WORKING DRAFT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000500020009-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 19, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

Apprdved For Release 20 07/27: Cl tO65A00050002Q -2
Sg rJty Information
WORKING DRAFT
PSB D_24/l
January 19, 1953
PSB Paper No,`D-24 of November 1, 1952 entitled "Psychological Prepa-
ration for Stalin's Passing from Power" includes the following reconnenda-
tion:
6 a. To avoid uncoordinated action in case of sudden death,
an agreed Government position should be prepared at once,
as a basis for stand-by instructions for the period
immediately following this contingency.
There is general agreement among those who have given consideration
to this problem that the exact conditions which will exist at the time of
Stalin's death, be it on the international scene or within the Soviet
power structure, cannot be foreseen. In the absence of such information,
it is impossible to issue intelligent stand-by instructions to information
media for the period immediately following Stalin's death except in the
most general terms, The aim of such instructions should be not the imme-
diate most effective exploitation of the factors in the situation favorable
to the advancement of United States objectives, but the avoidance of
blunders which will prevent or complicate the exploitation of such factors
after the situation can be thoroughly assessed, It is believed, therefore,
that all information media under United States Government control,, both
overt and: covert, should be given standing instructions that in the event
of Stalin's death they should limit themselves to strictly factual report-
ing pending the receipt of specific guidance. Such guidance should be
forthcoming with a minimum of delay in order to take maximum advantage of
the situation in the United States interest..
The reaction of the Soviet people to Stalin's death is not easy to
predict, Certainly there will be those who will feel that a heavy yoke
has been lifted from the Russian people and that Stalin's passing affords
the opportunity for beneficial change. Available evidence, however, seems
to indicate that the great mass of the population has been sufficiently
drugged by years of public adulation of Stalin and sufficiently impressed
by the growth of Soviet power under his leadership to ensure a widespread
feeling of genuine regret at his passing. It is important that in our
eagerness to capitalize on the situation our information media do nothing
which would do violence to this feeling if it indeed maaterializes. Nor
is there any valid reason to believe that the security authorities will
not be able to cope with the situation; premature appeals for violence
or resistance are therefore also to be avoided,
One question which should be susceptible to advance determination
is that of the course to be followed by this Government with respect to
extending the customa.rr official condolences, Three possible variations
suggest themselves: (1) the despatch of a routine message to the Soviet
Government; (2) the deliberate omission of such a message; (3) the
omission of an official message while transmitting through United States
information media a message to the Soviet people taking note of Stalin's
death, extending to them the hand of friendship and inviting their coopera-
tion in seeking a peaceful and secure world.
OP SE RET
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Page 1 of 2 Pages,
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 Approved For Release 2/07/27 : CtQE9=065A00050002 9-2
1ORKING DRAFT S o t' PSB D-24/1
January,19, 1953
The first course is probably one which will be followed by most
governments maintaining diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union
unless the United States Government takes the initiative in securing
advance agreement to some other proposal. Should we follow this course,
strong adverse criticism of the Government may be anticipated both from
anti-communist circles in the United States and from all emigre groups.,
Soviet and satellite. Furthermore, an opportunity would be lost to give
encouragement to any potential resistance elements within the Soviet
Union which might consider Stalin's death a favorable occasion to expand
their activities.
Complete silence on the part of the United States might be exploited
by Soviet propaganda in one of two ways. It might be played down, in
which event it would probably go unnoticed by the mass of the population;
the absence of formal messages from one or another government in the long
list of published communications spread over several days requires careful
reading to be detected, Or our silence might be interpreted as a deliberate
affront to the Soviet people and a further example of American hostility;
if the feelings of grief at Stalin's death are genuine, this line might
be. not without effect.
The third alternative steers a middle course; it forestalls the
criticism and resentment which would be occasioned by a formal message
to the Soviet Government, while at the same time offering reassurances
to the Soviet people. More importantly, it enables the United States to
seize the psychological initiative and thereafter to exploit the develop-
ing situation as our interests may dictate. It is recommended that
plans be developed to enable us to pursue this course. When such plans
are completed they should be discussed with other governments, particularly
the NATO countries, in an effort to obtain widespread adherence to this
course of action.
O SECS
Se purity Information Page 2 of 2 Pages.
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