LECTURE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE PRESENTED AT THE AIR WAR COLLEGE MAXWELL FIELD, ALABAMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2002
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 14, 1947
• Content Type: SPEECH

E~~ ~ws
Approved For Release 2003/01/2 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
LECTURE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
PRESENTED AT THE A I R WAR COLLEGE
MAXWELL FIELD, ALABAMA
14 NOVEMBER 1947
B Y B R I G. GEN. E. K. WF31 GHT'? DEPUTY D 1 RECTOR
IT IS A RARE TREAT TO BE AT THIS
STATION AGAIN AFTER A LONG ABSENCE AND
TO RENEW OLD TIES WHICH WERE MADE DURING
MY SEVERAL YEARS AS AN INSTRUCTOR AT
FORT R E N N I N G.
BUT OF COURSE MY REAL REASON FOR
BEING HERE IS TO DISCUSS CERTAIN ASPECTS
O F I N T E L L I G E N C E A N Df P A R T I C U L A R L Y2 T H E
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND ITS
RELATION TO OTHER AGENCIES AND DEPARTMENTS
OF GOVERNMENT.
THERE HAS BEEN ENORMOUS GROWTH, OVER
THE PAST FEW YEARS, I N THE A P P R E C I A T I O N
OF INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. SOME OF THIS
I N C R E A S E D A P P R E C I A T I O N I S DUE TO A F U L L
R E A L I Z A T I O N O F OUR PRE-WAR FAILURES I N
THAT F I ELD. SOME OF IT IS DUE TO THE
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHZNGE IN CLASS. ^
^ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHMII# s TO: TS S C3'.+ZQv
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80F*ff' `4001500
SATE (SEYIE
25X1
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
REDUCTION I N OUR ARMED FORCES. I T I S
AXIOMATIC THAT THE MORE THE ACTUAL COMBAT
FORCES ARE REDUCED THE GREATER IS THE
ROLE THAT MUST BE PLAYED BY INTELLIGENCE
A G E N C I E S,
HOWEVER$ I WANT TO BELIEVE THAT THE
FULLER APPRECIATION OF THE VALUE OF AND
NEED FOR GOOD INTELLIGENCE IS JUST THAT A FULLER APPRECIATION OF THE VALUE AND
NEED FOR GOOD I N T E L L I G E N C E
THIS NATION HAS DEVELOPED REAL
COMMANDERS IN ALL GRADES MOST OF THEM
AND ALL WITH A HIGH REGARD FOR OPERATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE, FROM THIS KNOWLEDGE OF
EXPERIENCE } AN APPRECIATION OF INTELLI-
GENCE HAS SPREAD THROUGH THE HIGHEST
RANKS AND AGENCIES OF OUR GOVERNMENT.
I BELIEVE YOU HAVE HEARD OTHER TALKS
ON INTELLIGENCE FROM THE DEPARTMENTAL
VIEWPOINT AND ARE TO HEAR MORE, THEREFORE
I SHALL ENDEAVOR TO HOLD MY DISCUSSION 10
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS ON THE NATIONAL SCALE.
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
IN D I S C U S S I N G THE SUBJECT O F NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE I THINK WE MUST BEGIN BY
RECALLING TO MIND THE CHAOTIC CONDITION
OF OUR INTELLIGENCE PRIOR TO THE WAR,
I T H I N K I T CAN B E S A I D WITHOUT
CHALLENGE THAT BEFORE THE WAR OUR INTELLI-
GENCE SERVICE COULD IN BUT FEW WAYS
COMPARE WITH THAT OF GREAT BRITAIN) FRANCE,
RUSSIAS GERMANY OR JAPAN. WE HAD A POOR
I N T E L L I G E N C E SERVICE BECAUSE THE P E O P L E
O F T H I S COUNTRY D I D NOT BELIEVE I T
S O M E T H I N G UN-AMERICAN ABOUT E S P I O N A G E
AND EVEN ABOUT I N T E L L I G E N C E GENERALLY.
AS THE UNITED STATES FOUND ITSELF
SUDDENLY PROJECTED INTO A GLOBAL WAR,
IMMENSE GAPS IN OUR KNOWLEDGE BECAME
READILY APPARENT. THE WORD t*I NTELL I GENCEip
QUICKLY TOOK ON A FASHIONABLE CONNOTATION.
EACH NEW WARTIME AGENCY -- AS WELL AS
THE OLDER DEPARTMENTS -- SOON BLOSSOMED
OUT W I T H I N T E L L I G E N C E STAFFS O F THEIR
OWNS EACH PRODUCING A MASS OF UNCOORDINATED
I N F O R M A T I O N. THE RESULTANT C O M P E T I T I O N
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
FOR FUNDS AND SPECIALIZED PERSONNEL WAS
A MONUMENTAL EXAMPLE OF WASTE. THE WAR
AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS DEVELOPED FULL
P O L I T I C A L AND E C O N O M I C I N T E L L I G E N C E STAFFS 1
A S D I D THE RESEARCH AND A N A L Y S I S D I V I S I O N
OF O, S. S. THE BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE
AND ITS SUCCESSOR. THE FOREIGN ECONOMIC
ADMINISTRATIONY, ALSO DELVED DEEPLY INTO
THE F I E L D S OF E C O N O M I C I N T E L L I G E N C E.
NOT CONTENT W I T H STAFFS I N W A S H I N G T O N)
THEY ESTABLISHED SUBS I D I A R Y STAFFS I N
LONDON AND THEN FOLLOWED THESE UP WITH
OTHER UNITS ON THE CONTINENT AND IN THE
PAC I F I C AREAS.
WHEN FOR EXAMPLE' OFFICIALS REQUESTED
A REPORT ON THE STEEL INDUSTRY OF JAPAN
OR THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE NETHER-
LANDS EAST INDIES THEY HAD TO CHOOSE
FROM THE REPORTS OF THE BOARD OF ECONOMIC
WARFARE) G -2' O N I' OR THE 0. S. S. -- JUST
TO NAME A FEW. AND' BECAUSE THESE AGENCIES
HAD COMPETED TO SECURE THE BEST PERSONNEL)
IT WAS NECESSARY FOR EACH OF THEM TO BACK
U P I T S EXPERTS B Y A S S E R T I N G THAT I T S
REPORTS WERE THE BEST AVAILABLE AND THAT
THE OTHERS MIGHT WELL BE DISREGARDED.
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
- 4 -
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
DURING THE WAR THE OFFICE OF
S T R A T E G I C S E R V I C E S -- O. S. S. -- WAS
ESTABLISHED FOR THE PURPOSE OF GATHER-
ING TOGETHER MEN OF EXCEPTIONAL BACK-
GROUND AND ABILITY WHO COULD OPERATE IN
THE FIELD OF NATIONAL, RATHER THAN DEPART-
MENTAL INTELLIGENCE. IN WEIGHING THE
MERITS OF THE 0. S. S.) ONE SHOULD REMEMBER
THAT I T CAME LATE I N T O THE F I E L D. !T WAS A
STOP-GAP, OVERNIGHT IT WAS G I V E N A
FUNCT I ON TO PERFORM THAT THE BR I T I SH> FOR
EXAMPLE HAD BEEN DEVELOPING AGGRESSIVELY
SINCE THE DAYS OF QUEEN ELIZABETH. WHEN
ONE CONSIDERS THESE FACTS' THE WORK OF
THE 0. S. S. WAS QU I TE REMARKABLE AND I TS
KNOWN FAILURES MUST BE WEIGHED AGAINST
ITS SUCCESSES. MOREOVER I T MARKED A
C R U C I A L TURNING POINT I N THE D E V E L O P M E N T
O F OUR I N T E L L I G E N C E SYSTEM AND WE P R O F I T
GREATLY B Y I T S E X P E R I E N C E S AND MISTAKES,
THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE
WHICH INVESTIGATED THE ATTACK ON HAWAII,
REACHED MANY PERTINENT CONCLUSIONS
REGARDING THE SHORT-COMINGS OF OUR
INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AND MADE SOME VERY
SOUND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ITS IMPROVEMENT.
Approved For Release 2003/01/22: C!i~-RDP80R01731RO01400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
THE COMMITTEE SHOWED THAT SOME VERY
SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION HAD NOT BEEN
CORRECTLY EVALUATED. IT FOUND THAT SOME
OF THE EVALUATED INFORMATION WAS NOT PASSED
ON TO FIELD COMMANDERS. BUT -- OVER AND
ABOVE THESE FAILURES WERE OTHERS MORE
S E R I O U S - - WHICH WENT TO THE VERY FOUNDA-
TION O F OUR I N T E L L I G E N C E STRUCTURE, I AM
SPEAKING NOW OF THE FAILURE TO EXPLOIT
OBVIOUS SOURCES; THE FAILURE TO COORDINATE
THE COLLECTION AND D I S S E M I N A T I O N O F I NTE LL I
GENCE) THE FAILURE TO CENTRALIZE. INTELLIGENCE,
THE C O M M I T T E E RECOMMENDED THAT INTELLI-
GENCE WORK HAVE CENTRALIZATION OF AUTHORITY
AND CLEAR-CUT ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY.
I T FOUND SPEC I F I C FAULT W I TH THE SYSTEM OF
DISSEMINATION -- OR5 MORE ACCURATELY THE
LACK OF DISSEMINATION.
IT STATED THAT THE SECURITY OF THE
N A T I O N CAN BE I N S U R E D ONLY THROUGH CON-
TINUITY OF SERVICE AND C E N T R A L I Z A T I O N OF
R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y I N THOSE CHARGED W I T H
Approved For Release 20Q3/01 27 :_CIA-RDP80R01731 R001400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150005-0
IT FOUND THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE
FOR RESOURCEFULNESS ON THE PART OF INTELLI-
GENCE PERSONNEL) AND THAT PART OF THE FA I L-
11
URE I N THIS RESPECT WAS FAILURE TO ACCORD
TO INTELLIGENCE WORK THE IMPORTANT AND
S I G N I F I CANT ROLE W H I C H I T DESERVES.
a
THE COMMITTEE DECLARED THAT EFFICIENT
I N T E L L I G E N C E S E R V I C E S ARE JUST A S E S S E N T I A L
u
I N TIMES OF PEACE AS IN WAR.
THE END OF THE WAR FOUND THE UNITED
STATES I N A POSITION OF I N T E R N A T I O N A L
IMPORTANCE AND POWER I N A VERY UNSTABLE
WORLD -- AND THAT POSITION MAINTAINS TODAY.
WE MUST NEVER AGAIN FIND OURSELVES CON-
FRONTED WITH THE NECESSITY FOR DEVELOPING
PLANS AND P O L I C I E S ON THE BASIS O F INTELLI-
GENCE COLLECTED' COMPILED AND INTERPRETED
BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, IT IS COMMON
KNOWLEDGE THAT WE FOUND OURSELVES IN JUST
THAT POSITION) AS REGARDED THE EUROPEAN
THEATRE) AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. FOR
MONTHS WE HAD TO RELY B L I N D L Y AND TRUST-
INGLY ON THE SUPERIOR I N T E L L I G E N C E S Y S T E M
O F THE B R I T I S H.
Approved For Release 2003/01127 :'61A-PDP80R01731 R001400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
HOWEVER, IN MATTERS SO VITAL TO A
NATION HAVING RESPONSIBILITIES OF A WORLD
POWER THE UNITED STATES MUST NEVER AGAIN
BE FORCED TO GO, HAT IN HAND BEGGING A
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT FOR THE EYES __ THE,
FOREIGN I N T E L L I G E N C E - - W I T H W H I C H TO SEE,
O U R WAR EXPERIENCE I N THE INTELLIGENCE
FIELD) THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE JOINT CON-
GRESSIONAL COMMITTEE WHICH INVESTIGATED
THE HAWAIIAN ATTACK, AND THE STUDIES OF
MANY OTHER GROUPS AND COMMITTEES, FOCUSED
ATTENTION ON THE NEED FOR A CENTRALIZED
INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM.
As MOST OF YOU KNOW A NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY WAS ESTABLISHED BY
PRESIDENT TRUMAN ON 22 JANUARY 1946Y BY
EXECUTIVE D I R E C T I V E . THE CENTRAL I NTELLI--
GENCE GROUP WAS DESIGNATED AS THE OPERATING
AGENCY OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
A U T H O R I T Y. SINCE THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
GROUP HAS NOW BEEN LEGALIZED BY THF_
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 -- UNDER THE
NEW NAME OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY -- I SHALL NOT DISCUSS THE OLD
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
ORGANIZATION FURTHER -- BUT WILL PROCEED
TO THE NEW,
f'/,5 T
lc--K # , - R ? 4 t + N B~ 1 W O U L D L I K E TO
(DI S C U S S W I T H YOU THE P E R T I N E N T P R O V I S I O N S
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
INSOFAR AS THEY AFFECT THE INTELLIGENCE
PICTURE, T H I S ACT E S T A B L I S H E S -- FOR THE
F I R S T T I M E ON A LEGAL BASIS - - A N A T I O N A L
S E C U R I T Y COUNCIL THE F U N C T I O N O F WHICH I S
TO ADVISE THE PRESIDENT ON THE INTEGRATION
OF FOREIGN) DOMESTIC AND MILITARY POL I C I E S
RELATING TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY. THE
COUNCIL IS TO BE PRESIDED OVER BY THE
PRESIDENT HIMSELF] OR BY ANY MEMBER HE MAY
DESIGNATE. I T S MEMBERSHIP I S COMPOSED O F
THE PRESIDENT THE SECRETARIES OF STATES
DEFENSE THE ARMY THE NAVY THE AIR FORCE
AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
RESOURCES BOARD TOGETHER WITH CERTAIN
OTHERS WHO MAY BE APPOINTED AT THE OPTION
O F THE PRESIDENT.
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IS
ESTABLISHED UNDER T H I S C O U N C I L.
INTENTS AND PURPOSES THEREFORE THE
N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y C O U N C I L W I L L TAKE THE
9
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
 Approved For Release 003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731R001400150005-0
PLACE OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY
W H I C H 15 S P E C I F I C A L L Y ABOLISHED B Y THE ACT.
THE LAW DOES NOT SET FORTH THE POWERS OF THE
COUNCIL i AS THEY RELATE TO OUR AGENCY, I N THE
MANNER IN WHICH THE PRESIDENTS ORIGINAL
EXECUTIVE ORDER DELINEATED THE POWERS OF THE
N A T I O N A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A U T H O R I T Y I N R E L A T I O N
TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP. HOWEVER i
THE FACT THAT THE AGENCY IS PLACED UNDER THE
C O U N C I L WOULD APPEAR TO G I V E THE C O U N C I L T H E
SAME GENERAL AUTHORITIES FOR DIRECTING THE
PLANNING DEVELOPMENT AND COORDINATION OF
A L L FEDERAL FOREIGN I N T E L L I G E N C E A C T I V I T I E S
WHICH THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY
HAD BEFORE IT.
THE ACT SPECIFICALLY PROVIDES F C R A
D I RECTOR O F CENTRAL I NTELL I G E N C Ef WHO I S
TO BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT BY AND
WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE
FROM EITHER C I V I L I AN OR MILITARY L I FE.
CERTAIN ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS ARE THEN
INCLUDED SO THAT THE DIRECTOR SHALL NOT
BE SUBJECT TO THE USUAL SUPERVISION If
R E S T R I C T I O N S AND P R O H I B I T I O N S W H I C H A P P L Y
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
TO MEMBERS OF THE ARMED SERVICES, I T
FURTHER STATES THAT HE IS NOT TO POSSESS
OR EXERCISE ANY SUPERVISION., CONTROL, POWERS
OR FUNCTIONS -- OTHER THAN THOSE HE WOULD
EXERCISE AS DIRECTOR -'~ OVER ANY COMPONENT
OF THE ARMED SERVICES. THESE CLAUSES WERE
INCLUDED IN ORDER TO ASSURE TO THE SATIS-
FACTION OF THE CONGRESS THAT THE DIRECTOR
WOULD BE FREE FROM UNDUE SERVICE POLITICS
AND I N F L U E N C E.
ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PROVISIONS
OF THE ACT VESTS IN THE DIRECTOR THE RIGHT
TO TERMINATE THE EMPLOYMENT OF ANY EMPLOYEE
OF THE AGENCY WHENEVER IT APPEARS THAT SUCH
T E R M I N A T I O N I S NECESSARY I N THE I N T E R E S T S OF
THE UNITED STATES. I T CAN BE READILY UNDER-
STOOD THAT' IN AN AGENCY SUCH AS OURS WHERE
S E C U R I T Y I S P A R A M O U N T) T H I S R I G H T I S AMONG
THE MOST NECESSARY THAT WE COULD HAVE.
UNDER NORMAL - C I V I L SERVICE P R O C E D U R ES, I T
IS VERY DIFFICULT TO REMOVE A PERSON FOR
INEFFICIENCY) OR FOR THOSE BORDERLINE
LOYALTY CASES WHERE THE SENSITIVITY OF AN
AGENCY SUCH AS OURS WOULD NORMALLY REQUIRE
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 R001400150005-0
TERMINATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, THIS
PLACES A VERY HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY ON
US A I N REGARD TO C I V I L L I BERT I ES, WH I CH
CANNOT B E L I G H T L Y E X E R C I S E D. NONETHE-
LESS, IT IS VITAL TO THE SUCCESSFUL AND
SECURE PERFORMANCE OF OUR DUTIES.
THE LAW SPECIFICALLY PROVIDES THAT
OUR AGENCY SHALL HAVE NO POLICE, SUBPOENAS
L_AW ENFORCEMENT POWERS, OR INTERNAL SECUR-
ITY FUNCTIONS, THIS PROVISION WAS ALSO
I N THE OLD E X E C U T I V E O R D E R,) AND I T I S
ONE WHICH WE ARE VERY HAPPY TO HAVE
INCLUDED IN THE LAW. WE HAVE CONSIST-
ENTLY URGED THAT CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
HAVE NOTHING WHATSOEVER TO DO WITH POLICE
POWERS OR FUNCTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE
I N T E R N A L S E C U R I T Y O F THE UNITED STATES.
THE INTERNAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS ARE
PROPERLY A PART OF THE WORK OF THE F. B. I.,
AND WE HAVE NO D E S I R E WHATSOEVER TO INTER-
FERE W I T H T H I S. I T I S A BURDEN W H I C H WE
DO NOT WISH TO ASSUME.
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
DURING THE CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS
WHICH PRECEDED THE PASSAGE OF THIS ACT)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WAS UNDER ATTACK
AS A P O S S I B L E AND I N C I P I ENT GESTAPO.
WE HELD THAT THIS ARGUMENT HAD NO BASIS
IN FACT) SINCE A GESTAPO CAN ARISE ONLY
WHEN P O L I C E POWERS AND I N T E L L I G E N C E A R E
C O M B I N E D I N ONE O R G A N I Z A T I O N. W E POINTED
OUT TIME AND AGAIN THAT OUR INTERESTS
ARE SOLELY IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE. THEREFORE, AS I HAVE
SAID WE WELCOME THIS PROVISION IN THE
LAW W H I C H E L I M I N A T E S ANY P O S S I B I L I T Y
THAT OUR ORGANIZATION WILL MERGE INTEL-
LIGENCE WITH POLICE POWER) OR ASSUME
ANY FUNCTIONS RELATIVE TO THE INTERNAL
S E C U R I T Y O F THE UNITED STATES.
AND NOW I WISH TO DISCUSS WITH YOU
CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE LAW RELATING
TO THE SPECIFIC D U T I E S O F THE AGENCY.
P/
THESE DUTIES WERE ENACTED FOR THE PUR-
POSE OF COORDINATING THE INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES OF THE SEVERAL GOVERNMENTAL
DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES IN THE INTEREST
OF NATIONAL SECURITY. IN OTHER WORDS--
13 -
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
0F TH.1 S
WHICH HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO
THE N A T I O N A L S-E C U R I T Y C O U N C I L - - I T
BECOMES APPARENT THAT THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IS TO SERVE AS THE
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R TO THE C O U N C I L ON
ALL MATTERS RESPECTING NATIONAL INTEL-
L I G E N C E.
THE NEXT DUTY IMPOSED UPON US BY
THE ACT IS TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO
THE COUNCIL FOR THE COOROINATIO OF THE
I N T E L L I G E N C E A C T I V I T I E S O F THE GOVERN-
MENT INSOFAR AS THEY RELATE TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY, UNDER THE PRESIDENTS
EXECUTIVE ORDERS THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE WAS ASSISTED BY WHAT WAS
KNOWN AS THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD.
T H I S BOARD CONSISTED O F THE SPECIAL
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE THE DIRECTOR
OF INTELLIGENCE OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT
GENERAL STAFF) THE C H I E F O F NAVAL I N T E L-
LIGENCE.7 AND THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF AIR
STAFF - 2. W H I L E THERE I S NO SPECIFIC
- 14 -
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
STATUTORY PROVISION FOR THE CONTINUANCE
OF THE I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y B O A R D 9 THE
LAW PERMITS THE APPOINTMENT OF NECESSARY
ADVISORY COMMITTEES) AND WE WILL MAIN-
TAIN THIS BOARD AND CONTINUE TO LEAN ON
I T FOR A D V I C E I N A L L PHASES O F O U R
A C T I V I T I E S. I T ENABLES U S TO KEEP I N
CLOSE AND INTIMATE CONTACT WITH THE
DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF
THE GOVERNMENT. IN ADDITION9PROVISION
I S MADE TO I NV I TE THE HE ADS OF eft
INTELLIGENCE A G E N C I E S O F THE G O V E R N M E N TP Tf& t
THAN THOSE MENTIONED BEFORE)TO SIT AS
MEMBERS OF THE ADVISORY BOARD ON ALL
MATTERS W H I C H WOULD AFFECT THEIR A G E N C I E S.
I N THIS MANNERS THE BOARD SERVES TO FUR-
NISH THE DIRECTOR WITH
THE KNOWLEDGE ADVICE) EXPERIENCE) VIEW-
POINTS AND OVER-ALL REQUIREMENTS OF THE
DEPARTMENTS W I T H RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE,
THESE RECOMMENDATIONS' WHEN ADOPTED CAN
SERVE AS THE BASIS OF MANY OF THE DIREC-
TOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COUNCIL FOR
THE C O O R D I NAT I O N O F OUR GOVERNMENTS
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
T H I S PLANNED C O O R D I N A T I O N I S O F
PARTICULAR I M P O R T A N C E I N D E T E R M I N I N G
PRIMARY F I E L D S O F I N T E L L I G E N C E R E S P O N"
E 3 1 T I E S OF THE V A R I O U S DEPARTMENTS
AND AGENCIES. WE ARE -- IN THE FIELDS
OF COLLECT I ON9 PRODUCTION,. AND DISSEM-
INATION -- WORKING TO PREVENT OVERLAP-
PI NG FUNCT I ONSj THAT IS, TO ELIMINATE
DUPLICATE ROLES AND MISSIONS AND TO
E L I M I N A T E D U P L I C A T E S E R V I C E S I N CARRY-
ING ~O-UT THESE FUNCTIONS,
_
THE NEXT PARAGRAPH OF THE LAW FRO"
V I D E S FOR THE CORRELA I Q N AND
THIS IS A MAJOR COMPONENT OF A SUCCESS-
FUL CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY COMING
"
UNDER THE BROAD GENERAL HEADING OF PRO
DUCT I ON, AND INCLUDING THE EVALUATION,
CORRELATION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE I N F O R M A T I O N G A T H E R E D
FOR THE P R O D U C T I O N O F INTELLIGENCE. IT
INVOLVES THE PROCESS OF SYSTEMATIC AND
C R I T I C A L EXAMINATION O F I N T E L L I G E N C E
INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETER-
MINING I T S U S E F U L N E S S) C R E D I B I L I T Y AND
Approved For Release 2003/01/27: CI4- DP80R01731R001400150005-0
T I O N IO N W I T H I N THE GOVERNMENT O F I N T E L L I"
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150005-0
ACCURACY. IT I N V O L V E S THE . S Y N T H E S I S OF
THE P A R T I C U L A R I N T E L L I G E N C E I N F O R M A T I O N
WITH ALL AVAILABLE RELATED MATERIAL.
IT I N V O L V E S THE PROCESS O F D E T E R M I N I N G
THE PROBABLE S I G N I F I C A N C E O F EVALUATED
I NTELI_ I GENCE.
IS SENT TO THE DEPARTMENT RESPONSIE'LE
FOR I T S COLLECTION. T H I S M A T E R I A L I S
NECESSARY TO THAT DEPARTMENT) IN THE
COURSE OF ITS DAY-TO-DAY OF= ERAT I ONI,
EACH DEPARTMENT MUST HAVE PERSONNEL
AVA I LABLE TO D I G E S T T H I S I NFORMAT I
AND HUT I T T O SUCH USE A S I S N E C E S S A R Y
W I T H I N THAT DEPARTMENT. THE HEADS C F
G O V E R N M E N T DEPARTMENTS AND A G E N C I E S
MUST BE CONSTANTLY INFORMED OF THE
S I T U A T I O N W I T H I N THEIR OWN F I E L D S T O
D I S C H A R G E THEIR C B L I GAT I O N S TO THIV,
COUNTRY, W I T H THIS D E P A R T M E N T A L
NECESSITY, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE W I L__L
NOT I N T E R F E R E, EACH DEPARTMENT M U S T
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
EVALUATE AND CORRELATE AND INTERPRET
THAT I N T E L L I G E N C E I N F O R M A T I O N W H I C H
IS WITHIN I TS OWN EXCLUSIVE COM-
PETENCE AND WHICH I S NEEDED FOR ITS.
OWN DEPARTMENTAL USE.
THE IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH TO
THE CENTRAL I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
BECOMES EVIDENT WHEN WE START TO
DEAL W I T H I N T E L L I G E N C E ON A N A T I O N A L
A S DISTINGUISHED' FROM A D E P A R T M E N T A L
LEVEL. THE RESEARCH P R O V I D E D B Y THE
CENTRAL, AGENCY MUST BE TURNED TO THE
P R O D U C T I O N O F ESTIMATES I N THE F I E L D
OF N A T I O N A L INTELLIGENCE, N A T I O N A L
I NTELL. I GENCE
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150005-0
I S THAT C O M P O S I T E I N T E L L I G E N C E) INTER-
DEPARTMENTAL IN CHARACTER? WHICH IS
REQUIRED BY THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER HIGH
OFFICIALS AND STAFFS TO ASSIST THEM IN
DETERMINING POLICIES WI TH RESPECT TO
N A T I O N A L P L A N N I N G AND S E C U R I T Y I N P E A C E
AND IN WARS AND FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
BROAD N A T I O N A L POLICY, N A T I O N A L I N T E L L I
G E N C E I S I N THAT BROAD P O L I T I CAL - E C O N O M I C
MILITARY AREA) OF CONCERN'TO MORE THAN
ONE AGENCY. I T MUST BE OBJECTIVE,) AND I T
MUST TRANSCEND THE EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE
OF ANY ONE DEPARTMENT, SUCH AN ESTIMATE
AS I HAVE JUST DESCRIBED WAS PREPARED BY
US ON THE SITUATION IN TURKEY AT THE TIME
WHEN THE PRESIDENT EXPOUNDED .THE DOCTRINE
OF AID TO TURKEY. THIS PARTICULAR STUDY
NOW SERVES AS THE BASIC HANDBOOK FOR OUR
M I S S I O N I N TURKEY.
WHICH A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY MAKES
I S THE P R E P A R A T I O N OF N A T I O N A L I N T E L L I
P R E V I O U S L Y) I F THE
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
OF A GIVEN SITUATION HE HAD TO CALL, FOR
EXAMPLE, UPON THE WAR DEPARTMENT WHICH
WOULD FURNISH HIM WITH THE MILITARY AND
A I R P I CTURE) THE NAVY DEPARTMEN'Tj WH I CH
WOULD PRESENT AN ESTIMATE OF THE NAVAL
P O T E N T I A L I T I E S AND C A P A B I L I T I E S3 AND ON
THE STATE DEPARTMENT.)WHICH WOULD COVER
THE P O L I T I C A L AND S O C I O L O G I CAL P I C T U R E,
BUT NOWHERE WOULD THERE BE AN OVER-ALL
ESTIMATE, EACH DEPARTMENT WOULD OF
NECESSITY-) PRESENT AN ESTIMATE SLANTED
TO I T S OWN P A R T I C U L A R F I E L D, Now I T
FALLS TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TO PRESENT THIS OVER-ALL PICTURE IN A
BALANCED) NATIONAL I N T E L L I G E N C E E S T I M A T E ,
I N C L U D I N G ALL P E R T I N E N T DATA. FROM T H I S
THE PRESIDENT AND. A P P R O P R I ATE O F F I C I A L S
CAN DRAW A WELL-ROUNDED PICTURE. ON WHICH
TO A S E E THEIR P O L I C I E S. AND I T S H O U L D
BE CLEARLY BORNE IN MIND THAT THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DOES NOT MAKE POLICY.
THE ESTIMATES FURNISHED I N THE FORM
O F S T R A T E G I C AND N A T I O N A L POLICY INTEL-
LIGENCE BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY F I L L A MOST S E R I O U S GAP I N O U R
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150005-0
PRESENT INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE. THESE
ESTIMATES SHOULD REPRESENT THE MOST
COMPREHENSIVE) COMPLETE AND PRECISE
N A T I O N A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A V A I L A B L E TO THE
GOVERNMENT. WITHOUT A CENTRAL RESEARCH
STAFF PRODUCING THIS MATERIAL)AN INTEL-
LIGENCE SYSTEM WOULD MERELY RESEMBLE A
COSTLY GROUP OF FACTORIES? EACH MANU-
FACTURING COMPONENT PARTS, WITHOUT A
CENTRAL ASSEMBLY LINE FOR THE FINISHED
PRODUCT.
THE ACT ALSO CHARGES US WITH THE
APPROPRIATE DISSEMINATION OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE W I T H I N THE GOVERNMENT.-
INDEED DISSEMINATION IS ALWAYS A MAJOR
COMPONENT OF A SUCCESSFUL INTELLIGENCE
O P E R A T I O N. YOU W I L L RECALL THAT ONE O F
THE GREAT FAULTS FOUND BY THE JOINT
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE WAS THE FAILURE
OF APPROPRIATE DISSEMINATION OF SOME OF
THE WONDERFUL INTELLIGENCE WE HAD AVAIL-
ABLE TO US. JUST AS THERE IS NO PURPOSE
I N C O L L E C T I N G INTELLIGENCE I N F O R M A T I O N
UNLESS IT IS SUBSEQUENTLY ANALYZED AND
WORKED INTO A FINAL PRODUCT, SO THERE IS
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
N O SENSE IN DEVELOPING A F I N A L P R O D U C T
IF IT IS NOT DISSEMINATED TO THOSE WHO
HAVE NEED O F IT. THE D I S S E M I N A T I O N OF
I N T E L L I G E N C E I S MANDATORY TO THOSE
O F F I C I A L S O F THE GOVERNMENT WHO NEE :D
I T TO MAKE THEIR DEC I S I O N S.
A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FROP-
ERLY COGNIZANT OF THE INTELLIGENCE RE-
QUIREMENTS OF THE VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS
AND AGENCIES IS BEST EQUIPPED TO HANDLE
THE DISSEMINATION TO ALL DEPARTMENTS OF
THE N A T I O N A L INTELLIGENCE M A T E R I A L TO
MEET THESE REQUIREMENTS. THE COMPLEX-
ITIES OF INTELLIGENCE) THE IMMENSITIES
O F I N F O R M A T I O N AVAILABLE V I R T U A L L Y FOR
THE ASKING 7 ARE SO GREAT THAT THIS IN-
FORMATION MUST REACH A CENTRAL SPOT
FOR ORDERLY AND E F F I C I ENT D I S S E M I N A T I O N
TO A L L P O S S I B L E USERS W I T H I N THE
GOVERNMENT.
SPECIAL MENTION I S MADE I N THE
UNIFICATION ACT OF THE FACT THAT THE
DEPARTMENTS AND OTHER AGENCIES OF THE
GOVERNMENT SHALL CONTINUE TO COLLECT
- 21 -
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
E V A L U A T EI CORRELATE AND D I S S E M I NAT E
DEPARTMENTAL I N T E L L I G E N C E. A L I T T L E
-
E A R L I E R I M E N T I O N E D TO YOU THE D15
TINCTION BETWEEN DEPARTMENTAL INTEL-
LIGENCE ON THE ONE HAND AND NATIONAL
I N T E L L I G E N C E ON THE OTHER. W E H A V E
SEEN, AS I HAVE PREVIOUSLY STATED) HOW
TWO OF THE MAJOR COMPONENTS OF INTEL
LICENCE -- NAMELY, PRODUCTION AND
D I S S E M I NAT I O N - - ARE HANDLED IN C E N T R A L
INTELLIGENCE. I NOW WISH TO TURN FOR
A FEW MINUTES TO THE THIRD MAJOR COM-
PONENT -- COLLECTION.
THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY IS TO COORDINATE. ~A COLLECTION
O F FOREIGN I N T E L L I G E N C E I N F O R M A T I O N AND
TO AVOID WASTEFUL DUPLICATION. THE
STATE DEPARTMENT SHOULD COLLECT P O L I T I -
-
C A L , ECONOMIC) AND S O C I O L O G I C A L INTEL
L I C E N C E I N I T S BASIC F I E L D, THE DEPART-
MENT OF THE NAVY SHOULD DEVOTE ITS
EFFORTS PRIMARILY TO THE COLLECTION OF
NAVAL I N T E L L I G E N C E. THERE SHOULD BE NO
REASONy FOR EXAMPLE) FOR THE MI L I TARY OR AtR
ATTACHE TO FURNISH THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
og~ pk'~-
ARMY WITH DETAILED P O L I T I CAL AND P O L I T I C O
TT
E CARp6BeW 00i RefeJUA2~d0~3/n1 /F2f ! CIA-RD1 01 173 0014F091 b000~-0 S H O U L D
22 -
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150005-0
BE COLLECTED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT.
IF A MILITARY ATTACHE SHOULD RECEIVE
POLITICAL INFORMATION HE SHOULD HAND
IT RIGHT ACROSS THE DESK IN THE EMBASSY
TO THE APPROPRIATE MEMBER OF THE FOREIGN
S E R V I C E ) AND V I C E VERSA.
W E ARE ENGAGED I N M A K I N G C O N T I N U A L
SURVEYS OF ALL GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES TO
A S C E R T A I N T H E I R R E Q U I R E M E N T S I N FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE. WHEN TWO OR MORE AGENCIES
HAVE S I MI LAR OR IDENTICAL REQUIREMENTS
THE COLLECTION EFFORT FOR ONE CAN BE
MADE TO SATISFY ALL OTHERS. THE ONLY
A D D I T I O N A L A C T I O N NECESSARY I S THE
ADD I T I O N A L D I S S E M I NAT I O N,
I N DETERMINING, APPORTIONING, AND
ALLOCATING THE PRIMARY FIELD OF RESPONSI-
BILITY AMONG THE VARIOUS AGENCIES OF THE
GOVERNMENT IT IS USEFUL TO NOTE ONE
ADDITIONAL FACTOR. AFTER THIS MASS OF
MATERIAL HAS BEEN STUDIED AND EVALUATED,
C E R T A I N GAPS I N THE OVER-ALL P I C T U R E W I L L
LICENCE AGENCY INTENT ON COMPLETING THE
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150005-0
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE P I CTURE9 MUST HAVE
THE POWER TO SEND OUT COLLECTION DIREC-
TIVES AND REQUEST FURTHER-MATERIAL TO FILL
T H E S E GAPS. ONCE THE I N I T I A L F I E L D O F
COLLECTION 15 DELINEATED? THE RESPONSI-
BILITY FOR SECURING THE ADDITIONAL INFOR-
MATION CAN BE PROPERLY CHANNELED AND
APPORTIONED, CENTRAL I NTE LL I GE NCE9 HOW-
EVER NEEDS THE AUTHORITY GRANTED
O R I G I N A L L Y B Y THE P R E S I D E N T S D I R E C T I V E,
AND NOW BY LEGISLATION TO COORDINATE, ALL
THIS. F O R E I G N INTELLIGENCE C O L L E C T I O N.
I FEEL I T I S SAFE TO SAY THAT I N
PEACE TIME APPROXIMATELY 75 PER CENT
O F THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE I N F O R M A T I O N
NECESSARY TO SUCCESSFUL OPERATION CAN
AND SHOULD BE COLLECTED BY OVERT MEANS.
BY OVERT MEANS I MEAN THOSE OBVIOUS
OPEN METHODS WHICH REQUIRE) BASICALLY,
A THOROUGH SIFTING AND ANALYSIS OF THE
MASSES O F R E A D I L Y A V A I L A B L E M A T E R I A L O F
UNITED STATES THERE IS FUNNELLED SO
VAST AN AMOUNT OF INFORMATION FROM 50
MANY V A R I E D SOURCES THAT I T I S V I R T U A L L Y
- 2 4 -
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
S T A G G E R I N G, I T ENCOMPASSES EVERY F I E L D
O F ENDEAVOR - - M IL I T A R Y P O L I T I CAL)
ECONOMIC COMMERCIAL ) F I NANC I AL, AGRI-
CULTURAL ? MINERAL ) LABOR ,1 SCIENTIFIC)
TECHNICAL) AMONG OTHERS -- AN ENDLESS
AND I N E X H A U S T I B L E SUPPLY.
IF WE FAIL TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF
THESE VAST MASSES OF MATERIAL WE ARE
DELIBERATELY EXPOSING THE A M E R I C A N
PEOPLE TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF A POLICY
D I C T A T E D B Y A LACK O F INFORMATION. W E
MUST REALIZE ALSO THAT WE ARE C O M P E T I N G
WITH OTHER NATIONS WHO HAVE BEEN BUILDING
UP THEIR INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS FOR CEN-
TURIES TO KEEP THEIR LEADERS INFORMED
O F I N T E R N A T I O N A L I N T E N T I O N S - - TO I N F O R M
THEM LONG BEFORE INTENTIONS HAVE MATERI-
AL I ZED I NTO ACT I ON.
AMONG THE PRIMARY COLLECTING AGENCIES
I N THE F I E L D O F F O R E I G N INTELLIGENCE A R E
THE MILITARYI AIR AND NAVAL ATTACHES OF
THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENTS AND THE
F O R E I G N S E R V I C E O F F I C E R S O F THE S T A T E
D F A R T M E N T, THE CENTRAL I N T E L L I G E N C E
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
AGENCY CAN NOT AND WILL NOT SUPPLANT
THEY DO MOST VALUABLE
WORK I N THE F I E L D O F C O L L E C T I O N. As
N A T I O N A L A I M S AND NEEDS I N T H I S F I E L D
ARE ESTABLISHEDI THEIR VALUE WILL BE
I N C R E A S I N G L Y APPARENT. T H I S W I L L B E
PARTICULARLY TRUE AS THE BOUNDARIES OF
DEPARTMENTAL COLLECTION BECOME FIRMLY
DEFINED, AND WASTEFUL DUPLICATION AND
OVERLAP ARE E L I M I N A T E D O R REDUCED.
As I STATED5 IT IS NOT THE PROVINCE
OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TO
TAKE OVER DEPARTMENTAL COLLECTION ACTIV-
ITIES, T H I S I S THE TYPE OF C O L L E C T I O N
WHICH CAN BEST BE DONE BY THE EXPERTS
OF THE DEPARTMENTS IN THEIR VARIOUS
F I E LDS.
THE LAW PROVIDES ONE SECTION WHICH
ESTABLISHES THE RIGHT OF THE AGENCY TO
COLLECT CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL
'
AND I SHALL QUOTE THIS SECTION VERBATIM:
To PERFORM) FOR THE BENEFIT OF EXISTING
I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C I E S SUCH A D D I T I O N A L
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP$0R01731R001400150005-0
SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN AS THE
N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y C O U N C I L D E T E R M I N E S
CAN B E MORE E F F I C I E N T L Y A C C O M P L I SHE D
CENTRALLY, T H I S SECTION I S W R I T T E N
PRIMARILY TO ALLOW THE AGENCY TO ENGAGE
I N FOREIGN C L A N D E S T I N E O P E R A T I O N S TO
GIVE TO THE UNITED STATES, FOR THE FIRST
T I ME, THE ESP I ONAGE SYS.TEM WHICH I Sj
-
UNFORTUNATELY MADE NECESSARY BY CON
D I T I O N S IN THE WORLD TODAY, IN ADD I -
TION2IT ALLOWS US TO PERFORM CERTAIN
COLLECTION AND OTHER FUNCTIONS WHICH
WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE TO BE DONE INDI-
VIDUALLY BY EACH OF THE INTELLIGENCE
A G E N C I E S OF THE GOVERNMENT -- STATE,
ARMY A I R2 NAVY AND THE REST. HOWEVER
WHEN THESE FUNCTIONS ARE PERFORMED
CENTRALLY9 THE SAVINGS AND SERVICES
D E R I V E D ARE C O N S I D E R A B L E. A S A RESULTS
THE VARIOUS AGENCIES WELCOME THE BENEFITS
G A I N E D FROM SUCH C E N T R A L I Z A T I O N AND NO
LONGER WISH TO PERFORM THESE FUNCTIONS
THEMSELVES. I W I L L C I T E YOU TWO
EXAMPLES,
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
WE HAVE TAKEN OVER THE EXPLOITATION
OF FORE I GN DOC UME NTS. THESE
FUNCTIONS WERE FORMERLY PERFORMED IN
CONNECTION WITH JAPANESE DOCUMENTS BY
THE WASHINGTON DOCUMENT CENTERS A JO I NT
S E R V I C E VENTURE. S I M I L A R L Y WE H A V E
TAKEN OVER THE GERMAN DOCUMENT CENTER,
FORMERLY OPERATED B Y THE WAR DEPART-
MENT, IT HAS BEEN FELT THAT THIS TYPE
OF FUNCTION CAN BE MOST ECONOMICALLY
AND E F F I C I E N T L Y P E R F O R M E D B Y A C E N T R A L
AGENCY SUCH AS OURS, FOR IT POOLS THE
SKILLED LINGUISTIC PERSONNEL AND THE
D I S S E M I N A T I O N F U N C T I O N S.
SECONDLY WE HAVE ASSUMED
STATINTL
R E S P O N S I?
WORDS OF FOREIGN BROADCASTS A DAY.
T H I S S E R V I C E RESTED WITH F E D E R A L L COMMUN-
ICATIONS COMMISSION DURING THE WART AND
WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TRANSFERRED TO THE WAR
DEPARTMENT. THE ARMY AND NAVY DEPART -
MENTS ARE BOTH BIG USERS OF THIS
MATERIAL BUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS
PERHAPS THE BIGGEST USER OF THE THREE.
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 :-CIA2RDP8OR01731 ROO1400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
THEREFORE THIS FUNCTION WAS AN UNWARRANTED
BURDEN ON ANY ONE DEPARTMENTAL BUDGET.
IT WAS F I N A L L Y D E T E R M I N E D TO CENTRALIZE:
THE OPERATION IN THE CENTRAL INTELLI-
GENCE GROUP AS ONE WHICH COULD BEST BE
P E R FOR M E D CENTRALLY. THUS MANY A G E N C I E S
O F THE GOVERNMENT R E C E I V E THIS S E R V I C E.
I HASTEN T O ADD THAT THE M O N I TOR I N G O F
FOREIGN BROADCASTS 15 B E C O M I N G A N I N.-
C R E A S I N G L Y I M P O R T A N T SOURCE O F INFORMA-
TION,, I T I S ABLE T O B R I N G I N V A L U A B L E
INFORMATION A GREAT DEAL FASTER THAN
NORMAL ATTACHE CHANNELS. MOREOVER A
C O N T I N U A L STUDY O F A
COUNTRY i S BROAD-
CASTS OVER A PROTRACTED PERIOD OF TIME
B R I N G S FURTHER INTELLIGENCE W H I C H C A N
BE SECURED BY NO OTHER MEANS.
TO GIVE AN EXAMPLE OF THE WORTH OF
T H I S M O NIT O R IN G I CAN C I T E THE F A C T
THAT WHEN THE SECRETARY OF STATES GENERAL
MARSHALL WENT TO MOSCOW LAST MARCH HE
REQUESTED AND WE FURNISHED HIM WITH A
D A I L Y ROUNDUP O F 500 WORDS ON S O V I E T
BROADCASTS-REGARDING THE GERMAN AND
A U S T R I A N T R E A T I E S. WHEN THE P R E S I D E N T ,
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
SHORTLY AFTER GENERAL MARSHAL2S DEF'AR-
TUBE, ENNUNCIATED THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE
WE ADDED MONITORING REPORTS OF FOREIGN
REACTION TO THE DOCTRINE TO OUR DAILY
ROUNDUP FOR THE SECRETARY IN MOSCOW.
WHEN THE SECRETARY RETURNED HOtvE,
AMBASSADOR SMITH WHO HAD FOUND THESE
SUMMARIES MOST HELPFUL -- REQUESTED THAT
WE CONTINUE THEM; AND WE CURRENTLY
F U R N I S H H.I M 1500 To 2000 WORDS A DAY.
F I N A L L Y t-tAV _A T c n -r"? a T H I S
SECT I ON OF THE LAWS WH I CH I NSTRUCTS
US TO PERFORM C E R T A I N FUNCTIONS CEN-
TRALLY) I S USED AS THE GL-,L-, E
T TO OPERATE THE CLANDESTINE
SERVICES OF THE UNITED STATES WHICH
HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO US BY THE PASSAGE
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.
THE C O L L E C T I O N O F I N F O R M A T I O N BY
THIS MEANS HAS BEEN OVER-DRAMATIZED5
AND U N F O R T U N A T E L Y OVER " P U B L I C I ZED.
HOWEVER I BELIEVE WE SHOULD FRANKLY
ACKNOWLEDGE THE NEED FOR AND PROVIDE
THE MEANS OF COLLECTING THAT INTELLI
Approved For Release 2003/01/22: C VNCRDEBOR01731ROO1400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
QENCE WHICH CAN BE OBTAINED ONLY BY
FOLLOW, LATE BY MANY YEARS) THE POLICY
AND EXAMPLE OF EVERY MAJOR FOREIGN
ESTABLISHED,) THESE OPERATIONS MUST BE
CENTRALIZED I N ONE O R G A N I Z A T I O N. T H E
EXPERIENCE OF. THE B R I T I SH S ECRET INTEL-
LIGENCE S E R V I C E OVER HUNDREDS O F YEARS
PROVES T H I S. THE GERMANS V I O L A T E D T H I S
PRINCIPLE --' AS DID THE ITALIANS AND THE
J A P A N E S E - " W I T H. D I S A S T R O U S RESULTS FOR
THEMSELVES.
FAILURE ALWAYS MARKS A MULTIPLICITY
OF SECRET INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS.
STUDY O F MANY I N T E L L I G E N C E SYSTEMS
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD1 TALKS WITH THOSE
WHO HAVE OPERATED I N THE F I E LD OF SECRET
INTELLIGENCE FOR LONG PER I ODS OF T1 MEN
AND POST -WAR I N T E R R O G A T I O N S O F H I G H I N T E L -
L I G E N C E O F F I C I A L S I N THE A X I S C O U N T R I E S
HAVE SHOWN CONCLUSIVELY THAT WHEN THERE
ARE SEPARATE SERVICES THE RESULT IS
CHAOS, SO FAR AS PRODUCTION OF INFORMATION
I S CONCERNED. INTERNAL BICKERING , WITH
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150005-0
CONTINUAL SNIPING, DEVELOPS BETWEEN THE
VARIOUS SERVICES. THERE WERE, TOO MANY
GERMAN SPY ORGANIZATIONS) EACH OF THEM
JEALOUS OF THE OTHER. THEY ALL DEVELOPED
A POLICY OF SECRECY? SO THAT EACH MIGHT
BE THE ONE TO PRESENT SOME JUICY TIDBIT
CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS IN ANY AREA
ABROAD, THEN SUCH OPERATIONS SHOULD BE
CENTRALIZED IN ONE AGENCY TO AVOID THE
MISTAKES INDICATED7 AND WE SHOULD FOLLOW
THE E X P E R I E N C E O F THE I N T E L L I G E N C E
ORGANIZATIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH
HAVE PROVEN SUCCESSFUL IN THIS FIELD.
WE HAVE BEEN USING BIG WORDS AND
H I G H- S O U N D I N G PHRASES. S U P P O S E) I N
CLOSING WE LOOK AT INTELLIGENCE FROM
A BASIC ANGLE ; -
N Op'
A L L I N T E L L I G E N C E I S NOT S I N I S T E R)
THERE ARE MANY WAYS OF ILLUSTRATING JUST
- 32 -.
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
 ? Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731R001400150005-0
WHAT I N T E L L I G E N C E 1 5 -- BEYOND THE COLD
D E F I N I T I O N O F THE WORD. ONE WAY 15 T O
CONSIDER THE I N T E L L I G E N C E ESTIMATE O F
A NATION AS A K I N D O F SUPER JIG-SAW
PUZZLE. WHEN FIRST SEEN THE PIECES
THE ANALYST STARTS WORKING AND SOON
THERE EMERGE S A P A R T I A L S O L U T I O N --
ABOUT 75 PER CENT OF THE PUZZLE. THIS
PART ? 1 S MADE U P O F THE F I ECES THAT A R E
AVAILABLE FROM OVERT SOURCES -- BOCKSt
CHARTS PERIOD I CALS, RADIO BROADCASTS,
TECHNICAL SURVEYS, PHOTOGRAPHS9 COMMER-
CIAL S U R V E Y S , GENERAL I N F O R M A T I O N, ETC.
Now WE HAVE 75 PER CENT OF THE
PICTURE AND ARE BEGINNING TO SEE THE
C A P A B I L I T I E S AND P O T E N T I A L S O F OUR TAR-
GET COUNTRY. THERE ARE S T I L L GAPS AND
TO FILL THESE GAPS WE MUST RESORT TO
CLANDESTINE AND COVERT. METHODS. THAT
WILL PROBABLY GIVE US 15 PER CENT MORE
O F THE P I C T U R E. A T T H I S POINT -- B Y
DEDUCTION -- WE CAN PROBABLY GET 5 PER
CENT MORE. THE F I N A L 5 PER CENT I S
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150005-0
 ? Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731R001400150005-0
PROBABLY UNOBTAINABLE AS IT CONSISTS
O F I D E A S AND P O L I C I E S NOT EVEN FORMULATED
EXISTING ONLY IN THE MINDS OF THE LEADERS
OF OUR TARGET COUNTRY. BUT THE 95 PER
CENT WE DO HAVE SHOULD G I V E S W I T H I N V E R Y
NARROW LIMITS, THE POTENTIAL, THE CAPA-
BILITIES, AND THE PROBABLE AND POSSIBLE
I N T E N T I O N S O F OUR TARGET.
IN C O N C L U S I O N S I WOULD POINT OUT T H A T
WHAT WE HAVE DONE SINCE JANUARY 1946 is
AN ATTEMPT TO BRING ORDER OUT OF CHAOTIC
CONDITIONS I N WHICH INTELLIGENCE FOUND
ITSELF BEFORE AND DURING THE WAR. IN MY
O P I N I O N, THE F I E L D O F I N T E L L I G E N C E HAS
AT LAST REACHED THE STAGE WHERE IT OFFERS
TO THE GRADUATES OF THIS COLLEGE AND TO
S E R V I C E CAREER SECOND TO NONE I N IMPOR-
TANCE. IF MY REMARKS TODAY HAVE HELPED
IN ANY WAY To FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION UPON
THAT FACT I WILL HAVE ACCOMPLISHED MY
P U R POS E.
TO THOSE OFFICERS OF THE ARMED
Approved For Release 2003/01/273: 6IA-RDP80R01731R001400150005-0
 I
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0
SERVICES WHO TURN THEIR THOUGHTS TO
I N T E L L I G E N C E A S A CAREER, I CAN O N L Y
SAY THAT THEIR DEC I S I O N W I L L B E O F
MAXIMUM S E R V I C E TO T H I S COUNTRY. W E
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ARE LOOKING
FORWARD NOT ONLY TO CONTINUING OUR
WORK 9 BUT TO D E V E L O P I N G AND I M P R O V I N G
IT9 NOW THAT WE HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED
DY CONGRESS AS A PERMANENT AGENCY.
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80RO1731ROO1400150005-0