JPRS ID: 10256 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500020025-7
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 25
• Content Type: REPORTS

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- JPRS L/ 10256
- 13 January 1982
Sub-Saharan Africa Re ort
p
FOUO No. 757
~BIS FOREIGN ~~OADCAST INFORMATION SERi/ICE
,
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Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated pre
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- Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
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JPRS L/10256
13 January 1982
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORi
FOUO No. 757
CONTENT'S
ANGOI,A
MeasiirFS TakPn To DevPlop Fiahin~ Sector
- (MAR~HF.S TROPICAi1X ET MFDITF.RRANFENS, 27 Nov 81} 1
Briefs
MPI~ Economic Decisions 2.
~ Spani.sh Missionary Kidnaped 2
WFP Aid 2
CHAD
_ Report on ~omposition of OAU Peacekee~ping Force
(Sennen Andriamirado; JEUNE A'FRIQUE, 18 Nov 81) 3
Chad Said To Have Been Good Training Schocl for Libyan Army
(JEUNE AFRIQiIE, 18 Nov 81) 6
Briefs
Libyan Losses in Chad 8
9 OACI Aid for Airport 8
LIRFRIA
Briefs
Austerity Measures 9
Saudi, Israeli Relations 9
Reduction in Commercial Fleet 9
� French t.oan 10
MOZAMBIQI)F ,
Rriefs
Measures A~ainst Rural F.xodus 11
~ - a - [III - NE & A - 120 FOUO]
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~ 1~OIt OH'1~ ICIAI~ 11SR QNLY
- SENFGAT.
Relations Between 'i~ao PDS Leaders 'Not Doing Well'
- (Sennen Andriamirado; JEt1NE AFRIQiTE, 25 Nov 81) 12
' PDS Secretary Interviewed Concerning Party's Condition
(Fara N'Diaye Interview; JEUNE AFRIQUF, 25 Nov 81) 14
Data on Industrial Firms in Dakar Free Zone
(MARCHES TROPICRUX F.T MEDITERR!'.NErNS, 4 Dec 81) 19
Briefs
Senegalese-Kuwaiti Bank Year 21
?.AIRF
F.conomic and Financial Situation at End of June 1981
(MARCHF.S TROPICAUX F.T MFDITERRANEENS, 6 N~v 81) 22
~
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ANC,OLA
MEASURES TAKEN TO DEVELOP FISHING SECTOR
Paris MARCH~S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1881, 27 Nov 81 p 3196
_ [Text] Fishing, one of Antola's main sources of animal protein, is a key sector
for the country. With 1,650 kilometers of coa'stline and favorable hydrographic
conditions, Angola has abundant water resources, resources poorly and inadequately
developed, especially since independence, which was accompanied by the exodus
- or sabotage of most means of production and the departure of nearly all off3.cers
- and specialized personnel. In fact, while the level of t'~e catch exceeded 70~,000
t:ons a year during the colonial period, it has been but 3~,000 tons in recent years,
although it did climb back up to some 9U,000 tons at the present time.
Combined with the essential need to impruve the terms of the natianal supply of
food products, this situat~ion has caused authoPitie~ to graxit top priority to the
rehabilitation of this sector of activity and, within such a f.ramework, to invest-
_ ments oriented toward production and the processing of fis.h_i*.~g products.
The recovery will take place in stages. The first will be completed through the
startup of a project whase ~:otal cost is an estimated $27.7 million and whose
~ financing is provided by: a$10-million loan fram the Arab Bank for African Eco-
nomic Development (BADEA), repayable in.15 years, including a 5-year deferment, and
carrying an annual interest rate of 6 percent; $12 million in aid from the Kuwaiti
Arab ~conomic Development Fund (FKI)EA); and the assumption, by the government in
Luanda, of the cost difference, or $5.97 million.
The main stages of the project are as follows: the purchase of ten 14-meter fish-
ing boats and the repair of 44 existing vessels; the purchase oF a training vessel
in order to teach fishermen, a freighter to suppl.y fuel to boats on the high seas
and other equipment and materials; the construction of ten piers to improve and
expand poss~bilities~ of accommodating and unloading boats; and the purchase of
transport vehicles, mechanical drying equipment, cold storage chambers and freezing
units.
The project will have a positive effect on employment, professional training,
processing industries and the commercial bal~ance. It wi~l be spread out over 4
years, beginning early in 1982, and will be supervised by the Ministry of Fishing.
COPYRICHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
= 11,464
C~O: 4719/339
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ANGOLA
BRIEFS
MPLA ECONOMIC DECISIONS--The Central Committee of the MPLA-Labor Party met in regu-
lar session from 17 to 20 November, presided over'~by Jose Eduardo dos Santos,
' chief of state and chairman of the party. Subjects taken up at the meeting included
Angola's economic problems. The Central Committee resolved: "to follow the prin-
ciple of paying wages in keeping with work done and to use material and moral in-
centives for workers at enterprises turning a profit and for technicians and cadres
completing additional work"; and "to protect products of national industry by
setting higher pri~es for similar imported products in~order to make up for the
deficit of certain nationalized enterprises." [Text] [Far.is MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1882, 4 Dec 81 p 3259] [COPYRIGHT: Zene Moreux et
Cie Paris 198~] 11,464
SPANISH MISSIOIJARY KIDNAP~D--Cistercian Father Benjamin Fernandez Manzanal, a
Spanish ~rissionary, was kidnaped on 15,November .in Amacupa, Angola, by a group of �
guerrillas, sY~ortly after he had celebrated mass. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No~1882, 4 Dec 81 p 3259] .[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et
Cie Paris 1981] 11,464
- [dFP AID--Persons displaced because of the South African intervention in southern
_ Angola will receive emergency food aid from the World Food Program (WFP) amounting
to r.early $4 million, according to an FAO bulletin. The WFP will send 10,140 tons
oE corn an1 edible oils to aid the 13].,000 persons mos.t affected for 6 months.
In July, the WFP sent food aid worth $2,368,500 to the people of southern Angola
hit by the drought. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
No 1882, 4 Dec 81 p 3259] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Mo:.ee:x et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464
~
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_
CHAD
REPORT ON COMPOSITION OF OAU PEACEKEEPING FORCE
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1089, 18 Nov 81 pp 35, 36
[Article by Sennen Andriamirado "The Triangle of Peace"]
[Text] The Inter-African Force will be equipped by Paris,
financed by Riyadh and commanded by Lagos....
Two battalions of Nigerians, one of Senegalese and one of Zairians, or more than ~
- 2,000 soldiers of the "Inter-African Peacekeeping Force" are set to move into Chad
within the next 2 weeks. Three thousand men in all will arrive between now and the
end of the year.
Edem Kodjo, the secretary general of the OAU [Organization of African Unity], has
been preparing to go over the final details on 11 November, in Lagos, with Nigerian
President Shehu Shagari. Nigeria's top diplomat, Ishaya Audu, and Gebre Egziaber
Dawit, an Ethiopian who is the OAU's special representative in Chad, flew in
specially from Nairobi, on the eve of the talks, to participate. And let us not
forget the Kenyan minister of foreign affairs, Robert ^Kou, representing his head
of state, Mr Daniel Arap Moi, acting president of thE organization.
So the first elements oC the Inter-American Force wiil thus arrive less than a
month after the departure of the first group of Libyan troops.
Other states, in a~?dition to Nigeria, Senegal ~nd Zaire, agreed to participate in
the force as a result af strenuous negotiations held on the sidelines of the Franco-
African conference in Paris. Gabonese President Omar Bongo, for example, let himself
~ be convinced by his more senior counterparts Felix Houphouet-Boigny (Ivory Coast) and
Mobutu Sese Seku (7.~~irc) to contribute to the force, though previously he had been
}~ostile to the idea, preferring a UN force. His contribution was not troops, how-
' evet, but putting C=130 transport planes at the disposal of the OAU.
Lgypt, according to minister Butrus Ghali, will make a symbolic contribution of
military medics: regular troops wouZd be perceived as a provocation to the Libyan
adversary.~ Benin and Togo have also decided to contribute since the time the Paris
summit was held. Also, Algeria has reportedly at last agreed to provide some of
the logist~cal support..
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Wl~at Ls it tliat has suddenly put an end to the equivocation which has paralyzed
the African states since 1979? For one thing, the decision made by the OAU summit
in Nairobi in June 1981, to be sure: fr~r the first time, a direct appeal was made
to all member states. Doubtless, also, the campaign Edem Kodjo has undertaken since
then to get the support of various heads of state. Above all, it cannot be denied,
reluctance was overcome by the agreement of non-African countries to furnish mater-
ial support (equipment, transport and even armament) and financial backing.
Thus, by an ironic twist of fate, former French president Valery Giscard d'Estaing's
cherished idea of a"trialogue," which t~e OAU had always rejected, is now being
realized in the most spectacular way--but in the domain of military ma.teriel. For
in the case at hand the Africans are supplying the natural resources (human beings,
since we are speaking of soldiers), an industrialized country (France) will provide
the technology, and--at least according to some repor~s--Saudi Arabia ~aill finance
- the expedition, particularly the maintenance costs of the force.
Paris's contribution was directly negotiated between France on the one side and
_ Senegal and Zaire on the other--Nigeria needed no assistance, and the OAU says it
has not asked anyone for technical assistance. The OAU, however, will issume sole
responsibility for coordinating financial contributions. For the OAU will be in
charge of al.l operations. The accord signed 4 November by the president of Chad,
Goukouni Oueddei, and Edem Kodjo when the two were passi::g through Paris (in reality
both men had agreed beforehand to meet there), laid outthe principles which would
guide the force, principles modeled on those which govern United Nations forces.
_ The first principle is that the inter-African Force will be under the authority,
not of the GUNT (Transitional National Union Government), but of the secretary
general of the OAU. He has already designated his special representative in Chad,
~ Ethiopian Gebre Egziaber Dawit, who is to be assisted by a committee formed from
representatives of Benin, Congo, Guinea, Togo and Kenya. Under the political-
administrative control of the OAU, the force will be under the military command of
a high-ranking officer--presumably a Nigerian--backed up by a"committee of officers"
from all of the various national contingents who will make up the general staff.
The second principle is that the Inter-Afi�ican Force will not be coercive, in
ocher words it will use its weapons only in slef-defense and not take its fighting
orders from the GUNT. There is, however, one subtle variation from the UN rules:
tlie Inter-African Force in Chad will do more than just defend itself, since it may
be led to defencl the GUNT's authority.
'1'he same nuance should also have the effect of amending tY~t~ third princi.ple, which
under UN rules i_s that an internationsl force must be purely for preservation, in
~ther words absolutcly neutral between the possible antagonists. In Chad, such a
restricti~n would not be in conformi~y with the spirit of the OAU decision. Of
- cour~;c� the prir~cipal mission of the Inter-African troops will be to prevent con-
front.~tions between the rival Chadian factions, and it is in this sense that the
term "peacekeeping Eorce" was used.
c)ne UN principle was not maintained: the nonparticipation of certain states in
creating the force. Since the Korean War, the UN has made it a rule not to allow
ttie tw~ most influential members of the Security Council (the United States and
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� ~ u~r~
thc S~viet UniQn) to participate in an international expeditionary force. No such
us~~;c exists (yet) In the OAU, but the Lagos accords (August 1979) excluded the
participation of neighboring states (Cameroon, Central Africa, Egypt, Libya, Niger,
Nigeria and Sudan). As it turns out, Nigeria is supplying the bulk of rhe troogs.:
According to the special representative of the OAU secretary general in Chad, Gebre
Egziaber Dawit, "the Nairobi resolution, adopted unanimously by the member countries
of the OAU, a resolution more recent than the Lagos accords, does not contain tN.at
restriction. As far as the OAU is concerned, this makes the Lagos accords inopera-
tive."
Thus there is nothing to prevent Libya �rom participating in the Inter-African Force.~
- But it seems unlikely that it wi11. For one thing, because Qadhdhafi has been ~o~
deeply involved to have credibility as an arbiter. For another, and more impor-
tantly, the prospect of hosting the next OAU summit in 1982 is forcing Tripoli to
take a more diplomatic tack. Nigeria--which is determined to asser.~ itself as
"Africa's great power"--understands this quite well.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981.
9516 �
CSO: 4719/314
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CHAD
CHAD SAID TO HAVE BEEN GOOD TRAINING SCHOOL FOR LIBYAN ARMY
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1089, 18 Nov 81 p 36
[Article by M.S. "Farewell to Arms"]
[Text] Col QadhdhaCi has certainly made up his mind to get out of the Chadian
_ imbro};lio. One week a('ter giving the order for his army to withdraw (Tuesday, 3
November), more than 5,000 soldiers--out of a total of 8,500--huve already returned
to their barracks at Sebha and Tripoli. Over the same period fully half the military
equipment has been sent b~ck, including the armored equipment and armored cars.
Day and night the big Ilyushin-76 and Hercules C-130 trancrort planes and a Boeing
707 belonging to Air Rwanda have been filled with m4n and machines to be flown
back to Libya.
All these operations are being carried out in a~ ~rderly and disciplined way.
ivdjamena was emptied of Libyan so~diers in scarcely 3 days. TL.e only one left is
Col Radwan Salah Radwan, commander in crief of the Libyan expeditionary force, who
must coordinate the countrywide evacuation from the Chadian capital.
Guereda, Adre and Iriba, three towns along the Sudanese border, have also been
evacuated. The ceasefire proclaimed by Hissein Habre several hours after the an-
- nouncement of the Libyan withdrawal made this possible. On Monday, 9 November it
was announced that the bases at Douguia, Mao and Ati, midway between Ndjamena and
~beche, had been evacuated. Then it was Abeche's turn. By leaving, the Libyans
showed their determination to abandon Chad completely. At least almost completely,
for Qadhdhafi has no intention of quitting the Aouzou Strip. Goukouni Oueddei
would in any case not be in a good position to claim a region which was reportedly
the subject of a deal made between Qadhdhafi and himself. In exchange for Aouzou
'l'ripoli is supposed to have a~reed to help Goukouni stay in power as president of
Chad.
'I'f~c I,ibyans would thus appear to have fulfilled thei~r side of the contract. In
:iddition to their support for the Chadian head of state, they created a sort of
stability in the country, even if their prolonged presence was scarcely to the lik-
in~; of a number of Chadians, particularly in the southern part of the country.
I'eople in the north, by contr