JPRS ID: 10317 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030026-5
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 26
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10317
10 February 1982
Sub-Saharan Africa Re ort
p
_ FOUO No. 761
~g~$ FOREIGN BROA~DCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original pr.rasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editcrial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [TextJ
or [ExcerptJ in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original iniormation was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phone::ically or transliterated are
- enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parenth~:ses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
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JPRS L/10317
10 February 1982
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT
FOUO No. 761
CONTENTS
- INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Impact on Africa of Monetary I}isorder Studied
- (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER.RANEENS, 20 Nov 81) 1
New Secretary General of ACCT Profiled
- (Ela Fia; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 23 Dec 81~ 13
ACCT Eighth General Conference in Iabreville
(Sophie Bessis; JEUNE AFRI~UE, 23 Dec 81) 15
Black Afric?~s Relations With Israe? Examined
(Bechir Ben Yahmed; JEUNE A~~TQUE, 23 Dec 81) 18
Article Urges Less Talk, More Action
(5ii�adiou I}iallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 16 Dec 81) 20
ANGOLA
- Goals for 1981-1985 Agricultural Season Announced
~ (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER.F~ANEENS, 8 Jan 82) 23
CAMEROON
- BrieFs
Coffee F'rice Increases ~ 25
CAPE VERDE
Brief s .
Political 'Radicalization~ Announced 26
_ CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Briefs
Amnesty Order 27
MLPC President's Charges 27
Settlement of Pygmies ~7
- a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
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rvn vr.�.a..Ma. voc. v,.a.a
GUI2JEA
~ Brief ~
Cooperation With GDR 28
Oil Prospecting ~8
MALI
Brief s
CCCE Agricultura.~. Loan 29
Japanese Rice Loan . 29
_ NIGERIA �
Brief s ~
Oil Producti.on 30
Tndusti�ial Production Stagnating . 30
. SENEGAL ~
Textil.e Industry Undergoing Difficult Period
- (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER,RANEENS, 8 Jan 82) 31
Brief s ~
. New Sudes Secretary General 33
TOGO
IncreasEd Cooperation With Kuwait Anticipated
, (MARCHFS TROPICAUX ET MEDITERR,ANEENS, 15 Jan 72) 31~
ZAIRE ~
Briefs ~ '
Cooperation With An;ola 36
Oil Production 36
Cooperation With USSR 3b
. Cooperation With Yiigoslavia 37
Gold Processing Plant 37
ZANIBIA
~ Briefs
Aid for Mir.ing Industry 38
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~ INTLR-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
IMPACT ON AFRI~A OF MONETARY DISORDER STUDIED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1880y20 Nov 81 pp 2925-2929
[Text] In our issue of 20 November (pp 2863-2867), we publish an
. analysis on the World Bank report devoted to "the accelerated de-
velopment of Sub-Saharan Africa: alongside,,wtth comments on that
report contributed by two experts on the p~o~'~na of Afr~can ,
~ develc~ment. The question ot the African cuz~rencies-~overvalued '
according to the Berg report--is rather complex ana t?~e follow-
ing article is an attempt to take stock of the situation.
The state of African currencies has long elicited pessimistic remarks because the;~ rs-
ceived the full impa.ct of the world economy's slump and of the disequilibrium in for-
~ eign exchange markets. In recent montli~s, it has been em~phasized that they are oftcn
overvalued, thus creating f inancial burdens for the International Monetary Fund (I?~)
which supports them and does not have inexhaustible financial assets.
The fact that these currencies often have inadequate rates of exchange is hardly sur-
~ prising since internation.al f inancial institutions have often pointed out in their
reports--in general terms and without mentioning any country--thgt the economic im-
balances of many African countries are aggravated by their unrealistic or overvalued
rates of exchange, The esoteric and, for the noninitiated public, obscure nature of
the many documents published by these organizations, *heir general analyses covering
Africa as a whole and, even more often, lumping all developing countries together,
and the sterEOtyped nature of the rectification measures advocated, have contributed
to making African monetary problems be deliberately ignored. This is all the more so
since the problema of the industrialized countriea are recognized to be complex and
- attract a sustained interest because th~ foreign exchange aiarkets register large move-
ments of their capitals which is not the case for Africa.
A Difficult Evaluatian
With monetary anarchy rampant all over the world, every currency has had, at some time
or othnr, its value and solidity sub~ected to disappointing and even depreciatory eval-
uations; this is a normal occurrence for currencies of Iittle or even symbolic impor-
tance which are a reflection of economic situations generally viewed as desperate in
some countries and certainly critical for any country which does not produce petroleum.
In these countries, external pressures (deterioration of th? terms oP exchange, inter-
ests rates and imported inflation) are compounded by the burden of internal restrictions
of a geographic, economic and even military nat~re.
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In any case, establishing the value of a currency lends itself to conxroversy; the
exact v~lue of a currency can certainly be determined in the foreign exchange markets
but there are so many speculative transactions that the rates quoted only apply for
a short while and do not take into account long term prospects.
The ur:reliable factors affecting the currencies af industrial countries are even
~tronger in the case of African currencies. T~.ere is no official open foreign ex-
change mark.et which determines the volume of the various currencies being sought and
offered in exchange for others and statistic figures, rapidly and constantly avail-
able for a specif ic currency, are scarce.
In fact, the IMF admits t:hat it is difficult to determine the exact effect of the ex-
change rate on the count;cy's situation; this is why in its analysis, the IMF gives not
only short term conclusic~ns but also includes long tPrm proapects such as external in-
debtedness and f easibility of development plans.
All this considered, the decision to change an exct~ange rate is always difficult; even
when .the db~ectives pursued are cZear and realietic, the choice of sectorial measures
required to meet these ob~ectives is a political tnatter and, therefore, subject to many
contradictory pressures. Finally, the timing of that ad~ustment is also very imp~rtant
because what might be opportune from a technicxl viewpoint is not always opportune from
a political viewpoint. ~
As for passing 3udgements on the African currencies, one must proceed with moderation
and caution because in the absence of foreign exchanges one cannot rely on the rates
quoted for bills on the free markets of Switzerland, Beirut (before 1975) and in other
markets. The IMF itself on.Ly publishea, on a regular basi~, the rates of the South
AfriGan rand (only African currency quoted in the London market), the Libyan dinar
and the Nigerian naira giving their par value in SDRs (special drawing rights).
It is only by reading press reports and, more particularly, the IMF's analyses that
one can get some idea of the position of moat of these currencies. For inatance, the
_ international organizations mention, among other things, "the advisability of follow-
ing a flexibl~ policy on rates of exchange" in general or for a,given country, or the
desi.rability "of reforming the r~gulations applying to foreign exchanges," or eli~e
the eff ects o�~ "policies resulting in inadequate rates of exchan~e." But they do not
publish accurate information on the issues and eome people deplo~e that omission.
Through its studies, the IMF has tihe task of "monitoring the foreign exchange policies"
of its member countries. The IMF does this on a regular basis through its missions for
consultation. When the situation requires it, additional consultations take plsce but,
as already noted, these c.onsultations must be approached "with the greatest caution
' and display of discretion."
The IMF also provides financial assistance to countrie�.which are facing or are likely
to face external payments difficulties. This form of assistance consists in allow~!ng
applicant countries to buy "special drawing rights, SDR's," or rather theix equiva-
lent value in foreign currencies, with their own currencies to meet problems need#ng
immediate solutions or critical situations likely to become dangerous on a short and
medium term and which require the immediate implementation of a recov~ry program, or
else, to help implemen~. programs of economic and financial stabilization spread over
a 3 year period. The repayment of Ehis assistance is made with the SDR's being
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repurchased by the fund. The volume of these operations has greatly expanded since
1979 and gress reports regarding these operations help to make an undoubtedly cursory
assessment of the diff iculties confron~ing many African currencfes.
African Currencies
Independence led each African state to adopt its own currency; the result is a collec-
tion of 51 currencies (not counting the French franc of Reunion), some more important
than others, and 49 of which are registered with the IMF. On the whole, these cur-
rencies are not convertible and after the fixed par values were abandoned on 1 April
1978, they do not have a common denominator linking them except for the currencies
- of countries in the franc zone. Many of them are lj.nked to a currency, to the SDR's
or to a basket of currencies. Based on the data released on 30 June 1981 by the IMF,
the currencies of African countries can be classif ied into several groups (the most
recent name of the currency is given in parentheses):
Nine countries with currencies linked to the U.S. dollar: Bu~undi (Burundian franc),
D~ibouti (D~ibouti franc), Egypt (Egyptian pound), Ethiopia (birr), Liberia (dollar),
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Libyab dinar), Rwanda (Rwandan franc), Somalia (Somali shil-
ling), Sudan (Sudanese pound). ~
_ Ten countries with curren.cj.es linked to the SDR's: Guinea (syli), Guinea-Bissau (peso),
Kenya (Kenyan shilling), Ma~awi (kwacha), Mauritius (Mauritian rupee), Seychelles
(Seychelles r:.~.pee), Sao Tome and Principe (dobra), Sierra Leone (leone), Zaire (zaire),
= Zambia (kwacha).
Seven currencies linked to a basket of currencies other than the SDR's: Algeria
(Algerian dinar), Botswana (pula), Cape V~trde (Cape Verdian escudo), Islami_c Republic
of Mauritania (ouguiya), Tanzania (Tanzanian shilling), Tunisia (Tunisian dinar),
Zimbabwe (Zimbabwean dollar linked to the U.S. dollar before April 1980).
Two currenci.es linked to the South African rand: Lesotho (maloti), Swaziland
(lilangeni) .
One currency linked to the poun~-s~erling: Gambia (dalasi). (The Seychelles rupee
was also linked to the pound sterling before December 1979).
� One currency linked to the Spanish peseta: Equatorial Guinea (ekuele).
In the case of Nigeria (nairs) and Uganda (Ugandan shilling), on 1 July this year the
IMT' had no information on rates and syatem of exchange.
Three currencies are independently floating or have ad~ustable exchange rates based
on indicators: the Republic of South Africa (rand), Ghana (cedi), Morocco (dirham).
Thirteen countries are members of the franc zone. Six of them belong to the West-
Afri~:an Monetary Union as a result of a treaty signed: Senegal, the Ivory Coast,
Upper Volta, Togo, Benin (formerly D~ihomey) and Niger. Five countries of central,
Africa have signed an agreement on monetary cooperation: Cameroon, Gabon, Congo, the
Central African Republic and Chad. Mali and the Federal Islamic Republic of the
Comoros are also in this group. The various national currencies issued by four issu-
ing institutes are the CFA franc for west and central African countries, the Mali franc
and the Comorian franc.
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'1'i~e franc of the Republic oC Mr~dagascar, with an exch~nge rate based on the French
franc, is simply 11nke3 to that franc by the IMF.
Finally, the currencies af Angola (kwanza) and Mozambique (metical) are not quoted by
the IMF because those countries are not members of that or~anization.
Of these 51 countries just mentioned, 21 are includEd in the ~~tegory uf "less de-
veloped countries" and 4 others have also requested to be classified as such.
On 30 June 1981, some countries had a multi;ole exchange rate system or a system of
dual exchange market: the Republic of South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana,
Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Zaire. These
systems which are common practice among industrialized countries, are merely tolerated
by the IMF because they are preferable to rigid and inadequate rates of exchange.
Barring some error or omission, the following countries have made changes in the par
value of their currencies with the IMF's approval:
--Su~an: June 1978 and September 1979.
_ --Ghana: July 1978, t
--Tanzania: January 1979.
--Zaire: January 1979, August 1979, February 1980, June 1981 (-40 percent).
--Botswana: September 1979.
--Mauritius: October 1979 and 28 September 1981 (-20 percent).
--Kenya: January 1981 (-5.07 percent), 19 September 1981 (a total of -1S percent).
--Uganda: devaluation (12 June 1981); flotation (26 June).
_ Therefore, there have not been too many ad~ustnents of exchange rates in Africa and
there is no evidence that those which took place over a certain period of time brought
any advantage except in the cas$ of Botswana where diamond mining was developed. On
- the other hand, the advantages of devaluation for export operations in the cther coun-
tries were curtailed by,the decline of prices for coFfee, cocoa and sugar and by the
higher cost of imported goods, mainly foodstuffs and petroleum products.
~ System of the Fran~c Zone Countiries
The frar~c zone countri~s have a special monetary system the main feature of which is
that the convertibility of their currencies is guaranteed by France and this gives
them the same 4tability as the French franc.
In the case of tne West African group, France signed an 4 December 1973 a cooperation
agreement with member countries of the West African Monetary Union created by the
treaty of 14 October 1973. Whenever n.acessary, the French Republic gives its
"assistance" to allow that union to "ensure the free convertibility of its currency."
In central Africa, the agreement on monetary cooper~tion signed on 23 November 1972,
between France and member states of the Bank of Central African States (BF.AC), stipu-
lates that this cooperation is based on the former pro~~iding "unlimited backing" for.
the currency issued by the bank and on the member states "depositing all ar part of
their foreign exchange reserves with the French treasury."
This ,guarantee of convertibility, as well as that extended to the Republic of Mali
- and ta the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros, operate by means of trading accounts
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which the French treasury opens for use by the issuing central banks and where their
respecttve transfer operations are recorded. A guaranteed ex~hange rate applies to
the credit balance of each trading account should there be a change in the par value
of the French franc. ~
The current par value of the various African francs in French francs is:
1 CFA (African Financial Community) franc or 1 CFA (Financial Cooperation in Central
Afric.a) franc = 0.02 French franc.
- 1 Comorian franc = 0.02 French franc. ~
1 Malian franc -~J.O1 French franc.
Since 1974, when the issuing system of west and central Africa was reorganized, the
authorities concerned have agreed ro follow France's policy on exchange rates main-
taining the aforesaid par values of their currencies after each devaluation.
- IMF Assistance
Until 1974, the assistance given by the IMF consisted in being able to use SDR`s made
- available to each state within the limits of the credit blocks allocated to them pn
the basis of the "subscrip~ion quotas" paid into the fund when they become a member
of the fund or when the fund's Articles of Agreement are revised. As already pointed
out, the member states purchase SDR's or their equivalent in foreign currencies;
they pay interest to the IMF on this kind of loan and cancel their debts by trans-
ferring SDR's or convertible currencies to the fund; at that point, the member ~tate
recovers its national currency and is again entitled to purchase more SDR's if the
need arises.
Two methods of. assistance have been in use over a long period of time:
~ Standby Arrangements (SBA) which are the credit blocks originally allocated and repre-
sent, in fact, overdraft facilities.
'The Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF) which offers the possibility of applying for
- additional drawings to help during a temporary decline in export earnings.
~ African states have made moderate use of these facilities.
After the o il shock, an Oil Facility was set up between 1974 and 1975 to help oil
importing countries facing considerably heavier energy bills. These countries borrowed
SDR 464 million; later on, a discount fund was establtshed to ease their debt (interest
d iscounts). .
~ In May 1976, profits from the sale of gold lield by the IMF were used to establish a
- "Trust Fund" offering loans to countries wiL�h a per capita annual income of less than
SDR 300 for periods of between 6 and 10 years and at interest rates equal to the ex-
penses incurred (0.5 percent). As a matter of fact, with the exception of Libya,
Nigeria, Gabon, Botswana and Tunisia, all the other African countries drew from that
fund a total of 9DR 943 million between 1 July 1976 and 31 N,arch 198I which is the
date when the last drawing ended. The top recipients were Egypt, Zaire and Morocco
in that order. ~
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In 1977, the Compensatory Financing Facility relaxed the conditions under which coun-
tries exporting commodities would have�access to that facility and, in 1978, the
3-5 year repayment period was extended to a 5-7 year period. The applicant country
must agree to cooperate with the IMF to find a solution to its balance of paym~nt
difficulties. The decline in estimated exports caused by falling prices (iron in the
case of Liberia and Mauritania; coff ee in Ethiop:a, Liberia, Burundi, Uganda, Mada-
gascar), or by poor harvests (sugar in N,auritius; peanuta in Senegal, Gambia,
Guinea-Bissau, Mali; cocoa in Equatorial Guinea; various products in Tanzania) are
the factors used to determine whether a request is justified or not. This facility
is of a precautionary nature and does not necessarily have to be used. In September
1981, the Ivory Coast was given the option to purchase SDR 114 million in view of
an estimated foreign trade deficit for 1981 due to declining cocoa and coffee prices
(this was obviously the case for its export quota based on the international agreement).
After being used a great deal between 1976 and 1978, this facility was not involved in
many operations in 1979 but after 1980 the volume of its activ#ty has increased
again. In May 1981, it started giving aid to member countries "with balance of pay-
ments diff iculties resulting from the additional cost of their grain imports." Malawi
was the rirst country to make use of this form of aseistance (on 17 September this
- year it was allowed to purchase SDR 12 million). ~
Since 1979, conditions have substantially deteriorated ~n countries not so much due to
temporary deficits in their balance of payments as to structural disequilibrium com-
bined with a decline of the prices of raw materials and the second oil shock; they have
had dogged inflation, budget deficits aggravated by poor harvests, an accelerated in-
' crease of the external debt, a prolif eration of public organizations operating at a
deficit, price policies which are bad for agr iculture, a frantic urban development
and so on.
To increase its aid effort, the IMF was forc.ed to expand its resources, which .it did
in 1979 by borrowing from the central banks (including SDR 22,0 million from the Cen-
tral Bank of Nigeria), and again at the ~nd of 19R0 when it increased ite subscription
quotas by 50 percent, tt~en, finally, in 1981 through arrangements to borrow made with
the Bank for International Settlements and with the ma~or industrialized countries.
This constant effort on the part of the international financial corimunity has made it
possible for the IMF to considerably increase its assistance to countries which are
more seriously hit by the crisis and where prolonged and restricting measures were
- required over a period oi aeveral years to achieve an economic recovery. But the
increase in the number of recipient states and the heavier burden imposed by this aid
on the fund's resources is offset by the fact that the applicant countries must adapt
a program known as a stabilization program or program of economic and financial ad3ust-
ment. This gave shape to the gradually well defined notion of "conditionality," a
rather uncauth word now consCantly in use by fund's officials.
Conditionality is criticized by applicant countries when it becomes too strict as is
obviously the case when recommendations are made involving the exchange rate, a
measure which could result in accelerated increases of consumer good prices. This
conditionality has diff erent aspects dependin~ on whether the decision to give
as~istance consists in a standby arrangement or in an extended arrangement, or more
precisely, an arrangement involving the use of an Extended Fund Facility (EFF). In
the latter case, the country is given the opt ion to purchase SDR's over a period of
3 years with specif ic dates of payment corresponding to the various stages of the
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recovery program undertaken by the r~ecipient country. The IMF explains (in its bulle-
tin of May 1981) that there must be a"detailed list of the policies and measures
planned for the f irst 12 months and fox subsequent 12 month periods." In the first
case (standby arrangement), the applicant state only needs "to produce f irm groof
of its efforts to overcome its payments diff iculties within a 1-year period."
Since the assistance given under these conditions over the last 3 years has been well
publici.zed, one can appreciate the frail nature of the economies of many African states
and the monetary diff iculties which result from this. Addressing the UN Economic
~ and Social Council, on 3 July this year, the director of the IMF noted that "three
fourths of the fund's current lending c~mmitments involve programs of economic re-
covery compared to one fourth a few years ago."
Standby Arrangements and Extended ~nd Facility
These two methods of assistance are bec~ming more widespread and their study shows how
serious the situation is for Africa.
(1) Standby Arrangements (standby cred its)--On 31 December 1978, the account b~ooks of
the IMI' showed four countries under the chapter of standby arrangements: Gabon, Kenya
(later cancelled), Ma~iritius and chiefly Zambia (250 million of partia~ly used SDR's).
N~w, just in Africa, it has standby arrangements with the following countries (figures
given in mil�lion SDR's) :
In 1979: Kenya (122.48, not used); Zaire (118), Mauritius (73.03, part3ally used),
Ghana (53), Malawi (26.3, partially used), Sierra Leone (17), Togo (15), 'Senegal
(10.5), Gambia (1.6), People's Republic of the Congo and Rwanda (not used).
In 1980: ;Cenya (in October, 241.5), Tanzan ia (179.6 of which only 15 were used),
L iberia (65 of which 32 were used), Madagascar (54.45 not used), Malawi (49.88 of
which 22 were used), Mauritius (,35 of which 30 were used), Mauritania (29.7 of whieh
8.9 were used), Uganda (12.5), ;~omalia (11.5 of which 6 were used), Equatorial Guinea
(5.5 of which 2.5 were used).
~ In 1981: Uganda (112.5), Madagascar (109.4), E~:hiopia (67.5), Togo (47.5), Sudan
(45.7), Somalia (43.13), Zimbabwe (37.5), Senegal (63), Liberia (55), Mauritania (25.8),
Central African Republic (10.4).
The list includes some countries which have ad~usted their exchange ratea: Kenya and
Uganda adjusted them in 1981 while Tanzania seems to be having problems in its nego-
tiations with the IMr; finally, in Zaire, a flexible exchange rate policy was part of
the stabilization program which that country agreed to implement in August 1979.
Al1 these standby arrangements allow the countries to purchase SDR's over a period of
1 or 2 years. The length of the period depends on the country's ability to introduce
more or less substantial stabilization programs. In 1980, the arrangements were for
2 year periods except in the case of Equatorial Guinea and Somalia. In 1981, the
- arrangements announced on X October were for 1 year except on the case of Togo (2 years),
Ethiopia (14 months) and Uganda (13 months) .
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Whenever ~ustified, these arrangements can be supplemented by purchases under com-
pensatory financing arrangements; thia wae done in the cases of Uganda, Senegal and
Ethiopia. The case of Senegal shows the IMF's flexibility when it decides to grant
assistance.*
A communique issued by the IMF on 16 September 1981 stated that it had approved a
_ standby arrangement allowing the Senegalese Government to maka purchases up to the
equivalent of SDR 63 million until 30 June 1982 on the ba~.is of a stabilization pro-
gram carried out by that government. In 1980, a"medium term program of structural
adjustment" was adopted by that country where the economic situation had been deterior-
ating since 1978. The results of the lst year of that program were ~ess sat isfactory
than expected due to bad weather conditions. "As a first step in the implementation
_ of the medium term program" the authorities decided to introduce a"short t erm stabil-
ization program" aimed at reducing the balance of payments deficit. TY?is program was
backed by the aforesaid standby arrangement and the extended arrangement made in 1980
has been cancelled. Measures were adopted "to improve and expand the revenue base,"
_ to "limit the growth of the nominal value of ordinary expenditures," to "reduce the
budget deficit" and "to direct i.nvestments toward directly productive projects."
It must be pointed out that one of the conditiona was to "set up consolidat ed accounts
for the transactions of the central administrat ion and to ~ontrol overdue payments
in the public and quasi public sectors." The Senegalese Goverr.ment has taken on a
giant task which must be carried out in a rather sh~rt period of time.
(2) The assistance given to member states through the "Extended ~nd Facility" was
f~.rst introduced in Africa in 1974 and had only been used in small proportions by
Kenya in July 1974 (with purchases of SDR 5 million), by Egypt and Sudan in 1979 and
in 1980 but it was not until 1981 that large amou~nts were involved as the fund
mobilized add~tional resources.
This facility is intended to correct structural shortcomings in the balanc e of pay-
ments. Countries are allowed to make drawings over a period of 3 yea.rs and the re-
purchases must be done in 12 equal installments and ov~r a period which varies between
4 and 10 years after the purchase. This assista!zce is tied to a 3 year adjustment
program affecting all the economic and financial policies of the applicant state:
- agricultural output and prices, retail prices; situation of the industries, even
transportation and opening of isolated areas; investments, foreign loans with recurr-
_ ing charges and overdiie payments; budf;et policies and particularly the q�iestion of
- subsid ies; proliferation and managemei~t of public and quasi public establishments;
regulation of domestic and foreign tr~ide; control over the exchange rate. It is to
be hoped that the problem of the exchange rates will remain confidential.
These arrangements are given quite a wide publicity.
P'or instance, it was m~de quite clear that the arrangement made with Gabon on 21 June
1980, involving SDR 34 mill ion, was a precautionary measure and would end on 31 Decem-
ber 1982. After going through a financial crisis in 1977, that country was able to
reduce its internal and external debt and eliminate all its overdue payments. Since
the 1980-82 interim plan calls for large investments, the purpose of the credit arrange-
ment is to f ill the gap of any foreign trade def icit which may occur.
* Details of the programs are taken ~rom IMF's communiques.
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In the case of Sudan, an arrangement made in November 1980, and involving SDR 227
million, came to reinforce the eff ect of a previous arrangement signed in May 1979
involving SDR 200 million of which 75 million were purchased. Therefore, until
5 March 1982, the government of th~it country will draw or can draw a total of SDR
352 million. On 30 April 1981, large sums were still available. After poor crops
which made inroads in their external resources, that country was in debt due to
"expansionist financial polic ies" and to a budget deficit. In addition to a program ~
to f ight inflation and cut back on budget expenditures, the country must carry out a
reform of regulat~_ons applicable to foreign exchanges and to foreign and domestic
trade. On the other har.d, the implementation of reforms in the agricultural sector
_ was slow during the lst year and the authorities have adopted additional measures to
promote cotton farming while they continue to reform their foreign exchange regula-
tions and to curtail the expansion of credit. This program will soon be completed
- and additiot~ai funding has been given through a compensatory financing arrangement of
- SDR 45.7 million because cotton exports declined in 1980 (permission to purchase
SDR's was given on 10 April 1981).
In Morocco, the method used was slightly different; an extended arrangement approved
in October 1980 for SDR 810 million was replaced on 9'March 1981 by an arrangement for
the equivalent of SllR 817.05 million valid until October 1983. Despite efforts made
in the framework of a 3 year program, the balance of payments' f inal f igures were
affected by a decline in phosphate exports.
Very special circumstances apply in the case of the Ivory Coast, a country which also
received on 22 February 1981 an extended arrangement to draw SDR 484.5 million valid
for 3 years. It will carry that country through to 1984 when it will no longer need
to import petroleum. A"massive investment program," originally due to be financed
with earnings from higher coff ee and cocoa prices, had to be funded with "loans and
by drawing from its reserves after 1977. Meanwhile, there was a signif icant increase
in public expenditures which�went up by 115 percent between 1977 and 1980. This re-
sulted in balance of payments deficits and in a deficit of the "over.all balance of
the public sector." A stabilization program was introduced to "reorganize public
finances," to eliminate the balance of payments deficit by 1983, to re;duce the budget
deficit and to cancel out overdue payments.
~ Since 30 March 1981, Sierra L eone ha s been the recipient of a less important extended
arrangement which was required to support a medium term program including, among other
things, a 3 year investment plan for mining and hydroelectric projects. This arrange-
ment involves SDR 163.7 mill ion, is valid until 22 February 1984 and supplements a
standby arrangement which had not been able to correct the external payments situa-
- tion due to a decline of exports and an increase of food imports.
In Zambia, wliere the economy has been in bad straights for many years, due to the drop
of copper prices and to export dif�iculties, an arrangement to draw SDR 800 million is
tted to a 3 year economic and financial program mostly based on modernizing existing
plants and carrying out "pro~ ects likely to produce returns within a short period of
time." Published on 11 May, this arrangement is valid for 3 years.
- Finally, on 23 June 1981, Zaire was allowed to purchase up to SDR 912 million through
the Extended Fund Facility, in addlt ion to that countxy's outstanding obligations
with the IMF amount ing to SDR 162.2 million. The authorities of that country have
adopted a 3 year program (1981-83) intended to "ease the strcctural problems of the
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economy while helping to correct the domestic balance and to bring the balance of
payments to a bearable position." After making ad~ustments in the exchange rate of
their currency and liberaliz ing some imports, the authorities are now planning "to
introduce a flexible policy of exchange rates."
It is useful to remember that Zaire's currency is practically controlled by the IMF
with a director of the Central Bank placed at the disposal of that country by the fund
- on a regular basis.
So far, the amount of assistance given to Africa ~uring 1981 by the IME ~snder these
extended arrangements totals in excess of SDR 2.3 billion.
An Important Contribution Requiring Caution and Pragmatism
After reading this ar~alysis, which makes no attempt to classify the African states, it
is obv ious that the IMF's contributions to the currencies of that area have been very
significant. Apart from the three ma~or oil producing countries and a few others,
Tun isia in particular, the governments who face balance of payments diff iculties or
fear that they will have them in the future, have thought it useful to turn to the IMF
for assistance. When the fund receives their requests, it must demand that these gov-
ernments adopt strict measures which can disturb their political options and their
development projects. This has happened even in the case of countries of the zone
"ranc, at least in certain better off countries and not in the poorer ones, which were
.~it by the decline of coffee and cocoa prices, by the drought and by their dynamic
investment policies. The convertibility of their currencies helped them to get the
economy on the right track and allowed them to continue to have an open trade policy
and access to the investment markets.
The IMF's increasing assistance to Africa remains a very ~pecial one given the diver-
sity of situations and diff erent degree of development of the countries concerned some
of which are particularly underprivileged from a geographic viewpoint. The variety
of inethods available to the fund is particula~ly su ited to the new problems con- '
~ fronting that continent.
However, it often happens that prospective recipients of that assistance f eel that the
fund is off ering them general solutions in the framework of stereotyped programs. The
answer to this lies in the choice of financial factors which can be effectively con-
trolled (volume of domestic credit, foreign assets, foreign debt, position of the pub-
lic treasury, interest rate and so on) and which basically reflect the policy of the
petitioning government. But "the distribution of the burden of the adjustteent" re-
quired depends on every aspect of that policy and, more particularly, on the political
and social aspects.
The exchange rate system which "is monitored by the fund" is sub~ect to a careful
~ study to determine its effect on the entire economy of the country concerned in situ-
ations where there is a serious disequilibrium in the balance of payments. It is im-
portant to understand the significance whicti the IMF attaches to exchange rates as
indicated in an article carried by the IMF's bulletin of 11 May 1981, and devoted to
the adjustment process in Africa, from which we quote a rather obsctire passage deal~
ing with the relationship between exchange rates and the policy on production prices
(page 140) :
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- "Rigid exchange policies have often had similar effects (meaning, a stagnation of
production) in several African countries. Many of these countries have overvalued
exchange rates which are linked to articially low commodity prices and to very strict
restrictions applied to exchange rates and to imports of goods listed as nonessential.
5uch policies have a deterrent eff ect on the production of export commodities and of
substitute products to replace basic i~nports, particularly food supplies and in-
dustrial raw materials, and they are very bad for the growr_h of the balance of pay-
ments."
This analysis is obviously applicable only to specific cases which are not identif ied.
But it is grounds to fear that the fund has a tendency to recommend monetary ad~ust-
ments.
The same can be said of the fund's views regarding frequent adjustments of the ex-
change rates since on page 50 of the 1981 Annual Report, it is stated: "As long as
a country is battling with serious diff iculties associated to a chronic inflation,
the only realistic solution for that country is to adjust its exchange rats constantly
or at least frequently." 1'ortunately, the report immediately mentions the conditions
which must be met if that operation is to be successful: wages which are not indexed,
a not too expansionist monetary policy, an absence of regulations curtailing "the
redistribution of available productive resources."
But none of the African,countries really meet these conditions. The report also
acknowledges that a change in the exchange rates of developing countries "does not
occur...without some particularly serious problems arising" and might require the
introduction of "auxiliary measures." Tbis is probably the reason why many precau-
tions are taken in negotiations with African states and why t~e decision to ~djust
_ the exchange rate is rarely made. As for the practice of having very variable rates
of exchange, used in South America (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay), in Asia and in Turkey,
it is not certain that this is a good solution for the profound disequilibrium aff ect-
ing most African countries even if som~e of their currencies are not convertible.
Generally, the increased value of exports in these countries after a devaluation takes
place is greatly outstripped by the higher cost of imports and the resulting increase
- of their foreign debt. The unstable nature of the prices of tropical products is,
in fact, a good enough reason to dismiss any hope af having a stable revaluation.
Finally, as it happens almost ~verywhere else, the governments have not been able to
avoid subsidizing consumer goods or providing public services at reduced rates. A
- devaluation must not have the eff ect of increasing budget expenditures but the range
of fiscal resources which can be tapped is very limited since most of them originate
from indirect taxation not to mention quasi taxation. Even in the case of politically
solid governments, the options in this sphere are very l.imited.
In Africa, one must also consider the behavior of what could be called, using a U.S.
terminology, the "underground" sector of the economy; this is a very important sector
which cannot be easily assessed. It consists of all transactions or operations which
are not off icially recorded or included in the statlstics. Indeed, factors such as
the overlapping of frontiers, the geographic isolation and poverty of some areas, the
diversification and effectiveness of traditional trade and rural cottage industries,
are all factors which complicate an economic analysis particularly when based on
figures.
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Finally, since industrialized countries continue to have doubts regarding the real
effectiveness of a devaluation and on the subject of how to select the right rate of
exchange, it is normal that the danger of making a mistake in this type of decision
becomes greater in Africa; even moderate measures can turr out to be a disasCer
given their effect on an economic environment which is not well laiown.
,
It is therefore wise for the IMF to be "cautious and pragmatic" in its dealings with
developing countries and to favor long term economic and financial adjustments ~ahile
it continues to support countries with tem~;arary balance of payment difficulties. In
return, the recipient couni:ries must implement the proposed measures if they do not
want to be instrumental in diminishing--indirectly and by reason of their reluctance
to keep thetr co~nitments--the options of the IMF to help the po~rest of these countiries.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981
8796
CSO: 4719/310
, '
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
NEW SECRETARY GENERAL OF ACCT PROFILED
Paxis JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 Dec 81 p 59
[Article by Ela Fia]
[Text] Francois Owono-Nguema, the new secretary general of the Cultural and Techni-
cal Cooperation Agency (ACCT), was born in Oyem (Woleu-Ntem Province) in Gabon on
23 January 1939. He wi1Z therefore be 43 years old when he takes office on the Quai
de Javel in Paris early in January.
After completing his secondary education at the Savorgnan-de-Brazza Ly~.ee in Cor:~o's
capital, he won his university striPes with no trottkile ~t all. After earning a'li-
- centiate in physical science and mathematics at thP Lille and Strasbourg Universities
(France) in 1962, he successfully completed work for his advanced studies diploma in
theoretical physics in 1964 and his doctorate in nuclear physics in 1968.. 'rie was
29 years old. In scientific matters, he was described as a sprinter with th~ con-
sistency and ability of ~a long-distance runner. Always open and available, he was~
able to ~onfirm the hopes ~aroused by his promising start.
Among other things, his research work concerned field theory (mathematical physics)
and nuclear models and reactions.
That was the visible peak of an iceberg whose submerged portion he was also construct-
ing at the same time. With the help of his intellectual curiosity,~he enriched and
deepened a general eclectic culture which, out of modesty, he never displayed. At
most, one glimpsed it in the turn of a phrase or on hearing one of his course lec-
, tures. Professor Owono-Nguema has a gift for explaining the most complex matters in.
a way that makes his listeners feel that they have known th~n for a long time.
Recalled to his country, he was cofounder of the National University of Gabon, where
he held the post of vice rector fr~m 1970 to 1971 and then became rFCtpr in 1971,
holding that position until 1975. A full professor of physics, he divided his teach-
ing time between the Libreville university and those in Lille and Strasbourg.
He`~vas high commissioner for scientific research in 1972, then secretary of state
- for culture and arts for the next 3 years. In 1975, he hdd to "sacrifice" his sci-
entiiic career to take over the Ministry of Research, which is also responsible for
- environment and the prote~tion of nature. He left that post in February 1980 to
become minister of state fer c~~lture, popular education, and arts.
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This father of seven,is experienced in international1affairs as a result of having
headed the Gabonese delegations to the political, cultural, and scientific meetings,
colloquiums, and conferences held by the United Natio2is, UNESCO, and the OAU. The
agency he is taking over is not unfamiliar to him. He has partici~ated in ministe-
rial conferences on the scientific policies of the member states and has worked ~s
top adviser on their harmonization. He became chairman of the ICA (African Cultural
Institute) in 1974 and has headed its Executive Council since 1980.
Were it not for his strong personality and his commitment on behalf of everything
affecting Africa, one would be ten~pted to ask what this fortunate and well-kn.own man ~
is going to do in the chaos of the ACCT. He will need the flair Yie is known to have
and his know-how as a nuclear physicist to master the uncontrollable particles of an
agency whose escut.^.heon has recently been sullied through the carelessness of the
African countries.
He will need his willpower free of authoritarianism, his rigorous way of thinking,
and his reserve, as well as his gift for listening and for hr:man relations if he is
to impose the moral authority of an office that has been tarnished.
We wager that Francois Owono-Nguema, for whom "managing" requires human qualities as
- much as knowledge, will be able to raise the tone of debate within the agency, tran-
scend the office, and give inspiration and a new face to the "business." That is
the least of our hopes for him. ~
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
11798
CSO: 4719/402
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~ INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
~
ACCT HOLDS EIGHTH GENERAL CONFERENCE IN LIBREVILLE
- Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 Dec 81 pp 58, 60
. [Article by Sophie Bessis]
[Text] On Monday morning, 7 December, the scene took place at the Convention Hall
in Libreville. All the actors were ready for the last act of a play ~raught with
intrigue and new developments. The first two acts, played in Paris, had served to
set the stage and present the chief roles without giving any indications as to the
ending. That explains why the actors with top billing,'those with walk-on parts,
- and the producers were nervous at the opening of the Eighth General Conference of
tYie ACCT [Cultural and Technical Cooperation Agency]. One question was on every-
one's lips: who will be elected secretasy general of the ACCT? The spot was coveted
by half a dozen candidates, all of whom firmly intended to fight to win.
The first was the outgoing secretary general, Dankoulodo Dan Dicko of Niger, whose
temperament led him to fight to the end to retain his seat. But his 8 years of un-
divided rule had brought a lot of ill feeling. The words ~f thanks addressed to him
during the first plenary session by Jean-Pierre Cot, speaking on behalf of France,
which he had come to represent as a stand-in for Claude Cheysson, amounted to a dis-
missal. But it was 24 hours later before Niger officially withdrew its candidate.
That left six candidates in the running, and that was a lot, all the more since irast
of them were in a good position to block an election of their rivals. The ACCT's
bylaws state that the secretary general must receive 90 percent of the votes to be
elected. Opposition to any of them by four member states could have resulted in a
_ deadlock.that some were secretly hoping for. So the yame was a difficult one. The
French minister delegate to the minister of external relations for cooperation [Jean-
Pierre Cot], who was scheduled to leave Libreville at 0800 hours on Tuesday morning,
decided to stay on in the Gabonese capital until the end, scheduled for the evening
of the 9th.
Along with his delegation, Cot went all out. He had to show that France takes the
agency and the French-speaking world seriously and that while it is the organization's
most important financial backer, it does not want to be the absolute master, but de-
sires instead to reach a consensus while honoring its con�nitments. It was'not an
. easy task, considering that in order to succ~aed, Jean-Pierre Cot had to erase the
bad impression left by his colleague in the Ministry of External Relations, who had
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apparently ignored instructions from the Elysee Palace and tried without much tact
to impose his own candidate, Raymond Chasles of Mauritius.
That embarrassing support was a poisoned gift for Chasles: having been dropped by
FranCe, that courteous and competent man received only three votes in the first round
of ballotina. Exit Mauritius, along with the Haitian candidate, Mr Guerrier, who re-
ceived only 2 votes, compared to 10 for Gabon, 8 for Tunisia, 8 for Benin, and 4 for
Zaire. It was in the second rerund, during more long and arduous meetings between del-
egation heads behind closed doors, that the real battle took place. Those still in
the running were Bokanga of Zaire, Ahmed Zeghall of Tunisia, Basile Kossou of Benin
(direct~r of the African Cultural Institute (ICA)), and Francois Owono-Nguema, Gabon's
minister of state for culture, popular education, and arts, who had long been an unof-
ficial candidate but who was officially presented by his couzitry at the last minute.
Bokanga received four votes and withdr~w in favor of Gabon following a telephone call
between Presidents Mobutu and Bongo. Zeghall received, eight votes--not many, consid-
ering that Tunisia entered the competition as the favorite. Several factors were be-
hind that semidefeat, one being the last-minute choice of a candidate who was unknown
to Africans south of the Sahara.
There were defections as well: while France voted for Tunisia in the second round of
balloting before switching its vote to Gabon, Canada--despiLe the assurances it had
given previously--launched into a noisy and insistent campaign on behalf of Owono-
Nguema as soon as the official announcement of the Gabonese candidate was made. Some
people claimed that Canada's economic interests in the region had something to do
with its action and thaL the choice of the minister of foreign trade to head the
Canadian delegation was not a matter of chance.
There were also defections among Arab Africans: Djibouti and especially Morocco, a
new member of the agency and one whose exc.ellent relations with Gabon determined the
decision. So the curtain fell on tha Tunisians, who were good losers despite some
bitterness. In the third round of balloting, there remained only Basile Kossou, whom
no one at the start had expected to get that far, and tt~e Gabonese, the increasingly
probable winner of the contest. President Bongo spared no effort to lead his favor-
ite to victory. Did he do it as a neat way of qetting rid of the man, as persistent
rumor would have it? In any case, the chief of state received each delegation to
praise insistently the merits of his minister.
In the final duel, he received 21 votes to 14 for the man from Benin. Does tr~is in-
dicate a cleavage between moderate Afri�ca and progressive Africa? That factor un-
doubtedly played a role, but it does not seem to have been a decisive one. In any
case, Benin was not unhappy to be able to take some small revenge on Gabon, which had
unceremoniously expelled its nationals in 1978. The director of the ICA, too young
and not enough of a"statesman" to do the job--despite brilliant intelligence and an
invigorating dynamism--nevertheless persuaded his minister to play the consensus game.
After all, Africa could not afford to present the image of too bloody an arena. So
afcer a final closed meeting, the tired but relieved delegation heads officially an-
nounced Owono-Nguema's appointment as head of the French-speaking agency. Visibly
happy, he :.uok charge of the rostrum. It was time to begin the speeches.
There was a succession of tributes and congratulaticans to ~he cadence of rhythmical
and noisy singing by the national entertainment troupe called in for the occasion.
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The end of the session had practically arrived, and there was scarcely time to dis-
cuss other matters that ought to have been of concern to the ACCT. There was just
time to ~dmit Guinea and Congo �to "the great French-speaking family" as full members
and Morocco and St. Lucia as associated members, thus bringing the number of inember
cauntrie~ to 38. It was also decided to open a regio~~~~l office for the agency in
Dakar, but the pronosal to open one~at the United Nations in New York was turned dawn.
The conference did no more than ratify the main decisions reached by the board of
directors, which met fram 2 to 5 December, and make certain recommendations: since
the budget for the next few years carries the stamp of austerity, it would be appro-
priate to place the budget restrictions on the agency's operations rather than on
its programs. Also examined were the requests for a show of solidarity as presented
by the Central African Republic, Chad, Laos, Lebanon, and the Seychelles. Just be-
fore the closing ceremor~y, Jean-Pierre Cot gave a brief presentation of the new French
policy toward an organization which is taking on "n~w importance" for the French Gov-
ernment. By stressing the "weight of the Western model," the need for South-South
cooperation, and the role of the social sciences in becoming better acquainted with
societies and transforming them without acculturation, he was employing a new ton~
that moved more than one African, and his statement was met with a real ovation.
Such is the power of words to make up for years of humiliation.
Thus it was that at the l~st minute, some of the real problems that should have been
brought up during the conference were discussed after all, although too quickly.
Will.the agency find in that fact something to think about? Beyoncl the political
stake it represents--one which was well illustrated by this meeting--will its new
secretary general and the team he puts together--taking into account not only re-
gional balance, as he is constrained to do, but also, one hopes, competence--do some-
thing with that poorly utilized instrument? What we have is a real structure and
one that has money, cadres, and possibilities, but one which has scarcely been really
used so far. Wi.ll that fine machinery finally be put to profitable use before it
rusts?
_ COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
11798
CSO: 4719/402
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BLACK AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL EXAMINED �
Paris JEUNE AP`r.tQUE in French No 1091~, 23 Dec 81 p 13
[Commentary by Bechir Ben Yahmed]
[Text] As this year ends, the major countries of Africa, both French-speaking and
English-speaking, are being subjected to intense pressure. The United States and
France are each telling them: "The time has come for you to resume diplomatic and
- political relations with Israel. Do so, and we will be gra~eful."
There are 29 countries that broke off those relations in 1973, thus joining the eight
Arab states of Africa which have neve�r had such relations. The countries that became
independent after 1973 have brought the number to over 40, with the result that as
1982 begins, Israel maintains open relations with only two important countries in
Africa: South Africa, which is not a member of the United Nations, and Egypt, which
is one of its founding members (and, incidentally, of the Arab League as well, al-
though it was "suspended" by that organization fol].owing the Camp David accords).
_ It should be recalled that the State of Israel has relations with more than 100
= countries belonging to the United Nations. Only the Arabs (with the notable excep-
= tion of Egypt) and the communist cour~tries (with the exception of Romania) do not
recognize it or have broken off relat:ions with it. All this is a way of saying that
by breaking off relations with the Je~wish state in 1973, the countries of black Af-
rica set themselves apart from the majority of nations. That explains the pressure
being placed on them at present by I::rael itself, which is stepping up its semisecret
missions to those countr~.es, and by ihe two big powers, which support the Camp David
accords.
The problem is not so much that the :tates of black Africa would be resuming their
relations with Israel--after all, more than half the nonaligned states do have re-
lations with that country. The danger is that they will divide into two camps.
The Africa of the OAU is in danger of splitting into the "softliners" (those that
give in to the pressure first and thus bring upon themselves the�accusation of "pro-
Americanism," as though the majority of the Arab governments were not pro-Americanl)
and the "hardliners" (of whom it will be said that they "preferred Arab money").
As for the Arabs, who are very busy at the moment with their dissensions, they are
shaken by Begin's initiatives and, as usual, are reacting rather than acting. They
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will wake up when it is too late, and then all they will be able to do is complain
or hurl abuse. The truth is that for the Africans, the root of the problem is not
- whether or not to resume relations with Israel. It is one of whether or not to do
, it together and for their own reasons, which are not the American or French reasons
- or those of the non-African Arab countries. Even if they are helped financially by
the F,rabs, the African states must not for that reason allow the Arat~ world to demand
from them what it cannot obtain from others. Even if they need France or have points
of agreement with it, and even if they expect protection from Washington, they do not
have to accede to the wishes of either. If they are sovereign, they must make their
decisions in full sovereignty, in accordance with their interests, and together.
The Africans are weak, and when they make a decision in extended order, they empha-
size that weakness. Zn doing so, their goverriments show--to their own people and to
the world--that they are "clients." Under the circumstances, elementary wisdom and
a sense of dignity ought to dictate that the issue of relations with Israel be dealt
with by the OAU CounciI. of Ministers, which wiZl meet this Februazy. In the mean-
time, those pushing for a resumption of relations and those opposing it will have
plenty of time in which to develop their arguments. For the moment, the Africans
have nothing else to do except listen.
And not only to listen, but also, and at the same time, to decide together on a cri-
terion. Brief reflection is all it takes to see that that criterion can only be the
attitude toward South Africa and apartheid. ,
To those who are asking us to resume relations with Israel, whether it be the Israelis
themselves or the Americans, we should ask: "What is your policy toward South Africa?
How do you intend to change its attitude in favor of the oppressed black majority?
What are you doing to compel the oppressive minority to change?" To those who would
tell the Africans not to resume relations with Israel, we should ask exactly the same
- questions. And this one as well: "If you are asking us to do what you cannot~get
the Asians or Latin Americans to do, it means that there are special relations between
you and us. Do you want us to make them explicit?"
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
11798
CSO: 4719/401
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~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
ARTICLE.URGES LESS TALK, MORE ACTION
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1093, 16 Dec 81 pp 18, 19
- [Article by Siradiou Diallo: "Let Us Move Into Action"] ~
[TextJ Is it a coincidence that �the year is ending in Africa with a series of
meetings of regional and subregional organizations? In West Africa during this
month of Decemtier, Dakar (Senegal) is welcoming the summit meeting of the CEAO
[West African Economic.Community] and the UMOA [West African Monetary Union];
while another meeting; planned tq follow them, for the OMVS (Senegal River Devel-
opment Organization) was pastponed at ths last moment. In September, the Eco-
nomic Council for Livestock and Meat met at Lome (Togo) while, in January 1982,
Yamoussoukro (Ivory Coast) will be host for the summit meeting of the Al~liance
Council [Conseil de 1'EntenteJ. The truth is that the states of this region are
tied to the chariot of no less than 26 Inter-African organizations.
Also at the end of 1981, Libreville (Gabon), in Central Africa, was first host to
the ministerial conference of the African Wood Organization, and then to the sum-
mit meeting of the UDEAC [Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa]. The
summit meeting, moreover, was enlarged to include two countries (Zaire and Equa-
torial Gu3nea) who, until now, were not members of the organization, not to men-
~ tion Chad which has bQen cooling its heals at UDEAC's door, waiting to be admit-
ted some day. ~
~ The annual session of the Association for Managing.East African Ports (including
11 countries of the region) was held from 30 November to 4 December at D~ibouti.
And a few days earlier the coordination conference for Southern African develop-
ment, involving nine countri~s from the Zambezi Basira, was concluded at Blantyre
(Malawi).
Some people will say that there is nothing surprising, quite the contxary, that
Africans born and raised on endless discussion, should increase the occasions
for gossip-sessions. Since they are unable tn act, they at least must talk, if
only to give themselves the illusion of doing (or being) something. To be sure,
like all bureaucracies overseeing the functioning of international organizations,
ours should increase the number of summit meetings, miniaterial conferences, col-
loquia, and other seminars. They certainly must ~ustify, along with the sky-high
salaries, the large investments the3r establishments entail. But that is not the
essential thing. If Africans increase the number of the interstate meetings, it
~ 20
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is not because of their love for long speeches, nor their need to travel, nor
r~ ~~use themselves. Rather, each day our political leaders, managers, and in-
tellectuals of all views become better aware of the inadequacies and limitations
~f the microstates inherited from the colonial system and, therefore, they feel,
more or less confusedly, the strong need to unite to confront the needs of the
hour. The number of states no longer able to fulfill their commitments is ac-
tually growing year by year. Some no longer have the means to maintain the in-
frastructures inherited from the colonial regime, much less develop new ones.
Others can no longer pay their dues (and this happens with increasing frequency)
to the regional and subregional organizations to which they belong. Some even
pay their civil servants 2 or 3 months late! Everything is happening as if, hav-
ing consumed the political marrow of our liberations, we now are reduced to gnaw-
ing the dry bones of our economies. Meanwhile, laughino up their sleeve, the
colonizers who had cynically undermined the terrain watch us from the heights of
their confortable skyscrapers, convinced that, sooner or later, we shall be forced
to call on them for help. "There is no other solution but to recall the whites
if you want to develop your countries," Mr Franz Joseph Strauss, leader of the
- Christian Democratic opposition in the Federal Republic of Germany, bluntly sug-
gested to several Africans who were talking with him.
- Assuming that whites in fact did leave immediately after the independence of these
countries (which is questionable) it is obvious that the solution to our problems
does not depend on their return. Rather, it depends on regional and subregional
understandings at~d cooperation by the states. Since it has been fo~und ineffective
to walk with only one leg, even with crutches, it is preferable ta help each
other, even lean on each other, in order to make a fresh start. Even Nigeria,
whose population will fluctuate at about 135 million in the year 2000, needs this
regrouping of lands. The other countries, who in about 20 years will have only
- an average of 12 million inhabitants, wi11 need it even more. Only a real soli-
darity contract, linking the 50 states, even if only at the level of the five or
six great regions sketched out at the economic summit meeting at Lagos (April
_ 1980) could help us out of the rut.
But this regional cooperation should not be limited either to childish propaganda
or incantations on the theme of unity and dignity. I~r should be conceived and
applied with a real concern for effectiveness and with no tricks or dodges. In
other words, if it is true that such an action must be based on a genuine politi-
cal conviction, it is no less true that it is too serious a matter to be lelt
only to the ~judgment of politicians.
- Today everybody sees where the latter's actions have led Africa. Whether they
wore a felt hat or a helmet, few undertook the battle, or followed the direction
needed, against underdevelopment, or encouraged the enthusiasms and dreams of
. youth so as to better invest them later on. Most spent these last 20 years ex-
hausting themselves in futile ideological quarrels, setting off to war, like Don
Quixote, against windmills, or to wring the neck of their fellow citizens; and
all this took place while seizing power for the benefit of a group, clan, ethnic
group, region, or even a mere village.
However, the real and only battle Africa must now fight is the one against under-
development, illiteracy, poverty, and sickness. Such a battle can only be won
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with the support of managers, intellectuals, young persons, dynamic businessmen,
technicians, and workers in the towns and countryside regardless of their reg-
ional, ethnic, and even more so, political origins. The state, and even more so,
the nation belongs to no single person. ~ach citizen should feel perfectly se-
cure for his physical and moral being as well as for his property. The stra~~gy
could consist of building solid and lasting infrastructures tending to bring
- African populations a little closer to each other each day. It should begin with
those populations of the same region, within the meaning set forth by the OAU.
For that, it is advisable to develop lines of communication (roads and rail-
roads); air, maritime, and telephone connections; interconnect the electrical
- networks; simplify entry formalities at frontiers; multiply cultural and ath-
letic mee.tings; coordinate educational programs. The aim is to raise the inhu-
man barriers and all the administrative constraints so as to make each of our
great regions (North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, and South
Africa) a vast homogeneous and open space where circulation of peoples and goods
takes place in total and perfect freedom.
No doubt the treaties and coriventions signed by the African states contain clauses
of that nature. But everyone knows how things are in practice. What can be more
shocking than seeing Africans provided with passports and visas turned back at
the airport of such and such an African capital, if not i.mprisoned for several
days without food or drink, and even sometimes savagely beaten. Is it not upset-
~ ting to witness massive expulsions, under false excuses, by African states, of
citizens of other African countrie:;, leaving behind broken families and pillaged
_ possessions! Former President LeoF~old Sedar Senghor objected in the OAU to these
practices which dishonor Africa. P~ut the commitments made by his colleagues at
that time have by no means been fu]filled. Moreover, the procrastinations noted
- du.ring certain negotiations for the construction of hydroelectric dams of subre-
- gional or even regional interest in the frontier zones are out-of-date. Now that
a generation of competent and aware African managers and technicians is growing
up, political leaders should place cor.fidence in them to draw up and study solid
and reliable regional projects, resolutely directed toward the satisfaction of
the people's needs and aspiration;ti.
We have spoken (and written) too much for 20 years. Now let us move into action,
the more so, since the framework for action is no longer missing--not even really
the human and financial resources. It is enough to use the regional organiza-
_ tions, not as tribunes for poii:ical agitation, but as real instruments for
Africa's only real struggle, the struggle against underdevelopment.
~ COPYRICHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
9772
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ANGOLA
GOALS FOR 1981-1985 AGRICULTURAL SEASON ANNOUNCED '
Paris MAFiCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1887, 8 Jan 82 p 100
[Text] The basic ob~ectiv.es for the 1981-1985 period, defined at the First Spe-
cial Congress of the MPLA-Labor Party, were reiterated by Angolan Minister of
Agriculture Artur Vidal Gomes. Those objectives are the following: to increase
the production of agriculture, livestock rai~ing and forestry in order to meet
national needs for f ood products and raw materials for industry, so as to reduce
the country's dependency on imported products that can be obtained locally by

.1 the end of the 5-year period, and increase production of export products, parti-
. cularly coffee; to raise the standard of living and improve working conditions of
" farmers and farm workers; and to consolidate the socialist agricultural sector
(,national companies and cooperatives) .
Within this framework, production objectives have been set.~ They concern market
production alone that is, that share of production destined for marketing and
distribution circuits, to the exclusion of quantities produced for local consump-
tion in rural areas (the amount of which cannot be estimated, moreover) and
tonnages reserved for the building of seed stock.
It is difficult to trace ~uidelines for cotton, a sector almost solely in the
hands of the government which is experiencing difficulties in the region of Catete
and Porto Amboim, where the harvest has dropped to nothing because of the lack of
rain. This situation is not at all abnormal in a zone which, for that very rea-
son, produces only every 2 or 3 years. National cotton production is going to be
transferred to the region of Malange, where climatic conditions are such that a
harvest can almost be guaranteed.
Manioc is a crop grown by the private sector in Malange and Ulge provinces. Pro-
duction planned for the 5-year period amounts to 65,000 tons. For palm oil, the
goal for the S-year period is 8,000 tons.
Concerning rne new 1982 season (September 1981 to September 1982) in particular,
_ it is already known thst some of the ob~ectives set forth will be difficult to at-
tain, considering the poor condition of agricultural equipment and the instability
in certain regions because of the South African attacks, which have caused people
to give up their crops and livestock.
Coffee production in the northe~n part of the country, far from Pretoria's attacks,
has obviously attracted the authorities attention because it is a maj or source of
_ ~ ~3
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foreign exchange incume. This.Eector is now being reorganized, with the establish-
ment, approved by the ministers ~f planning, f inance and agriculture, of 26 terri-
torial enterprises with an area of ?85,000 hectareso
These state-owned enterprises are to put coffee plantations abandoned in recent
years back into production and take over areas cultivated by.ENCAFE [National Cof-
fee Company], most of which are in poor condition. Work planned (clearing, razing,
- r~planting, and so on) will be spzead out over the next two or three years. There
are also plans to improve coffee preparation and processing starting this year.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
_ 11,464
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CAMEROON
BRIEFS
COFFEE PRICE INCREASES--By virtue of two decrees signed by the Cameroonian chief
of state on 28 December, prices to coffee producers were inereased. The first
decree concerns superior grade Robusta coffee, wliose price per kilogram goes from
320 to 330 CFA francs. The second cancerns washed, commercial grade Arabica cof-
fee, which will be purchased at 350 francs a kilogram during the 1981-1982 season,
- compared with 340 francs for the previous season, an increase of 10 CFA francs
in each case. A bulletin from the Cameroonian Ministry of Economy and Planning
indicates that as the result of the conclusiotls of the meeting of the commission
- on the distribution of Arabica coffee rebat~es for the T980-1981 season, the govern-
ment has set the rate of the Arabica coffee rebate for the 1980--1981 season at
40 francs, compared with 20 francs for 1979-1980, thereby increasing the total
payment for washed, commercial-grade Arabiea coffee to 380 franes a kilogram in
1980-1981, compared with 350 f rancs in 1979-1980. The bu lletin also indicates
- that these increases occur in a situation marked.by overprod~etion and a drop .
. in prices which, despite inflation, have fallen to their level of 5 years ago.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1888, 15 Jan 82
p 149] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] ii,464
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~
CAPE VERDE
~ ~ BRIEFS ~
POLITICAL 'RADICALIZATION' ANNOUNCEI~-Ir. his New Year's address, Aristides ~ereira,
president of the Republic of Cape Verde, stated his determ{.nation to radicalize
the political process after the congress of his party, the PAICV [African Indepen-
dence Party of Cape VerdeJ, which has outlined the ~guidelines to be followed for
the coming years. The Cape Verdian president said that the agrarian reforna will~
be carried out in order to rationalize agricultural production and fight the coun-
try's food dependency. Cape Verde suffers from a chronic drought. The president
~announced measures aimed at guaranteeing jobs for 30,000 persons (10 percent of
the population), affected by the drought this year. They will work on construc-
tion projects aimed at deriving greater benefit from the soil in case of rain ar.d
at expanding the area irrigated. Finally, Pereira emphasiz~d the need for proper
organization and moral and political determination in the fight against the'
drought, which cannot be won salely by pro~ects and the millions invested, he
said. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPTCAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1887,
8 Jan 82 p 80]~ [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cle Paris 1982] 11,464
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� ~ CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
BRIEFS
AMTIESTY ORDER--On 31 December in Bangui, Gen Andre Kolingba signed an order con-
cerning amnesty for certain violations committed between 13 August and 31 December
1981. Excluded from the amnesty order are those responsible for assassinations,
murders, killings, the misappropriation�of public funds, and ~o on. Amnesty does
- not include reinstatement in public offices or ~obs and in no case entails the
recovery of one's career. Furthermore, persons sentenced before 1 January 1982
will have their sentences reduced by half. If the sentence is under 5 years in
prison, it is nullified. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRIANEENS in
French No 1887, 8 Jan 82 p 88] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464
MLPC PRESIDENT'S CHARGES--Ange Patasse, president of the MLPC (Central African
People'g Liberation Movement), recently accused.leaders in Bangui of planning,
"along with foreign mercenaries," the "liquidation" of his supgorters, using the
p~retext of "attempted coups d'etat." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDI-
TERRANEENS in French No 1887, 8 Jan 82 pp 88-89] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Mc~reux et
Cie Paris 1982] 11,464 , ~
SETTLEMENT OF PYGMIES--The most recent BULLETIN DES OEUVRES HOSPITALIERES FRAN-
; CAISES DE L'ORDRE DE MALTE states that in the Central African Republic, the
village of Belemboke, set up nearly 10 years ago by a priest and two nuns at the
request of Pygmies in the region, naw has 800 inhabitants. These sedentary
Pygmies have remained autonomous. Another 600 live 40 kilometers from the set-
tlement, while another group of 1,000 are found 20 kilometers away. According
to the village founders, the shift from nomadic life to crop growing is gradual
because it takes several years to obtain sufficient yield from what is planted,
In addition, with respect to health, settlement has reportedly tended to aggra-
vate illnesses and classic parasitosis in A�rica. That is why the sedentary
Pygmies regularly leave the village they have built to return to their secular
forest life for a few months. Nevertheless, 190 pupils regularly attend school
in Benemboke. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICATJX ET.MEDITERREINEENS in French
No 1887, 8 Jan 82 p$9] [CQPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464
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� FUR UH'N'll;lAL U~~; U1VLY
GUINEA
BRIEFS
~ COOPERATION WITH GUR--The first meeting of the Guinea-East Germany Joint Commis-
sion was held in Conakry 16-18 Nov~ember and ended with the signing of a protocol
agreement. The corimission reviewed the various items on the agenda: examina-
tion of the possibility of reducing the GDR's clearing balance; analysis of the
state of commercial relations between the GDR and the People's Revolutionary Re-
. public of Guinea and examination of ways to augment trade; the possibility of
~the GDR participating in the final stages of the work on the OAU [Organization
of African Unity] Palace and the development of the FAPA [Agro-Pastoral District
Farms] and agricultural cooperatives; cooperation in the field of higher educa-
tion, technical and scientific training, and in the field of put~lic health; as
well as establishing the by-laws for the joint commission on ecor.omic, scien-
tific and technical cooperation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAiIX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French No 1883, 11 Dec 81 p 3303] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981]
9516
OIL PROSPECTING--Guinea and the Australian group "Bright Oil" have recently con-
cluded an agreement for prospecting oil and natural gas in Guinea, both on land
and offshore, as was announced 2 December in Conakry. By the terms of the agree-
ment, the Bright Oil group is commit~ed to investing $15 million per year for
the next 3 years and to begin drilling in 1983. [Text] [Paris MttiiRCHES TKOPI~AUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1883, 11 Dec 81 p 3303] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux
et Cie Paris 1981] 9516 ~
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MALI
BRIEFS
CCCE AGRICULTURAL LOAN--The Malian Council of Ministers has recently approved a
proposed order ratifying the loan agreement signed 18 August 1981 by the Malian
ministry of foreign affa~.rs and international cooperation and the Central Fund
~ for Economic Cooperation [CCCE]. The agreement relates to providing 270 million
Malian francs toward the financing of a subsidized loan program being undertaken
by the National Agricultural Development Bank (BNDA). [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROP7CAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1883, 11 Dec 81 p 3303] [COPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreux et'Cie Paris 1981] 9516
JAPANESE RICE LOAN--Alioune Blondin Beye, Mali's minister of foreign affairs and
international cooperation, and Chiyuki Hiaroka, the Japanese ambassador, signed
an exchange of notes 30 November in Bamako to consummate an agreement whereby
the Japanese government will provide Mali with 370 million yen (about 900 mi1-
~ lion Malian francs) to f inance the purchase of rice. The agreement also pro-
vides that Japan will contribute close to 1.29 billion Malian francs "toward the
implementation of plans to exploit subterranean water resources." [Text] ~
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1883, 11 Dec 81 p 3303;~
[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9516 ~ ,'I _
~
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~OR OMM'1(:IAL USE UNLY
NIGERIA
BRIEFS
OIL PRODUCTION--A.ccording to the periodical PETROLE ET GAZ ARABES, Nigeria's oil
production in 1981 reportedly amounted to an average of 1.39 million barrels a day
and, according to oil circles in Lagos, to 1.45 million barrels a day. Nigeria's
official figures were 2,068,165 barrels a day in 1980 and 2,308,822 barrels a day
in 1979. Consequen~ly, 1981 will be marked by a drop in production, with the
historic slump of the month of August (708,000 barrels a day). Furthermore, the
average for the nine months was lower than that of the first six months: 1,473,500
barrels a day, compared with 1,707,300 barrels a day. The recovery occurred during
the last quarter, with an estimated average during those three months of 1,554,000
~ barrels a day, but thanks also to successive price reductions. It should be noted
that in 1981, Nigeria was not the only country belonging to OPEC (Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries) to experience a drop in production. For all of �
these countries, the drop was some 16.4 percent compared with 1980, with a general
average put at 22.48 million barreis a day. Indonesia was reportedly the only
OPEC member not to have had a slowdown in production. [Text] [Paris MARCHES.
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1888, 15 Jan 82 p 147] [COPYRZGHT:
Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION STAGNATING--It is believed that the general industrial pro-
duction index did not progress significantly in 1981 compared witih 1980. It
should be recalled that, on a basis of 100 in 1972, the figure went from 167 in
1979 to only 180 in 1980 (up .6 percent),.while from 1978 to 1979, growth was much
gr~ater (up 15.2 percent), fram 145 to 167. The manufacturing industries, which
occupy an ever larger place in the makeup of the index, alongside the mining in-
dustries (in a continual decline for years) and electrieity (increasing, but with
a tendency toward a certain co~npression), have in fact experienced different for-
tunes. Among the 20 sectors taken into account, several were in.a clear decline
in the ~r~iddle of the year, particularly the sugar, beer, shoe, paint, refined
petroleum product and pharmaceutical sectors. Those s~ctors showing growth:
radio assembly, roofing materials, cement, textilea, cigarettes and soft drinks,
scarcely balanced those in a decline. However, spectacular growth should be noted
in the area of automobile vehicle assembly. In this sector of activity, the index
(still employing the base figure of 100 in 1972) reportedly went from 1,363.9 at
the end of 1980 to 3,515.7 at the end of the f irst half of 1981, or an increase in
6 months of 157.7 percent, while from 1979 to 1980, growth in this sector was only
19.75 percent (from 1,138.9 to 1,363.9) and only 14.72 percent between 1978 and
- 1979 (from 992.7 to 1,138.9). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French No 1888, 15 Jan 82 p 147J [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982]
11,464
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ANLY
SENEGAL
TEXTILE INDUSTRY UNDERGOING DIFFICULT PERIOD
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1887, 8 Jan 82 pp 78-79
[Text] Despite important development potential (domestic market and national cot-
ton production), the Senegalese textile industry is going through a difficult
period. Exports are down, the domeatic market is in a decline, mu~.tifaeeted fraud
is taking place to the detriment of national production, local industries have not
succeeded in taking consumers' real needs into account and equipment has not been
replaced by newer machinery.
Senegal's textile sector employs some 5,000 persons and contributes 5 billion CFA
francs to industrial added value. It includes SODEFITEX [Textile Fibers
Development Company], which is both an enterprise to organize rural cotton produc-
tion and an industrial ginning unit, and pureiy industrial enterprises which pro-
cess cotton from the spinning stage to garment making.
However, for the past several years, out of the nine main industrial units in the
sector, nearly two-thirds have experienced difficulties. The SIV (Industrial
Garment Company) has financial problems and difficulty collecting government debts.
For its part, ICOTAF [African Cotton IndustryJ has had extremely high losses for
4 years. The Senegalese Textile Company is also faced with financial troubles.
At the same time, its product~on is dropping and sales declining.
Since 1979, enterprises that had previously been successful have begun to mani-
fest signs of weakness. These are the TMS (Mechanical Knitting Company of Senegal),
the SCT (Cover and Weaving Company) and the Cape Verde Cotton Company (CCCV).
In the face of this situation, the government and manufacturers have drawn up a
recovery plan. For the government, it will be a matter, according to LE SOLEIL
of. Dakar, "of reconciling the interests of SODEFITEX and those of the industrial-
ists, while maintainin~ employment and seeking long-term solutions for the re-
covery and development oE industries."
For the government, "reconciling the interests of SODEFITEX with those of the
manufacturers" means applying a reasonable cotton price that will enable each
side to derive a profit. It has therefore increased that price by 16 percent,
for it had been far below the world price. However, the government will continue
to subsidize cotton for 2 more years. After that time, new discussions will takP
place based on the evolution of the situation.
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rv~a vrr~..~na. voc v,�a.i
Another measure taken by the Senegalese Government is an intensification of the
fight against.fraud. Together with customs, the National Textile Commission will
est2b~ish a scale for the main imported produets in order to fight the practices
. of some importers of limiting the amount of duties they have to pay. Overseeing
import applications will continue, even be stepped up.
In order to protect the marke*_, certain forms of imports will be ended. It will
no longer be possible to import articles found locall;r unless they come from
CEAO (West African Economic Community) nations. Along the same line of ideas~
the Ministry of i:conomy and Finance is in the process of studying the possibility
of lowering entry duties and taxes on textile products in order to discourage
fraud. ~The domestic market on wtiich the textile induatry seems to have lost a
great deal of ground will be revitalized.
Finally, as part of the recovery plan, a typical contract program is ineluded.
. According to their contract, manufacturers will, at the same time they guarantee
~ jobs, pledge to improve productivity. With ~overnment aid, they will renew their
infrastructure in order to produce higher quality articles that can penetrate the
international market and halt the drop of Senegalese textile exports.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
11,464
CSO: 4719/471
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SENEGAL
- BRIEFS
NEW SUDES SECRETARY GENERAL--Madior Diouf, professor af French and African litera-
ture at the University of Dakar, has been elected secretary general of the Sole
Democratic Trade Union of Senegalese Teachers (SUDES), at the close of the Third
Congress of that trade union, held in Dakar at the end of December. Diouf re-
places Mamadou Ndoye, in$pector of education. The National Exe~utive Board of the
union (19 members) also chose all new offi~ers. SUDES is one of the three unions
of teachers in Senegal. It essentially draws its members from the eight leftist
and extreme leftist parties in the country. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1887, 8 Jan 82 p 78] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et
Cie Paris 1982] 11,464
CSO: 4719/471
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TOGO
INCREASED COOPERATION WITH KUWAIT ANTICIPATED
Paris MARCHES TROP�ICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1888, 15 Jan 82 p 145
[TextJ From 4 to 6 January, Gen Gnassingbe Eyadema, Togolese~chief of state, made
an official visit to Kuwait, accompanied by a large delegation from the Togolese
Government. ,
During the discussions that took place between the two partiea, Togo submitted a
number of development pro3ects, including the program to develop Mono, expansion
work on the port of Lome, the repair and paving of the transversal Natchamba- ,
Kabou-Awand~elo, Kara-Ketao-Benin border road, with a branch road to Pagouda,
and the proposed phosphoric acid plant.
Kuwaiti authorities and the Kuwaiti Development Fund indicated their intention to
participate immediately in the financing of some of these projects, mainly the
Mono development pro~ect and the transversal road pro3ect.
rn order to speed up the latter, authorities from the Kuwaiti Development Fund
asked the Togolese Government to publish notice of the preselection of enterprises
and to send to Togo, by the first quarter of 1982, experts to evaluate the project,
whose estimated cost is 6 billion CFA fra~.cs.
Regarding the Mono development project, Kuwaiti authorities clearly indicated their
_ intention of taking part in the financing of this regional project, which brings
together the nations of Benin and Togo. These two countries have decided to devel-
op their common river in order to produce the electric power they need. The cost
of the hydroelectric portion of the pro~ect is $180 million, or around 60 billion
CFA francs.
Re~arding the proposed expansion of the Lome port, it would consist of the con-
~ struction of a second pier that would increase the handling capacity for various
types of goods from the current figure of 400,000 tons to some 1.5 million tons.
This project is divided into two sections and wurk on the first will begin this
year. The Togolese Government has asked Kuwait for additional financing for the
second portion of the pro~ect. Both phases will cost some 16 billion CFA francs.~
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The fou~~h pro~ect, the phosphoric acid plant, ie aimed at increaeing the indus-
trial capacity of the OTP (Togolese Phusphate Offiee). In order to do so, the
Togolese Government has decided to begin to work other deposits, which would, in
an initial phase, permit the conversion of phosphate into phosphoric acid and, in
the second phase, into fertilizer. The total cost of the pro~eet,.some 75 billion
CFA francs, will require the participation of several sources of financing, includ-
_ ing the Kuwaiti Development Fund.
CaPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
11,464 .
CSO: 4719/477
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ZAIRE
BRIEFS
COOPERATION WITH ANGOLA--The Zairian-Angolan ~oint commission met in Kinshasa
from 21 to 29 December 1981. Its work led to the signing of two agreements, one
instituting the ~oint grand commission or. cooperation and the other dealing with
cultural and scientific caoperation between the two countries. In addition, both
parties agreed to reactivate the tripartite commiasion on refugees, which includes
Angola, Zaire and Zambia, and to strengthen cooperation in the fields of commerce,
� fishing, the merchant marine and oil. Lengema Dulia, Zairian secretary of state
for international cooperation, and Paulino Pinto Joao, Angolan secretary of state
for cooperation, said after the signing of the accords that thay were satisf ied
with progress made during the Kinshasa meeting. They added that the meeting
enabled both parties to intensify their dialogue. Another meeting of the Zairian-
Angolan grand commission was set for 1983 in Luanda. The precise date remains
to be determined. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French .
No 1887, 8 Jan 82 p 91] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464
OIL PRODUCTION--According to a bulletin from Cometra Oil, crude oil. production in .
Zaire's maritime zone, in which the subsidiary Muanda 0i1 Company:has a 17.2-
percent participation, has reached an average of 22,568 barrels~a day for the
months of September to November 1981P co~apared with 19,987 barrels per day for
the first quarter, 18,089 for the second quarter and 20,483 for July and August.
Total production for the first 11 months of 1981 amounted to 6,755,547 barrels
and production for the entire year is an estimated~7.4 million barrels (average
of 20,274 barrels a day), compared with 6,498,000 barrela (average of 17,754 in
1980). This increase essentially stems from an improvement in productivity at
the Mibale structure, which is now on the order of 22,000 barrels per day out of
a total of 23,600 for the entire maritime zone. The drilling of an initial well
in a structure located some 20 kilometers offshore, announced in September as
scheduled for mid October, was delayed because of the inavailability of the plat-
form. The most recent inFOrmation indicates that it would begin at the end of
- December 1981. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
No 1887, 8 Jan 82 p 91] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464
COOPERATION WITH USSR--The Soviet-Zairian joint commission on maritime transport
held its third meeting fram 23 to 25 December 1980 in Kinshasa, attended by the
Zairian secretary of state for international cooperation, Lengema Dulia, and the
- Soviet depi!ty minister of the merchant marine, Vladimir Beletsky. As part of
the framework of the cooperation agreements linking the two countries for over
5 years, this ~oint commission, whose previous meeting was held in Moscow in 1980,
is entrusted with the task of promoting the operation of maritimE connections
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rt~~c a~rr~~.~na. tJOG VliLl ,
between the port of Matadi and Soviet ports to the benefit of vessels from the
merchant fleets of the two countries. The first meeting, held in Kinshasa in
- 1979, was essentially devoted to the establishment of solid foundations and the
by-laws of the joint commission. The second session, in Moscow, dealt with
training and technical questions relating to maritime transport and maritime
~ consultants. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in Freneh No 1887,
8 Jan 82 p 92] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464
COOPERATION WITH YUGOSLAVIA--According to Kondov D~ordji, Yugoslav charge
d'affaires in Kinshasa, Yugoslavia, one of the partners in the international
consortium Aluzaire, plans to~participate in the project to build the high-tension
line between Bukavu, Katana and Goma and in construction of the electrical equip-
ment plant financed by the Executive Council. It also plans to help with comple-
tion of the construction of a hydroelectric plant in Katende, in Western Kasai.
In order to intensify cooperation in this f ield, Yugoslavia proposes to send
experts to the National Electric Company (SNEL) to engage in energy research. In
the field of agriculture, Yugoslav cooperation with Zaire concerns corn and soybean
production on the Bateke plateau. Construction of a research center for seedcorn
production is planned there. Some 30 yo~ing Zairians are completing'training a:.
Yugoslavia's university and advanced institutes. S~veral ~airian cadres have
already completed training programs there. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1887, 8 Jan 82 p 92] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et
Cie Paris 1982J 11,464 ~
- GOLD PROCESSING PLANT--Officials of the Kilo-Moto Gold Mine Office (OKIMO) believe
that rehabilitation of the Office's gold processing plant is an indispensable in-
vestment,. not only in order to improve production, but aTso in order to guarantee
the very survival of. the enterprise. Cost of the prcject is an estimated $6 mil-
lion. OKIMO officials believe that they will be able to cover the f inancing of
the project without outside aid provided the sum allocared to them in foreign ex-
change is sufficient. Moreover, in their opinion, this problem of foreign exchange
is the main difficulty the company faces. Officials also recognize that the
C.ffice has never had a medium- or long-term development program and that its
administrative management has always been faulty. OKIMO's future therefore de-
pends on an increase in foreign exchange resources, the drafting of a development
policy and a fight against fraud and clandeatine gold mining. [Text] [Paris
MARCH~S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1887, 8 Jan 82 p 92] [COPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464 '
CSO: 4719/467
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ZA1~IA
J
BRIEFS .
AID FOR MINING INDUSTRY--Following a favorable decision by the steering commit-
tee of the EDF [European Development Fund] (MTM of 9 October 1981, p~2549),
Zambia is going to get 55 million ecus for SYSMIN [expansion unknown]. The
- agreement, which was reached after a visit to Zambia by the director of devel-
opment for the EEC, Mr Maurice Foley, calls for the funds to be used for train-
~ ing and technical projects relating to the copper and cobalt industries, two
vital pillars of the Zambian economy. Lusaka should be able to come up with an
initial inventory of its needs by February. It will then become the first bene-
- f~ciary of SYSMIN, which was established as part of the Lome II Convention.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1883, 11 Dec 81
p 331bJ [COPYRIGfiT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 95i6
CSO: 4719/355 END
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