STAFF STUDY - - PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE COMMUNIST BW PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000500050005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 3, 1952
• Content Type: STUDY

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PSYCJWICAL STRATEGY BOARD
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STAFF STUDY -- PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF TIC COMMUNIST
BW PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN
I. PROBLFM
1. To analyze the implications of the Communist BW propaganda
campaign and to make recommendations for action in the light of the
conclusions reached.
II. DISCUSSION
2. A Soviet hate campaign against the United States Is generally
considered to have started on January 21, 1951. On that date Pospelov,
in the presence of the full Politburo, delivered a speech on the-theme
"The hands of the American imperialists are steeped in the blood of the
Russian people." Immediately after the speech there appeared numerous
documents allegedly proving American atrocities, Photographs were
published showing Russians who were being mutilated, killed, or
tortured; presumably at the hands of Americans. Every Russian news-
paper played up this theme. As pointed out by Mose Harvey in a.POC
briefing, thi's hate-America campaign is being carried on while the
Soviet Union is theoretically at peace with the United States. This
is without precedent even in Soviet history. Stories appear almost
daily alleging further American atrocities: The "never forget and
never forgive" theme is hammered into the Russian consciousness in a
fashion which can hardly fail to have an effect. The charges usually
give alleged details with dates, corroborative evidence, etc. The
campaign is not-limited to the USSR, but is carried on in the European
satellite countries and in Asia. In Rumania, the Communist Party
issued a directive explaining exactly how the campaign should be pro-
secuted. A similar directive was issued in China.
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3. The hate campaign continued throughout 1951. In the spring of
1951 there were allegations, which were not followed up, from Chinese
Communist sources stating that the United States was engaged in germ
warfare and poison gas warfare.
4. On February 22, 1952, a new campaign was launched by the North
Korean Foreign Minister who charged that the United States was carrying
on BW in North Korea. On March 6, the Pei Peoples' Dail, an
official Communist organ, said that the United States.had sent 448 planes
on BW missions over Manchuria the preceding week.
On March 8, Chou.En-tai charged that the American use of germ
warfare was aimed at "wrecking the Armistice talks in Korea, prolonging
and expanding the aggressive war in Korea, and instigating new'wars."
He stated that US pilots who used BW weapons would be treated as war
criminals.
5. A CIA Special Intelligence Estimate, published March 25, out-
lines the preceding facts and points out that the accusations concerning
BW have been directed exclusively at the U.S. The Estimate also notes
Malik's attempt to bring the issue before the UN and refers to the
alleged evidence published in the Chinese and Soviet press. This "evidence"
consisted of photographs of insects, germs, and germ bombs which American
forced presumably dropped in North Korea.
6. The Chinese Communist Government rejected a proposal by the
International Red Cross offering to investigate the charges. It refused
an offer from India to assist in any investigation of the charges and
also rejected a proposal from the World Health Organization to send aid
into epidemic areas. The Chinese Communist Government claimed that an
investigation was already being carried on by the Chinese and friendly
governments and that ICRC and WHO were interested only in securing
military information for the U.S. High Command,
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7. The campaign alleging BW activities by the United States con-
tinues, various statements have been issued by Communist front organiza-
tions which have picked up the Communist charges. The World Peacew'
Council will undoubtedly spearhead and coordinate a continued attack
directed against the United States.
EFFECTS
8. Replies to a Department of State circular to missions in
various parts of the world inquiring about the effectiveness of the
germ warfare campaign suggested that as of April 2 the campaign had
not been effective in most countries.
9. Most of the missions felt that U.S. sponsored programs to
denounce the Communist charges would merely keep the campaign alive.
10, The British Foreign Office, however, has suggested that if the
campaign continued it "may in long run be effective because of (a) anti-
US feeling in certain areas (b) ignorance of realities of war (c) fear
of plague (d) resentment of any Western warfare against Asiatics and
(e) pacifism and lassitude in Burma."
MOTIVATIONS
11. A number of explanations have been advanced for the present
Communist germ warfare propaganda campaign.. The "real" reason for the
germ warfare propaganda campaign against the U.S. is not certain, It
is clear, however, that the present phase of the "hate a7merica" campaign
serves several purposes -- some of which may be peripheral to the as
yet unidentified main purpose. Some of the uses to which the BW propa-
ganda campaign is or can be put are listed below:
a. It discredits the U.S. in the eyes of Asiatics.
b. It provides an alibi for current (and future) epidemics,
c, It makes Communist troops more fearful of picking up UN
propaganda leaflets and less willing to be captured.
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d. It creates a moral climate in which it might be difficult
for the U.S. to employ BW, CW, or Ali in the event of global
war. (The Stockholm Peace Petition of 1950 combined all
three in the category of weapons to be "outlawed.")
e. It provides a Justification for possible Communist use of
f: It provides a*justification and a psychological prepara-
tion for all out global war if the USSR decides such a
move is expedient.
12. The BW propaganda campaign has already provided the Soviet.
Union with a means of harnessing the forces of nature to their propa-
ganda advantage. Any epidemics or any insect infestations anywhere
provide an opportunity for charging the United States with employing
BW or testing its BW capabilities.
For example, a Canadian communist newspaper quoted by TASS
noted the outbreak of the hoof and mouth disease in Canada and charged
that the U.S., Britain, and Canada were conferring on the production of
"germ warfare weapons ... for spreading hoof and mouth and other anixial
diseases." Charges were also made that the U.S. was experimenting with
locusts in Saudi Arabia and other Near Eastern countries. These charges
coincided with the plague of locusts throughout the Near East. Troubled
backward areas may be constantly invited to blame diseases and plagues
on U.S. imperialist machinations. Even American efforts to help the
peoples of these areas may be used against the U.S. For example, U.S.
planes fighting locusts may be blamed for the plagues and U.S. doctors
fighting the disease may be accused of spreading it.
POSSIBLE FUTURE ACTION
13. The BW propaganda campaign may be combined with a gas warfare
campaign. Nearly all references to the U.S. use of BW mentioned U.S.
failure to ratify the 1925 Geneva Convention on germ and gas warfare. The
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committee of "democratic lawyers" who "investigated" the use of BW in
Korea have already referred to the American poison gas bombs in their
findings. (The 1951 spring propaganda offensives from China, Korea,
and Indo-China all claimed that the U.S. was employing poison gas
against North Korean and Chinese troops.)
III. CONCLUSIONS
A. The germ warfare campaign is clearly part of a continuing
Soviet hate-America campaign. By its scope and intensity it marks a
new phase in the latter, however, suggesting that implementation of the
hate-America theme will play a major -- and perhaps increasing -- role
in Soviet psychological strategy.
15. The precise reason for choosing germ warfare as the subject
of the present campaign is not known. However, it fits into one of
the main patterns of the general campaign, which is to link the United
States, and particularly the U.S. armed forces, in the public mind with
the perversion of science.
16. While all types of communist hate-America propaganda are
potentially serious from the U.S. point of view, the atrocity type of
propaganda is particularly significant in its strategic implications,
since it is directed primarily against the U.S. armed forces.
17. It must be expected not only that the hate-America campaign
will continue, but that the Soviet communists will continue to emphasize
special campaigns of the science-atrocity type, either by prolonging
the current germ warfare campaign or by shifting emphasis to new subjects.
In particular there is a strong possibility that the Soviet communists
may soon launch an all-out propaganda campaign alleging that the U.S.
has been using poison gas in Korea, perhaps accompanying this theme
with charges of scientific extermination and torture methods in Korean
prison camps.
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18, Irrespective of the popular credence in any country given to
particular conmunist hate-America campaigns, the emulative effect of
these campaigns over a long period of time may be to seriously impair
the U.S, psychological position in certain areas, particularly with
relation to the possible use of scientific and unconventional weapons in
case of general war. On the other. hand the shrill pitch of this type
of communist propaganda and the crude fabrications used to support it
create a Soviet psychological vulnerability which we should be able
to exploit. A U.S. counter-propaganda campaign alone may not be suffi-
cient to cope with these effects. Rather, there may be required an
integrated program of governmental actions, in relation to which propa.
Banda will take its appropriate place.
IV. RBC4 NDATIONS
19. That the Department of State make provision for issuance of
appropriate information gutdazace to include the following points:
a. Cautionary guidance on the explosive possibilities inherent
in the BW propaganda, campaign, indicated above, and the
necessity for coordinating carefully all statements in
coan ji.'netion with it.
b. Continued emphasis on the following features of the U.S.
BW counter-offensive: U.S. willingness and Communist
refusal to submit to impartial interna"ional investigation,
and the obviously unscientific basis of the charges.
(Purpose -- to retain for the U.S. the confidence and
sympathy of world.-wide governmental, scientific, and
journalistic circles.)
c, A concerted campaign to secure due credit -- not gratitude
to the U.S. for its positive assistance in disease and
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pest control, indicating that the responsibility for
putting such efforts in the proper perspective rests
principally on the governments concerned. (Purpose -- to
anticipate Soviet attempts to make the U.S. the scapegoat
for epidemics and insect plagues.)
20. That the Departments of State and Defense consider measures to
counteryan anticipated early increase in communist allegations that the UN
forces in Korea have employed gas. The following are suggested measures,
the feasibility of which should be explored:
a. Secret advice to the Secretary General of UN and to
neutral governments such as Sweden and India that we
anticipate the allegation of having used gas in Korea,
coupled with a request to these governments that officers
of their medical units now in Korea be immediately
detailed, on a secret basis, to an inspection team to
tour UN artillery and air units and satisfy themselves
and their governments that the UN forces are not using
gas. These governments, plus one of the Arab League
and one of the Latin American governments, should be re.-
quested to relieve this medical team as soon as possible
by technically qualified officers, to remain on this
assignment until an armistice is concluded.
b. Coordinated statements, immediately the Soviet-inspired;
campaign is underway, by the UN and the above-mentioned
governments testifying that such charges were expected,
and that they are untrue.
c. Appropriate technical advice and assistance to the inspec-
tion team by CINCUNC.
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21. That the Department of State investigate the possibilities of
applying or extending existing legal principles with a view to filing
with the World Court or the UN, or both, a complaint against the USSR
based on the theory of an international libel action, alleging
particularly the more extravagant types of communist atrocity-propaganda
and stressing the long-range 'lingering radiation' effects of such
propaganda upon world security, as well, as its threat to the mental
health of young persons.
22. That the Poychol gical Operations Coordinating Committee be
assigned the following missions: t
a. Taking into consideration the conclusions of Section III
above, analyze and seek to identify the underlying
strategy and the probable evolution of the hate-.America
campaign, to include:
(1) The Communist }3W propaganda campaign.
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(2) Gas warfare allegations.
(3) Potato bug, Locust plague and similar "perversion
of science" propaganda,
b. Develop further measures to minimize the effects of the
present BW propaganda campaign and to undercut anticipated
future propaganda campaigns similar in nature or related
thereto.
23, That Central Intelligence Agency prepare for the Psychological
Strategy Board a National Intelligence Estimate, appraising the signi-
ficance and impact of the Soviet BW propaganda campaign, gas warfare
allegations and "perversion of science" propaganda, in their relation-
ship to the total complex of Soviet cold war strategy.
24. That the Chairman, POC, submit to the Director, Psychological
Strategy Board, appropriate progress reports on the project assigned by
paragraph 22.
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