JPRS ID: 10251 JAPAN REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500020020-2
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• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 20
• Content Type: REPORTS

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- JPRS L/10251
' ~ 3 January 1982
- Ja an Re nrt
p p
- CFOUO 2/82)
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JPRS L/10251
13 January 1982
~
,lAPAN REPORT
(FOUO 2/8 2 )
_ COi~7ENTS
M [ LI'P/1f2Y
LDP Link With Military Buildug Policy Reviewed
(Hideo Ohtake; ASAHI JANARU, 6, I3, 20 Nov 81) 1
ECONOMIC
~ Mitsubishi Broadens Scope of Deals With China
(JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 15 Dec 81) 24
MITI Called on To Consolidate View on Materials Sectnr
(Haruo Suzuki Interview; JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 15 Dec 81). 25
Honda, Yugoslav Firm To Construct Engine-Making Plant
(JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 15 Dec 81) 27
SCIENCE AND T~;CHNOLOGY
Technical Cooperation Among Japan, U.S., Europe
(3APAN GCONOMIC .TOURNAL, 15 Dec 81) 28
_ Companies Pin Hopes on New Products, Technology
(JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 15 Dec 81) 30
-
_ JIRA Asked To Farticipate in USSR Robot Show
_ (JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 15 Dec 81) 31
- Nuclear Powerplant C onstruction Revives
(JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 15 Dec 81) 32
Two Underwater Steel-Cutting Technologi~es
(JAPAN ~CONOMIC JOURNAL, 15 Dec 81) 33
~apan Still Imports More Technology Than It Exports
(JAPAN ~CONOMIC JOURNAL, 15 Dec 81) 34
- a - [III - ASIA - 111 FOUO]
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Small Metal Partic).es Used for Production of Carbon Fiber
~ (JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 15 Dec 81) 35

\ Briefs
Australian Uranium Enrichment 36
Automated Car Painting 36
Machine Tool Orders Down 3~
Semi-Finished IC Chip Exports 37
Carbon Fiber Plant 37
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N~c~H c~N~�~c~?,~~. u~i�: e~ni.~~
MILITARY
LDP LINK WITH MILIT.ARY BUILDiIF' POLICY F_FVIEWEL~
Tokyc~ ASA~II JANARU .in Japanese 6, 13, 20 Nov 81
[Articles by Hideo Ohtake: "From Detente to Military Buildup"]
[6 Nuv 81 pp 30-34]
['lext] [N~ 14] I'ukuda Government and Military Expansion Plan
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) suffered a disastrous defeat in *_h~ 5 December
1976 general elections, about a month a~ter th.e "GenQral Principles of the Defense
Plan" were deci3ed. Przme Minister Miki took the responsibility and resigned, and
was replaced by Takeo Fukuda as prime minister. Many members of the Fukuda faction
were critical of the decision on the "General Principles," as was the Seirankai
(Blue Storm Society), which had provided active support to the establishment of the
Fukuda government. Also, the new cabinet was less than enthusiastic in faithfully
upholding the "General Principles" and the policy of "keeping under 1 percent of the
_ GNP," because it was not directly responsibla for the decision on the "General Prin-
ciples." It is therefore not surprising that the disengagement from the Miki-Sakata
- line of dent.ente began with the change of government.
However, the Fukuda cabinet did not rush precipitately toward military expansion and
militarization soon after acquiring political power. The reason was that there were
- several constraints which prevented a sudden change in policy.
l~irst, thr. LDl' deic.a~ wliich resulted ir. Miki's resignation (and the subsequent in-
- auguration of the Fukuda cabinet) brought a ba~ance of power between conservatives ~
~ anc! reLormists in ttie Lower and Upper Houses. The LDP barely maintained a mujority
� with the late addition of unaffiliated winners, and the party candidate for prime
minister was appointed by a bare majority of one vote. As a result, the Fukuda cabi-
net had to be extremely careful not to irritate the opposition parties by disengaging
itself from detente, and it also.could not neglect its guard against moves by the
Miki faction, which sought to merge forces with the opposition. This was probably
why Mihara, a veteran of Diet policy affairs, was selected as director of the
Defense Agency.
Second, the Japanese economy faced a grave crisis in 1977 and 1978. The policy of
restrainin~; overall demand to stabilize "runaway commodity prices" following the
Cirst oi1 sliock ha.d resulted in the beginning of a serious recession. Moreover,
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ccnditions had failed to improve despite the government's switch to business stimu-
~ Iating measures beginning in 1975, and mass bankruptcies and an employment crisis
loomed. The new prime minister, who had prided himself on being "Fukuda, the
' economic expert," personally sought to improve cond~*_ions and was completely bound
up with economic problems in the early stage of his administration. Also, on thP
international froiit, dnmands made on Japan regarding such eco:~omic policies as the
"three engine theory" took center stage and, together with the detente diplomac.y of
- ~the early Carte~ period, resulted in the defense problem being placed on the back
burner, Consequently, there was no room or necessity for the prime minister and his
a.ides to take strong leadership on the defense question.
Thirdly, the signing of the Japan-China peace and friendsh~p pact was the prime
foreign policy project at the time, wit:~ Chief Cabinet Secretary Sonoda (foreign
mi.nister since late 1977) taking the initiative. Sonoda was trying hard to avoid the
inf:erence tl~at Japan-Cliina relations would signify an encirclement of~ the Soviet Union,
and li~ was ttic:refore impelled to adopt a cautious stance to avoid irritating the
Soviet Union with a buildup of defense power. Additionally, Sonoda who wielded real
power with the Fukuda cabinet adopted a dovish posture on foreign pola.cy and defense
problems in general. As a result, his presence could be seen as having played a cer-
tain restraining role on militarization. Especially since 1978, Sonoda was considered
to have a braking influence on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was run by anti-
Soviet hardliners of the Shinsaku Hogen school.
Fourth, Sonoda had advocated "a test as a veace-loving nation" in the face of foreign
criticism of Japanese militarism in the eariy 1970's, and apparently needed some time
to convert to an "inherent" nawkish stance, even with the nudging of hawkish elements
in liis faction. For example, wtien Sonoda visited the ASEAN countries in August 1977,
he announced the Manila Delcaration (Fukuda Doctrine) basEd on the following:
"Looking back on history, economic powers have always been militar.y powers at the same
time. However, our nation upholds the unprecedented ideal in world history of trusting
- in the ju~tice and faith of the per~ples of the world and of striving to maintain their
security and existence with the ciecision net to take the path of a military power.
'('his is our challenge to a test unprecedented in history. I believe that this option
}~y .la~~;in will contribute tu tlic fundamental benefit of n~t only the entire Asian
rebiuii, but also to tliar. of tl~e entire world." This statement represents Fukuda's
pet tl~eory, and it was not at all surprising to find it inserted in the communique.
liowever, as we will explain later, when one considers that by that this time the
Soviet threat was already beginning to be pointed out inside the Foreign Ministry and
the DeFense Agency, the fact that the communique was issued has a significance which
cannot be overlooked,
With this as a background, Fukuda continued the basic Miki-Sakata line for some time.
Tt~is posture is best revealed in the Fukuda caoinet's positi.on vis-a-vis the questiun
of U~.S. troop withdrawability has grown in terms of the budget since the time of
Shi~eru Yoshida, tlie distrust of the military felt by Yoshida took hold in the de-
Cense ideology of the conservative mainstream. It came down to the Fukuda government
with liardly uny change. In this respect, one could say that the military was not
"recognized " even by the LDP.
Furthermore, Kanemaru announced this mainstream conservative thinking on every
occasion after he became director general of the Defense Agency. For example, a
book he wrote contains this passage: "I was born in 1914, so I saw the escalation
of military activities from the 15 May incident to the 26 February incident and the
tragedy of Japan's defeat in World War II, the Pacific war, with my oum eyes. I was
conscripted into the army as a private. I experienced treatment many times based on
the idea that military men were superior and 'others are not true Japanese.' In
that situation, I seriously wondered, as a young ma.n, "With things like this, what
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N'()R ()I~H'1('IA1, lltil~. ()N1,1~'
- will become of the future of Japan?" There was no freedom. Speech was controlled.
Because of one red piece of paper, it was necessary to select the path o~ death.
'Is this the way a country should be?' This anguish penetrated to the marrow of my
bones. This feeling did not change at all when I b~came director general of the
Defense Agency." He repeatedly made such pronouncements. "We must not go back
to a prewar Japan. This is the first step in thinking about national defense."
"The director general of the Defense Agency is the guardian of the ironclad principle
that 'The civilian government takes precedence over the military'."
With respect to the issue of civilian control, Kanemaru steadfastly maintained the
position, based on similar experiences, of form~r Director General Sakata who was
responsible for determining the "defense guidelines." He supported complete control
of the military by the Defe.tse Agency. We cannot appreciate the "understanding" of
Kanemaru's defense policies shown by the opposition parties without this background.
Therefore, Kurisu's series of statements were a hindrance to the "trust" between
the director general and the opposition parties. The quick response by Kanemaru to
- tlie supra-legal action statement demonstrated Kanemaru's strong convictions.
From these circumstances, we can see that Kurisu's criticism of the Defense Agency
actually implied a challenge to the defense ideology of the conservative mainstream.
However, at the time, Fukuda, who wd~ able to control the rightwing of the party,
was.in power, and he gave total support to Kanemaru. Therefore, this challenge did
not create a rift in the party. If an incident like this had occurred while the
rLiki government was in power, circumstances might have been different.
In any case, the first challenge by the military was avoided through Kanemaru's de-
' cision for "release". However, this certainly did not mean that the problem was
solved. This is because Kanemaru's policy of breaking down the taboo on defense
itself made it difficult to prevent statements by the military. The Kurisu statement
was induced by this policy of the Fukuda cabinet.
Furthermore, if the defense question is treated as a technical problem of ndtional
defense rather than as a problem of constitutional principles, the voice of military
officials, as professional experts, will inevitably become stronger. In fact, the
t)emocratic Socialist Party conducted talks with the chiefs of staff of the Air,
Cround, and Maritime Self Defense+Forces in August 1978, and there have been stronger
demand~ that the opinion of the military be heard by the Special Committee for Security
Affairs in the Diet.
' Military Challenge Not Ended with 'Release'
Also, it is difficult to give convincing reasons why the milirary professionals
should not report to the prime minis~er on the military situation as demanded by
Kurisu. It is not logical to recognize the Self Defense Forc~es but not give them the
right to speak. To borrow Kanemaru's own phrase: "It does not make sense to use
the people's tax money for military situation analysis and then not use it in govern-
ment policy. Presumably, we are not having it done for the amusement of the in-
dividuals involved." If we are aiming at becoming a medium-size military power
similar to the countries of Western Europe, it is difficult to reject Kurisu's claim
that "at least, we should allow the military to have as much politi.cal influence
as in the countries of Western Europe."
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Ttiis became very evident in tt~e work on strategic plans and emergency laws carried
otit by Kanemaru. The strategic plan and emergency laws are related to the area of
"military command" for actually moving troops. In an emergency, or in preparing for
- a hypothetical emergency, the influence of the military leaders as military profes~
sionals inevitably becomes stronger. The following statement by Kurisu accura~ely
reflects his awareness of this fact:
"In an emergency, it will be necessary to create a consolidated force, if only from
military necessity. And again, the Defense Agency resists this. If a consolidated
_ force is to be created, the joint chiefs will have to have authority over all oper-
- ations. The Defense Agency does not like that." "In an emergency, or in other words,
in time of war, civilian control will be entirely in the hands of the prime minister
as supreme commander and, within the limits of the directions he receives, the
= director general of the Defense Agency. The bureaucrats of the Defense Agency should
no longer be a problem." In short, strategic planning and work on an emergency law
:~ystem prc~vided a golden opportunity for rapidly raising the position of the military
:in relation to the _T)efense Agency Uureaus. This meant that as long as the Fukuda
~;overnment continued that policy, the challenge to Japanese-style civilian control
' could not be ended just by Kurisu's dismissal.
- Furthermore, cooperation with the American Government was creating a new pattern of
pressure f rom the military being applied through the U.S. Government as an intermed-
iary. Also, the spread of a co ncept of the Soviet threat brought about an increase
- in tlie number of military supporters in the LDP.
Thus, the defense policies under the Fukuda administration can be said to have brought
about a reexamination of the pr evious system of civilian control and the need for a
new concept. However, this awareness was almost nonexistent in the government and
the LDP. Director General Kanemaru, in particula.r, labelled the statements of the
military as being "the same as before the war" and only tried to stop them from making
such statements. There was no attempt to build agreement or establish a concept of
the role that should be taken by the military, as military specialists, in determining
defense policy. Ironically, he took exactly the same line of argument as the opposi-
tion parties which do not recognize the Self Defense Forces. This policy has the dan-
~;er oE only adding to the doubts of the military and leading in the direction of
cill.owin~ completely t~nrestricted influence to the military.
't'hu:;, the problem of civilinn control was left unsolved by Director General Kanemaru.
I3ecause of tiiis, tlie criticism of the Defense Agency by the chiefs of staff of the
Air, Ground, and Maritime Self Defense Forces continued after Kurisu's dismissal.
"Kanemaru proclaimed everywhere that 'the emergency law system will stand on its own'
znd tl~ere was no end to the 'disturbance' until there was a change in personnel."
Just befur~~. Kanemcu-u resigned as director general, a section manager in a
Defense Agency bureau had the following comment. "Kanemaru did many things such as
producing the guidelines for Japan-U.S. defense strategy. However, in the end, the
director general said: 'I do not understand the Self Defense Forces any more.'
The members of the Self Defense Forces now say they cannot get along well with us.
Why is this?"
T9ie greatest reason, in my opinion, is that Kanemaru did not directly accept Kurisu's
proposal for reexamination of c ivilian control.
COPYRIGHT: Asahi Shimbunsha 19 81
9f,51.
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ECONOMIC
MITSUBISHI BROADENS SCOPE OF DEALS WITH CHINA
_ Tokyo JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL in English Vol 19, No 985, 15 Dec 81 p 4
[Text] Mitsubishi Corp. has Under the a~eement, the areas of China. Even then,
strengthened cooperative friendly tirms will actively they are not able to take up
ties with so-called "friendly secure orders from China detailed transactions as in
trading houses" exclusively even for commodities which the case~ of the friendly
engaged in trade with China. they so far have not han- firms. The general trading
It recently reached agree- dled. Mitsubishi, on its part, houses, however, have the
ment with 15 s+~ch trading will supply commodities for ability to cope with inquiries
houses under which it will export to China when neces- for all sorts of co modities,
guarantee supply of com- sary and cooperate in trans- including transa~tions be-
modities contracted for ex- actions, tween third count es.
port to China which these As a result of China's eco- Mitsubishi thus decided to
friendly firms cannot pro- nomic adjustments, large cooperate with the friendly
cure on their own. scale deals, such as thase . firms to supplement each
Sino-Japanese trade has for plant exports; are not be- other's weaknesses and
slowed down recently due to ing concluded, and trade has Work for receipt of orders in
China's economic adjust- tapered off. Since China also a more effective manner as
~ ment program. Mitsubishi is taking a policy of regional Well as to expana transac-
believes that it will be able decentralization of power, tions. ~
to take part in more detailed the time has passed when y,arge-scaie transactions
transactions by joining with business could be conducted With China have disa~
the friendly firms acxl this simply by going to Beijing: ~ared. It thus can be said
will serve mutually to ex- The friendly firms enjoy that the era of competition
pand trade deals. mobility. :z11�any of tt?em ~tween the general trading
Niasaaki Enomoto, manag- have clients in~ China's re~ ~~es and friendly firms
ing director oE Mitsubishi, gional areas. One of their ~s arrived, with the former
- and the heads of the business weak points, however, ~S tending to eacroach on the
divisions of the company met that theic business ~ is rights of the latter.
recently with the presidents specialized. which limits
of the 15 friendly tirms which their transactions. The recent step taken by
in the past engaged in trans- On the one hand, Mit- Mitsubishi is aimed at stem-
- actions with :~titsubishi and subishi and otner general ming the decline in trade
reached an agreement on trading houses have finally with China by strel~gthening
entering into cooperatjve embarked on expanding its cooperative ties with the
ties. their branches in regionai friendly firms.
- COPYRICH'P: 1981, Tl~c Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc.
CSO: 4120/94
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ECUNUMIC
MITI CALLED ON TO CONSOLIDATE VIEW ON MATERIALS SECTOR
Tokyo JAPAN ECONUMIC JOURNAL in ~nglish Vol 19, No 985, 15 Dec 81 p 16
[Interview with Haruo Suzuki, chairman of Showa Denko K.K., by Seiji Okada,
industrial news editor of THE NIHON KEIZA SHIMBUN; date and place not speci-
fied]
[TeXt] Huruo Suzuhi, chnirman of Showa Denko K.K., wants the
Guvrrnment to frame a clear policy regarding petrochemica!
und other so-colied "materials industries" (which pr~duce
such basic materials as nonferrous metals and steel). His urge
for a clear policy followed submission of an interim report by
thc~ fndustria! Structure Council's chemical industry com-
- rnitt~~. Ird by an~~ther prominent economist, Niromi Arisawa,
c~~ th~ Minister of International Trade & Industry. (See JEJ
Dc~contb~r 8 issue. ) .
The report advised MITI to drajt n raw materials policy,
includin~; imports of naphtha, in light of the worldwide trend
to mah~ petrochemicals from natural gas (ethane). The
pressur~ of imports was forecast to keep Japan's ethylene
production at the present (evel of about 4.5 million tons in ]990.
Suzuhi's views on the industry's problems were obtained
t>~~ S~~i.ji Ohada, an industrial news editor of The Nihon Keizai
.ti{timbtut.
NK~: .?opan will be unable points. In other words, it is But I think that MITI may do
to con,pete with the U.S. and hard topractice (freefeedstock its business in two dime~ions.
Canada, Which utilize inexpen� imports). The members should The materials industries are
sive nacurat ~~as as raw n,nte� investigage why it isdifficult to important in terms of invest-
ri~i. The Japoriese indiistry in- practice the recommended im- ment and employment size.
sists that i!, be allowed to freely ports. I want MITI to abandon MITI's top officials should con~
irrt~~url invxpE~nsivt~ nanh~ha. its ambiguous stand. solidate ministry opinions into
'I')ii~ inli~rim reporl shows NKS: MITI peopl� held hot one now thst the (Zenko)
understandinK oJ thc~ problYm debates before the advlces Suzuki cabinet has been reshuf-
but jails to come up with spec- were submitted. But the f1ed.
ijic measures. !s the industry Agency of Nntural Reaourc�s & :VKS: Not much can be ex-
jrustrated? Energy, which controls the pected of the Goverrtment for
tiuauki: The rec:ommenda- petroleum industry, won the raw materials problem. So, it
tion shows that the ISC mem- arguments over the Basic In- seems that the industry ~tselj
bers know the direction to dustries Bureau, I hear that the should try to improve its proj-
which we should head for. But petrochemical industry ~n_ itability and revise the produc-
it has not said a word aboul im- ments about lack of their politt- tion base auitable to slow
- mediate implementalion. The ~a~ injluence. growth of demand in the future.
report is vague when it comes tiuzukf: I cannot tnentlon That requ{res improrement oj
lo the core, lh~ mos: important any specific divisions at MITI, the industry's behavior, such as
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HOR OFFiCIAL USF. ONI.Y
o~~ercompetition. panies. Won't the discussion be
Suzuki: Two or three lead- regarded as a problem in light
ing producers in specific are~s of the Anti-Monopoly act?
should be made responsiblefor Suzuki: The present
alt the producers' profitability. petrochemical industry situa-
Our lShowa Denko's) tie-up tion is analogous to a sick per- ~
with Mitsui Petrochemical It} son who does not have to t?e
dustries in medium- and low- hospitalized but has to go to a
pressure polyethylene is such hospital once or twice a week.
an example. Healthy persons may be ex-
NK~: Wilt excessive capac- posed to free competition. But
~ ity become a major probleml the industry's status satisfies
Suzaki: It is important to 60-70 per cent of the conditions
make production facilities for cartel formation. It d~
muscular. it is desirable to serves a near-cartel. Given
abancinn as much inefficient slow growth, MITI and FTC
and ut~nolete capacity as possi- should not be antagonistic but
ble so thal the operating rates form a consensus about what
oi' m~xicrn, efficient plants can prescriplion is necessary. Thal
Ix~ raised. The industry must will be a plus for the whole
hurry to modernize its capac- economy, too.
ity. I paitifully feel that we will NKS: Do you meon a
- go nowhere if we maintain the mechanism with which
status quo, but we are not mak- theraphy can be practiced
ing thora.ghefforts. openly departing jrom the pat-
NKS: Overcompetition, in tern of MITf. providing its ad-
- some people's view, stems mintstrative guidance and FTC
from too many a company in trying to amend it?
the same area. The inte~im re- Suzuki: I mean that when
port said that "mergers are poor men are talking together,
desirable" and advocated a policemen dces not need to
"consolidation that wili jorm stop by (and interfete).
leading companies." NKS: Can the petrochemi-
Suzuki: Mergecs are im� caI industry survive problems
possible even if companies go ~n Japanl
under. There will be no major Suzuki: Fesslmism pre-
mergers in the next two. or vails, but I think it can sur-
three ears. I believe that tie vive. You cannot be sure that
ups in production and sales will the raw ma!eriai cost gaps with
be as effective or nearly effec- the U,S. and Canada will re-
~ tive as mergers. We should main in thQ future, tao. Even if
pursue tie-ups with understand- imports grow to account for 20-
ing trom the Fair Trade Com- 30 per cent at the demand in
mission. Tie-ups will be effec- Japan, you~ should be aware
tive in recovering profitability. ~t the markets here are fairly
NKS: Formation oj com� large. Only domestic producers
pany groups and consolidation ~n satisfy. the severe demand
will require discussion by rnm� IPOiri useCS BbOUt pPO~uCt qU81i-
ties and deliveries. Cast dif-
ferences alone will not wipe out
Japanese makers from the
domestir markets. Excessive
fears are not justified.
COPYRIGIiT : 1.981, Tl~e Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc .
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H'()I2 ON!~1('IAI, lltil? ()NI.Y
- ECONOMIC
I
HONDA, YUGOSLAV FIRM TO CONSTRUCT ~NGINE-MAKING PLANT
Tokyo JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL in English Vol 19, No 985, 15 Dec 81 p 7
[Text] Honda Motar Co. will start the Republic of Croatia, where
producing general-purpose it will turn out Honda engines,
engines in Yugoslavia at the G-150, G-200 and G-300, at an
end of next year on a joint ahnual rate of 24,000 units in
venture basis. the first year and 30,000 in the
_ The Tokyo-based company following years.
recenlly oblained final go- Honda Motor will supply the
ahead of the Federal Govern- Osijek plant with frames,
ment of Yugaslavia to operate transmissions and other major
a.joint venture enterprise, Mio parts of engines. The ratio .of
Standard Tvornica Motora local contents to total parts
Osijek, with an indigenous supplies will be raised to 70 to
agricultural machinery maker, 80 per cent when the joint ven-
Metalska Industrija Standard ture operations go on stream.
~ Osijek. Yugoslavia will thus have an
The ~'ugoslav firm so far has integrated cultivator producing
been assembling Honda setup in its country.
, cultivaturs and pumps at an Meanwhile, Honda Motor has
annual rate of 10,0()0 units. in mind a similar plan .to
The joint engine-making provide its technolo~cal know-
- company will be capitalized at how to China in launching a
$6 million ~or approx. ~F 1,300 joint motorcycle-making ven-
miUionl, of which Honda will ture sometime in the near
put up about 16 per cent lor future.
some Y�l00 million) in the form The engine-making venture in
of providing its manufacturing Yugoslavia will prove an
know-how. important test for its plan to
The new company will provide skills and produce
construct a facto:y in Usijek, motorcycles in China.
COPYRICH'1: 1981, 'lhe Nit~on Keizai Shimbun, Inc.
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SCIGNCE AND TECHNOLOGY
- TECHNICAL COOPERATION 11MONG JAPAN, U.S., EUROPE
Tokyo JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL in English Vol 19, No 985, 15 Dec 81 pp 1,3
[Text]
ln the midst oF ongoing trade field of turbochargers - newly- Electric Works, ~.td. has signed
Erictions, Japan, the United developed equipment in- an OEM contract to provide
States and Western Europe dispensable to improve com- parts of ultrasound diagnostic
have been stepping up teclr bustion efficiency of engines for equipment to General Electric
nical exchanges in eomputer, energy-saving in the future. Co. of the li.S. Similar coo-
- semiconductor, robot and other Mitsubishi Heavy lndustries, tracts have been signed by
high-technology tields recentiy. Ltd., the early starter in the TEAC Corp. to offer video disc
- ()bservers note in particular tield, ottered technalogical as- players to Thomson-CSF of
that Japan is taking the initia- sista~~ce to General Electric France and by Minolta Camera
tive in masl trilateral ex- Company of Britain recently, Co. to offer plain paper copiers
changes which have taken the and at around the same time, to 1BM of the U.S.
form of technological co- MitsuiEngineering&Shipbuild- President Nihachiro Kata-
- operation, joint venture, origi- ing introduced techr~ology yama of Mitsubishi Electric
nal equipment manufacturer from MAN-B&W Diesel GmbH Corp. commented, "I have
(OEM) contracfs and others. of West Germany. . And the impression that we have
This indicates, they say, that Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy entered the era of equal part.
despite continuing confronta- lndustries Co. has, in coopera- nership, when his company
tion, a new era ot trilateral tion with Brown Boveri Co. of was being urged by Westing-
technological cooperation with Switaerland, managed to com- house Electric Corp. oE the U.S.
Japan as a pillar is eiaerging. merciaiize wi�bocnargers, to coope?'ate iu semicu~iductnr
in hcavy machinery and .These exchanges have been and industrial robot fields, and
he~ivy electrical machinery more evident in Japan's even production technology and
fields where Japan used to leading fields of eletronics and quality control skills.
- imporl technology, there have electromechanics. Fujitsu Ltd., More and more American
been a number of Japao- which already has business ti~ and European firms are willing
initiated projects with the U.S. ups with Siemens AG of West to introduce Japan's superb
and West Europe recently, Germany and Amdahl Corp. of production and applied tecir
Kawasaki . Heavy lndustries, the U.S., has recently coo- nology. Symbolic of this are
I.td. has initiated joint develop cluded a contract to oifer tect~ moves in the field oi large-scale
ment of a large coal-burning nology for large-scale com- integrated circuits where U.S.
tx~iler with Deutsche Babcock puters and semiconductors to makers like Texas lnstru-
& Wilcox AG of West Germany. 1CL Ltd. of Britain. And Nippon ments, lnc., Motorola, lnc. and
Mitsui Engineering & Ship Telegraph & Telephone Public lntel Corp. have piar~s to ex-
building Co. has cooperated Corp. has also concluded a pand its Japanese subsidiaries.
with Biphase Energy Syslems cross-licensing contract on Toshio Kodaka, president of
of the U.S. in commercializing patented technology of com- Tokyo Electron Ltd. which used
two-phase flow turbines ap~ puters and electronic telephone to import and sell semiconduc-
p;::able to ~eothermal and low- exchange systems with lnter- tor production equipment from
temperature power generation. national Business Machines the U.S., but is today io-
'l'he lypical technological Corp. of the U.S. creasingly handling Japanese
cxchanRe can be found in the E'urthermore, Yokogawa products, said, "Domestic users
28
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no longer buy our products Thus, it is an urgent matter
unless they are made in for Japan to overcome such
Japan." "comparative inferiority" and
Although the ~U.S. and West to that end, induction of v?�est-
Europe increasingly praise ern technology ��ill continue in
Japanese production and ap~ the years to come. lt is true
plied technology, a great many that technolog~� exchange. must
Japanese managers believe be based on s~~�apping superior
Japan is still inferior to the technolog~�, but the important
West in basic technology. For ' thin~ is ~ihderstood to be to
example, Tokyo Electric Power ~ee to it technolog}� offer-
Co., a user of boiling w~ater- cc1 contributes to industrial
typc nuclear reactors, has promotion of the other side.
started studying a plan to iTM Noi~oru 1'oshii, ser~ior ad~�iser
troducc pressurized water-type of Som� Corp. ~~�ho participated ,
reactors in an attempt to in the recent conference of the
diversify reactors, but Japa- Japan�Britain Electronics
nese makers like Toshiba Council, said, "We ha~~e been
- Corp., Ilitachi, Ltd., and Fuji successful in offering tectr
Electric Co. ti�ere forced to dis- nolog~� of home appliances to
p;itch their engineers to Kraft- W'est Europe, but ��e must
H~erk Union AG of West Ger- lhink of technical transfer,
many to be brirfed on pres- ~~'hich ~~�ill take root in the
s?n�ized ti�ater-type reactors. w~est�~~
Recent Partnerships among Japanese, American and European Enterprises
( I nclutling cases under negoftation)
Esfablishment ol a venture fo produce video tape Establishmenf of a ioinf venture to produce "mini
retordEf SY51em5 among VictOr COmpany Of Japan fax" fBC5imi12 equipmenf befw2en Mat5u5hita
l.ld. (JVC1, Thorn EMI Lttl. ol Britain and Teleiunken Graphic COmmunication Systems, Inc. antl fhe 8ritish
of West Germany Government
' ~l - Establishment of a joint VTR manufacturing com~ Exchange of patenfed technology on cOmputers, semi�
pany belween Mafsushifa Electric Indusfrial Ca. antl contlucfors antl elecfronic telephone exchange
Robert Bosch GmbH ol West Germany sysfems between Nippon Telegraph 6 Telephone
? JoiM development ol new boiling water�fype afomic Publlc Corp. and International BuSiness Machines
reactors amonq Toshiba Corp., Hitachi, Ltd., Tokyo COrp. of the U.S.
Electric Power Co antl Genera~ Eleciric Co. ol the 0- Joint develOpment of turbo charqers for vessels be
U.S. tween Ishikawaiima~Harima HeavY Industrie5 and
Joint development o~ new pressurized water type Brown Boveri Co. of Switzerlantl
atq,n~c rea~t0~s amony Westinghouse Eledric Corp. ? Licensing of industrial robof manufacWring
ol the U.S.. Mitsub~sh~ -Heavy Industries. Lfd. and technology bY F~jilsu Fa~uc Ltd. to 600 Group L~mif~
some of~er Japanese companies ed of Britain and ofhers
Joint tlevelopmenl o~ jet aircrafl enginesamong Kolls ? Licensing of lighfing antl aircontlifioning confrolling
. Royce Lid. ol Priram, Ishikawajima Marima Heavy technique by M~isushifa Eleciric Works. Lfd. to
~nuustries Co., Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Lid. and Brown Bovcri 6 Cie. AG of Wes1 Germany
M~ISUhish~ H~ivy Intlustries, Lid. (XJB pfoiect) ~ Licensingaf logic circuit technology by Toshiba fo L51
I 1 Jo~nt devclopment ol Japan's nexf generalion Civil ~oGic ot the U.S.
,iin rqlf amonq M~fSUUishi Hrovy Industrfes, Kawa~ ? ~ Licensinp ol industrial robot and semiconductor
sah~ frravy ~ntlustr~es, f ui~ Eleavy Industries, Ltd manulacturing technolopy by Hitachi ~o General
,~nd I~nnmy Amrrican aircrall makcrs ( VXX pro~ccf) EICCI~iC C0. 01 fhB U.S.
~ I Janl Uovrlopiui�nl of coal Uum~np UOiIPfS bMWCPn ? ~ L~censinp of IifhWm batte~y manulaCturing flchniquP
KnwasaM 1~~�.~vy Induslries and OeutSChe Bdbcock 6 hy Matsushita EleUric Industrial fo Ray O~Vac ol fhe
W~ICO~ AG ol Wr51 GclmanV U.S.
~ ~ Ctwp~vahon bMwoen M~tsui Engmeerinq 6 Shipbuiltl~ ? ~ L~censing ol opfical character reader technique by
_ ~nq ~o ~nd B~phase Encr9y Systems ol the U.S. fo Nippon EleUric Co. to Burroughs Corp. ol Ihe U.S.
commerciJlire Iwo phase IIOw turbines ? Licensing ol IArqe-scale compufer and semiCOndu[for
Inlormation rxcnanne on single unif video lechnology by Fulitsu Limited to ICL Ltd. of Brifain
cameraNTR un~ts among Eastman Kodak Co. W the O- licensing ol vessel use turbo charger technique by
U.S., Sony Corp., H~~achi, Lfd., Malsushifa Elecfric Mitsubishi Meavy Induslries to Gene~al Elecfric Gom~
- Induslriul and somr others pany o( Britain
COPYRIGHT: 1481, Ttie Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc.
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-y SCILNC~ AND TECHNOLUGY
- COMPANIES PIN HOPES ON NEW PRODUCTS, TECHNOLOGY
Tokyo JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL in English VoZ 19, No 985, 15 Dec 81, p 4
['Text ]
Uevelopment of new products cent. '1'hirty-five per cent cited grappling with the problem bt
and t~,~chnologies is the for~ raising the productivity of their elevating office productivity, in
most aim of leading companies direclly concerned field of which interest lately has been
in considering what they should work. growing.
do about their Euture manage- The association also querried The association also probed
m~,~~~ lhe companies on their main into such aspects as personnel-
7'his a~as disclosed recently operalions, using the product education, production, re-
in the yearly survey on man- portfolio management (YPM) search-development and
methcxl to ascertain their pre- marketi
agerial aims carried out by the ~~nt-future ossibilities. This bared that as to r
Japan Management Associa- py to this, 26 r cent said sonnel-education, the rob
em
tion in October. lt directed its ~ P
checkup at 500 companies listed theY were a"problem child" of devising measures for
on stock exchanges. bus~aess c in a growing industry ` vitalizing young and middle
Responses obtained from 191 but with a small share) and 11 age employees" had risen to
of them showed that 92 per cent per cent said they were a the top level; two-thirds of the
thought that development of "beaten dog business" (in a companies recognized that the
new products-technologies was low growth industry with a life-cycle of products had
the matit important. This was little share). ln other words, diminished; 45 per cent of the
as in the case ot last year's one-third of the respondents felt companies had started small
survey. thal lhe direction ot their group activities, such as
'l'he answrr indicated that business in the future was in quality control (QC) circles, in
rnterpriscw operating in an era need of a review. the marketing area.
ul stable growth were most This revealed that these Note: PPM is a managerial
concerned about develuping firms [elt the urgency of ineans to gauge product com-
ne~~ products-technologies so developing new products and position by taking into coo-
that they would not be left technolopies for replacing their sideration the smallness or
t~ehind in the current tide of main business phases. largeness of the market share
t~~chnc~lugical innovations. Un the other hand, only 35 per of a product and the smallness
Next most important goal cent of the companies surveyed or largeness of its growth.
ti�as "el~wating markc~t share" were found to be systematically
such repli~~ reaching 37 per
COPYRIGHT: 1981, the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc.
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
JIRA ASKED TO 1'ARTICIPATE IN USSR ROBOT SHOW
Tokyo JAPAN ECONGMIC JOURNAL in English Vol 19, No 985, 15 Dec 81 p 8
[Text] The Soviet Government, ~ The semi-governmental
scheduled lo open an inter- Japan External Trade Or-
national industrial robot ganization will acl as a
exhibition in Leningrad for a channel Eor Japanese robot
l0-day showing beginning makers to participate in the
Uctober 18, next year, has Soviet exhibition.
called on the Japan Indus- The Soviet Union, noting
trial Robot Association to that Japan possesses 70 per
join it. cent of the world's total
JIRA members, num- robots, originally envisioned
berir?g 3G, appear willing to holding an exhibition ot
take parl in the proposed solely Japan-built robots in
sho~~� as the~~ expect it wiU A9osco~~~. The Kremlin, how-
lead to cultivating fresh e~�er, has given it up in favor
demand for their products. of an internationai show in
In im~iting Japanese robot [.eningrad.
mak~rs to Leningrad, the Aside from such a show,
Kremlin has presenled a list the Soviet Union has been
of specific items the~� want approaching 1Viitsubishi
the Japanese lo display. Heavy Industries, Ltd. lo tie
The~~ irx~lude manual mani� up on robot-making skills.
pulators, computer-aided So far, only Kawasaki
- designing s~5tems, flexible Heavy Industries, Ltd. has
~ ~ manufacturing system~, sold a number of robots a
related parts and com� Soviet auto plant, with
ponents, jig machines, and others making several con-
almost all kinds of industrial tracts for exporting a feH~
r~h~~ti products in small lots.
CUPYRIGH'L': 1981, '1'he Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc.
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- SCI~NCE AND TECHNOLOGY
NUCLEAR POWERPLANT CONSTRUCTION REVIVES
'fokyo JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL in English Vol 19, No 985, 15 Dec 81 p 5
[Text ] lVuclear power plant con- one or two years. But the latest
struction, stalled so far this MITI action for Chubu Electric
year, is moving ahea~: again. Power indicated that the
Chubu Electric Power Co. is Government and utilities
. scheduled to start building its suffered only about six months ~
third atomic energy plant with oE delays.
a generating capacity of 1.1 Japan Atomic Power was
- miqion kilowatts at Hamaoka originally scheduled to start
in March, t982. Japan Atomic construction of its large plant
Power Co. plans to start a ~Tsuruga-2) in June. But the
- similarty large (1.16 million ?eakage caused MITI to refrain '
kilowatts) at Tsuruga once it from issuing its~ construction
. solves the problems with a approval in light of the
- radioactive waste leakage into Tsuruga-1 problem. The ~
seawaters. smaller reactor will remain
The problem involved a suspended until December 17 by
smaller plant at Tsuruga. The the ministry's order.
Government's Electric Power Meantime, Hokuriku Electric
Source Coordination Council is power Co. is trying to blueprint
likely to approve construction its nuclear project, including a
plans totaling in generaCing 540,000-kilowatt plant at Noto
capacity more than 4 million peninsula. This project, how-
kilowatts, including a project of ever, is unlikely to progress ~
Tohoku Eleetric Power Co. for fast enough to seek the EP-
a 825,0o0-kilowatt plant at SCC's approval in fiscal 1982.
M~'' Hokuriku, Kansai and Chubu
The nuclear projects were are considering a joint nuclear
scalled after the accident at the Project for a large (10 million
- Three Mile Island station in the kilowatt) nuclear complex also
U.S. in March, 1979. Projects
were revived in August, ?980, on the peninsula. But Hokuriku
when the Ministry of Inter- has not submitted its joint plan
national Trade & Industry ~o local governments because
allowed lwo utilities - Tokyo of the affects the Tsuruga prob-
and Kansai Electric !Power lem has.
Companies - to construct two Elsewhere, the projects are
cach reactors at Fukushima going on relatively smoothly.
:~nd 7'akahama. Then, the Utilities plan to propase six
utililics here were hil by the projects in the MITI-sponsored
'I'tiuruga I~akage problems, public hearings and EPSCC
which MITI discovered in April meetings in the rest of [iscal
this year. 1981. The largest plans e the
'i'he utility industry feared two 1.18 million kilow;.tt~lants
lhat lhe problems would cause considered by Kyushu Electric .
nuclear projects to be delayed Power Co.
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- I~OR UFFI('IA1. USE ONI..Y
SCtENCG ANU TECHNOLOCY
TWO UNllERWATER STEr.L-CUTTING TECHNOLOGIES
Tokyo JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL in English Vol 19, No 985, 15 Dec 81 p 17
_ [Text] The world's first two are stainless covering. The gas
electric discharge methods for torch process had already been
cutting undenvater for the developed in America for com-
safcst disposal of radioactive mercial application. Japan's
steel structures, developed by own methods feature
last F~bruary by a Japanese minimized underwater genera-
govc~rnmental laboratory, have tion of redioactive gas.
become applicable to modern As the institute explained, the
commercial nuclear station gas toreh it has used for the
pressure vessels, it was steel part of the stainless-cover-
recently learned. ed steel s'tructures of the N-plant
According to the Government pressure vessels has reached
Induslrial Research lnstitute, the new high capacity through
Shikoku, Takamatsu of the such improvements as: 1)
- Ministry of lnternational Trade Enlargement of the torch dia-
& lndustry's Agency of lndus- meter from 20 to 30 milli-
trial 5cience and Technology, meters; 2) Expansion of the
onr of its two methods of cut- oxygen blow mouth diameter
ting slainless-clad steel struc- from between 1.9 and 2.3 to 2.9
tures into smaller pieces has and 3.2 miilimeters, 3) Use of
been developed to a higher the conventional propane gas
capacity of severing up to 300- mixed with a 30 per cent
millimeter-thick steel plates or methyl-acetylene gas as the
bars. The capacity thus has main flame; and 4) Switching
becn doubled compared with of a"pressurized water cur-
- thr original one announced last tain" applied to both the ~arc
February. discharge cutting and the gas
The two methods, respec- torct~ cutting to an "air pres-
tively for culting stainless steel sure curtain" in the case of the
anci stainless-covered steel, gas torch to eliminate water
fealurc an underwater arc type seepage.
of electric discharge like But the whole severance
welding, (or efficiently equipment did not have to be as
sevcring stainless steel and in enlarged as anticipated. The
the case of stainless-clad steel, new capacity is more than
thc cumbined application o[ enough tor cutting off the
thal ~lcrtric are discharge existing commercial N-plant
- pruccss for cutting through pressure vessel steel of 250
sWinless steel and a gas torch millimeters in thickness.
ior si~verinK stcel under the
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
�APAN STILL IMPORTS MORE TECHNOLOGY THAN IT EXPORTS
`l'okyo JAPAN ECONOMIC .JOURNAL in L'nglish Vol 19, No 985, 15 Dec 81 p 17
['1'ext ] ~apan's annual balance o[ The predominance of .
technology imports and machine and electric-elec-
exports still registers a big tronic technologies' clearly
excess ot imports despite reflected Japan's recently-
the recent sharp growth in mounting imports of Amer-
Japan's technology exports. ican. and West European
The Science and Tech- technolo~ies concerning the
nology Agency revealed developr.ient ot new types of
recently that technology nuclear electric power
imports in fiscal 1980 ended p~a~?~, ~arge thermal-steam
last March, in terms of electric power plant boilers,
_ royally and other compen- other heavy-duty machin-
sation payments on a dollar ery, and computer-related
base, totaled 51,439 million, equipment.
t4.2 per cent up from the Computer-related tech-
preceding fiscal year. nologies numbered 190 con-
- Technology exports during tracts, up 26 or 15.9 per cent
fiscal 198u totaled 5378 from the preceding year, ,
million, 10.5 per cent up. with the U.S. accounting for
Both annual increases in- about half, and France,
- dicated a conlinued brisk West Germany, and Britain
interchange of technologies, coming thereafter in that
Apart fr