REPORT TO THE NSC ON NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000400020005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REPORT

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REPORT TO THE NSC ON NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAM
GENERAL
The Central Intelligence Agency, in conformity with NSC 10/2 and 101'5,
has developed covert programs on a world-wide basis in support of national
psychological objectives.
From a covert point of view, there is need for forthright exposition and
constant repetition of What the U. S. stands for in the present day of inter-
national tension. This declaration should reaffirm those principles which
characterize our position in the Community of Nations; our respect for the
dignity of the human being; our belief in a just economic system which res-
pects the rights of private property; free enterprise, which recognizes the
responsibilities and privileges of labor and management; recognition of our
international responsibilities; our determination not to withdraw from the
affairs of Turope; our concern for the cultural, political, and economic
integrity of the peoples of Asia; our equal determination to assist the unfor-
tunate peoples of the Satellite States in regaining their lost liberties; our
friendship for the peoples of the USSR; our dedicated belief in the future of
the United Nations; and, finally, our determination to maintain the security
of the free -world.
This statement of principles is vital at this time to give manning and
justification to the activities of Radio Free Europe, as well as other covert
activities pertaining to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Orbit in general.
Immediately following is a general report by geographicel area of the
status and progress of covert activities for the past fiscal year with
respect to U. S. national psychological programe.
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The sucoessful accomplishment of a cold var program is
contingent upon the development and maintenanoe of solidarity
and cohesive strength of the Western POWTS.
Eeeter1411MMDR:
The greatest single obstacle to the attainment of our
national psychological programs is the presence of powerful
contingenti of the RedArmr in East Germany, Austria, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary,
0.
lestigeatan arm' and atalLt1 ganatertat
The security police forces are the greatest deterrents
for realizing our national psychological program. The Balkan
peoples reportedly feel that little can be done by the West with
respect to the Communist-contrelled police forces, except under,
conditions of war, to free them from the Commuoist yokeq
d. JR:
The existence of a controlled pollee state Vhich has
employed every yknical and technical means to isolate its
people from
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people from contact with non.CormuDist nations and peopleala mili-
tant ideology under firm party'propagatiorg ability under its systam
to employ coercion without regard to law; doeumentary controls on ?
the Movement -of peoples and concondtant vigilance which such
checks affordi.rakes agent reoruitment and utilimtion of indigenous
personnel a formidable Obstacle. There are, however, administrative
2. galla gMEt:
Valor deterrents to successful prosemtiaa of a national
psydhological program in the !addle at area are the rise of irreo.
ponsible nationalism, acoompanied.by anti.Westernism? anti-colonialism,
religious extremism, and zenophebial economic instability and social
unrest; racism; regional disputes, such as the Palestine and Kashmir
problems; international disputes, such as the Anglo.Egyptian? Anglo.
Iranian, and Franco-Tunisian conbroveirsies; and politica/ ineptitude
ta,?Xfrre4ponsibility.
represent significant
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The rejor disadvantage accruing to the U. S. Government in
the Far East is the fact of its over-all position of relative meekness
econordcally, and psychological Inability to bring
the Korean war to a satisfactory conclusion and the continued threat
to Indochina are factors ndlitating against the restoration of sta-
bilit3r in the Far East. Present status of recognition andwa-recognition
of Ceramist China among the Allied' powers is a special factor impeding
S. psychological rrograms; likewise, the conflict in attitudes and
objectives in Southeast Asia between the tr. S. 25X1 Britain, and France.
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The moven efficiency and extent of Communist administrative
and police eontrol are additional restrictive factors to the =mess
of U. S. programs. The rationalist espirations of peoples striving
for release.fram colonial dominance. (Indochina? Meleya)..and the politi-
cal immaturity and ineptitude of those recently released (Indonesia,
Burma) are inhibitions which consciously makea them suspeet of U. S.
motives and efforts, no matter how well intentioned. The fear in these
peoples of economic doming4614 the U. S. has suwseded the fear of
2EWtieal subeervienoe. British and American confliot on pOlioY with
respect to China
4. Aztrist:
U. S. coneentration on European nutters? and particularly the
large quantities of money expanded in that area, have given rise to
Latin American chargee that the U. S. is neglecting its natvral and
truest friends. This, however? Should have little effect on covert
missions, with the possible exception of the mission to combat anti-
Americanism in the area.
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5. ktamatlitag.:
Factors that impede the successful prosecution of a national
psychoIogiCal program are:
a. The continuing inequality ia the distribution of income
in We stem Europe, partieularkv Frances, itsly9 and Germanys, and
the very limited success that ESA -(and mati) has had in twinging
pressure to bear to change this situation. -
b. The excessively militaristic and aggressive tone of some
or the statements made by OUT Government ()Metals mhich play
directly into the hands of the Soviet peace off ensiveo
e. The inability of the U. 3, Governmnt oispeeific issues
relating to coloniolism to take a. firm and clear stand because of
the exigencies of the European:Allem? systemc,
4. The Aehilles heal of the raoial issue in the United. States
and the ineffective efforts to date to deal with the exploitation
Of this situation by the Gonmunists.
e. 1110 McCarron Act and its 'Smiting prohibitions on itmdgra.
tion into this country.
f. The fact that our tariff structlm) runs directly counter to
our efforts to exlend international trade and severely limits the
ability or famAgnootmtries to export to this country,
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PART _11
ARRA (COURT
.A.
2, What information is available through covert channels to
indicate
ao Whether Voice of America broadcasts are audible in
aTOMatr?4.0.4?0
spite at Russian jamming?
b. Whether they are provieg effective in achieving our
dbjectivosY
co Whether the Soviets have begun to put into effect
measures designed to seal off the Rummien radio audience
????Pielbal..,??????????????????41,
from my penetration by ogr radio programs?
??,C t.???*?,,...% rwpfte.e,Texsamac.;aa..ksc
Information receivod in 1930 and /951 through covert
Annnas indicated thmt VGA broadcasts vere audible in the USSR.
Tha Areas from vhich these roparts originated covered the Baltic
countries end the Ukrainian SSRo Recent intelliGence? houovor?
indicates that the aevere jith Liatitu?d by the Soviets has
oonsidersibly reduced the auelibility of the VOA broedcastso This
is farther sabstentiated by the information obtained from return-
ing German Prior e' of Wao? Soviet refngesa and defector*, vho
indicate that considerable segments of the USSR population continue
to listen to
broadcasts despite the jamming And the risk involved.
usasginch as the
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Ins3ae2ch as the only intonizence obtained tiff,:ruzli crmert
chaelels i tbft VOA broadcasts hlt13 rtmail priparily fecm the Baltic
countries eazA e Ukrin:Lan 53110i o1c1 t xje-FA:'fietat
to dateraine at thas Urn whikedstr tkna brozideszts E;t1-3 31:triird:6 to
enective in achieving our ObjClettirCrie iiirOalatirt3 jbtZille4
theaillgh ti2L3 laterrOa2AolOil or soviet de:kV/eters,. forisaw 6';tridal
:ft.:laaners of' War f.,dad reeeetly arrivcd reitgoes csensrall.47 iialicates
f..;hat the ViIk broadcasts wit not sufficlentiy formftl, aud that a
conmidsrablo tiun of ths yrograms i 170ied to inelova2t
uraters which have no df.rect effect on the present etriv' 1)"71843.1
i-bqqaat rola the West. Therz he also been coroiderEW.e cetticism
frccs the etbn:',..c Linoritj exiiv% grows, pecetIcularly the
iiikzainians, who claim that the Va.t broadcasts sim not cleficiently
mpwantstlye of the desivee and eTvloations of tin pcopler":3
the WEAL likrainisn emigre 1ea0ors insist that the 1/014 likrainolan
broolcastre sho4d bo rode rare 12atimel in character ma sktNald tea
cegalgunee of the Ukrainien strutzle for liberation.
graeralt there is sufacient evidole,ne to ir.licate thato
t7espite the aAnyent inuarfectiene *i.fhich,L44,ybi inharos:6 in some of
thr; VOA wearants, them broadcasts ;,-)lay en important prrecilological
Yale in re:,ainclirs the ploplas of the 1j25f1 that there ill; azi aternata ,
vey of life. Eavir at the arse tire,, providing tlyAa with 4% Lola of
er,t-Rate litamtlen fron the tyrrynicel pp to of Vie S34ct
Lec0.7..e.9 effectivenoss of therm broadcestsv however:, aitad P-Oi;
mee,Arft-rrod in taros
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be measured in terms of immediate reactions or attainment of short-
range Objectives. Their value lies mere in the field of preparation
for ? long-range psychological conditiasing which serves to reinforce
ell other efforts directed to it the support of the peopaes ofithe
USSR to our cause.
There is no definitive evidence obtained through covert
channels 'Aid) wad indicate that thaeoviets have begun to put
into effect measures designollo seal off the Soviet radio audience
transom, penetration by vestera radio progress. Obviously, jamming
has been instigated for this specific purpose. In addition, there
are some unconfirmed reports vhich indicate that the recent models
of Soviet mamcfectureti radios are being designed to prevent tubing
in to the broadcasts originating from outside the USSR.
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Se:amity 7nformation
Co COI:MA=421i
10 - What evidence is availelle through covert ch nels_of uhe,
effectiveneps of
a. Voice of America, and
b. Radio Free 11.1.a
gettir42E...their e.j_een acrost to 'tale Phine.;%e?
CIA has received little evidence through covert channels
of the effectiveness of VOA or RFA to data, The scarcity of radios
on the mainland and the systeri of controls imposed by the COMMtrafit
Golrernmont are, of course, contributing factors; more speoifica13.7
however, our agents or, the mainland at this time are too rear and
too busy to handle anything but the highest priority l.ntelligencer,
Intalligance.repts inCicate that broadcasts to the main-
land of China via RFA req..ch only those government officie7s who are
al:lowed radios, and official reel? operators. Expansion of faciliAios
for broadcasting to the rainland of China would appear to he useless.
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PAR EAST
A. ,fea.-ea
1. Has the Korean debate led to any conolusion as to the
adequacy or maahinery
warfare field beth with oivilian and Illav authorities?
Coordinating machinery as operating between civilian a
military authorities in the field of psychological warfare in Korea
has given evidence of certain inadequaeies,. Inasmuch as responsibility
for tactical peychological warfare is vested in the military a quasi,Iti,
military organisation headed by a designee of the theater commander
was established. This organisation has served as a coordinating
element in tactical psychological warfare measures operate?oth on the
part of the military and CIA D but has failed to include the operations
of CUE services in Korea,
Two major plaits formulated by the Psychological Strategy
.Board regarding the overall propaganda approach to Korea have to this
date failed to produce anything concrete as to an agreed upon coordinated
effort especially where command and support are concerned. LikewieeD
policy with regard to the Korean situation ha a been in ovate in .
meeting current and longc=range propaganda requirements. /t has .often
en TVS
ssary.for the field to formulate its own policy to meet
eituati ns as theyarise.
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3. It is " sible? from guerrilla activities in Korea to
paw any useful conclusions which might become practical in other areas
Original CIA efforts in Korea wore designed to recruit,
train, equip and launch classical guerrilla teams who were assigned
the task of organising a resistance organization simultaneously with
and at a result of guerrilla operations However, after a year of
.directing and supporting this operation, the program was reoriented
so that the first objective of the new program would be toward the
establishment of a politlealiisyaholopical resistance organization
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CIA
has been able to support the military with battle intelligence? In
psychological warfare operational) the Eighth United States Army in
Korea and CIA haws for some time worked in close cooperation in
implementing their different responsibilities?
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Seturitt InforgiatteS
LATIN AMERICA
lo 9p1ans are under consideration to utilise All miscible
covert resources to ale& the recent Taglierth et
Q2magalLs_m? and
be l!Poronismff
in certain Latin American countries?
ComoUnism. There is a very strong Communist drive thmagbout
Latin Arica, It is. aimed not so much at converting the Latin Americans9
but at paralyzing action on their part through deparating what are
largely pro-4,4, governments (now more responsive to public opinion than
formerly) from the people. COnaunism in general presents its threat
through sniarfoe with those nationalistic and social forests on an anti?
US basis. The great period of growth of the
Conauniet partied, in Latin'Azieride*sa in'the'twO.ai"three yoats after
.V.TA),40? and ? generally '6134aiditg thei'hav&.ciSclined somow'hat in strength
and influence -bintei'-theno'.':.!4be 'recent growth", thareibro? is lird.ted
as to size and in to Guatemala and to a lesser extent Bolivia and
es to. indium:24o -ta:Argentint 'Sad, to.:a leaser extent Chile, The moat basic
underlying' influenose ..to be' dealt. with' in Ulan,' Ainaticas heti:avert. "are the
tremondene'trives'for natiOnalist ?and 'boast juatiimi. going On-in.thcie-- ?
conntrioa as they onergei from isend4eidalissi into the Modern" so0..ial and
indeistrial'rSvolutioi.;-
.? ,
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