JPRS ID: 10278 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Sequence Number: 47
• Content Type: REPORTS

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J~RS L/10278 ~
25 January 1982
West Euro e Re ort
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JPRS L/1~278
25 January 1982
~IEST ~UROPE REPORT
' (FOUO 4/'E12~
CONTENTS
E CON OMI C
I TALY
Reaearch Study on Severance Pay System
(Gimwanni Zan~tti; MICROS, Nov 81) 1
POLITICAL
FP,ANCE
PSF Secretariat Member on PCF, European Reaction to Po].and
(Jean Poper~n Interview; LE NOUVEL OBS~E~VATEUR,
- 9-15 Jan 82) 26
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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E CON OMI C , I~,y
RESEARCH STUDY ON SEVERANCE PAY SYSTEM
Milan MICROS in Italian Nov 81 pp 39-51
- [Study conducted by Giovanni Zanetti, professor of corporate economics,
member of the Economics and Trade raculty, Turin University; and
Giovanni Fraquelli, research scholar, CERIS-i~NR. This study and the
- elaboration contained in it are the fruit of research done at CERIS,
the ~iational Research Center's institute for research into business
and development, as part of a broader program of analysis of the pr~o-
- ductive system=~ efficiency.]
- [Text] Severance pay: what to do about it? Some empirical
findings and suggestions.
Premise
- After nearly 2 years during which interest in the severance pay machi.-
nery seemed to be declining, the issue has over the past several months
become one of keen concern. This is the result of the solicitation
of aignatures on the petition for a referendum for repeal of the spe-
cific provisions in PL-91 which would'render meaningless the stops on
- the economic barometer~ in the ~irocess of branging the ~und up to re-
quired levels; it is also an index to the desire to let go of a situa-
tion of stalemate wh~.,h, in the wake of renewed discussion and sugges-
tions for ctianges in thi~ instiute over the course of 1975, 1976, and
1977, would tend to leave the situation unchanged for years to come.
The fact is that the provision of PL-91 ha~ eased the i.mpact of annual
payments into the fund on corporate bankrolls, as well as its burden on
_ the struc~ure of the tax position: however, it has clearly not healed
the anomaly of an inatitution born way back in 1919 (DLL 9 Feb, n~ 1112)
- daaigned to soften L-he dire consequences to the hired worker of sudden
and unexpected loss of his job, but which has in the intervening years
been so distorted as to become a kind of deferred payment whose p~3l~a-
tive effects have been outdistanced de facto by existing pension sys---
_ tems or by more up-to-date and adequate wage structures.
There are still sound and valid r~easons for reconsidering the existence
and operation of this ~ind of welfare which gives the worker a greater
level of security at the moment he ceases to be emp~oyed (a de fact o
cushion added to o.ther farms thus f ar available) by denying him imme-
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diate access to a portion of hia earnings, letting the company con~;rol
the quality and size of its own financial potential while ~veighing it
down quite seriously with commitments and burdens of a special kind_.
The spark provided by the current challenge to PL-91 can thus open the
door to challe:nge on a far broader issue. To deal with the latter, how-
- ever, it seems essential to develop some interpretive clarity, particu-
larly in relation to the real nature of the link which, through severance
_ pay, is established between the compa.~y-employer and the workPr. It is
equally necessary to have adequate measurements in relation to the real
scope of the phenomenon and to the nature of its consequences.
1� A Two-Way Relationship
As we know, the worker receives as a consideration f or the work he has
' performed a remuneration which has a number of aspects and partakes
only partially of the nature of ~eal dis~osable income~ The severance
pay share is in this sense an integral part of his overall compeiisa-
tion which establishes the labor relationshxp or~ a contractual basis.
Once the worker has acquired +,he i~ight to that quota and, under current
re~ulations, canr~ot have immediate access to it but rather leaves it
wholly in the hands of corporate management, it t~kes on the natur~e af
real financial backing for that ma*.-~agement. The worker, in otYier w~~rds,
becomes the nominal owner o~ forced savings of a port,ion of his own
e~arnings, which he must leavP in ~he possession of the company with
which it has accumu~ated. Tli~_s is a very special financing op~ration:
by reason of the uncertainty of its term, dependent roughly spPaking
on the duration of the job relationship; by reason of the type of re-
- payment, which is not easy of access and stability ap�rt from the au-
tonor.ious and individual decisions of the company and the worker-finan-
- cier; and by reason of its non-spontaneous character. There cannot,
nevertheless, be any doubt as to the fact that, fo~ whatever portion
he canilot have immediate access to, the worker becomes a real muney-
_ lender to the company for which he warks.
In line with this concept, wP can recognize what might be properly in-
terpreted as a cost or financial assets thus acquired from prodiiction
or as repayment of financial advances. The laws and reg!xlations gov-
erning the severance pay institution establish a de facto distinction
between the act of setting aside in the fund~ relating t--o each year
(the relevant quota determined as to its varying sirce according i;o
whether the worker is unskilled, an o�fice-worker, or an executive),
and the ac~ of ~etting aside in order to bring the existin~ fund up..~o ~
the requisite 'level on the basis of new wage scales (a portion of pre-
vious set-aside, resulting from the variation in the entitlement share
resulting from changes in wage scales mult}' plied by the employee's years
of service to the company). E. Filippi `Z) very cogently poin oti'c
that one can say�, as a good ballpark estimate, th~.t ti:e amount t,.~ c~:;:-�
~ pany must come up with each year to bring thr; existing f�nds up to the
mark i.s, to all intents and purposes, the cost it must bear to keep
' suct~.sums of money available. The annual burden on the corporate eco-�
nomy for managing the severance pay fund should thus be split into
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two parts: one, relating to the share of entitlement, and hence part
of laboi~ costs; and the other, relating to re-evaluation of pre-
vious ~everance set~lements, becoming part of the financial costs for
the capital thus obtained. Because he leaves the fund at the company's
~isposal, the worker earns the right to its regular increase on the
basis of the (upward) variation in the compensation he receives: the
amount of the iund increase constitutes, in practical terms, a form of
interest coming due on the resources he is ~ompelled to lend to the
company for the entir�e duration of his employment there. That sum will
in turn be left once more available to the campany and will form an in-
tegral part of the machinery for further increases. Loab:ing at the
whole thing through the worker's eyes, we clearly see the pattern of
what~ is nothing more or less than a loan of money under a compound ca-
pitalization scheme based on a vari~ble rate pegged to the changes in
contract wages.
It would seem wise to remember this approach as w~ seek to formulate
some h,ypothesis that would solve the currently hot question of the
ef fects stemmiz~; from the application of PL-91. Born in response to
t,he need to coi.:ain the spiralling costs of ~abor~ that law in ~ act
affected the variability of the rate on the b~sis of whicr. capitaliza-~
tion occurs. Not to make allowance, in compu~ing variati~ns in pay
scales to determine the sums rec;uired. to bring the funcl up to par
1�:ith the enti.tlements accumulated in previous years, ar with the in-
creases stemming from further economy-triggered raises, woald be
~ tantamount in fact to lowerin~ the overall total of the potential
~ growth in the severance pay fun~i and. thereby reducing the sampling
level on the basis of which that increase is calculatea. Since the
escalator also reflects the rise in the national inflation rate, the
criterion that prevailesi prior to the advent of PL-91 brnught about!
w in practice, the pegging of the last recorded interest rate and tied
it directly in with the cost of living, ;vhich makes this practically
a unique case in the whole range of financing open to corporations.
The s~~bsequent exclusion of th.p economic trigger-points has, on the
contrary, certainly changed if not altogether cancelled the indexing
a criter~.on for that form of financing by pegging its repayment to the
' ups and downs of the bargaining strength of the parties.
A I,it tle Quant if ying
In ordcr to provide some practical underpinnings for the hypothesis
- stated here and to evaluate its consequences, it is helpful to detex-
_ mine, zf we can, the amount of financing that has flowed into cor-
porate cofFers along this route and the cost curve for this kind of
resource. It i~ not an easy subject to analyze, in view of the
marked. absence of hard data and, even were such data available, given
the extreme variability among the individual situations to which we
needs must refer. In the hope of essaying a~atisfactory sesponse to~
_ t,his need for data, we foll~wed the criterion of proceding to evalua-
tions separated according to level: we lumped the whole industrial
sector of the economy together; we left out a large group of compa-
nies picked out from the liet made available yearly by the Banca di
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Credito Finanziaria (Mediobanca); we separated out some major corpor-
ations active in several sectors of industry. From the who~e corpus
of estimates were were able to arrive at in this way it is possible
to subsume the factors of distortion and of harmony, so as to arrive
at overall judgments and, perhaps, some suggestions.
a. Aggregate Level
For an assessment of the "aggregate" dimension of the phenomenon, the
national statistic~ offer a limited contribution. They are confined
to supplying "f low magnitudes," ref erring to annual set-asides and
- payments~ on the basis of which it is not practically feasible to
arrive at a satisFactory ~ssesament of the overall dimensions of the
severance pay fund. Furthermure, there is no way to ascertain the
break~lowns of annual set-asides as between job compensation and up-
grading of previ.ous compensation, while, finally, the national sta-
tistical estima~es cover the entire private s,; stem (hence includ~.ng~
- agriculture and the aervices as well) with data gathered from big and
small businesses, most ~f them operating in the industrial processing
sector. Since between one axea of production and the other there are
regulatcry differences as well as differences in actual practices
(average seniority, average compensation, etc.), such an extrap~la-
tion will perforce lead to results that are very la.rgely approxima~ .
tions.
We decided, therefore, to go ahe4d independently, without using the
data contained in the national statistics, with a new assessment based
on a narrower observed reality (covering only the industrial proces-
sing ar~~a), but at the same time analyzing it more completely and in
greate~ depth. ?'t makes it possible to arrive at both the basic es-
timate and the annual set-aside in the two p~rtions that constitute
it (job entitlement and increase of previous entitlement) and thus~
on the ba~sis of the foregoing, at the calculation of the rate of in-
crease in the existing fund and, de faato, at the cost of these fi-
nancial resources.
The computations were based on the data in the General Report on the
- National E~onomy, on actual findings released periodically by ISTAT,
and on data published by the EEC up te 1973. Where the data were in-
adequate we resorted to controlled eatimates on narrower real bases
or to experience derived from actual cases. The methodological ap-
proach chosen involved finding the data and running the calculations
starting with the size of the labor force split into its three com-
ponents executives, office-workers, and in-plant workers as of
December of each year from 1970 to 1980. For each of the three cate-
gories of employees we found or esti.mated in some cases the data shown
- in Table l:
_ number of employees;
average monthly wages, including all elements (and hence the 13th-month
bonus) except family allotments;
average seniority ~of the company~s employees;
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TABLE I. Basic data for calculations on the severance pay fund
- for the industrial proce~sing system as a whole.
~
! ~ ~ ~ 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
- din~enti 42 45 48 S2 56 62 67 72 76 80
N.OCCUPATI impieQati 758 7Y5 852 908 944 458 1.053 1.088 1.124 1.170
~ z~ D[PENDENTI o~~~ 5.700 5.660 5.600 3.540 S.S00 5.480 5.380 5.340 3.300 5.2SQ
Imi~litial
toule 6.SOU 6.500 6.300 6.300 6.500 6.500 6.300 6.300 6.300 6.500
RET'RIBUZIONE
( 3~ MENSiLE MEDIA diriQenti S3S 618 753 898 :.048 1.333 1.563 1.783 2.085 2.433
A FINE ANNO impie~ati 214 247 301 359 43Y 533 626 713 834 982
Icompr. ntco 13�) openi 122 141 172 21 I 2S8 323 39i 460 556 677
Imigliaia di lirc) -62 -114 -186 -2$S
meno: contin`enra
- AMZIANiTA diriQenti IS IS IS IS 15 15 IS 15 15 15
~ 4~ MEDIA impie~ati 7,9 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8,5 8.6 8.7 8.8
(�rnni) openi 6,2 6,3 6.4 6,~ 6,6 6,7 6,8 6,9 7,0 7,1
i
1 N. MENSILITA diri~enti I.5 I,5 1.5 1.5 1,5 I,5 1,5 1,5 1,45(1) 1,4(1)
~ S 1.4NN0 (in parentesi impiegati 1 I 1 1, 1 1 1 1 1 1
il marginale se operai 0,51 0.52 0,53 0,3~1 0,55 0,56 0.57 (1.58 0,59 0,60
diverso dal medio) 10,56) (0,57) (0.58) 10,59) (0,601 (0,61) 10,62) (0,63) (0,64) (0,65)
KEY:
1. Executives '
Clerical staff ~
Plant workers
Total
2. Number of full-time employees (in thousands)
3. Average monthly earnings as of year-end (including the 13th-
month bonus) (in thousands of lire) minus cast-of-living
increases
4. Average seniority (in years
Nwnber of monthly payments per y~ar (marginal payments shown
= in parer~theses where different from the average)
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the average number or fraction of monthly earnings payable for each
year of seniority.
With particular reference to the annual set-aside, we a~so found or
estimated:
the number or fraction of the monthly wage payable for the addi-
tional year of seniority: this is a marginal value, different from
the average value for the unskilled workers in many sectors and, as
of 19~8, for executives (a~n the basis of the agreement of 18 July
19~8, for every year of seniority completed since 31 Ja~uary 1979 t'~e
entitlement drops from 1.$ to 1 month~s wages);
the rate of increase in individual compensation as compared with the
mean (this rate was used to quantify the updating of entitlement
reached in years prior to the datp considered as a result of the im-
provements in the employees' position by comparison with the mean
- due to increased seniority, transfers from one categ~ry to another,
merit raises, promotidns~ etc.).
The payout for each yea~r t was obtained by means of the difference
between the ~et-asid~e for the year t and the growth experienced by
the fund between ~che end of y~ear T-1 and the end of year t.
On the basis of these assumptions we determined the size of yearly
set-asides based on the job and for updating previously earned en-
titlement, the percentage rate of such updating, the total payout
and the size of the fund at year~s end, using both the assumption of
- real total count of the wage variations (hypothetical increase) and
that of ignoring the economic trigger-points so as to upgrade pre-
viously earned entitlement (actual upgrading). The results are shown
in TabZe 2. .
The sum total of the complex of financing made available to the cor-
porate system through the severance pay mechanism ~or 1980 comes to
about 2 trillion lire. Had the t.rigger points not been ignored the
total of this sort of financing would have come close to 3.2 tril-
lion. It can be said that, by way of preliminary approximation
(the payouts were in fact underestimated because the only figures
available were those for actual payouts, meaning those calculated on
the basis of the "eterilized" contingency points) by comparison with
the 19~5 year-end when there was no need to distinguiah between the
hypotheti~al and the actual size of the fund, there was a growth
_ shortage of 96.9 percent.
Another observation has to do with the rate expressing the cost of
capital made available to companies, arrived at with approximate
reckoning on the basis of the ratio between the annual set-aside for
~pgrading previous entitlament levels and the fund as it was at the
end of the preceding year. One can see at a glance th~t up to 1976
the rate showed particularly high values which would decline somewhat
, although remaining at high levels in the subsequent years where the
- fund was enlarged to keep pace with the overall increasP in wage le-
vels. Vice versa, when the contingency points were sterilize3 after
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TABLE 2. The Industrial Processing Sector (billions of lire)
_ ~ 1~ Accantonamenti ~ 2~ Eroga~ 3F~ondo a fine anno
zioni
~OMPETEN2.4~ 5~ ADEGUAMENTO PREGRESSE ~ 6~ TOTALE
~ lpotetica Effettiva lpotetic~ 8 ~Effettivo lpotetico Effettivo Ipotetico Effettivo
~
1971 S83 585 3.986 3.986
1972 693 693 686 17,2 686 17,2 1.379 1.379 554 4.811 4.811
1973 869 869 1.137 23,6 1.137 23,6 2.006 2.006 660 6.157 6.157
1974 1.086 1.086 1.404 :2.8 l.404 22.8 2.490 2.490 820 7.827 7.827
1973 1.338 1.358 1.880 24,0 1.880 24,0 3.238 3.238 1.090 9.973 9.975
1976 l. l l4 1.714 2.306 23,1 2.506 13.1 4.220 4.220 L.405 12.'790 12.790
1977 2.120 t.842 2.697 21,1 837 6,S 4.817 2.679 1.294 16.313 I4.175
1978 2.316 1.996 2.834 17,4 1.178 8,3 3.350 3.174 1.646 20.017 15.703
lg'7q 2.yg2 2.128 4.020 20,1 1.~38 10,4 7.Ou2 3.766 1.894 25.123 17.375
1980 3.636 2.327 3.130 20,a 1.742 9,9 8.786 a.069 2.033 31.836 19.389
The value shown in the columns with an asterisk expresses
the percentage rate a~ which the fund is brought up to
statutory level, calculated as the ratio between the input
for that purpose for year t and the fund existing at the
close of year t-1. It indicates the aost level for finan-
cial resources made available to the corporate industrial
system through the mechanism of the se,verance pay fund.
KEY:
1. Set-asides 5� Input to cover previously earned
_ 2. Payouts entitlement
3. Fund at year-end 6. Total
4. Waqe-baseci 7� Hypothetical
8. Actual ~
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January 1977, the size of the portion for upgrading pre~ious entitle-
ment drops spect acularly, and along vlith it the money-cost rate which
expresses it, with a net advantage to the companies. You will note
as well, hewever, that the sharpest decline occurs in 19~~, the year
immediatel~ following the change in in~plementation of severance pay,
after which thc rate turns upward a~ain to re~ch a peak in 19~9, the
year latsvr contracts come up for negotiation.
Non-Aggregate Level: A Calculation Using Mediobanca Data
We may try to find confirmation for these initial conclusions by means
of a different "estimating" procedure based on information found in
the report prepared by Mediobanca which, in 1980, co�rered a total of
9Z4 busine$ses. This was a methodological approach which did not
reach out to the entire Italian economic syatem and contains its share
of approximations, made for the purpose of compensating for the lack
of solid data on a great many of the aspects under consideration.
Notwithstandi:~g these shortcomings it can be helpful in providing an
overall picture of a decidedly broad segment of the It alian industrial
system, based on reliable, although n~t quite exha ustive sets of data.
It was deen~ed advisable to separate from the whole group of Mediobanca
companies thoae in the transpor~; construction sector. These companies~
and most particularly FIAT, the bellwether company in that division,
were central figures in major operations modifying their structural
stance, particularly in the wake of inergers and divestments. "'his
might have m ade conclu~sions drawn frura them particularly shaky and
potentially distorted, as for that matter we fo*and from several early
experi.ments. The FIAT data will be taken into consideration, further-
more, at the next level of non-aggregation, which deals with indivi-
dual corporations.
For purposea of the preliminary processing needed here~ the Medio-
banca data are irasufficient, in that they relate the overall amount
of eet-asides to the fund without making any dxstinction between the
- amounta aet aside each yee~r on the basis of jobs and the amounts set
aside for upgrading previous enti~lement. We therefore had to concen-
trate our major effort on performing this division operation with a
reasonable margin of safety. To do this we first proceded to estab-
lieh the total labor costs recorded for purposes of de~ermining the
severance pay, so as to arrive at something close enough to t~r~ total
of the annual wage-related set-aside. After that, by subtraction from
the total aet-aside as reported by Mediobanca in the total economic
cost, we proceded to estimate~ with what we think is adequate approx-
imation, ~the ar:iount of previous entitlement and the consequent level
of the rate at which the existing severance pay fund is added to.
We can say, swnmarily, that the amount of the a;~nual set-aside to co-
ver previous entitl~ment is obtained ~y subtraction, reckoning the
amount of wage-based aet-aside for each fiscal year and subtractang
it from the total set-aside. We ar~ived at the wage-based set-asade
figure by starting with the overall cost of labor and then, through
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through a gradual process of elimination, arriving at a determination
of accountable compensation to define the annual quota for severance
PaY�
The analytical process can be followed on Table 3. To make it more
readily understandab~e, we offer the following explanatory notes:
the social costs percentage (line D) was found through a process of
reading and comparing a great many corporate balance shee+s from corn~
panies, large and medium, which provide such information. That percen-
tage, which varies sligYitly from year to year, was used as a base for
reckoning the amownt of social costs (line E) to be separated from
total labor costs in order to find the gross amourit of compensation to
be entered as severance pay (line F);
the size of the frozen cost-of-living cushion (line G) we found by
counting c.o.l. points accumulated annually and cumulatively since
January 1977, then translating t;iem into their actual monetary e~uiva-
lent, including the 13th~month bonus, taking into account the average
nusnber of employees on the payroll over the course of each year at
each company studied. The calculations involved are sho�~rn below:
( 1 ~ Puiti ~ ~ ~ - ~ 6 ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ S ~Importi
con- Mesi di Punti da Valore del Importo annuo cumulati
Anno tingen7a applicaz. contegg. Totale x punto = complessivo (000) (000)
Q x 11 = 99
1977 6 x 8 = 48
5 x S = 25
4 x 2 = 8
180 204 x 2389 = 487 487
~ 9 trediceaima 24
4 x 11 = 44
ly~g 5 x 8 = 40 '
6 x S = 30
- 5 x 2 = 10
124 144 x 2.389 = 344 24 x 13 x 2389 = 1089 .
tredicesima 20 �
6 x 11 = 6~,
1979 8 x 8 = 64
6 x S ~ 30
- 8 x 2 = 16
176 204 x 2.389 = 487 (24 i- 20) x 13 x 2389 = 1853
trodicesima 28
- KEY :
l. Year 5� Total
'L. Cost-of-living points 6. Value per point
' 3. Manths applied 7� Overall annual sum (000) ,
4. Points to be cou.nted 8. Cumulative totals (000)
9. 13th-month bonus
9
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Portion of the cflntingency (c.o.l. ) fund to subtract from Meciiobanca
a~ter aeparating th~ transport divisions :
ao Average number of 1977 197 1979
employees 1~ 387, 293 1, 372, 017 l, 375, 658
b. Annual c.o.l. per 487 993 1,853
employee (000)
Absolute size
( ooo, ooo) 675, 612 1, 362, 419 2, 549, 094
(a x b)
For all employees of the companies studied we had to establish the
_ average fraction of compensation (expressed in man~-k~ours)4 on the ba-
sis of which we could determine the share of set-aside to ~ the fund
(line I).
= The basic hypothesis taok l. � months~ salary frora executives, 1 month
from white-collar employees, and a number of days/month for workers
which varied according to the sector to which t}iey belonged. Since we
were usin~ real data for Mediobanca~s set-aside,s, which already inclu-
ded both holiday pay as well as the thirteenth-month bonus, we did
not have to estimate any compensatory additions for them. It was ne-
cessary, however, to pinpoint both the probable sectoral makeup of
Mediobanca corporations, as well a~ the probable structure of the la-
bor force employed by them in terms of executives, plant workers, and
white-collar workers. What we actually did was this:
Shares credited to:
Executives : 1. 4 months ~ base salary � In hours, this would
be h= 173 x 1.4 = 242 hours
Clerical: 1 month~s base pay. In hours: 173
Plant workers : these will vai�y from sector to sector and ac-
to the worker~s own seniority. The average num-
ber of hours for plant workers at Mediobanca
companies is derived from the a,sumption af
predominant presence of four typical sectors,
each with a different weight in terms of occu-
pati.on : ,
Metalworlcers Food Industry Textiles Chamicals Total
66 7�4 7�7 18.9 100
The average hours per month that can be witheld on the basis of con-
tracts and of a;~erage seniority assumed for Mediobanca were established
- for set-aside:
10
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- Metalworkers Food Industry Texti.les Chemicals
138 hours + 90 hours + 86 houra + '70 hours
~ The overall average for the four sectors can be seen in the following
summary:
METALWORKERS 3 138 hours x 66 = 9,108.0
FOOD INDUSTRY = 90 hours x ~.4 = 666.0
TEXTILE WORKERS = 86 hours x = 662.2
CHEMICALS = ~0 hours x 18.9 = 1,323.0
Average hours for the entire Mediobarnca worker popula-
tion:
11, 759 � 2
h 100 - h 11~.6 (rounded to 118)
On trLe basis of these assumptions we performed a sumraary count of the
fraction of monthly earnings tn be counted for the sample under obser-
vation.
_ To do this, we formu~.ated a hypothesis as to the distributian of the
working population at Mediobanca for the major categories of workers
and at the same time we established the proportion within which pay-
scales could be set in relatian to the different levels of employment.
For each year we performed the following counts on the basis o~ which
we found that, for all Mediobanca companies, the plausibl~ fraction of
a raonth is about 2$ days; it drops to 22 days when workers are assumed
to have worked a minimum of 90 huurs.
The need to arrive at a convincing figure for the fund set-aside quota
on the basis of wage levels in effect at the end of each year led us
to find the rate reflecting the increase ir the cost of labor at a
point about midway through each year.
The per capita c~st of labor derived from the Mediobanca~ data refers
= to the total of pay re~~~ived over the entire year, and therefore can
be used as the basia ior a rough estimate of the aver~age earnings at
midyear, or, if you will, as of 30 June. Since that per capita labor
cost 3.s uaed to figure;the wage-based set-aside quota, it seems wise
to try harder for a tigh~er fix on it, usang for the purpose earnings
accruing between 30 June ar~d 31 December of each year.
~ This was done by finding the arithmetical mean between the per capita
labor cost for Z successive years referred as we said to 30 June, and
thus arriving at what is probably a reliable figure for the 31 Decem-
ber that falls between them. The increment in this datum with respect
to per capita labor cost for the previous 30 June gives us the per-
centage shown on line N. It is used as the basis for calculating the
datum on line 0.
_ 11
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Struttura Struttura Rapporto Strutt. �/r Ore di (e) Ipotesi minima
Anni per tipo per tipo tra livelli �1o di (c) accanton. (c x d) 90 h. per operaio
lavoro lavoro retribut. (c) (d) ~pp (fl
~Z) ~a~~3) (b)(4) (axb~ ~5) ~6) ~7)
~ 8~ Dirigenti 1 I W 100,0 3,8 242 9,196 9,196
lmpiegati 28,8 33 950,4 36,1 173 62,453 62,453
1y74 Operai 70,2 22,5 1.579,5 6U,1 I18 70.Y18 54,090
TOTALE 100,0 2.629,9 IW,U 142,567 gg.24,7 125,739 gg.21,8
Dirigenti 1 1 W 100,0 3,7 242 8,954 8,954
- Impiegati 29,7 33 ySU.I 36,6 173 63,318 63,318
~ y~s Operai 69,3 23, I 1.600,8 59,7 I I S 70,446 53,730
TOTALE 100,0 2.680,y ]OU,O 142,718 gg.24,7 126,002 gg.21,9
Dirigenti 1 100 100,0 3.6 242 8.712 8,712
Impiegati 30,1 33 993,3 35,R 173 61,934 61,934
~ y~~' Operai 68,9 24,4 I.681, I 6U,6 I 1 R 71,508 54,540
TOTALE IU0,6 2.774,4 1(X?,11 142,154 gg.24,7 125,186 gg.21,7
Dirigenti 1 I(~ 100,0 3,6 242 8.712 8,712
Impiegati 30,7 33 I.U 13,1 35,R 173 61,934 61,934
~y77 Operai 68,3 25,1 1.714,3 60,6 I18 71,508 54,540
TOTALE 1(~,0 2.827,4 :OO,U TA2,154 gg.24,7 125,186 gg.21,7
Dirigenti I x