JPRS ID: 10329 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030038-2
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 38
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10329
17 ~February 1982
Near East North Africa Re ort
p
CFOUO 6/82)
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATI~N SERVICE
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NOTE
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JPRS L/10329
17 February 1982
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
- (FOUO 6/82).
CONTENTS ~
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Briefs
Libya-Morocco Diplomatic Ties 1
AFGHANISTAN
Political Sociology of Traditional Hierarchy Studied
(Pierre Centlivres, Micheline Centlivres-Demont;
COI~tETTAIRE, Wi.nter 81-82) 2
LIBYA
Increased Investments in Italy Described
(MARCH]~S TROPICAUX ET MFDITERRANEENS, 11 Dec 81) 14
Briefs
Pakisttini Workers Repatriated 16
_ Produce: Packaging Plants 16
Pasta ~'lants 16
_ SUDAN ~
Electricity Projects Reviewed, F.xpanaion Dioted
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET ~iF:DITF.RRANEENS, 11 Dec 81) 17
\ Briefs
Real Estate Development 19
- a- (III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
LIBYA-MOROCCO DIPLOMATIC TIES--A simple question of language is delaying the
arrival in Rabat of a Libyan diplomatic mission. Tripoli calls it a"fraternity
office." For the Moroccans, the heacl QF such an officz could not have contacts
with the palace where only recognized ambassadors are received. The most difficult
problem, however, has been surmounted since all sides are in agreement that Libya
reestablish its diplomatic representation in Morocco. [Text] ~Friiis JE[JNE
AFRIQUE in. French No 1092, 9 Dec 81 p 44] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981.]
~ 8796
CSO: 4519/73
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,
~
' NOR OHFt('IA1. t ~tit~: (1N1.1'
I
~
AFGHANISTAN
~
POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF TRADITIONAL HIERARCHY STUDIED
Paris COMMENTAIRE in French Winter 81-82 pp 514-525
[Monograph by Pierre Centlivres and Micheline Centlivres-Demont; July 1981:
"Village in Afghanistan"]
[Text] Afghanistan is baffling, particularly the situation created by the Soviet
intervention on 27 December 1979. We are far from having simple models with
- clearly identif iable elements: occupation, resistance, liberation movements,
collaborators, progressives, conservatives. The number of Afghan refugees in
Pakistan is considerable--perhaps the largest number in the post-waY period, but
it is often not lciown who trey are, what they are running away from, or why. The
resistance defies analysis because of its many factions, divisions, a^.d i^ability
ta portray itself as representative of the country as a whole.
Moreover, the information from Delhi, Moscow, Kabul or border crossers reveals
little about the real situati,on in the countryside, the v illages, or the
peasant communities in what is sometimes called the "liberated areas." Also, the
insistence among information professionals on intelligibility promgts them to
employ some strange analytical concepts. We sometimes hear about the Afghan
pe.asauts being oppressed by a feudal system operated by the big landowners, tribal
chiefs, and fanatical mullahs; and at other times about democratic, egal itarian,
and semi-autonomous village communit~es.
Give Up Preconceived Notions ~
The 13 million Afghans are not just emerg3ng from the Middle Ages; most of them
are not members of nomadic tribes, but of a peasant soc iety mobilized for centur-
ies by powerful and bureaucratic states, and consolidated around urban centers
containing garrisons, markets, and administrative bodies.
Study of the authority-dependence relationship of the village communities and the
administrative centers, and of the recent changes observed ~ust prior ~o the 1978
coup d'etat, makes it possiblA to put in perspective the quest3Ans being raised
about Afghanistan.
. How can we describe the g.o,vernment's activity and its representation in the
northern Afghanistan villages? The peasant communities are only partial entities
and are dependent. We have therefore decided to treat as a study unit, in the
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following pages, the network composed of the administrative center of the provin-
cial subdivision and its dependent villages, the network which is the context for
the direct confrontation among the peasants, prominent individuals, and the admin~
istrative representatives sent by Kabul.
The subprovincial administrative center is usually at the end of the passable
vehicle road. It is also the site of the weekly or semiweekly market, of the
large mosque which gathers the pPople from surrounding areas on Friday or major
f east days, and of the district;officials' building.
Since unification of the country by the Mnha.~madzai dynasty in the 19th century,
the Kabul government has controlled, through a hierarchical administrative a_nd
political system, an extremely diverse collection of ethnic, linguistic, and
religious groups. This ethno-cultural complex includes speakers of Tadzhik, Arabic,
Pashtu, Mnngol, Uzbek, and Turkmen, t~ cite only the main languages. The communi-
ties are not autonomous and do not appear anywhere in the organizational pyramid
diagram of the prov~inces, subprovinces, o~ districts; there are no formal ties be-
~ween them except through their common administrative center.
The modern means of communication: roads and official vehicles, telephone and
telegraph connections, as well as the omnipresent, earth-colored sold iers' uniforms
confirm the broad spread of Kabul's authority; one can sa~ tnat Afghanistan is a
centralized state governed by telephone instruct ions from Kabul to the government.
The Afghan society is fragmentary, including elements who are qualitatively dif-
ferent in language, ethnic origin, andalso in the basis of their sense of
identity: genealogical for some, territorial for others, religious for some
minorities within Islam, a^d for the people of the north and s~uth a separateness
of the whole community due to the way in which they 6ecame part of *he Afghan
state. The north, 1{ke the center and east, w~re conquered and "pacif ied" for
the Emir of Kabul by the Pashtun tribal alli.ances in the second half of the 19th
century. The state and its officials are still regarded by many as the envoys GL
- a conquering power, formerly foreign and today still viewed as radically separate,
charged with maintaining order and raising the tribute payment in men and money.
The Afghan sociopolitical system exhibits the dual character of centralization of
the state apparatus and heterogeneity of the local communities. The state has
an extensive coercive power of which it has sole control. The centers of decision-
making are "interlocked," f.rom the top all the way down to the smallest adminis-
trative units. The positi~ns of command, i~ particular in the army, police, and
among high officials, are occupied by a political elite with its own clientele.
This elite, which has both an ethnic and regional basis, is of Pashtun origin and
has its own divisions and factions, for example between the Durrani of the south-
- west and the G hilzai of the east. Finally, the loyalty of the civii servants is
one of clientele and ethnic ties, wh.erea$ the loyalty of those administered is
based on acceptance of the legitimacy of the rule and not on identif ication with a
national entity.
Failure of the Nation State and Pashtunization
Following the example of the European states of. the pa~t century, Lhe Kabul rulers
had one objective, a national state of Afghan people, w{.th a common political goal.
3
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It is clear that at the beginning of the 1970's Afghanistan was more a feudal
state than a nation state. The sub-national identity, belonging to an ethnic
community, and the supranational identity, belonging to Islam, w^re much stronger
than identity with an abstract national entity. Open claims to regional identity
are a recent phenomenon dating from the last years of the monarchy, and resulted
only, and that only intermittently, i: some radio broadcasts in languages other
than the so-called national tongues, Pashtu and Dari (Persian and Afghanistan).
For most of the farmers, farmer-herdsmen, and craftsmen of northenl Afghanistan,
the state is, to use Olivier Roy's expression, i:i exterior location; it constitutes
a radical alterity. Its off icials are cons~:dered to speak a foreign language,
P:shtu, s~�en though it is the official language and there have been repeated
efforts to impose it on petty local officials and secondary school students. Pashtu
is the language the police chief and governor use when they talk, the languages of
3r~crees broadcast over radio, the language of official documents, and the language
of the notations on the identity card whi~h all adult males have to carry.
_ The Pashtun control over the non-Pashtun areas of Afghanistan, and particularly
thr_ north, was achieved in two stages. After the conquest of tfie north and the
pacif ication at the end of the last century by Emir Abdur Rahman, the Kab~.~l govern-
mezt settled Pashtun elements from the south and southeast-~-people of turbulent
reputation and same only recently pacified--on cultivable, i:rigable, ar.d fertile
' land wnich wa~ supposedly state land but was in fact often seized from the local
far~ers. This process of Afghanization has continued into recent years. By so
doing, t`~e government wanted not only to take them away from their environment of
origin and end any dissidence, but also to establish in Tadzhik, U~bek, and Turlanen
areas "naqelin" colonists speaking the same language and of the same origin as the
~thnic group in power and tied to this group by having received land from the
- state. This creation of Pashtun pockets in the north has caused, and still causes,
m:ny ~,roblems of an interethnic nature. Tadzhiks, Uzbeks, a^d Turlanens regard
these Pashtuns, even those who have been there a long timg, a:: alien people in
league with the Kabul government, and as usurpers of land which they feel was
stolen f rom them.
_ What is called Past?tunization is of more recent date; it is a result of the cen-
tral government's desire to impose on the whole country the Pashtun administrative
:~ystev:, language, way of life, and ideology.
The national radio, even though it transmits its official broadcasts in Dari,
r_he lingua franca of the country, uses abstract and administrative language which
i.s incomprehensible to the rural people. Finally, the off icials have received
- an educdtion--at Kabul, in secondary schools, and at the university--of a
"moderr.ist" type; they are not scholars in the Islamic sense of the word, but
We~ternized elitists, whatever their political tendency. The signs of the
power: concrete administration buildings, and the clothing and uniforms of
oEf.icials, a:-e in full evidence, b~~t tl:e power's words and its goals are not in-
telli~ible.
TF~is unintelligibility of the ruling ~ower seems to us to be a general phenomenon
in Afghanistan. The peasants do not understand the laws, regulations, or measures
whi.ch are applied to them; no effort is made to inform them, and what information
is approved for the public is incomprehensible; figures on taxes, duties, and fees
~1
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due from citizens are outside the people's understandiag. The peas