JPRS ID: 10260 KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500020029-3
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 29
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10260
19 January 1982
Korean Affa~ rs Re ort
p
CFOUO 2/82)
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NOTE
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JPRS L/10260
19 January 1982
KOREAV AFFAIRS REPORT
c~ouo 2/a a )
I.ONTENTS
SOUTH K~.)REA
POLTTICS AND GOVERN'.~IENT
Deta:~~~ of Personal Network of Chon Regime Reported.
(Maeda Yasuhiro; SEKAI, Nov 81) 1
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S. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
- DETAILS OF PERSONAL NETWORK OF CHON REGIME REPORTED
Tokyo SEKAI in Japanese Nov 81 pp 156-1.70 ,
~ [Article by Maeda Yasuhiros "Personal Connections of the Chon Tu-hwan Regime"]
[Text] The Inauguration of the Chon Regime
President Chon Tu-hwan of the Republic of Korea has implemented important domestic
and foreign programs one after another, including the presidential election, the
National Assembly electians, the U.S.-Korea summit conference, and iiis visit to
the five members of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). Moreover, he
boldly carried out wholesaie personnel changes in political an~ government circles.
This was designed to achieve stability for his regime. In addition, during the
- past year he has also tackled reform of the top leadership of the Korean military
forces, which form the nucleiis of his power structurs. Thus he has taken steady
steps for the perpetuation of his power.
~ It was 1 year and 11 months ago, on 12 December 1979, L;iat Maj Gen Chon Tu-hwan,
commander of the Defense Force Security Command, daringly staged a"caup for mili-
tary puxge" to eliminate Army Chief of Staff and Martial Law Comrnander Chong Sung-
hwa and other top military leaders and elders. Also, it was a little over a year
ago, on 1 SepLember 1980, that he abrupt.ly forced acting President Ch'oe Kyu-ha to
- step down and took over the presidency. It took President Pak Chong-hui (a major
general at that time) 2 years and 7 months from the time of the military coup in
May 1961 to become president in December 1963. Compared to this, one can see how
speedily he usurped political power and has pressed forward with r~~forms.
The new lineups of the political, government, and miliCary ci.zcles that support
the Chon regime will be scrutinized below.
To begin with, let us trace the steps leading to his political takeover. It all
started with the measures taken on 17 May 1980 to expand and strengthen the
Emergency Martial Law. Because of intensified student demonstr3tions the mea-
sures called for banning all political activities. The Defense Force Security
Command (CIC) arrested on the suspicion of antigovernment activities and ~llicit
accumulation of wealth the so-called three Kims, that is, Kim Tae-chung, former
- presidential candidate of the opposition party, the New Democratic Party; Kim
Chong-p'il., former prime minister (and president of the progovernment party, the
Democratic Republican Party}, and Kim Xong-sam, president of the New Democratic
Party. ~
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- On the following day, 18 I~fay, protest demonstrations by studen~s and the masses
demanding the restoration of democracy, the breakup of the Yusin systAm, and the
resignation of the Chon Tu-hwan military regime were started in Kwangju city.
After armed intervention with indiscriminate mass slaughter by the Airborne 5pe-
cial Warfare Corps (paratroopers), the protest demonstrations were quashed by thP.
martial law troops on 27 May.
The schedule for General Chon to take over political power eme:.ged in concret.e
~ form with the "Emergency Countermeasures Committee for National Secur~.ty" inaugu-
rated after the suspension of all the functions of the National Assembly at the
end of May. General Chon, as chairman of the Standing Committee for National
Security, pressed ahead with steps to let the Ch'oe Kyu-ha regime transfer its
power. This Standing Committee of the Committee for National Security was com-
posed of 18 active-duty sol3iers as the nucleus. It gave birth to a new constitu-
tion which was promulgated in October 1980, 1 month after Chon became president.
Furthermore, on the basis of the supplementary rules GL this constitution, a
legislative organ, the Legislative Assembly for National Security (the so-called
Leg~slative Assembly) was estzblished on 27 October ~o replace the National Assem-
bly.
- Ttiis Legislativ~ Assembly (composed of 81 mencbers in all, with military officers
at ~he center) wfl uld be led to the formation of an assembly for the president to
serve as a stable political base with a progovernr~ent party holding a majority.
During the 156-day period until the day before the opening of the new assem}.,ly
on 10 April 1980 when it was dissolved, the Legislative Assembly held no less
- than 196 sessions, including plenary sessions and subcommittee meetings to pass
at a stretch as many as 219 bills, including 189 legislative bills, plus the 1981
national budgetary bills, and some resolut~.ons.
~ Included in them weLe the Political Climate Reform Law aimed at purging estab-
lished politicians, the Presidential Election Law, the National Assembly Election
Law, the Political Party Law, the Political Fund Regulation Law, the Fundamental
Press Law, and others.
The personnel ~han~es among the top military leaders, regarded as the granting
- of rewards for their service in the 12 December military purge, were tentatively
completed. The personal connections ir the military were drastically changed as
a result of the replacement of the brains at the Blue House and the transfer of
mi?itary brass to administrative sectors and to the asseinbly.
Who has the real power within the Chon Tu-hwan regime and who exerts influence?
What kind of character do the people who form the core of the power in the rE~ime
have? The following persons are discussed in this context based on information
available up to now.
National Assembly
In accordance with the new constitution, 15 electoral districts were added to the
previous 77 electoral districts. ~'hus there are 92 local electoral districts.
Two seats are elected from each district, 184 seats in total. Then 92 national
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district seats termed the "proportional representation system" are added to the
, lccal districts. The grand total is 276 assembly seats.
- According to the new Election Law, the seats in the national district are not
elected by direct popular vote. Inste2d, the party which wins first place in the
~ocal elections receives twJ-thirds (61 seats) of the national district, and the
remaining 31 seats are distributed among th~ second place party and others propor-
tionately accordin~ to the number of seats t~iey win. The progovernaner?t party, the
Democratic Justice Party (Mingjong Party) whi:ch was hastily inaugurated toward the
end of 1980, aimed a~ becoming the first-place party by putting up one candidate
each in all 92 electoral districts. It won 90 seats. As was expected, it gained
151 seats after adding the proportionately distributed seats, greatly surpassing
the simgle majority. The Democratic Korea Party (Minhan Party, with Yu Ch'i-song
as its presidenr.) which was formed with persons from the right-of-center faction
of the opposition party during the Pak regime, the New Democratic Party, became
- the second-place party, winning .57 seats, and after adding 24 proportionately
distributed seats the total number of its seats was 81 (82 later as an independent
joined the party). The third-place party, formed with the core coming from the
Democratic Republican Party and the Yushin Fr~ends Party (Yujong Party), bozh pro-
government parties during the Pak regime, was the Korean Nationalist Party (Kung-
min Party, with Kim Chong-ch'o as its president). It won 18 seats, and its total
reached 25 after adding 7 proportionately distributed seats. In additi.on, the
Democratic Socialist Party which clair~s to be a socialist party, tile People's
Rights Party, ar~d the New Politics Party won two seats each. The Democratic
Agrarian Par'ty and the Anmin Party won one seat each. There were 11 independents
elected (one independent later joined the Minhan Party). These minor parties re-
ceived no proportional seats.
Precisely herein lay the aim of the Chon regime in proclaiming its welcome to a
"multiparty system," designed to cause a mushrooming of minor parties. As a re-
sult, the Minjong Party with only 37 percent of the votes gained 54 percent of ~rhe
seats. The persons who make up the three top-ranking parties represent the criss-
crossing of former progovernment and opposition party members. There is no dif-
ference whatsoever in their golitical beliefs and ideals or in their policy. They
are, moreover, all "conservatives."
The first-place party, Che Minjong Party, is expec[ed to play nnly the role of a
voting mach~ne for President Chon. In the new National Assembly, major.bills are
expected to be automatically approved. The drafting and proposing of legislative
bills is ca~ried out by the brains at the Blue House and the administrative bureau-
crat group. The scope of the activities of the National Assembly has bec~n dras-
tically curtailed. The quintessence of the function of the National Asseulbly is
different from that of a 4lestern-style parliament. Its aim is to d~velop ~~oodwill
diplotn~1cy toward the two major allies of Korea, the United States and Japan, by
using National Assembly members as a conduit. Although the National Assembly mem-
bers are "not needed for the deliberation of bills," these ne;aly elected assembly
members who will form a part of_ the puwer structure as the progovernment party
members for 4 years to come will be analyzed, beginning with the process of their
- elections.
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NOR ON'FIC'IAI, IiSE~: ()Nl.ti'
Composition of the New National Assembly Members
- President ~hon assigned his trusted lieutenants to form a progovernment party.
First of a.ll, the makeup of the 151 members of the Minjong Yarty is characterized
by the massive presence of former soldiers. With Military Academy graduates at
the center, 28 either recently retired from military service or se;:ved in the
military in the past. They are followed by 25 former ministers and high-ranking
bureaucrats. Included in tham are a former assistant director of the Central In-
telligence Agency (KCIA), an attorney general, and a director of the Seoul Metro-
politan Police.
From among the Legislative Assembly members who assisted in the formation of the
new National Assembly, 24 were seJ.ected to become new National Assembly members.
From the Democratic Republican Party, the pr%~government party of *_he Pak regime,
11 were selected. From another former p~ugovernment party, the Yujong Party, ~
se~~en ~aere selected (some of them were also Legislative Assembly members). Eight
_ are former assembly members from the New Democratic Party. In terms of occupa-
tional classification, there are as many as 22 well-known journalists, such as
newspapPr executives, reporters, and television newscasters. Trey for!n one of
the three n,3in forces of the party, along with the former officers group and the
- politicians. In addition, 22 members were selected from financial and business
conglomerate circles. There are 12 former scholars and school administrators.
While the majority of the Minjong Party assembly members, 83 of them, are over
40 years of age, only 3 are in their thirties. Of the total, 46 are in their
fifties, and 17 in their sixties. Although the average assembly member is some-
what younger than his counterpdrt under the Pak regime, it d~es not coincide with
the younger trend of the eligible voters, as 60 percent of them are in their
twenties and thirties.
This is the result of the appointment of old politicians who survived the Polit-
ical Climate Purification Law, and especially of the appoiatment of 61 members as
~ proportionate repres~ntatives from among noted elder politicians, financiers,
and high--ranicing government officials, with the exception of some young former
soidiers dispatched by President Chon for the formation. Compared with Japan, the
average age of the leadership in every circle is younger by 10 years. Of the
Eive persons in their thirties, two are women (both served in the Legislative
Assembly) who were assigned to seats from the national district. Other members
in their forties were selected by direct vote. Therefore, the generational change
in certain quarters is not designed to reflect the diversifying political trends
of the eligible voters. Instead, it is a product of "deliberate" consideration.
As will be disr_ussed later, the former subordinates of Pcesident Chon (50 years
- of age) occupy the leading positions. With the exception of those who occupy
honorary positions and had meritorious service in the Legislative Assembly, the
actual working force is composed of persons in their mid-forties. In terms of
educational background, as many as 20 are graduates of Japanese universities and
colleges (including former ones in Manchuria, now Northeast China) such as Tokyo,
Kyoto, Tohoku, Nihon, Waseda, Chu and Doshisha Universities. Being the Japanese-
- speaking generation the;? are still regarded as playing a part of the role of con-
duit between Korea and Japan (ages quoted in the fol?owing are all calendar-year
ages in the Korean style).
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Soldiers-Turned-Politicians
The group in the Minjong Party that exercises the real power is led by former
Legislative Assembly member Kwon Chong-tal (45), who is the central figure in the
- "leading reformisc force." He retired from active military service as a brigadieY
general in October 1980 and contributed his efforts to the inauguration of the
par:y. He has been appointed secretary general of the party. He was born in North
Kyongsa:~.g Province and is of the 15th Class of the Military Academy. He is regard-
ed as a personal fol~ower of Yun P'il-yong, former commander of the Capital Guard
Command. In the Def~nse Force Security Command (CIC) he was in control of intelli-
gence on the military. The fact that he served as director of the CIC Intellig~nce
Office at: the time of the 12 llecemb~r coup for military purge led to his excep-
tional promotion. Since he visited the United States and Japan as a confidential
emissary of the president to resolve the dispute between Japan and Korea over the
execution of Mr Kim Tae-chung, he has been busily occugied also with the behind-
the-scenes operations regarding Japanese political circles on behalf of Korea's
request for a 6-billion-dollar loan.
The number two man is a deputy secretary general of the party, `.'.i Chong-ch'an
(45), of the 16th Class of the Military Academy. He garnered 116,000 votes in the
celebrated electoral district which includes Chongno-ku and Chung-ku, popularly
known as number one on the political street. In May 1980 he was appointed direc-
tor of the Planning and Cuord~ination Office of the KCIA in order to carry out a
wholesale purge of the persons connected with Kim Chae-kyu, former Director of the
KCIA who shot Pak to death. He displayed his ability in the revamping of the KCIA.
- He is said to be favored ;~ith the influence of his grandfather, who was a forxner
_ vice president and an anti-Japanese fighter. He served as a councilor at the
Korean Embassy in London and is also a calented administrator. He is expected to
be active as chairman of the Steering Committee of the National Assembly.
Yun Sok-sun (44), who was ranked third in the proportional representation (na-
tional district) list, is a deputy secretary general of the party. He is one of
the young and Fowerful triumvirate. He is not a Military Academy graduate, but
was selecred from his former position as director of the General Affairs Bureau of
the KCIA. He is closeJ�~ connected with Ho Sam-su, chief presidential investiga-
' tion secretary, who was a classmatP of Yun Sok-sun at Pusan High School. Ho is
one of the powerful men at the Blue Hous~, as will be discussed later. The names
of these young powerful men were hardly knowil to the Korean people until half a
= year ago. This atte5ts to the fact that thi.s series of political changes consti-
tutes a military coup in the purest sense of the term.
rormer Mini.srer of National Defense Chong Nae-hyok (55), ane of the 28 soldiers-
~ turned-politicians of the Minjong Party and elected speaker of the National Assem-
= bly, is a graduate of the Japanese Military Academy. He is known even in Japan
- for his activity to obtain the release of the hostages in the highjacking of Japan
Airlines' Yodo (1970). He has many acquaintances in defense circles in Japan. He
will serve as an important pipel'_ne when new exchanges between Japanese and Korean
parliamentarians commence. There are 21 graduates of r_he Korean Military Academy.
The 8th Class is represented by four, the 13th Class by three, and other classes
- generally by one or two. Only one, Chong Son-hu (43)g former managing director
~f the Korean Electric Wire Company, represents the 17th Class among those who
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Eorm the young core of the leading reformist force. It is characteristic of thase
- of the same class who enter politics after doffing their uniforms tF~at they are
appointed only to positions in the inner circle at the Blue House or to diplomatic
posts.
Yu Kun-hang (53), a retired major general who was commander of the Army Intelli-
gence Command, of the 2-A Class of the army, is reputed to have been one of the
army ~upporters for the coup for military purge. Kim Yang-son (51) of the 7th
Class and former director of the Anti-Espionage Countermeasures Headquarters, is
President Chon's senior by 4 years. He is highly familiar with military intelli-
gence and military justice. As the prasiding judge of the common court martial
under the martial law during Kim Chae-kyu's trial, he handed out the death sen-
tence to Kim Chae-kyu. Assemb~y member Kim Yong-son was selected along with in-
cumbent Minister of Home Affairs So Chong-hwa (47) as a deputy director of the
KCIA, after Yun Ik-kyu~ and Kim Chae-tok (former minister to Japan), who had close
personal ties with Kim Chae-kyu, were discharged. Kim Yong-son is regarded as
outstanding in his service in reorganizing th~ KCYA to suit the Chon Tu-hwan re-
gime.
A superstar among the 8th Class is Pak Tae-chun (54), chairenan of the Pohang
Steel Company. As the president of the company he was successful in its manage-
ment, and developed the company into one of the representative enterprises in
ICorea. He suddenly surfaced as a leader i:~ financial circles after the ^hon re-
- gime was inaugurated. He was appointed chairman of the Korea-Japan Economic Asso-
ciation inaugurated on 26 February, thus b~coming a manager on the Korean side of
the pipeline tha.t connects the economic circles in Japan and Korea. Before the
- liberation he once studied at Waseda University in the Science and Engineering
' Department, but he withdrew before graduation and later entered the Korean Mil~
tary Academy. He was appointed to the position of director r~f the Secretar.iat to
the Supreme National Reconstruction Council immediately after then Maj Gen Pak
Chong-hui started s military coup. He is currently active as chairman of the Fi-
nance Committee of the National Assembly. Other members of the 8th Class are Yi
Pom-chun (53), former assistant minister ef national defense for logistics and
- director of the Maritime and Port Administration; Pak Sang-kyu (SO), former direc-
tor of the Housing Corporation and a retired brigadier general; and Yi Sang-ik
(53}, former Yujon g Party assembly member and minister to Japsn. Of the 8th Class
of the Milit~ry Academy, former Prime Minister Kim Chong-p'il and Yi Pyong-hui,
former minister without portfolio (in charge of Japan affairs), were purged from
politics for 8 years on the suspicion that they had been involved in irregulari-
ties and corruption. Thus a clear demarcation line ~aas drawn among them.
What attracts one'a attention is the llth Class, the classmates of President Chon
Tu-hwan. The three prominet~t ones are: Kim Sik (48), former director of the
Materiel Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense; Kwon Ik-hyon (47), former
assistant to the minister without portfolio; and An Kyo-tok (47), president of the
Chongu Development Company. As will be related later, President Chon strongly
wanted his comrades bonded in blood at the time of the 12 December coup for mil~
tary purge, Lt Gen Chong Ho-yong (49), deputy army chief of staff, and Lt Gen No
T'ae-u (49), commander of the ~efense For~e Security Command--ranks given are
those held a~ the time of the purge--and others who were in uniform to turn to
politics. Not all of them would doff their unifortns. Messrs Kim, Y.won, and An
were not closely connected as comrades in the coup for military purge, but they
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Were classmates who pledged their cooperation from outside at the time of the in-
ception of the Chon regime. The Cfiongu Development Company was started as a mili-
tary supply contractor to the American forces in Korea. The company adopted a
_ copresident system, and former generals have filled the positions. Therefore~ th~
company has strong ties with the government. One president, Min Sok-won, is not
an assembly member but he was a member of the llth Class of the Military Academy.
He came to Japan last April and seriously attempted ta "make an inroad" in Japan's
political and financial circles as President Chon's highly trusted representative
from business circles. Mr An held the position of Chief of Operations of the Army
Staff and rose as high as to the rank of full colonel. Hereafter, Presidents An
and Min are expected to be in charge of the twin sectors of politics and economy
in laying the pipeline between Japan and Korea.
Then, those in the llth Class were followed by Ch'oe Nak-son (47), president of
the Koesong Paper Manufacturing Company, of the 12th Class; 0 Han-ku (47), direc-
tor the Pohang Steel Company, of ~.;he 13th Class; and Pae Myong-kuk (47), the
president of a construction company, and Yi Ch'un-ku (47) who was active as cha=Y-
man of the Pur.ification Committee, both of the 14th Class.
Those who directly changed their status from active duty to become members of the
Legislative Assembly include Yi U-chae (4?), of the 13th Class, a brigadier gen-
eral who commanded the V Communication:: Corps; Chong Sun-tok (46) of the 16th
Class, a brigadier general who served as the chief of staff of a field army; and
Ho Ch'ong-il of the 20th Class, a military police ofiicer with the rank or lieu-
tenant colonel. Assembly member Ho also cooperated with General Chon at t:he time
of the 12 December coup and served with distinction.
Participating in the Chon regime from the air force and navy are: Ch'on Yong-song
- (52), president of the Korea Electric Ma.intenance Corporation, of the lst Class of
the Air Force Acadeny; Kim Yong-su (52) of the 2d Class of the Air Force Academy,
- who served as commander of the Air Force 'Training Base; Chong Won-min (54), former
- First Deputy Chief of Naval Operations and member of the Standing Committee of the
National Security Committee, of the 5th Class of the Naval Academy; Kim Chong-ho,
oF the 3d Class of the Naval Officers' ~andidate School and former Second Deputy
- Chief of Naval Operations; and Yi Yang-u (/+9), of the 4th Class of the Naval
Academy and former Yujong Party assembly member. Besides these, Yi Chae-hwan
(43), former director of the Presidential Protective Service Office, is one of the
, unique ~~articipants.
In terms oC former military personnel, 12 retired generals led by Pak Kyong-
won of the 6th Class of tha: riilitary Academy, who was former governor of Kangwon
Province, joined en masse ttie then New Democratic Party in pursuit of their polit-
ical careers. But all ot them were implicated thereafter in the Political Climate
Reform Law. Even thoiigh they were not purged, none of them has become a member
of ttie National Assembly. There are gigantic forces working against military men
- o~ho try to join an opposition party.
Journalists-Turned-Politicians
As journalists-turned-pol.iticians, assembly members Kim Yun-hwan ~49) and Nam Chae-
hui (47) are already well known. As they have an excellent command of the Japanese
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~anguage and also are well acquainted with all circles in Japan, they have loome3
as the central figures among Tapanese and Korean parliamentarians. Mr Kim was
born in Sonsan, North Kyongsang Province. He was a special corresp~ndent of
CHO50N ILBO in Tokyo and assistant managing editor of the same paper. He was then
appointed Yujong Party assembly member in 1979. Pir Nam was managing editor of
CHOSON ILBO, and chiei editorial writer of SEGtTL SINMI~N. He was appointed Demo-
cratic Republican Party assembly member in 1977. Both were known as specialists
- in Japanese affairs. Winning President Chon's confidence early, they joined the
prog~vernm~nt party, and they were promised cabinet posts at later dates. Pak
Kyong-sok (44), who was appointed the pr~government party spokesman, was a former
editorial writer of TONG ILBO and also a special correspondent in Tokyo, It gives
the impression that those at the frontline level of Korean journalist circles have
"rallied" under the Chon regime, including Song Chi-yon~ (65), a former editorial
writar of CHOSON ILBO and a former member of the Legislative Assembly; Kim Yong-
t'ae (45), former managing editor of CHOSON ILBO; Chong Nam (4Q), assistant man-
aging editor of KYONGHYANG SIM~IUt~; Sim Myong-po (46), former managing editor of
, HANGUK ILBO; and Yi Yong-hui (50), a woman editorial writer of HANGUK ILBO. Pong
Tu-hwan (46), a former newscaster with TBC, a commercial television station, who
editorially argued for the Pak regi~ne, won the larg~st number of votes (158,OOOj
throughout the nation as a representative of the television industry.
In addition, there are active newspaper management representatives such as Nam
Chae-tu (42), president of TAEJON ILBO, and Sim Sangcau (42), president of CHONNAM
ILBO. Those antigovernment journalists charged with violating the Emergency Mar-
tial Law and various other laws during 1980 were either imprisoned or were forced
to resign from their employment positions. Thus they have disappeared from the
scene ~o le~d the remainder of their lives in a manner contrasting with those
journalists who have nenetrated the central nerve system of power.
Among those who hsve sideslipped into various p~sitions from executive and judicial
circles are Kim Ki-ch'ol (64), former ministe.r of communications, and Chong Chong-
t'aek (46), former minister of agriculture and forestry. Mr Chong has been ap-
pointed to the ne.wly created post of first minister for political affairs. Others
are Hwang In-soag (55), former minister of transportation; Kim Chong-kyong (S8),
former attorney general; Yi Yong-hun (54) former director of the Legislative
Bureau; Na Kil-cho (58), former associate justice of the Supreme Court and a grad-
uate of Meiji University in Japan; Pak Tong-chin, former minister of foreign af-
fairs and a graduate of Chuo University in Japan; and Kim Cnong-ho (46) former
vice minister of home affairs. Unique among thos~ who benefitted from the inf].u-
ence of relatives is Pak Chae-hong (40), President Pak's nepnew, who is chairman
of rhe Tongyang Steei Pipe Company.
In response to President Chon's summon for "national concordance,"~as many as
eighe assembly members and even staff inembers of the former largest opposition
party, the New Democratic Party, have participated in the Chon regime. Y~ Chae-
yong (66) former vice president of the New Democratic Party, who paved the way
for party President Chon to assume the presidency, has been appointed a represen-
tative member of the party. He is a graduate Qf Chuo University in Japan. For
his service in inaugurating the party, he was named to the first position in the
list of the natiana~ district. Other former New Democratic Party assembly mem-
bers were all accused of being "turncoats" but won elections in local districts
_ in a good fight. They thus acted as models of the posture for national unity.
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Among them, assembly members 0 Se-ung (48), Pak Kwon-hom (49), and Han pyong-
ch'ae (48) are also known in Japan through the former Japan-Korea parliamentari-
ans League and other organizatio~ls. Assembly member Chin I-chong (59) quickly
tuYned his coat snder the Ch'oe r.egime following the shooting death of Przsident
Pak to serve as minister of public health and social affairs for the first time
as an opposition member. Among the turncoat group are assembly member Yun Kil-
chung (65), a former nember of the Legislative Assembly and a graduate of Nihon
University in Japan, and ~Ia Sok-hu (46), who once defended Kim Tae-cb.ung and
others who were implicated in the case of the Declaration for Democratic National
Salvation (MarcYi 1976). Assembly member Cho Chong-hu (60), a former opposition
party member who served as a secretary to former President Yun Po-son, the leader
of the anti-Pak forces, also served as an assembly member. As he w^:; a member of
- the former Legislative Assembly, it indicates the broad base of si:pport for the
Chon regime.
Oi former progovernment party assembly members, both the Democratic Republican
and Yujong Parties, the majority of t~i.gwigs and able persons were implicated in
the Political Climate Reform Law and forced to retire from ~alitics for the next
~ 8 years. Consequently, almost all new assembly members are almost unknown "small
wheels." The precious few sur.vivors among them are assembly member Kim Ssk-hyon
(64), ele~ted in a local district and a graduate of Waseda University, and assem-
' bly member Sin Sang-ch'o (59), elected in the national district who once attended
Tokyo University. While with the Yujong Party he wun the confidence of President
Pak and long served behinci the scenes in negotiating with Japa;~. For this reason
he has many acquaintances in political, financial, aud government circles in
Japan. He is expected to assist the Chon regime in its dealings wi~h Japan in a
style diff.erent from that of. thz young group of Japan specialists.
The Most Corrupt Elections i~i History
The recent elections were held in accordance with the new election laws which gave
landslide victories to the progovernment party. Moreover, the whole government
and bureaucrats openly enF;aged in baiting with promises of benefit. All opposi-
tion parties deplored this: "These elections were the most corrupt in the his-
tory of Korea."
Large handing out of subsidies as special. f.avors of the government to local cities,
towns, and villag~s, the indiscriminate issuance of campaign pledges, and the buy-
ing of votes were openly rampant. In the two cities of Taegu and Inchon, in the
presence of President Chon, progovernment party candidates petitioned for the pro-
motion of r.heir ci_ties to the status of special cities. Their petition was in-
- stantly approved. It ~ras obviously a case of doing "one favor every day." The
opposi~ion found nu ways to co~inter and were beaten.
In Korea, ~he 1oca1 self-bovernment system has not been implemented since the
period of tlie Pak regime. Instead, the existing system calls for the appointment
of pr~v.incial governors by the presiden~ and also for the appointment of mayors,
coun~y, town, and village c}~iefs by the superior government agencies. Also,
local legislative coun.cils at all levels have been disapproved on the ground of
financial saving. Therefore, there is a complete centralized system enforced in
Korea. For this reason more than 500,000 public employees and police officers
functioned as vote-collectin~ machines for the incumbent regi~r~e, forced voters
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to gu to polling stations, and obstructed opposition party candidates. This re-
- sulted in making the recent elections more c~~rrupt than those during the Pak
regime. The reason is clear, then, for disapproving the enforcement cf the local
self- government system i~ the new constitution ~.n spire of the strong demand for
it on the part of the people.
rir Im Pang-hyon (51), a famous Blue HouSe spolcesman unrler the Pak regime, ran as
a candidate in Chonju-Wanju D istrict, North Cholla 1'rovince, with the slogan that
- "progovernment bureaucrats were needed ror the development of North Cholla Prov-
ince. Even President Chon went there personally to endorse his candidacy and
- public~y pledged scholarships to young peop7_e from the Cholla provinces and the
remolding of the Chonju railroad station. Assembl.y member Im was successfully
- elected. The FAR EASTEIZN ECONOMIC R~ViEFJ commented: "The politically oppressed
people judged it hopeless to change the situation and sold their votes. Such a
phenomenon portends danger."
There were some incidents leading candidates who held strong views against the
incumbent regim~ to withdra~v their candidacy. T.n Kwangju city, South Cholla
Province, ~ahere there were bloody riots in May 1.980, a powerful local leader, Maj
Gen Chong Ung, ran as an independent, but he disappeared 10 days before the vot-
ing. At the time of the Kwan gju incident, Major General Chong was comma.nder of
the 31st Division stationed in the locality, and he issued a statement that he
could not obey the orders from the national governnent to mobilize troops for the
suppression of the "riots." He thus won fame overnight.
In the llth National Assembly which opened on 11 April 1981, the Democratic Jus-
tice Party picked Ch'ae Mun-s ik (56), a former New Democratic Party member and a
member of the Legislative Ass embly, as vice speaker of the assembly, and conceded
another vice speakership to Kim Un-ha (56), vi.ce president of the Democratic Korea
Party. But the Democratic Justice Party mem~.,ers monopolized the chair~anships of
all 13 standing committees. Six former military men were among them. The party
made it clear that it would manage the National Assembly with the progovernment
party alone.
Although the second largest party, the I~emocratic Kor.ea Party, was criticized for
being "an opposition party by day and a progovernment party by night" by other
opposition parties, it caas succes~ul in electing many assembly members, inainl_y
from among former New Democra tic ~arty Asse~hbly member~. As somewhat dis~inct
from rightwing New Democratic Party members who turned to the Democratic Justice
Party, the DemoGratic Korea Part"~ :rnciude~ such middle-of-road and left-leaning
assembly membeLs as Ho Kyong-man (43), who was a defense lawyer during Kim Tae-
chung's trial, at~d Son Se-il (45), who was an assistant to Kim Yong-sam, presi-
dent of the New Democratic Party. ~~so, t~te third ].~rge5t party, the Nationalist
Party, originated from the f o rmer Democrati.c Republ~ca~z Party. Et is considered
- a quasi-progovernment party b y the Korean people. Conspicuous among the National-
ist Party assembly members is Cho I1-cl~e (S3), from North Kyongsang Province, a
former assembly membPr from the Yujong Party. He served as depury director for
security at the KCIA, and was appointed consul general in Osaka and then minister
at the Korean Embassy in Japan. He was active in controlling "anti-Korean organi-
- zations" in Japan.
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Socizlist Parties
" Compared to the above-mentioned three parties, the independents and socialists
were pathetic. "The only way to maintain order in thE National Assembly is to
prevent the assembling of individual politicians without party~affiliation. Th~t
is to say, the new National Assembly should keep quiet and should not undertake
any ac*ivity (statement by Kwon Chong-tal, secretary general of the Democratic
Justice Party, as quoted in REVI~W). As expressed in this statement, independents
and socialists have become open targets for obliterati~on.
President Chon approved the establishment of socialist parties for the recent
elections. His foremost aim was to effectively win the support of West European
nations with strong socialist democratic forces for the Chon regime. Another
reason was that President Chon could also refute the accusations of the Democratic
_ People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) that "South Korea is controlled by mili-
tary fascist groups, and socialists are oppressed."
First of all, Mr Kim Ch'ol (55), former adviser to the United Socialist Party, took
the iniriative in forming the Democratic Socialist Party. During the Pak regime
Mr Kim demanded recognitioti of North Korea and President Pak's resignation, and he
led the labor movement. He was imprisoned altogether 24 months. Thus he was
known as a diehard fighter for democratization. In November 1980 President Chon
- appointed Pir Kim Ch'ol as a member of the Legislative Assembly. Mr Kim consented
to have his name listed as a member of the Legislative Assembly in order to gain
the legitimization of the activity of socialist parties, because he aspired to
the "complete and unconditional restoration of parliamentary politics." However,
while he was aut of the country attending a Socialist International conference
to~vard the end of 1980 and the early part of 1981, another veteran "socialist,"
Ko Chong-hun (61), toolc control of the Democratic Socialist Party. Thereupon, the
"orthodox" faction led by Mr Kim founded the Socialist Party and split from Mr
Ko's group. Of 20 active socialist elders, 18 rallied to the Democratic Socialist
Party. As a result, Mr Kim's party beca:~e an extremely small party, and his long-
time comrade, An P'i1-su, former chairman of the United Socialist Party, was ap-
prehended. Mr Kim h:~mself was defeated in the election, and his party gained no
seat in the assembly. The Democratic Socialist Party elected two, including Mr
Ko. In accerdance with the New Political Party Law, along with the Korean Chris-
tian Democratic Party, the Wonil Pazty, and the United Nat~onalist Party, the
registration of th~ Socialist Party was invalidated.
There are large proups of unorganized workers who are not allowed to engage in
political activity. It is a future task to decide which pnlitical party will forge
them into a large viable political force. As the Chon regime estimates that a so-
cialist party will intrinsically lead to the denial of the military regime, even
- if it adopts anticommunism as a slogan, the Chon regime has obliterated in every
way the emergence of a so~ialist party. Mr Kim considers the existence of the
Democratic Socialist Party as the "Trojan horse that wi11 destroy socialism."
However, many in the democratic forces are strongly critical of Mr Kim on the
ground that "he was defeated in the election because he had been appointed a mem-
ber of the Legislative Assembly to be integrated into the Chon regime and this
alienated the voters."
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Mr Ko prides himself on the fact that a socialist party won assembly seats, if only
two, for the first time; he has a colorful personal history. During the period of
the American Military Government he served as a language officer for the American
forces, and as a full colonel was active in military intelligence. But after the
~i.udent revolution of.1960 he organized a reformist group to d~velop a socialist
movement. He experienced a total of 56 months' imprisonment. During the past 10
years he has Pxclusively engaged in writingn publishing a large number of works.
At the same time, he has close relations with many former military men who make up
the Chon regime. He came to Japan last mid-Apri1 to contact the Democratic Social-
ist Party of Japan, and announced that he would attempt a substantive developtlent
of his party after the "realistic idealist" model of the Democratic Socialist Par-
- ty of Japan." They are watching him more than the major parties to see whether
under the military rule he will be able to advance the cause of democratization,
including the welfare of the poor classes, or whether he will become a Trojan
horse to take the teeth out of the socialist movement.
Exchanges Between Japanese Parliamentarians and Korean Parliamentarians
In terms of Korea's relations with Japan, the former Korea-Japan Parliamentarians
League has undergone a massive organizational change. The Korea-Japan Parliamen-
tarians Security Consultative Conference and the Korea-Japan Friendship Society
have been dissolved into a single organization, the new Korea-Japan Parliamentari-
ans League.
Exchanges between Japanese parliamentarians and their Korean counterparts which
started in 1965 under the Pak regime led to corrupt p~wer practices called "Japan-
Korea connivances" in both countries. Arguing that such exchanges frequently re-
sulted in negative aspects whereby the interest of individual parliamentarians
- became preponderant, the Chon regime switched to a parliamentary diplomacy to be
conducted under the supervision of the Blue House. On 8 Ma.y the league selected
assembly member Yi Chae-yong as chairman, assembly member Kim Yun-hwan as chief
secretary, and asseMbly members Pak Kyong-sok and Chong Nam as st~.nding secre-
taries. The total number of Korean members is 52, from both the progovernment
and opposition parties.
The Korean side has no :~ntention of limiting the pipeline between Japan and Korea
to the hawkish group in the Liberal Democratic Part~ and a faction of the Demo-
cratic Socialist Party as in the past. Instead it wants to extend the pipeline
to other forces in the Liberal Democratic Party and to the Komei Party, the New
Liberal Club, and the rightwing faction of the Socialist Party as well. The
Korean delegates who came to Japan last June for a get-together made aggressive
contacts with influential representatives of all circles. It has already achieved
~ substantive progress through the general meetings of the Japan-Korea Parliamentari- ~
~ins League and the Kore