JPRS ID: 10361 JAPAN REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040007-5
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 75
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/10361
3 March 1982
Ja an Re ort
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(FOUO 15/82~
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JPRS L/10361
_ 3 March _:1.982
JAPAN REPORT
(~oLO 1s/s21
CONTENTS
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
Tanaka's Influence on New Cabinet Formation Analyzed
(Bin Suzuki; SHUKAN ASAHI, 11 Dec 81) .l
Tanaka Polit ics, Liberal Democratic Party Analyzed
(EKONONff SUTO, 5 Jan 82) 12
Power of LJP Secretary General Po.~it ion Analyzed
(Asao Yamaguchi; GENDAI, Feb 82) 27
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Extent of Cooperative Ventures With Foreign Companies Noted
(SHiJKAN TOYO KEIZAI, 26 Dec 81-2 Jan 82) 43
Yasukawa's All-Electric ARC-Welding 3obot Described
( Kei~ i Yasukawa, et al. ; _ KIKAI SHINKO, Dec 81) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
_ a _ [TII - ASIA - 11I FOUO]
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
TANAKA'S INF~,UENCE ON NEW CABINET FORMATION ANALYZED
Tokyo~SHUKAN ASAHI in Japanese 11 Dec 81 pp 16-22
(Article by Bin Suzuki: "The Influence of the 106-Man 'Tanaka Corps' Shown in
Suzukis Cabinet Reshuffle." The term "cabinet" in the original Jag~anese is meant
to be a pun.]
[TextJ Grey High Officials: The Eye of the Disturbance That Susumu Nikaido
(the Party Secretary General) and Mutsuki Kato (Withdrew Himself From Appointment
to a Cabinet Post) Have Left Behind
Former Prime Minister Tanaka said: "If you intend to be reelected (in the fall
of next year), wouldn't it be best to appoint Mr Nikaido secretary general?"
Prime Minister Suzuki replied: "I und~rstand. Don't worry."
Thi~ is said to be the dialogue exchanged between the two when they met during
the Shichikendo Festival at the former residence of Shigeru Yoshida in Oiso on
18 October, more than a mont'n before the reshuffle of the cabinat.
Prime Minister Suzuki has never mentioned "reelection" himself.
- However, all agree that the prime minister's ~basic strategy in reshuffling the
cabinet was to win reelection wlr`~ the cooperation of the Tanaka faction--the
largest faction, numbering 106 members--by appoin~ting Mr Nikaido, its alternate
leader, as secretary general, the key position in the Liberal Democratic Party.
Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki
(Fukuda Faction)
MITI, Shintaro Abe
Construction, Ihei Shiseki
Administrative Affairs in Prime Minister's Office, Kunio Tanabe
Environmental Protection, Bunbei Hara
Party's Administrative Affairs, Tatsuo Tanaka
(Nakagawa Group)
Science and Technology, Ichiro Nakagawa
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~ aln w a......-.., v...-. v, .
(Komoto Faction)
Defense, Soichiro Ito
Labor, Takiichiro Hatsumura
Economic Planning, Toshio Komoto
(Suz;iki Faction)
Cabinc~t Secretariat, Kiichi Miyazawa
Education, Heiji Ogawa
Agriculture and Fisheries, Yoshiro Tazawa
Party's Political Affairs Research Council, Rokusuke Tanaka
. (Neutral)
Justice, Michita SakaLa
Financa, Michir Watanabe
(Nakasone Faction)
Foreign Affairs, Yoshio Sakurauchi
Health and Welfare, Mot,oharu Morishita
Administrative Management, Yasuhiro Nakasone
(Tanaka Faction)
_ Transportati.on, Tokusaburo Ko~aka
Home Affairs, Masataka Seko
Posts and Telecom~unication, Noboru Minowa
National Land, Yukiyasu Matsuno
Party Secretary General, Susumu Nikaido
The Suzuki administration is often called '4ae11-balanced government" that hinges
upon the balance between Kakuei [Tanaka] and Fukuda.
tJhile Prime Minister S~izuki has been called "Kakuei's shadow" at one time and
"Fukuda's shadow" at another, he has come through the political situation by
keeping under consideration the balance between Kakuei and Fukuda.
But....
A well-info nned source explai~i:.: "When his reelection was at stake, Suzuki had to
consider which of the two, K~~~~.�sei or Fukuda, would really be dependable. At the
Oiso meeting Su2uki made his true intention clear to Tanaka, saying something like:
'I will go with Secretary General Nikaido. So, please remember me'."
Then, it can be said that the month-long rumor~ that Nikaido would become
secretary general emanating chiefly from the Tanaka faction were clearly intended
- to probe the reaction of the Fukudo faction.
However, the opposition of the Fukuda faction was surprisingly mild, at least
to the ex�~:ent it appeared on the surface. Of course, Mr Fukuda himself often
spiked the rumor of Nikaido ~ecoming secretary general by saying: "Concentration
of power should be avoided." But this did not lead to the opposition of the Fukuda
faction as a whole.
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One reason why is said to be the following: "Because the Fukuda faction was
pushing the appointment to a cabinet post of Vice Chairman of the Policy Affairs
Research Council Mutsuki Kato, lixe Nikaido another grey high official in t e
Lockheed case, they could not openly oppose the appointment of Nikaido as
secretary general."
= As long as the Fukuda faction did not raise a disturbance, Nakasone, ~inister
of tlie Administrative Management Agency, and Komoto, director of the Economic
Planning Agency, who promptly decided to remain in the cabinet an3 took the
- attitude of being "cooperative with Prime Minister Suzuki," had no alternative but
to go along with the general trend. Thus, "Secretary General Nikaido" seemed
superficially to have been decided without any trouble. But....
A medium-standing member of. the House of Representatives close to former Prime
Minister Tanaka said that in fact there was bitter "veiled enmity" between
- Kakuei and Fukuda over the issue of backstage maneuvering to appoint Nikaido
secretary general.
One example was efforts to persuade Shin Kanemaru, former director general of
the Defense Agency, to stand for secretary general. Although Mr Kanemaru belongs
to the same Tanaka faction as Mr Nikaido, it is well known that he has a close
relationship with Mr Fukuda. It appeared that "Fukuda float'ed a trial balloon
_ to Kanemaru by sending a certain man from the business world to ask if he would
be interested in becoming secretary general. But Kanemaru refused."
Also, there was information that "Fukuda called Nakasone to for~ a'war front to
- oppose the appointment of Nikaido as secretary general'."
Next, remarking that "although it sounds like a ghost story," the Diet member
said that "it appeared as though Fukuda himself made motions indicating that he
was aiming at the foreign minister's post."
"One person told me that quite recently a certain leader in the business world
close to Fukuda m~t Suzuki and broached the subject of 'appointing Fukuda as
foreign minister.' Hearing this story from a reliable source, I was surprised.
If Fukuda had become foreign minister, actually a dual head system of Fukuda in
the cabinet and Nikaido in the party would have been established. This would
not have contradicted Fukuda's so-called elimination of the concentration of
power.
"Of course, it was hard to belie�~e that Fukuda was really after the foreign
minister's post. But it must have been a declaration of Fukuda's intention
that 'he would not let things go as Tanaka wanted' when the situation became
such that Nikaido was sure to be appointed secretary general."
Former Prime Minister Tanaka also seemed to have heard such stories. Since
Foreign Minister Ito resigned in May this year (1981), there have been ru~~rs
of Fukuda becoming foreign minister in certain political circles. And
Mr Tanaka has been telling people clos~ to him that "such a thing as Fukuda
becoming foreign minister is absolutely impossible." However, when this rumor
came up again in relation to the reshuffle of the cabinet, it must be supposed
that Tanaka knew of Mr Fukuda's extraordinary rivalry.
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Now that Nikaido is in fact sec:etary general, it should be said that Kakuei.
has gained "half a point" for the moment in the veiled enmity between Kakuei and
Fukuda.
The balance in the Kakuei-rukuda rivalry that supports the Suzuki administration
has clearly shifted its specific gravity toward "Kakuei." It can be said that
the cabinet reshuffle was Prime Minister Suzuki's "interior angle" [In Japanese,
naikaku--interior angle--is a homonym for naikaku--cabinet] personnel reshuffle,
as he has taken Kakuei [the kaku in Kakuei literally means angle] further
inside [nai means inside].
Prime Minister Su.zuki must have clearly understood that the public would criticize
_ him if he appointed Mr Nikaido--one of the grey high officials in the Lockheed
case--secretary general, the "spokesman of the party." Nevertheless, he dared
to do it because it ~aas notfiing other than "the logic of Nagata-cho" [the location
of the Diet building and the Liberal Democratic Party headquarters].
According to a well-informed source, it meant the following. "In preparation
for the worst when the prosecutor of the Marubeni route cases of the Lockheed
trial makes his concluding speech and proposes punishments next spring and,
furthermore, when a judgment of the first instance is expected to be handed down
in the fall of next year, Tanaka's most important objective is to suppress the
movement of anti-Tanaka members in the party and to suppress vacillation within
the Tanaka faction. Since the secretary general has powerful authority over money
and party endorsements at election time, he can keep members in fear of him within
the party. TI~e Tanaka faction succeeded in capturing leadership in the party.
It was a measure to insure reelection for Suzuki and to control damage from the
Lockheed trial for Tanaka. The interests of Zenko [Suzuki] and Tanaka coincided
in the appointment of Secretary General Nikaido."
Using "Grey" Differently ~.n the Party and the Cabinet
If Prime Minis~er Suzuki is reelected next fall, his term will last until the fall
of 1984. A House of Councillors election is scheduled in the su~er of 1983.
Apart from the question of whether or not a lower house election will Ue held at
the same time as the House of Councillors election, it is certain that the House
of Representatives election will be held during Suzuki's term as prime minister.
Looking at this political calender, the leading members of the Tanaka faction
read the followinb: "In case the ~udgment of the first instance in the Lockheed
trial holds that 'Tanaka is guilty,' minimizing the influence of the judgment
on the national election will be the supreme task for both Zenko and Kakuei."
In oCher words, the functions of the Nikaido appointment are not limited merely
to countermeasures for the.judgment in the Lockheed trial, but extend further
to "post-Lockheed election measures."
"At any rate, the political situation will be tinged with trial politics
hereafter." This is the view shared by all members of the Liberal Democratic
Party.
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A question that remained unsolved until tb.e last minute on the day of the cabinet
reshuffle of 30 November was whether or not another Lockheed grey high official,
former Vice Minister of Transportation Mutsuki Kato, would be appointed to a
cabinet post.
Former Minister of Transportation Seijuro Shiokawa and other members of inedium
standing, together with young members, had severely taken former Prime Minister
- Fukuda to task the previous day, saying: "The grey high official Nikaido becomes
- secretary general, but Mr Kato cannot be a cabinet member. It does not make
sense."
- Mr Fukuda and former Chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council Shintaro Abe,
a big brother of Mr Kato, strongly requested that Kato be appointed to a cabinet
- pos;. in the negotiations with Prime Minister Suzuki's side. But the pr.ime
ndnister firmly reiected the proposal.
"When dealing with grey high officials, tha weight is nati~rally different in the
party and in the cabinet. Ministers represent the nation in international
relations. On the other hand, within the party the grey officials will always be
tre~ted as members of the party. Even if the names of Nikaido and Kato come up
in the Lockheed trial ~udgments next year and Mr Suzuki is questioned about them
in the Diet, as long as they remain party officials, Pri~e Minister Suzuki can
somehow manage to get by. But if they were ministers, that would not be the
case. If the worst comes, it would damage the Suzuki cabinet itself. It would
- affect his political life. That is probably Suzuki's thinking." This was the
reading of sources close to the prime minister.
Fina].ly, after 1 pm on the day before the Cabinet Organization Headquarters was
established, Mr Kato announced that he would withdraw himself from consideration
for a cabinet post and brought the issue to an end.
There are several views about this settlement of the matter. "The Fukuda faction
could not push the appointment of Kato to a cabinet post too hard, because it
would look to the public as though 'the Fu~.:;.ida faction was bulldozing the
appointment of a grey high official to a cabinet post'." Or, "If Kato could be
appointed to a cabinet post, the influence of Abe would increase within the
faction. This would have been unpleasant to Fukuda and other senior members.
- Fukuda might not seriously have recommended Kato for a cabinet post. In addition,
if the political situation becomes shaky due to the judgment in the Lockheed trial
next year, it will be easier for Fukuda, who is looking for an opportunity to shake
up Suzuki, to do so without Kato in the cabinet."
With Kato's Withdrawal the Fukuda Faction Turns to the Offensive
Of course, the Fukuda faction did not back down silently. Among cabinet posts,
the post of foreign minister, which the Tanaka faction wanted, was given to
former Secretary General Yoshio Sakurauchi (Nakasone faction), who is said to be
- "also close to Fukuda." The construction minister's post, which has been
considered the stronghold of the Tanaka faction, was passed from Mr Noboru
Minowa (Tanaka faction) to Mr Ihei Shiseki (Fukuda faction) at the vPry last
minute. The reason for this was persistently observed to be "a result of Zenko
listening to Fukuda's claims."
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Since there remains something angular among Suzuki, Kakuei, and Fukuda, the S.S.
Reshuffled Suzuki seems destined to sail through rougher and higher waves in the
- future.
First of all, Suzuki is concern~ed about the series of judgments in the Lockheed
trial forthcoming in the near fvture and the movements of each faction within
the party, esFecially the Fukuda faction.
The actual prison sentence given to Osano last November did not stir up any
noticeable movement within the party. There was silence in "the whole party
system." However, this silence may or may not continue in February when judgments
are handed down to two more defendants, former Transportation Minister Tomisaburo
Hashimoto (ex-Tanaka faction) and former Vice Transportation Minister Takayuki
Sato (Nakasone faction), who are involved in the A1_1 Nippon Airways route portion
of the Lockheed trials, and furthermore when.the prosecutor delivers his concluding
speech and proposes punishment and the judge anrounces his verdict to Tanaka,
a defendant in the rlarubeni route portion of the Lockheed trials.
Suzuki's reshuffled administration took considerable account of r^ukuda's claims
vis-a-vis cabinet personnel and maintained "the whole party s~stem" in form.
- However, a well-informed source notes the following: "It is certain [hat the
Fukuda faction was grumbling because Kato did not get a cabinet post and that
the grumbling would become an unpleasant feeling persisting into the future. On
the other hand, the Fukuda faction did not have to bear the burden of having a
grey minister. If Nakaido and Tanaka are criticized by the public as a result
of judgments in the Lockheed trials, the situation will become favorable for
Fukuda to shake up Zenko and Tanaka."
Second, what will be the moves of Mr Nakasone and Mr Komoto, who have their eyes
on the succession after Suzuki's reelection, and ::ew leaders such as Sh~ntaro
Abe, Noboru Takeshita, Kiichi Miyazawa, Rokusuk~ Tanaka, Michio Wantanabe, and
Ichiro Nakagawa?
~ Right now, assuming that "Suzuki will be reelected," there is a strong possibility
that a real struggle for the Liberal Democratic Party presidency will not occur
next year. But maneuvers aimed at the next, in other words, at the party
presidential election in 1984, will start next year. Specifically, the factions
will begin a race to acquire more party members.
"Although it is not predictable whether the post-Suzuki succession will be
decided by negotiations or by election, it is inevitable that every faction formu-
lates a strategy on the premise that a party presidential election will be held.
Even though the new reshuffled Suzuki administration maintains the system of
gathering all powerful leaders, the outcome of the next reshuffle cannot be
predicated." Or, "If a rumor spreads that one of the powerful leaders has started
to acquire party members in his faction, speculatian about the succession will be
mixed in the confusion of the undercurrent in the Suzuki administration and the
instability is certain to gradually spread." Such observations have already
been discussed.
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When the Exceptional Law for Administrative Reform was passed in the House of
Representatives during the previous Diet session, Mr Kom4to was said to be critical
of the Suzuki-Nakasone administrative reform: "With this, a true administrative
reform cannot be accompl ished. This is only a saving of 2Q-30 billion yen."
� A well-informed source says: "The reason why Komoto talks about administrative
_ reform that makes an income tax cut possible is, in short, because he believes
'Nakasone's administrative refox~ is not good.' And he is appealing to Zenko for
an economic policy of an expanded equilibrium through tax reduction."
If Komoto's economic policy is not acceptecl by the new Suzuki administration, the
following view may prevails: "If his economic policy is not accepted, it may
_ result in a diminution of his chances. That is why Komoto is desperately
counterattacking."
"After ttie general session of the Diet next year, Korioto may resign from his
cabinet post and prepare for the party presidential election." Such a rumor is
also being whispered.
tllthough Prime Minister Suzuki appears to have strengthened his position for
reelection by shifting to the side of Kakuei, there are still mountains and
~ valleys ahead of him. It seems to be a road of penance for him.
Grey Secr.etary General Is a Challenge to the Separation of Three Pawers--Comment
by TakasYii Tachibana, a political critic
The appointment of a grey high official, Mr Susumu Nikaido, as secretary general
is a result of Prime Minister Suzuki's flattery of the numerical strength of the
_ 106 Tanaka faction members. First of all, Kakuei Tanaka is not a member of the
Liberal Democratic Party. So a man outside the party is controlling the party.
That is an outrageous act turning the party politics upside down. The ru~es of
the Liberal Democratic Party do not allow this sort of reckless act.
Prime Minister Suz~iki e;fplains that "the party is different from the cabinet."
In reality, however., the secretary general of the Liberal Democratic Party goes
to the Cabinet Organization Headquarters and plays a leading role in deciding
cabinet personnel. affairs. The power of the secretary general surpasses by far
that af a minister.
Mr Nikaido says: "In criminal matters, there is only guilt (black) or innocence
(white). Grey does not exist." This is a sophistry. The definition of "grey"
--"although money was given and received, one was protecCed by the statute of
limitations or one did not possess official jurisdiction"--"has been confirmed.
And Mr Nikaido has been called "grey" on tt;c basis of this definition.
Why has Tanaka had to go to so much trouble to make Mr Nidaido secretary general?
One sure reason is to expand his power, to suppress wavering within the party
that would come with the verdict of guilty, and to increase the number of Tanaka
f.action members in the next election in order to retain power.
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The secretary general has strong control over personnel matters and money. At
the time of elections he holds immense p~wer over the party's endorsement of
candidates and distribution of funds. By manipulating the secretary general
freely, Tanaka will campaign during the House of Councillors election in 1983
and the general election.
It is certain that he will try to influence the Lockheed trial both overtly and
covertly. Mr Nikaido is the man who unashamedly went to see the public prosecutor
general 3 days before an indictment in the Tanaka financial backing Shinsei
enterprise trial in 1475. Because of loyalty to Tanaka and hatred of the public
prosecutors, he will take any measures in order to save Tanaka.
He will seriously try to think of practical ways to invoke the ministry of
~usticF's right of command over the prosecutors. Technically, it is possible for
the c~{nister of ~ustice to request the Public Prosecutor's Office to report the
content of the proposed punishment before the prosecutor delivers his concluding
speech and proposes punishment in the trial, which is scheduled for next spring.
Then, if the "commands" by offering the general observation that "it is questionable
to propose such a punishment for a man who was once the country's representative,"
what is going to happen? When Justice Minister Sakata is forced into such a
_ situation to do so, can he resf.st? Will not he fall into the same trap as
Justice Minister Inukai at the time of the shipbuildina scandal? [In 1954
Justice Minister Inukai, in accordance with the policy of the fif th Yoshida
cabinet, quashed the public prosecutor's request for permission ta arrest Liberal
Party Secretary General Eisaku Sato.] Undonbtedly a crisis is approaching for
the separation of three powers. [end of Tachibana's comment~
New Justice Mir.ister: Hot Looks of the Tanaka Faction Fall on Michita Sa~.ata--
Checking the Angle of Previous Ministers' Gaze [The Japanese word for angle is
- the same as the "kaku" of Kakuei. The whole expression gyokakudo, meaning roughly
the degree o~ worshipful gaze, is also a homonym for the degree of administrative
reform. )
Along with the question of who would become secretary general in the cabinet
reshuffle, attention was paid to who wo~sld become justice minister at this time
of critical importance to the Tanaka faction. When the lid was lifted, it was
Mr Michita Sakata. I would say it was a reasonable choice.
"People in the Miki and Nakasone fact{ons (who occupied the center of power at
the time of the Lockheed incident's revelation) were absolutely unacceptable.
But we could not strafghtforwardly push one of our members f rom the Tanaka faction
to be appointed justice minister" (a Diet member of inedium standing in the Tana'.ta
faction). For the post of justice minister, the label of "former Ishii faction"
(a neutral faction), which.for practical purposes involves no factional interests
or strategies, was the most desirable. Moreover, a rarity among Liberal
Democratic Party members, Mr Sakata "possesses an extremely gentle personality.
Although he benefits from round eyeglasses, he is nevertheless fair and
disinterested" (a political reporter). It was natural that a person such as Mr
Sakata was "the most likely candidate" even before the start of the cabinet
_ reshuffle race. Is Mr Sakata going to be "the fair and disinterested" ~ustice
minister his previous reputation suggests?
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- Before disc.ussing this, I would like the readers to look at the angle from which
Ka.kuei Tanaka has been looked up to--in other words, "the degree of the angle of
- previous post-Lockheed justice ministers' gaze." The measuremen;. has been made
by coasulting the opinions of pblitical critics and reporters.
Many readers may still remember how Mr Inaba, who was justice minister when the
first repolts of the incident reached Japan from the United States, merrily bubbled
over before Tanaka's arrest by saying: "(Those arrested) will not be only sardines
and small mackerel."
He received severe criticism: "Although still under investigation, he kept
talking and off ering uninformed speculation, and interfered with the im~estiga-
tion. He disquaiified himself as justice minister" (political critic Kotaro
Tawara). However, in regard to Tanaka, tlle angle of his gase was "zero degrees
or even downward" (political critic Kiyoshi Iijima).
The Tanaka faction learned a lesson from this, and thereafter used its force to
push for the appointment of people from "the pro-Tanaka faction" as ,justice
minister one after another.
First was Mr Hajime Fukuda. He is a member of the Thursday Group stemming from
the former Funada faction, but he also has another label as a secret Tanaka
- faction member. This Thursday Group consists of 17 veteran members calling
themselves the Liberal Democratic Party's sensible faction. At one time the Tanaka
faction tried t~ enroll all of them into the Tanaka faction by using Mr Ha~ime
Fukuda as a lever, but this invited repulsion by other factions. Nowadays, "this
group barely survives thanks co Tanaka's intention to support it as lon.g as Fukupin
(Hajim~ Fukuda) ~s in the group" (a well-informed source in the political world).
This view is strongly supported.
Both the Fukuda Faction and the "Antiplutocrats" Are Pro-Tanaka for Some Reason
The next justice minister, Mr Setoyama, belongs t~ the Fukuda faction, but the
truly knowledgeable know that he is pro-Tanaka. He surprised the political
- world by setting up "the Kakuei-Fukuda meeting" last fall. As a result he
created the widespread impression that he was pro-Tanaka, and in the process
buried the much discussed prereshuffle rumor that he would be appointed justice
minister again.
- Then, Mr Yoshimi Furui succeeded Mr Setoyama. While Mr Furui superficially
- declared that he was an "antiplutocrat" (an address commemorating his 25th year
in the Diet), "he kept casting hot looks toward Tanaka" (a political reporter).
Although Mr Tadao Kuraishi belongs to the Fukuda faction, he became justice
minister, much to the surpri~e of Mr Fukuda and his people. The same day he
joined in a Tanaka yell. This seems to have been an unwanted favor even for the
Tandka faction.
The next justice minister was Mr Seisuke Okuno.
"He himself is a very sincere person. Perhaps he did not intend to interfere"
(Mr Iijima). Such was the analysis of respected political critics. When the
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prosecutor called Mieko Enomoto, former wife of Tanaka's former secretary, as the
witness who would clecisively demolish Enomoto's alibi, Justice Minister Okuno
severely criticize~ the prosecutor for "failing to follow the way of inen." As
a result he was labelled extremely pro-Tanaka. He made the following explanation:
"It is good to protect the prosecutor's freedom. However, in case the prosecutor
goes too far out of the way, I must pull him back into place. That is the role
of the justice minister. In the same context, if it is for the people rather than
a certain political party, invocation of ministerial authority is acceptable,
_ isn't it?" As a result, however, he ~aas inevitably considered antiprosecution
and pro-Tanaka.
- Can Jus~ice Minister Michita Sakata, who has to cope during his term as justice
minister with the verdict on Wakasa (an All Nippon Airways route case scheduled
for next January), the verdi~t on Hashimoto (an All Nippon Airways route case
s scheduled for next February or March), and the verdict on Tanaka that is expected
to influ~nce not only Japanese politics but also international politics thereafter,
meet people's expectations or not?
~ The Past Record of Single-Minded Cooperation between Kakuei and Sakata That Cannot
Be Ignored
"Whoever becomes justice minister, that ~ustice minister cannot control the
judiciary. (Even though the justice minister has authority over the prosecutor,)
- once a trial has started, he cannot exercise it," said Diet member Ryutaro Nemoto,
who was one of the recent candidates for justice minister. Former Just~ce Minister
- ~kuno also said: "The prosecutor is not powerless. If the prosecutor is
inter.fered w:tth, he will become tougher. That is the very thing the Liberal
Democratic Party does not want. 5ince I am also a member of the Liberal
llemocratic Party, I have a relationship with Mr Tanaka. However, as justice
minister I never contemplated what was favorable or unfavorable to Tanaka.
Concerning the Lockheed iricident, I never received any request. Even if I were
asked, I would never have accepted it." On the other hand, there is the view
that the justice minister can influence the court if he makes full use of the
justice minister's power. "For example, there is a strong possibility that
Hashimoto will be judged innocent. In such a case, it is theoretically possible
for the justice minister to in5~ruct the prosecutor not to appeal to a court of
intermediate appeal" (Mr Tawara.). In relation to elections, "It is possible for
the justice minister to order delays of at least one or two months in the pro
_ prosecutor's concluding speech and proposed punishment" (Mr Iijima). F.ven if the
~ justice minister does not do that much, it is possible at least that he will
dissuade the prosecutor from putting handcuffs on Tanaka right after the verdict
is rendered, as he would with an ordinary convict, or from putting Tanaka in
prison.
The true desire of the Tanaka faction is not fo~ the justice minister simply to
keep the prosecutor in fear of him as a symbol, but to exercise substantially
hi~ power as minister. Of what mind is Mr Sakata?
Mr Sakata's father, Mr Michio Sakata (a former Diet member) was a teach~~r of the
late Prime Minister Eisaku Sato (the political boss of Tanaka) when he was
attending the old Fifth Hign School. Because of this connection, the. younger
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Sakata and Tanaka have known each other from an extremely early period. The
younger Sakata was electedto the House of Representatives for the first time in
1946. The next year Tanaka became a Diet member. For 2 years starting in August
1961 the combination of Policy Affairs Research Council Chairman Tanaka and Vice
Chairman Sakata supported the Ikeda administration. During the Sato
- administration, for 2 years starting in August 1965 Tanaka was secretary general
- and campaign headquarters director and Sakata was executive secretary of t'~c
campaign headquarters. Both worked cooperatively in the general election fight.
Furthermore, while Sakata was education minister, Sakata passed the University Taw
in single-minded cooperation with then Secretary General Tanaka. Peering in from
the outfield bleachers, the relationship between the two sonlehow concerns us.
But in relation to the Lockheed trial, Justice Minister Sakata can do nothing
better than to carry out his duty with a level gaze.
COPYRIGHT: Asahi Shimbunsha 1981
9896
- CSO: 4105/35 .
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
TANAKA POLITICS, LIBERAL DII~IOCRATIC PARTY ANALYZED
Tokyo EKONOMISUTO in Japanese 5 Jan 82 pp 56-65
[Special Report: "Tanaka Pol.itics and the Postwar Japanese Society: The Root
~ of Tanaka's Political Power Assessed"; the participants in the discussion are;
Kenzo IIchida, editor in chief, KYODO and Takao Iwami, commentator and editor
of MAINICHI SHIMBUN; chaired by Michitoshi Takabatake, professor, Rikkyo
University]
[Text] The Significance of 108 Members
Takabatake: On the basis of. Mr Iwami's report, I would like to begin with an
evaluation of the actual power of the Tanaka faction, or rather, the Tanaka
"army corps."
The Tanaka faction has a present strength of 108 people in both houses of the Diet.
And it has Nidaido ~.s chief secretary of the LDP. Therefore, it is natural to
think of the Tanaka faction as being at the peak of its power. A completely
opposite view also exists. This is that this is a desperate last struggle before
the trial. The faction has played all its potential cards, the "hidden Tanaka
faction" members, and this is all they are capable of. The way the faction
persisted in getting Nidaido installed as chief party secretary, even though it
meant a reduction in cabinet posts for the faction, shows a weakening or a final
struggle in the awareness that an era is ending. This is the interpretation.
There is a jumble of different theories, and it is difficult for a person on the
outside of political circles like myself to make a judgment.
Uchida: At present, there are 422 members of both houses of the Diet in the
Liberal Democratic Party. And 108 is about one-fourth of that. It is amazing
that the Tanaka corps has grown to more than 100 members, has reached threE
figures. But it is just one of the three major factions in the lower house. The
reason it is such a large group is that it contains a very large number of inembers
of the upper house.
This relate~ to the proposed subject, what the Tanaka faction is. Putting that
aside for the time being, it is certain that, betng in control of one-fourth of
the LDP, it has great power. However, in judging whether it is an advancing army
or, to put it in extreme fashion, is making a last desperate struggle, I am closer
to the latter view. I believe they have gained as much power as they are going
to .
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Looking at the matter from the Tanaka side, the new year will see the conclusion
of the trial. There will be a decision. This is the year when Tanaka and the
Tanaka faction will be in a life or death struggle. To gain as much strength
as possiLle in preparation for this, they have assembled 108 LDP members and
brought about the personnel changes that have occurred recently.
Iwami: Tanaka's arrest and indictment occurred more than 5 years ago. The
- character of the faction known as the Tanaka faction has changed a great deal.
It was a rather strong group before the arrest and indictment, but since then
it has made a display of many thin~s. I believe that the boss, Kakuei Tanaka,
certainly had the desire to show strength--greater than reality in many respects--
to the world and to the party. Therefore, there are real aspects and false
aspects mixed in together.
According to Tanaka himself, there are 130, or a maximum of 150 Tanaka faction
members, if the "hidden Tanaka faction" members are taken into account. However,
can alY 150 be made into actual members? It is not that easy. We can see
from watching one added here or two added there that they are not accumulating
members without great effort. In November 1980, a group of seven led by Tokusaburo
- Kosaka entered the faction. This was big news. However, I understand that the
faction met certain conditions to persuade each of these men to join. There was
a rumor that Kosaka was granted freedom of action within the faction and allowed
to have something like a Kosaka group. Therefore, just because the Tanaka faction
has reached three figures, it does not mean that it is the same faction as that
before the arrest and indictment expanded to three figures.
However, Tanaka himself certainly has the ability to manage things. This is
demonstrated by the reference to the faction as the "Tanaka general tzading
- company" or the "Tariaka general hospital." The faction has the most energy and
~bility of any in the LDP, not ~ust the greatest numbers. In that sense, the
faction moves at the command of the leader and gets things done. T'here is no other
faction like it.
Why the Chief Party Secretary Position?
Takabatake: The expansion of the Tanaka faction has occurred both in spite of
and because of the trial. With respect to this, why did it concentrate on the
- party secretary position even at the expense of losing cabinet posts? What
_ influence does it gain by holding the chief secretary position? What is the
strategy behind that?
Iwami: I believe there is no doubt that Tanaka intended to create a political
environment that would make it as easy as possible to carry on the court battle
in an advantageous way. However, at the stage of Nikaido's installation as
party innocence. Rather, I believe the emphasis has been shifted to how the
~ Tanaka faction will be managed after the court decision. That is why it insisted
on the party secretary post.
The post of chief party secretary has much more authority than the public imagines.
_ Therefore, the idea of making Nidaido party secretary had an element of gambling.
It was uncertain whether it could actually be done, even though the rumor arose
early in the process. In short, because this post is one of great authority,
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it should mean real control of the LDP or give the impression of such control, if
it could be obtained. Either would be all right. However, the occurrence of the
_ Nikaido problem was proof of its importance.
Takabatake: While facing trial, a strategy taking into account the trial of the
secretary's position.
Uchida: More than the post, the moment of the court decision of first instance
is very important. Therefore, the aim of the Tanaka group is to focus on that
single event. In brief, how can it cope with the shock of that first decision?
Furthermore, while it is questionable hew much criticism of Tanaka ex3sts in the
party, those who are critical of Tanaka are beginning to set their sights on the
moment of the first instance decision after watching the recent personnel
reshuffle.
Iwami: That is so.
Uchida: Thinking over the previous problem of whether the Tanaka. faction is
successful in spite of or because of the trial, I would say that the two factors
are inseparable.
- Put another way, the great strength of the Tanaka faction is an expression of
Tanaka's weakness as well as his strength. At any rate, the faction has to exert
its influence and power as much as possible. There is always the danger of
crumbling suddenly if it is not careful. It must be constantly vigilant and
continue to demonstrate strength. It is powerful in the sense that it can exert
_ influence, but weak in that it will crumble if it doe~ not.
The Essence of the LDP
Uchida: So what is the strength of the Tanaka faction? Briefly, there is no
political party that fits the present Japanese society as well as the LDP, and the
Tanaka faction is the "essence" of the LDP. The Tanaka faction is the most
representative of the character of the L~P, the party which has continued to
= dominate political power in Japan. Therefore, it can command one-fourth of the
LDP Diet members.
Some observers think that this is because of the uncommon power and ability of
Kakuei Tanaka, the individual. It becomes a hero theory. Another extreme
theory is that Tanaka's power is nothing but money. Everything is dueto the power
of money, and if the money disappeared, it would fall apart. I believe that
neither view is really true.
I acknowledge that Tanaka is a strong~y individual and extraordinary person, and
it is certainly true that the power of money was used to build the Tanaka faction
and to obtain the position of prime minister. However, I do not believe that
the present Tanaka faction has come together just because of money or that it
has the money to make e~ansion possible. AJ.so, I do not believe that Tanaka could
continue to maintain this group in the face of adversity through personal
magnetism alone.
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There ar~ certain reasons why Japan can be equated with the LDP, and the LDP can
be equated with the Tanaka faction. One is the inducement of political favors.
- There is a structure set up to give maximum satisfaction to the regional demands
of the electorate. Another is the Japanese system of rautual obligation and
- compassion used in performing these functions. There are many faction members
with great ability in this area ~ust like Tanaka. Is this accidental or due to
the magnetism of the leader?
Specifically, this ref ers to the assistance given in connection with ceremonial
occasions such as weddings and funerals, and the perforniance of obligations
and assistance on these occasions is scrupulous and thorough. This mechanism
and the "software" that improves its image are quite efficient.
Takabatake: There are three special features of the Tanaka faction. They are
the personal leadership of Tanaka, the structure of political power connected
with money, and the structitre for acting as intermediaries in providing
favors. This is the "essence" of the LDP.
- Iwami: That is a wa3 to describe its characteristics.
Takabatake: The question is how this can be considered as something new in the
- I.DP or in conservative politics. The Iwami Report says that all conservative
parties have been structured to maintain political power on the basis of money
ever since the war or even from before the war. The conservative parties have
always had a favor-granting function on the grassroots level. Also, the
leaders have not been ineffective.
In short, these kinds of things have been accelerated and have reached their apex
with Tanaka. Is there anything in the Tanaka method of governmen~ that is
different from any other in postwar or post-1960's Japan?
_ Iwami: In Tanaka's own words, there is the "prime minister engine theory." This
is the concept that government is controlled by a machine just as a moon rocket
is controlled by a computer center. There was probably no one before Tanaka
who thought this way.
Therefore, he controlied very mechanically. His method of control was different
from that of pr.evious men of ability. For example, there is his approach to the
law. According to the ordinary perception, laws should be obeyed. However,
he figured out how to utilize the law or he combined two laws and did something
new with them. His perception of the law was that it shou~d be used rather than
_ that it should be obeyed. This was new.
Also, we speak simply of political favors or graft, but Tanaka~s method of running
the government writh tnoney is also different from that of other factions. He
manages r_hings with great practicality, promptness, and effectiveness. I have
- never got a look at the internal situation so I do not know what really goes on,
however.
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What Are the Special Characteristics of the Tanaka Corps?
Takabatake: From a wider perspective, I believe that what might be called the
"Tanaka phenomenon" contained some new elements in p~stwar politics. First,
although it is now largely forgotten, there is no other example.in postwar
Japanese politics or since Japan was established as a m~dern country af someone
with ?~ardly any academic background reaching the position of prime minister.
Therefore, he developed a great following among the co~on people. That still
exists potentially. Even though the Tanaka faction has taken on a villain's role,
it is still popular.
Because the system of postwar Japanese politics has become m~re and more solidified
on the surface as an elitist system for success based on academic background,
Tanaka became a star to the common people who are at the bottom of the social
ladder. 'I'here is emotional support for Tanaka, whether he is good or bad, which
comes from the envy and grievances of the people on the bottom.
Second, the power of granting privileges has become concentrated in the state
administration during the period of high growth under the administrative nation
state and popular democracy which were established after the war. A system of
pressure politics has grown up in the state administration through the distribution
of benefits under the pressure of elections, This was particularly a phenomenon of
~ the 1960's. Tanaka was the person who developed the most organized political
methods for dealing with this situation.
Diet members who started as public officials are not able to act as intermediaries
to distribute favors to local supporters with great care and thoroughness. And in
turn regional Diet members are not able to control the public officials.
As Mr Iwami pointed out, Tanaka saw the law as something to use. In interviews,
Tanaka boasts that there is no one who knows the law better than himself. With
' this knowledge he was able to control officials or get them entangled, organize
the Echizankai, and go around taking orders from his constituents. The emergence
of this kind of politician and political organization is a new development.
Third, the period of high growth provided opportunities for the emergence of
economically powerful men who differed fram the mainstream of the financial
world, the establishment. Power was concentrated in the government bureaus because
of the periad of high growth, but there was a rapid expansion of subsidies for
construction distributed out from the center. There was also a lot of money made
from land due to political w~repulling. A new typ~ of powerful man emerged as
intermediary. This provided the route for the emergence of the present Taiko
(ruler like Hideyoshi). As the Iwami Report states, Tanaka did not concentrate
the power of conferring benefits in the organization but in himself as an
individual. The problem is complicated by the emergence of a new style of
individual dispensing of favors.
Therefore, the question remains of whether Tanaka's power can be maintained when
the high growth stops, the Japanese economy is reorganized, and a new establishment
takes its place.
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- Fourth, ttiere is a somewhat doubtf~ul but ~*_:~eresting idea of a correspondence
between the emergence of Nixon and Tanaka based on a new international situation.
This was stated in the "Press Co~entary" column of ASAHI SHIMBUN using the argu-
ments of Akio Yamakawa.
According to this, the U.S. Democratic Party represented the Eastern establishment
and the labor unions, and at that time a conservative mains*_rea~m had been
established in Japan. The honeymoon period was ending for this system because of
trade friction resulting f.rom the emergence of Japan as a major economic power.
America's policies were also ninning into trouble because of Vietnam. This was
when Nixon emerged. He was backed by new capital and large corporations from
the Western United States, and he used Kissinger to strike out in a new direction
with a realism divorced from traditional ideologies and moralism. ThiG was
related to the changes in the cold war situation brought abaut by diversification
of the world political structure.
At the same time, Sato (Eisaku) was in a dilemma over foreign relations with
America and China. Then Tanaka emerged and accomplished such feats as ~ollowing
Nixon in establishing relations with China and cutting off the Japanese textile
industry. The room for maneuvering required for these actions had developed in
_ Japanese politics. The period of international and domestic change in the first
half of the decade of the 1970's fit in with the emerg~nce of Tanaka.
How~ver, I would like to ask how we can interpret the position of these two men
today. At present, Nixon has a successor in Reagan, and this creates the
international conditions necessary for the reemergence of the Tanaka faction.
However, Reagan ic calling for a drastic return to the cold war. In contrast to
this, Tanaka is generally regarded as a dove in Japan. Although he maintains a
slight distance from the conservative mainstream, he represents the most dovish
group of the conservative party. Because of this, some observers comment on
the continuity between the Tanaka faction and the Komeito and the New Freedom
Club.
However, in the international context, there is a correspondence between the
emergence of Reagan and the expansion of the Tanaka faction. The Reagan group
resembles the Tanaka faction in being dispensers of political favors. Would it
be correct to see the true character of the Tanaka faction as being hawkish like
Reagan?
The Lower Social Strata and Tanaka
Uchida: Witn respect to this fourth point, I have doubts about the Yamakawa
thesis. However, I think the first three observations are right on target. Still,
I doubt that these things are very new.
In short, these methods are old features of the LDP and they have long been used
in Japan. In relation to this, we should note that Tanalc~'s popularity comes from
the fa.rming villages and rural regions. It is doubtful how effective these
methods are with the urban populace and voters.
Takabatake: It is that much more interesting that his popularity lies in the
countryside. The fact that Tanaka is popular in the countryside demonstrates
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the existence of a structural lower class envy unique to modern Japan. From this
point of view, the rural area farmers continue to have the impression that the
- Socialist Party and the Communist Party are the parties connected with an
academic background and are the parties of the city and that these are the
- establishment. If Tanaka is the representative of that feeYing, there is a
problem of whether the forces that are represented by Tanalca will cause a rift
in the conservative leadership system. In other words, this is a point where the
national interest as conceived by the bureaucrats does not ma.tch the distribution
of benefits to the regions on the basis of political considerations. However, the
Tanaka faction also takes care of providing for postretirement employment of high-
level bureaucrats.
Therefore, just like the emperor system, the Tanaka faction provides a bridge
betwe~n the upper and lower classes so that it becomes mc~re and more secure.
Uchida: The Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election is said not to have gone
according to Tanaka's wishes. There are probahly various reasons for this, but
- basica.Ily there is a limit to his power here.
Takabatake: In the city, right?
Uchida: In the city. Looking at the structure of the Tanaka faction, although
Tokusaburo Kosaka did enter it, we see that Tanaka politics cannot get a hold on
city people.
Iwami: Mr Takabatake touched on the inside story of the change from Sato to
Tanaka. Looking back on that period, I recall that Tanaka ran for prime
minister using more cash than anyone before him and got the reputation of reaching
_ the top with the power of money. However, after that he gradually learned a
number of things and did not always rely only on money. Tanaka was the only man
- who coiild handle the tough job of straightening out the trouble between Sato and
Nixon.
It is true that the period of high growth provided fresh ground for a
Tanaka-style new establishment different from the traditional establishment. In
addition to the old personnel networl~: and the traditional unity of government,
bureaucracy, and business circles, there was an area opened up by virtue of
Tanaka's personal qualities.
Takabatake: In that respect, Tanaka had some characteristics similar to
Kissinger.
Iwami: I believe he did.
A Group With Noncommissioned Officer Leadership
Uchida: I believe that the Tanaka popularity was based on the first observation--
that he was supported by the common people's religion of success--and the third
- observation--that his success was related to the period of high growth. He
emerged at the high point, the peak of the high growth period, and he made use
of political methods that rode on the crest of high economic growth. When he
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took office, it was the year after the "Nixon ahock" and the year before the oil
shock. That was the background that brought tragedy to t1~.p Tanaka government and
- gave it a short life.
Takabatake: I would like to ask something more about the third point. You sav'
that there were many people in the Tanaka faction who were involved in the
construction industry, which has an intermediary function in dispensing political
favors, or were bureaucrats involved with staff work and then became members of
the House of Councilors. In other words, the me~ers of the Tanaka faction have
in certain respects conducted campaigns just like Tanaka, taking care of
constituents, dispensing favors, and organizing support organizations like the
Echizankai.
Iwami: I believe they are trying to learn from him. However, the success of
such methods depended greatly on the ability of Tanaka, the individual. So not
just anyone can do the sane thing as Tanaka. There are examples of both
successes and failures, but they all definitely look toward Tanaka as a political
model.
Uchida: The secretary of an influential Diet member who belongs to the Tanaka
faction had this to say: "I was amazed when I entered. The unity of the Tanaka
faction secretary's association, as well as the Diet members themselves, and their
way of working are unimaginable from the outside." This is another special
characteristic. Their organization greatly resembles the old Japanese army.
Takabatake: That is why they are referred to as an army corps. This is also a
new feature.
Uchida: I do nut know who began calling them an "army corps" or whether they did
so with this in mind. However, it is run by a type of noncommissioned officer
= control system with quick response to commands. The organization makes an
all-out effort to bring benefits to the electoral districts. It is reported
- that the organization has perfected its mechanism so that the entire corps works
in concert to perform the things that each Diet member needs to do for his own
electoral district.
Iwami: Therefore, the members are trained while they are in the corps.
Takabatake: Tanaka himself is from the most obscure district in Ni.igate
Prefecture, the Niigate Third District, a deep snow region with one of the lowest
rates of higher education in the country. Aren't there a lot of people in the
Tanaka faction from obscure parts of the electoral districts, the third districts
of the various prefectures? (laughter)
If that is the case, the Tanaka faction is a rather strange part of the conserva-
tive party, different from the conservative mainstream, which is made up chiefly
of former high-ranking bureaucrats with connections to the financial world. In
short, it represents the most regnessive regions in Japan and has built a support
base with thoroughgoing, well-organized techniques of dispensing favors and has
directly linked the central bureaucracy with these regions by giving assistance
� to them. In addition, the faction itself has an internal educational function of
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. disseminating new political methods to all members. In this respect, it is
quite different from previous factions.
Going Beyond the Yoshida Mainstream
Uchida: Tanaka has recently claimed that he is a part of the Yoshida mainstream,
a graduate of the Yoshida school. He ma.y have had the last position among the
13 Yoshida men, but he keeps insisting that he was truly a part of it. In a way,
that is exactly right. In other w~rds, he could be described as the essence of
the main line of Yoshida-style conservatism or perhaps the most straightforward
expression of the last conservative school, This might apply to the fact that
he emerged at the end of the period of high growth with the job of cleaning up
U.S.-Japanese relations. However, Yoshida and Ikeda were more sophisticated in
the area of technique. Tanaka has maneuvered in a much cruder fashion.
Iwami: However, at the same time, I believe Tanaka privately despised the Yoshida
mainstream. I believe he thought he had gone beyond Yoshida, that he was different
from the Yoshida mainstream. Taking the example of his theory of reconstruction
of the Japanese archipelago or the recent Doshu system, [system under which the
- political sub-divisions of the Japanese Islands were made during the pre-~modern
period] I do not believe that these ideas could come out of the single line, the
simple, straightforward thinking of the Yoshida mainstream. He says that he is
in the mainstream because it is advantageous to do so in the party, but privately
I believe he thinks that he is superior to it.
Takabatake: One reason for this is that the Yoshida period is far in the past,
so everyone claims to be the successor to Yoshida; Yoshida is very popular now.
However, I believe the Yoshida school was divided into two parts. One was the
Sato faction, in which anticommunist ideology appeared clearly on the surface.
It was made up chiefly of elite bureaucrats. In contrast to this was the Ikeda
faction, where technocrats were the main bureaucratic component. It was mainly
concerned with economics. However, in the 1960's, even though the Sato faction
took power, it did not go beyond the limits of the Ikeda ideas when all was said
and done. Its only achievement was economic progress. That was because of the
age.
One generation younger, we have the present Fukuda and Suzuki factions. The
Fukuda faction still has a strong element of the anticommunism of Yoshida. In
contrast, the Suzuki faction is more concerned with building the country
- economically. However, the present age calls for a reappearance of Yoshida's
anticommunism. If this happens, what will be Tanaka's role? This relates to
the previously mentioned issue of international relations.
Uchida: With regpect to the Yoshida mainstream--I do not want to use the words
"conservative mainstream"--you spoke of Ikeda and Sato. Sato was indeed one part
of the Yoshida mainstream, but he was also Kishi's actual younger brother.
Ikeda and Sato were definitely of Yoshida's school. At the Yoshida Symposium in
the summer of 1981, Masaaki Kosaka (professor of Kyoto University) was asked:
"Is Suzuki of the Yoshida school?" He replied: "No, the Yoshida school ends with
Ikeda and Sato." I also felt that that was right.
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~
However, looking at the present five ma~or factions, it is clear that the Miki-
Komoto faction and the Nakasone faction are not Yoshida mafnstream. Mr Takabatake
says that the Fukuda faction carries on the line of Sato. But ~ust as Sato was
the "child" of Yoshida and Kishi, Fnkuda is the "child " of Sato and Kishi.
Therefore, it is hard to call this the Yoshida mainstream.
So the remnants of the Yoshida~mainstream are the Ohira and Tanaka factions.
- However, as Mr Iwami mentioned, Tanaka claims he is the last of the Yoshida
followers, but actually he looks down on tt~e Yoshida mainstream. Perhaps only
the Ohira-Suzuki faction is purely Yoshida mainstream. The Ohira faction is very
bureaucratic, very sharp.
Takabatake: The elite bureaucrats.
Uchida: In that respect, the Tanaka faction is not such a sodden, simple group.
I believe it matches Mr Iwami's description.
Takabatake: As far as that goes, just as the Fukuda faction has slipped from the
Yoshida mainstream, the Tanaka faction has slipped from or gone beyond it. It
_ has that aspect.
Uchida: I suppose that is correct.
Committed to Realism
Iwami: That is Mr Takabatake's fourth point. It comes to the issue of whether
Tanaka takes the po~ition of a hawk or a dove in the LDP. However, Tanaka does
not insist on such a distinction. In other words, he is always prepared to push
_ either the hawk button or the dove button depending on which is necessary to
launch the rocket. It is a matter of realism. He is rather straightforward about
it. There is some argument about his present position, but I think he has pushed
the hawk button.
- Takabatake: I see. The Ohira-Suzuki faction is connected to the Ministry of
Finance bureaucrats in particular and believes in the economic rationalism of
those bureaucrats. For example, it insists on a limit of 1 percent of the GNP
for defense spending. From the point of view of economic rationalism, military
industries should not be expanded. The Suzuki faction has consistently maintained
this position. In contrast to this, the Tanaka faction does not take this sort
of thing too seriously, does it? Or does this relate to the quality of bureau-
crats who enter the Tanaka faction?
Iwami: I do not think so.
Takabatake: It doesn't?
Iwami: I must apologize for speculating but I think that if the brakes on
military expansion set up by the Yoshida mainstream are to be removed in the
future by constitutional revision, revision of the U.S.-Japan Mutual
Security Treaty, or reinterpretation of the three antinuclear principles, I
believe that Tanaka has the confidence or sense of mission to think, "I'm the
- onlv one who can do it."
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l'Vl~ Vl'l ~\.aAL~ VVL, Vl\Ll
Takabatake: I also think that is possible for Tanaka himself. Would the
Tanaka faction fall in line, saying, "if that's what the old man thinks, so do
I~n
Iwami: I think it is possible.
Takabatake: Does such an understanding exist when one joins the Tanaka faction?
Is this a diff erence between ~oining the Suzuki faction or the Tanaka faction?
Uchida: I believe this is a question of Tanaka's qualities as a politician. In
other words, Fukuda has certain concepts and ideologies characteristic of
Fukuda. So did Ohira. Tanaka is very spontaneous. Japanese-Soviet problems such
as the northern territories and Siberian development were handled with this
kind of approach. This goes beyond being a hawk or dove. That is the
situation.
We have previously thought that the LDP had a rig~,~w ng tendency and Tanaka
represented the tendency toward control of government through the use of money.
Therefore, we have argued that we have to approve of Fukuda when it comes to
p~litical ethics, but we cannot go along with his tendency toward the right.
But in terms of the use of money in politics, how much of an actual difference is
there between Ikeda-Ohira, Fukuda, and Tanaka? It is simply that in the
bureaucratic factions, these things are carried out with more refinement and do
- not appear on the outside. With Tanaka, it is done more openly. Recently, I
think that our distinction between Fukuda on the one hand and Tanaka on the
other does not really hold up.
- Takabatake: I believe Japan's high-ranking bureaucrats and the Suzuki faction
are economic na*ionalists and are not concerned with ideology. Their first
concern is the pr~sperity of the nation`s people because that is the foundation of
their establishment. Because of this, they do not want to get drawn in`o the
strong anticommunist position of Reagan. Therefore, on an international level,
they have an iron determination to maintain this principle even if Japan is
criticized for not fulfilling its obligations to the free world or is called
commercialistic or irresponsible in its international relations.
Nixon and Kissinger are said to have been completely realistic but their realism
was an anti-Soviet realism. It was not an ideology-free realism. The idea was
to bring in China to reinforce America's declining position in the balance of
power and surround the Soviets. This became more evident with Reagan. Therefore,
Nixon ended the Vietnam war and normalized relations with China. Reagan, on
the other hand, escalated the cold war. But their reasons were the same.
In this respect, Tanaka also has a stronger antico~unist attitude than the high-
ranking bureaucrats. He is though of as a dove because he made peace with China.
However, I believe he just bought China because of one thing--its anti-Soviet
line. Depending on changes in the international situation or in power
relationships, he could take Japan in any direction.
The three antinuclear principles or rearmament would be no problem to him. If
the time came when it was necessary to exceed the limits, they would be exceeded.
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Iwami: When Tanaka was in power, I~elieve Kissinger disliked him. He liked
Ohira and disliked Tanaka. That is because Tanaka and Kissinger resemble each
other in essential ~aays. However, Kissinger now makes visits to Tanaka's private
home in Mejiro as Reagan's emissary. Now that American-Japanese relations have
~ become so troublesome, Kissinger may think that "only Tanaka" can understand the
problems quickly and take effective action.
Takabatake: That was true with China. Therefore, we cannot ignore the
international situation in which China and Reagan hav:; great expectations of
Tanaka.
Iwami: That's probably true.
- The Relationship of Pers~nal Privilege and Democracy
Takabatake: Finally, how are we to evaluate the larger problem of the Tanaka
faction and the system of parliamentary democracy in Japan? I do not think that it
_ is just a problem of democracy being underdeveloped in Japan or of a leniency
toward the use of money for political influence. Mr Iwami discussed this in
comparison to the example of America.
_ Uchida: Theories about Tanaka are in abundance right now. I would like to discuss
t:~o problems in respect to them, One is the argument that what Tanaka did is
representative of Japanese political customs so it is not right to punish Tanaka
alone. At any rate, this is one reason for sympathizing with Tanaka. Mr Iwami
referred to this point in terms of the problem of a crime committed by the prime
= minister. It is impossible to excuse what ranaka did just because it is a common
practice in Japanese politics. This distinction must be strictly made.
Another argument is that Tanaka was the victim of international politics.
Tanaka had to resort to dirty methods to clea~i up the mess made in U.S.-Japanese
relations by Nixon and Sato. So, in the end he was done in by America. That's
how the theory goes. It is a kind of noble outlaw theory. The international
context of the Tanaka problem has been discussed already so I will not go into it
further here. However, there is no way to rationalize the acceptance of the 500
billion yen.
Takabatake: There is something that Mr Iwami did not mer.tion that has bothered
me from the start about the Tanaka problem. If this had happened before the
war, there are two points of criticism that would have emerged. The first is
that a bribe was t=ken in connection with the nation's military. There was the
Siemens incident before the war. This would be a big proble~s from the point
of view of militaristic nationalism.
Uchida: For example, the PC3 problem?
Takabatake: Yes. However, this aspect does not emerge. Nobody seems to think
this is a particular problem. I think this is all right. It is f.ine that we
no longer take a position that means we get upset just because something is
connected with the military.
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On the other hand, the prime minister of the nation is accused of taking a bribe
from a foreign country, from a multinational corporati.on. In the old days, he
- would have been considered a tra~_tor. I do not lj.ke to use the wro rd traitor,
but I do not think we should overlook this dimension. It was different from an
o:dinary bribe. The only thing that comes up is whether he did or didn't take
the S00 billion yen. If one goes to the Niigata Third District, they seem to
think that the fact that he got it from a foreign country is proof of his greatness
ar~d that he contributed 500 billion yen to improving the trade balance. Even the
opposition parties do not make a strict distinction about what was improper. This
is proof that Japanese politics is not ~ndependent under the mutual security
treaty system.
On the other liand, if it comes down to a problem of whether he took money or not,
allowiitg for differences in scale, all of Japan is taking money.
However, in politics, money moves around and connects up with the distribution of
Pavors. If a certain amount is paid, a c2rtain profit will accrue. This has
become general knowledge among the electorate. Before the war, there was no
return. In this respect, the system is a result of democracy. Prof.its and
benefits arise in proportion ta the cost of campaigns and lobbying. This is a
. necessar historical step.
_ Tr~e probl~~ is the next stage in which rules must be made for the methods of
campaigni~ and lobbying. Right now, money is number one and votes are number
tw~~ .
General Lack of Attention to Politics
- 'I'akabatake: However, for the time being, it is mainly the intelligentsia and the
- press who expect to see a purifying effect on this behavior through the action
of the courts. However, it should be possible to expect reform from within the
parties and political circles. And there should be reform effected by the
electorate. A three-part structure must be built up.
- There are various prob7.ems involved in getting this done. The first problem is
~ how much of a reforming function can be expected from the courts. Two
problems of postwar Japanese democracy are the expectation that the courts will
function as a last resort and the complaint that the higher a trial goes in the
= court system, the more the issue is obscured. (laughter) That is probably what
the Tanaka faction is hoping for.
Uchida: At the time of the Hakkai trial, the watchword was: "There's still the
Supreme Co~~rt. In the present case, the LDP and the Tanaka faction seem to be
- saying: "There's still the hearing of final appeal."
Takabatake: There is also the independence of the Public Prosecutor's Office.
If we lay our hopes too much on this, we could be drawn into a police fascism.
Sometimes the police are the leaders in ~ustice, sometimes the instriunents of
oppression.
Uchida: Therefore, it is very dangerous to fall into thinking that the Public
Pr.oser_lltors' Office is always on the side of justice or that the courts are a
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Last refuge of appeal. However, who was responsible for bringing about that way
of thinking? It is just as written in Mr Iwami~s report.
Therefore, to put it boldly, although Tanaka is working hard for a comeback,
after the decision of the court of first instance, even if it is a bit lace, it
would be very good for Tanaka himself and for Japanese politics if he would
announce that he will continue to fight in c~urt but that he will stop the
activities of the Tanaka army corps or resign his post as a member of the Diet.
This may be a vain wish though.
Also, recently a lot of private courts have been appearing in various magazines
(laughter), giving verdicts of guilty or not guilty. That is very bad. Instead
of these courtroom games, the media should, since Tanaka is a politician, make
a comprehensive summary of Tanaka's political performance.
There would then be two other problems to cover in criticizing the politics of
dispensing f avors. One is to accurately reassess what Tanaka's political
performance has been in terms of international politics. The other is the plan
for reconstruction ot the archipelago. I believe that Tanaka had failed
politically before he resigned as a result of the controversy over his financial
entanglements. This comprehensive assessment is lacking so there is the illusion
- that the financial network problem and the Lockheed incident were bad, but Japan
~aould be better off if we let Tanaka have another try at it.
Takabatake: Judging from the sense of Mr Iwami's statement, this is the same
as the "development dictatorship" of the countries of Southeast Asia.
Development is carried out by a barrage of money from above, privfleges are
- concentrated toward the top, and this results in internal corruption. But by
this means the establishment propsers and this situation resembling a dictatorship
can continue indefinitely.
Tanaka demonstrated the working of this kind of Third World dynamics in Japan
during its high growth period. This is a special characteristic.
The Rules of Pressure i'oiitics
Iwami: Close attention is being given only to the idea of Tanaka as a money
worshipper, but the distinctions have not been made clearly between what in his
politics should be rejected, what is a step in development, and what deserves
a positive evaluation.
Also, Takabatake spoke of accepting the use of political favors and the return
of benefits to the electorate as a historical step. This is very important. This
is very important. This relates to the problem of self-discipline in the
political world. If Tanaka were to tell the truth about the postwar history of
Japan and U.S.-Japan relations and advocate the Tanaka idea of justice to the
people of Japan, the people might bow their heads in agreement. Other
politicians might sympathize, saying: "I~m a representative of the same thing.
I also mix money and politics." And they might also make a clean bill concerniu~
Tanaka and Japan's postwar development, Tanaka and U.S.-Japan relations, and the
background of the Lockheed incident. How would that be?
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l V\\ J� � �w.~~ ..-.+u v~ ~r. �
However, although there may be something to what Tanaka might have to say,
democracy is the final standard, as Mr Iwami said. Therefore, the problem is
Tanaka's own self-discipiine, Tanaka's own ability to make impartant distinctions.
Takabatake: I said this c~uld be accepted as a historical step in the sense
that parliamentary democracy actually operates on the basis of profit through
pressure politics even though it is supposed to arrive at rational conclusions
through debate. Democracy has been realized only in this form. I believe that
journalists as well as political scientists have lacked an awareness of this fact.
If this is true, a debate to establish rules for power politics is urgently
needed.
Iwami: They have pretended not to see.
Takabatake: These things were handled behind the scenes. And on the surface,
there were sermons which pointed in a completely different direction, saying only
idealistic things. Therefore, for example, Japan has arrived at the stage where
it should establish something like the American political ethics law. This debate
should be waged in earnest. Otherwise, pressure politics has become so
generally practiced that it seems only natural to take a gift when granting a
request, and a vulgar notion has gained ground that democracy means a flowing
back of profit to the electorate.
If the LDP canrot be counted on to make an effort at self-purification within
political circles, it would seem that all the opposition parties could. But
they are not very impressive either. Therefore, the preblem is not just in the
LDP. Of course, there is the view that Tanaka polluted the party. But the
~ problem for dernocracy f rom now on comes back to establishing rules for this. If
they are not established, we will go back to a troubled period of internal
confusion where the man with the most influence, the strongest connections, and the
largest gifts will win.
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Shimbunsha 1982 '
9651
CSO: 4105138
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
POWER OF LDP SECRETARY GENERAL POSITION ANALYZED
Tokyo GENDAI in Japanese Feb 82 pp 78-90
[Article by Asao Yamaguchi, political commentator: "LDP Secretary General's Super
Power Disclosed"]
[Text] 20-Billion-Yen Party Fund at Disposal
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Executive Board meets every Tuesday and Friday
beginning at 10 am. The meeting is presided over by Secretary General Susumi Nikaido.
Nikaido shows up immediately before the meeting, puffing on his favorite cigar, and
sits down in the center seat. The meeting is usually run by Noboru Takeshita, who
is the acting secretary general. When the discussion gets under way, Nikaido seldom
utters a word. He appears to enjoy the aroma of the cigar smoke which fills the
room. The reason he doesn't say a word is the lack af any controversial issue during
the meeting. Whenever any issue is anticipated, Takeshita usually has a compromise
in hand before the meeting takes place.
"It is just like a Tanaka board meeting. Everyone observes the look on the secretary
general's face as he speaks. With the principal posts secured by the Tanaka faction,
there is no chance that an issue will be raised."
The middle-level cadres of the other factions on the board say they feel stifled by
- pressures from the Tanaka faction.
"There is an utter lack of balance regarding the top three party posts. Chairman
Tatsuo Tanaka of the Executive Counci~ and Chairman Rokusuke Tanaka of the Political
Affairs Research Council are treated like children by the 3ecretary general. The
- chairman of the Executive Council is kept at arm's length, while the chairman of
the Political Affairs Research Council tries desperately to draw close to the
secretary general. We cannot help seeing the clout carried by Secretary General
Nikaido."
_ A veteran Diet member who was seated on the Executive Council by bloc recommendation
described the atmosphere in the council.
The "Sonoda-Tanaka coalition" which has monopolized both the LDP and Diet operations
- with Secretary General Nikaido in the center has solid control over the most important
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NUR UNrl~ir?L UJr. UiVLY
posts and exerts its authority over politics in general. And the shrewd sCrategy
displayed by the Tanaka faction during the cabinet reshuffle last November has been
further sharpened and aimed toward the next goal.
Why was the Tanaka faction so persistent in its support of nominating Nikaido as
secretary general? In a word, it was because it could gain control of the enormous
power which accompanies the post of secretary general--appro~dmately 19.011 billion
yen (1980) in party funds as well as authority regarding personnel affairs (about
200 party posts).
The Tanaka faction is large, with 108 members in the Lower House (including Kakuei
Tanaka himself), but it is extremely difficult to provide them all with adequate
funds and posts.
Michio Watanabe, the incumbent finance minister who hopes to form a"Watanabe faction"
in the near future, said: "FYom the standpoint oi the distribution of funds and
posts, 40 members is probably the optimum number in order to maintain a faction."
A faction is based on the three elements of funds, posts and conditions in its
constituent districts, but the expansion of the Tanaka faction is clearly a violation
of commonsense. Moreover, donation sources for the Tanaka faction such as the
Etsuzankai, the Financial Research Society, the Political and Ec~nomic Research
Society and the Political Friends Society (Seiji Doyukai) are definitely on the de-
cline. Or course, if the danations from Noboru Takeshita and other cadres are in-
- cludeci, the faction is far ahead of the other factions, but the Tanaka faction's
"coffer." is not at all bountiful.
~ The fact that the secretary general's post is the key to ready funds totalling some
19 billion yen is in itself a great attracrion.
Highest Authority in Charge of Party Affairs
How, then, is the position of LDP secretary general defined?
Article 8 of the party rules stipulates: "The secretary general shall assist the
party president and discharge party affairs." The bureaus under the secretary gen-
eral's jurisdiction include the General Affairs Bureau, the Personnel Bureau, the
Accounting Bureau, the Research Bureau and the Registrar's Office. In other words,
_ the secertary general has jurisdiction over the key organizations at the party's
headquarters.
Regarding the party president, article 4, paragraph 2, of the party rules st;ipulates:
"The party president has the highest responsibility in the party. He represents the
party and presides over party affairs." However, the LDP president is also the prime
minister of the cabinet. As a result, the secretary general, who assists the presi-
dent, acts in behalf of the president and discharges party affairs as the person
with the highest responsibility.
In case a party vice president is appointed, article 5, paragraph 2, states: "The
party vice president shall assist the president and discharge the duties of the
president if unforeseen circumstances should befall the president or if he should
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be absent." However, the vice president has no 3urisdiction over any bureau or
department as in the case of the secretary general.
When Hayato Ikeda contracted throat cancer in 1964 and resigned from his post, a
fierce struggle took place regarding his successor involving Eisaku Sato, Ichiro Kono
and Ichiro Fujiyama. The mediators in the struggle were party Vice President Shojiro
Kawashima and Secretary C~eneral Takeo Miki.
Kono was unhappy that only Secretary General Miki among the party's three principal
chairmen acted in a mediating role. He contended: "The three party chairmen manage
party affairs as a trinity. Therefore, it is unfair for the secretary general alone
to be appointed as a mediator."
Of course, in the background of the appointment of Kawashima and Miki as mediators
was the fact that both men were called to Ikeda's sickbed and were asked to "sound
out the opinions within the party (regarding a successor to the presidency) and to
coordinate them." However, it is the rule that in a cabinet reshuffle it 3.s the
vice president, the three parry chairmen and the president of the Upper House Members
Association who take charge of the cabinet-forming headquarters at the prime mtnister's
residence.
From this standpoint, Kono's contention that the three party chairmen should receive
equal treatment regarding personnel affairs sounds plausible. But from the stand-
_ point of party rules, there is a wide variation in the authority of the secretary
general and that of the chairman of the Executive Council and the chairman of the
Political Affairs Research Council.
It is stipulated (in article 39) that "the Executive Council shall deliberate and
render decisions on important matters concerning party operations and Diet activities."
It is literally a decision-making organ concerning party resolutions. The duty of
the Executive Council chairman consists in "convening the Executive Council and
managing its operations as its president." It is also stipulated that "a resolution
by r.hP Execu*ivc C~~~nc~i requir.es ~:;~;,:i~y quoruni of ~t~ meud~ers, and in case uf
a deadlock the president (Executive Cosncil chairman) casts the deciding vote."
In effect, the Executive Council chairman is limited to managing the operations of
the council and to exercising his authority in case of a vote deadlock.
As for the Political Affairs Research Council, "resolutions which the party adopts
as policy must be deliberated by the council (article 43)" and the council r~hairman
"shali manage the operations uf the council." He also "shall convene deliberative
sessions and manage them as president."
There is no reference to the Executive Council chairtnan or the Polit~cal Affairs
- Research Council chairman indicating their strong authority to "execute" operations
as in the case of the secretary general.
"LDP-Jack" by the Tanaka P'action
Regarding criticism of Nikaido's appointment as secretary general, Prime Minister
_ Suzuki said: "Mr Nikaido has made serious efforts in behalf of the party and the
- nation as chairn~an of the Executive Council. All three party posts are important
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rUK Vrrt~,if+~ v~~ Uiri,i
and it malces no differ.ence whether a person is secretary general or chairman of the
Executive Council. I believe this is clear whea people understgnd the party organi-
zation and operations." Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly a weak evasion on the part
of the pY~ma minister.
Takeshita, who assists Nikaido as acting secretary general, began by saying: "I in-
tend to do my best under Mr Nikaido," and continued: "The title follows the man.
As you know, Mr Nikaido was considered as a secretary general in substance even when
he was Executive Council chairman." He thus emphasized that there has been no
special change since Nikaido became secretary general.
Certainly, as Takeshita pointed out, a post is created by the person. The person's
political capability can create an influence exceeding the authority given to him.
It is said: "Takeshita has boasted that he will not relinquish the executive de-
partment until 1983, whan the political battle is over" (reporter assigned to the
Tanaka f action).
Speaking of 1983, the unified regional elections in April, the Upper House elections
in June and the dissolution of the Lower House are expected in that year. Before
that, the court decisions on the Lockheed scandal and the riarubeni pipeline (Kakuei
Tanaka, et al) case this fall, in addition to the LDP presidential public election,
are pending. Of course, prior to that, court decisions will be handed down on Tokuji
- Wakasa and others of the Lockheed affair and the A11 Japan Airways pipeline involve-
ment on 2b January this year, followed by decisions on Tomisaburo Hashimoto and
Takayuki Sato in February. At the same time the exchange of cash bribes among Nikaido
and other "grey officials" will be clarified. During the next 2 years, serious
political upheavals are expected in succession without respite.
With the Lockheed trials and the political schedule in mind, Secretary General
Nikaido is a"strategic gem" produced by the Tanaka faction.
In addition to the secretary general, the Tanaka faction placed Takeshita as acting
secretary genCral, Hajime Tamurd as Diet Policy Committee chairtnan, Hideo Utsumi
as chairman of the Lower House Steering Com�nittee and Tokuro Adachi as president
of the Diet Members Association. It has not only gained control of the party and
Diet operations, but it also won the reappoint~xent of Yoshiro Hayashi as chief of
the Accounting Bureau--the watchdog of the party's coffer. Also, Motohiho Kanai is
chairman of the party's Discipline Co~ittee.
It is no wonder that the other factions complain: "Zt i.s like an 'LDP-jack' by the
Tanaka faction" (Fukuda faction cadre).
Of course, regarding the appointment of the Accounting Bureau chief, "negotiations
were held with the Tanaka faction to name Eisaku Sumi, but the talks failed" (Suzuki
faction cadre).
At this rate, it is not clear which is the prime minister's faction. The LDP has
ruled for a quarter century since the conservative coalition in 1955, but there has
been no precedent where the prime minister's faction has relinenerald the Diets of
not only the secretary general but also the acting secretary g ~
Policy Committee chairman and the Accounting Bureau chief, and where they have been
monopolized by a single faction. It is a veritable control of the LDP by the Tanaka
faction through numbers.
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Aggressive Building of a Pipeline to the Opposition
If, as Takeshita has s tated publicly, the Tanaka faction continues to control the
LDP for the next 2 years, what will happen to Japan's political direction?
This writer's hypothesis is that, first, there wil? probably be a dissolution of the
Lower House and a general election prior to a co:;~~t decision in the Tanaka trial.
The basic replies to questioning during the extraordinary investigation in July would
provide grounds for a dissolution, including the issue of dividing up the National
Railway Corporation, which would be unacceptable to the Japan Socialist Party (JSP)
and others. Also, the Komeito, the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and the Japan
Communist Party (JCP) would oppose a realignment of the national election districts
~ (to a system proportionate to the memberships for the Upp~r House, and there would
be no lack of issues durin~ the extraordinary Diet session. Moreover, the chairman
of the LDP's electoral system investigation co~ittee is Masaharu Gotoda of the
Tanaka faction.
If a general election is held before a decision in the Tanaka trial, the Tanaka fac-
tion, which controls the Executive Board, has a definite advantage and there would
be no change for the next 4 years. If ttie party should receive a setback in the
elections, it would be Prime Minister Suzuki who would be blamed. If the party should
come out ahead, Suzuki's reelection to the party presidency would be a foregone con-
clusion, while any upheaval within the Tanaka faction in the event of a party defeat
would be kept to a minimum,
Also, if the realignment of national districts for the Upper House should be carried
uut, the Tanaka faction would be favored in an Upper House election also next year.
The second possibility is an approach to the opposition.
"Even if the elements within the LDP critical of Tanaka were cut off, the adminis-
tration could retain power by courting the opposition. The Nikaido-Takeshita-Tamura
line could be interpreted as an arrangement toward such a purpose" (Suzu':ci faction
cadre).
Even the Suzuki faction cadres are apprehensive about the maneuvers of the Nikaido
Executive Board,
Speaking of the opposition, not only the DSP, which is said to be farther right than
the LDP, but also the Komeito at its party convention last Decetnber, recognized the
existence of the Self Defense Force (SDF) in connection with the defense power build-
- up issue. The Komeito went on to emphasize the constitutionality of the SDF and
- evidently declared its intention to study the possibility of collaboration with the
LDP,
The close relationshi.p between the Tanaka faction azd the Komeito has been well known
in political circles as an established fact since the free speech and publication
issue of the Sokagakkai and Komeito in 1970. The Nikaido-Takeiiri meeting held
in Beijing last September attracted attention from the standpoint of underscoring
the relations between the two parties.
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H~UR U!~'b'1l:lAL UJ~: UNLY
' Regarding such speculation, Takeshita stated: "Mr Nikaido's pet goal is to cultivate
the sound parties, excluding th~ JCP and the JSP leftwing, as part of our system.
From this standpoint we welcome the clarification by the Komeito at its convention
last year regarding its position on the constitutionality of the SDF, which establishes
_ its position as a party within our system." He also declared: "In fact, we are
maintaining cooperative contacts with opposition party cadres."
- The Nikaido Executive Board not only controls the LDP, but also is aggressively
building a pipeline to the opposition.
The common view in political circles is that "LDP funds are probably being used for
moves toward the opposition parties" (LDP Diet member who is a former member of the
Diet Steering Committee).
Rob Peter To Pay Paul at the Expense of Financial Circles
In order to write this article, the writer requested a large number of prominent Di.et
members of the LDP to comment and offer their opinions of the secretary general.
However, the moment the secretary general was mentioned, they either begged off or
asked for "anonymity." This is the first time the writer has had such an experience.
The impression gained was that the LDP members were completely intimidated regarding
Secretary General Nikaido and his "Sonoda-Tanaka coalition."
The Diet members who agreed to be interviewed unanimously pointed out that ~"the
secretary general can do as he pleases with party funds and posts."
How m~~ ~:h f unds , then, does the LDP have?
As mentioned before, the party revenue totalled about 19.011 billion yen in 1980,
approximately 15.224 billion yen in 1979, and about 11.293 billion yen i.n 1978.
- Practica.lly all of the revenue comes from donations by financial and economi.c organ-
izations channeled through the National Political Association, as legislative in-
vestigation funds for members of the Upper and Lower Houses (presently 600,000 yen
per member per month) defrayed by the national treasury or as party costs and revenue
from its organ publications (JTYU SHIMPO and the monthly JIYU MINSHU).
However, in the c~se of the LDP, whenever special funds are needed such as for
elections, it can request increased donations from financial circles or bozrow a lump
sum from the Banking Association. This is another prerogative as a government party,
and its revenue (including loans) could be said to be unlimited. In this case, also,
it is up to the discretion of the secretary general.
Of course, like a nation's deficit bond issues, the LDP carries an annual defici.t of
5-10 billion yen. Deficit financing stays in a certain condition of paralysis. Since
most of the deficit is paid by donations, the repayment of debts must inevitably
depend on donations. Peter in the form of financial circles is robbed to pay Paul
- and there is no need to worry over trivials.
In fact, a typical case of debt financing was reportedly carried out by Secretary
General Tomisaburo Hashimoto during the Tanaka regime. When Hashimoto succeeded
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Secretary General Shigeru Hori of the Sato government ~.n July 1972, the deficit was
about 6.4 billion yen. And 2 years and 4 months later, Hashimoto had increased the
deficit to about 11.3 billion yen.
According to testimony by a cadre Diet member of the Nakasone faction, when he visited
Hashimoto at the secretary general's office during the 1972 general elections and re-
quested support funds, Hashimoto immediately asked: "One or two?" When the Diet
member looked confused, two packs of 1 million yen each in cash were brought from the
safe snd he was told: "Do your best with these." One pack ("hitotsu") contains 1
million yen while one bundle ("ippon") contains 10 million yen.
During the 1974 Upper House elections, the Tanaka cabinet staked i.ts life on the
election campaign. Hashimoto, who was at the helm, joined hands with the business
world and eagerly sought out "talented candidates" from the media and entertainment
world. At the time, it was already rumored that 100 million yen would be needed for
the candidates in the national districts alone.
One "talented candidate" (a professional sportsman) who was persuaded by Hashimoto
to run said: "He told me he would take care of all expenses and provide campaign
supporters. All I had to do was to run. I had heard that I would need at least
100 million yen, but I didn't know how far I could rely on his promise."
Hashimoto did not set any limit on election spending. Even the LDP campaign workers
confided: "Those were the good days. We didn't have to worry about money when
travelling to the regional areas."
However, the LDP took a beating in that Upper House election, narrowing the gap be-
tween tha ruling party and the opposition in the Upper House to a mere seven seats.
In the aftermath there was increased criticism regarding the money connections and
a demand for Tanaka's resignation.
Signature Opens Door to Unlimited Spending
Yoshio Sakurauchi switched from secretary general to foreign minister as a result
of the cabinet reshuffle last Noveaiber. At his. last press conference as secretary
ganeral, he boasted: "I was told by my predecessor (Kunikichi Saito) that managing
party dzbts was a big headache, but I was able to tell my successor, Mr Nikaido, to
rest assured because all the debts had been repaid,"
Sakurauchi's tenure as secretary general was exactly 2 years. During that time,
the joint Upper and Lower House elections were held in Jun~ 1980, resulting in an
overwhelming party victory. Moreover, about 5 billion yen worth of debts were paid,
which marks him as an outstanding secretary general. However, no one within the
party has rated him as such. If he were in the private sector, he would probably
been called an excellent manager.
On the contrary, cadres of the Komoto faction have advanced the view that "with the
post of guardian of the coffer (Accounting Bureau chief) secured by the Tanaka
faction (Yoshiro Hayashi), even the secretary general did not have free access to
party funds," Although the debts were paid, it was not because of the secretary
general's prowess,
_
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N~UR UN'H'lC lAL UJ~: UtVLY
- When Accounting Bureau Chief Hayashi was asked about the circumstances resulting in
the payment of debts, he replied: "Party finances cannot be considered in the same
light as the balancesheet of a business concern. The revenue reports submitted to
the Home Affairs Ministry are nothing but annual progress reports."
Of course, to be without debts is certainly desirable, but there is no sense of
scruples against borrowing money from business concerns and banks when necessary.
The LDP bank vault is placed in the Accounting Bureau on the second floor of LDP
headquarters. Donations from the National Political Association are generally de-
posited in a bank. The Accounting Bureau withdraws the money as necessary. Except
for special cases such as elections, not much cash is kept in the vault.
"Leaving cash in the vault means it accrues no interest. An LDP accounting chief
who does such a stupid thing should be fired."
Yoshio Sakurauchi spoke with a confident laugh.
However, according to LDP revenue reports submitted to the Home Affairs Ministry,
Secretary General Kunikichi Saito of the Ohira cabinet received funds for organi-
zational activity 48 times in approximately a year, from 7 December 1978 to
16 November I979, totalling 472 million yen.
In December 1978, when he had just assumed the post of secretary general, he made
10 withdrawals totalling 142 million yen during a 1-month period.
"December 1978 means it was just after the party president preliminary e'lection.
The money was probably spent to fix up things in the aftermath, although this is
just my guess" (Fukuda f action cadre).
The reason such a pos~ibility occurs to him is because the system permi.ts the sec-
retary general to draw money out as he sees fit.
- During the general elections of October 1979, the money withdrawn in September alone
reached 167.3 million yen in 10 withdrawals, Of course, they were undoubtedly dis-
tributed as election campaign funds, but the breakdown of amounts received remains
unclear.
Masayoshi Ito (former foreign minister) has served as both Accounting Bureau chief
and Party Finance Committee chairman, and according to him: "During the elections,
I was told I would be given special treatment and I was grateful, but I looked into
an old ledger and discovered my treatment was no different from that of others."
- It would still not be so bad if they were recorded, but when the distributions are
made on the secretary general's signature alone, there is no way to ascertain the
accounts.
Yet in 1979, 4.655 billion yen was spent as election-related expenses. Actually,
election-related expenses entail various kinds of expenses.
Diet Policy Expenses Include Mahjong Costs
Approximately 100 million yen was spent annua.lly in the final period of the Sato cab-
inet and during the Tanaka government as Diet policy implementation expenses. The
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- LDP Diet Policy Committee chairman reportedly filled hie wallet with yen bills,
played mahjong with opposition Diet members at his favorite "geisha" restaurant
and deliberately lost the games.
Especially at the Diet session in October 1967 to ratify the Japan-South Korea treaty,
it was rumored that money in eight digits was distributed to Diet policy cadres of
opposition parties.
Secretary General Yano of the Komeito, who was elected to the Lower House for the
first time in the January 1967 general elections, in making his initial speech before
the budget committee, lashed out at the LDP for its ties to opposition Diet members
through the use of Diet policy funds, but he met a concerted counterattack from both
government and opposition party Diet members and failed in his disclosure effort.
Nonetheless, the item "Diet policy funds" has recently been omitted in the LDP revenue
reports submitted to the Home Affairs Ministry.
Only six items of expenditure under "political activity expenses" are listed: organ-
_ izational activity expenses, election-related expenses, organ publications expenses,
research expenses, donations and grants, and ether expenses.
The rea~on is that the custom of entertaining opposition Diet members in restaurants
and at mahjong games is still an effective weapon of Diet policy for the LDP today.
However, a perusal of the revenue reports reveals a curious fact. Secretary General
Sakurauchi's organizational activity expenses paid out in only two handouts during
his approximately 2-year tenure beginning in November 1979 was, surprisingly, a mere
3 million yen.
Although Sakurauchi was in charge of the joint Upper and Lowex House elections, he
apparently engaged in hardly any organizational activity.
Accounting Bureau Chief Hayashi was asked about this.
"I was not bureau chief when Mr Kunikichi Saito was secretary general, so T wouldn't
know, but the key issue is essentially the matter of receipts. Should the secretary
general write the receipts himself and just hand over the money, or should he, as in
Mr Sakurauchi's case, have the recipient write the receipt? I think there was this
difference in handling."
It does sound reasonable. However, actually there was a considerable difference.
In Saito's case he was spending money for the maintenance and stability of the ~ha.ra
_ government as secretary general, representing the Ohira faction of the government
party. It is more effective far the secretary general to pass the money to Diet
members at his own discretion rather than to have them submit receipts directly.
On the other hand, Sakurauchi was as it were a"hired madam." If he were to spend
money for his own faction (Nakasone faction), the Accounting Bureau chief would re-
port it to the party president and he would be severely criticized by the other
factions. Sakurauchi virtually relinquished hia discretionary power as secretary
general. That is probably why he was able to pay up the party debts.
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The secretary general's power is not limited to dispensing funds. As the real power
in party affairs, he has enormous clout in extraparty affairs.
During the shipbuilding industry scandal in 1954, it oecame evident that Eisaku Sato,
then secretary general of the Yoshida government's Liberal Party (Jiyuto), received
2 million yen from four shipbuilding companies in connection with the enactment of
the shipbuilding interest and subsidy law, and Justice Minister Inukai esercised his
command authority prior to Mr Sato's arrest. It is a well-known incident, but the
secretary general has the most clout in bringing legislative bills and policies to
fruition.
Jurisdiction Over All Personnel Affairs:Except the Cabinet's
On 9 December last year, the three top party chairmen, including Nikaido, paid a
courtesy visit to the heads of four financial organizations and held discussions with
them. At the time, the financial leaders displayed fierce opposition to the proposal
to increase corporate taxes (including a review of special tax measures, lowering of
mortgage funds for bad debts and transfer rates of funds for retirement wages, and
an increase of taxes on entertainment costs).
Nikaido responded: "The party will consider this issue independently," and he adopted
a different posture from that of the government, which attracted attention at the
time. Subsequent events showed that the government, which had originally expected
increased revenue of about 450 billion yen from corporate taxes, eventually took in
about 350 billiori yen. It was a compromise of 100 billion yen, which was the result
of opposition from Nikaido and others.
To give an ordinary example, it is not an overstatement to say that if the secretary
general is against it, no bill or policy has a chance of being passed. Especially
the Nikaido coalition, which has placed its people in posts ranging from Diet Policy
Committee chairman to Diet Steering Committee chai~an, has nothing to fear. The
Suzuki cabinet is like a puppet regime of the Tanaka faction, and Nikaido's power
surpasses that of Suzuki. In the 26-year history of the LDP, there has never been
such a powerful secretary general. It is the first time a secretary general has
outranked a party president (prime minister).
Tl~e official schedule of the LDP secretary general is as follows: Monday--meeting
with leaders of the government party (noon); Tuesday--board meeting (10 am),
Executive Council meeting (11 am); Wednesday--government party liaison meeting (noon);
Thursday--various duties; Friday--board meeting (10 am), Executive Council meeting
(11 am); Saturday and Sunday--trips to outlying regions (political, economic and
cultural parties sponsored by prefectural liaison commj.ttees, etc)~.
In addition, a daily press conference is held at noon (at the Hirakawa Club) and a
discussion meeting with the press once a week. The number of unofficial meetings
is limitless.
"The secretary general's job is a tough one. ~ven I am extremely busy with ury
schedule. In any case, not a day passes without the secretary general's office bea.ng
busy all day with visitors," Takeshita explained as he displayed a schedule pad full
of appointments.
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_ Nonetheless, the most important task of a secretary general is, after all, decisions
- on personnel appointments other than those of cabinet ffiembers. There are intraparty
ap~~ointments includi~ig parliamentary vice ministers, chairmen and vice chairmen of
_ the subcommittees in the Political Affairs Research Council, the chairman of the
- Research Cor,~mi.ttee and the chairman of the Special Committee. There is also the
selection of the chairmen of the Diet standing committees and the directors. There
are more than 200 posts, and the secretary general is responsible for the designation
of all LDP members of the Upper and Lower Houses, except for a few including the cab-
inet posts and the top three party chairmen.
Of course, like the appointment of cabinet posts, the selection of these posts be-
comes the center of factional differences and fierce competition.
Last year a fierce struggle evolved as usual between the factions over appointments
to parliamentary vice ministerial posts.
"The first plan (on the distribution of posts) that was presented was simply un-
acceptable. The Tanaka faction had monopolized virtually all of the important posi-
- tions" (Fukuda faction cadre).
Final talks on the selection of parlimentary vice ministers are held among the deputy
secretary generals representing the various factions. In the case of the Lower House,
a candidate for parliamentary vice minister must have been elected three times. In
the case of the Upper House, a candidate who has been elected once but is qualified
for reelection 2 years later is considered.
The most popular parliamentary vice ministerial posts are those which belong to class
A, including the chief and deputy chief of the Secretariat, followed by the vice
ministers of finance, tnternational trade and industry, and agriculture and forestry.
Those in class B are the vice ministers of construction, welfare, foreign affairs,
and postal and telecommunications. Class C includes the vice ministers of education,
transportati~*_:; defense (agency) and general affairs. Last year the parliamentary
vice ministzrial posts were allocated to the powerful factions in order and in
accordance with the popularity of the posts.
"It appears that rIr Nikaido had practically no involvement in the appoa.ntment of the
parliamentary vice ministers, Even though Takeshita ostensibly had a hand, they
were actually decided by Tatsuo Ozawa" (Nakasone faction cadre).
This was possible because the Tanaka faction controls the secretary general. None-
thel~ss.~~iessrs Nakasone and Komoto are unhappy that the appointments went predominantly
to the Tanaka, Suzuki and Fukuda factions.
Secretary Generals Have High Rate of Promotion
tllthougti the Tanaka f action did make some compromises, the appointments to the
directorships of the Political Affairs Research Council subcommittees were conducted
under the leadership of the Tanaka faction. None of the su;~committee chairs were
gained by the Nakasone faction.
It is stipulated in party rules that "the chairmen and vice chai:-men of the council
subcommittees are decided by the chairman of the Political Affairs Kesearch Council
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with the approval of the Executive Council." However, Tatsuo Tanaka, the Executive
Council chairman, was not consulted at all. The Fukuda faction protested to the
prime minister's office, but it was too late to do anything.
, Another important task of the secretary general is election policy. The General
Affairs Bureau chief is the person who gathers data and inFormation on a daily basis.
The present buzeau chief is Eisaku Sumi, but he is under the secretary general's
jurisdiction.
The person who held the position of General Affairs Bureau chief in the LDP longest
was Seisuke Okuno. He served for 4 years and was part of a famous pair, with Kakuei
Tanaka. Okuno is said to have utilized his connections among former Home Affairs
Ministry bureaucrats and he had an ear into trends in regional polit3.ca1 circles.
- He not only fielded Shunichi Suzuki as governor of Tokyo Prefecture, but the recent
appointment of former Home Affairs Ministry bureaucrats as heads of regional self-
- governing bodies is said to be due to Okuno's intercession. He is responsible for
the collapse of reformist self-governing bodies.
Sumi is a former bureaucrat who served in the Labor Ministry but has connections among
former Home Affairs Ministry bureaucrats. It will bear watching how he performs.
- Relations with other parties are handled by the Research Bureau, which is also under
the secretary general's jurisdiction. Gentaro Nakajima of the Fukuda faction is the
- new Research Bureau chief. His predecessor, Hiroshi Mitsuka, received a complaint
fr~m the "Society to Correct the Social Evils of the Sokagakkai" and he earnestly
tried to sutmmon Daisaku Ikeda to the Diet to investigate the Komeito's use of dummy
votes. He eventually ran up against the Executive Board and failed. However, Mi.tsuka
reportedly mobilized the Research Bureau employees in charge of the Komeito and
collected "testimony" from 100 former members of the Sokagakkai who had actually
used dummy votes.
The Research Bureau, which is comprised of groups of two or three members each frorn
the various political parties, collects data and information in close cooperation
with the mass media as well as with data-gathering government organs such as the
Cabinet Research Office.
"When I was chief of the Research Bureau, I thoroughly investigated the election tac-
- tics of the Japan Communist Party. The LDP Research Bureau was inadequa.te, so I used
- data from the National Police Agency and the Public Safety Research Agency as refer-
- ence. The Research Bureau's information must have contributed significantly to
measures for coping with the opposition and to election measures" (cadre Diet member
and former Research Bureau member).
Various kinds of information are thus forwarded to the secretary general.
111e LDP's election measures and the selection of candidates are carefully considered
on the basis of such information. In particular, new and promising candidates are
grab~ed up by the secretary general's faction.
This is made clear when one analyzes the winners from the most powerful factions.
The Tanaka faction has the most five-time winners, with 14. Of these, two (Tokujiro
i:osaka and Eiji Nonalca) are "outsiders" who recently joined the Tanaka faction, but
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the remaining 12 were elected during the 1969 general elections when Kakuei Tanaka
was secretary general.
The Nakasone faction has the most three-time winners, with 10 who were elected during
the 1976 general elections. Nakasone served as secretary general until the eve of
the elections.
The Suzuki faction (Ohira faction) has the most two-time repeaters, with 12 who were
elected during the 1979 general elections, at the time Ohira was prime mi.nister.
He had himself served as secretary general for 2 years in the Fukuda cabinet, but
after taking over the government and appointing his henchman Kunikichi Saito as
secretary general, he took charge of the general electiona himself. This resulted
in the elections being run by the party president and the secretary general icogether.
Meanwhile, problems sometimes arise out of petitions for public endorsement from
factions other than the secretary general's faction. For example, if the secretary
- general's faction fields a newcomer candidate and there is a profusion of candidates
- from the other factions, a situation arises where coordination becomes impossible.
"In a case where it is disadvantageous to the secretary general's faction, no amount
of effort can convince him to convene the Election Policy Commi.ttee. In the meantime,
an unofficial announcement is made. In my case, I was unable to coordinate the sit-
uation because of the profusion of conservative candidates, ~ut after the start of
- the election campaign, only candidates of the secretary general's faction received
party certification. It was a great handicap and I had a most difficult time. It
is my dream to become secretary general some day and pick candidates for publi.c
endorsement" (young Diet member).
Secretary General Steppingstone to Party President
The secretary general is truly almighty as far as party operations are concerned.
The feelings of the LDP Diet members in wishing to "become secretary general some
day" is understandable.
A look at the list of secretary generals since the conservative merger in I955 reveals
that thei�~ has been a considerable change in accordance with the conditions of the
times.
7.'he 10 prime ministers under the LDP aegis are: Ichiro Hatoyama, Tanzan Ishibashz,
Nobusuke Kishi, Hayato Ikeda, Eisaku Sato, Kakuei Tanaka, Takeo Miki, Takeo Fukuda,
Masayoshi Ohira and Zenko Suzuki. Among them, only Ishibashi and Suzuki never had
experience as secretary general. It is no wonder that the secretary general is con-
sidered a stepping stone to party president.
However, during the 26-year history of the LDP there have been 15 secretary generals.
They are: Nobusuke Kishi, Takeo Miki, Shojiro Kawashima, Takeo Fukuda, Shuj3. Masutani,
Shigezaburo Maeo, Kakuei Tanaka, Shigeru Hori, Tomisaburo Hashimoto, Susumu Nikaido,
~ Yasuhiro Nakasone, Tsuneo Uchida, Masayoshi Ohira, Kunikichi Saito and Yoshio
Sakurauchi. Among them, five went on to become prime ministers and party presidents.
They were Kishi, Miki, Fukuda, Tanaka and Ohira. Their tenures vary, but their
experiences as secretary general did not automatically open the way to the post of
prime minister.
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~ I would classify the 15 secretary generals into five groups.
The first group would be categorized as the prewar or "party man type." Shuji
Masutani, Shojiro Kawashima and Shigeru Hori belong to this category. They con-
sidered being secretary general the highest honor as a party politician, did not
_ entertain any ambitions to become prime minister and party president, and merely
endeavored to use their political abilities to the fullest.
The second group would be called the "ruler type." By becoming secretary general
they cut their paths to the post of prime minister and party president. Nobusuke
Kishi, Kakuei Tanaka and Takeo Fukuda belong to this category. Although they were
all different, Kishi and Tanaka used their authority as secretary general to the hilt
in cultivating their own factional power and could be called the "self-cultivating
type." Fukuda could be said to have used service as secretary general under Kishi
and Sato as a"period of learning" in order to become prime minister.
The third group gave priority consideration to intraparty affairs of the LDP and
would be called the "guardian deity type." Takeo Miki, Yasuhiro Nakasone and
Masayoshi Ohira belong to this category.. I~iiki was secretary general during the
Ishibashi and Ikeda regimes. During the Ikeda administration, when a bogged-down
factional strife occurred in the party president public election prior to Ikeda's
election to a third term, Miki, who was chairman of the Organization Research Council,
drafted the "Miki reply" on party modernization centering on the dissolution of
factions and was appointed secretary general to implement party modernization. He
was probably a secretary general who was born not by the will of the party president
(Ikeda), but from factional strife.
Nakasone served as secretary in the Miki cabinet, which was born as a bolt from the
blue when Tanaka resigned because of money politics. Like party president Miki, he
was nominated by Deputy President Etsuzaburo Shiina, but he really owed his appoint-
ment to Tanaka's money politics.
- Ohira was secretary general in the Fukuda cabinet. Since the advent of the "Fukuda-
Ohira coalition" was instrumental in forcing the resignation of the Miki cabinet,
a formula of divided rule was agreed upon with Fukuda regarding the cabinet and the
party. It was the most stable period since the Sato administration in terms of a
balance of power.
However, in the preliminaries of the November 1978 party president public election,
Ohira turned the tables on Fukuda to win by gaining the full support of the Tanaka
faction. Nonetheless, he is a good example of the power held by a secretary general.
Incidentally, during his tenure as secretary general Ohira appointed Kuniki.chi. Sait~
as the senior deputy secretary general and Masayoshi Ito as the Finance Bureau chief,
ttius garnering the top party posts for the Ohira faction.
Maeo and Hashimoto Were Selfless and Dedicated
The fourth group are classified as the "head clerk type." Shigezaburo rfaeo, Tomisaburo
Hashimoto and Kunikichi Saito belong to this category. Although he served only for
a short period, Nikaido was in this category toward the end of the Tanaka government.
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Each member of this group served with selfless dedication as the righthand man to
the party president. From the standpoint of the principle of the party cabinet
system, this type is probably the ideal secretary general.
Maeo, who was secretary general in the Ikeda cabinet, had a relationship of highest
trust with Ikeda. His actions were deemed by not only the Ikeda faction but also
by the entire party to represent Ikeda's will, and there was not an inch of cleavage
between the two. No other party president and secretary general have been so closely
united.
In comparison to Maeo, Hashimoto was also in unison with the party president (Tanaka),
but in many respects he was under Tanaka's command and acted more like a puppet.
There is doubt as to how much he exercised his authority as secretary general and
acted under his own volition. Of course, it probably ste~ed from Tanaka's strong
personality as party president and, at the same time, no one except Hashimto might
have been able to serve under Tanaka.
Nikaido was secretary general for less than a month and his tenure ended without
any achievements as secretary general. However, if his tenure had been longer, he
might have demonstrated his ability as a"head clerk type" of secretary general like
Maeo in the Ikeda cabinet.
Kunikichi Saito became secretary general with the advent of the Ohira government.
He was the only secretary general to ignore the rule of "separation of the party
president and the secretary general" (to avoid the appointment of a secretary general
from the party president's faction), which had been an understanding within the party
since the start of the Miki cabinet.
Ohira's view was that "the understanding on the separation is applicable when the
party president is chosen by mutual consent, but it is not when he is picked in an
election (in this case, a preliminary election)." He advocated the unity of the
party president and the secretary general. At first, Zenko Suzuki was proposed as
the candidate for secretary general, but there was fierce resistance from the Fukuda,
Nakasone and Miki factions, and the less controversial Saito was appointed. Of course,
later developments indicated that Saito was probably Ohira's real choice.
Saito had served as the ranking deputy secretary general under Secretary General
Ohira in the Fukuda cabinet, and Ohira had been impr~ssed with Saito's capability.
Is Nikaido the "Fruitless Flower" of the Lockheed Scandal?
Finally, the fifth group would be classified as the "practical type." Tsuneo Uchida
and Yoshio Sakurauchi belong to this group. Both served as secretary general since
the Miki government and were products of the understanding on the separation between
the party president and the secretary general.
Of course, Ohira and Nakasone were both secrr.~tary general under the separation
understanding also, but in their cases the party president was not particularly
enthusiastic about their appointment and was more or less obliged to select them
because of intraparty circumstances.
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In this respect Uchida and Sakurauchi were picked by the party president under
similar circumstances as alternatives under the separation understanding. These
two did not have any strong factional attachment and were chosen for their depend-
ability rather than their political acumen.
On the other hand, when intraparty struggles occur, they tend to lack powers of co-
ordination and arbitration because of an inadequate factional base. Z'herefore, the
"practical t}~pe" cannot avoid the fate of being a"lightweight secretary general."
Meanwhile, to which group does the present Secretary General Nikaido belong? As a
matter of form, the principle of separation between the party president and the
secretary general undoubtedly applies, but he is different from the "guardian diety
type represented by Ohira and Nakasone. The reason is that there is no intraparty
factor which makes Nikaido an inevitable choice as secretary general. On the other
hand, neither is he a practical type like Uchida and Sakurauchi.
Based on the circumstances surrounding his appointment, Nikai~io could.be said to be
a new type of secretar; general. Of course, it ~ay sound paradoxical, but it would
be a different story if one thought that party President Suzuki had sold himself to
the Tanaka faction. Considering the circumstances when he turned the party completely
over to the Tanaka faction, this theory makes sense. However, since Nikaido does
not consider himself as Suzuki's clerk or follower, he does not belong to the "head
clerk type."
Although Secretary General Nikaido can only be analyzed on the basis of results, he
certainly has extremely "drastic" attributes worthy of being described as an "LDP-
jack breed" of secretary general.
Is Secretary General Nikaido a"fruitless flower" who has appeared on the scene as
a last resort amid critical circumstances pointing to a certain Tanaka conviction
in the Lockheed trials? It must have been a desperate chance taken by party President
Suzuki. There is no telling but that he might overcome the Lockheed affair, succeed
in reelecting Suzuki and become a secretary general with a contract for the party
presidency." The political direction by the end of the year should clarify this
point.
COPYRIGHT: Kodansh~a 1982
5884
CSO: 4105/52
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
EXTENT OF COOPERATIVE VENTURES WITH FOREIGN COMPANIES NOTED
Tokyo SHUKAN TOYO KEIZAI in Japanese 26 Dec 81-2 Jan 82 p 108-119
[Text] Japanese industry has been criticized for not having originality and for
importing all its basic technology. But the level of its technology and managerial
capability has reached top world rank. There have been repeated efforts to change
the humiliating unequal contracts common a short time ago, and a correct evaluation
of Japanese industry is being established. At the same time, Japan has advanced
further, and the world is amazed at the high technology and the high level of
production and of production control technology in Japan. On the basis of this
technology, Japanese industry is now in a position to take the initiative, and new
international collaborative relationships are being established. This situation
is examined below.
--Fujitsu-ICL: Era of U.S.-Japanese Confrontation Heralded by Technological
Assistance to Europe
On 7 December, a technological assistance agreement was signed in London between
Fujitsu and the British firm ICL (International Computer Limited). It contained
_ the follo~aing provisions. 1) The use of Fujitsu technology will be allowed in
the large computer to be developed by ICL, and F~~itsu will build the main
computer. 2) Fujitsu will develop and supply the LSI's to be used in the small
- computer being developed by ICL. 3) ICL will market Fujitsu's newest ultra-large-
size computers, the M380 and M382, and sell them under its own brand. 4) Fujitsu
, will continue to offer technological cooperation to ICL in the future.
ICL is the nationa:~ British computer manufacturer. It expanded on the basis of
government financial assistance and a government "buy British" policy and kept
IBM's market share under 50 percent.
However, ICL has been unable to keep up with the rapid tide of technological
innovation. With the added problems of a rising pound and inflation, its profits
decreased in 1980. Then, beginning in January 1981, the government abandoned
its policy of preferential purchasing and orders fell off. More than 5,000
employees were laid off in May 1981, and the company was in the red by 40 billion
yen at the end of the accounting period ending in Septembe.r 1981.
In order to cope with these difficult circumstances, ICL began to look for a
tieup with a foreign manufacturer, and sought a partner. Initially it negotiated
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_
with Sperry Univac and CDC of the United States, but it was unable to reach
agreement on terms and the negotiations were broken off. Then the nod went to
~jitsu. There was an inquiry from the British Government when former Minister
of International Trade and Industry Tanaka visited Britain in June, and that led to
the signing of an agreement.
The Influence of Fujitsu's Track Record
As is well known, the computer industry giant, IBM, dominates 60 percent of the
world market. Its great power has forced even huge corporations like RCA and GE
to retreat.
Among IBri's competitors, only the Japanese manufacturers have been able to put up a
good fight. Of these, Fujitsu has pursued a policy of building IBM-compatible
equtpment and has developed high-performance equipment which surpasses that of IBM.
It beat IBM Japan in domestic sales in 1979.
It has also begun to expand substantially abroad. It confronted IBM head-on
over an order from the Australian Statistics Bureau in 1979 and succeeded in
' getting the contract. It al.so succeeded in OEM exports of large machines to
Seimens of West Germany beginning in 1978, and it has replaced IBM in many parts
of West Germany. It is gradually breaking down the fortress of T.BM in other areas
of the world by such means as strengthening a tieup with the Amdahl rorporation of
the United States and concluding a market agreement with TRW.
ICL took nate of these achievements of Fujitsu. The advantages of the tieup
for ICL include a reduction in the huge amount of development expenses and the
development time period that would be necessary for developing a large computer.
ICL's operations have been going badly, and the advanced technology which will be
provided by Fujitsu will make it possible to avoid the risks of development and
- facing immediate competition directly with IBM.
For Fujitsu, there are "intangible merits" (according to President Yamamoto). It
will be able to move into a new market, that of Great Britain, and this fits in
with the strategy of building a net around IBM.
Also, we should not overlook the fact that the export of technology rather than
products alone is a way of overcoming trade friction.
The problem is whether the rebuilding of ICL itself will get on track. Failure
in computer development means elimination from the industry. It can be very
- serious. Therefore, Fu~itsu is not providing any financial assistance. It is
avoiding any risk as much as possible. British Minister of Industry Jenkin says:
"T~ie welcome the tieup with Fujitsu and will support ICL." However, the development
of this tieup is being watched to see how things will actually come out.
In any case, the fact that a Japanese manufacturer is supplying technology to ICL,
the largest computer manufacturer outside of Japan and the United States, means
that a period of U.S. and Japanese dominance and confrontation has begun in the
advanced technological field of computers.
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--Honda Motor Industry-BL: A Compressed View of the Turnaround in Power
Relationships Between the United States, Europe, and Japan in the Automobile War
A technological colZaboration agreement was concluded in January 1979 between
Honda Motor Co (Kiyoshi Kawashima, president) and BL (the old British Leyland;
Michael Edwards, president) of Great Britain.
The initial provisions of the collaboration were that Honda would provide BL with
a manufacturing license for a type of passenger car being developed by Honda,
and BL would pay royalties to Honda on a yen basis.
Subsequently, the Ballad (called the Triumph Acclaim in Britain) was decided on
as the model to be produced. In the spring of 13$1, Honda began to supply the
- engine, transmission, and instrument panel of the Acclaim (1.3 liter) to BL, and
BL began production in June at the Cowrie plant in Oxford, England.
For several years now, the European market share and production volume of BL have
been dwindling. It sustained net losses of 55.1 billion yen in 1979 and 206.1
billion yen in 1980. The survival of the company was in danger. Because of this,
it was attempting to find a way out by producing the Minimetro (1 liter class),
developed by BL, and the Acclaim, with technological assistance from Honda Motor
Co, backed by several hundred million dollars in assistance from the British
Government.
From Honda's point of view, the underlying reason for this technological assistance
was to smooth the path for marketing activities in Europe, the next largest market
after the United States, since Honda has a high rate of export (a little less
than 74 percent for the accounting period ending in September 1981). But the
most prominent aspect of the tieup was the rescue of BL.
The Second Step: Joint Development
However, the tieup b?tween the two companies is about to enter a new phase.
The Acclaim went on sale on 7 October and has begun selling favorably. With sales
of 3,279 cars in October, it was the fourth best-selling car in Britain. In
November, 2,684 were sold, putting it in seventh place. Beginning in the middle of
November, the production system at the Cowrie plant was expanded to two direct
lines, and there are plans to begin exporting the car to the European market early
in 1982 and to expand production to 85,000 vehicles annually by 1983.
With this as a basis, Honda and BL agreed to jointly develop a luxury passenger
car to go on sale in 1985. A memorandom was signed on 2 November.
Public announcements so far have only stated that the production model will be
- a higher class car than the Honda Accord and lower than BL's best model, the
Jaguar. It is likely to be a 2-l.i.ter class executive car (the West German BMW
is a representative model of this type).
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Project teams have started working in both companies. A~oint conference will be
held as early as 1982 to begin examining specific details of development,
production, and sales. A formal agreement will probably be made in early fall.
This expansion of the collaborative relationship will compensate, in the form of
joint development, for BL's lack of development funding and technology. For
Honda, it spreads out the high investment risk in its four-wheeled vehicle section
over that which would be incurred with independent development and makes it
possible to expand the product lineup. The initial tieup was tipped toward the
rescue of BL, but in the second step it has moved up to a more businesslike
relationship.
However, even in the present collaboration, Honda has not agreed to a capital
relationship. This is based on the judgment that "a corporation is moved by
people more than by a ruling relationship and being ruled through capital"
(President Kawashima). We should probably see here the operation of Honda's
first-class rationalism and cautious calculation. It will not have to get deeply
involved in case difficulties arise.
Previously, Nissan received technological assistance from BL for a passenger
car (the Austin). When we consider how the technological foundation of today's
automobile production was built up, the tieup between Honda and BL is truly
a miniaturized picture of a reversal of the power relationship between Japan and
- the advanced countries of Europe and the United States. Also, while the
Japanese, U.S., and European auto industries are expected to continue to have a
relationship of closely following each other, the working out of the Honda
strategy is being watched as one direction of development.
--Nippon Kokan-Ford: A Symbolic Example of Assistanc,e,,in the "Resuscitation" of
the U.S. Steel Industry
The Japanese steel production technology is now labeled::�the best in the world.
The steel manufacturers of the United States and the~countries of Europe, which
are advanced steel countries, are actively importing Japanese technology, trying
hard to f ind a way to resuscitate their steel industries. A typical example of
this is the technological cooperation agreement between Nippon Kokan and Ford
unofficially concluded at the beginning of February.
Ford is the only company among the U.S. auto industry's big three which has a
steel plant and maintains a complete production system beginning with steel. This
steel plant is located in its Dearborn, Michigan automobile plant and is called
the River Rouge Steel Plant.
With three blast furnaces, an annual capacity of 3.6 million tons of crude steel,
and 6,000 employees, it is the ninth largest steel plant in the United States.
Its main product has been sheet steel for car bodies. However, it has lagged
behind in development of high-tensile strength sheet and surface treated sheet,
which are keys to the lightening oi auto bodies. Inhouse consumption is less
than 30 percent and the rest is sold outside in such forms as hot coils. At
present, Ford is purchasing much of the sheet used for its auto bodies from other
steel manufacturers.
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Therefore, Ford decided to rationalize its unprofitable group of plants by
separating and building up its steel division. In order to do this, it decided
to make the steel plant independent and to begin operating it as "Rouge Steel" on
1 January 1982. It has reportedly already reached agreement with the UAW
concerning a reduction in the capital level of the steel division.
It plans to improve its facilities and strengthen its sheet steel for use in
automobiles, such as surface treated sheet, through technological assistance from
Nippon Kokan and to raise the inhouse consumption rate for sheet steel to more
than 50 percent. The official signing of the technological cooperation agreement
between Nippon Kokan and Rouge Steel ~ill take place in January 1982. Under this
agreement Nippon Kokan will export both the hardware and the software for
continuous casting and will construct the facilities. Hitachi Shipbuilding and
Engineering Co will deliver the equipment and instruments. Nippon Kokan will
take care of engineering and provide guidance for operation.
Funding of 100 billion yen will be necessary to modernize the steel plant, and
Ford does not have the capacity right now to make that much of an investment.
It will cost 35 billion yen for cantinuous casting facilities alone. Mitsubishi
Shoji and Moran Guaranty Trust will apply loans from the Export-Import Bank of
Japan to this, and Ford will lease the facilities. There is speculation concerning
capital participation by Nippon Kokan, but this i~as not yet been determined.
This kind of technological assistance, equipment export, and licensing provided
to American and European manufacturers has increased greatly during the last
several years. Taking only the conspicuous examples in the United States, we
find that Nippon Kokan has participated in technological collaboration or
technological exchanges with Kaiser Steel, National Steel, and Inland Steel and
has provided a license for the continuous casting process to Bethlehem Steel.
Japan Steel Corp has participated in technological exchanges with U.S. Steel,
Armco, and Bethlehem Steel, and Nippon Kokan and Armco have small holdings of
each other's stock. In addition to this, Kawasaki Steel is providing
comprehensive technological cooperation to Republic Steel, and Sumitomo Metals and
Kobe Steel are also exporting equipment.
The Japanese steel industry achieved its present position by importing technology
and the latest facilities from Europe and America in the years from the late
1940's to the early 1960's. Now it is providing technological guidance and helping
to rebuild the industry in the United States. It is like a modern version of a
folk tale about returning favors, but this is one aspect of the new era of U.S.-
_ Japanese collaboration.
--Toray-UCC: Strongest U.S.-Japan Alliance Dominates the Carbon Fiber Market
The world's civilian aircraft entered a period of renewal in the 1980's. A
- demand for over 5,000 planes is expected over a 10-year period. Therefore, the
demand for carbon fibers as a structural material for aircraft is also very likely
to increase drama.tically.
The B 767, which will go into service in 1982, uses about 1.5 tons of carbon
fiber reinforced parts (CFRP) per aircraft. Also, the YXX (next-period civilian
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cargo aircraft) is expected to use nine tons of carbon fiber reinforced parts
per aircraft.
Because over 1,000 of the B 767's alone will be produced, the demand for carbon
- fiber reinforced parts will e~and tremendously. Therefore, facilities for
high quality PAN (polyacrylonitrile) type carbon fibers are being continuously
expanded. But for the time being, the world fiber market is being led by the
Toray-Union Carbide (UCC) alliance.
In 1969, Toray commercialized the PAN-type carbon fibers under a patent of the
Agency of Industrial Science and Technology, and since then, it has led the
world. UCC was first in the w~orld to coimmercial3ze carbon fibers from rayon and
has a great deal of interest in carbon fibers.
The history of collaboration between Toray ~nd UCC goes back a~ong time, to April
1970. Initially, there was a cross-licensing of Toray's technology for making the
raw thread of carbon fiber and UCC's heating process technology. At the same
time, UCC began marketing Toray's carbon fibers under the brand, "Sone1."
~
In January 1979, Toray provided its production technology (for a fee) to UCC for
PAN-type carbon fibers (complete technology f~om synthesis to spinning and
heating). Based on this, UCC built a plant (with a monthly capacity of 30 tons)
in Greenville, South Carolina which was completed in December 1981.
Toray produces 45 tons of carbon fibers per month and exports two-thirds of
that, or about 30 tons, to the United States. Even when UCC's new plant goes into
operation, there will soon be a shortage of capacity because of the expanding use
of carbon fibers in civilian aircraft.
Therefore, Toray is building a very large-scale line capable of producing 60
tons monthly in its Ehime plant (with an investment of 6 billion yen). This is
scheduled for completion in June 1982. UCC is also watching the movement of
demand and showing intentions of expanding facilities for PAN-type carbon fibers.
That is not all. The Toray-UCC alliance is carrying out a plan to join with the
E1 Factine [Phonetic] company of France and build a PAN-type carbon fiber plant
with a monthly production capacity of 25 to 30 tons in southwestern France.
This plan is expected to take shape by the spring of 1982, and operations should
_ begin by 1983.
By this means, a beachhead will be established in France to supply the aerospace
industry of France, which is second only to that of the United States.
As a result, the Toray-UCC group will have a carbon fiber supply system with a
capacity of at least 160 tons per month by 1983, which will be solidl~ in first
place in the world.
- This is a skillful combination of Toray's PAN-type carbon fiber technological
_ strength and Union Carbide's marketing strength in the U.S. aerospace industry.
It is undeniable that Toray seems to be in a superior position.
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On the other hand, Toray can import production technology ~rom UCC for pitch-type
- carbon fiber (poorer in quality than the PAN-type but much cheaper) at any time, so
it is in a position to work with the automobile industry which is seen as the
next most promising demand source after the aerospace industry.
For some time, it is certain that the market for both PAN- and pitch-type
_ carbon fibers will develop around an axis of Toray and Union Carbide.
--Toshiba, Hitachi-GE and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries-Westinghouse: Stronger
Japanese Position in Agreement on Improved Atomic Reactors
"The ease of concluding the present agreement is the best proof that the old
agreement produced good results over the last 15 years and functioned smoothly
and well." This statement of extreme satisfaction was made by GE Vice President
Betram Wolf when he visited Japan to conclude a new technological agreement with
- Hitachi and Toshiba on 10 January for boiling water reactor technology.
The old agreement between GE and Hitachi and Toshiba was a one-way licenser-
_ licensee agreement. The new agreem~nt has progressed to a cooperative arrangement
in which information is to be exchanged in all areas, including design, parts, a;_d
manufacturing, from the development stage on. The methods of infox-~nation exchange
have been limited in the past to documents and telexes. Now it will become
possible for the personnel involved in technology to exchange opinions over the
telephone.
Up until a few years ago, GE often responded to Japanese inquiries by saying:
"That comes under GE patent rights, so we cannot give an aswer." Then it would
be necessary to call in GE's technicians for analysis of ultimate causes of
accidents and corrective action. When we recall this situation, the change in
- GE's attitude is amazing.
According to Vice President Wolf: "We are now equal partners with Hitachi and
Toshiba." The royalties paid to GE by Hitachi and Toshiba have been "greatly"
reduced.
This new agreement actually took effect with 1 month of the effective term of
the old agreement remaining, The reason the three companies rushed to put it
_ into effect was that they wanted to procped with the development of an ABWR
(advanced boiling water reactor) as soon as possible under a new agreement.
The world's largest user of the BWR, Tokyo Electric, took the lead in mobilizing
GE, Toshiba, and Hitachi to develop an ABWR which would be a Japanese version of
the BWR. The aim is to improve operability, reliability, and resistance to
ear.thquake tremors by: 1) improvements in the core and fuel design,
2) incorporation ef the recycling pump inside the pressure container,
3) electrification of the control rod drive mechanism, and 4) use of a concrete
container. The development period is S years. The development costs of 15
billion yen will be split equally between the electric company and the
manufacttirers. GE will bear one-fourth of the manufacturers~' share of the
costs, and the remainder will be borne by Hitachi and Toshibe. The percentage
of development costs borne by a company ordinarily relates directly to its share
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of the development, so in this case T^shiba a~.d Hitachi are in a slightly superior
position in relation to GE.
At the same time, development of an APWR (advanced pressurized water reactor) has
been started by an international consortium made up of Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, which has monopolized supply of the PWR in the Japanese market;
Westinghouse, the PWR licenser; and Bechtel, the world's largest engineering
company. The selling points of the APWR are: 1) improved large core,
2) high performance fuel development, and 3) improved vapor emitting mechanism.
Mitsubishi's basic policy in the past has been: It may be dangerous to play
around with imported technology. Until all the bugs are worked out, we will
follow (Westinghouse's) design faithfully." So the present arrangement is a
180-degree turnabout.
Furthermore, according to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Executive Managing Director
Jutaro Iida: "The basic policy is that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries will make
decisions based on the needs of the electric company and use Westinghouse as a
'teacher'." It will do more than just "use" Westinghouse. Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries was planning to undertake the entire development itself as of the
end of 1980. This high spiritedness is formidable. The turnabout in the power
relationship between Japan and the United States for both the BWR and the PWR
is due partly to the maturation of the nuclear production technology of
Japanese industry. But it also results from the fact that the market for nuclear
power in the United States has been "destroyed," so the American licensers are
forced to rely on the Japanese market. The 1980's wi~l certainly be "the
Japanese age" as far as nuclear power is concerned.
--Yasukawa Electric-Torstechnique: More Active Exporting of Arc-Welding Robots
with Technological Collaboration as a Weapon
Japanese robot manufacturers are actively moving overseas through technological
collaboration with foreign corporations. Robots were originally developed in
the United States and the technology was imported. They were first introduced
in Japan around 1967. At that time, fareign manufacturers such as Barsatran
(phonetic] and Unimation had absolute technological superiority. Kawasaki Heavy
Industries, for example, formed a technological collaboration with Unimation and
began domestic production of robots, but there were many manufacturers who
continued development with domestic technology and did not rely on foreign
technology. One of these was the number one manufacturer of arc-welding robots,
Yasukawa Electric Manufacturing Company.
Yusukawa Electric has world-class motor technology. Most robots rely on hydraulic
pressure as a drive source. The hydraulic pressure system has high speed, but
it is inferior to an electrical system in accuracy of positioning. Due to progress
in servo motor technology, it became possible to develop a new multi~ointed type
of arc-welding robot, and Yasukawa now holds 70 percent of the market in this
field.
Yasukawa Electric has been very active in overseas activity because of its
overwhelming strength in the field of arc--welding robots. Yasukawa's arc-welding
robot, which utilizes servo motor technology, gives high accuracy in positioning
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and excellent reliability. It does not break down even after long periods of
. operation. In these areas, foreign manufacturers simply cannot compete.
Recently, foreign manufacturers, especially in the automobile industry, have
been increasingly interested in introducing robots, and Yasukawa Electric has
also received many tieup offers from forei~n manufacturers.
The special f eature of Yasukawa's tieups with foreign manufacturers is that the
other parties are mostly welding machine manufacturers. Robots are imported from
Yasukawa, fitted with the other companies' own welding equipment, and then sold
to auto makers.
The most successful of these cooperative ventures is the technological tieup
formed in 1978 with the Torstechnique company of Sweden. This company is an
engineering company, but Messergrisheim [phoneticJ of West Germany (tieup formed
in 1979), Alcos [phonetic] of Italy (tieup formed in 1980), and Hobart of the
United States (tieup formed in 1980) are all welding equipment manufacturers.
Technological cooperation has also been carried out actively in 1981. A tieup
was made in June with Feado jphonetic] Robot Systems. Two others were made in
August with Barrows Engineering of South Af rica and A.N.I. Perkins of Australia.
These tieups are for the most part made with companies having strong engineering
capabilities.
There have also been inquiries from India where there is a shortage of skilled
welders, and there will probably be increased cooperation with ~lustralian companies
related to the auto industry.
Exports in 1981 will probably grow from the 60 units initially planned to 140
units. Over the long term, the company is aiming at a 2:1 ratio of domestic
to export business (now about 20 percent), so the movement tow~rd foreign
tieups is likely to continue. In the f uture, the company plans to broaden the
range of its foreign tieups beyond the arc-welding robot field on the basis of
its success in this area.
--Asahi Glass-Dow Chemical: A Dynamic Strategy for Cooperative Ventures in
Ion-Exchange Membrane
Asahi Glass is making repeated e~orts of technology for its ion-exchange membrane,
"Flemion," which is used in the electrolysis of soda. Beginning with PPG of the
United States in 1977, it exported technology to Olin in 1y78, ICI of Great
Britain in 1979, Uhde G.m.b.H. of West Germany (an engineering company affiliated
to the Bayer, Hoechst and BASF group). And in 1981, it exported technology to
the largest chemical company in the world, Dow.
Then in September 1981, it concluded a cross-licensing agreement for film with
the membrane manufacturer Du Pont. This required a very large technology fee,
referred to as a"conciliation fee," and was in reality a technology export
arrangement.
There are also cooperative ventures with many other companies now under
negoti~ition or at the inquiry state.
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~tethods for electrolysis of sodium hydroxide include the mercury method, the
asb~stos dissolving membrane method, and the ion-exchange membrane method. The
mercury method can no I.onger be used because of pollution problems, and some
manufacturers have switche~ to the dissoiving membrane method, but there are many
- problem~: in quality (contdmination of table salt) and yield of soda. So finally,
the only resort is the ion-exchange membrane method which produces good quality and
is energy-efficient.
~ central concern is the membrane. The special features of the Asahi Glass
"Flemion" are: 1) 35-40 percent high-density soda can be obtained. 2) It is
Pnergy efficient with low electrical resistance. 3) It is mechanically strong
with higti. resistance to heat and chemicals. These ~erits have led to frequent
- export of this technology.
Syster~ Orders
The strong point of Asahi Glass is not just the membrane but a high-efficiency
~;~~d:: electrolysis system," AZEC." This system employs a new electrode and special
electrulytic tank construction along with the "Flemion" membrane. It requires only
2,~00 kilowatts of electrical power to produce 1 ton of soda (when the volume
. of steam heat required to raise the soda density is also converted to electricit~).
This is close to the minimum limit. This is a great savings when compared to the
3,000 kilowatts required by both the mercury method and the dissolving membrane
method. It even beats the 2,500 kilowatts generally used in the ion-exchange
. ~aemhrane method and the 2,300 kilowatts attained with the SPE method by Denola
[phonetic] of Italy which was once the subject of warldwide attention. We can
say that the possibility of exporting ion-e;cchange membrane technology arose on the
basis of the AZEC system.
w
',~~;iy was Asahi Glass able to develop this system? According to Osamu Shirogami,
ttie director of the technological development office: "Our accumulated experience
of 50 years in table salt electrolysis, 20 years with ion-exchange membranes,
and 17 years with fluorine is very important." The "Flemion" membrane uses
fluorine resin as a base material combined with carboxylic acid. It is given a
special surface treatment so that chlorine and hydrogen produced during
electrolvsis will not adhere to it. This kno~ahow is not simple. Dow does not
h~ive ~nuch experience with fluorine chemistry, and while Du Pont has expertise
;aith fluorine, it does not have the eiectrolysis technology. ICI and Hoechst
have the fluorine and electrolysis knowhow, but not the exchange membrane
~ tecnnology. The key to Asahi Glass's success was that it was the only company that
met a11 three requirements.
According to Yasuo Nakaide, general manager of the chemical products division:
"In tize future, technical assistance ventures involving the entire AZEC system
~oill increase, including use of the system in chemical projects in Canada and
Tndonesia.
In addition, Asahi Glass is increasing its international activity in both
tectinology and capital investments tn other areas. Between 1977 and 1979, it
exported technology for combination g~.ass to be used in automobiles to several
. ~uropean companies, and in 1981 it bought two European glass companies. Together
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with the electrolysis system exports, these developments suggest the beginning
of a new era.
--Victor Japan-Telefunken: Aggressive Joint Ventures in Europe and the United
States Using the k'eapon of Superior Video Technology
The Victor Company of Japan has built up two large-scale international cooperative
relationships using its video development methods in an attempt to restore its
flagging overseas strategy at one stroke.
dne is a joint venture for production of VTR equipment, video cameras, and video
displayers formed with Telefunken of West Germany, Thomson-Brandt of France, and
Thorn [phonetic] EMI of Great Britain. The other is a joint venture for production
of video disks formed with GE of the United States, Thorn [phonetic) EMI of Great
Britain, and Matsushita Electric Industrial.
These two ventures are bejng undertaken with the important video manufacturers
of several countries. What they have in common is the technclogical superiority
of Victor Japan as the developer and manufacturer of the VHS type VTR system and
the VHD video disk. Victor has already carried out OEM supply of VTR equipment
to Thorn, Telefunken, and Thomson, and Matsushira has had a similar relationship
with GE. Therefore, these ventures are partly the product of an international
family using Victor's systems created on the basis of unified international
_ standards.
= The world VTR market is split between the VHS system and Sony's Beta system.
The V~ID system has also been established as one of three major video disk systems
along ~vith Phillips-MCA's optical system and RCA's CED systsm.
VHD Programs was set up as a joint venture with Matsushita, GE, and Thorn (with
Thorn taking inanagerial responsibility) to produce and sell software. VHD Disk
Manufacturing was set up with the same arrangement to manufacture the disks.
VHll Electronics, (a three-company joint venture, excluding Thorn) was set up to
manufacture players. These companies were established with the aim of
simultaneous expansion in Japan, Europe, and the United States beginning in the
latter half of 1981. However, because of delays in software production and mass
production of disks, the start of sales will be postponed until April 1982 in
Japan, June in the United States, and June or 3uly in Europe. So VHD is falling
behind the optical system and the CED system.
_ Furthermore, these two systems already on the market are having difficulties.
The building up of a video disk market will not be easy. How well Victor Japan
can make up far the delay in software and disk production will '.:ave a great
effect on the success of the international collaboration and the formation of
this bus2ness family.
Uncertainty Over Thompson Nationalization
Althou~;h the video disk venture is a Japanese-European-American cooperative
venture, including Matsushita Electric, the four-country joint venture can be
described as a Japanese-European video alliance under the leadership of Victor
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t vn va~� �~.a~a. vva. v~.a..a
Japan. The Europeans were behind in development of the growth product, VTR, and
were having difficulty in coping with a soft ma.rket in consumer electrical products
and the assault of Japanese exports. Victor Japan wanted to internationalize
its production bases and avoid trade troubles. These factors came together in
producing this cooperative venture.
In addition, Victor, which is providing technological assistance and supplying
parts, and the Europeans will carry out joint production and mutual supply of
products on a three-country basis. This is almost unprecedented and is one
reason tnat MITI, which is promoting the avoidance of trade friction and urging
internationalization in Japanese trade, is supporting this venture.
First, the four companies will set up a joint venture company in a third European
country with equal investment. Telefunken wj.ll be in charge of VTR, Thorn will
take care of video display equfpment, and Thompson will direct video camera
= production. It has been agreed that subsidiaries of the joint venture company will
be created for each of these functions.
However, Thompson has been targeted for nationalization under the policies of
the Mitterand government, so the start of operations has been delayed far beyond
the original date of Juty 1981. In addition, Phillips and Sony have reportedly
approached France about joint VTR production and are checking the operation of
the four-company joint venture. Therefore, Thompson's participation is still
uncertain. However, the basic policy remains unchanged and it is likely that the
solution will be to begin production of VTR equipment in Berlin in the fall of
1982.
--~fakino Milling Machines-Le Bronde [phcnetic]: A S~mbol of the Turnabout in the
~ U.S.-Japan Technological Gap in Connection with the Automation Revolution
Makino Milling Machines was successful in acquiring management rights in the
Le Bronde Company (Cincinnati, Ohio, United States). This company, established
_ in 1887, is an old and well-knoam company in the American machine tool industry.
It is a large company which specializes in manufacturing lathes, such as
numerically controlled and multiple-use lathes, and is the third or fourth largest
company in r_he industry in the United States.
Its yearly trade volume is estimated at about 100 million dollars. There are
1,000 employees in the main company in the United States, and it has a
subsidiary in Singapore with 500 employees. In number of employees it is larger
than Makino. (Makino has 730 employees in its main company.)
Until 4 or 5 years ago, it would have been "unthinkable even as a dream" (company
oPficial) for a Japanese machine tool company to swallow up an old, large
American company.
The Le Bronde Co was unable to keep up with the steadily advancing technological
revolution from numerical control (NC) to machining centers (MC) and other types
of numerically controlled machines. In particular, it is said to have been
unable to stand up against the new types of Japanese machine tools. Therefore,
it began looking for a Japanese partner.
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Makino, on the other hand, had begun serious expansion into overseas markets
_ ,just after the first oil shock with the goal of a 3Q-percent export rate. It
sought to join together with a local company to create an overseas base, and its
first such venture was a 25.1-percent capital participation in H and H
(Heidenreich and Habech).
As a second venture, it began to seek a partner in America. It had already
established a local corporation, Makino USA, as a base for sales and service,
but it lacked strength for substantial expansion in the United States. However,
there were too many risks involved in making an investment large enough to create
a full-scale production and marketing system.
So the two companies had compatible interests and Masatoshi Shimizu, president
of Makino, and Mr Le Bronde, the owner of the U.S. company were already
acquainted, so the negotiations moved quickly and the main lines of an agreement
were formed by the end of 1980.
Advantages in Sales and Service Network
The beginning of operations was delayed slightly because of procedural problems,
but the "Le Bronde-Makino Machine Tools Company" was formally established In
Sepbember 1981. Makino will hold 51 percent of the shares and Masatoshi Shimizu
will take the chairmanship. Mr Le Bronde will continue to serve as president.
There will be no essential changes in executive management, and the arrangement
- shows respect for the American side. However, Makino will send in three of its
people as directors.
In addition, the work force of Makino USA will be absorbed in the new company.
And this company will perform all of the marketing and servicing of Makino
products in the United States. Production will start in February 1982 with a
few knockdown vertical MC's per month. In the future, it will probably progress
to full-scale production of Makino`s milling machines, all types of MC`s and
electric spark machines. However, this will require some time. For the time
_ being, the actual significance of production will not be very great.
The utilization of the already existing sales and service network throughout the
United States will have the greatest significance foz Makino.
In any case, this is a good example of a once inferior company reversing its
position because of another company's inability to keep up with the technological
revolution.
--Toyoda Machine lJorks-Erno Somur [phonetic]: Reversal of Position After 10
Years; Deployment of Forces in Europe with MC Technology
The technological tieup between Toyoda Machine Works and H. Erno Somur is
expected to be a model case of international technological cooperation, although
it will be on a small scale for the time being. Toyoda Machine Works is a
strong manufacturer which, as a part of the Toyota group, makes both automobile
parts, such as power steering mechanisms, and machine tools. In addition to
making special machines related to autombiles, it is the top manufacturer of
- cylindrical grinding machines. It is a financially sound company with no debts.
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r~.n w�r,...r....
Somur is affiliated with the French-Belgian conglomerate Anpan [phonetic] and it
is the third largest manufacturer of machine tools in France. It has been making
NC lathes but it has fallen far behind in the MC (machining center) which is
expected to be the next great growth product. Therefore, in the spring of 1980,
it proposed an "international tieup" with Toyoda Machine Works, which was
planning to expand the export of its products to France. An agreement was
formally concluded in June of the same year.
As a"testimony" of this collaboration, a joint venture company, H.E.S. Toyoda
(capital, 36,290,000 francs; 65 percent held by Somur, 35 percent held by Toyoda
Machine Works), has already been established. This new company has inhPrited
the entire machine tool division of the old Somur company. Beginning in the
spring of 1981, a total of 14 French technical personnel entered the main plant
of Toyoda Plachine Works in Kariya City, Aichi Prefecture to undergo technical
training.
In December I975 Toyoda ~iachine Works concluded a technological assistance
agreement with Danobat [phonetic] of Spain for cylindrical grinding machines, but
this is the first time it has gone as far as making a capital investment in a
cooperative venture. Toyoda's rival, Okuma Machinery Works, was discussing a
- "technological collaboration" for MC's with Fuhre (phonetic] of France but final
agreement could not be reached on the fee for technology and other terms, and
negotiations ~oere broken off. Toyoda's example showed an effective contrast
to this.
The cooperative venture is set up in two stages. The "first stage" is import and
_ sales of MC's in the finished product stage. Under the agreement, Somur's
exclusive sales territory is the EC and its periphery. Eastern Europe, the
Middle East, and Africa are nonexclusive. Somur will be able to pass along a
new product, the MC, to its old customers,and Toyoda will be able to utilize
Somur's sales routes and service network.
Tt~e second stage of the collaboration is assembly production of the products by
a joint venture company using Toyoda's technology. However, in order to reach this
stage, at least 5 years will be required to make up for the gap in technology.
Therefore, Toyoda Machine Works is making an effort to train technicians right
now. It selected one person from the technical area and one from the office
management area and sent them to H.E.S. Toyoda to provide management guidance.
From this point of view, company operations are entirely under the leadership
of Toyoda Machine Works even though the French company has a majority of the
shares.
Another interesting thing is that Toyoda Machine Works previously received
technological assistance for production of milling machines from Somur for 10
years, beginning in 1961, and used it for domestic production. Now, 10 years
later, the positions are exactly reversed.
This joint venture is aimed at local production of MC's for the immediate future,
but if things go well, the collaboration may extend to tapeless numerically
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controlled machine tools (DNC), FMS, and robots. However, this will depend on
the recovery of the French economy and the degree to which the French company
is willing to learn submissively.
--Matsushita Electric-Bosch: Contemplating Joint Production of VTR; Impetus to
Conquering the World Market
The rise of Japanese electrical equipment makers in the world has been shown by
the expansion of their overseas market share in color television. It was even
more decisively impressed upon the world by tfie home VTR. The Japanese were
ahead of European and American manufacturers at each stage from development to
commercialization and the mass production. And even now, they have not allowed
any new entries into the market.
Home video has grown at a rapid pace in a few years. Around 9 million sets are
expected to be produced in 1981. It has taken over from the color television as
the locomotive of the household electronics industry.
Matsushita Electric has the top position in home VTR. It was beaten out in
development and commercialization by a subsidiary, Victor Company of Japan, and
by Sony, but it vividly demonstrated its power as the world's top household
electronics manufacturer in its speed in moving from commercialization to mass
production and iFs dominance in the market.
rlatsushita is now set up to produce a total of 250,000 sets a month in its
- Okayama and Kadoma plants, and in its subsidiary, Matsushita Kotobuki Electronics
Industry, and it maintai.ns a domestic market share of 30 percent. It has made
_ OEM deliveries to RCA, GE, Magnavox, GTE Sylvania, J.C. Penney, and Montgomery
Ward in the United States, and to Braupuncht Belche [phonetic] and Teledent
[phonetic] in West Germany. In the United States, in particular, it has over a
50-percent market share, if OEM supply is included.
Not only the top world electrical equipment manufacturers like RCA and GE, but
even subsidiaries, like Magnavox and GTE Sylvania, of Holland's Phillips, which
has developed and commercialized its own home VTR, are receiving deliveries
from Matsushita. This shows how highly Matsushita is evaluated in Europe and
the United States
Matsushita is presently conducting negotiations with the world's largest auto
parts manufacturer, Bosch of West Germany. This ~oint venture plan began when
Bosch took notice of the groG~th potential of VTR and Matsushita's cooperation for
production in West Germany.
The contents of the plan are as follows: 1) The two companies will form a joint
venture company to produce a VHS type VTR. 2) Matsushita will supply design
sFecifications, production technology, and other knowhow. 3) Both companies
will receive products produced by the ~oint venture company and market them
throughout Europe using their respective sales networks.
Home VTR has about three times the number of parts color television has. Also,
it requires precision processing technology. Therefore, it is generally doubted
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~ J~� V~ ~ ~~-~~~u v..r. .i..u.
- whether local produc*_ion is possible, and Matsushita is being very cautious in
these negotiations. "It would be a serious problem if there were a difference
between localYy producPd products and export products. Therefore, we must watch
the arrangement of management authority, parts procurement, the scale of production
in relation to cost, and the attainment of approval from the West German
Government. At present, it is clear only that Matsushita and Bosch have reached
the stage of agreeing to cooperate in local production, but the details,
including the ratio of investment wi11_ be determined soon, by spring 1982, and
local production is expected to begin in 1983.
Matsushita has the problem of trade friction with Europe so it is approaching
this venture positively. If it comes about, together with the joint venture
local production by Victor Japan in Europe, the VHS system will be in a superior
position. And it will also demonstrate the great strength of the Matsushita
group.
--Toyo Rubber-Continental: Strategy To Survive in Period of Violent Change by
Forming a "Japanese-German-American Alliance"
The tire industry~ is in a period of reorganization throughout the world. The
only companies that are certain to survive in the future world market are
Goodyear of the United States, Michelin of France, and Bridgestone of Japan.
The coming business collaboration between the number four tire company in Japan,
Toyo Rubber, and the largest in West Germany, Continental Gumi Werk [phonetic] is
- closely connected with a strategy for international survival.
Toyo Rubber cancelled its technological collaboration agreement with General
of the United States 4 years ago. Then for 2 or 3 years it showed its technology
and plants to Continental and carried out a process of examination and evaluation
with the intention of forming a tieup with Continental. It carried out mutual
exchanges and discussions on the factory level concerning technology and
design, formed a consensus in both companies, and now has proceeded to a
comprehensive collaboration.
The relationship of the two companies is built around equal and mutual provision
of technological assistance. Toyo Rubber will carry out OEM production under
the Continental brand of a tire for the small car model, Santana, jointly produced
by Nissan Motor Co and Volkswagen. It will also undertake consignment production
and sales of Continental brand tires for Southeast Asia. President Okazaki of
Toyo Rubber says confidently: "In the future, we expect an annual production of
1 million tires on consignment per year."
- Continental is the next largest tire maker to Michelin in Europe. However, it
has been slow in advancing into the markets of advanced countries like the
United States and Japan, and it has little marketing strengt:i in Asia.
Technically, its strength has traditionally been in tires which perform well at
high speed. However, it is weak in the areas of fuel saving tires, radial tires
for trucks and buses, and very large tires. It is also behind in polyesterization
of tire cords and production control technology. It plans to eliminate these
weaknesses through the tieup with Toyo Rubber.
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Will American Industry Be Involved Too?
Now the companies' policy will be to make active exchanges of special technology
between their technical departments and carry out international divisions of
responsibility in most fields, including technological development, production,
production control, and sal.es. President Okazaki says: "At present, a single
technological development program costs the huge sum of 10 billion yen. We have
great expectatians of advantages in speeding up technological development while
reducing the cost. Continental will provide Toyo Rubber with specifications,
compounds, and all basic technology for the tires of the Santana, the car to
be jointly produced by Nissan and Volkswagen.
By this means, the union of Continental and Toyo Rubber has lined up its forces
for a joint strategy in Europe, the Far East, and Southeast Asia. The next aim
of this union is a tieup with a manufacturer that can assist them in America.
It is expected that negotiations are underway, and it is very likely that a
"Japanese-German-American alliance" will be formed by Continental (West Germany),
Toyo Rubber (Japan), and some American company in the near future.
The big two of the world tire industry are Goodyear and Michelin. Next is
Bridgestone. Will this "J~apanese-German-American alliance" be able to build a
company that will take fourth place? President Okazaki has a broad vision.
"Through this, we wi1 I become a major world company in the technology of radial
tires for passenger cars, trucks, and buses and extra large tires."
Cooperative Ventures Under Japanese Leadership Proliferate
There are many other examples besides the 12 companies discussed in this article
in which the technical strength of Japanese industry was recognized and tieups
were formed under Japanese leadership. Some of these are introduced below.
The advertising industry has been slow in internationalizing, but a step in that
direction was taken when Dentsu established Dentsu, Young, and Rubicum (a 50-50
joint venture) in November 1981. The short-term aim of establishing the new
company was to establish battle l~nes for Young and Rubicum, which had entered
Janan with 100 percent foreign capitalization. However, from the point of view
of Dentsu, this is the first time it has driven a wedge into a foreign-capitalized
company. The long term aim is to use the network of bases established by Young
and Rubicum throughout the world, make separate subsidiaries, and carry out a
multinational expansion.
Even though Young and Rubicom was first to enter the world market, it ~udged
that it would be a wise policy to combine with Dentsu and use Dentsu's power to
get a foothold in Japanese industry, which is rapidly expan~ing throughout the
world.
At any rate, there are few cases of using the network of an existing international
company for multinational activity. This is noteworthy as an example which
clearly demonstrates the amazing growth of Japanese industry.
Last November, Japan Air Lines made its first comprehensive maintenance contract
with Garuda Airlines of Indonesia for its large jets. JAL has already made
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. . .
aircraft maintenance agreements with 45 domestic and foreign airlines, but this
will create opportunities for comprehensive contracts with other airlines.
The direct contribution of this contract wi.th Garuda will be 3 billion yen a year,
but it is very interesting as a testimony to the growing internationalization
of Japanese industry in the field of high technology service.
Sharp is now providing semiconductar technology to the company from which it
begged to learn about semiconductor technology 10 years ago. The company is
Rockwell International. When Sharp began moving into semiconductors, Rockwell
provided a wide range of technological assistance for products such as semi-
conductors which are low in power consumPtion and ideally suited for microcomputers
and memories. It is a case which clearly shows that Japanese industry has
completely passed up ~.merican industry, the original source, in applied and mass
production semiconductor technology.
A different sort of case is the cooperative business venture between Mitsui Real
Estate Development and Coldcaell-Banker. They will e~change information and extend
their brokerage and consulting business in order to deal with the tendency of
Japanese lif e insurance and damage insurance companies to increasingly invest
in foreign real estate and the increased investment in Japanese real estate by
American pension funds.
COPYRIGiiT: Shukan Toyo Keizai 1981
9651
CSO: 4106/31
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
YASUKAWA'S ALL-ELECTRIC ARC-WELDING ROBOT DESCRIBED
Tokyo KII~AI SHINKO in Japanese Vol 14, No 12, Dec 81 pp 120-127
[Article by Keiji Yasukawa, president; Itsuro Matsumoto, director, and Tak~~o
Suzuki, researcher, both of Automation Technology Research Laboratory, R&L Depart-
ment; Toshiya Matsuhara, chief in charge of inechanical products, Office of Tech-
nology, and Fumiaki Kawai, mechanical product designer, both of Yahata pla~Zt; and
Kenji Hara, electronic product developer, Tokyo plant--all of Yasukawa El~actric
Manufacturing Co, Ltd: "Development of All-Electric Jointed-Type Arc-Wel~j.ing
Robot" ]
[Text] Foreword
Efforts to rationalize the production process and to save labor have been themes
of long standing in industrial circles, and during a period of steady growth, more
diversified products and improved quality are demanded by the customer.
Therefore, the production method must be flexible enough to be able to cope with
the changing times, and the introduction of FMS or popularization of industrial
robots in recent years clearly shows the trend of the future.
~ Industrial robots, in particular, have already contributed significantly to the
improvement of work environment, safety, and product quality. To be able to cope
with a future society whose constituents are expected to be higher in level of
education and in age, popularization of robots possessing even higher performance
_ is expected to increase, supported in part by the enthusiasm of the user and the
advancement of the technological development.
The industrial robots described in *his article belong to a group of all-electric
rohots which were developed in 1977 to replace the hydraulically operated robots
which formerly occupied the mainstreams and were the newsmakers of the time.
Background of Development
This company has conducted R&D of all-electric playback-type industrial robots on
the basis of electric servodrive technology and NC control technology unique to
this company since 1973.
In the beginning, popularization of robots could not be realized in spite of the
strong need for automation experienced by industrial circles due to the restric-
tions imposed by economy and the limited robot performance.
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However, with the appearance of the microprocessor as a turning point, playback-
type industrial robots witfi jointed construction were successfully developed and
commercialized in 1977. During the course of product development, work accuracy
and light weight were pursued to the limit, to say nothing of the efforts spent to
improve the economic aspects, and in the end, highly accurate robot~~ with a greatly
improved operabilit_y which could not be achieved in the conventional model were de-
veloped.
Therefore, the applicat~on of robots to the arc-welding operation, which previously
had been difficult to realize, became a reality and this company was able to take
the initiative in popularizing robots for this particular application.
Subsequently, the operability of robots was further improved significantly through
the a3dition of a number of control functions such as shift and various types of
interpolations using coordinates transformation, and new models of industrial
robots cliaracterized by high speed, high degree of accuracy, compactness, and low
cost were developed for the purpose of mass production and popularizati.on.
The fact that the industrial robots of this company, backed by its rich store of
application technology, received a surge of orders is proof that its robots are
able to satisfy the needs of industrial circles to automate a.nd save labor.
- Basic Construction
The Motoman-L series industrial robot of this company is an a1l-electric jointed-
type playback robot designed on the basis of a combination of lightweight struc-
tural design technology, numerical control technology, and application technology
in the field of arc-welding and a goal of economy.
Table 1 gives the specifications of these robots and Photo~raphs 1 and 2 show
their external appearance.
These robots, as shown in Photographs 1 and 2, consist of three major parts: a
robot body, a control device (YASNAC-6000 RG) containing a CPU, and a teach box.
In addition, they contain auxiliary equipment, including welding work attachment
jigs, a welding power source, a welding torch, and a welding wire feed mechanism.
l. Robot Body
The robot body has five degrees of freedom and consists of a revolving part, a
lower arm, an upper arm, and a wrist part having two degrees of freedom attached
to the end of the upper arm. This construction affords a large range of movement
in comparison to the floor space it occupies. The working end of the robot can
be made to move at high speed by choosing an appropriate lever ratio between the
- driving part and the worki.ng part. The driving power source of these robots is a
- DC servomotor unit consisting of a pulse generator for position detection and a
DC tachogenerator for speed detection which is manufactured by this company. To
~ insure accuracy of positioning, speed reduction of each shaft is accomplished
through the use of a harmonic drive unit free from backlash and the use of a pre-
cision ball screw in order to keep lost motion to a minimum. Care is also taken
to lower the center of gravity and to reduce the weight and radius of inertia in
order to realize rapid, smooth movement.
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2. Control Device
Figure 1 illustrates the construction of the control device, Photograph 3 shows
the operation panel of the control device and Photograph 4 shows the teach box.
The reliability of hardware is significantly improved through the use of custom
LSI, large-scale multiwire type of printed baseboard, and flat keyboard switches.
The functions necessary to the playback-type robot, such as track control, opera-
tional conditions and sequences, are provided by a software system which is flex-
ible and easy to program. Furthermore, the operability is significantly improved
through realization of a number of functions, including linear and arc interpola-
tions, three-dimensional shift and scaling enabled by the high-speed three-
dimensional interpolating computer developed independently by this company.
Technical Features
The Motoman-L10 which was develaped by this company in I977 already possessed a
number of features different from those of the conventional robots in the range
of movement and driving power source, and superior in such aspects as compactness,
high speed, high accuracy, and low cost.
The further improvement of the control device and further miniaturization in pur-
suit of even higher performance resulted in the birth of the Motoman-L3 with im-
proved performance.
The technical features, mainly of the Motoman-L3, having the highest functions are
listed below.
' 1. High-Speed Movement
The speed was raised 30 percent over that of the L10 model through a number of
improvements, including lightweight high-rigidity construction with a 50-percent
- higher natural frequency and improved attenuation character,'_stics, and through
achieving optimum acceleration/deceleration control by me:~ns of software treatment.
2. High Accuracy in Repeated Positioning
The accuracy of repeated positioning was raised from 0.2 mm for the L10 model to
� 0.1 mm for the L3 model, the highest accuracy achievable by any robots existing
today, through improved accuracy in the machining of its parts, standardization
of its parts, and strict quality control together with a 50-percent increase in
control resolution.
3. Compactness and Light Weig:~t
It was designed to occupy approximately the same space as occupied hy a person so
as to minimize the alien attitude toward robots felt by people who work among them.
The frame of the L3 model is made of thin walled aluminum casting. Special design
technology was introduced to insure uniform flow of molten metal and to prevent
strain. As a result, a lightweight robot having a body weight of 93 kg and a
wrist load capacity of 3 kg was created. This greatly facilitates the installa-
tion or relocation of the robot.
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4. Improved Operability
The memory capacity was expanded to 1,(100 points and its operability was doubled
through the introduction of additional features, including a call capability,
various types of interpolations carried out by high-speed computer, and a shift
function.
S. Better Economy
� A price reduction of approximately 15 percent was achieved through the use of a
compact, lightweight structure, and standardized and interchangeable parts. The
total number of parts in the L3 model was reduced 20 percent from that of the
_ L10 model.
6. Increased Productivity
The arc rate was increased from an average of 50 percent achieved by the conven-
tional operation to approximately 60 percenC, thanks to the high-speed performance.
Productivity can be effectively increased through a reduction in the tact time of
operation.
7. Better Reliability and Maintainability
The reliability was doubled through the adaptation of various time-tested tech-
nologies and special custom LSI together with a reduction in the number of parts
used. Moreover, the number of functions related to self-diagnosis and abnormality
- surveillan~e was increased from 6 in the old model to 31 in order to improve the
maintainability.
Utilizational Features
- The economic effects of introducing the Motoman-L are as follows.
l. Improvement in Productivity and Labor Saving
Before robots were introduced, the welding of a certain item of construction ma-
chinery having 13.7 m of welding line required 70 minutes per piece by manual
operation. After robots were introduced, the same welding required only 25 min-
utes per piece, with an approximately threefold increase in productivity. The
operations were shifted to handle those work processes preceding and following
the welding operation with a labor savin~ of one human.
In the case of welding an automobile part, after four robots were introduced, four
workers were able to achieve the same amount of production which used to require
10 workers.
In the case of welding a construction machinery part, a total of 12 workers--two
for temporary welding, eight for main welding, and two for inspection and repair--
were required before robots were introduced. After four robots were introduced,
a total of four workers--two for temporary w~elding and two for inspection and re-
pair--were required to do the same job.
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- 2. Countermeasure for Shortage of Skilled Labor
Welding by robot can be carried out repeatedly once the robot is taught by a skill-
ed worker in the beginning, so an extremely large volume of raork can be fiandlE-d by
a very small number of skilled workers. Moreover, welding work requiring human
labor is reduced to transporting work pieces to and from the welding jigs, so that
part-time or aged laborer can be employed, thus effectively alleviating the short-
agc~ of skilled labor.
3. Reduction in Rejection Rate as a Result of Improvement in Work Quality
Work welded by robots, in comparison with work welded by manual operation, is bet-
ter in quality and Iower in rejection rate.
Welding omissions occurred frequently with manual operation, but none occur with a
robot.
4. Countermeasure for Production System Handling Small Number of Praducts With
Great Variety
In the case of automobile parts, there is a great variety of parts depending on
the model, for domestic consumption or for export. On occasion more than 20 dif-
ferent types of work may pass through the same work line. Moreover, the demand
for production of a required amount of product at a required time has become
stronger as a result of the introduction of a"Kanban system" (e.n. Toyota devel-
oped this system in which only needed parts are manufactured). A production sys-
tem employing robots, under such circumstances, can cope with the situation easily
and quickly by simply changing t~e memory through a cassette tape.
An analysis of the robots in operation today shows that more than half of them
are used in the production of a small number of products with a large variety.
This is an indication that more robots are entering the high producti~n system.
Furthermore, the introduction of robots by small and medium enterprises has in-
creased tremendously in recent years. This is another proof that the use of robots
in the welding operation is highly effective.
5. Improvement of Environment
Robots have contributed significantly to the improvement of work environment by
freeing workers from heavy labor as well as from the fumes, heat, and spatter of.
the welding operation.
6. Accumulation of Knowhow Related to Welding Operation and Automation
When the Motoman-L was first introduced to the worksite, a sample test was often
requested by the user. The knowhow thus accumulated, includi.ng the instruction
data related to automatic welding of various types of products, constitutes a huge
technological property. The voluminous data accumulated thus far will contribute
significantly to the automation of welding operations in the future.
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. . . . ~ .
Industrial Ownership
During the course of developing an all-electric jointed-type arc-~elding robot, the
f.ollowing Patents (including those pending) were obtalned.
l. Robat Structure
Utility model No 1338046: Wrist mechanism for industrial robot
Patent application No 76-135625: Arm drive mechanism for industrial robot
Utility model application No 81-115798: Tool attachment deviceforindustrial robot
Plus 12 other patents and 7 other utility models.
2. Robot Control Device
Patent application No 75-137039: Robot control device
" " No 79-718805: Robot shaft control device
" " No 81-92155: Control format for electric machinery
- Pl~is 22 other patents.
- 3. Servodrive
Pa[ent No 745379: DC motor speed control device
Patent appl.icatioT~ No 73-45724: Automatic backlash corzection device
P1us 43 other patents and 3 other utility models.
4. Numerical Control Device
Patent No 844032: Function generation format
= Patent application No 78-8028: Numerical control device with automatically vari-
able pause capability
Plus 14 other patents and 1 utility model.
A t~tal of 90 patents and 11 utility models.
~ Conclusion
. It t~as been 4 years since the Motoman-L was first introduced to industrial circles.
During this period, the number of units supplied annually has grown at a tremendous
rate, two-three times the previous ratio. Today, there are more than 1,000 robots
` of this series engaged mainly in arc welding here as well as abroad, contributing
positively to the economic effect as described above.
However, robots, which are truly useful in a production system handling a G*~al~
- number of products with large variety must possess intelligent elements such as
- sensing functions, self-control, and decisionmaking capability. We will continue
to follow the path of developing more improved fun~tions steadfastly with the aim
of leaping into the next era.
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Table 1. Robot specifications.
Main Body
l Name Motoman-L3 Motoman-L10
Degrees of freedom 5, jointed type ditto
S axis rotation, 240�, 120�/sec 240�, 90�/sec
Range of Arm L axis lower arm movement � 40�, �40�, 800 mm/sec
movement 840 mm/sec
and
maximum U axis upper arm movement +?0�, +2p�, -40�,
speed -40�, 1180 mm/sec 1100 mm/sec
T axis twist 360�, 225�/sec 360�, 150�/sec
Wrist
B axis swing 180�, 150�/sec 180�, 100�/sec
Load carrying capacity 3 kg maximum 10 kg maximum
- Accuracy of repeated � 0.1 mm � 0.2 mm
positioning
Weight 93 kg 400 kg
- Environmental temperature 0-45� C 0-45� C
Control Device
Name YASNAC-6000 RG
Positioning format Broken-line path control (P.T.P.)
Number of control axes 5 axes simultane~usly (6 axes maximum)
Instruction format Teaching-playback
Position control format Incremental mode digital position control
Position-sequence memory format IC memory
Memory capacity 1,000 steps; 600 instructions
External synchronous signal Input: 22 contacts; Output: 21 contacts
Welding current-voltage 0-127 steps
designation
[Table continued on following page]
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Change in welding current- Possible
voltage during welding
Speed change TRT function (0.1 second unit); designation of
absolute value of velocity
Job copy Possible
Step forward-backward Possible with teach box
Addition-elimination-correction Possible
of teach point
Search function Possible to search position, program, job, and
instruction
Dry run (track recognition Possible
at s:lre speed)
Machine lock Possible
Automatic return to origin Possible
- Timer function A code designation, 0-25.5 sec (0.1 sec unit)
External synchro- A code designation, 5 kinds
nous signal
Instruction Counter function H code designation, 3 kinds
functions
Branch-call J code designation, 7 kinds
func tion
Welder control F code designation, 6 kinds
Error function 32 kinds
Parameter indication/designation 19 kinds
Alarm function PG, TG abnormality, CPU abnormality, overrun,
overload, servo err.or, panel interior tempera-
_ ture abnormalit~, sAquence error, RPG hard
er~roi, etc--a total of 31 kinds
Cassette interface Contained internally
Computer interface Addition possible
Three-dimensional linear Designation of absolute value of velocity
interpolation function (1 mm/min unit)
Five-axis simultaneous interpolation
Automatic acceleration/deceleration
- [Table continued on follow~~g page]
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Three-dimensional shift function Possible to designate arbitrary shift range
(3-D translation and rotation) Designation of shift from 3-point teaching
Three-dimensional mirror image Same as above
~ (3-D left-right symmetric
translation)
Cylindrical coordinate movement Cylindrical coordinate movement possible dur-
ing teaching
Three-dimensional arc interpo- Designation of spatial arc by 3-point teaching
lation function
Three-dimensional scaling Possible to enlarge/reduce spatial shape by
(3-D track enlargement/ 1-point teaching
reduction)
Six axes simultaneous control Possible
Soft weaving Amplitude Max � 12.5 mm, Frequency Max 1.0 Hz
Environmental temperature 0-45� C
Electric power source +10% +
AC 200/220 V_15~, 5Q/60 Hz _ 1 Hz, 5 kVA
(3 kVA for L3)
YASNAC 6000 RG 5
~~I z ~
-7 o~~~~~ ~ ROM RAM1 CPU
~ ~J ?o J F 1~9-7:-A
IP.RON) (C.Y05)
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r ~r.Jl
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Figure l. Construction uf control device.
[Key on following page]
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Key:
1. Operation panel 9. Data paths
2. Remote input/output controller 10. Cassette recorder
3. Teach data (1,000 steps; 600 11. Cassette interface
instructions) 12. General purpose data transmitte~
4. Three-dimensional interpolator 13. High-speed pulse distributor
5. Welder interface 14. Servomotor controller
6. External input/output interface 15. Power amplifier (Servopack)
7. Relay unit 16. 5-axis + 1-axis (option)
8. Teach box
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F'OR OFrICIAL USE ONLY
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CVi~ VL'l'l~.IHL VJL' Vl\L�
Table 2. Examples of economic effects resulting from introduction of Motoman.
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