JPRS ID: 10252 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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JPRS L/ 1025?.
13 January 1982
West E u ro e Re ort .
~ p
CFOUO 2/82)
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,
JPRS L/10252
13 January 1982
- WEST EUROPE REPORT
~ (~ouo 2/s2)
CONTENTS ~
POLITIC~!Z
AUSTRIA
Kreisky on Middle East Problems
(Bruno Kreisky Interview; STERN, 23 Dec 81) 1
FRANCE
- Ambassador Martinet on NATO, Foreign Policy, Pacifism
- (Giles Martinet Interview; MONDOPERAIO, Nov 81) 7
- MILITARY
ITALY
Commentary on European Security, NATO, TNF, EEC
(Stefano Silvestri; MONDOPERAIO, Sep-Oct 81) 12
SPAIN
i Secret Coupist Org~.nization Within Military Described
(CAMBIO 16, 7 Dec 81) 29
~ - a- [ TII - WE - I.50 FOUO]
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POLITICAI. AUSTRIA
KREISKY OI3 MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS
DW230957 Hamburg STERN in German 23 Dec 81 pp 48-52
[Interview with Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky by editors Bernd Doerler, Georg
Karb and Henri Nanner in Vienna, date of interview not given]
[Text] S'TI:RN: Mr Chancellor, you have just returned from a tour of the Persian
- Gulf states. Austria is not a world power, but the l~~ad of the Austrian Government
obviously deems himself a world politician. How does that ~ibe?
Kreisky: The Austrian head of government does not operate as a world politiciar.
but is an old man who, of the 70 years of his life, spent at least 55 awarely
as a politically thinking person. And during these 55 years he did see quite a
lot of people, political configurat?ons, crisis and wars. And this Austrian
chancellor does advocate the presumptious view that whenever he sees a solution
in a difficult world configuration of which he believes that it is practicable,
he should say so, too. After all, it has turne3 out that people occasionally
wish to know this.
STERN: People have often said that your stand for the Arabs and against the state
of Israel is quite remarkab.le, for a Jew. Do you propose to overcompensaCe
- something there?
Kreisky: Well, you know, this is old hat as far as I am concerned; I aui familiar
with it, and you can forget it. As far as I am concerned th~ Middle East has been
the politically most important part of the world since World War II. And I w311
tell you why. A new state has emerged here due to the Euro~eans' fault. Withnut
Hitler Israel never would have gained this virulence. But it was not Hitler alone.
Other European politicians did not behave particularly magnanimously in the face
of the Jewish persecution in Germany. Thet~ they created this state by UN decision
and stuck to the principle: "Right or wrong--we are ~reatly culpable, we are
unable to prevent the mis�ortune which swooped down on the European Jews, and
therefore we must protect them na matter what the cost might be." But you cannot
muKe amends for one injustice '~y means of another. So, this new state existed in
- hostility with its neighbors, the expelled Palestinians, and it has always been
_ clear to me thaC a catastrophe will occur unless a melting process takes place.
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~ox o~'~~jc�.ai. ~.,s~: t~.~~.~,
STE1t~I: Did the UN declaration of March 1948 not envisage two states in Palestine,
an Arab state and a Jewish state'?
Kreisky: Yes, of course, all this is exactly ~aritten down on paper, but history
has ignored it. Just the same, I am convinced that Israel in the long run will
be able to live only if it comes to tern~s with its neighbors. It is possible to
negotiate on anythin.g, and one must try to 3o that, anyway. I realized c~uite
early that the Palestinian problem is the crucial problem of the Israeli-Arab
conflict. Hence, Israel must negotiate *aith thE Palestinians. You just cannot
piclc the one whom the other side selects as its representative. Henee, if it is
_ 'Arafat, then th~y must negotiate with 'Axafat.
~ S'rERN: Prime Minister Begin says, as did I~oreign Mi~nister Yitzhak Shamir in
STERN just r~._ently, that they ~~aould r�~t sit down at the same table wi.th a terrorist
who has made Israel`s destruc~ion his maxim.
Kr~isky: Israeli roreign Minis~:.er Shamir, after a]_1, was one of those who at the
_ time partici.pated in the assassination ~f Graf Folke Bernadotte. And probably
there was nobody who was as meritorious for the Jews as ~+*as this Swedish count.
Near the end of the war Graf Falke Bernadotte achieved through negotiations the
option o� liberating the Scanc~inavsans h~t also tens of thousands of Jews. Because
of. these extraordinary merits he wds se:Lt to Israel as UN commissioner to iMplenent
there the UN resolution on the two st?ce~.
STERN: But Israel's Prime Minister Begizi also refused to negatiate with 'Arafat
whose people committed bomb attempts on schocl buses.
Kreisk~: You know, terrorism is a strange matter. There is a terrorism as a
means to its own end--that involves the crazy people who really do not have any
' particular cbjective, such as the Red Army faction in Germzny and the Red Brigades
in Italy. They simply want to destroy the democratic order. Then there is the
other terrorism which I will neither condone nor approve, yet this t~arrorism
often marks the bebinning of revolutions and political movements. lle Valera, the
Irish presisent of long years, first was a terrorist--and later a recognized,
respected statesman. And there was hardly any more terrible and brutal terror
movement in Africa than the Mau-Mau revolt led by Yomo ICenyatta. But later
Kenyatta became a statesman and a hope for stability in Africa.
And let us rsot forget that Begin at the time blew up the "King David Hotel" in
Jerusalem caith his people. The victims at ithe time were British soldiers--but I
do not differenr.iate. To mP women and children as victims are just as pitable
= a~ is the humble English soldier or Graf Bernadotte. I do not accept this double
� morale. I do not approve of the terrorism of the Palestinians, but neither do I
- share the hypocritical outrage displayed if and when this happens to oneself.
, 'Chere lias always been that kind of terrorism whi~h ceases immediately once the
~oals can be attained with different means.
STERN: Can t~e Israelis sit down with the Arabs at one table as long as the Arab
states do not accept the existence of Israel?
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Kreisky: Why should the reco~;nitiqn stand at the beginnino? One starts negotia-
_ rions always with maximum demands. They should try it first. If nothing came of
it, one would at least have done everything. But as things are today, the Israelis
do not G~ant to negotiate at all. They want to dominate the region, and whether
they want to do it out of a need for security or because they conside~ themselves
the masters of the Middle East does not matter in the end. You see, when I made
my first trips to the Arab countries, I was not received in 3 f.riendly way at all.
They~ have naturally told the socialist Kreisky: You come as a r~presentative oi
the socialist international, the political grouping which failed in the case of
France in Algeria, which marched to the Suez Canal with the socialist Premier Guy
Mollet, the British and the Israelis. Well, I was suspiciou~ to them as a
socialist. Not only as a Jew; that did not interest the people. You forget that
the Arabs are not anti-Semites.
- It was not much d_~f~erent with regard to the West. When I first met al-Nasir in
1965 and 'Arafat in 1974, the European politiciar_s asked what Kreislcy want to
_ achieve there, adding that he should not bore us ~ver and ov~r again with these
things. They considered the Palestinian problem only as a refugee problem, and
~ they believed Golda rleir who had said: "There is no Palestinian people, al_l that
is nonsense." When the oil crisis came, one has suddenly thought di.fferently,
saying that Kreisky obviously has the best relations with the L'~rabs and that
Kreisky should handle the matter.
STERN: The idealist Kreisky suddenly became a useful man for the pragmaticists?
Kre;sky: You see, I have not spoken of idealism. I said that I may have realized
somewhat earlier than others that the Middle East will become a hotbed of crisis
J if the Pal_estinian proL��lem will not be solved, and that a new war is more likely
to come from there than from the big powers who kno~a,what will happen to them if
they start a war. But the bfg powers can become involved in it.
And as regards oil, I have my own experience, too. I have been dealing with energy
problems much earlier than others. Austria would still be a Ruasi_an oil colony
if we had not excluded this in long negotiations with the Russians from the 1955
stute treaty. Austria has a. few oil fields, and according to the state treaty
pact of the victorious powers, the Russians ~vere to have the right of sitting up
to 30 years on the oil fields opened up by them. So they would sti11 be sitting
there today. After �ierce disputes we nave eliminated this from the state treaty
through negotzations:
_ I r~alizec~ it pretty soon that the energ~� basis of Western Europe does not lie in
Europe and that it caill ;ie for a long time far away, namely in the Middle ~ast.
'1'he American5 have their own energy resources, the Russians have theirs, the Pole.s
have tt;~~ir coal, only Western Europe was living at that time from the oil of the
- Arabs. Naturally we have found some oil ir. the meantime, but of the 600 million
- tons of oil consumed annually by West~rn Europe, some 400 million come from the
- Arab states. In such a situation Europe cannot afford no* to cooperate with Arab
countries, even more so since it tu.r.ned out ~hat alternative energies are not
av~ilable--for political reasons. The only ones who managed to use nuclear energy
on a large scale are the French. OtherwisP nuclear energy supply of Europe has
practically failed. So Arab oil remains for us the most important energy basis.
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'1'he ~Jestern statesmen suddenly realized that the socialist dreamer is a quite
~ pragmatic man, ar_d from there on one had much understanding for my policy. It
is obvious now for the European community that we must do ever}�thing to live under
~ acc~ptable conditions with the Arabs.
S'PERN: But t~-~e Arabs said they would drive the Israe~is into the sea. Are nego-
tia~ions between Israe.lis ann Arabs at all possible under these circumstances?
Kreisky: That is an old hat. I think it is extraordinary that the Arabs, respon-
sible Arabs, say today: "We realize that the state of Tsrael exists, that is a
reality. Help us now to found a Palestinian state so that these two states can
exist side by side as envisaged by the UN resolution." And in this situation
Israel says "na."
STERN: Jordan is a staLe mostly populated by Palestinians.
Kreisky: At the time being some 1.2 million Palestinians still live on the West
Bank and on the Gaza Strip. And that is occupied country like Czechoslovakia
when it was occupied by Hitler and treated as a protectorate. We cannot ignore
that. No morai right exists to withhoid a state from the Palestinians. Moreover,
Israel would never be able to handle such a large Arab populace. That would be
a built-in explosive with which an Israeli state could not exist in the long run.
The plan presented by Saudi Crown Price Fahd is clearly based on the existence
of the Israeli state. Point 7 says: "Conformation of the s~tates ~f the region to
exist in peace." Israel belongs to this. And what do they do? They annex the
Golan Heights, and Israeli Prime Minister Begin has the cynicism to state in the
Israeli Parliar:~nt that the timing was caused by the Polish crisis. The attention
of the wurld is focused on Warsaw so *_hat I~rael does not make the headlines.
The annexation of the Golan Heights is an obvious violation of international law.
I can ~~nly support the statement of the German-Israeli working circle for peace
in the Ni:!~dle East, when this really not anti-Israeli circle stated through its
chairman, evangeli~al Professor of theology Rendtorff: "Israel's radical terri-
torialism plays opn~ly into the hands of radical Arab forces. No wonder that
there are people among the Arabs who consider even 'Arafat a traitor if he is
prepared to negotia.te with Israel.
STERN: The conference of rez has shown that the Arabs do hold different views
about the Fahd plan. And perhaps Israel thinks this Fahd plan is just some bluff.
Kreisky: This can be f.ound out only if a test is made. What I told Israeli
Interior Minister Burg just recently was this: "Why don't you sit down and find
~ out whether it is bluf.fing." It is, after all, a big chance if as important a
country as Saudi Arabia has the courage to advance such a proposal. After all,
such a proposal does not mean "root, hog, or die." Nobody says that Israel must
adopt the plan as it is. Yet, it is necessary to sit down and negotiate--provided
- one really wants peace.
STERN: Do you believe that the PLQ would be satisfied with the West Banlc and the
Gaza Strips? Is Israel's apprehension so wholly unjustified in that continuously
new attacics might be launched against Israel from this Palestinian state?
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Kreisky: Tsrac~l would not be any weaker if a Paleatinian atate would exist on
this tcrritory whose form and armam~nt might be sub~ect to negotiations. After
all, no~ody asks the Israelis to disarm. It is quite definite that they will
continue to bP the strongest military power of the region. The present situation
is what constitutes for Israel the r~al source ~f ~11 tensions and security problems.
Just 3s the Balkan dodged our control at the time the Middle East, too, will be
beyond any control unless pacification is achieved there.
' ~TERN: How can the ;~Liddle East calm down if the Un:Cted States concludes a military
pact with Israel and the Soviet Union an assistance treaty with the Syrians?
Kreisky: The Americans do not even understand the whole problem. In the United
States the presidents obviously be~in to think about *_he Palestinian ~roblem only
when their term i~ over. Besides, the two superpowe;~s in reality are trembling
with fear of being dragged into war by the Syrians oi- by the Israelis. And the
vast majori.ty of the Arabs, too, does not want the Russians. They want to be left
alone by both great powers as much as possible. Afte.r all, it is the fault of
= the policy of the I~;raelis ~hat the Soviet Union is n.ow sitting in this region.
STERN: Do you consi.,~er it possible that you would fly to Israel to point out
~ your standpoint to Bc~gin?
~ Kreis'~cy: That is senseless. The aversions between ~is are too great. F. mediator
- can be only somebody who is trusted by both sides. T have done what I coul~ to
outline the problem.
STERN: And you believe that the Israelis have no re:ason to mistrust you?
Kreisky: No, they have no reason, by God. If they need something fram me, they
come to me. For instance when it comes to letting 250,000 Russian Jews emigrate
through tlistria to Israel. No other country in thr~ world wanted to handle this
task. We are doing it for 15 years.
STERN: But if reconciliation between Jews and Ar;3bs is the work of your life,
so to speak, should not you overcome yourself to make a step toward Begin?
Kreisky: 't'o make that clear: The ~aork of my life lies in Austria. This is where
I have to fulfill my political mission. My rel~:itions with the Middle East were
a task I have set myself next to other things, but iti gained more and more signi-
ficance. Tod~;� all West European governments T:ealize, be it in Bonn, London,
Brussels or Oslo, that the solution of the Palestinian problem is the key to
solving the Middle East problem. A simple pex.�son cannot achieve more.
S'rLI2N: But the problem will still occupy you.
Kreisky: t will tell you an anecc~ote: Around 1912 or 1913 the whole glorious
~ Austrian Army was parading on Vienna`s Ringstrasse. The lancers in their neat
uniforms and the dragoons in their attire. A spectator says to another: "Say,
~ are they not too nice for waging war?" I think of thaC anecdote which is not
- pathetic when I see the young Israelis working somewhere in a kubbuz, or when I
see the young Arabs. Then I say to myself that they are rea].ly too good for
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waging war. But it seems that the Israeli politicians are far from this insight.
Read the bible. There are ~nbelievably many examples showing that Israel has
always fought at the wrong time, at the wrong place aeainst the wrong people and
~ that it has always lost. Heroism alone does not help any, politics is a matter
of reason. But I f.ear that Mr Begin and Mr Shamir are about to prepare a new
biblical f ate for the Israeli peog~a.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co.
CSO: 3103/168
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POLITICAL FRANCE
AMBASSADOR MARTINET ON NATO, F"OREIGN POLICY, PACIFISM
Rane MONDOPERP,IO in Italian Nov R1 pp 18-20
~Interview with Giles Martinet, French Ambassador to Italy, by Mario Baccianini, cor-
respondent for MONDOPERAZO; date and place not specifiedJ.
[Text] [Que stion] Last July 50,000 peace marchers descended on Paris from northern
Europe. They were received with indifference. A march organized by the PCF at the
end of October was equally disappointing. The non-Cammunist French Left seems willing
to exert itself mainly for causes like Afghanistan and Poland, but it is luke-warm
about incipient neutral~sm in West Germa.iy, Holland (wher~ this peace mavement
originated) and England. Is this just because the Reagan administration's military
choices are of no concern to France naw that France is out of NATO? Or are there
more complex reasons?
(Answer] There are more ccmplex reasons. We want Europe to be independent both poli-
tically--especially where the Third World is concerned--and economicall~, especially
as regards American and Japanese c anpetition. We would like Europe to be independent
militarily as well, but we know that that isn't possible. Europe as a whole has not
been wil_ing to make the effort that would have enabled it to have military power
- camparable to those of the USSR and the USA. Our population is larger than that of
th ~ Soviet Union ar~d our industry is stronger, but we allocate only about 3.5 percent
of our national revenue to military expenditures c anpared to the 12-14 percent spent
by the USSR. From the moment when, for very praiseworthy reasons--you can call them
develapment or social progress--we bet on peaceful coexistence, we have relied on our
. alliance with the United States for our defense. You can't get away from trat. We
don't have the right to say we want to be defended fran a potential Saviet threat and
at the same time reject the consequences of our alliance with the United States.
[Question) But that alliance can also have undesirable political costs.
[~Answer) Our pc:sition on this gaint is common knowledge, as reflected in the press ali
over the world after the Mitterrand-Reagan meeting. We don't want our military alliance
to affect our foreign policy or our econanic policies. But in the realm of the
military, since we don't intend to make the effort to maintain the balance of power
in the world by ourselves our dependence on the United States is inevitable. We don't
understand why sane people who accept the Atlantic Alliance--as the French and
Italian Ccmmunists do--want to deprive the United States of the means to ensure this
defense.
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F~ok o~y~ic�e,~t. ~~~a.~~~
- [Question] Isn't it slightly paradoxical that the Italian and even the French Can-
munists--albeit with mental reservations--recognize the need for the Atlantic
Alliance, whereas tr~ditionally prcrNATO groups ~ike the British Lalaor Party, certain
sectors of the SPD (German Socialist Party) , and even scene members of the British
and German liberal parties are questior.ing this need?
(Answer] I should say that French public ~pinion, including the Socialists, is very
independent. But independent thinking takes two f orms in Europe, one pacifist and
the othQr "military." In France we don't have the problem of the installation of
American missiles on our territory, it's true, since De Gaulle rid our soil of the
American presence completely. Instead we have our nuclear force d~ frappe [strike
force], and it is this force on which some of France's independents base their position.
A lot of people say: If there were to be a war in Europe--and w~ d~on't think there
will be, despite everything--then it will be a war of coalitions, anu that is what
we are used to. But if the Americans or the Soviets were to start such a tiar under
circumstances which we found unacceptable, we have the means to protect our neutrality:
the force de frappe. You can disagree with this reasoning. But you have to bear in
_ mind the fact that because it has nuclear weapons France is not in the same position
as the ott:er European countries.
[Question] You mean it has a sort of potential armed "neutrality?"
[Answer] Yes, but with this difference: if we were faced with a war unleashed by
Soviet aggression we would undoubtedly go to war. If, however, events were to take
p1acP somewhere in the world that induced the Ameri~ans to intervene and farce their
~ European allies to join them in their venture, we would be able to make a:r own
choice.
(Question) On Saturday 17 October LE MONDE reportec3 Mitterrand's trip to America:
"Washingtor~ considers the French president able but hard to understand." What is it
about Mitterrand that the American administration ~inds eni~matic?
[Answer] The Americans were surprised by our firmness about East-West relations.
They expected strong disagreement witl-~ t'~eir policies, partly because we have C an-
munist ministers in our government. The fact that of all the countries of Et~rope we
were thefirmest vis-a-vis the USSR was a big surprise to them. But then we criticized
the Americans for their attitude toward Latin America, especially Central America.
We made a joint statement with the Mexican government about civil rights in E1
Salvador. The Third World's problem is to free itself frcm poverty. The Americans
find this reasoning hard to understand. For them everything is black or white.
There is the problem ~f relations with the USSR, they say. Our aititude iG firm on
the proalems of Afghanistan, Cambodia and Poland? Then we must also support everyone
who is fighting Communism in th_~ world, including Latin American dictators. We
don't accept this concept, ancl the Americans, just as they consider us realists where
East-West relations are concerned, consider us starry-eyed idealists whpre North-
S outh relatinns are concerned.
[QuestionJ Hernu does not exclude the possibility of producing the N bomb. It seems
to me that the F'rench position resembles Carter's: continue research, perhaps be
- able to produce it, but then make a political decision as to whether to actually
produce it. These statements don't bottier the French. Is that because there i~ a
wi.despread conviction in France that the Russians took advantage of the detente years
to alter the balance of military power--conventiional or nuclear--in their favor?
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[Answer) There are various opinions in the French socialist ma:~ement. One yYOUp is
hostile to the neutron bomb and even had trouble accepting the idea of our maintaining
a strike force. Another group is basically pacifist, but is in the min~rit;~.
[Question] In public opinion as a whole, too?
[Answer) Yes. But surveys have shown that the majority of the population accepts the
strike force. There are two schools of thought among those wh~ accept the strike
~ force, however. The first adheres to the doctrine of deterrence. It is really a
sort of neu~ralism: we say that deterrence can only be a national issue, not Eur opean.
- In the present circumstances this means simply lettinq it be known that the French
sanctuary is invioldble. This theory has been expounded by various ci.rc:les, including
some generals. It was General De Gaulle's official theory.
- [Question) But it's hard to reconcile it with membership in the Atlantic Alliance and
with policies based on a European Co;nmunity...
[Answer] That's true, because it is based on the �ollowing reasoning: if someone
- attacks French territory we will use our atomic bombs. This is the principle of
deterrence. But if we look at the map we see that we don't have any borders in con~nan
with the USSR and if 4re were ever in a position where we were not threatened by a war
that started in West Germ~:,y, for example, either we would go to war because we
thought there had been aggression, and then we would h~ve to join our aliies, or we
would withdraw from the alliance and take refuge in our sanctuary. Those who hold
this latter opinion are against the neutron bomb, n~t because it is more terrible than
other bombs--it is less terrible than the atomic bomb we have--but because i.f we
produce the neutron bomb we are accepting the idea of fighting in Germany and
rejecting the idea of a Frencn sanctuary. But if we are already involved in a war
in Germany fought with tactical weap~ns it will be hard for us t~ brandish this
_ threat. The th?ory of dererrence is one of all or nothing: either the Apocalypse or
leave us alone.
[Question) But this makes sense only in a context of political neutrality.
(Answer] In fact, so~ne people think tnat we should retain the possibility of F�rance's
deciding to avoid the conf?ict, and that we should therefore keep this apocalyptic
threat. Others think that if there is a c,rar in Europe it will be a war between
coalitions and we will be drawn into it because we can't accept a Soviet presence on
the Rhine, for example. So then we ask ourselves why we shouldn't have the same
- weapons our allies have in a waL between coalitions.
[Question] So we have three trends in France: one pacifist, one neutralist (the
"French sanctuary"), and one based on a solid alliance among Western countries,
especially European ones.
(Answer) This third tLend is represented now by the present government and by the
President of the Republic, feeling that France's policy should not be purely selfish
and that the force de frappe is an important political factor for Europe. Our having
- it changes the given part of the problem of relations with the United States.
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: '1'ake for example Reagan's last speech, alluding to th~ passibility of a nuclear war
� limited to ~urope. The reaction to this was i.ndignant.. Tn �act, the Americans have
- always contemplated this possibility. The concept of flexible defense implies
- escalation up to the Apocalypse or a limited nuclear war. This last hypothesis
implies the use of American tactical atcYnic weapons against East Germany, Czecoslovakia,
- and Poland, but they would not rear.h ~oviet territory bec.~use if they did American
territory would b~ bombed in retaliation. But if there is someone in Europe who can
say: "Tf our territory is bombed we can bomb the OSSR," than the Americans are obliged
to discuss matters with us.
[Question] But there is obviously a psychological and moral crisis in northern Europe
because of the end of detente,. and not surprisingly it is above all West Germany
which reacts the most sensitively to pacifist movements. Don't you think the Reagan
_ administration has committed soQne errors in proposing its present policy, at least for
the initial phase? Above and beyond the merits of the issue, est mod us in rebus.
[Answer] Here we must distinguish between Germany and other countries. Pacifist
feelings have always run strong in couni:ries like Denmark and Holland. In my opinion
the change in Germany is due to two fundamental reasons. Thanks to the Pershing
afFair the people discovered that they were living not on a keg of gun powder but on a
formidible array of atomic missiles. The quantity of these weapons samehow transformed
their quality. The feeling of fear came when it was pr oposed that scQnething be added
to what already existed and had been accepted and which people didn't want to think
about. The Pershings had a shattering psychological effect. We alre ady have thousands
of warheads on our territory--the Germans said to themselves--and now they tell us the
- battle will start in our country. The German people suddenly woke up to their problem.
They have rediscovered it not because of any change in the nature of the American
- presence but because this quantitative change suddenly revealed a reality they wanted
- to ignore.
The second reason is the economic cris~s, which plays an extremely important part in
this issue. Germany does need to maintain and develop its economic relations with
the East, above a~l with East Germany. We kn ow perfectly well that a lot of products
exported by West Germany are partly made in East Germany,which fulfills the same
function for West Germany as Taiwan or Korea ior Japan. Then we have the problem of
gas and the problem of German exports to the East. Al1 this gives rise to resentment
toward the Americans when the United States--which is supplying the S oviet Union with
grain--says: You mustn't supply the East with sophisticated technology, or buy gas,
etc.... A reaction is understandable.
[Question; The big peace demons'~rations--I'm thinking of the German far Left--seem
to be a rep~tition of the big youth demonstrations of the 60s against Vietnam. Ter-
rorism has even re-emerged as anti-American.. There is none of this in France. Al1
the former protestors, from Pierre Vict.or to the new philosophers to newspapers like
LIDERATION and ACTUEL", have been deeply critical of socialist realism, and also of
- terrorism. France has been almost untouched by terrorism of the Lef L. Why?
[Answer] There has been a very interesting phenomenon in France. May 1968 could have
given birth to terrorist movements, with the enormous disillusionment there was among
- young people. But this didn't happen, for various reasons. The main one is that most
_ of the intelligentsia that belonged to the far Left or supported it was struck above
ail by totalitarianism. The discovery of the Gulag mac3e the intellige ntsia--exaggerating
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at times--set their sights on totalitarianism (in eastern Europe, Latin America and
Africa). There was a sert of fascination, even an obsession, with totalitarianism,
that is in contrast with what the Red Brigades or the Ge~man terrorists were saying.
What they said didn't get through to France.. Young people can be against our present
societ1, they may criticize reformist socialism as they have experienced it, bu.t the
idea of resorting to violenCe and not respecting democracy is inadmissible for them.
So the reaction in France was a little different from in West Germany. But it is
also true that in France we have never had the kind of primitive anticommunism that
was bound to arise in Germany.
[Question] The basic difference, therefore, is still that the French far Left is
_ unwilling to give the USSR and socialist realism any credit, whereas the German and
Italian far Left is. For example in the case of the peace movements this willingness
to see good in the USSR takes the form of a certain reluctance to recognize the
reality of Soviet expansionism and of the aggressive intentions of the USSR.
In France we have a problem with the attitude of the Communist Party. The PCF
denounces the Pershings without contemplating the problem posed by the SS-20 at the
same time. We are not in favor of the installation of the Pershings. We would like
an agreement to be reached with the Soviets for the withdrawal of the SS-20. But the
PCF is waging a unilateral campaign against the Pershings. This is a pro-Soviet
= position. But when they demonstratz they find themselves alene. In France pacifists
dislike being mistaken for pro-Soviets.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Mondoperaio Edizioni Avanti
9855
CSO: 3104/60
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- MILITARY ITALY
COMP'~ATTARY OP1 EUROPEAN SECURITY, NATO, TNF, EEC
Rome P~tONDOt'ERAIO in Italian Sep-Oct 81 pp 8-17
_ [Article by Stefano Silvestri: "Pblitical Ties"; pa.ssages enclosed in slantl3.nes
printed in boldface~
[Text~ If one would like--as is only proper--relations among the members of the
Atlantic Alliance to be on a more equal footing, the problem to be resolved ~s to
be found not so much in Ame~ica as in Europe. The American policy may or may not
be to one's liking, but it cannot be replaced or seriously aitered unless Etiirope
itself is in a position to resume effectively at least some of the roles that are
today played by the USA. Desiring to gain more autonomy at sma.ll cost would be too
risky a proposition for everyone concerned.
In the case of Italy we have, to be sure, an opportunity to leave the "sma.ll time"
and set sail in the mcre difficult waters of interna.tional policy; but this also
requires that our country assume a greater measure of responsibility in respect to
security. Moreover, i+, Lequir.es a, more active Italian presence in the EEC in
ord.er to develon a common policy for the Mediterranean~ Africa and the Middle Ea.st.
Let us begin by es~ablishing tre fact tha.t the world is changing, and rapidly.
- The old alliances no longer sa�eguard us at all. The new dangers are called energy,
_ inflation, tempo of development. The old dangers (war~ subversion, ungoverna.bility,
totalitarianism) have not disappeared; on the contrary, they have in some cases
intensif ied. The world as a whole--seen from Europe--is at one and i:he same time
very secure and very terrifying. No one really thinks that it would be a.dvantageous
to unleash a. war in Europe or in behalf of Europe. Euxope does not know, however,
how it can survive the change in equilibriums and the tlareats against its prosper-
ity, it~ stability, its security and its freedom. Things are not so ba,d at present,
but the outlook is gloomy.
_ It is therefore not easy to design a foreign policy for Italy (and for Italy aa part
o.f Europe): it is a question of r~ot losing the security enjoyed today, and of
improving the prospects for the future. The diff iculty is that many formulas for
improving the future have until now been limited to taking action that xould worsen
the present, and are therefore unacceptable. "Better ari egg today than the chicken
tomorrow"--especially if the chicken can be realizable only in the ve.ry dista.nt
future and serious doubts exist as to the freshness and fertility of the egg. This
will be our point of departure, howevers namely, changes in respect to security.
Not a very exci~ting topic, you say? Yes, wars are what is exciting--at first,
anyway.
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;~?ew Challenges
Michael Nacht recently summarized the "factors �or change" (~r~ DAEDALUS, January-
March 1991 Z'he -f irst factor is the relative reduction of U. S. power vis-a.-vis
the USSR . The latter has developed a�t least as many--if iiot more--intercontinenta�1.
nuclear weapons, a.n ocean-going fleet~ a capa.bility for global intervention, and
has intensified its conventional and nuclear threat to E~rope, China and. Ja.pan. It
has theref'ore become difficult to rep~lcate experiences such as the Korean ~'ar~ the
crisis of the Chinese islands, the Cuban crisis of the 1960's, the siege of Khe
Sanh during the Vietnam war, the blockade of Soviet intervention during the 1973
Arab-Israeli war, and so forth. In each of these cases (and in o-thers as well, as
for example the various Ber13.n crises) the USA threatened the USSR with its nuclear
,a.rsenal and the USSR avoided direct interv ention. Today such a thrEat is more
;~isky and less credi.ble~ in short, much more difficult.
Moreover, the American government today has less fzeedom of ac-cion than previously
vis-a-vis the Congress and public opinion. However much Reagan can count on his
great popularity and his ma,jority} it is c lear that everything ~ould change in the
event of defeat or humiliation. ?"rudence therefore reigns supreme .
Fven the American economy is less strong than it was. In the 195o's the USA pro-
duced more than SO percent of the world's manufactures; today it produces less than
25 nercent . In terms of per capita GNP it is today surpassed by Norway, Swedex~,
Switzerland and ICuwait and is more or less on a'par with Ca.nada, Federal Germany and
Denma.rk .
Besides the USSR, ~the other center of power that has devQloped enormously i.n �today's
world is OPECs that is to say, the petro leum exporting countries taken as a whole.
Although OPEC is not a unitary center of power, it is a source of economic threats
and threats with respect to energy, as we 11 as th~ motivatin~ factor i~r an immense
concentration of conventional military power (and of dangerous developments with
respect to nucle~.r proliferation) in parts of the world that are anything but peace-
ful.
. In addition to ~hese traditional conflicts, the end of colonialism has also
bequeathed to the world the so-called North-South r,onflict, that is to say the
diversity of interests, perceptions and strategies as between thz developed world
- and the developing world. These diversit ies axe in genera,l the underlying cause of
much strife and absorb a great part of the attention of our diploma.ts arid our
military.
Lastly, what we have is the reality of a world that is increasingly interconnected
(communications, culture and so forth) and increasingly interdependent--a world in
which negative phenomena are being manifested which axe both universal and trans-
national in character, such as terrorism; the growth of sepa.ratist, na.tiona.list and
reli~ious irrationalism; and, in general, the conflicts between traditiona,l values
- a.nd modernization. The nation-states have survived but are becoming more inter-
dependent (and therefore less independent ) and are undergoing a process of political
and military fragmentation that militates agatnst their survival.
These changes are threatenin~; the tra,ditional arrangement with respect to European
security and are c~anging the relationship between Europe and America.
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In essence, it is a question of coping with four principal problems to which all
- the oy,her problems are subordina,tes a) What kind of relations should be ma.intained
with the USSR? b~ What kind of relations should be maintained with OPEC?
c) How should the problem of economic development be dealt with? d~ How can a
cred.ible framework of European military security be ma.in~ained (or, in other Nord.s~
what kind of relations should be ma.inta.ined with the United 5tates)?
Europe and the United States
The ~optimal~ response to these four qusstions implies a qua.litative change in the
Eurogean political pi~tiire. Any change involves, in its own way, a reexamina,tion
of the re.lationship between Europe and the USA---a relationship ~which has until now
ensured tha-t there will be acceptable responses~ to all four of these questions.
In fact, these questions are raised precisely because an examina.tian of the current
trends in the developnient of the internationa,l system has raised doubts as to the
ability of. the USA to ensure that these same responses will continue in the future.
Natur.ally, however, any new response cannot exclude the United States. Even if the
United States is not (and can never af;ain be~ in the future~ the same super-super-
power it has been in the past, it nevertheless is still a superpower. Not only,
_ therefore, can the USA not be disreg~~.rded (just as the USSR cannot be disxegarded)
but it is ~entirely advantageous~ to Europe that the United States rema.in its ally,
because the American interests are assuredly closer to Europe's interests than axe
the Sovie-t interests, and because only the American superpower is in a position to
oppose the Soviet superpower.
If indeed this is the way things are, then the dilemma of the relationship between
- L~.irope and America can be stated simpl,y: Is it a more "equal" relationship that is
desired, or more rapid ancl efficacious decisions? TYie txo propositions are not at
- all compatible, at least for the short term. Rapid and efficacious decisions im~ly
a kind of division of labor that is centered on the partner who is more powerful
and flexible~ namely the USA. Better consultation can mitigate the inevitable
= discord, but it cannot change the substanee of an American "bossism" in the inter-
na,tiona,l context. Because we axe in the pluralistic and democratic West instead of
in the monolithic and autocratic East, this "bossism" (which some erroneously
- define as "imperialism" because they love cheap sensationalism) obviously leaves
some rc~m fo.r dissent. Mi~terard may continue to criticize the USA over E1 Salva-
dor or N-~.mibia; Schmidt may be angry with Reagan's economic policies; 3randt ma.y
praise detente, inventing--for the use and consumption of young German social
democrats--a "golden age" that never existea; and even Berlinguer may conjure up a
NATd that has z~othing to do with the military equilibrium vis-a-vis the USSR. At
the approp.riate moment., however, the Europeans must "go along with" the American
decisions and content themselves with a~ew corrective changes in respect to form.
A relationship based on greater equality, however~ entails greater European respon-
sibilities. The justification for demanding this greater equality is to be found
bo~h in the fact that European interests do not always coincide with'American
interests, a.nd in the fact that Europe is far richer and potentially mueh more
powerful today than it was 20 or 30 yeaxs ago. If these two premises are accepted
the Europeans can certainly be more autonomous, on condition--of course--that they
~.cquire the means to ~uarantee for themselves a greater measure of independ.ence
coupled with at least an equal measure of security, and if they assume the risks
~.nd responsibilities inherent in such a choice.
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To want to be more autonomous at small cos~t (a scenario wi~ich the Americans have
defined as "Finlandization" and others define as a paci�is-t--or acan~til.y arined--
neutralism) would not only be dangerous but would hat-e profound~y divisive effects
both as among the various E~ropean cou~tiries and inside those countrias. It is
indeed obvious that those couni;ries which feel thernselves most threatened--anr~
those political forces which place the leasi; confid~nce in the goodwill of the
USSR--would have no other choice than to appeal to the Americans and to their
_ "bossism," as the lesser of two evils. ln other words, it woul~: amount to a return
to the 19~9 split between pro-Russians and pro--Americans, with a resultant crisis
in respect to the ou-tloolc for Europe.
If we therefore concede that the Europeans--in an autburst of seriousness and faith
in their future--will insist on a greater measure of autonomy from the USA, E~~ropean-
American relations would then undergo a"crisis oi effectiveness" if for :~o other
reason than because Washin~ton wou]_d have to be reEduc~.ted in order to acc~~pt th~.t
~reater measure of eqizality. It could be woxth the wnile, however. The "b~~ssist"
hypoi;hesis could in fact--over the long term--prove to be weak and counterproduc-
'.ve, eliciting domestic neutralist opposition as well as "Thi-rd Force" (or na.tion-
alist) oFposition within va.rious European countries. If the "bossist" hypothesis
should then also prove to be incapable oi' dealing wi-th a serious crisis with opti-
mal results, we could abrup-~ly find ourselves facing a sudden public re,jection of
the alliance with the USA without havin~ prepared any alternative. Ima.gine, for
example, a serious crisis in the Persian Gulf az~l. an American inability to guaran-
tee Euro~e's ener~;y sup~ly: would NATO survive?
Let us not deceive ourselves, however. The ~roblem to be solved is not so much in
America as in Europe. The American policy may or may not please, may satisfy or
may leave one perplexed~ but in no case can it be replaced--or significantly
amended--if Lurope itself
is not in a position to resume at least some of the roles
tha.t are toda~ being played by the America~s.
In the absence of such a, development, the onlf course remaining will be to opt for
"bossism" and try to handle it a.s well as possible while hoping for the best.
There ar.e many possible instrume�rtts to effect an awakening--or qualitative leap
f'orward--in .re ec-t to European policy. We shall discuss several hypotheses at
- the conclusion af this article. T'.~ese hypotheses must, however, be prefaced by
some ~;eneral politica.l considera.tions, for the quality and qua.ntity of the instru-
ments in question depend in ~reat part on what one wishes to do. We shall thexefore
return to our four ori~inal questions. What would be the best course to take?
Wh~.t I?oes the USSH 4Jant?
Any policy re~ardj.n~ the USSR involves an evalixation of what the USSR wants from us.
Such an evaluation is not easy to make, because there are so ma,ny different inter-
pretatior.s: at least as many as there are Sovietologists. If a Sovietol.ogist
wishes to be a realist~ however, a measure of simplicity is called for. Basically,
- it is not so much a question of knowing whe-ther Brezhnev is being more honest when
' he invades Afghanistan or when he proposes a new era of peace in Europe as it is a
question o� accepting the fact that the USSR--just as every great power (and as a
sunerpower, in an even more definite sense~--has a multiplicity of interests and
policies that are ada.pted to, and change with~ changes in circumsta.nces and in
interloci.~tors. These considerations should disabuse anyone of either optimism or
pessi.mism. Pierre Hassner (at the most recent annual conference of the Interna.-
tional Institute of S~trateqic Studies in London~ brilliantly summed up tha
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weaknesses of both camps, urging the reader to "avoid both the illusions of the
progressives--who tend to minimize the Soviet threat and the role of militaxy force
and to exa.ggerate the hopes engendered by detente--and the illusions of the conser-
_ vatives, who tend to exaggerate the former and minimize the latter." We should
accordingly avoid the mistake ma.de by those "xho tend to minimize the impa.tance of
new weapons systems~ and military interventions, xhen they axe the work of the USSR
but find them highly destabilizing and dangerous when they axe the xork of the USA."
These individiials tend to mistake fiction for fact. We should also, however, avoid
the conservative conviction that there exists a"conc~ption of spheres of influence
of the 'cujus regio ejus religio' type, and a dogmatic belief in the impossibilit,y
either of evoluti.on~ or of revolution, within the communist regimes."
_ Hassner ~oes on to observe (alao quite correctly~ that the strangest thing of all is
the fact that those who ask the USA to imitate the USSR by assigning absolute
pr.iority to a. policy of strength are the same people who affirm most strongly that
- the relationship between the WPstern system and the communist system is chaxacter-
_ ized by diversity and indeed by incompatibilitys in short, precisely thdse conser-
_ vatives who in the last analysis are advising Reagan to imitate Brezhnev. Tn so
doin~ they are "assuming that an open and pluralistic democratic soc9.ety or alliance
can adopt the same strategy as a totalitarian society without itself being trans-
formed in turn into such a society." To tell the truth, it is not a very convin~
cing assumption.
Equally stran~e and unconvincing, moreover, are ~those anti-Sovi.et observers who--
less strongl~~ anti-Soviet--put their faith in a depoliticized vision o~f economic
relations and of disarmament, tnereby eliminating from these relations any pr~ssure
on 5oviet behavior and hopin~; to "teach the USSR by example" to do likewise. These
observers are committing the error (exactly the opposite of that committed by the
conserva.tives) of. tendin~; to "underestimate the differences existing between the
irniteci States and the Soviet Union, and on the other hand to emphasize the common
interest ~n d.i.s~.rmament and economic interd.ependence, but then a,dvising the United
- States {and the other ?dest~rn countries) to behave differently than the USSR is
behavin~."
Aeth positions~ in sho.rt, seem neither very logical nor very farsighted. The fact
is nrobably tha~t both positions are nartly cor.rect and that the relationship between
_ the ?~1est and the 115SR cannot be interpreted in as simplistic a fashion as one fac-
tion o.r. the other woiild like. A E~zropean policy vis-a-vis the US5R must inevitably
i.ncl~.~~e a li.ttle of. both positions.
A~fter ~.7.1~ Moscow's Pol3cy towa.rd Europe is itself fu11 of ambiguity. At the mili-
tary levet ther.e Ls no doubt of thiss the same period during which Washington and
Moscow were talkin~ about detente is the very same period during which the great
_ a.rms btiildiip and Moscow's offensives in the Third World took place. The emphasis
chan~;eci with �he chan~es In circumstances. At times the effort was directed toward
obta.ini.n�r, f;ra,di,~.l noli.tica.l control of Central E~rope, a.nd Germany in particular~
both by dir.ect and by indirect methods; at times Moscow has concentrated on revolu-
_ tions in the Thi.rd GJor1d; at ttmes it t~a.s favored detente (as in 1981); and at times
it has exalted the ~rowing mi~ht of the Red Army and the Soviet capa.city for being
the principal axis of international policy (as in 1976). Underlying this diversity
of tactics are differing evaluatioi~s of the forces in the field, political opportu-
nities and interna.l problems of th~, communist camp; but overall we can single out
r
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- I~OR (N~I~~CIAI, ilti3~: tD~v;.'a'
- elements of convergence--a.s well as elemen~s of competition---with the West. The
proUlem ise how tc enhance the convergence wi~hout in fact diminish3.ng the chances
of defeating the competition?
A Nonsuicidal Response
The response is to be found ir~ the elaboration of an overall strategy that will
combine both of these elements. But bewaxe: a ce�rtain Fa.cifist rhetoric existing
in Europe is tending to divide the problem geographically. To put it in simpl~
- terms, many Europeans appear convinced that the USA sr~ould concern itself with the
"competition" and Europe the "convergence." Su.ch a formula is suicidal, for
several reasons:
a. Because the Americans by themselves (as we havc already said) could find. them-
selves in trouble and aba.ndon the competition in z::~ions or areas that are of vital
concern to us Euro~eans.
b. Because this divisic~n impels the USSR ta 3trive for a deepening of the gulf
between Europe and America, r.ather than for a mod.ification of the policies of both.
c. Aecause this method has already been a.ttempted., first by De Gaulle and then by
Schmidt and Giscasd, and has alrea.dy failed on several occasions. The USSR has not
accepted the European nations as interlocutors on a basis of equality (it has
contented itself with attempting to play them off against the Ameri~ans), while on
the other hand the hopes (especially on the paxt of the Germans) for the creation
of a"community of interests" (a ki.nd of "lingua franca" of detente) between Western
- Europe~,ns arrd Eastern Europeans~ simultaneously imposing conditions both on the USA
and on the USSR, have been dashed against the fragility--and the subordina,tion to
Moscow--of the governments of Eastern Europe (the fall of Gierek, the Polisr
"friend" of Schmidt and Giscard ; the anti-Bonn betrayal of Honecker; and. so forth~.
d. ~3eca.use such a course will encou.rage the alxeady strong ~lirop~an inclination
toward irrespor.sibility and noninvolvement, and induces the European governments to
underestima.te the elements of competition and lor~-term strategy that axe present
in Moscow.
e. Because such a policy contradicts the basic E~ropean need (as we have noted)
for maintenance of a close allia.nce with the USA.
_ The operative conclusions flow rather easily from these premises. On the military
plane (we shall speak of it in greater detail later) it is a question of maintain-
i*~g and stren~thening the existing equilibrium in Europe and in those regions of
strategic interest. Negotiations are a viable course to follow only within the
perspective of this greater security, as a complementaxy and confirmatory factcr.
It is not a question of attempting to roll the tJSSR back to a regional role, or to
~ re~ai.n total military suprema.cy over the US5R (an objective which~ among other
� thin~r,s~ is in practice unrealistic), but rather of conv~.ncing--once anc1. for all--
both the USSR and the Third World of the impossibility of successfully employing
_ force, or the threat of force~ t.o oppose our fundamental interests.
On the economic plane~ it is a question of 1;aking account of the politica,l vision
that the USSR has of economic relations (a vision that is shared also with our
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= pa~-tners of the Third wor13, with OPEC in the vanguard~. It is not possible to
hope (as some spokesmen of the Rea,gan administration seem simplistically on
ocaasion to be saying) tiiat the cost of the militaxy competition will force the
USSR into a domestic economic crisis of such seriousness as to compel it to come to
_ terms or to change its policies. This was already the hope of Gec,rge Kennan wnen
he developed the first American theory of "containment" and xas the basic idea
Uehind Foster Dulles' hope for a"rollba.ck" (i.e., forced xithdrawal~ of the USSR
from Europe. Such theories have shown themselves incapa,ble of foreseeing the
Soviet capa.city for resistance and the lon~-range chaxacter of Moscox's policy.
Economic cooperation can therefore become a perma.nent factor in Ea,st-West, rela-
tions, on condition however that it not be burdened with excessive hopes tl:at axe
at least as unjustified as the hope that was placed in the development o~ reformist
forces in the USSR (in the eyes of many ~op~ans--Heaven only knows why--Kosygin
had rema,ined a"reformist" long after even the aba.ndonment of every reformist
- policy).
It is not easy to find a middle way between economic cooperation without precondi-
tions and the short-term political use of the economic weapon. Because both of
these options have already proved disappointing to us, however, it is at least
advisable that we cease to repropose them uncritic~,lly ar,ci twrn instead to a more
= realistic and analytical vision of the overall situa,tion.
One course of action, however, has not yet been undertaken decisively, and an effort
in this direction could be worthwhile~ we ha.ve always spoken in torms of economic
relations with the USSR, but ~why not make a distinctton between the USSR and the
Eastern European countries?~ For even though Eastern Europe has shown itself to be
- politically weak and economically in a situation of crisis, it is certainly more
- i.nterested--from a structural standpoint--in its relations with the West than in
its relations with the USSR. The ;ioviet Union itself--in Poland, and in a differ-
ent form in Hungaxy and Ruma.nia has appreciated the importance of relations with
the West, provided that thes~ relations do not seriously jeopaxdize the solidity of
i~ts bloc. The greater the p~litical and economic tensions within the G'EMA, the more
opportunity there is for a Western economic initiative that would be politically
relevant and that S.n any event could influence Moscow's behavior towazd its satel-
= lites. The same thing could happen in countries of the Third World that are linked
to Moscow militarily but that a,re very desirous of increased economic relations
with tYie '~1est. In short, it is a question of rendering the Seviet empire maximally
permeable to the West. A strate~y of this type can be attempted, although there is
one di.f�iculty: in some cases it can prove to be a costly strategy. However,
unless we believe that the communist bloc is monolithic--and provided we believe
that a.fter all, even this bloc is capable of evolving--it is an option full of
promise.
Petroleum, Development a.nd lJorld Equilibrium
I�t is now time to discuss intexnationa.l economic policy. Not being a specialist
(cr~ in any event, an ~bserver with expertise) in this field~ I gladly leave to
o~her.s (in this same issue of MONDOPERAIO) the task of examining the intricacies
of this subject. In the present article I should likP to emphasize certain politi-
cal aspects of relations with 0~'EC, on the one hand, and with the Third World in
general.
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; These countries have become important actors on the internationa,l scene thanks to
the economic levera~e they possess (in the case of OPEC) and thanks to their abil-
ity to give expression to a broad common front (in the case of the developing
countries that identify themselves as members of the group of the "77" in the
United Nations). Even T~lestern Europe, moreover, owes its current interna.tional
role to its economic dimension and to the power of attraction demonstrated by the
European Economic Community. The necessity for taking political action ba.sed on
the economic dimension is therefore obvious, in order to respond to the demands and
pressures of some and to do justice to the card.s we hold.
In this case, too, the primary requirement is security--the stability of our basic
_ position. We cannot be credible paxtners if we rema,in vulnerable to every change
- in the wind. The very fact that our in-terlocutcrs are especially able to take
ac�:ion in the economic sphere should put us on our uasd~ for vulnerability or
excessive dependency (in the absence of reciprocity~ on our part would inevitably
motivate them to attempt to force our hand, that is to say, to employ the means at
their command in a competitive rather than a cooperative ma.nner. Suffice it to
remembzr the experience gained in relations with the Arab na,tions af OPEC, for the
' period of naximum Eu.ropean dependence and vulnerability in the ener~;y fiold was
also the period of the lar~est increase in ener~y prices and of the ~ravest threats
to emPloy this weapon politically in order to influence Western behavior in the
Aliddle East. A ma.rgina.l chang~ in the situa~iion of ~Jestern dependence was suffi-
cient to create a growing opPortunity for the moderate forces withiri the Arab world
. to achieve relatively stable petroleum prices.
This experience should not be forgotten. The less our partners are convinced of
- our vulnerability, the longer will cooperation and interdependence be able to
su?�vive. This obviously has important consequences for the domestic economy,
- including rapid development of all alternative sources of energy.
If, however, we accept the hypothe~is that Europe and its pa.rtners in the industri-
alized world will succeed in ma.intai:~ing a sufficient margin of flexibility in
r.espect to ener~y and economic autonomy~ we are then faced with the problem of how
to play a posj.tive role in the Third World.
t�!e axe already aware of many of the theoretical responses. They have been developed
at interna.tiona,l conferences and in the attempts (excessively modest so fax) to
effect a triar?~ular recycling similar to that proposed~ in his day, by Guido Carli.
These responses, however, come into conflict with a difficult political reality.
The fact is that :in the Third j,lo.rld a competition for the reins of power is taking
_ place--competition centered around txo problems that axe oftan confused xith each
other but that should. instead rema.in well differentiated, at least as far as ana.l-
yses are concerned. The first problem is that of the ~growth, in world political
stature, of the individual d~veloping countries.~ This growth results in contradic-
dory tensions as between cooperation and conflict with the rrealthier (or more devel-
oped) countries, encourages domestic instability, and under.lies various regiona.l
conflicts among Third World countries. Although ec~nomic development requires a
framework of cooperation and interdependence, the political premises for it give
rise to conflicts that are endogenous to the Third World itself.
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Ea.st-41est Competition in the Third ;Jorld
The second ~.~oblem is that of the ~competition between East and j~~est in the Third
tJorld~, competition which has as its reward and objective the conquest of ba.ses and
~.llies and the control of the strategic resources and means of communication upon
~rhich the I~est depends. This kind of competition exploits the endogenous conflicts
- and at times exacerba,tes them or accelerates them, but only very rarely provokes
_ them.
Eben in this case the problem is one of finding a happy medium between two equally
inadequate formulas. The formula of the new American a.dministration--an admini--
stration which ands to expa,nd the concept of "terrorism" to ma,ke oF it a label.
applicable to every offensive initiatEd in the Third 4lorld and which tends to see
the "long arm" of the USSR behind every domestic or international con~'lict--is
not convincing. The drawba,ck of this formula is that it ~atuitously hands over
to the USSR a profitable position which the latter can exploit at its pleasure,
and the formula has a subsequent disadvantage in that the jdest is thereby motivated
to sunpor.t uncritica.lly every reactlonary force, eliminating ~:11 flexibility and
sqtianderin~; ~litical opportunities. This k9.nd of decision is divisive within the
- Trlester.n world itself anci therefore threatens to weaken our internal consensus. Ir_
short~ such a decision does not allow us to exploit in depth the potential of our
p~reate.r economic capacity and impels us to disregard the requests that flow inde-
pendently from the Third World countries, needlessly making them our enemies.
On the other hand, the theory of those who believe that the West should not concern
itself with -the Ea.st-West dimension of the problems of the Third World is not convin-
cin~ either. This theory haa had various applications, as for example during the
initial years of the Caxter administration (in the conviction, later revealed to be
mistaken, that the USSR kould be unable to "rule" for very long in the countries
where it ha.d established itself)--applications in the form of certain multilateral
initiatives by the United Plations and the EEC. To disregasd. the struggle for power
under way in the Third t~lorld is to cut oneself off from the dimension which is of
the ~reatest interest and concern to the very'same developing countries which are
our partners. One cannot understand how it is possible at one and the same time to
hope for ~reater interdependence and cooperation and then attempt to disregard the
very bases of an;~ policy af interdependence and cooperations that is to say, the
cont'~nuity of the interlocutors; their capacity for respecting the agreements signed;
thei.r security; and -Eheir national ambitions.
A"middle way" should therefore avoid all dangerous theoretical or ~deological
~eneralizations. Speci.f ically, it is also a question of sorting out an overall
policy composed of various correlated initiatives. It is essential to establish
a code ~f action that will make possible a joint effort to put the theory of inter-
dependence into pra.ctice. This code should be based simultaneously on initiatives
to promote military security arul economic cooperation (that is to say~ on both
dimc~nsi.ons of the political reality of the Third World).
There is accordingly no need to be afraid to speak of the need for reestablishing--
or ma.intaining--certain regiona,l military equilibriums, both in relation to the USSR
and in relation to the countries of the area in question. Interdependence is
directly connected with the overall stability and security of the developing re-
gions. Areas such as the Mediterranean; sub-Sahaxan Africa; the Middle Ea.st (or
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"Southwest Asia~" as it is currently fashionable to say, so as to emphasize the
Persian Gulf and Pa.kistan); Southeast Asia; and the region b~tween the Pacific and
the India.n Ccean reqtii.re for themselves a strategic equilibrium in which the ~test
should play a fundamental role. E~rope car. par~icipa.te in a decisive waf in some
of these equilibriums~ and Japan in others. The United S-tates is ba.sically present
in each area. Ma.intenance of an equilibrium also involves the possibility of the
use--or threat of the use--of force in a credible ma.nner. Force should be employed
primar~.ly to keep the USSR under control, but it is also a necessary element for
ensuring the overall credibility of the West~ vis-a-vis its allies. It is true that
ma,ny states of the Third World actually contend trat the military presence of the
sunerpowers is "destabilizing," but there are no cther alternatives. If anything,
it is a question of anportioning the forces in a political manner so as to avoid
havinq them ultima.tely prove to be counterproductive.
Such a policy should obviously also have an economic dimensior.~ either as a deter-
rent or as an incentive for regional stability and development. This economic
djmension must at times go as far as "linka~e": in other words, it is possible to
try to increase the pri.ce that the USSR must pa.y for every intPrvention it makes
in the Third ~lorld, thereby forcing the Soviets to take into account the proba-
bility that there will be reprisals--in different areas and in different modes--
in those regions where its operations are taking place. Above all, however, it is
essential to develop a policy of incentives that will speak directly to the devel-
J oping countries.
It is also necessary to r~member our premise, namely that there are, in the world,
revolutionaxy situations and situations of conflict that are not a function of
Soviet interventi_on. In coping with a situation of this na.ture, the use of force
o.r oF the economic weapon should be apportioned in various wayss the ti+fest should
show itself to be at least as amenable to change as the 5oviet Union. The two
aspects are not mutually contradictory, however. It is very difficult to accept
cha.nge if one is in a situation of strategic infer~ ority, and if one is afraid of
- losing the la.st positions of strength that one possesses. In this way, for exam-
ple, it was very difficult for the Americans to accept the hypothesis of a change
of regime in Iran, because in that period the USA appeared to be short of allies
and was in a situation of strategic inferiority in the Middle Ea,st, and because
- Eurape was in a period of great vulnerability with respect to ener~y. On the
other hand, it was possible to achieve a positive compromise and a change of
re~ime in Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) because the French-American-Moroccan inter-
vention in Zaire had preserved the stability of that country and because the
strength of South Africa was a sufficient guarantee of the ma,intena,nce of a mili-
_ tary equilibrium in the region. This lesson~ too, should not be forgotten or
undervalued.
The ~�lilitary P.roblem and NATO
!Je now come to our final problem in the area of foreign policys the ma.intenance
of a credible framework of military security. I do not propose to dwell on the
strategic problems of the East-West.conflict. On the other hand, it is interest- ~
ing to emphasize some problems relative to the relationship between the Western
Euro.peans and the Americans.
President Reagan has decided on a strong program of rearmament-~both conventional
and nuclear--justified on the ba.sis of the slow but continuing numerical decline in
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; the American armed forces durir~ the past decade. This process of reaxmament
(which is quantitatively inferior to the rearmamen-t that took place in i:he USA on
other occasions such as the i{orean War, the "missile gap" of the Kenned.y era, and
the Vietna.m xar) should ma.ke i~t Fossible for the USA to face several crises simul-
_ taneously in several parts of the world. This theory is not completely in accord
with reality, however.
In terms of conventional forces, the equilibrium of the forces in Central E~rope is
not one of the best. After a couple of weeks of mobilization the Warsaw Pa,ct
could, in this category, achieve a r~atio of superiority to NATO of 2 to 1 in person-
nel, 2.5 to 1 in tanks~ 2.4 to 1 in artillery and tactical missiles and 2.4 to 1 in
armored equipment, whereas NATO has a 2 to 1 advantage in antitank missiles ar~d
1.8 tu 1 in helicopters. The fact is that the Americans probably have neither
sufficient tactical aircraft nor sufficient personnel, for example, to confront
the 1JSSR in Europe and in tr.e Persian Gulf simul~taneously.
According -co calculations made for the IISS by Tom Wheelock, the Soviets can put
approxima,tely 600 tactical aircraft over Iran, plus an unspecified number of
medium-ran~e bombers; two airborne divisions rea.dy for action plus another six
available on short notice; 21 mechanized divisions (ready afte~ a brief period of
mobilization) and one armored division, in addition to a flotilla of eight wax-
ships. Almost all of these forces are stationed in the southern districts of the
iJS5R and therefore do not diminish the Soviet presence either in Europe ox on the
Chinese border.
On the other side, the Americans have a group of tKO aircraft carriers, 16 waxships
and 110 fighter-bombers; the AWAC5 stationed in Saudi Arabia; a-tactical air group
of 7(~ aircraft normally stationed in Europe; the use of the B-52's normally sta-
tioned in Spa.in or Guam (in the Pacific~; four +,actical air groups stationed in the
USA (and normally regarded as part of the NATO strategic reserve; two battalions of
ma.rines available within 24 hours (one airborne batta].ion from Italy and the other
an amohibio~;; battalion now in the Indian Ocean); one briga,de of m rines available
withtn 7 days .from the iiSA and from Diego Garcia; one airborne br.ig~.d.e available
within 7 days, and the entire division within 14 days (forces des~tined for NATO
and ba.sed i.n the USA); one brigade of maxines from the Pacific, ava3.lable within
21 days; one division transported by air within 4 weeks; and one mechanized divi-
sion trans~orted by sea within F weeks (these two divisions axe also part of the
NATO strate~;ic reserve ) .
In ter.ms of naval ec~uilibri~xm~ the disl~atch of two aircraft carr3.ers to the south
of the Gulf redtaces the perma.nent American presence in the Mediterra.nean to one
aircraft carrler, and forces the Atlantic command to concentrate all its other
- forces in the North Atlantic (among other things~ with problems relating to lines
of communication and to the defense of the South Atlantic). It also reduces to
_ one aircr.aft carrier the p~rma.nent presence in the Pa.cific, thereby intensifying
_ Japa.n's defensive problems.
However much Reagan ma.y increase the number of aircraft caxriers (but this will
take more than 10 years) and the number of divisions (but here there are personnel
Trroblems) as well as the "prestocking" in Europe, designed to speed up the tempo
= of reinforcement of the European front, the fact xemains that the USA does not
have--and probably will not have--sufficient forces ready for action in order to
cope with more than one crisis at a time. It would need at least 2 months to
mobilize all the forces necessary.
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I~uclear Forces and Conventional Forces
Othe.r developments--i.n the sPhere of nuclear forces--have been announced that may
complicate the sit~zation. The strategy of "compensation" provides for the limited
use of nuclear forcE~ in response to a victorious conventional attack by the
Snviets. This is also the standard doctrine of NATO. It is doctrine, however,
that requires a greater degree of invulnerability on the part oi the American
= strategic forces (seme people are in fact talking about "clusti.ng off" the anti-
missile missiles that were res~ricted by the SALT-i treaty), for a greater invul-
nerability of this sort woiild render the use of tacti.cal nuclear weapons more
_ credible but clearly run the risk of increasin~ ~i,e /distance~ between the tactical
theaters (Asia, Europe) and the American nationa,l theater. This ma.y create tension
between the USA and its allies, who ma.y feel themselves threatened by the hypothesis
~ of a nucleax war limited to their own tarritory.
Moreover (as Jan Lorial emphasizes, also for the IISS~, the tactical and "Eurostrat-
egi~" use o-P nuclear weapon.S gives .rise ~Eo ; orerative~ doubts, ina.smuch as the
problems of command, control ~.nd communications appear not to have been solved, as
well as the problems .relating to recognition ancl acquisition of �~actical objectives
(esnecially if they a.re movi.ng; objectives~ t~y these forces. These weanons can, to
be sure, destroy pr.eselected fi.xed objectives~ but it i.s unlikely tha-t they could
keep tzn with a. strate~ic situation which is in motion. According to certain ~our-
nalistic indiscretions, the nuclear ~reaction times~ themselves could prove to be too
~;rea.t to cope with close-in strategic situations. I~astly (to quote Jan Loda1~,
"the ,~,~rowin~; possibility of rendering credible antipersonnel capabilities operative,
cambined with the current NATO strategy of threatening to be the first to use
nuclear weapons to strengthen a conventional defense that is failing, adds a strong
a.r~;ument in favor of the development of antipersonnel nuclear capability in the USA
(such as the "N" bo~nb or other tactical categories--editor's note). The technical
im~ossibiiity~ however, of carrying out an antipersonnel attack that would be
~completely~ crowned with success removes much of the validi.ty of the decision to
- continue the development of antipersonnel weapons." In short, we have in this case
as well two contrasting truths bo'ch in respECi; to nuclear forces and in respect to
conventional forces.
In the conv~ntional sphere, it is by now increasingly obvious that the USA. must
increase the mobility and strategic flexibility of its forces~ but this will reduee
the concrete possibilities forrreinforcement and in some scenarios its very pres-
ence in Europe.
- In the nuclear sphere, the existin~ disequi.librium constitutes an incentive for
development o.f tactical nuclear forces~ but these forces will subsequently resolve
neither the economic problem (a "C31" system--comma,nd, control and communicat,ion
plus "intelli~ence"--that is truly effective costs as much as~ and. more thar.., new
conventional armed forces), nor the huma.n problem (for in reality the requirements
for troops appear to increase rather than decrease), nor the militaxy problem
_ (beca.use of the a.forementioned technical problems and because the advanta.ge to be
gained by beir?g the first to use these forces would very likely prove to be fleet~
in~, except in certain cases involving the "closing off" of lines of communication
or a surprise attack, either of which would, however, be difficult in viex of the
nTATO systems of C31.
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The development of "Eurostrategic" forces could actually enhance the credibility of
the tise of tactical nuclear forces in Europe. 5ucn forces could in fact--by posing
a stron~ direct threat to the Soviet national territory--d~ssua,de the USSR from any
massive use of tactical nuclear weanons against Western Europe in response to a~y
ta.ctical military use of NATO nuclear weapor.s against Sovi.et conventiona,l forces~
_ Wherea.s the VATO tactical nuclear weapons would indeed strike Sovi.et forces but not
_ the territory of the U'3SR, the Soviet tactical nuclear weapons emPloyed by attacking
forces and a.dva.nce �oroes would inevitably strike Western European territory. In
densely populated areas (such as those of Central Euro~e~ the destruction of numer-
ous Western military objectives with nuclear weapons would also involve the ma.ssive
destruction of civilian objectives and would be little--if at all--different in its
effects from a massive nuclear attack against the European populations. To this,
NATO could therefore--with good reason--respond by carrying out the massive destruc-
tion of civilian and military objectives in the USSR. This could induce the USSR
to en~age in a much more limitad use of its theater nuclear forces in E~Zrope, and
could therefore enhance the credibi.lity of the milita,ry use of tactical nuclear
forces by A'ATO.
Europe's t-lilitary Commitment
This devel~nment, too (,iust as every other aspect o:f nizclear strate~y at every
level~, h~,s i.ts own ~.mbi.~uitiess above all, because it is anything but certain that
this kind o:E' reasoning will "hold up." The USSR, for example, might fear that
almost any nuclear attack in Europe could unleash a"Eurostrategic" r_esponse, and
could ther.efore attempt a preventive striIce against the Eurostrate~ic Forces, ~thereby
_ "escalatin~;" the conflict by ma,ny degrees and accelvrating the destr.uction of Eur.ope;
and secondly, because wherever this line of reasoning does "hold up" it would in any
event make the Iimited use of nucleax arma in ~rope more feasible, with consequences
that would certainly not be at all positive and would be politically divisive.
A Llironean pnli.tical-military response to these problPms is therefore essential. This
response should be made in at least two directions~ nucle~.r weapons and conventiona,l
- weapons.
_ Tf we proceed on the latter basis, trie conclusions to be drawn are very obvious (at
least the extent to ~rhich they will be difficult to put into practice): it is a
question of ~elying less and less on the American conventional forces, and in some
cases (a.s .in the case of the air and naval forces) of integrating them better. If
_ the TTSA must defend Ei~ronean interests in Asia, E~rope must make a more substantial
contri.btztion towa.rd equilibrium on its continent.
This of course does not mean a geagraphical di.vision of jurisdictions, for that would
be courrternroductive. The USA must remain closely ~.inked to the defense of Europe
_ and the .F:uropeans must be able to intervene in the Third World, if only for reasons
of poli+ical-milltary flexibility and in some cases because of different interests--
a.nd different de~;rees of vulnerability--as between the USA and Europe. Tt is inevi-
_ table, however, that the relative relatic~nship between the two components will
_ change and that the European role will ~row in importance. This is true--unless
one wishes to stake everythin~ on nuclear weapons.
Defense, unfortunately, is expensive. Germany has reduced its proposed expend.itures.
_ To fina,nce its presence in Germa,ny and its strategic nuclear forces, Great Britain
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- FOR ~FF'ICIAI. US~: OI`d1_Y
has reduced its naval ~resence in the weste_~`~ and southern Atlantic, leaving the
Americans virtually a.l~~~~ there. F`rance h~.s announced a reinforcement of all areas,
but it is likely that development of new nuclear forces will consume a dispro-
portionate share or the budget to the detriment o~ the conventiona.l forces. Italy
is gradually increasing its budget, but not suffi.ciently to enable it to caxry out
a"two-fr_ont" strategy, that is to say, to enable it to operate with full efficiency
both in the northeast and in the P4editerranean (and it is therefore sacrificing
both sectors somewhat, but especially the latter~.
~ To compensa.te for the American changes therefore requires a fina.ncial effort, but
above all requires (and this is the most difiicult part) the coordination and inte-
gration of the various national efforts. A greater ~specialization of the roles~
~ of. the European forces is inevitable, as are also a greater mobility ~among the
- various fronts~ and the effective ~standardization~ of the arma.ment. Unless these
three developments ta~ce place, Europe's defense will experience a multiplication of
instances of duplication and waste of resources, accompa,nie~ by the impossibility
- of inte~;ra.tin~; the for.ces in the field effectively; as a result, the use of nuclear
forces would become more necessary and more urgent. Such a failure would in fact
have the effect of deterring the very defense of Europe and thereby discourage all
resistancc.
In the nuclear sphere the problem is not so much one of freeing oneself from
nuclear weapons (which are henceforth an integral paxt of the European equilibrium)
as it is one of keeping thPm under control botiz irom the military standpoint and
from the political standpoint as it relates to negotiations.
There are those who--as an alternative to the present situation--are inclined toward
the development of an au~tonomous nuclear deterx~ent (either a. na.tiona.l one or, less
likely, a. European one). The development of such a deterrent would in reality not
solve our problems, which are as follows:
~
a. The r.~~>blem of credibility--because national deterrents do not add to the over-
al1 deterrent effect vis-a-vis the USSR. On the contrary (at least in the case of
Germany) they are proba.bly less credible than the American tactical deterrents and
Eurostrategic deterrents of NATO.
- b. The rrrob]_em of cost--and therefore of the relationship between conventional
ind nucle~.r c~ete.r.rents. On the contrary: the British and F~ench experience (and
on a. 1ar~;er� scale, the Ameri.can exper_ience) demonstrates that the development of
thF nucl.ear deter.rent impac-ts the availabi].ity of funds for the conventional deter-
rent~ thereby intensifying the overall defense problems.
- c. The prohlem of C31--with the aggravating factor that in the event a nativnal
nuclea.r clete~rent is developed it would probably be necessary to renego~iate the
iise of the C systems and--above all--the "intelligence" systems of the Americarvs.
Thi.s would therefore create new, additiona.l costs of no sma.ll consequence.
d. The Dr.oblem of ne~otiations--because the USSR would inevitably tend to view
such for.ces as additional foxces and therefore as justification for inereased
reaxmament on its own part.
_ e. Political problems--whether domestic in na.ture or (especially) those involving
- rela.tions wi.th the USA.
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f. ''roblems of rep~i.on~1 equiliurium--fox exa.mple? in the Mediterranea.n. 1"uclear
I~ea.rmament af ~tal,y would accelera~te the nuclea.r rearmament of. otr,er states such
as I.ibya , E~y~t ar.d so forth.
rc,n~eqiaently, a. moY�e ~,nn.r.opriate hypothe~is would appear (at least for the medium
term) to he the exez�cise of better Eiaropean control over this problem without
malcin~ any ba.sic chan~e .in the current arrangement. To this end there already
exist numerous P?AT~ committees (such as the vuclear ='lanning Group, the High-Level
Groun and the Special Groun), although F`ra.nce has excluded itself from them.
These committees~ moreover~ operate strictly from the "P~ATO perspective," which on
the one ha.nd i_s perh~.ps based too much on a military--and Central European--logic
a.nd on the other hand excludes problems such as those relating to the extension of
force to areas outside Europe and to regiona.l equilibriums other than the princi-
pal equilibrium with the USSR.
- Instead, it would be advisable for the Europeans to begin to thin3t autonomously
_ concerning the problems with respect to negotiations, strategic logic, and "contin-
gency planning,~" without reference to the fact that the nuclear forces belong to
the USA. This latter reality has impelled the Europeans to a.dopt a"passive"
stance chara.cteristic of recipients who find themselves being urged with the
greatest insistence to express their criticism and propose modifications to the
strate~y chosen by the Americans. ~r~hat is lacking is the autonomous elaboration
of ~Europe~.n doctrines~, even though the ability to do so ?s not lacki.ng. ~zrther-
mor.e, in the absence of any elaboration of such doctrines, even the control exer-
cised over the nuc.lear wea.E~ons of PlATO and over the progress of negotiations
ca.nnot help but be li.mited. The European interests are sin~led out and defended
in a fr.agmentary manner~ while the overall picture passes unnoticed.
Tnstea.d ef ~rY'omnt~.n~;' the development of other national nuclear deterrents (which
a.mon~ other thin~s would intensify the fra~mentation of the European response),
thi s ki nri ~f si.tua.tion cali s:For the creation of a sort of "European Arms Control
a.nd Di s~.rmament A;ericy" on the model of the American coi.tnterpa.rt, includin~ however
a/~~.~nction of "cont.'~n?ency Plannin~;" and analysis~ of the overall, and regional,
stT�~.te,~ic situa.ti.on (of the type which in America is carried out by the Department
of Defense). Such an "agency" (which should inevitably ma.inta~.n a dual headquar-
ters, in ~,urope and in Washington, in ord.er to have the necessary quick reaction
time and completeness of i nformation~ has alr.eady been singled out as a"neces-
sity" by ma.ny analyst (includin~;, a.mon{; others, Alistair Buchan as ea.rly as
1`?.(~h) but was never created because to do so was politically difficult.
Thc F;uro pea.n ProUlem and Ital y
~Iow we come ~rec~sely to the real European political problem, the .problem which
underlie~ all the proposals put forward in the present article: namely, the lack
of a~;enuine process of Furopean political integration. !~lithout a European "intel-
lect" (on~ obli~ed to think, and act, in continental and inte~;rated terms), these
nolicies either cannot be implemented or can be implemented only in very pa~rtial
and inadequate manner.
The. F.uro~~e~,n ~;overnments have proposed many palliatives (ranging fr.om development
of. cooneratton in the snhere of fo.r.ei~~n policy a.mong the 10 F~C countries to a more
extei~si.ve izse of summitry and to the creation of special ~;roups of countries--in
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the natu.re of "managers"--that would be assi;ned ~ta sexve as "task forces" to
deal with individual nroblems, specific strategic axeas~ and so forth. I shall
no~t digress into a detailed discussion of these proposals (I discuss them in
detail in my article enti+,led "A Policy for Europes Forei~n Policy and Security
Problems, published this year in 5~'ETTATORE II~'TERNAZIONALE, to which I refer any-
one who is interested). I should like only to quote the conclusion I drews "The
centra.l pr.oblem is tha.t this kind of ~communications network~ is devoid of any
inceniive or institutional stimulus to arrive at effective and operative decis~ons.
Every ministry of fnrei_gn affairs or na.tional defense is, quite logically, st'~uc-
tured with a view to making decisions at the national level. Once this objective
is a.chieved, the ma.ndate of these ministries has been fuily satisfied. The network
of European contacts is therefore viewed basically as a means for improving commu-
- nications, sneedin~ up the flow of information, avoiding mistakes and misunder-
st~.ndings~ and--if possible--developing a common position. It is not a decision-
making process in the strict sense of the ~srm~ fox it lacks any internal institu-
tiona.l lo~ic that would impel it to make decisions, or any necessity to face up to
the ma,j~r Eiironean nroblerns in a timely and efficacious fashion."
The ~ri.ncina.l politica]. conclus n to be d.rawn from this entire analysis may there-
fore apnear to bE self-evid.ent and commonpla.ce, but it is nonetheless necessarys
It~.1y must stri.ve to develop European i.nstitutiona.l systems that possess this
internal necessi.ty--~.nd impulse--to malce decisions.
This conc].tisi_on is likewise incomplete, however, if one does not add that in order
to accom~lish th3.s goal Ita.ly jmust in the meantime change its ways~~ change
temno a.nd quality of ii;s forei~n policy and policy on security. In this way the
meditam- and l.ong-term problem becomes in ac~tuality also a short-term prorlem.
~ Such a ctia.n~;e wi.ll require first and foremost a new awareness of Ttaly's potential
- and opportunities--of the real possibilities that exist to emerge from the current
"sma.ll-t:Lme" nhase ~.nd set out into the more difficult waters of interna.tiona.l
nolicv.
Such a choice wi11 require a~greater degree of responsibility~ on Italy's part,
even with resnect to security. The course undertaken with the conclusion of the
a~:r.eement {~iaranteeinF; the neutrality of Ma.lta a.nd the installation of the ~uro-
~ missiles m~zst be nerfected and substantiated. In this way, for example, it is no
lon~er no~s:ible i;o a.dopt ~the hypothesis of a gr.eater ini~tiative in thP Middle Ea.st
i.f thi.s is not acc,omPanied by the assumption of a greater measure of d.ir.ect respon-
_ si_t~i.tities~ such a~ n~.rticip~~.tion in the internationa.l force that is to guaxantee
the ~:a.mp D~,vi.d accord.^ tn the Sinai and a series of political-military and techni-
ca.l. ~.S~,ista.nce a,~�ee~nents with Middle East countries--a~;reements that are congruent
with -the polici_es tha.t one wishes to carry out (above all, therefore~ with Egypt,
T>>ni~i~. a.r~ci Perhan~ Al~;eria). This icind of Alediterranean nrojeetion is already
i nc1 ~uied in Tta.ly' s d i. nloma.tj c ~lans ( continuin~ attention to the GreeIc-?uxkish
di. ,n~~te, a. tTrow9.n~; inte.rest in the Cyprus nroblem, a t'r?aty with Yugoslavia, and so
forth~. Howeve.r, i-L al.s~ involves an ana.lysis and an orientation of our defense
~~~ticy desi~;ned to ma.lce ou.r ?~resence in the P~lediterranean credible, and a study of
the econom~ic comPa.tibilitie~ and prospects that underlie a better common European
policy toward the i~ledi.terranean, ,Africa and the Pliddle East. in this connection,
the two aspects u� defense a.nd interna.tional economic policy (including energy
~,sectzrity) are closely llni:ed.
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Thi;-; also will mean see';in~r, a, ciift'erent, a.nd. more active~ Italian presence in tze
- 4!}1 tCtl rniist ~owever izncler~o a chan~;e in qual:i.ty and in strate~y. Cur European
act~on is ~n ~enera.l center.eci en i;he Gea..rch for ~political axes~, or indeed privi-
- 1_e~Ted a.llia.nces with one nation or a.nother. >�te may call attention, for example~
to the I~ome-T~ondon a.x~_s, and more recently the Rome-Bonn axis. This type of
~oolicy by alignments~ has not proved to be very productive. Not only has the
Italian position appeared ~;enerally speakin~; to be "in tow," adapted in reality
to the interests and nlans of the other p.rtner, but these very same axes have
nro~~ed to be rather unnroductive because they have been partial and incomplete.
Thus~ for example, there is today a clear-cut Italia:i-German and Italian-British
conver~;ence on certain prohlems of foreiQn policy (with the Germans as regards
detente~ with ~he 8ritish as regards certain decisions concerning the Middle
Ea.st), but in neither of the two cases has there been a convergence on the problem
of reforming the E~C institutions and budget.
It is therefore ad.visable to abandon for the time being this typically Ita.lian
obsession (which can also be found in our domestic policy) concerning alignments
and 3.llia.nces, in the illusion that these alignments and alliances can in and of
_ themselves define policy, and to oass on decisively to a planning phase, a
~hase of proposals, ~.nd therefore a phase of a search for alliances, for collab-
oration and commitments based on effective operative plans developed with a full
measure of analysis (instrumental analyses, cost analyses and ana.lyses of results).
2n short, in respect to our foreign policy as well, it is ti:ne to ~establish our
- nrior.ities
~1atu.rally, a chan~e o.f this sort cannot take place in an institutiona,l vacuum.
Giulio Amato (in this same issue of MO~IDOPERAIO) analyzes the negative political
a.nd operattve implica.tions of the current institutional chaos in which our foreign
nolicy fi_inct:i.ons. Creater ef.fectiveness in our foreign policy entails greater
consistency in ~;overnmental act~on, a.n emphasis on planning, and a closer linka,ge
with d.omestic policy.
COI'YRTGHT: 1)~'1 M~ndoneraio Fdizioni Avanti!
1
~c.
~~o : ~ t i3r,,
T
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MILITARY SPAIN
- SECRET COUPIST ORGANIZATION WITHIN MILITARY DESCRIBED ~
- Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 7 Dec 81 pp 56-61
[TextJ An underground, coupist and antimonarchical military organization, detected
but not infiltrated by the state secret services, is attempting increasingly to
make its presence felt. It is a question of the Spanish Militar.y Ilnion (UME).
In 1975, after the arrest of a senior officer and eight junior officers belunging
to the then c~lknown Democratic Military Union (UNID), when the minisrer of the Army,
Francisco Coloma Gallegos, received a lieutenant colonel, already retired, a former
comrade-in-arms, the latter tried to intercede in behalf of the arrested officers.
"What they want," he stated, "will be the country's future before 5 years have
passed."
The minister said that perhaps this might be true, but that he could not pardon
them fo~r having established an underground organization within the Armed Forces.
Then the lieutenant colonel could not avoid a gesture of skepticism and, addressing
his superior and friend, he reminded him that 40 years earlier they had organized
the Spanish Military Union, the UME. The reply by Lieutenant General Coloma Galle-
gos was categorical: "That is different!" ~
At that same time, the military governor of La Coruna visited three UNID prisoners
held in the E1 Ferrol military prison. During the interview with the UNm members,
reference was made to how dangerous the establishment of underground organizations
within the Armq was to it.
When the topic of the Spanish Military Union was discussed, the military governor
of La Coruna changed his mind: the UME that they had established before the Civil
War was made up of decent, rightist persons.
These two anecdotes, unpublished up to now, reflect a constant in the Spanish Army
in recent years: an excessively beneveloent treatment of military persons con-
nected with the extreme right and strictness, harshness and persecution for mili-
tary persons defending liberal or democratic political positions.
This constant enabledthe coupist ~ectors in Army to have a'.free harid, onc~ fihe
political reform had been carried out, to conspire against democracy. The facts
are evident: in Holy Week 1977, while the UrID was persecuted harshly, a group of
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t;i~ner:ils cunn~~clecl witli tli~~ rcctcli~~ii;~ry r[~;I~l mcl Cii .Jnvcri :incl prc>muLc~~i :~n ciLC~ropC
to have the legeiliz~ition of ttie Communist Party of Spain reversed.
One year later, shortly before Christmas 1978, another military officer advocating
reversal of that legalization--LtCol Antonio Tejero Molina, of the Civil Guard--
was the protagonist in a second attempted coup d'etat.
UME Comes Into Being
Up to that time. coupist mil_itary plots had shown signs of not being organized.
~PVeral groiips of military officers with far right leanings had established organi-
zations like the Military Patriotic Union (IPM [sic; should read iTi'rI]}, th~: Mi~i�-
rary Patriotic Movement (MPM), the Patriotic Associations or the Spanish Union
for the Defense of Spain (UEDE), which did not go beyond being mere attempts to
form an association of military persons thinking along conservative, coupist lines.
They died a few days atter their establishment. Like autumn flowers. And the
only evidence that there is of the existence of those secret organizations in the
barracks are photo~;raphs in tY?e files of military secret services of some isolated
item si~ned with the acronyms UPM or MPM.
The sieuation was to change as a result of the reduced sentence imposed on Antonio
Tejero Molina, a Civil Guard lieutenant colonel, and on Ricardo Saenz, a major
in the National Pol.ic~, For the attempted military coup kncwn as "Operation Galaxy."
Starting at that time, military off icers of the extreme right who went under the
acronyms of rLilitary Patriotic Union, Patriotic Associations and Military Patriotic
Movement entered into contact with each other and established th.e Spani.sh Military
Union, resuscitating the old underground organization that enabled Gen Francisco
Franco to set off the coup d'etat on 18 Ju1y 1936.
Nevertheless, the new UNfE was not a strictly military organization , as it was
in 1936, but also behind the extreme right military persons there is a complex
_ conspiracy of civilian coupists connected with the New Force Party and the intelli-
gence services of the single party of Franco's Movement and of the vertical labor
unions, including the only civilian arre~ted during the 23 F~3 Februar~~ coup:
Juan Carcia Carres.
~ Ttie ci.vilian conspirators were precisely the ones who gave the UME cohesion and
5eructure and the ones who designed the new strategy to be followed, in order to
demolish the structures of the democratic state.
A member of tEie sta~e`s intelligence services who agrees with CAMBIO 16's analysis
_ statect to tt?is periodica] that, starting in 1979, a very subtle operation of in-
C:ittration in t}ie arcas ot- military intelligence and in the immediate intervention
Ul11CS was detec~ed in CXL"relllE' rightist circles of the Army.
"Thc ertreme r i~;ht miliL-ar.y persons," he stated to CAMBIO 16, "who up to that time
seemed to be little interested in the art of warfare, suddenly began to aim at
General S~aff courses and to request assignments in the best equipped military
units regarded by the high command to be for 'iumiediate intervention~,~~
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The same source remarked that "it was clear that their intention was to take hold
of the three basie means for the operation of any army: intelligence, staffs of
the units in which action plans are prepared and guns."
Bound by Oath
In the first months of 1979, the UME--according to data from this peri~dical--
was only a group oF military persons with extreme right thinking, very closely
knit and bound to each other by oath, in order to prevent infiltration and in order
to act in the most absolute secrecy against the democratic institutions and against
the Crown.
That structure is the one that they still maintain at the present time, although
among its plans .is a plan to come to the surface some day, in arder to be able
to increase its number and to create a reliable structure that will enable them
to carry out military action against the king and the will of the people. What
concerns them most is not the number of inembers that the UME can have, but rather
the contacts and the number of persons with whom they associate every day.
One of the UP4E's instructions to its members is to associate constantly witi~ other
military personnel of their same class, to study what their political thinking
is and to try to ascertain how many persons in each Army unit would be inclir~ed
to participate in a seditious coup, under the assum.ption that a FavorablP situation
would oacur in Spain that would enable them to destroy the regime of freedoms.
Intact
- These instructions, which are not written in any manual, but which are transmitted
verbally, Yiave enabled the UME to have a rather complete file in which the number
of military persons who would be in agreement with a military solution and the
number who would remain passive and would not obstruct tanks from going out into
the street is recorded.
Ttie UM1:, wliich, according to all the information that CAMBIO 16 has, took part
in rlie preparations for the 23 February military coup, disassociated itself from
it as an organization when, months before Lieutenant Colonel Tejero Molina seized
the Congress of Deputies, Gen Alfonso Armada, with the support of foreign secret
services, entered into the coupist p1ot, in orcier to try to soften the rebeilion
and to attempt to prevent Uloodshed as much as possible.
- On the other hand, it does seem that there were members of the Spanish Military
Union who joined the 23 February coupist conspiracy in an individual capacity.
Tt~e Almendros collective, which, according to the French newspaper LE MONDE, c~n-
SisL-ed of Colonel San Martin and Colonel Marchante, Lieutenant Colonel Villalba
and Lieiitenant Colonel Fuentes Gomez de Salazar and Major Pardo Zancada, was an
idea o� the UM~ to warm up the atmosphere and prepare the way for the coup from
the pages of the daily newspaper EL ALCA7.AR.
Uf the L-ive persons mentioned by the French newspaper, two of them--Pardo and San
Martin--are under arresC for military rebellion and Lieutenant Colonel Fuentes
y Comez de Salazar, who was the one who convinced Tejero to surrender, has been
under slrict watch by the anticoup brigade, which has been unable to find the
slightest shadow of suspicion in his behevior.
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- 'L'll~r~fure, the intern.il slructure of tlie UME is intact and running smooClily. The
pruoE oi` ~his is thnt many ot its members have been the main promoters of the
strategy of disinEormation and negotiation concerning the ones tried for the 23
February coup, while another sector of the organization has worked on organizing
- collections for the coupists. "And it must not be forgotten, according to a mem-
ber of the secret service, "that Franco's UME came into existence, in 1934, to
organize "Blue Aid" for the military personnel against whom reprisals were taken
because of the [miscarried] Sanjurjo [coup]."
They made only one mistake in this work, although it occurred quite a bit before
the 23-F coup. A lieutenant colonel in Seville, associa~.a. with sectors close
to the Spanish Military Union, was dismissed in the middlC of 1980, after someone
in~~his office stole some code tapes with which the military coupist conspirators
were attempting to control the military intelligence communication networks and
to decipher their messages.
The incident was only an obstacle on the way, but it did not make the UME char.ge
its course or its objectives. And thus, on 31 [sic] April 1981., over a month after
the miscarried coup d'etat, the UME brought out a 70-page report in which it ana-
lyzed the mistakes made in the c~upist attempt and stated that "the f irst obstacle
to savi.ng Spain is the king" and that, when they go into action, they are not going
to ~sk anyone for permission.
Nut even their seniors. Because, according to CAMBIO 16 data, the present UME
is made up basically of junior and senior officers of the Armed Forces--the men
who command the regiments, battalions and companies--and they have an olympic scorn
for the generals whom they regard as a disturbance to their plans, because they
regard them as a cl.ass very much tied to the political command.
"The men who won the war of liberation, they say in one of their reports, "were
not the generals. The generals, ~the majority of whom remained loyal to the Repub--
lic, lost it. Only the captains, majors and colonels in command of the units and
who are in direct contact with the tr~~ops are, therefore, the ones who can again
"enable us to rise up victoriously."
- COPYRIGHT: 1981, Intormacion y Revistas, S.A.
10,04'L
CSU: 3110/55 ~ND
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