JPRS ID: 10393 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 39
• Content Type: REPORTS

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- JPRS L/ 10393 ~
- ~6 March 1982 ~
Sub-Saharan Afroca R~ ort
p
~FOU'0 No. 766)
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JPRS L/10393
16 March 1982
SUB-S~4HARAN AFRiCA REPORT
(~'OUO Nd. 7 6 6 ~
CONTENTS .
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
UDEAC Summit Concludes, Problems Remain
(Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 6 Jan 82) 1
ANGOI~A
Savimbi Ties, Vi sit to Morocco Attacked
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 1 Feb 82) .............o..................... 4
Brief s ~
Production of Construction Materials 6
. Phosphate Mining Complex t~
Angonave Activity 6
Benguela Meat Shortage (i
~ CAPE VERDE
Briefs .
- Swedish Aid 7
GHANA
Post-Coup Climate of Fe~, Uncertain+.,y iVoted
(MARCHES TROPICAUR ET MEDT.'rERR,ANEENS, 22 Je,n 82) 8
GUINEA BISSAU
Brief s
Relations With Portugal Normalized 10
Foreign Trade i~ 1981 10 �
IVORY COAST
Additional Port Facilities Opened to Petroleum Operators
(MARCHE3 TROPICAUX ET MEDITER,RANEFNS, 12 Feb 82) 11
- a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
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y MOZAMBIQUE .
Brie f s
, Wheat S~lf-Sufficiency Envis3.oned 12
Public Works Projects 12
- Construction Difficulties 12
~ Camera Surveillance S~stem Planned . ~ 13
Nat~onal P~.an for 1982 13
SENEGAI~lBIA
Paxtisan, Compartmentalized Nature of Press Noted
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 6 Jan 82) 1Lt
SIERRA LEONE
Nation Seeks Ways To Avoid Major Economic Crisis
(Patrick Anelli; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERR.~NEEATS,
29 Jan 82) 16
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
UDEAC SUI~SIT CONCLUDES, PROBLEMS REMAIN ~
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1096, 6 Jan 82 pp 54-55
[Article by Siradiou Diallo: "A Common Market~2:ot Possible?"]
[Text] Having stayed away from the Union for the last 13 ;ears,
Chad retarns ~to the fold. But the problems remain the same
_ af~ter the summit _neetin.g in Libreville. ~ ~ .
~c is henceforth traditional that Christmas ev~ in Central Africa brings the annual
sumiait meeting of thP Customs and E~onomic LT~ion of .Central Africa (UDEAC) . The
year 1981 was no exception ~to the rule. By virtue of the rule of al.ternating, this
year it was the turn of Libre~~ille (Gabon) to host from 17-19 December the~ l7th
summit of this sub-regional organization whose members include Cameromn, Central
: African Republic, Congo, and Ga~~n.
It wae ac once apparent, however, that the Libreville meetings were going to stray
from the beaten pazh, and that a truly new orientation was in the off ing; not
because of any t~-nics included on the agenda, since, as usual, they had to do
mainly with technical issues: the harmonizing taxation and statiatical data, the
improvement of ~ommunications, the creation ~f a school of broadcast engineering
in Libreville, etc.
At f irst glance, the new direction could be ascertained from the number and rank
of the observers se:~c to attend this summit: seven nations (Angola, Equatorial
Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Rwax~da, Chad, Zaire, and Burundi), the first six
which were represented.by their heads of state. A l~st of dignitaries to which
it is fitting to add the secretary general of the Organization for African Uni.ty,
Edem Kod~o, and the executive sec:retary of the Afr3can Economic Commission, abebayo
Adede~ i.
It so~n became clear that not all had trave~ed to Libreville to do sightseeing or
to remain paesive. Thus it was �that Chad, wt~:ich had def initively walked of the
UDEAC 13 years ago, announced through its spokesperson, Goukouni Weddeye, that it
intended to return to the fold--before the next Yaounde su~t; since, as the
president of the Transitional National Union ~~~ernment (GUNT) was to point out,
"We do not wish to return here merely as observers." It is trus that in spite of
their internal problems the leaders from N'Djamena do not int~end to reclaim their
seat in the Union unless certain problema are solved beforehand, the very problema
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that had originally caused them to walk out: notably, the fact that the three
coastal states o� Cameroon, Congo, and Gabon refused to grant a real and consistent
compensation to the two inland and thereby less industrialized states of Chad and
the Central African Republic.
- There is reason to believe that, with time, Chad's wishes will be granted. At any
rate, there is no lack of willingness to bring about solutions acceptable to a11
parties. The concerned ministers have taken over the case. With the help of ex-
perts, they can scarcely avoid f inding solutions either concerning better
operational procesiures for the Solidarity Fund, or adjustments in the single-tax
system, or modifications of the investment code. For Chad, as well as for the
Central African Republic for that matter, it means making sure that UDEAC benefits
more tham ~ust the coastal nations and that in the future there will be a more
equitable distribution of advantages coming out of the integration efforts.
Of the seven observers present in Libreville, only Chad had come with the f irm
intention of again.making UDEAC an instrument for subregional cooperation. The
other six were intent on going beyond that framework, even on expanding it to
include the entire region. In the manner of the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), which brings together West African countries regardless of politi-
cal or linguistic differences, what needs to be done is to build an equivalent
organi~ation in Central Africa. And, concerning this sub~ect, th~ Libreville
summit seems to have taken a decisit~e step forward, since the declaration signed
by the 11 participants is unambiguous. It makes a solemn commitment to implement
whatever is necess~.ry to institute an Economic Community of Central African States.
A similar perspective to what was includ~d in the Lagos plan of action (Apri1, 1980)
wauld endow Central Africa with a market of some 60 million consumers, which, given
the small size of the states and even of the entire UDEAC which has a population
of only 12 million, would be a more efficient setup. The Community would allow a
better development of the region's natural resources, while facilitating optimal
industrial production and better-planned development of transportation.
This ~point has not as yet been reached. UDEAC has not succeeded, 17 years after
its creation, in promoting a true economic union. As3de from petroleum products
and cement, the trade volume within the region has increased only modestly. Trade
between member countries accounts for only about 5 percent of the Union's total ~
. exports. Numerous studies.have been done and proposals made with an eye to dis-
tributing industries over the diff erent countries. Under such plans, Cameroon
would specialize in bauxite and aluminum, Gabon in petrochemicals and cement,
_ Congo in chemicals, and the Central African Republic in pharmaceuticals and
clock-making. But not one of these multinational projects has as yet been realized.
Similarly, in the f ield of transportation, a plan had been drawn up to build
connecting roads in order to tie all the member countries into the Lagos-LMu:mba.sa
Trans-African Road whose pro~ected route goes through Bangui. A railway ir;~m
Banqui to the Atlantic, to be tied into the Trans-Gabonese, was declared to be a
high-priority cooperative project. And the creation of a multinational freight and
coastal navigation company was proposed. But in these cases as wel.l, all tnese
plans remain slumbering in the f iles of administrations.
, Ta overcome the hurd~es erected by lack of funds, an institution, the Development
Bank of the Central African States (BDEAC), was founded. Its headquartera are
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located in Brazzaville. But heretofore it has been able to play only a marginal
role in crenting cooperative projects. Thus it is that from 1978 to 1981 the total.
value of the projects which it f inanced comes out to only 5.47 billion CFA francs,
as compared to investment budgets which for 1980 alone add up to 57 billion CFA
f rancs for Cameroon, 71 billion for Congo, and 5.5 billion for the Central Af riCar~;
Republic.
Under these conditions, ob~ections will be made, how can UDEAC, itself, unable to
get going in spite of the many affinities which unite its members, claim to be aUle
to motivate a larger and thereby more heterogeneous community? In the opinion of
the experts of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), extending cooperation to
all the states in the region is perfectily feasible. In order to do this, they
recommend taking the initial step of restructuring UDEAC and beginning negotiations
between the organiaation and the varioua countries. These negotiations, having to
do with jo3nt projects, should strengthen the production capacities af each and
~ allow a fairer distribution of the benefits of integration.
Zaire is already weaving close ties with most of UDEAC's members. And the Chamber
- for Compensation and Payments of Cer?tral Africa, created recently, can only further
exchanges between these countries. As long as there exists a~rue political will,
_ the management will fall in line. And Central Africa, having enormous natural
resources at its disposal, will in the years.to come be able to live up to the
expectations of the Lagos plan of action whose implementation wi11 be setting
forth the conditions for the development of the continent.
� COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981. .
9847
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- ANaOLA
SAYII+IBI TIFS, VISIT TO MOROCCO ATTACKED
- Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in F~ench No 258, 1~'eb 82 p 19
- /~Unatbributed articlet "The Savimbi Shox in Rabat"
~
/-Text 7 The flower of x~at Portugal hae in the ray of reactionary ~ournal-.
~sts was invitfld to Rabat, in mid-January, Yor a pre~s conference on...lingo-
la. On the ehox program Jonae 3e~vimbi in peraon. The cdrrespoadent of a
Liebon rightist weekly, TIIdFO, xas there, ~rith aa ~ bo~ua, the promise of
- an ezclusive interview ~?ith tk~e ~ngolan traitor. Aa pramised and due, it
did take place,.but 3 days later than planned, Pretorie~e puppet having
_ shut himself in for a lengtY~y meeting slane xith Hasaaa II in the royal
palace at Marrakeah. ~
"Hia Ma~esty," euplained a t1NITA spokesman to th~ TII~D ~ournaliat, anever
lets slip an~opportunity to liaten at length to~3avimbi diecouraing on in-
ternational politice, eapecially African problema.~~
It is a fact that the honeynwon is on b~twesn Ii~asan and Savimbi, Who was
received in the Moroccan capital xith full honoras armored Olden?obi].e,
luxurious auite at the Rabat ~hellah...at the king'8 e~cpense, the ~ournalist
apecified. llnd he added that to make up for the ~rait, Savin4bi auggsated
- t,alcing hitn back to Lisbon himaelt, in hia pr~vate ~et.
Fearleea of ridicule, TII~O quotea the Angolan traitor~a remarke about the
reaaons purportedly motiv~tir~ M~orocco'a eupport of UNITAt Haasan II hopea
- that vith 3avimbi in poxer, ~ngola would en~oy...Qrmater religioua freedom,
_ which xould allow Islam to sprend in that country(aic)....
- The Yact that Morocco ahould be ths laat country in Africe atill gr~nting
direct and open aid to UNITA -,eapecially after the defection of Senegal,
Which ia nox normalizing relatiQUa with Angola - oannot cane as a aurprise
when one ia axare of the strengtheniug of tieo betxesn Rabat and Waohington,
vital tiea for the aharifian re~ime. It is ot couree oa 1i11tehin~ton indead
~ thst Ii~saan II is counting for military aasiatance, the oaly meana oP pre-
" venting collapae in the Sahara.
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In the palace at M~arrakesb, the txo men ~uat hsve been re~oicing in uniaon
over Waahingtoa's increased aggreaaiveaeea iu the dafense of imp~rialiat
interests in ~t'rica. After the defeat oY aiacard in France, all their hopes
had been concentr~?ted on the White Houae. Dsclaring h3maelf tully eatisfied
With the reaulte of his recent visit to Washington, 3avimbi did, ho~ever,
regret that the Clark au~endu~nt Dad not yet bean aboliahied....
On the other hand, he clearly showed his displeasur~ xith the attitude of tbe
Portugueae government, ia which he nevertheleaa has many ~riends. Yortugal
has not ofPicial~jr talcen aay ateps in hia favor, and that ie primarily be+~.
- cause oY President Taaea' etubbornaeae. The ~ngolan baadit'e blackmail, in
threatening to kill the Portugue8e priassner~ civiliana captured b~r tha
Kwachas in the South did indeed aot eucceed.in modityin~ (3eneral Banea'
attitude.
Hence the charm cainpaign be~ore the Portugueae ~ournaliats in R,abat, to whom
he announced the unco~ditional relaaee of the 28 priaoaera. Oace again, aYs
uzieuccesaful maneuvez~, eince the Portuguese pre~ideat hae 3ust declared fala~
the nexa that there l~iad been a~a~~ting betveen UNITA and repreaeatatives o~
the govertu~ent in Luanda under tk~e auspicee of the Portugueae authorities.
No meeting of the eort ~rill take place, ae Bauea xell knovs, and he seems to
share I;uanda~a viexs in aeaerting to hi~ entourage that tha Angolaa problean
- is not one of nnational reconciliation." Iadeed, the American campaign can-
not mislead thi8 man, Who knoxa perYeatly vell who Savi~abi xae even before
he threw himse~f body arid soul in vith the South AiPric~n raci~ts. He knoxa
in detail the persor?al hietory of the man Who used to vork Yor the faeciat
Portugueae aolonial army, a~ainst tha MPLA'a Aagolan nationaliste a- ar~d that
mair~y yeare before 25 April.
In June 1974, AFRIQUE-A3IF published aa a xorldvide excluaive, eelections
from the vast correapondence betxeen the traitor Savimbi and the fascist
authoritiea, includin~ Caetano himself. Edifying selectione~ ~hich defini-
tively put the fin~ehing touchea on Savimbi'a partrait aad his role in the
national liberation struggle.
1211~9
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ANGOLA
~ BRIEFS
PRODUCTION OF CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS--Production in Angola's construction materials
- industry improved during 1981 compared to the previous year but only 48 percent of
- the installed capacity was used. Aguiar Martino, denuty minister of construction,
~ said recently that the main cancern of his department was to make the plants as pro-
fitable as possible and to introduce the required technology which will help to meet
the needs of the country. Alsc, production difficulties are often the result of fre-
quent electrical power outages and this is particularly true of cement production.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAU% ET MEDITERRANEEN~ in k'rench No 1:888, 15 Jan 82
p 159J [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796
PHOSPHATE MINING COI~LEX--The mining complex of Kindonacoxa, in the Province of
Zaire, was inaugurated last 11 November as part of,the celebrations to mark the 6th
anniversary of independence. The complex was created as par�~ of a coaperation agree-
; ment signed with Bulgaria. It has~capacity to produce 15,000 tons of ground phos-
phates a year; the complex cot.sists of a strip mine, a treatment plant and infra-
structures comprising a repair shop, a diesel power plant, tanks to store gasoline
and lubricants and a building for offices and living accommodations.' f.'i'ext] [Paris
' MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANTEENS in French No 1888, 15 Jan 82 p 15~] [COPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796 ,
ANGONAVE ACTIVITY--The Angolan national shipping company ANGONAV~~ has recently de-
cided to expand its regular service between the northern cantizient and Angola by
calling on French ports. It should be noted ahat ANGONAVE operatea a regular ser-
vice between the five Angolan pozts of Cabinda, Soyo, Luan~a, Lobito and Mocamedes
transporting ordinary and container freight. At the end of October, a first vessel,
the Ludonge, was assigned to serve the French ports (tf~ey will be two ports on the
Atlantic and North Sea coasts) which axe scheduled tr, be chosen later. [Text]
~ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in Fren~�h No 1888, 15 Jan 82 p 159]
[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 879F
BENGUELA MEAT SHORTAGE--The Benguela ProvincF needs at least 185 tons of ineat per
month. But the DINAPROPE [National Cattle Producta Distributiag Company], a spe-
cialized company for marketing and supply, could only provide 500 tona during the
, firs* 8 months of 1981. The drought anr: a scarcity of the barter gooda wanted.by
~ the stockbreeders (mostly light motorr_ycles, radios and bicycles) gre the reason
~ for the gap between needa and suppli_es. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDI-
TERRANEENS in French No 1888, 15 .,Tan 82 p 159] [COPYRIGIiT: Rene Moreux et Cie
Paris 1982] 8796
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CAPE VERDE
~ ~ B.RTEFS . ~
SWEDISH AID--Official sources said on 13 Januarq in Praia-that, during the 1982-
_ 83 period, Swedish aid to Cape Verde will amount to approzimately 40 million kronor
(same amount in French francs).� Cooperation between these two countries started
in 1975 when urgent aid was grat.ted to help the newly independent Cape Verde
deal with a difficult situation. Between 1979~ and 1981, Sweden provided 140 million
- kronor to Cape Verde in the form of 6ilateral aid. [T~t] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS in Frencfi No 1889, 22 Ja~n 82 p 196] ~COPYRIGHT:
Rene l~breux et Cie Paris 1~82, ] g7~6
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' GHANA
POST-COUP~ CLIMATE ~F FEAIt, UNCERTATNTX NOTED
Paris MARCHES TROPTCAUX E'T MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1889, 22 Jan 82 p 200
[TextJ For Captain Rawlings and his team, the Provisional National Defense
Council, taking over the destiay of Ghana ia once more proving to be a difficult
task.
Early this week, only 7 out of the intended 11 members of the council had been
appointed and the government, which that council is supposed to sponsor, was yet to
b e formed.
According to some ~ources, m4re and more questiona are being ra~ed in the West
concerning the ro~e that Libya may have played in the coup and that country!s in-
fluence over the new leaders.
Also, ac�cording to some eyewitness accounts, the recent events caused mpre
' hlod.dshed than it was originally reported and several t~undreds of people are said
to have '~~een kill~d. The figure of 700 casualties ~was even mentioned, Z+bre exe-
cutions r;re said to have ti.een carried out in a more or less sua~ary fashion by a
badly controlled army and by.people's tribunals.
~
In the economic sphexe, the situation is taking a turn for the worae. The chief
of staff, who is in charge of defense within the council, admits that the situa-
tion is "very bad" and even thinks that the measures adopted regarding banking,
mainly curtailing cash withdrawals and freezing some accounts, have had disastrous
consequenees for business and fo~c companies. Imposing price controls which are
difficult to enforce has already had the same eff ect as in 1979 of making consumer
goods even more scarce. As for nwbilizing young people and students to transport
; th e cocoa crop from the f ields, it could become an ineff ectual operation due to the
; lack of iner~ns and to the very bad condition of the roads.
' In any case, Ghana is now living in a state of uncertainty and even in a climate
of fear which gives ground for the neighboring countries to worry about their
~ own future. Libya is sa3.d to have supplied the Ghanaian Army with allegedly
~ defe,.r~sive weapons to forestall a foreign aggression.
~ Meanwhile, Captain Rawlings, who was very much in the limelight after hia f irst
coup'd�etat, has hardly appeared in public since the last one and this atti:.ude
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of relative self-effacement also gives rise to questioning. The boieterous demon-
strations of support for the young of~icer ~made by some sectors of the populatt.ion
could have been partly orchestrated. Certainly, not everybody is pleased with the
return of the military even if, this time, they are trying to surround th~nselves
with civili~ns. For instance, the group formed by the associations of lawyers,
doctors and engineers which had wozked fiard to establish a civilian regime recently
called for that regime to be restc~red as soon as possible. Will Captain Rawlings
heed their request? One can hope that he will do so but, for the tirae being,
it is hard to see when and how.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.
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GUINEA BISSAU
HRIEFS
RELATIONS WITH PORTUGAL NORMALIZED--The heads of state of Portugal and Guinea
Bissau, Gen Antonio Ramallio Eanes and Gen Bernardo Vieira, will hold talks
shortly either in Hissau or in Lis~ion. This meeting, taking place at the initia-
tive of the African head of state, will ~ie the first between the two presidents
since the Guinea Hissau coup d'etat of 14 November 1980. Since General Vieira
came to power, high level contacts Tietween Portugal and its former colony have
been practically broken off, ~he release, on ~last. 30 Dece~nber, of former Presi-
dent Luis Cabral who had li.een under fiouse arrest since the coup and on whose be-
half General Eanes had interceded, fias remove3 the last obstacle to a normaliza-
tion of relations between the two countries. jText] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1883, 22 Jan 82 p 196] jCUPYRTGflT: Rene Moreux et
Cie Paris 1982;] 8796
FOREIGN TRADE TN l~$1--According to the latest report issued by the Ministry of
Commerce, during the first 6 months of 1981, egports from Guinea Bissau totaled
279.3 million pesos (Fr 43 million) while its imports represented 1,016 billion
pesos (.Fr 155 million). Sea food tops the list of esports with 133.2 million
pesos followed by agricultural products C~4.3 million), industrial goods (31.1
million) and timber ~19.4 million~. 9pain was Guinea Bissau's main customer
fol~.owed by Senegal for Africa and China for Asia. In the chapter on imports,
foodstuffs are at t:he top of the l~.st for the first 6 months of 1981, followed by
manufactured goods. Portugal was ~uinea Bissau's main supplier ahead of Sweden.
Senegal heads the list of suppliers from Africa, China from Asia and the United
States from America. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET l~'DITERRANEENS in French
No 1889, 22 Jan 82 p 196] jCOPYRTGHT: Rene I~breux et ~Cie Paris 1.982.] 8796
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IVORY COAST
ADDITIONAL PORT FACILITIES OPENED TO PE~'ROLEUM OPERATORS
' Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS in French 12 Feb 82 p 390 ~
[Excerpts] On 29 January, Maritime Affairs Minister Fadika Lamine presided at
the inauguration of an offshore base for petroleum operators. The contractor,
Socopao CI [not expanded], has leased from the port about 4 ha on which, in
addition to its garage and'ship repair slips, it is constructing: a mezal,
timber-lined pier of 100 m, to b~-. extended to a length of 150 m, draught~7 m,
and load capacity 6 tons per cubic meter; clearing behind the pier an area for
pipe racks storage; constructing warehor.~ses and offices for the operators and
their subcontractors, providing storage for drilling materials (mud, barite,
bentonite, etc); building a heliport for liaison with platforms.
The minister and the port recently granted Socopao an additional 3 ha for build-
ing rear base sheds for subcontractors, who already have facilities for mooring
auxiliary ships, tending them for servicing the fresh-water platforms, 25-50
ton cranes for loading, etc.
The base, which operators consider provides first-rate services, is opened to
all comr.anies interested in petroleum research in ivory Coast, for as long as
desired. For example, Phillips, which built its own base, regularly uses the
Socopao base for facilitating the work of its supply-boats.
The installation can accommodate simultaneously, 6 auxiliary ships and provide
a storage area of 5 ha and 7,500 m2 of warehouse space. The cost of Socopao CI's
investment is about l.l billion CFA francs.
_ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
CSO: 4719/611 '
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1~OZAi~IQUE
BRIEFS
WHEAT SELF-SUFFIC~fi1GY ~NVTSTONED--M~ozamhique is planting experimental wheat crops
sponsored by the FAO. Yields of 3 ton~ ppr hectare have been obtained despite the
fact that not all cultivation rulea were strictly observed. Some 50 tons of the
Helena European v~riety were planted in the ~cegions of Moamba, Rai-Xai, Venduzi,
Angonia and Matama. Other varieties, probably Mexican ones, could be t~ied out;
they are said to be ~ietter suited to the country's ecological eonditions. Based on
these experimenY~s, 10 years from noar, Mozambique hopes to be able to produce about
150,000 tons of wheat per year which is what it requires to satisfy its needs.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAU% ET MEDTTERRAhEENS in French No 1889, 22 Jan 82
p 215] [COPYRIGHT: Rene I~oreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 8796 .
PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS--The Tamega Conatruction Company is doing construction work
- costing more than 1 million contos in the M~ozambique Provinces of Maputo, Gaza,
Nampula and Cabo Delgado. Some of these pro~ects are: lengthening the main runway
at Mavalane International Airport~~in Maputo, 5uilding an ir~igation system in
Gaza, building a plant for the T~QUE ITextiles of Mozambique] eompany in
- Nanpula, building a road between Diaca and Oasse and other roadworks (in Maputo,
the Julius Nyerere Avenue and the access to Ponta do Ouro; repair work on the
Mapapa-Chokwe road and on the Chicumbane-Xai Rai road). [T~ct] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1889, 22 Jan 82 p 215] (CAPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 8746
CONSTRUCTION DIFFICULTIES--The Constructd.na Integral de Nampula (CINAP), a Mczam-
bique building and public works company which employs 1,800 people, will not be
able to meet its production targets for 1~81. During the first 9 months of the
year, many construction ~obs were not completed on schedule because the company
failed to receive in time some of the imported f ittings it required�or the blue,
prints for some of the ~obs it was assigned to do. The company was working at 40
buildin~ sites which included housing accommodation in teachers' training centers;
a development of 40 fiouses in Nampula; substatione for.the powerline of Nacala,
Nbr.apo and Nampula; maintenance work on 1,900 kms~of roads Eout of the 3,800 l~s
required to transport farm producta) some of which had not been repaired since
1975. In 198'2, the work achedule oi CINAP will be lighter and more realistic; road
maintenance work, among other things, will iie assigned to a apecial department of
th e Ministry of Public Works and Housing. jText] jParis MARCHES TROPICAUR ET
MEDIT'ERRANEENS in French No 1889, 22 Jan 82 p 215] jCOPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et
Cie Paris 1982.] 8796 '
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- CAMERA SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM PLANNED--The Ministry of Security of the People's
Republic of Nbzambique plans to purchase and install very shortly a system of
- microwave cameras in the countrq's ma~or towns. The purpose of this system is to
keep certain public areas (squares, streets and so on) under survei].lance and,
therefore, the system will Be connected t~ a television central post. The came~S~
w311 be equippe~d with a sound recording system. The Ministry of Security also wants
a videa recording system with multiple display so the picture can be slowed down
and stopped. Finally, it would like to obtain all technical details on how to
operate the suggested equipment. Firms who may be interested are invited to give
their names to the CFCE [Council of Commercial Federations of Europe] (Tel
505-33-22, Mrs Debien) and, also contact the commercial attache of the French
Embassy. [Text~ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANi~ENS in French No 1889,
22 Jan 82 p 215J jCOPYRTGAT: Rene'M~oreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 8796
NATIONAL PLAN FOR 1982--A 24.5 percent increase in industrial production is one of
the targets set by the 1982 annual national plan recently adopted by the Mozambique
Assembly. The plan, enacted on 1 January, also envisages a 36 percent rate of
growth in the agricultural sector and emphasizes the development of transportation
with, among other things, a 25 percent expansion in rail transportation and 60 per-
cent in sea transportation. In the education sphere, the authorities are hoping.
to teach a total of between 400,000 and 600,000 people (the population of Mozam-
bique ~s estimated to be 10 million inhabitants) to read and write and to provide
- them with an education. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEEITS in
French No 1888, 15 Jan 82 p 159] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796
CSO: 4719/507
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SENEGAMBIA
PARTISAN, COMPARTMENTALIZED NATURE OF PRESS NOTEll ~
Paris JEUNE AFR':QUE in French No 1096, 6 Jsn t32 p 11
[Text] Bara Diouf, director general of the Senegale~e nt~tional daily LE SOLEIL,
complains that his newapaper seems to have reached its circulation ceiling. Up to
a point, it is a victim of democracy. The Senegalese press offers a rich abundance
of publications which, unfortunately, cannot be listed in any serious survey be-
~ cause irreg;slarity is the rule with regard to periodicals, with the only exceptions
heing LE SULEIL, ZONE 2(a weekly sports magazine) and AFRIQUE NOWELLE (a weekly
- devoted ta west Africa).
Apart from a few publications such as AFRIQUE NOUVELLE, AFRIQUE TRIBUNE and LE POL-
ITICIEN, this press is partisan and compartmentalized into as many political par-
ties as can be found in Senegal. There is a histor3cal reason for this situation
which is common to all of Africa. Under colonial rule, newspapers (often clandes-
tine) were often the only vehicle far political ideas. When independence came,
most of the countries were ruled b}r single parties which, to establish their auth-
ority, monopolized the right to speak. This was. never the case in Senegal, proof
of it being that the oppos3.tiori parties which were not recognized--and were, there-
fore, underground parties--until 1981, were still able to develo~~ openly through
the mere voice af the press. This is what happened with the RND (National Democrat-
ic Rally) which has always expressed its views through its daily TAXAW. .The same
is true of the political trends that were to give rise to the 1~IDP (Democratic and
Popular Movement) and to the PIT (Independence and Labor Party) and wh~ch achieved
recognition through ANDE SOPT. �
The contents, ;rguments and practices of the Senegalese press are determined by
this almost general affiliation to political factions. Offering some slight differ-
ences, AFRIQUE NOUVELLE, AFRIQUE TRIBUNE and LE SOLEIL are practically the only ve-
hicles of information even though LE SOLEIL is openly progovernment. The other
publicatons give the general tone of the press which is violent and thundering, at
times even inordinately polemic. LE POLITICIEN--a satirical publication "appearing
regularly though unexpectedly"--launches its attacks on all directiona but, one
must say, it offers the advantage of being g~nerally well informed. L'UNITE leads
the fight on behalf of the Socialist Party (in power) loudly assieted by CAAXAN
FAAXEE, mouthpiece of the socialist youth. On the opposite side stand a11 the oth-
er publications attacking the government and, at the same time, vigorously denounc-
ing one another; they are ANDE SOPI and TAXAW, of course, and also JAAY DOOZE BI
(THE PROLETARIAN) which resorts to a verbal violence anly matched by C~.AXAN FAAXEE.
. ~ ll~ ~
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This daliberate choice of verbal sparring actually reflects the temperament of the r
Senegalese people who love to speak and engage in polemics. But it has disastrous
consequences for the newspapers and readers: ihe factions are so divided along the
lines of the parties that only people who are already convinced read their respective
pap~:rs.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 19$1.
- 8796
CSO: 4719/507
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SIERRA LEONE
~
NATION SEEKS WAYS TO AVOID MAJOR ECONOMIC CRISIS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Jan 82 pp 241-246
[Article by Patrfck Anelli]
[Text~ Sierra Leone is an English-speaking country of ~oderate size located in the
West African F~uhreqion and surraunded by Guinea and Liberia. Except for a brief
period ~n 196~, before President Siaka Stevens came to power, it has so far experi-
enced a political life free~of military coups. The regime's progress through the
stage of dominant party to that of a sinqle party (the All People's Congress [APC])
ia 1978 has not been able to stem cabinet crises revealing the tribal tensions and
political opposition existing within the regime. ~
The events of last summer and the proclamation of a 6-month state of emergency* on
2 September have left observers puzzled as to the future of a country that has been
compared with no hesitation to neighboring Liberia and the tragic fall of President
Tolbert in April 1980.
Despite a serious recovery effort, Sierra Leone is in a tricky situation on the macro-
economic level. The burden of external debt and the unsatisfactory results obtained
from the praductive apparatus make it a"disaster area" highly dependent on national
and international silent partners for carrying out its in~~estments.
- The macroeconomic situation is in sharp contrast to the wea~.thy status of certain
individuals, leading one t~ think that it is possible to make a fair profit and grow
rich in Sierra Leone. While it is easy to identify the few~enterprises shawing satis-
factory results, it is ~more di~ficult to estimate the extent of the underground econ-
omies that suppor.t the country,at a different tempa.
Strong Presidency
7.'he regime's hardening attituc~e, strengthened by the praclamation of the state of
emergency, should not delude anyone: despite the movement taward an authoritarian
presidential system since 1978, Sierra Leone's British-inspired political system re-
mains based on parliamentary constitutional foundations.
~ * See MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 4 Septeniber 1981, p 2279.
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Follawinq a referendum in 1978, the APC became the only party recognized by the con-
stitution. and in effect, the other political groups became illegal. Despite the con-
centration of pawer in the hands of the chief of state, who is head of the government,
commander in chief of the armed forces, and chancellor of the university, as well as
the very acute vassalization of the senior administration, the political system has
not been able to eliminate all opposition, which exists even within the single p~rty.
The party includes groups with various leanings, among them the members of Paxliamen~
from the former SLPP (Sierra Leone People's Party), ~vho joined the new majority in
1978.
The legal m~chanisms governing succession in case of the president's absence present
a number of political problems. In such cases, the incumbent vice president swears
to uphold the constitution, arid his exercise of the country's highest office gives
him access to the highest responsibilities in the financial area (commitments regard-.
ing the state guarantee) and in the use of the armed forces and the police.
In other respects, the most important government decisions must be approved in advance
by the cabinet ("cabinet conclusio~ns") at a meeting presided over by the chief of
state. Those decisions are confidential and secret and are not the subject of any
. statement or publication at the conclusion of the cabinet meeting. This concentra-
tion of economic and financial power clogs the cabinet's agenda and is the cause of
- a slawdown in administrative action. The phenomenon has worsened since 1980, the
year in which the chief of state was chairman of the OAU and foreign problems occu-
pied a preponderant place in the cabinet meetings.
Cabinet posts are distributed with scrupulous attention to the majority's various
ethnic components. Since the dismissal of certain ministers in 1981, their port-
folios (energy and pawer, interior, and development and economic planning) have de-
volved upon the president himself, the first vice president, and the minister of fi-
nance, thus reinforcing the concentration of power.
As he had previously announced on several occasions, President Stevens las~~ October
confirmed his intention to withdraw from public affairs following the legislative
elections. It is difficult to foresee at present who the regime's new strong man
will be, but it is certain that succ~ssion to the office of chief of state remains
the main political problem of the moment.
In foreign policy, Sierra Leone has sought to strengthen economic ties with its
neighboring countries. Establishment of the Mano River Union with Liberia in 1976
and its extension to include Guinea in 1981 reflect the objective of forming a union
in politics and defense despite disat~reements of a linguistic nature, even if a long
period of mature deliberation is required before that economic union's achievements
see the light of day.
The influence of President Stevens has made itself felt in all the countries of West
Africa through the regional committees--the CEAO and ECOWAS. His international ac-
tion was strengthened on the occasion of the 17th OAU Summit Meeting, which was held
in Freetov~m in 1981 under his chairmanship.
Wi~hout laying down an obvious political line, the Sierra Leonean chief of state was
confronted during his term of office [as chairman of the OAU] by the two thorniest
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= problems facing the Afr~.can co~ntinent: Chad and the Western Sahara. But he stuck to
' his role as conciliator even when the situation between the protagonists seemed most
tense.
Econamic and Financial Crisis, Recovery Measures
For several years, the growing deficit in the balance of payment~ and the inadequacy
' of national production have been leading the Sierra Leonean Government further and
further into foreign debt (estimated at $350 million in 1980). This has considerably
increased the burden of debt serv3.ce on public finance. S~veral debt rescheduling
- agreements were reached with the creditor states in 1980 itnder the terms of the Club
ef Paris multilateral aqreement. These to~k the form of a moratoritnn defe~ring pay-
= ments, with refunding interest exceeding 5 percent in all cases. Some observers
have noted that those stabilization measures occurred before the 17th OAU Sumanit
Meeting was held in Freetown and after new financial burdens had been assumed to
cover investments necessary in preparation for that inter-African conference.
Upstream from those measures, and after the stabilization plan of September 1979,
the IMF' Board of Executive Directors approved a grant of 162 million SDR's that will
permit execution of a development plan totaling 500 million leones (1 leone = about
4.8 French frzncs). Its priorities were decided on in agreement with the IN~, with
preference going to projects in the sectors of agriculture and hydro~lectricity.
The release of the first tranche of 27 million leones in 1981 made it possible to
reduce delays in making payments to foreign cre~.iitors. On the other hand, strict
rules are forcing the Sierra Leonean Government to be extremely sever~ in its selec-
tion of new investments by not contracting loans for periods of more than 1 year ar
less than 12 years.
State of Economic Resources
The Sierra Leonean econany supports a sizable private sector alongside a public sec-
tor whose importance should increase as a resul~ of f.he government's determination
' to give that sector a decisive role in national development. In addition to the
financial institutions (the Central Bank, the Development Bank, and the Commercial
Bank), the government has established state-owned enterprises in the most varied
sectors: water dzstribution and treatment in the city (Gumma Valley), the production
and distribution of electric power (Electricity Corporation), agricultural develop-
ment (Sierra Leone Produce Marketinq Board (SLPMB), Sierra Leone Agriculture Produc-
tion Corpcration (SLAPRO), and National Produce Corporation (NAPCO)), management of
the autonomous port of Freetawn (Sierra Leone Port Auth~r~ty), and petroleum refin-
ing (Sierra Leone Oil Factory).
Alongside those state-owned companies, the government has steadily increased its
capital holdings in mixed-economy companies involved in agricultural development,
the mining sector (National Diamond Mining Company (DIMINCO)), and fishing (5ierra
Fishing Company). Tlie new investment code, now in preparat~ion, should confinn that
trend. ~ ~
Sierra Leone therefore offers the advantage of being an economy of the liberal type,
in which government intervention occurs to better insure achievement of ob~ectives
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1 of a national cha~cacter, but without developing a paralyzfng structure for a develop-
ing country.
The relative value of the official statiatical apparatus and the qradual abandonment,
unti.l just recently, of ineditan-term planning make it difficult to dig out economic
data in Sierra Leone. This~situation is explained by the existence, parallel witH
the legal econc~nic channels, of an undergrQUnd economy of sizable dimensions whQSe
profits are earned from,trade relations with bordering couiitries whose strong cur-
rencies have until now been a lure (Liberia).
,
Subsistence Farming and Ambitious Agricultural Programs
The primary sector accounts for ~7 percent of the GDP and employs over 70 percent of
the country's a~ctive population, while earnings from agricultural exports, despite a
slight weakening, represent 30 percent of the total earninqs.
- The weak takeAff of agroindustry, the existence of subsis'tence farming, and the ab-
sence of self-sufficiency in basic agricultural products (on~ons, rice, and palm oil)
- are the domi.nant featu~es of this sector, despite the goverrnnent's repeated efforts
to encourage agricultural production on an industrial scale or to implement a price
policy more favorable to direct remuneration for ~he farmers.
Sierra Leone produces traditional foodstuffs, such as rice, manioc, and corn. More
recently, the grawing of tobacco, citrus fruit and other tropical products for domes-
tic consumption has been introduced. .
Coffee and cocoa account for almost alI of the agrocultural exports and for 37 per-
cent of the earnings fron? e~orts. Coffee production dropped by nearly 2,500 tons
in 1980, while cocoa production rose by 3,000 tons. The development of ginger, cola
nuts and palm oil products should enable the SLPMB to increase its exports.
Sierra Leonean Agricultural Production
(in tons)
1978-1979 1979-198~
Rice 620,000 650,000
Coffee 13,500 8,500
~ Cocoa 7,500 10,500
Corn 14,000 15,000
- Manioc 82,000 80.,000
Sweet potatoes ? 10,000
5ource: FAO (indicative statistics)
According to the FAO, more than 300,000 farmers, working plots whose average size
does not ex.:eed 1.8 hectares, cultivate the arable land by the same methods as those
used by their ancestors. This is the case with rice, which is grown on 61 percent
of the cultivated land on the plateau by the burn-baiting method under a 3-year ro--
tation system (bush fallows).
The deveZopment of modern techniques is hampered by the shortage of skilled manpawer,
- which is offset slightly by the mechanization of agriculture, although mechanization
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is sanetimes unsu3ted to socioeconoamic factors and poorly adapted to the size of the
farms.
Aware of those difficulties, the government has taken an overall approach to agricul-
tt1Ya1 development by setting up integrated agricultural development programs in coop-
' eration with multilateral organizations (the UNDP [UN Development Program], the ~'AO,
and the World Bank) and bilateral orqanizations that are aimed at covering the entire
territory.
Since 1975, the Ministry of Agric~lture and F,orestry has had a tool for scientific
study and research with which to evaluate soil, water, and vegetation re~ources (the
Land and Resources Survey ProjeCt). Its operations are intended to deternii.ne the
- rea~ suitability of Sierra Leonean lands to the various tropical and subtropical
crops. For that purpose, it uses the most modern techniques and has air coverage of
the entire territory at its disposal. That "data bank" is working in cooperation
with the integrated agricultural development projects and West Africa's specialized
research institutes: the International Institute of Trop~cal Agriculture (IITA, of
Nigeria), the IRHO [Institute for Research on Edible 0ils and Oleaginous Products]
of France, the West Africa Rice Development Association (WARDA), and the NUC [expan-
sion unknown]:
_ The SLPMB enjoys a near monopoly on the exportation of certain high-yield products
and is also re4ponsible for establishing the import program for certain food resources
such as rice. Sierra Leone, which exported rice until 1971, now imports between
40,000 and 80,000 tons per year, or more than one-fourth of its total imports. The
SLPMB is responsible for stabilizinq producer prices and sales prices so as to guar-
~ antee the farmers of a real and bona fide profit. It has not completely succeeded,
_ since the price of that foodstuff regularly doubles during the period between har-
vests.
In 1980, two subsidiaries were established to denelog the production of coffee and
cocoa (SLAPCO and NAPCO).
Under the Lome II accords, the EDF [European Development Fund] considers aqriculture
a priori~y sector. Particularly urgent intervention measures have been stressed,
as follows:
Rice growing was the principal single crop in 1980 in the Koinadugu (EEC), Magbosi
(F'AO), and Moyamba programs, as well as in the Tormabum project carried out with
Dutch assistance.
Market gardening has been introduced in the northern part of the country (Koinadngu).
The distribution of market produce will be facilitated by ending that reqion's isola-
~ tion and completing the road link between Makeni and Kabala.
, To reduce dependence on the outside world for sugar, two projects are in view: in
Magbas, a plantation and mill set up under state supervision with help from the PRC
should insure the start of production, and a second project is under study in
- Pendembu South by the British consulting firm of Tate and Lyle. It seems to be
a~med at the establishment of small production units, which are considered more
profitable.
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A projec:t headed b~;~ SLAPCO in Pendembu and financed by the World Bank should make it
~ possible to quadruple coffee and cocoa production in the medium term.
The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is studying the conditions for a plan to
rehebilitate and expand industri.al oil palm plantations (PADI) jointly with the vil-
lage cooperatives. ~tao projects have been identified to date:
1, The Daru plantation (about 2,670 hectares), established with the assistance of
the IRHO in 1960, is currently experiencing serious technical and management diffi-
culties despite financial assistance from the World Bank in 1972 for buildinq an
_ oil mill. The oil mill is currently operating at 30 percent of its total capacity
because of inadequate plantings. New financial assistance could be granted as part
of PADI's third phase for Eastern Province.
2.~The Gambia Matru complex (Southern Pravince), which is larger, has the same ori-
gin. A modern oil mill was installed in 1977 by the French construction firm of
SPEICHIM, but the lack of maintenance, canbined with the shortage of palm clusters, .
has caused the mill's production to drop to less than 15 percent of its total ca-
pacity.
There are two private plantations, one in Mobai. with 1,000 aares (400 hectares) that
has.a small-capacity oil mill and operates with the assistance of the FMO (an agency
of the Dutch Government), and the other in Port I,oko. The latter is a larger plan-
tation belonging to Vice President Koroma. Both began operations a few years ago.
A feasibility study financed by the British Government has been concerned with the
development of coconut growing on the Turner Peninsula. That ainbitious project
would require a sizable investment (about $100 million).
Tkie rubber plantation in Potoru (Southeastern Province) was e~�:ablished in 1964, but
has never reached the stage of industrial operation. It was the object of a deci-
sion in principle by the board of directors of the Comanonwealth Development Corpora-
tion (CDC) to grant a luan of 6 million leones (for 20 years at 8 percent) for par-
tial financing of the project, The Sierra Leonean Government has approached the
financial institutions connected with bilateral foreign aid, particularly the Cen-
- tral Fund for Economic Cooperation, whose assi~tance and participation it has re-
quested.
The fishing sector employs over 20,000 small-scale fishermen alongside an industrial
sector in full expansion. With a catch of about 110,000 tons, it contributes 1.5
percent of the GDP. The government's first agreement was concluded in 1976 with
the Soviet Union. Running for 5 years and renewable for 3 years, that agreement es-
tablishes the conditions for cooperation between the two countries. A training
school for fishermen and navigational personnel was opened in 1980 with technical
assistance from the USSR. Under the terms of the agreement, the Soviet authorities
are entitled to operate in Sierra Leone's territorial waters to exploit its fishing
resources by means of trawlers whose number is established in the master agreement
and for which the Sierra Leone Fishing Company holds the required licenses. The
catch is then divided up, with 63 percent of the fish being marketed in the USSR
, and Europe by FRANSOV, a mixed-economy company owned by holders of French shares
and the USSR's Ministry of Fish Industry.
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The Sierra Leone Fishing Campany (linked financi~.tly to the U.S.-Liber~an Mesurado
group) is in the front rank of the industrial fishing sector. It sells frozen fish
and deep-frozen prawns on foreign markets through its subsidiaxy SHRIMPEX (about
188 tons per year). Other fishing enterprises located in Freet~an are involved in
the industrial fishing of demersal and pelagic species, and the authorities have
reportedly issued nearly 80 fishing licenses.
v~r!~�;.1 the agreement with the Soviets expires, the government will probably seek to
replace it k~ith agreements with other partners, there being a tendency to withdraw
from relations with the USSR in fishing matters. The chief of state has approached
the ~ttropean Community in Brussels concerning projects cherished by Sierra Leone in
a sector which is destined to experience considerable development.
Expanding Mining Sector
The mining sector accounts for 10 percent of the GDP, but ~rovides 54 percent of the
country's export earnings, and the active population employed in this sector has in-
creased steadily through the years. On the advice of the IN~', the government should
soon begin working new diamond and bauxite deposits. Foreign participation in this
sector remains preponderant (Austria, Switzerland, Great Britain, and the United
States).
Diamonds are the oldest of the mining resources being exploited. In 1970, the gov-
ernment acquired a 51-percent interest in the company operating the country's two
largest concessions--in Tongo and Yengema--while the private stockholders belong to
the De Beers and Oppenheimer groups. Production is tending to decline and cw~~ently
stands at around 600,000 carats per year. The gradual exhaustion of the alluvial
- deposits and the persiste~ce of illegal exploitation may be a partial explanation
for the fall in production. The outlook is moving the government, on the basis of
the feasibility study carried out in 1979 by the Selection Trust, to contemplate
the exploitation of several veins of kimberlite that have been identified and lo-
cated since 1937 in Sierra Leone's subsoil.
Since 1963, a fully-owned subsidiary of ALUSUISSE known as SIEROMCO has been work-
ing the Mokanjy deposit under a lease and royalty agr.eement with the government.
Recently, a new deposit was opened up in Gandama, not far from the original conces-
sion, following an investment of 50 million leones.
In addition, negotiations have been underway for 4 years to open up a sizable baux-
ite deposit (reserves of 150 million tons) at Port Loko. The deposit is low in
alumina and silica and would require partial processinq at the site. The size of
the investment and the search for appropriate financing are the reasons for the de-
lay in starting up the project, which would include installation of an alumina
plant.
Sierra Leone is thought to possess one of the world's largest deposits of rutile
(titanium ore). After a gap of 8 years caused by the bankxuptcy of the Sherbro Min-
eral Company, the American consortium of 5ierra Rutile, Limited is now exploiting
the Bamanga deposit. Despite sizable capital investments ($600 million), production
results have come up to only one-fifth of the objectives (20,000 tons in 1979, the
first year in which production was resumed).
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~ Since 1981 the Austrian company of Austro Minerals has been reopening the iron de-
posits in Pepel. Operations there had ceased in 1975 due to poor conditions in the
world iron market.
Exploration for precious metals, particularly gold, has attracted many small-scale
prospectors to Sierra Leone. Over the past two decades, the government has granted
prospecting licenses to local companies partly owned by foreigners, but the results
are difficult to determine because the prospectors are discreet. Several sites have
been identified and located in the country's Southeastern Province (Bomahun), where
concessibns are held by the EUROCAN firm.
Sierra Leonean Mining Exports
1978-1979 1979-1980
Diamonds (carats) 797,042 855,104
Bauxite (tons) 804,647 583,262
Rutile (tons) - 7,500
Iron (production halted in 1975
and resumed in March 1981) - -

-l
Industry's Difficult Takeoff, Energy Problems
The industrial sector's productivity is low, contributing 10 percent to the GDP.
Half of its production is provided by the average-sized enterprises, which employ
0.35 percent of the total active population and are concentrated (two-thirds of the
total) in the Western Region.
The 1960 Development Act currently qoverns the establishment of new industries that
can contribute to the nation's economic development. It provides those firms with
appreciable tax advantages, which are granted to them on the advice of the Ministry
of Trade and Industry and by a subsequent decision by the cabinet presided over by
the chief of state. New industries in the agroindustrial sector enjoy comparable
benefits under the Agro Based Industry Act. ~
Firms in the food group are represented by rice mills, an industrial flour mill
(Seabord West Africa), and, just recently, a sugar complex in Magbas that is oper-
ated by the PRC under state supervision (60,000 tons of sugar annually), as well as
a cracker factory (NATCO) belonging to the Indian Choitrams group, an inadequate
number of slaughterhouses in the northern part of the country, and three palm oil
mills, including the Daru and Gambia Matru complexes, belonging to the government.
_ A brewery (Sierra Leone Brewery) established by the UAC group and Heineken supplies
over 1 million cases of locally produced beer. Two factories for the production of
nonalcoholic beverages and soda (Freetown Cold Storage--a Swiss group producing
Coca Cola under license--and Sierra Leone Enterprises, which produce~ Pepsi Cola)
supply an annual market for over 70,000 hectoliters of nonalcoholic beverages.
Lastly, a state-owned distillery process liquor locally.
The footwear market is dominated by two local firms (Bata Shoes Sierra Leone and
AFROPLAST), which supply a market for over 2 million pairs of cheap shoes (thongs
and plastic shoes). The rest of the demand is met by other importers.
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A refinery (Sierre Leone Oil Factory), with a total capacity of 60~,000 tons per
year, processes between 190,000 and 2C0,000 tons of petroleum products (gasoline,
kerosene and fuel oil) for the local market, and a gas plant bottles oxygen and
- acetylene, while a soap and detergent factory belonging to the Indian Chanral qroup
~npplies the local market for those�products.
Three forest firnis operate in the country's interior: the Panguma Saw Mill, belong-
ing to a French operator; the government-owned Kenema Saw Mill; and the third, a
mixed-economy company (SILETI), that exports logs.
In addition to the Sierra Fishing Company, several fishing companies exist locally.
The most important are Marine Development, ~Jnited Fishing Enterprises, and the Inte-
grated Fish Mill Industry.
A clinker grinding plant is currently being set up. It will manufacture cement with
the assistance and cooperation of the French Oriqny-Desvroise cement group. Several
local construction firms share the work provided thrauq.h national or international
bidding (Mattar, the Sierra Leone Construction Cor.poration, and the International
Construction Corporation). �
There are also a shop producing mechanical tools (the National Workshop) and units
for the manufacture of building materials, suitcases, chalk, and mattressQS. Their
importance and the market they serve are limited by strong competition from foreign
imports. .
Z'he fact is that Sierra Leone's industrial sector suffers from three major disadvan-
tages: excessive concentration of the industrial sector on the peninsula and in
Freetown, the only exception being the forest firms and the oil mills, which are
scattered; excessive dependence on imported qoods, which whittles down the added
value of locally produced goods; and the nonrational use of local raw materials.
Energy dependence is one of the key factors in this country's economic takeoff.
The petroleum bill has quadrupled since 1973, totaling 50 million leones in 1980,
or 16 perrent of all imports.
To correct that situation's perverse effects on the balance of payments, a hydro-
electric development plan has,been established. It calls for execution of a re-
- gional program by the Mano River Union (the dam on the Mano River) and construction
of the hydroelectric dam at Bambuna to supply the Western Region and Freetawn with
electricity. In addition to those two big projects, about 10 sites have been chosen
by the Ministry of Energy and Power for the construction of si.~all hydroelectric
pl~nts of less than 2 megawatts. ,
On the basis of x:esults from preliminary studies, Sierra Leone has started offshore
- petroleum prospecting off Sherbro Island. The work is being done by Mobil Oil and
- a consortium of three companies (Oc.cidental Petrol~um, Danson Oil, and PANOXO). If
- exploitation of the deposit becomes possible, the result could be increased activity
for the Freetown refinery, in which the governmen~ is a majority stockholder.
Transportation and the coaanunications infrastructure have been improved considerably.
Port facilities will be diversified, and the work done in preparation for hosting
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the 17th OAU Summit Meeting included modern infra~tructure for Lungi International
Airport and a doubling of runway capacity for takeoffs.
The land communications network has developed apace with ovexall development opera-
tions, which have resulted in the opening up of regions through feeder roads and
repairs to the road systems from Makeni to Lunsar in the west, from Makeni to Kabala
in the north, and from Freetown to Bo in the south.
In order to compress domestic demand and thus reduce the balance of payments deficit,
all i.mported products are now subject.to administrative authorization granted by the
Ministry of Trade and Industry, which controls the quantity, kind, volume, and price
of products. Applications covering 1 year must be submitted ~t the start of the cal-
endar year. Certain products are exempt from those regulations but are covered by
specific licenses: they are energy products and foodstuffs considered essential, as
well ~s raw materials for local industry. According to official sources, hortaever,
the value of import licenses was reduced to 230 million leones in 1978-1979, to 190
million in 1979-1980, and to 175 million in 1980-1981.
Since the national currency is nonconvertible and nontransferable, debtors are com-
pelled to make their payments through the local banking system based on the amount
of foreign exchange held by the Central Bank, the institution which controls and
_ authorizes transfer operations. As soon as payment in local currency has been en- ~
tered on the commercial bank's books, the file is sent to the exchange controller,
who verif ies that the importation was legal and actually occurred and checks to see
that the firm or individual entrepreneur has paid the tax (proven by the tax receipt).
Payment is then subject to a delay of from 4 to 6 months, depending on how the na-
tional economy performs. The system is in general use in Sierra Leone, and the
. rare exceptions in which transfers are exempt from the authorization requirement
are limited to small amounts (5,000 leones) or have now lapsed.
Delays in the "pipeline" are usually shorter during the second half of the calendar
year, due to the receipt of foreign exchange from the sale of mining and agricul-
tural production on international markets, but the shorter waiting period varies
according to bank (the Bank of Commerce and Credit, Barclays Bank, the Coanmercial
Bank, and the Standard Bank).
For several years the government has pursued a policy of controlling consumer pric~es.
The official list is drawn up by the Ministry of Trade and Industry with cabinet
approval. The rigidity of the controls encourages the appearance of the same prod-
ucts on parallel markets, where they are sold at higher prices, or their replacement
by completely identical substitutes not covered by the imposed price.
By means of decrees or circulars from the Central Bank, the government adopted a
series of ineasures during 1981 aimed at completinq and strengthening legislation on
the payment of taxes (the Income Tax Act of 1970). The delivery of imported goods,
- departure from the country, and even the renting of a hotel room or the purchase of
an airline ticket by a Sierra Leonean re~ident or a foreigner are subject to presen-
tation of a tax rECeipt.
According to the government, the "Vouchergate scandal," as it was named by the press
and public opinion--it resulted in the arrest of three cabinet officials and more
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than 40 government employees--demonstrated that those measures, which were challenged
on legal grounds, were aimed chiefly at exposing and repressing tax fraud.
On the whole, this country's economic development has progressed at a very slaw pace
over the past decade, since the GDP rose by less than 0.5 percent annually through
- 1981. Most of the nation's production comes from exploitation of the mining resourCe~
(chiefly diamonds, bauxite, and rutile) to the detriment of agriculture, which con-
sists mainly of food crops, with a~maller vol~une of export crops, to which tlze gov-
ernment has devoted considerable effort e.-sd investments amounting to as much as 25
- percent of the national budget. Domestic demand ~~as risen to such an extent that for
several years it has exceeded national production capacity. This situation has con-
tributed to the deterioration of trade, reflected in a very sharp rise in imports,
which are expensive in terms of foreign exchange for a country whose national cur-
rency is nonconvertible and nontransferable and on which the measures establishing
import quotas and restricting licenses have so far had limited effect.
- Heavy Dependence on Foreign Aid
The proportion of foreign aid in Sierra Leone's development has increased steadily
~ through the years, and it is estimated that in 1980, over $18 million were devoted
- to technical assistance, while nearly $121.6 million were devoted to economic coop-
eration using foreign funds.
Multilateral aid remains sizable, especially in the foxm of technical assistance.
The World Bank and the African Develo,pment Bank head the list. Aid from the sc~cxal-
ist countries is declining markedly, except in the case of the PRC and certain peo-
ple's democracies (Romania). '
Total financial assistance for investment (capital investment) underscores the basic
contribution made by the IMF and the EEC (EDF). In.bilateral aid, Japan pro~ided
~ substantial aid for the acquisition of equipment in preparation for the 17th OAU
Summit Meeting. Next in order of importance is aid fram U.S. AID, followed by Great
Britain, which in 1980 canceled a sizable debt.
_ France has sought to strengthen its cooperation ties wa.th Sierra Leone in the area
of economic, cultural, and technical cooperation. The CCCE.(Central Fund for Eco-
nomic Cooperation) is still the privileged instrument of French policy for coopera-
tion between the two countra.es. It finances development projects through long-term
_ loans at special interest rates. To date, three projects have been set up: financ-
= ing for extension of the water treatment system in the city of Freetown, installa-
~ tion of a telephone transit exchange, and construction of a clinker grinding plant.
The government has approached the EEC seeking financing for agricultural nrojects
(rubber plantations in Potoru and oil palm plantations) and for a project covering
fishing equipment for the Sierra Fishing Company.
The recent joint commissions on cultural and technical cooperation (1979 and 1981)
ma~ie it possible to decide on the new objectives for future activitie~ aimed at a
better adaptation of scholarships to the country's needs. This will make it pos-
sible eventually to carry out a genuine transfer of technoloqy to Sierra Leone and
- to insure a wider diffusion of the French ]:anguage~through the media.
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Structure of Trade and French-Sierra Leonean Economic Relations
The foreign traae structure is characterized by steadily rising imports of conswner
goods--chiefly energy products--at a rate exceeding the rise in exports, which are
dominated by mining and agricul~ural products.
Sierra Leonean Foreign Trade
(in millions of leones)
1976 1977 2978 1979 1 Jul 79-30 Jun 80
FOB imports 163.1 185.1 259.1 288.4 308.0
FOB exports 126.7 163.6 193.8 234.5 229.9
Deficit 36.4 21.5 65.3 53.9 78.1
Main Imports
(in millions of leones)
1976 1977 1978 1979
Total 163.1 185.1 259.1 288.4
of which: �
Food products 31.0 35.8 48.4 40.0
Tobacco and beveraqes 7.6 9.3 9.7 5.8
Petroleum products 12.4 29.2 35.0 50.0
Autamobiles and transportation 33.2 38.0 70.0 80.0
Capital goods 51.5 51.0 72.4 73.2
Miscellaneous manufactures 16.3 I9.3 23.2 22.6
Sierra Leonean Exports
- (in millions of leones)
- 1976 1977 1978 1979
Total 126.7 163.6 193.8 234.5
of which:
Diamonds 73.8 64.9 117.8 131.3
Bauxite 4.5 7.9 7.6 8.4
- Rutile ' ' - ~'9
Total mining products 78.3 72.8 125.4 140.6
Percentage 61,7$ .44.4~ 64.7~ 59.9~
Coffee 7.2 ~ 50.5 19.1 37.8
Cocoa . 7.7 18.9 22.8 31.8
Other agricultural products 9.9 8.9 10.9 15.2
Total agricultural products 24.8 78.3 52.8 84.8
Percentage 19.5~ 47.8$ 27.2~ 36.1~
Great Britain was Sierra Leane's chief supplier from the time the latter became in-
dependent until 1977, when Nigeria took Great Britain's place due to the rise in
value of hydrocarbon imports, of which Nigeria is the main supplier. Great Britain's
trading position is also strengthened locally by the dynamisni of Lebanese business-
men, who traditionally turn to that country for their imports. The United States
is in third place, ahead of Japan (automobil~s), the FRG and France. Until recently,
products imported from France consisted mainly of automobiles and tractors (61.8 per-
cent), with the remainder consisting of sugar and flour products.
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The products exported by Sierra Leone go chiefly to its English-speaking partners.
This is explained by Great Britain's participation in the operation of diamond mines.
The r~.se in exports to the United States is explained above all by the latter's par-
ticipation in the mining of rutile, with most of the production going to that coun-
try~
T'he tables below do not include the balance of invisibles resulting from the main
barter agreements in effect with certain countries, including China and the USSR.
The latter benefits from a special agreement covering exports of sea products.
Sierra Leone's Chief Suppliers and CustomQrs
(as a percentage of the values)
Chief supp liers 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
United Kingdom 22.2 21.3 25.1 19.5 17.6
Nigeria 3.6 8.0 7.1 12.6 23.8
United States 8.9 9.0 7.2 8.1 8.7
- Japan 9.4 9.6 6.2 7.6 6.8
- France 7.9 5.2 4.6 6.9 4.7
FRG 8.0 6.7 7.5 7.5 5.8
Chief customers
United Kingdom 67.4 61.3 56.1 60.0 49.2
Netherlands 6.1 14.9 16.8 11.9 19.4
United States 5.7 5.6 7.6 7.4 19.4
FRG 4.9 4.0 2.3 2.3 . 0.7
Source: Sierra Leone Statistics
Trade Between France and Sierra Leone
(in millions of French francs)
1977 1978 1979 1980
French exports to Sierra Leone 49.4 60.8 80.3 96.1
Imports from Sierra Leqne 11.5 9.1 15.7 19.4
Rate of cover for France 429.5 669.2 511.2 495.4
Source: French statistics
Trade Between France and Sierra Leone
. Chief imports and exports
(in millions of French francs)
Chief French imports Chief French exports
1979 1980 1979 1980
Coffee 8.98 3.67 Cars and tractors 22.24 5.42
aeverages, shellfish 2.54 2.96 Sugar, confectionery 19.30 ?.3.60
Wood and byproducts 2.23 6.04 Flour products ~8.10 7.50
Metallic ores - 3.03
Sierra Leone's particularly difficult financial situation has forced foreign credi-
~ tors to freeze their policy of granting guaranteed medium-term commercial credit
owing to the particularly high rate of losses, and the position of the credit in-
surers is reportedly unanimous today, following the agreements rescheduling the pub-
lic debt.
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The growth of French exports to Sierra Leone has been accompanied by the recent es-
tablishment of French firms in various sectors of the economy: Fougerolle, Origny-
Desvroise Cement, UMARCO, the UTA IAir Transportation Union], and the UTH [Tourism
and Hotel Industry Union] have joined the long+established_French firms (the CFAO
[French Company of West Africa] and the 5COA [West African Trading Company]).
The government's economic recovery efforts make it possible to see the importance of
national or regional (Mano River Union) projects affecting this West African subre-
gion, since they will give rise to orders for equipment or infrastructure. .
In the relatively near future, Sierra Leone intends to:
1. Begin exploiting new mining deposits (diamo~,ds and bauxite) and replace some old
equipment.
2. Start new agroindustrial projects (oil palm, coconuts and rubber).
3. Develop the industrial and small-scale fishing sector and aquiculture.
4. Build up an energy potential that can satisfy its industrial development require-
ments (hydroelectric dams and small power plants).
5. Undertake the repair and extension of the road infrastruc~cure (the Kabala-Kamabai
road) and a section of the Pan-African highway between Monrovia, Freetown, and
Conakry. ~
6. Study the plan for establishing a national airline c4mpany to serve the regional
or even international market.
7. Encourage the establishment of local firms capable of re~lacing imports with their
~ own production.
More generally, attention should be drawn to the steady flow of government calls for
tenders covering the purchase.of consumar goods and capital goods for major govern-
ment departments.
There is no doubt that Sierra Leone can hope to base its development on the indis-
putable advantages of its tourist attractions. The beauty of its places of inter-
- est and the picturesque quality of the peninsula and the provinces, which offer
striking contrasts, provide the some 200,000 tourists who visit this country an-
nually with the charms of authentic Africa. The peninsula has hospitable hotel in-
frastructures offering a total of nearly 1,500 rooms and several recent hotels of
international class, among them the Cape Sierra, the Bintumani, and the Mamany Yoko
Hotel, which is managed by the French UTH (a subsidiary of the TITA). To compensate
for the lack of accommodations in the country's interior, the ~::onstruction of three
50-room hotels has been scheduled.
However, the poor condition of the road linking Freetown with the peninsula's
paradise-like beaches has hindered the development of tourist hotels in that area
despite the optimistic prospects contained in the feasibility study commissioned
from the Yugoslav ENERGOPROJEKT en~terprise.
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There are still some uncertainties today in the economic and financical policy. The
general elections i.n April 1982 could delay implementation of certain projects which
represent a sure hope in a difficult situation. The endemic situation in economic
life does offer some ~triking contradictions. The national currency, for example,
despite being nonconvertiY~le and non~ransferable, has stabilized on the para11e1
- market over the past few months at not more than 30 percent below par, and social
peace has not really deteriorated since the autumn of 1981.
Despite the size of the noncash sector and the existence of underground economies,
Sierra Leone might experience a slowdo~wn in economic life, since the increase in its
growth rate was inflated,somewhat by substantial investments in connection with the
OAU. If so, this would render hypothetical the prospects for a recovery whose main
card remains the stability of the domestic political situation.
However, it remains to be seen whether Sierra Leone in coming years will experience
a more critical economic situation made worse by a political crisis or whether, an
the contrary, it will experience the era of prosperity and stability hinted at so
far by the members of the single party. Public opinion in Freetown is beginning
wonder whether the w~.sdom of President Stevens, respectfully nicknamed "The Old Man,"
will once again be sufficient to prevent crisis.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
11798
CSO: 4719/547 ~D
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