break with thP Bazargan movement.
[Answer] ~t that time, the young peonle were attracted by Bazargan, because
he was the only one with a scientific view concerning Is.'~am. They were re-
ceptive to this ideological opinion, but challenged it from a political and
social point of view. In these two f ields, it was Ta]eghani's analyses that
they shared. Mnreover, Taleghani was considered by some of the mullah to be
an infidel, an unbeliever, becauae his analysis of the Koran was very pro-
gressive.
[Question] Did he publish his analyses? And why did he settle ir. Tehran?
[Answer] Yes, his texts were available. His choice of Tehran had two mean-
- ings. On the one hand, he wanted no*_ to be considered a religious leader
_ or to have followers and disci~les like Khomeynis but to establish contact
with the intellectua.ls. On the other hand, he did not want to be assimilated
into the traditionalists, whose'.fief is Qum.
[Question] On what were these analyses based?
[Answer] To simplify, it can be said that thia hinged on a central idea:
Islam is a religion of struggle; it is a religion foi the disinherited masses
and against despotism, colonialism, and the exploitation of man by man. Ob-
viously this was not said in such a clear and simplified ma.nner, but we under-
stood him this way.
[Question] So, all the same, he had a certain freedom of expression.
_ [Answer] Yes, Relative, but real. He held many debates, and the ideas cir-
culated widely. At the time I was in Mashhad. My claesmates were the future
founders of the People's Fedayin: Ahmed-Zadeh and Puyan. The meeting place
= for all revolutionary youth was in an Islamic club led by Ali Shari'ati's
father. We were all opposed to the Shah and spoke with nostalgia of
Mossadegh's era. But here, ~oo, there was a religious content. And that
was an important element. Hanif-Nejad and Sa'id MQhsen were doing their
military service. They had a year and a half to thinko And they put this
period to good use by taking stock of the Iranian movement and especially
- by studying other countries' experience. At that time Algeria, whose strug-
gle we had followed and supported, had ~ust won its independence. And its
experience w~s decisive for us, since the Algerian revolution had this
Islamic content of which I have apoken.
[Question] What did you learn from it?
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[Answer] That struggle is a science, that our previous struggles had had no
connection with the popular masses, that this struggle requirea revolution-
ary organization, somethfng that never really existed in Iran. Up until
then, no distinction had been made between i.ntellectual struggle--brewing up
- ideas--and professional combat. This was an enormaus discovery. It is pos-
sible that now people will laugh at this and fi.nd it puerile, but that is
like laughting at single-cell creatures.
[QuestionJ Then this was no longer a debate on the way to reform the system,
but how:and by what means to overthraa it in order to transform it.
[Answer] Exactly. We knew then what the obstacle was: first, the reform-
ist currents themselves. We understood why there were opportunists and what
the organic and social moi,ives of opportunism are. Previously, we had thought
- that opportunism was to be attributed to personal problems.
[Question] A 11 of this debate lasted 2 years, at the end of which an or-
ganization resulted, that of the mojahedin,
[Answer] Yes. On 6 September 1965, the decision was made not to found an
organiza*ion but to create a central nucleus whose task would be to prepare
the ideological, political, organic, and military ba~es for a revolutionary
- movement.
' [Question] So there was no official birth certificate of any kind.
[Answer] That is a date of reference; moreover, the name of mujahid was
given to us by the people when our militants were in prison.
[Question] Why this total clandestineness, including in the formulation?
[Answer] We wanted to avoid all forma.lism and rigid structure with its con-
gresses, coum~issions, etc. The central nucleus was composed, to begin with,
- of three founders: Ha.nif-Nejad, Sa'id Mohsen, and Ali Asghar Badi:Zadegan.
Later it was to be enlarged and to have a dozen members. ~
- [Question] Including yourself?
[Answer] Yes, I said then that future struggles must be thoroughly consider-
ed and prepared.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Afrique-Asie.
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ISRAEL
DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON VIEWS LEBANON OPERATZON
PM221315 Paris PARIS MATCH in French 25 Jun 82 p 42
[Defense Minister Ari'el Sharor. interviewed by Ben Porat--date and place
not given]
[Text] MATCH: The op~ration which b~gan as a raid entitled "Peace for
Galilee" has ended at the gates to Beirut and could be called "Sharon's
war".... What do you think of that?
Ari'P1 Sharon: Is that a compliment you are paying nie? I rather doubt
it.... But it is not true. There is nothing personal in it. No~measure
has been taken at my level alone. A11 the deeisions dewn to the smallest ~
- detail have b~en made by the government, which was kept informed of the
developments in the situation on the front as they happened. Prime Minister
Begin did not make do with merely convening th~ war Gabinet: All the
ministers took part in the debates, hesitations and disaussione. And c~�e
hesitated a great deal. I do not remember there being so many government
meetings during our previous wars.... T went from ~the front to Jerusalem
every day without exception to report to the government and put forward my
most minor suggestions. I also repor�ted to our parliament's defense
committee which includes the opposition, who did not go easy on me....
- MATCH: You will not resent it, will you, if I say it is nonetheless you
who inspired this whole operation?
Ari'el Sharon: Listen, as defense minister it was my duty to submit my
program to the government and to shoulder the responsibility for implementing
the decisions made by the government.
MATCH: You were in Beirut Sunday evening. How were you received and with
whom did you~have talks?
Ari'el Sharon: I visited the Beirut region late Sunday to follow the
operations by our troops who were busy sealing off a11 access to the capital.
The aim is not to besiege the city. The civilians, who have nothing to do
with the PLO, are free to move around. The encirclement of Beirut 3s aimed
_ solely at preventing the arrival of Palestinian reinforcements and pre-
venting their leaders, caught in a trap, from fleeing. It is also aimed at
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rux urrl~ic~ u~,: ~,~Lr
~ preventing the return of the Syrian troopa who, ~?til our arrival, were
stationed in the capital and who enabled the Palestinians to install
themselves there. Now, our main ob~ective is to remove that woimd from the
city. On my travels I met with Lebanese soldiers who recognized me, hailed
me and ev~n embraced me Arab-style. They were very surprised to see the
Israeli defense minister in a halftrack, wearing a steel helmet and a big
bullet-proof ,jacicet and holding an automatic machinegun in his hand.
Later, when passing through Ba'ab da, which is to Beirut what Ne uilly is to
Paris, I met entirely by chance with a mayor and a group of senior officers
from the Leb anese gendarmerie. Their welcome was very friendly and very
warm.
MATCH: What did you say to them?
Ari'el Sharon: I told them that we had no intere5t~ in remaining in Lebanon
and that we did not wanC to annex 1 c~ntimeter of their territory. Our
ob.jective is to destroy the Palestinians' infrastructure in Lebanon since
for many years they have perpetrated violent acts of terrorism in Israel
and other countries. I told them th at we had nothing against the Syrians
either. If the Syrians had not intervened to support the Palestinians we
would not have been forced to fight them.
MATCH: So you did not go to Beirut to install ~ new Lebanese government
there?
Ari'eI Sharon: What an idea! I have told you and I repeat: I met those
people in Beirut by chance. I did so in complete friendship. I told them
uf our hope to see Leb anon become a f ree and independent country again soon.
P~ATCH: Is President Sarkis free to do what he wants, without any threat
from you?
Ari'el Sharon: We are not inteY~fering in what President Sarkis does or
wants to do. We are not interf~ring in that country's political future.
MATCH: But surely your tanks standing a few meters from the presidential
- palace nonetheless constitute a threat? That is likely to influer.ce
people, to say the least.
Ari'el Sharon: Dear friend. Go there and you will see, as I did myself,
how enthusiastic those people are about our presence. They told me so
openly. They have no reason to fe~.r us. Our tanks are directed against
the Palestinians, not a~ainst the Lebanese. En route I visited several
dozen Lebanese villages and I would like to stress that they remained
intact after our troops passed through. Our tanks were not directed
against them. Each of our officers was equipped with an accurate general
staff map from the start which indicated the places in which the Palestinians
were. They knew precisely where they had to seek them. It was necessaA}?
to latmch fierce battles against the Palestinians or Syrians near Lebanese
~illages. But those villages were not hit.... To return to my talks in
Beirut, I told the people I met that I w~nt their country to regain its
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independence and to be able to live free from the Syrian and Palestinian
occupations which extended from the capital to the south of the country.
_ I told them that all foreign armies should leave their territory. I say
all armies, in other words the Syrian troops, the Israeli forces and, of ~
course, the armed Palestinians, their terrorist organizations and their
leaders who must all leave Lebanon.
MATCH: At the start of this operation you set out~to clear an area of
40 km [in depth]. How do you explain the fact that you are now in Beirut?
Ari'el Sharon: First take a map. Draw a 40km-line from Mettula, tY~e moat
northerly point of Galilee. You will then reach soa?ewhere north of Sidon,
which is~on the coast around 70 km from RA's a1~Naqura on the Israeli border.
Second, from the start ~f our operation, we have repeatedly stated ou~
intention of smashing the Palestinians' military infrastructure in Lebanon.
In the framework of a political settlement we ask for nothing more than
the demilitarization of that 40- to 45-km zone in order to place Galilee
out of range of the enemy artillery. Moreover, the PalesCinian military
infrastructure was 10 timea bigger than we had imagined.
MATCH: Were you surprised by their infrastructure, despite the l.egendary
quality of your intelligence servicea?
Ari'el Sharon: Yes. We discovered vast quantities of arms, munitione and
explosives in underground depots.... We found masses of guns, mortars and
even tanks. In the Sidon region alone you can now count more than 80
Palestinian tanks destroyed by our guns.
MATCH: Has that infrastructure now been d~stroyed in the south and in
Beirut?
Ari'el Sharon: It has been only par..t,~~y destroyed in Beirut. Everywhere
else it has been or is being destroyed. That takes time.... We are still
mopping up. There are still Paleatinian snipers hiding throughout the area.
The mopping-up operation to which I refer extends from the Israeli border
to the Beirut-Damascus road. But believe me when I tell you that when the
- time comes for a political settlement we will insiat that not one armed
Palestinian can again enter this 40- to 45-km area. Just imagine what would
happen after our departure from Lebanon if we had not first destroyed that
military infrastructure beyond the 40-km limit.... They would quickly
infiltrate again. As for the Syrians, whom we did not want to attack,
our tactics are to push them northward so that they move the Palestinian
positions installed in the middle of their linea and which threatened
Galilee away from our border. We warned them in various ways, secretly
and openly. It was in vain. They continued to protect the Palestinian
positions. So we had no choice but to attack them in the south.
MATCH: You are aware that the whole world is atiocked by the number of
civilian casualties caused by the fighting?
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Ari'el Sharon: Listen. It is up to you to believe me or not. I do not
thiiik there is a~ army in the whole world which has takPn such risks to
cause as few civilian casualties as possible.... We only opened fire on
buildings from which people were firing on us. And even then, before
launching an attack, we warned the inhabitants by bullhorn and with leaflets.
That is~what we did in Tyre, Sidon and Beirut, suggesting that they take
ref uge outside their homes to avoid the fighting.... Nonetheless when
operating in a city like Sidon where there were some 7,000 terroriste--
including 2,000 foreigners who had come to train in PLO camps--it wae
inevitable that the.re would be ~ivilian casualties. Moreover, we paid a
_ high pr~:e for that. Most of our casualties were the reault of the caution
with orhich our t.roops executed thEir mission in the ~na~or inhabited area~.
We did our best t~~ spare the civilians, but there is a limit to :verything
and I know that it is a tragedy, as in all wars.
MATCH; There are children of 12 and 14 among your prisoners.
Ari'el Sharon: I will give you a piece of exclusive informati~�: We
discovered docum~nts proving that Fatah long ago ordered the recruitment of
do you 'near.
~ all Palestinian children from the age of 12. 'itaelve years,
Moreover in another document which I am plaeing at your disposal it is
- clearly stated that it is absolutely .forbidden to recruit children under
12....
There Is~No Logic in Arab Terrorism
MATCH: Were~the children taken prisoner bearing arms?
Ari'el Sharon: Yes indeed. And they are 12 years old.
MATCH: Hc;w do you explain the illogical behavior of the Palestinians who,
by violating the cease-fire every day virtually playe~l into your hands,
enabling you to pursue the destruction of their positions?
Ari'el Sharon: If those people reasoned like you and I, there would have
been no reason to carry out this operation. There is no logic in Arab
terrorism, which we have seen in various forms for almost 1,000 years.
That terrorism is the cause of all the misfortunes besetting the Palestinians.
Behind that terrorism lies the desire to phyaically destroy Iarael.
MATCH: Has the PLO been destroyed?
Ari'el Sharon: The PLO has suffered a very serious b1ow. But not fatal.
At the present time (Monday evening) it still has a ma3or ~ilitary and
political infrastr~scture in Beirut. But we have decided not to enter the
capital and not to conquer it. It ia up to the Lebanese authorities to
ensure that the Palestinian command withdraws from Beirut. But those
authorities will not be able to.exercise their powers while the Syrian
occupation continues in a large part of Lebanon and while the 20,000 armed
Palestinians and the 40,000 Palestinians organized into militia in the
j capital remain there. It goes without saying that the withdrawal of the
Israeli troops is also essential for the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty.
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- MATCH: I pres~e that you are not talking about the withdrawal of all
Palestinians as such from Lebanon?
Ari'el Sharon: Not in the least. I am not taZking about the PaYestinian
civilians.. I am only talking about the terrorists. The departure of the
terrorists, the Syrians and the Iaraelis is a vital precondition for the
reemergence of a free Lebanon. That is also in the interest of L�he West
as a whole. We accept as pri:arity and without hesitation the need for our
withdrawal in the framework of the sertlement which I explained to you.
Our villages in Galilee must never again be hostages to the Palestinians
in southern L~banon. I hope that that seCtlement will be found very quick~y.
MATCH: So it is the Lebanese Government which must take responsibility
for removing the PLO from Beirut and ensuring the departure of the Syrians
- and Israelis from Lebanon?
Ari'el Sharon: Precisely. Otherwise Lebanon will be no more indeperident
in the future than it was in the recent past. As far as we are coiic~,rned,
there will be no problem because we want to leave as quickly as possibie.
MATCH: A final question: How did your air force manage to destroy 12
Soviet-made antiaircraft missile bases in 2 hours without losing a single
plane? �
Ari'el Sharon: I must content myself with telling you that we learned the
lessons of the Yom Kippur war: We made a very serious examination of the
problem of antiaircraft missiles. We trained for a long time and our
pilots executed a brilliant operation. I leave the rest to your imagination.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 par Cogedipresse S.A.
CSO: 4400/340
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SAUDI ARABIA
DEFENSE MINISTER VIELdS IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT
PM111127 Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 5-11 J~ 82 pp 39-40
[Interview with Saudi Defense Miniater Sultan ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz by retired
- Gen Georges Buis in Geneva: "We Will Not Allow Iraq to Be Defeated"--date
not given]
[Text] Georges Buis: Clouds seem ~o have gathered over Franco-Arab rela-
tions after years of amooth relations. Some people blame that on [French
President] Francois Mitterrand's visit to Israel....
Sultan ibn 'Abd al-Aziz: We were certainly not over3oyed by that visit.
But Mr Mitterrand is a free man at the head of a free country and his
gesture does not come under our ~urisdiction. On the other hand it is our
right-- and even our duty--to 3 udge the impact of that visit: What contri-
bution does it make to the cause of peace and ~ustice and in our region,
to restoring a balance which has long been tipped in Israel's favor?
Therefore we were not going to trip up your president on the road to
Jeru~aleni. But we are busy sweeping away the ~ umble of propaganda. That
is because we do not want to fall into the trap which Iarael has laid for
us by portraying that visit by the Fren~h president as the prodigal son's
return to the bosom of his family.
Georges Buis: However, surely President Mitterrand's first trip was to
Saudi Arabia?
Sultan ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz: Out of a desire to be excluaive the Israelis
portrayed that visit to Saudi Arabia by the French president as a mere
commercial traveler's tour. In short, absolution. We were happy to
receive your president in our coinztry. H,e war3 able to see that we were
not a spontaneous generation of gasoline pump attendants but a line of inen
whose history is much older than that o� oil.
By visiting my family birthplace at al-Dir'iyah and by acquainting himself
with Arabia's history, Mr Mitterrand learned that my father, the laCe King
'Abd al-'Aziz al-Sa'ud liberated and reunified his fathers' land with a
handful of inen and without uging Exocet misailes or AMX-30 tanks. Other
times, other ways, you may say--but still the same determination to be
master in our own coimtry, and independent and dignified in our relations
with others.
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Oil and guns aside--I do not deny their importance--we have another dispute
with France, namely cooperation between our two countries as part of an
international ef�ort to restore a~us~ and lasting peace in th~ Near East
and to restore the Palestinians legitimate rights; in other words, in their
dwn state Mr Mitterrand's friendship for Israel ought to be a source of
hope, not a handicap. It should maice it possible to warn Israel against
iCs obsessive wanderings which are likely to put the region and perhaps
the world to the fire and the sword.
Georges Buis: In that connection, what is the position on the Saudi peace ~
plan?
Sultan ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz: It takes two to make peace. The Arabs for their
part have put forward their proposals in this so-called Saudi ~.eace plan.
As for the Israeli peace.plan, it is a series of excuaes for annexing other
people's land, for attacks on Lebanon and for official or im~uthorized
installations on the West Bank. You may argue that the Saudi plan has not
_ been accepted by~ all the Arabs, but their criticis~ns relate to the form of
- the plan, not to its content. The Israelis reject the content--peace, and
that is natural, Although a vaurped people's legitimate rights can be
clearly spelled out in order to be.recognized and accepted, an impostor
needs chaos, constant danger and pity in order to survive.
Georges Buis: Another major probl,em at preaent is the problem of Iran and
Iraq. Their war is now taking a turn which maq be decieive. How is Saudi
Arabia's security threatened by the development of that war?
Sultan ibn 'Abd al-�Aziz: Nobody stands to gain from the war between
Iraq and Iran. Indeed its harmful effects are not likely to be limited
to the protagonists alone but to destabilize the whole region. You can
see that we, like the other Islamic gnd nonaligned cotmtries, are anxious
to end this wa~ and to see negoCiations reopened. I feel that Ixaq wants
peace and would agree to a negotiated solution. But it ie o~r Iranian
friends who are reluctant and who are refuaing to sit down at the conference
table. �
Georges Buis: The Iranians seem close to victory. Saudi Arabia has
already given Iraq considerable sid. But what form of military aid do
you envisage, should the need arise? Is it indirect sid with Jcrdanian
and perhaps even Egyptian forces? Is there a purely military plan for
= halting the Iranian forces?
Sultan ibn 'Abd al-'Aaiz: At present it would not be w3se publ~icly to
express an opinion on that point. Some official viewa may fan the flames
and delay the advent of peace. But if contrary to our wishes, that war
were to continue, the Arab states--or at the very least the Gulf states--
would be forced to hold a heada of state or defenae council mee~ing to adopt
a clear stance on that danger. I hope that that day will never come and
that Iran and Iraq will aoon be perauaded that a negotiated solution is
much more fruitful than an armed conflict. War ie a last resort when all
peaceful channels have been exhausted.
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Georges Buis: Would this :zot be an opport~ity for Egypt to re~oin the
Arab League?
Sultan ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz: We all want that, because Egypt has a prominent
place on the Arab and international scene. That would be a return to the
bosom of the family, but it could not take place outside the Axab League
- charter's stipulations and the deciaions talr,~n by many Arab summits.
Georges Buis: What is the position o~t the U.S. plan.for a~oint military
committee with Saudi Arabia?
Sultan ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz: We rely main.l~ on ourselves to defend our
country. We are not accustomed to relying on othera to protect our heritage
or our territorial integrity. But we can also apprec~ste the efforts of
influential nations in the service of peace, human rights and ~ustice.
Georges Buis: Does v~hat is now happening in technol.ogical terms in the
Falklands give you ~ new view of how to defen d the Gulf?
Sultan ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz: Strategic nonclusions and accurate assessments
of a particular piece of mil3tary equipment used would be premature at this
point in the conflict. Once the armR t~ave been laid down snd the ine and
outs of that war made clear, we will ~hen be ab 1~ to gauge, ~ udge and learn
from the gains and losses. There are, nonetheless, some conclusive experi-
ments, like the Exocet missile which the Saudi armed forces hav~e acquired.
And, while adopting no stance on the circtmnstances in which it was used,
we concluced that we had bought an extraordinary weapon. That is a~udg~nt
made exclusively on the weapon's efficacy.
Georges Buis: Le t us remain on the shores of the Gulf. What might happen
if Iraq is defeated?
Sultan ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz: It is difficult to aecept Iraq's defeat. If
Iraq is defeated, the whole situation in the region will be upset. We
- will not allow Iraq, or Iran, to be defeated.
Georges Buis: If Iraq is in serious difficulty, is Syria not likely to
intervene?
Sultan ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz: I do not think that the Syriane will reach the
point of wanting the end af Iraq as a nation and a people, despite all the
current disputes between the two regimes and the two leaderahipa. No,
_ I do not think th at Syria could go to such extremes--to want Iraq to
- surrender and coll apse.
_ Georges Buis: So, Syria will not deal the final blow?
Sultan ibn 'Ab d al-'Aziz: I do not think that the Syrian people or the
Syrian Arzry would take the responsibility of attacking Iraq or any other
Arab country. And I think that is the case irrespective of who leads
Syria. Nonetheless I am not pointing a finger at the present regime,
I am talking in general terms.~
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rt~K ~rr~a,iw~ u~~ ~,vLr
Ceorges Buis: What do you thiak of Omaa's stance on the deployment of
~ ~ U. S. f~r-ces?
= Sultan ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz: I do not think that Omaa has the right to meddle
~ in a conflict which does not directly concern it, and i find it difficult
to imagine a developing country, without its own means, entering into
- conflic~ with a big nation for~a cause which would not dire ctly aftecL it.
r But, if it is directly concerned, it will defend itself. ,
Gearges Buis: Do you agree with the fact that the little island of
al-Masirah has become a kind of American aircraft carrier?
Sultan ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz: Our policy is plain and clear: We are opposed
to any foreign presence on Arab land.
Georges Buis: So no military bases in your country?' .
Sultan ibn Ab d al-'Aziz: No to military basea. No to military presence.
Yes to cooperation through arms supply. Yes to technicians for a specific
mission. No more.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 "le Nouvel Observateur"
CSO: 4400/339
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- SYRIA
AKRAM AL-HURANI CRITICIZES CURRENT REGIME _
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 269, 9-15 Apr 82 pp 35-38
.r,~nterview with Akram al-Hurani, co-founder of the Ba'th Party by Walid Abu
Dahar: "This is How to Save Syria"; date and place not specifie~
/'Pex~ Akram al-Hurani: 71 years old, his face lined with the modern his-
tory Syria and the heroic nationalist movement of confrontation and libera-
tion from all forms of oppression...In his eyes is a deep sadness over the
tragic events which took place in his home town of Hamah and from which all
of Syria is suffering. But it is the sadness of a strong man that meets a
great blow with even greater stoiciam and determination. Aa he speaks, the
furrowed lines of his face seem to vanish to reveal a young man brimming with
zest, confidence, and faith. It is a face which suggests heartfelt faith,
- clarity of mind, and sharp skill at analyzing events and at drawing the
- picture of the future. A great Arab warrior with an optimist ic eye, conf i-
dent of our nation's eventual vi.ctory over its enemies.
It was only natural that AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI should seek an interview with
the man who has played such a crucial role in the destiny of Syr~ia. We were
f inally granted a meeting with "Abu Jihad" in the garden of his lovely home.
It was a frank and spontaneous session, yet bold and trustin~ at the same
time...It began with a question about the role of the National Alliance to
Save Syria, and ended with a call of support for saving Syria.
I asked Abu Jihad: Is the National Alliance to Save Syria a consequence of
the Hamah events, or had the idea already existed previously?
He replied: The call for the constitution of the National A1liance to Save
Syria was issued by a number of national leaders and conscious indivi~iuals
during the June 1967 disaster. Many serious and difficult a~tempts to
realize this alliance were undertaken on sev.eral occaeions. Unfortunately,
the internal and factional conditions of Syria and of the Arab and inter-
national community precluded the realization of these attempts.
We Syrians believe that the only way to rid Syria of Hafiz al-Asad's regime,
which supported by Zionism, Western Arabs, and the international community,
- is to establish the National Alliance among our people's sons. This alliance
will off er the opportunity to establish a patriotic regime in Syria.
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A patriotic regime in Syria would place a limit on the massacres occurring
~ all over the Arab world, in S~ria, in Lebanon, and on the eastern borders
of our Arab homeland. And, as everyone knows, Syria accomplished the most in
- the f if ties under the oppressive rule of the National Coalition, a coalition
in which all political factions, from the extreme right to the far left,
including the communists, participated...At the internal level, the Coalition
achieved some basic social and economic gains. The Council of Deputies
passed some important legislation regarding the peasants, the workers, and
the economic, industrial, and cultural rebirth...The nationalization of
foreign companies was carried out, and the bigger ports passed into public...
Even the national budget--which is a mirror that reflects the extent of
general economic growth--increased by an average of 30 to 40 percent each
year. All of this was possible despite the economic blockade, despite the
fact that Syria was denied any foreign aid; Syria was one of only three
nations that did not get foreign aid after World War II.
- Even under the shadow of the National Coalition, Syria at that time managed
~ to confront all of the foreign plots hatched against it and against the
. Arab nation. This list includes the Mutual Defense Pact, the Baghdad Pact,
the Eisenhower poctrine, to the Tripartite aggression against Egypt...The
official records on the Baghdad Pact, which were revealed after the 14 July
1958 revolution in Iraq, expose the devilish lengths of the plota aimed at
Syria...But in the shadow of the Coalition, Syria was still able to suppress
all plots and emerge victorious.
Indeed, Syria was encircled by some Arab and Islamic states allied with the
West against it. But thanks to the democratic parliamentary national govern-
ment, Syria emerged victorious from these battles. At that time, Syria
was a radiating beacon in the Arab world, a shining light of liberation for
- the peoples of the Third World. It was even called "heroic Syria." The
world could not imagine that a small country deprived of human and natural
resources could survive in the face of all these powers conspiring against
it, and ultimately emerge victorious. What allowed Syria to bring about these
' miracles was democracy and the national unity that sprung up in the shadow
of the National Coalition.
It is unnecessary to mention the amount of aid given by Syria to the Algerian
revolution and to Egypt against the Txipartite aggression and the con-
spiracy against the National Union there. Our support reached fruition with
the establishment of the Egyptian-Syrian union in February 1958.
Question: You were the def ense minister at the beginning of the rule of the
National Coalition. You must have keen insights into the Syrian army's com-
position. What is your explanation for the massacres that took place in
Hamah?
Answer: We need to understand the Syrian army's structure from the begin-
ning. In the mandate period France forme~ ~nat it called the "mixed army." It
included French off icers of different ranks and off icers and soldiers from
certain Syrian sects, the most prominent from Latakia Mountains, Jabal
Druze, al-Sharaksa, and al-'Asha'ir. France upheld this racist, tribal, and
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sectarian composition. It would not give the ma~ority of the youngrmen of
the country, i.e., of the towas, the opportunity to enter the military
colleg~ or the army, except in a very few cases, and from only certain
families.
When the popular upr~.sing of 1945 oc~urred to end the mandate, a large number
of these officers 3oined it. Three years later they were to play a super-
visory role in the f ighting for Palestine, deapite tlheir small numbers and
little artillery. The fatality rate of these off icers was relatively high
in Palestine in 1948 because they fought at the head of their unita.
I~n the nationalist period following the mandate, the sectarian composition of
the armed forces was aboliahed by a law mak3ng military service obligatory
for all men. Admission to the military college was made conditional upon the
applicant's personal merits and the attainment of a secondary school
diploma. In this way the Syrian army became a national army that all Syrians
- could ~oin in ~o protect their country and to realize the goals of the Arab
nation. And in Syria's Golden Age, during the rule of the Progressive
National Front, the Syrian army witnessed ita greatest period of atrength and
national solidarity...This admirable state of affairs was a contributing
factor to the realization of the above-mentioned accomplishments by Syria
during this time.
Indeed, the biggest blow to befall the army's structure occurred after the
. movement of 8 March 1963, when steps were taken towards restoring the methods
of the mandate period. A lasge number of officers were dismiased, especially
after the coup of 22 February 1966...Then Hafiz al-Asad completed the sec-
tarian approach by concentrating the leading poeitiona in the hands of inen
from his own clan and sect.
Question: We understand that Hafiz al-A~ad opened a gaping wound in the unity
of Syrian society by aff irtning the sectarian character of the government and
the army. How can this wound be treated?
Answer: When the French entered Syria in 1920 after noble.popular resistance
at the battle of Nislon, they divided the country into sectarian mini-states,
in the Alawi Mountain and Jabal Druze. They granted each area. f iscal and ~
administrative independence, and a flag. They tried their best to attribute
to each one of them a separate cultural character, h3atory, and distorted
heritage...until the people's struggle toppled their attempted artificial
sectarianism. Complete popular a,nd political unity was achieved after the
- 1945 revolut~on when the French were expelled from the country for good.
What France tried and failed to achieve, America and Israel are now attempt-
ing--not only in Syria but in the entire region. Zionism and the West under-
stand very well that IsraeJ,'s strategic superiority over a handful of Arab
states is an artificial, superiority that could be undone and demolished.
Israel's leaders do not try to hide the fact that their policies are based on
car~ring up the region into paltry sectarian entities...
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...Aftex the June 1967 defeat, Moshe Dayan and othera stated that the Middle
- East is not an Arab region but rather a mosaic of several nationalities...he
meant by that a cluster of sectarian and racist en.tities.
Atid in fact without slicing the region into sectarian, racist mini-states,
- it would not be possible for Israel to maintain its ascendency in this Arab
region in perpetuity. ~
Here the savage, sectarian regime in Syria links up with Israel's expansion-
ist designs in the Arab world...the regime has crushed national unity in
- Syria. and has exposed the destiny of the Arab nation to grave danger.
The Syrian army has lost its military might in the face of this suppression
of national unity by the regime. For military might is a function of internal,
domestic cohesion...Without national unity, military potential is minimal,
regardless of what the army might possess in terms of arms and artillery.
In such cases, the military machine can only be used against the people.
This sectarian regime has f itted nicely it~to Israel's expansionist designs
in Lebanon, as was made clear in a communique by the National Alliance to
_ Save Syria.
It is indicated in the Red Line agreement over which America took upon itself
to start a mission of negotiations and understandings betwean Hafiz al-Asad
and Israel...It is indicated in the despicable and cowardly acts committed
in Lebanon, whereby the army has lost its reputation for patriotism and
fighting spirit. The army has been transformed into a night waLchman on the
~ streets and an instrument of mischief in the hands of smugglers and thieves.
It has been made into an ii~strument of slaughter of Palestinians and Lebanese.
A band of sectarianists are to be found within the ranks of the Mu~lims them-
selves in Lebanon.
The collusion of al-Asad's sectarian regime with Israel's expansionist plans
to carve up the region was clear during the rebellion of the agent Barzani
in northern Iraq. Despite the fact that Israel was supplying Barzani with
arms, money and off icers to train the rebels during the late Shah's rule,
- Hafiz al-Asad was also giving aid to Barzani. And when this agent Barzani
was defeated and died in America, flaf iz al-Asad summoned Barzani's son,
Mas'ud, and ca~oled him into rekindling the rebellion. It is well known
that Mas'ud now spends his time between Syria and Iran.
There are eyewitnesses that claim that Haf iz al-Asad en~oyed good relations
with the shah. When the shah was in the prime of his.power, al-Asad used to
get financial aid from him. Even more dangerous is the fact that Khomeyni's
regime of ayatollahs currently established in Iran is openly in league with
the sectarian regime in Damascus and no longer hides it. This is the same
regime of ayatollahs which atill calls up to this minute far the annexation
of Iraq and the Arabian penninsula to Iran, in the name of Is1am...A1-Asad
~ knows Chat Israel ia supplying the Iranian rulers with all kinds of military
aid. ,
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The Zionist plan for carving up the region was revealed in the famous docu-
ment handed over by the late Jamal 'Abd al-Nassir to the Indian journalist,
Karin~ia, and is the subject of the latter's book, "The ~sraeli Dagger."
This book exposed the Israeli plan for dividi'ng the Arab region into sec-
tarian, racist mini-states. Hence, the sectarian, racist regime of Haf iz
al-Asad, is a tool to be used by Zionism and imperislism to carry out their
plan.
Question: What in your view is the best way to solve the Lebanese cri~is, in
, light of the conflict between the Palestinian issue and the Lebanese issue?
Answer: The Le.h~nese crisis cannot be solved until the Syrian army with-
draws from Lebanon and a patriotic, democratic government is established in
Syria. It was the Asad regime tha.t brought Israel to Lebanon in fact...It
- added a new sectarian wedge in Lebanon when the popular leadership of Amal
and founded Ali Eid's organization in Tripoli. It was also an inhibiting
factor in bringing about conciliation between the diff erent sects (factions)
_ in Lebanon, including the Palestinians.
Hafiz al-Asad's propaganda that claims that it was necessary for his forces
to move into Lebanon to protect the Palestinians from Israel and prevent
sectarian massacres between the Lebanese only confirmed the truth that his
presence in Lebanon was a contributing factor in the increa$e of sectarian
- slaughter within the ranks of both Muslims and Chri3tians. Events showed
that these forces did not fire a single shot to protect the Palestinians
during Israel's attacks on Lebanon, especially during the barbaric shelling
of Palestinian dwellings in Lebanon that obliged the Palestinians to accept a ~
ceasefire with Israel. ~
The facts also suggest that Hafiz al-Asad's presence in I~ebanon served, and
continues to serve, as a pretext for Israel's occupation of Iarge parts of
southern Lebanon, especially where large clusters of PaYestinians are found,
and aimed at annihilating them.
- Question: As one of the long time greats of Syrian patriots, how did news
reach you of the events at Hamah,and how true do you think they are?
Answer: I think that the atrocities committed by Haf iz al-Asad in the heroic
city of Hamah a~e truly unprecedented in the annals of the most uncivilized
conquerors in all history, including Genghis Khan and Timurlane. I don't
think there has been anything like it anywhere in the world. An estimated
20,000 people were killed, including old men, women, and children. Atroci-
- ties, destruction, mutilation, 1oot~ing and pillage occurred of an order
unlike anything you are likely to read about in books...Women's honor was
- defiled and word-of-mouth tells us of several women who committed suicide
in their struggle against the bestial forces of Hafia al-Asad, protecting
their honor. One young girl exploded herself in the midst of some of these
- savage soldiers, killing 20 of them. At least one-third of all the
- buildings in the town were destroyed.
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~ Bodies lay strewn on the streets until the town started to fester with 3is-
eases. News is still reaching us about bodies being pulled out from under
the ruins...Whole piles of bodies are being~buried in mass graves dug out by
steamshovels. They say that that butcher's forces have even resorted to
burying some of the martyrs' bodies...~ust as they burned some of them alivel
The city of Hamah used to boast a population of 300,000. Now it hardly has
15,000. The authorities are still barring $ny ~ournalists from going into
the city. What is really sad is that the Arab and the international news
- media, east and west, are keeping quiet about this foulest deed in contem-
porary times.
Question: During the Hamah events, the off icial.Damascus news media targeted
only the Muslim Brotherhood. Was it a conflict between the authorities and
- the Muslim Brotherhood only, or was it a contest between the authorities and
all of the patriotic opposition forces?
Answer: We mentioned that the city of Hamah once held 300,000 people. It is
incredible to think that the whole town, including its men, women, and
children, consisted of Muslim Brothers...But it was only natural, consider-
ing the encirclement and barbaric destruction of the town, that everyone
should have rushed to protect the inviolability of their town and jnin in the
` f ighting without fear of death, regardless of the fact that they were out-
matched in arms and ammunition...The no~a~^psrs iotic resistance displayed by
the people of Hamah accounted for a loss to the buteher of 150 armored cars
and tanks.
If what the sectarian regime's news med~a says is true, then were Hamah's
Christians who met death in the city and the surrounding countryside, also
- members of the Muslim Brotherhood?
More than this...There is an intuitive sense of the lies and falsity of these
- claims.
In the period of parliamentary government, Hamah used to elect its own repre-
sentatives to Parliament. The Arab Socialist Ba'ath party would propose a
complete list of candidates and all of them would win seats in free, demo-
cratic elections...Therefore, since when have the old men, women and chil-
dren of Hamah's 300,000 population, including the Christians there and in the
surrounding count~yside, all been part of the Muslim Brotherhood?
~ From another angle, the number of political prisoners in Syria taday has
reached the thousands, and run from all sections of society. These include
members of the unions of workers, engineers, doctors, teachers, students
- and the military. So the battle is not only between Hafiz al-Asad's regime
" and the Muslim Brotherhood, despite the efforts being made to portray it as
such.
Some have raised questions about.the savagery shown to Hamah by Hafiz al-
- Asad...What could be the reason for it?
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~ ~
The number one rea~on was to deepen the sectarian dif.ferencea in Syria to
the point where they became irreconcilable. The tyrant I~as been.working
towards this end throughout his rule. The ~econd reason is to spread fear
and terror among the people in order for the tyrant to maintain silence
~ over his savage crimes, over his support for the regime of Rhome}?ni, and the
ayatollahs in Iran, and over crimes committed against the Arab nation and its
rightful future.
- Question: In your opinion,~why didn't any Alawites rise up after the events
of Hamah? ~ ~
Answer: It is regrettable that there are no young men to be heard in the
Latakia mountain region raising their voices against the barbaric crimes
. committed by Hafiz al-Asad against Syria and the Arab nation. It is
regrettable that they would voice no protest even if it meant their death.
- That is why I direct my words to the patriotic consciou~ and the Arab
sentiment existing in the minds and hearta of the youth of this honorable
. sect. They must determine what their position towards this regi~ne is going
to be. We want them to rally to the banner of the National Alliance to Save
Syria, the only way to save the Syrian people and the Arab nation from
this traitor's rule...It is the only effective response to Hafiz al-Asad's
attempts to deepen sectarian differencea in Syria.
We await the news of our sons in the Latakia mountains to fight at the
~ side of their brothers in Syria together against this criminal butcher's
- ~ regime. ~ ~
Question: Do you think that the Syrian regime is r~ay to follow in the path
- of Camp David, if given the opportunity?
Answer: The full anawer to that is contained in the charter of the National
Alliance to Save Syria. . . . ~
COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
9945 �
CSO: 4404/431
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SYRIA
PLANS TO ELIMINATE OPPOSITION ABROAD CITED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 273, 7-13 May 82 pp 19-20
- [Article: "Syrian Plan to Eliminate the Opposition Abroad"].
- [Text] Up until last Tuesday evening, the closing date for this issue of AL-
- WATAN AL-'ARABI, the French authorities had not given out any final information
regarding the results of the investigation. The cause of this silence is two-
fold. The first part concerns the fact that serious information has reached
Paris concerning an official Syrian plan to eliminate the opposition in Western
Europe, and the second part is other information concerning a counter-plan,
~ which has not yet crystallized, being prepared by the Syrian opposition to con-
~ vulse the pillars of the regime abroad, and especially in Europe.
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, which is following the investigation and its ramifications,
~has uncovered some of its aspects in light of the Syrian plan and the possibil-
ities of a counter-plan.
- 'More than two weeks after the Rue Marbeuf explosion, which was aimed a~t AL~
WATAN AL-'ARABI, the ~udicial investigation has not obtained any significant
results, in terms of discovering,the perpetrators, although it has specified
- the "Syrian role" in the massacre in an undeniable fashion, in terms of making
the decision to punish and intimidate AL-WATAN AI~-'ARABI.
It has become clear today that the Syrian regime's responsibility for the at-
- tack is not debatable, since it was aimed at killing two birds with one stone,
as various French political circles have stxessed.
1. To inflict the most damage possible on AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI.
2. To prompt the French authorities to clamp down on AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI's free-
dom and perhaps on the.emigre Arab press �s a whole, on the one hand, and to
send a direct warning to the French Government because of izs intervention in
- the Lebanese crisis behind Syria's back,'on the other. The French criminal
police last week interviewed a number of persons, including Hamidah Na'na',
Lebanese correspondent for AL-SAFIR, who is a supporter of the Syrian regime,
the Egyptian writer Ghali Shukri, and the Syrian ~ournalist, Ghassan al-Amam,
for 3 hours. They were then all released except for one person, whose name has
not been disclosed. �
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Evaporated Like Salt
The French policQ have also distributed a composite picture of the driver of
the Opel car that blew up on the etreet. Police experts determined the fea-
tures of the man's face in light of information from the eye witnesses who saw
the driver of the car up close hours before it exploded. The picture, which
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI is publishing along with this report, ehowe a face with
Arab features, distinguished bq thick black hair, streaked with some gray, and
a thin mustache.
, This photograph was circulated to Interpol and European police organizations,
- since the first expectations were that the perpetrator might have been success-
ful in leaviag Fxeach territory.
On the other hand, a team of French police went to the Czech city of Jablonec
to interview the woman responeible for the car agency where the orange Opel was
rented.
It has become clear that the young woman who rented the car presented the agen-
cy with a falae Swiss passport, in the name of Margit Stadelman. It is known
that she has browa skin and is about 30 years old, but ahe has "eva~porated"
- without a trace. The land or air route that she used to reach Jablonec is also
not known, nor is the hotel where she atayed, although there is the belief that
she carried several passports and travelled under various naunes.
The young woman's description has been paesed to other European police forces
charged with combating terrorism, in order to identify her, but the~results
were negative. This proves that the Syrian regime, and specifically the De-
fense Companies' intelligence,~prepared the attack with extreme care and pre-
cision. They took all the time they needed to prepare for it, in cooperation
with their informants and spies in Eurape. ~ .
The Richest Man ~
The French media, for the third consecutive week, has continued to play up the
massacre and its perpetrators. The newspaper FRANCE SOIR publiahed a factual
report about Rif'at al-Asad and his terrorist activities both at 11ome and
- abroad, as well as concerning his secret wealth. It considers him the richest
man in Syria today. Other magazines have also published pictures of some of
his real estate holdings in France, including a huge villa in the western out-
- skirts of Paris, specifically, in the middle class area of (Saint Ne L~Eau) Pro-
- vence, which is about 35 kms from Paris. It also published a picture of the
villa and the opulent gardens aurrounding it. A large group of cara was shown
parked outside the house.
The French press mentioned thatltif'at a1~Asad registered his property in the
name of a real estate company called "al-Janan," which is managed by his lawyer
brother-in-law, Na3i al-Khuri. They added that Rif'at a].-Asad recently visited
this villa, and apparently secret mee~ings were held there to plan the opera-
tions and actions of his~intelligence organization on French soil.
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The Liqui;da~ion Plan
It is evident that these activities were in the context of an extremely danger-
ous secret plan, which certain French political circles disclosed this week.
The plan calls for pursuing opponents of the Sqrian regime and either liquida~
tit~g them or' kidnapping them back to Damascus. It is based on huge resources
and a vast network of terrorists.
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI is alone in focusing on this plan in all its aspects and
_ background, backed by facta, figures and names.
It was decided to put the plan into use in a secret meeting lield in Damasaus
on 14 February. On that day, the forces of the a1-Asad brothers completed the
destruction of most of the districts of Hamah and were mopping up pockets of
_ armed resistance in its streets and buildings. As a result of that, the Syr-
ian president summoned his chiefs of intelligence to an urgent and secret meet-
ing. It was attended by 'Ali Haydar, responsible for eliminating opposition-
ists in Western Europe, 'Ali Duba, responsible for military intelligence,
Muhammad al-Khuli, responsible for general intelligence, as well as Rif'at al-
Asad.
The plan was prepa~ed and in Rif'at's pocket. ~
The meeting was simed at putting the finishing touches on the plan and at dis-
cussing some of its operational details. Ita goal was "to hit the opposition
hard, to pursue them everywhere and to create consternation in certain Western
capitals that have accepted Syrian oppositionists and have given them freedom
of movement, in order to make these capitals expel them'or impose restrictions
on their activities, including the media." '
This is.the,first time 3n the history of international relazions.that a country
has adopted a plan of this icind aad has shoc.~a sueh disdain for the simplest
principles that govern relations between nations and peoples, through direct
terrorist intiervention in foreign nations.
At the secret meeting,.ways of 3mplementation were diacussed "in light of Pres-
ident Hafiz al-Asad's guidance and instructions." Rif'at spelled out the role
of the "soldier" in the pursuit operation. It was decided to make use of the
most capable elements from the 'Alawite sect, after furnishing them with dip-
lomatic passports and the necessary equipment.
This equipment is another stiory.
American Expertise
Syrian intelligence sought the assistance of an American arms dealer~ notoxious
for his past relations with American intelligence~ in order to furnish them
with the most effective means of killing and with his practical advice in this
regard.
This dealer's name ia well known in arms dealers' circles and in the warld of
intelligence. He is George Gregory Rorkala. He was sentenced by an Amexican
court to 53 years in prison for violating an official ban on supplying arms to
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Libya. However, Korkala was successful in fleeing American territory, and in
offerring his aervices, along with his two partnera, Wilson and Terpil (under
10 year prison sentencea, charged with collusion with Rorkala) to those organ-
izations and groups who wished them.
However, American intelligence has not forgotten the fugitive "troika" and con~
tinues to pursue Korkala, Wilson aad Terpil. The three were succesaful in stay-
ing out of the clutches of the police and Interpol, until the most dangerous
of them f ell into a trap .
~ That happened on 25 February in the city of Madrid. Interpol surprised Korkala
at an exhibition of electronic listening devices and equipment. He was arrest-
ed and "shipped" at once to New York.
After a series of prolonged iaterrogations and investigations, Korkela agreed
to "cooperate" with the police and faciliCate their ~ob. He revealed everything
with facts and figures.
The confeseions were startling. Both the American CIA and FBI had thought
that Korkala and his two partners only worked for the Libyan'regime. ~iowever,
Korkala revealed for the first time th~t he also work~d for Syrian intelligence.
What were the details that he gave?
His confession was a very serious document concerning the Syrian regime's ter-
rorism. Let us read it and also hear the story of his relationship with Rif'at
al-Asad's intelligence organization.
"In 1977, I and my partner Teih~il were invited to visit Damascus secretly.
_ There, I met with General 'Ali DubF who told me he was interested in obtaining
the American Ingram machine gun, u~sed by American intelligence. He urged me
to get~ him a sample of this mach{.r~egun for him to test.
_ "A few weeks later a Syrian delegation came to New York, led by the foreign
minister, 'Abd al-Halim I~addam. A captain in Intelligence, Haytham Sa'id, was
a member of the delegation. He contacted me, and we agreed on a date to meet
at my factory, Amstech International, in the city of New Jeraey [sic]. Haytham
came; he asked me if I was able to supply him with advanced silencers, magnify-
- ing scopes that use rays, and other sophiaticated equipment uaed by American
intelligence.
"Later, there was a ser3es of ineetings between us in Damascus and Geneva to dis~
cuss these matters."
Korkala also confessed that the Syrians provided him with a contact in Frank-
furt, Germany, wha was purchasing on behalf of the Syrians the following items:
booby-trapped toys, pistols, and explosive ink pens and lighters. The shipment
was to be via Lufthansa.
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Poisons ~or the Opposition
"The Syrian military people then asked me," Korkala went on to aay, "for very
powerful explosives that the American army uses and for toxic substances that
kill immediately, such as thalium, strychnine, digitoxin and aconitum. "I
brought this stuff to Paris, and according to the instructions that had been
given to.me, I waited in one of the hotels. An emissary came to me from 'Ali
Duba, under the assumed name of Ziyat. All of this was done through a special
"code" that had been agreed upon at the start of our cooperation. Ziyat asked
me to go to Damascus, specifically to the Hotel Meridian, where I would be con-
tacted."
Accordingly, Syrian Intelligence was supplied with the most modern and techni-
cally sophisticated equipment to be used in the liquidation plan in Europe.
This equipment was shipped in diplomatic pouches to Europe, where groups of
kamakazi commandos waited to declare war on the opposition in Paris, London,
Frankfurt, Aachen, Madrid and elsewhere in other European capitals, in execu-
tion of the plan which Hafiz and Rif'at al-Asad diecussed last 14 February.
, From al-Muhaysan to Delamare
Informed French circles, including the French magazine V.S.D.~ which published
details of the plan, put the Luropean war of liquidation in the context of the
Lebanese war and the series of Syrian liquidations which have been going on
in Beirut for several montha. The officer who carried out the kidnapping of
the former Jordanian charge d'affairs in Beirut, Mr Hisham al-~iuhaysan, was
none other than Syrian Captain Muhammad Yasin, who also tried to hi~ack one
of the Arab airplanes at Beirut sirport.
Muhammad Yasin is the righthand man of Col Muhammad Ghanim, who is in charge
of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon. He ia the one who devised the plan to assas-
sinate French Ambassador Delamare in Beirut, and delegated its implementiation
to al-Musawi.
- Therefore, the Syrian plan to eliminate the opposition in Europe is merely an
extension of the liquidation going on in Lebanon. However, it is more dangex-
ous, in the sense that it is being conducted in complete secrecy and with the
most modern equipment that leave no traces: kidnapping (the case of the Syrian
opposition officer, Barid al-Baridi, who was kidnapped from Strasbourg to Dam-
ascus), assassination, atrangulation, poisoning, Etc. French suthorities are
expecting a new wave of these "operationa" soon in other European countries,
in which there are Syrian or Arab opposition elements, for the purpoae of "con~
vulsing" both the opposition�and the Weat. It was revealed in Paria that Rif'at
al-Asad recently visited France (the city of Bordeaux), under the guise of seek-
ing treatment, in order to supernise some of the technical touches to the plan.
However, the unexpected anger against the Syrian regime, which resulted from
the Marbeuf massacre, in addition to the expulsion of the two Syrian diplomats,
Hassan 'Ali and Mikha'il Kasuhah, and the imposition of etrict security pre-
cautions all over Europe, have shuffled some cards and closed some channels to
Syrian terrorism, which might delay the implementation of some foreign opera-
tions.
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The question that arises is: Can the European security authorities manage to
stop the terroriem coming from Damascus~ and paralyze their intelligence organ~
izations, or will war develop between the two eides, with some European nations
resorting to direct response and usiag the same methods, as a senior French
official indicated?
For its part, this question bringe up another one: W111 the Syrian opposition
eater the foreign "arena," in order to reapond to the terroriam, and how?
- COPYRIGflT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
7005 .
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TUNISIA
- INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS LAUNCHED IN KEY INDUSTRIES
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1906, 21 May 82 pp 1329,
1330
(Article: "Industrial Projects in Tunisia")
[Text] During the Fifth�Tunisian Development Plan (1976-1981), the total invest-
menrs of manufacturing industries were lower than echeduled: 791 million dinars
instead of 950 million dinars (million dinars: I~ID; 1 dinar = about 11 French
francs). As a result, the realization of certain large projects has been af-
fected (iron and steel industry, cement, ammonia, sugar production, etc.).
, Nevertheless, private investments have exceeded the Plan estimatea by 30 IrID
(313 IrID against 283 IrID) .
= In 1982, manufacturing industries were to make investments amounting to 245 IrID,
representing 17.5 percent of the total investments (compared with 195 I~ID and
15.9 percent in 1981). Private investments represent a large percentage of the
total, especially in the mechanical and electrical engineering industries.
NOTE: For this stuc'.y, we have considered only the projects~that are now in
progrESS or the realization of which is scheduled to start during 1982.
Table 1. Investments in Manufacturing Industries (in Millions of Dinars)
Increase in
added value
1980 1981 1982 1982
Agricul.ture and food industries 33 55 . 50 0.3
Building materials industries 40.1 49 60 17.6
- Idechanical and electrical engineering 21.2 25 44 11.6
Chemical industries 13.2 34 40 8.1
Textile and shoe-making induatries 15 19 27 9.6
Miscellaneous indt.stries 11.8 13 24 14.6
Together ~ 134 195 245 9
In 1982, the rate of growth in this sector will be 9 percenC, whereas the aver-
age rate of growth adopted in the Sixth Plan (1982-1986)-~which has just been
the object of a large nationll conaultation--is 11.5 percent. This rate is
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rutc ur'r'1~1A1~ u5~ u~vLY
based on the recovery of the textile industry, a slight decline in the mechan-
ical and electrical engineering industries as well as in the chemical indus-
tries, and a stabilization of agricultural production.
Agriculture and Food Industries
- For technical reasons, the expansion of the Beja sugar refinery--to increase
its capacity from 80,000 to 145,000 tons of beets--was not realized in 1981.
Constrc.ction of a new sugar refinery at Ben Bechir is scheduled to start in
1982. This sugar refinery complex, which will have a processing capacity of
4,000 tons of beets per day, and a production capacity of 41,000 tons of sugar
per year, will also include a yeast manuf actL.ring plant producing 7.5 tons of
dry yeast per day. For its realization, Tuaisia has signed an agreement with
- an Italian-West German consortium. The total cost of the project is 47 NID
and p rod ucti o n should start in June 1982. The German Bank for Development
and Construction is providing a 45 million mark loan to finance the second
unit of this complex.
In addition, two f lour--mills are scheduled to be completed, in Kairouan and
Gabes; also, 5 1~ID will be invested to camplete the Port of Tunis
dairy station.which is managed by STIL [Tunisian Dairy Industry Company]
(200,000 liters of milk per day), and 2 IrID to continue the expansion work at ~
the Sidi Bou Ali dairy station.
In the tobacco industry, 2.6 IrID represent the cost of starting the: expansion
- program of the Tunis plant. The construction of an egg and food packaging
equipmert plant in Mateur accounts for a total investment of 1.5 I~ID, with a
participation from the Koweiti Development Bank.
Building Materials Industries
. The total investments for ~.982 amount to 60 IrID, including 40 NID to finance
cement works projects.
In Enfidha, the Central Tunisian Industrial Cement Company (SICC) will build
a cement factory with a capacity of 3,000 tons of clinker per day, correspond-
ing to an annual, production of 1 million tona of cement and 120,000 tons of
artificial lime. This project will cost 71.5 1~ID, of which 20 I~ID will be spent
in 1982. The construction of thia f actory has been entrusted to the Japanese
company Kawasaki Heavy Industries and production is expected to start late in
1982. The Export-Import Bank of Japan is contemplating a lo an of 45 million
yens to Tunisia.
The Jebel Oust Cement Company and the French company Polysiu s will build a
si.xth ce~r~ent factory at Jebel Oust. It will have a production capacity of
1 million tons per year, and will increase Tunieian cement production to 4
million tons. The project will cost 79 I~ID and will be realized over three
years.
The other projects deal essentially with the realization of the Bir Mcherga
cement factory (15 NID), the hydraulic lime unit (1 NID) and, finally, tl~e ~*hite
cement unit (2 NID).
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Mect~.anical and Electrical Engineering Industries
It is er.pected that 44 IrID will be invested in 1982 in the realization of lai~e
mechanical engineering projects.
In 1981, Tunisian authorities started negotiations with automobile manufactur-
ers, and three manuf acturers appear to have agreed with the government
- requests.
STIA (Tunisian Automobile Industry Company) and Peugeot have a~gned an agree-
ment for the assembly of 10,000 model-504 vans, 1,000 model-504 .station wagons,
_ ~and 2,500 model-305 cars. ~ Some of these cars will be exported. The agreement
provides for a progressive increase of the industrial integration coefficient
in van production, with a medium term coeff icient of 30 percent; it also pro-
vides for the production of spare parts for these cars, and for the purchase
by Peugeot of ind+sstrial products (automobiles and others) made in Tunisia.
The project will cost 12 NID and its implementation is scheduled for the end
of 1982, after che expansion of the STIA workshops.
A second manufacturer--Renault--will realize two units for the assembly of
4,000 5-HP and 7-HP cars (4 1~ID), and for the production of brake levers,
remote controls, igni.tion coils, etc., all of which are to be exported (5.6 NID).
The third manufacturer will reaZize an unit for the assembly of 10,000 vans,
half of which to be exported (cost: 10 IrID) .
The Tunisian Economic Development Bank (BDET) has launched a series of auto-
mobile components projects. It has signed an agreement with the German
mechanical engineering enterprises Kloeckner-Humboldt-Deutz (KHD) for the
realization of a mechanical engineering complex in Mateur, where light mechan-
ical accessories will be manufactured. This complex will include a unit for
the construction of 6,250 Diesel engines and a unit for the assembly of agri-
cultural machinery (2,200 tractors, 80 combine harvesters, and 700 other
machinE:s) . The estimated cost of the proj ect is 45 I~ID.
A Tunisian company, COTREL [expanaion unknown] has been created; it will pro-
duce 6,000 tons of springs for automobile vehicles, mostly for the export
market. A five-year agreement has been signed with Fiat for the sale of
2,000 tons of leaf springs. Technical assistance from the Japanese company
- NHK [expansion unknown] has been secured. The project will cost 4.5 I~ID, of
which 1.5 NID will b~ invested in 1982.
Other investments in this sector (21.5 IrID) will be Por moder,nization and
expansions, and for a series of projects dealing with metallic structures
(5.3 1~ID), electrical engineering (6 I~ID), a machine-tool production unit in
Jerissa and a factory to produce radiators for all types of vehicles in
Gafsa (1.4 IrID). .
In the iron and szeel industry, 4.6 NID will be invested in 1982, including
2.2 1~ID for the overhaul of the E1 Fouladh blast furnace. The structural steel
shortage reached 100,000 tons in 1982 and will reach 300,000 tons in 1986. A
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preliminary feasibility study made by Atkins and.Partners reco~ended a two-
stage development of the plant to adapt it to.the production of long products
with a d~.rect reduction process. The estimated cost of the operation is 144 MD.
Table 2. Investments in Mechanical Engineering (in Millions of Dinars)
Cost of the Realized prior
~ project to 1982 1982 .
Automobile assembl.y 27.7 4 9.4
Automobile components ~ 31.8 ~ - 5.3
Handling equipment 1�9 - 1
Tools and machine-tools 2.2 0.4 1
Mechanical engineering complex 38.8 - 1.1
Others " - 4' ~
Total 102.4 4.4 22.5
_ In addition, 1.3 NID will be devoted to the expansion of the SOFOMECA [Iron
Works and Engineering Company] foundry so it can produce tubing (1.3 I~ID);
2.6 IrID will be invested in metal works, and 3.5 I~ in tb.e expansion of inetallic
packaging.
Chemical Industries ~
The total investments allocated to this sector for 1982 are estimated at 40 I~ID
(compared with 34 1~ID in 1981.) . The3 include essentially the completion of the
- new ICM-3 [Ma~hreb Chemical Industries] phosphoric acid production unit (10.3
IrID). This project is part of an effort to increase the phosphate processing
capacity. Its realization would make it possibl.e to optimize the use of exist-
ing equipment in the first two ICM~units by raising their production capacity
to 280,000 tons, and to increao~ the total ICM capacity.to 445,000 tons of
phosphoric acid. The total cost of the project is 39 MD and it is expected
to start in June 1982.
The Phosphate and Nitrogen Fertilizer Company will continue the realization
of the SAEPA [expansion unknown] proj ect (15. 5 I~ID) and will start work on the ~
new IC [expansion unknown] projects (4 1~ID) and on the project for uranium ex-
traction from phosphoric acid (2 1rID). The SAEPA project will cost a total of ~
82.5 I~ID and includes essentially two units for tr~e production of sulfuric acid
from imported sulfur (990,000 tons per year), two units for the production of
diluted phosphoric acid (330,000 tone per yesr), and one binary fertilizer
unit (330,Od0 tons per year).
A French 220 million franc loan will be used to increase the capacity of the
local phosphate processing industries and to finance the purchase of equipment
for the M'Dilla (Gafsa) phosphate ferti:lizer complex. This complex will in-
clude a sulfuric acid production'unit (1,500 tons~per day using the Heurtey
Industries process), a phosphoric acid productior~ uniC~(480 tons per day using
the Tusinian SIAPE fPhosphoric Acid and Fertilizer Manufacturing Company]
proc ess), and two triple superphosphate production units (672 tons per day
using the SIAPE process). Production is acheduled to start in 1984.
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The realization of a project for the extraction of sulfuric acid and cement
from gypsum and phosphogypsum will start; it will ensure the production of
~ 80,000 tons of sulfuric acid per year and of the same amount of cement. The
plant will be built in Meknassy, will cost 12 1rID and will recycle the residual
_ phosphogypsum from the Gabes and Sfax phosphate processing f acilities.
In the other branches of activity, we should note that BDET and the Italian
group Pirelli have signed an agreement for the realization of a tire factory
_ in M'Saken (Sousse). The project wi.ll have a production capacity of 490,000
units, will cc~sC 35 t~? and must meet 30 ~exGent of the local demand.
A furfural plant--the first of its type in the Arab world--will be btiilt in
Mahdia, and will produce 10 ton~ of furfural per day. Furfural is used for
- tY.e production of synthetic materials, colors and hydraulic alcohol; it is
essentially.produced from spe.nt pomace, almond shel~s and other vegetal
products.
The Central Pharmacy has a 9 I~ID investment pr�ogr~n(Sixth Plan), including 2 NID
- in 1982, f or the expansion of its production line.
= The German company Reifenhauser and SIAPE have signed an.agreement for a
~ plastic bag f actory. The f actory will be built in Mezzouna and will produce
2 million bags per year starting in 1983 (cost: 5 MD).
Textile Industries
,
In 1982, 27 DM were allocated to this sector. Three f ourths of these invest-
ments will be in various activities of the private sector: clothing and
hosiery (9.5 I~ID), spinning, weavi~g and finishing (6 NID), tanning and shoe-
making (4 . 5 r~) .
It is expected that 7 IrID will be devoted to the modernization and optimization
of the equipment of SOGITEX (General Textile Industries Company) subsidiaries.
The World Bank has agreed to give an 18.6 million dollar loan for this project.
In addition, 3.4 IrID will be invested in the expansion and modernization of
SITEX [expansion unknown), and 3.5 Nm in the modernization of the equipment
_ of TISSMOK [expansion unknown], SOMOTEX [expansion unknown] and SITER [expan-
sion unknownJ.
- COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
9294
CSO: 4519/196
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- rvx vrr~~,~wL vvc v~~Lr

~ ~
TUNISIA
~
ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH GULF STATES EXPANDED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1117, 2 Jun 82 pp 53-54 ~
_ [Article by Souhayr Belhassen: "Heading for tYne Gulf"]
[Excerpts] For the period covering the Sixth Plan [1982 to 1986], Tunis is
counting on a total sum of 1.2.billion dinars in Arab~transfers (500 million
in the form of long-term loans, 400 millian in capital market loans and
300 million in joint venture loans). These funds ~ill represent 30 percent
_ of Tunisian foreign capital requirements which are valued for the period
~982 to 1986 at 3.4 b illion dinars, i.e., t-~;ice the amount which had been
obtained during the Fifth Plan. Until now, Arab money has primarily been
invested in banking and touri~sm. Four banks grouping Tunisians and non-
~ Tunisian Arabs exist in the country. A fifth offshore Kuwaiti bank with
14 r~illion dinars in assets opened recently. In the field of tourism, the
- Kuwaitis have invested more than 80 million dinars, not counting the 17
million resulting from a recent agreement fc~r proj~cts in Sousse and Sfax.
= What is new is that today the Arab investors are as equall.y interested in
non-touristic faciliti2s. Among such projects, as diverse as they are ,
- numerous, are the following: a Gabes-Meden:ine railway (20 million dinars),
- telecoTnmtmications and a fishing port in Bizerte (14 million), chemical
- industries (17 million), axpansion of the Tunis-Car~hage airporf:~ etc.
- Mines and agricultural pro~ects themselves attract petrodollars. The Saudis
have participated in financing the Sid~ Saad Dam and in the purification of
- the Lac de Tunis. Abu Dhabi will no doubt contribute tc the expansion of
- the Bizerte petroleum refinery. The tour made by Mohamed Mza'..i in the Gulf
states in March did not merely result in new financial agreements amounting
to some 120 million dinars; rather, it enhanced his public image in the Arab
world. "Tunisia's new orientation," says one Saudi newspaper, "proves that
it is possible to make a suecess of all Arab poli~cies which take into account
the interests of each parCy."
- COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982.
CSO: 4519/207
i
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' YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC
ASSESSMENT, IMPLICATIONS OF VARIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES '
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI.in Arabic No 275, 21-27 May 82 pp 32-34
[Article by Sa'd Zaghlul Fu'ad: "Where Did the Missiles~in the Mountains of Yemen
Come From? The National Democratic Front Facing the Last Choice"]
[Excerpts] The attempt to depict the relatioriship between both parts of Yemen
graphically will inevitably show a line rising, falling and even f%.uctuating.
There are indications, however, albeit unconclusive, that the recent meeting of
, the two presidents in Ta'izz has begun moving~that relationship in the direction
of a straight line. What are these indications? Is it possible to determine the
course of the present stage in a historical perspective? The correspondent of
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in San'a' will try to answer these questions.
The Political Front
During the revolution's battles and the battles that were fought to defend the
- republic, political movements and beliefs became widespread among the vanguard
revolutionary forces until these were ultimately formed into seven political
parties. Five of these parties are Marxist; one is national; and the other is
religious. These parties do in fact exist today even though officially, political
parties are still prohibited by law. But the government is satisfied with a super-
_ ficial application of the law and is preventing [the establishment of] public
_ party centers and newspapers. The government overlooks the actual activities and
the objective prESence of these parties and forces perhaps because they are
_ confined to intellectuals and have not penetrated deeply among the people for
- reasons that have to do with the tribal nature of the people and the high rate of
illiteracy among them. The government may also be overlooking these activities
because it prefers to play it safe; it wants a life of stability, and it wants to
~ provide security.
Individualism in Yemen is synonymous with tribalism. It may be related to the
geography of Yemen, especially in the mountains where if a tribe were to mutiny
because of an obligation to get even, it would seek refuge behind the rocks and
- vegetation and resist in its own way the fiercest of armies. Hence the state
found itself compelled to accept this fact; it did, however, ban Che carrying of
weapons in hospitals, in government offices, in schools and in universities.
Foremost among the Yemeni parties is the Arab Socialist Ba'th party which states:
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_ "Comrephensive Arab unity is the noblest goal of the Arab struggle. It is the
great hope of the masses of our nation. Through unity our independence is streng-
_ thened and our Arab nation acquires actual control over its natural riches and
resources so it can put them to work for comprehensive development in an
intEgrated economy that is based on the masses, that operates in their favor and
that meets the basic needs of the toiling and producing classes. This overall
framework of unity has a social content that clarifies independence, bestows the
principal means of production on the people, brings abou~ ultimate deliverance
from backwardness and builds a united Arab socialist society that is based on
democracy and freedom."
The last one among the parties in Yemen is that of the Muslim Brothers, which is
basically a political party operating in a religious framework. "Islam is a
religion and a state.... It is worship and leadership.... The Koran is our
' constitution, and death for the sake of God is our highest hops." However,
the Muslim Brothers do not have a specific politicai program; nor do they have a
clear economic theory or view. They do not have their own idea of constitutional,
- administrative, political and financial institutions upon which a state can be
built. To them the revealed law of Islam is the most important source of positive
- law. Hence, they are very active in giving religious counsel and urging good
- moral conduct. Recently, on the basis of a religious premise opposing Marxist
atheism they established training camps in the mour~tains for Marxist rebel's, even
though they have not taken part in any battle�so far because the government has
succeeded in paving the way for a solution to the dispute and the achievement of
a national reconciliation. The outcome of that is expected next September along
- with the celebrations for the revolution's 20th anniversary.
,
The following five leftist a~d Marxist parties fall between al-Ba'th party and
the Muslim Brothers: the Revolutionary Democratic party, the Democratic People's
Alliance, the Revolutionary Resistance, the Labor party and the leftist group of
the al-Ba'th party which recently broke with that party and formed another which
it called al-Tali'ah al-Sha'biyah, [the Popular Vanguard]. When national recon-
ciliation is brought about it will be these seven political parties that will
cooperate with the secular and independent elements that are ruling the country
today. All the political and ideological forces and movements will then become
one; [they will work in unison] to overcome backwardness and to build a united
Yemeni society. This will be the society of efficiency and justice that is based
on democracy and self-acting cooperation, as President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih says.
Despite the fact that today political parties are banned by law and confined to
intellectual groups, they represent the political facade of future Yemen whose
purpose is to overcome backwardness and move beyond [the confines of] a tribal
society to become a progressive and a developing society.
Missiles. Where Did They Come From?
Thus despite their diff.erent orientations, the five parties were calling upon
each other to unify their struggle throughout all the stages of tension, anxiety
and dispute. They called for the formation of a national, democratic front that
would include the progressive parties. The function of that front would be to
overthrow any government in the north that would not adopC scientific socialism
and would not achieve unity with the progressive southern portion of Yemen. These
five parties then formed an alliance in the National Democratic Front. Their
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members armed themselves and sought refu~e in the mountains of the central re-
~;ion, especially in the area of (Shar'ab) where they declared their i.nsurrecti.on.
This was how the struggle became an armed struggle. Government forces wer~e able
_ to flush out the insurgents from most of the mountainous central region, and the
signs of danger and factors for a major insurrection began spreading into
neighboring areas and perhaps into the entire Gulf area. Besides, foreign
elements would have been dragged into the situation under the pretext of putCing
out the fires."to protect oil interests and strategic locations."
The government in San'a' was surprised when SAM missiles shot down two MIGs be-
longing to the Yemeni air force. This incident almost broke relations between
both parts of Yemen. Aden was :�uspected of giving the insurgents the Soviet
missiles. Thus Saudis and Yemenis issued their joint threatenino communique sta-
- ting that "Riyadh and San'a' pledge to stand as one against all the clandestine
and public conspiracies that were being contrived to destabilize the area's peace
_ and security, regardless of their source....~The [two countries] pledge to oppose
anyone who tries to infringe upon the unity of the area's soil and the
independence of the area's countries or impose any kind of hegemony or influence
over the area." It was reported that military forces in a state of alert were
being amassed on what was assumed to be the borders between both parts of Yemen. .
The situation was about to explode, and people on all sides held their breath in
anticipation of the impending explosion. However, there were communications
between the two presidents after which they met in Ta'izz between 5 and 7 May,
and [as a result] the fires were put out and serenity was restored. The efforts
of the joint committees that have been working to bring about unity between
San'a' and Aden were stepped up, and it was determined that the Soviet missiles
had come to the insurgents from one of the distant Arab capitals. Aden closed its
borders to the insurgents, or it promised it would, and it promised it would
support the efforts of San'a' to achieve independence in the north part of Yemen.
The Proletarian State
At the same time President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih made it possible for the National
Democratic Front to turn over its weapons, and he appealed to its members "to
- assume their positions among the masses in the course of the revolution and the
quest for democracy to build a new Yemeni society, a society of progress,
efficiency and justice."'The National Dialogue Committee in San'a' stepped up its
_ contacts with its leaders to prepare for the popular elections during which the
people will elect their representatives to the General People's Congress which
will be held in the next few months. The proposed National Charter will be
presented to that congress for ratification. That charter will be tantamount to a
_ national action program during the coming period for all the national forces in
Yemen, including the five parties of the National Front.
One of the uncommon qualities of the ideological struggle in Yemen lies in the
fact that one of the intellectuals of the front described the old Yemeni society
,of the Sabaean state as a society of slaves. He was being consistent with the
- Marixst materialistic interpretation of history, beginning with.the primitive
state of collective ownership, the age of slavery, the age of feudalism, the age
of capitalism and the society of scientific socialism. An independent writer
replied~[to that statement and said], "The title or name he gave to the system of
the Sabaean state is inconsequential. This system of slavery produced a civilized
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city, and anything that will produce a civilization benefits people and the
state. If ~he purpc~e [here is to state that] scien.tific socialism is the highest
form of cultural evolution because it is based on a collective system and that
the power ~nd accomplishments of scientific socialism under the leadership of the
proletariat, that is the workers, as was the system of the Sabaean state, are
derived from cooperation and the collective participation of ~the people in
completing~�public projects, then the people of Yemen in the Sabaean state did
constitute a class of toilers, that is, a proletariat who were under the aware
leadership of a monarch. By comparing the time difference between the age of
Sabea in khe eighth century B.C. and our present age with regard to workers'
wages and ~living conditions, it becomes evident that the toilers who worked on
the Ma'rib Dam, for example, after the harvest did so to comply with the king's
orders. Thousands of them would be rounded up and put to work to build a dam, dig
a canal or build a road, a city or a temple. The state would take care of their
food ~and their drink. Thus came about a spiri*. of civilization and cooperation in.
building this city. It was done by a cooperative society with the least cost and
with no foreign loans and aid. Those toilers from the proletariat of Sabaea were
satisfied with a few thousand camels, cows and sheep that were slaughtered to
feed them, and they were satisfied with a few thousand sacks of� dates, flour,
shortening and oil. With such modest provisions they were able to build an urban
city that they are still proud of, a city whose memory is everlasting. However,
we the Yemenis of this age have received hundreds of millions in assistance and
in loans after the revolution, but these have had no commensurate effect in
developing our economy. We are sti11 asking for more, and we are still backward
because we have lost the spirit of civilization which our Sabaean forefathers had.
Two Objectives, Two Targets
In less than 1 month San'a' hit the target twice in the political arena. The
first time was when it received former Syrian president, Amin al-Hafiz, semi-
officially thereby blocking the Syrian regime's attempts to extend its influerice
into the moutains of Yemen. The second time San'a' hit the target was when it
pulled the rug from under the National Democratic Front when it staged an
expanded, large and official Labor Day celebration an 1 May. That celebration was
= attended by the president. There were processions that included more than 1
million workers who make up the newborn class of workers who were urged by
President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih to form their general federation expeditiously.
Workers had worked last year on forming their associations whose processions
joined the parade grounds on the morning of 1 May in San'a'. There were official
Labor Day celebrations also on a small scale in the remaining provinces and
principal cities. In his speech to the workers assembled on the parade grounds
the president of Yemen w~nted to proclaim the country's willingness to let by-
gones be bygones with the ~emocratic Front and to look forward to the future, if
the members of the front were to join the march for revolution and the quest for
- democracy and work on buildin~, tomorrow's advanced society.
Unity through Dialogue
Some people are saying that in addition to the pacts and agreements that exist
between tlie two parts of Yemen, such as the Cairo Agreement, the Tripoli Pact and
the Kuwait Agreement, the Ta'izz meeting outlined a new framework for the
relationship between the two Yemens. Both t}~e meeting and the agreements led the
~ 1t1
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presidents of both Yemens to form a council that would work for unity. In addi-
tion, constitutional, economic and cultural unity committees were formed. A con-
stitution of unity will be presented to the people at the next people's congress
- which is expected to be held in the next few months.
So far, the two presidents of Yemen have held six summit meetings; these were
. held in San'a', Aden and Ta'izz. If unity is achieved, it will have been achieved
by democratic dialogue and objective principles.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
8592
CSO: 4404/491 END ~
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