(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000400010128-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2000
• Sequence Number: 128
• Content Type: OUTLINE

Approved For Rele 2002/01/ CIA-RDP80-01065A00 44, 0 010128-2
(NEM TO KNai
ANI G
1. t~ eoti
To assist, in Korea and contiguous areas. UN military opearatiOns,
2, Lis~cussio
a, In achieving the above objective it is necessary that both overt and covert
psychological warfare be employed to the limit of ow capabilities, Such action,
however, must be governed by considerations of the politico-military North Korean
and CMmunist China situation developing,
(1) Detailed plans rust be prepared for engendering or inciting, in the
North Korean and Chinese troops and civilians, conduct antagon-
istic to the Soviet-led Communist regimes, cmoh conduct to range
from non-cooperation through passive resistance and augmented
confusion to vigorously prosecuted guerrilla warfare,
(2) To insure proper planning and appropriate emecuti.one
(a) Detailed planning will be the responsibility, of the
Government department or agency having primary reaponsi-
bility in execution of the operation concerned.
(b) Detailed plans will contain an estimate of the political,
economic, military and psychological feasibility, accepta-
bility,, and applicability of the operation concerned,
(c) Detailed plans trill provide for adequate coordination at all
levels and will recamend regarding the situation which
should surround the moment of execution for producing maximum .
desired effect.
(3) cecution of detailed plans must be in accordance with political and
military considerations surrounding the developing North Korean
situatio *
Action Effects Desired
a, Interference, confusion, and disruption In all aspects of North Korean
and Communist Chinese military operations; and in other activities, military or
State Dept. decd ~Yl i~i'~ ef~f~d~s1/~ 14rR ~~IyQ6 00'0128-2
 Approved, For Rel 2002/01/03: CIA-RDP80-01065A00~0010128-2
TOP SECRET
civilian, where interference, confusion, or disruption would direot3y affect
Camamist military operations in Korea. Such action effects might includes
(1) Increased guerrilla activity in North Korea and Cr. ninist
China.
(2) Interference with and disruption of enen r lines of camsatnication
and supply ? including destruction of or interference with rail
lines, motor transport, telegraph and radio facilities, etce
Consideration should be given to inciting attack on cocannications
at points of greatest vulnerability, such as motor transport at
its scarce of fuel; urging political interference with or actial
sabotage of vessels under non-Cc aiai gist flags engaged in supplying
Communist China, eta.
(3) Confusing of Chinese econ r and civil administration with resultant
h fight r: -si k: in W; capon operations in the mIii-
taty field.
(4) Defection of Chinese Casmmist and North Korean troops.
(5) Passive resistance and non cooperation, both military and civilians
4. Psi ogicai Ettects Desired
a. Lowered morale of North Korean and Chinese troops and civilian supporting
Soviet-led Cam?anis.
be Heightened morale of North Korean and Chinese peoples desiring defeat
of Soviet-led Camm n stn,
a. An' attitude of violent antagonism to Soviot-led C ism in the minds
of North Korean and Chinese peoples,
d,. Hopelessness An the minds of North Korean and Chinese Comnwist leaders,
both military and civilians, regarding the military situation.
e. Explosive throe-way distrust between Pyongyang,, fig, and Moscow,
f. General confusion in the minds of North Korean and Chinese Ccummist
leaders.
Approved For Release 2002/01/03 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400010128-2
 Approved For Release, 2002/01/03 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400010128-2
p m I
5d
a, 11* bcaUm listed aaticape am aanaitlered to bawer pe p a appl iaaticcc
in R htevli the Obove poa+ahQk iee1 effectai
12) CVett and am= t politi.oal attic,.
(2) Qftrt sad eoowt pa? 1 activities.
(3) D1a ct static, uneh as a sa aive lead et drop agw3mt Cbias
minlend p~opul~aettm .eat r.
Onot am eae't eea,aaie activities,
Otseorrifa activities,,
(6) otbea! *anwt, activities*
6, j2gM ailed Aches
The add reooa n ct are deeds reigardixng canes of action a1s
beft falloMad; it! a:.cw, dance with c #.abjSsze c aitd ststt,oxt yr
~a Gdeai qg eaddi.ticaal and uotbar than nasal' action is xecomeendeda
as Pe1i_aiiiMA... Rat"m
(1) Thin for, rod at smah ti as it ae r becem politically and Mil..
teri]y feasible end acaeptabis, prep re for and a .cute massive
4.3
Approved For Release 2002/01/03 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400010128-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/03 : CIA-RDP80-01065A00 4600010128-2
leaflet drop over population centers of the China W r-.land. (sew
Appendix (I) to this .Annex for score considerations this opera-
Q
tion)
(2) Develop through estimate stage, and suit to the 4= holes :;ica>.
Strategy Board for consideration, additional "other - :'h unialll
actions for employment in Korea and contiguous area.n to . as ist UN
military operations.
Central Intelligence Agency
fix) Develop through estimate stage. and submit to JCS A cons .derFation,
additional "other than usual," actions for esmploy ner ? :In Korea to assist
UN nrstlitary operations4
(2) Develop through estimate stage,, and submit to the P~~ hoio cad Strate
Board for consideration, additional "other than uswA. actionze for
employment in areas contiguous to Korea to assist UN miitaxy operationso
25X1X8
Approved For Release 2002/01/031 ~`0-01065A000400010128-2
 Approved For Rele se 2002/01/036CI RDA 80-01065A0004 9010128-2
j
ANNEX G
APPENDIX (1)
CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON A LEAFL ? DROP OVER THE MAII'1LAND OF CHINA
J~-19-O
is A leaflet drop over cities of Communist China might be of very great
psychological advantage to the United Nations and th:> United Mates in bringing
about a state of mind among the Chinese people so to influence or deter the
Peiping Goverment in its courses of actions
20 A main reservation as to the utility is in relation to the consideration
that the Peiping Government may have pretty thorough control over public
Opinion in Chinao That is to say, it has placed impediments to the formation
and focusing of group opinion among the Chinese peopled Thus the regime has
made itsAlf relatively independent of sutonanously generated group opinion.
The basic con'dideration as to the value of such a leaflet drop therefore is
whether it would serve to break through the control now exercised by the regime
3m Such leaflets should carry a dignified and complete statement of the
case of the United Nations and the United States0 It should. deal resaectfu7ly
with the Chinese peopled It should concentrate on the points that the United
Nations and the United States have acted from no aggressive intention but
only to repel aggression, that the interests of the Chinese people have been
made subject to designs of action which are contrary to their welfare,, that
peace is attainable at any time on the basis of true recognition of the
motives and the purposes of the United Nations in the Korean struggles It
should emphasise the United Nations framework as distinguished from the United
States aspects of the interposition in Korea& By indirection it should raise
the question in the minds of the Chinese people whether the C3d.nese Government
-does not now act in subordination to alien interests.
Z. Such a leaflet drop should be undertaken if at aU, only after the
G-14
#
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 Appr`'o ed For Release 2002/01/03 : CIA-RDP80-01065AO 00010128-2
struggle has entered a new phase in .rhich thr wraps have been taken off air
operations b cyond the confines of Korea and Into China proper, It shoWA be
borne in mind that the leaflet drop would involve derrogation of air sovereignty
over China and would therefore be construable as an act of violencea
5o A relevant question is the question of auspices for the air dropo
1-1hether the authorLty of the United Nations could be stated on the leaflets without
recourse to consort from the other governments involved in the Korean-United Nations
operation is a question rich would have to be settled in advanced
6a If carried out, such leaflet should aim at maximum coverage in a one-'
t'sne operation. he planes should fly as far inland as possible and cover as
many cities as po:asibleo It might be particularly important to cover the city
of Sian as this is reported to be designated as the Chinese Communist capital in
the event of tr. a .ntbreak of a general gar. Such leaflets ebold carry the
it messag,) that they might have been bombs rather than leaflets. The
impact of sucr a mes.age upon the Chinese people should be carefully estimated
by persons cc,==,7ersant 4th the Chinese background and the present situation.,
7, The TIE:,-sage should be carefully coordinated by individuals aware of the
content of the ~-,~t ed Nati s ? and United. State's g policy and 1nO-1v-!
with Chinese i; J.t-ire 'd capable of evaluating Chinese rcactionst. !t w .d be
necessary to rut?G ,he in * ap rcpt izat . c.Pi ,.L.,--Was ?a~ e v
by individuael > >mpable of dealing' with the nuances both of the policy V.V1 of
the Chinese idiom,..,,
8, An imps Cant consideration is as to the precise result to be achieved
by such an air cps To gain maximum advantage it should be planned and executed
not merely to crate dismay and dissatisfaction among the Chinese people but also
to focus their -,.ismay and dissatisfaction in such a i as to bear upon the con.-
duct of the Chaise Communist rulersp
1-2
Approved For Release 2002/01/03 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400010128-2
 AA 4 OAR
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