DEPARTMENT OF STATE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000300070068-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2001
• Sequence Number: 68
• Publication Date: May 21, 1951
• Content Type: PAPER

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No 4 of 10 es.
41.111N/MOMMONYI
DEPART:JUT 0 STA2E
T A SECRETARY 170R PUbLIC APPAIRS
TO establish anpropaganda position,based on
existing information, Which is to be taken at present re-
garding the possible succession to Ztsltn, and in future
in the eventuality of Staling* dee
bACKORUUND:
The scope of this paper is limited to sst*lishment
of an interim position. Sufficient informstion does not
exist in organised form to serve as basis for a policy
which would exploit this subject to the full extent of the
possibilities which it could offer. Pending acquisition of
such information, guidance is limited to the opinions of
those who have intimate knowledge of the Solid t system and
the power position at its apex. Reeo ition must b? taken
of the inhibiting street of the lack of firm knowledge of
the attitude* of tne individuals involved or of the power
mechanisms which they control,
The following discussion prieents the best available
line of informed reasoning upon which a propaganda position
say be based.
Ohs
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? is no conclusive eviaencs that Stalin hes
summer, in spite of some conspicuous ebe
scow for considerable periods in the years
and in epite of rumors or ill health, tkuire
Is also no evidence that illness or Iva has reduced hia_. --
bold on the supreme power, Stalin Is seventy
old, but his constitution is rugged and the leorgian strain
Is notably long-lived,
2 e nature of the Soviet system, a personal die-
ta o hip, diaguited under various wraps party rule
Soviet rule, rule of the proletariat,ru].e of the masses
* personal dictatorship without any egitimete ruli
family* or "legitimate heir,* makes a constitutionrSUcces-
_,
lion extremely difficult, Even In Lenin's day, before the
Party and the Soviets had been so completely drained of all
political content and porkers it proved impossible to arrange
a suooession by purely peaceful and "normol" =OAS' without
struggle between potential heirs.
3. Lenin got throe solemn warnings of death, in the
form of partial cerebral parslytic strokes. Only after the
second did be begin to try to create a "legal" succession
through his *political testament." ftecognisinc that de facto
his personal authority and prestige had become excessive, he
sought to reverse the process of personal power by proposing
a collective leadership otter his death. His testament was a
knock for each close associate (to keep him from becomtns per-
sonally dominant) and a boost (to keep him free amine elim-
lusted completely). bat Stalin began to gether the reins of
organizational power, adisloyelly," while Lenin was helplessly
paralyzed. Lenin tried to offset this by a last-minute codicil
proposing the removal of Stalin from the key organisational
post of General zeeretary. This was not carried out. A strug
gle for succession ensued, involving purges, expulsions, ul-
timate blood purges, and Stalin emerged as the absolute dic-
tator in a sense that Lenin had not been. Lenin defeated his
party opponents in argament? then tried to selvage their per-
sons and dienity. Stalin besmirched his associates, made them
blacken themselves, then killed them. Lenin possessed more
morel authority, Stalin possesses more physical immer. The
extravagant cult of Lenin's person was distasteful to him and
opposed by him while he lived, It grew up only *round his
esbelsed corpse. Stalin, on the other hand, exacts the cult
of his person, demands that It bottom* aver more extravagant.
Millions involuntarily admired Lenin. The entire nation Is
compelled to pay fantastic tribute to Stalin. The difference
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humiliatingly
likely to bind
the mess of his v
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1 e was unable to bind his
r his death. The exacted,
ship of Stalin is even less
and his party, much less
their relatives.
4. The eztrsvaace of the Stalin cult,increasing-
ly the cult of en omnipotent, omniscient, oinicopet.nt
living god, dwarfs the Whole of Soviet society, the Party
end the Politburo. 4verything Is presented as the work of
"'Itself Stalin personally, except the errors Pad yesterday's
line. These errors and abandoned lines ire the work of
traitors ard scapegoats. Thus every other official has a
feeling of insecurity, even Politburo members: (of. the
Politouro members Who disappeared in the blood purges, and,
more recently, chief planner Vosnesentky, who not only has
disappeared but now apparently has never existed, has be-
come an "unperson"). No one Is secure except insofar es
he enjoys the favor of Stalin personally. when a an does
enjoy the post of crony (the plebien autocrat's equivalent
of the old-time court favorite), he can continue on the sur-
face as an apparent big shot even though he be a small
potato - example, Molotov.
5 Stalin has killed all his sums r i.e., al
the men of the first rink who were coeval and coequal taco-
asters of his in Lenin's day.
He has surrounded himself only by secondary san,
s faction agents, syoophants, cronie and yes-
executed even cronies for trivial causes e.g.
7* Some of tIee, given apace en one-sixth of
the earth - and time enough, became able executors of his
will, just as when he had killed off his entire gdnerel
staff, new green officers, after three years of retreat and.
the surrender of thirty-nine areas the size of France, be-
came an able general staff..
U. But his life history skiowe that he is jealous,
envious, suspicious by nature. As oon as any one around
him begins to shine, however dimly, by the lijat of his own
deeds, Stalin removes him from the stage, shifts him to a
minor post, sends him to the provinces. Examples, Zhukov,
Timoshenko. Shen Zhdanov seemed too popular as the rewalt
of the defense of Leningrad, Stalin unceremonioualy removed
him from Leningrad two days before that city wee to be dec-
orated for its heroism. Thus he makes it ever herder for
any one to grow big enough or acquire the prestige to fill
his shoes or don the mantle of the apostolic succession.
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thing, military science,
lithe transfermetion of
as else, except the greeteat
ell lands end ell times,
SECRET
A third of a century of bolthevik dictatorship,
and a uazter of taljnjst dictatorship hove destroyed all
the illusions thet stalin end his group may have once hod
as to the popularity of their re1ia.. Their reaction has
been ever more force, contiruzoue purge, mass concentration
camps, and the extravagant Stalin cult, plus the cult of
hatred of all that diminishes or challenges it. file regime
is consciously based on fear end force and *mooted worship.
On his death, his associates will be torn between fear of
the messes, which will tend to force them to "hang to6(Aher"
and fear of each other, since only one of the CA4 doe tile
mantle of the succession which is required by a regime of
per-sone). autocracy without legitimacy or legal heirs. The
mantle can be ossumsd by one person and only one. The other
aspirants will never thereafter be trusted nor long survive.
10. When Stalin dies, the first attempt of the Polit-
buro will likely be to establish the illusion - or perhaps
the reality - of a collective leadership to fill the vacuum.
U. But such a transformetion of the eersonol reeime,
even Lenin could not enforce at his death, in a more fully
organ zed and more vitally functioning party. aenee? it the
very moment they are adopting the above attitude, the men In
the Politburo will be eyeing each other and maneuvering,- for
PD sition.
12, he only man wno ZI0V0
muted or open strug. le are those
the real power levers which const
government.
*hence in that ensuing
o are in possession of
tute the real organs of
Molotov, he is still alive end still in
in not unlikely elven his record for survival, w
become prosier, but can not conceivably become
is an irsemediably socond-rater? and his aesoeie
Stalin was boos when he had no state titles, arid
could not become boss though, he were loaded with
titles, HO IS as unfit as Kilian for the role o
looking even Xalininos personal popularity,
The real power posts and power levers are
or, which
possibly
Oee? he
know it,
?tow
t50.1
boss,
Iwo. it
a) Control
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a) Control of the Secret Pollee at p t Berle
b) Control of the party lieehine - at present Malenkov
e) Control of the Am, if the Army cm be rallied
around a single person, or if the ?Motors' corps
vill close its ranks sufficiently to emerge with a
military candidate. At present nobody, yet, de-
spite Stalin's careful watching or the Army, not
an imposelbility.
l. Thor. are strong reasons why a fOrtt Cvrzuent
should not give any support to any of these three candidates
who emerge because they ere In control of and therefore sym-
bolise three huge instruments of oppression. insIde tee
party hierarchy, apparent support would be the kIss of death
for anyone on whom it could be pinned. )utsde the party
hierarchy, amone the rank and file and tlati :ernes, we 'would
disgrace ourselves by aiding with thee* hated men and hated
machines, symbols of tyranny. Even worse, end deservedly so,
would be the eompromise of our reputntion in the ranks of op-
pressed nationalities the millions In concentretion camp
and their nastiest* all friends, and all the popuintions of
the restive sabject satellite cauntries. If tee masses
thought that we were supporting somebody for "good reason"
thmt would arouse feIse hopes in the messes - our one depend-
able ally. en the party hierarchy, the one we supported would
have to become vst violently antiekmerican end most ardently
warlike to prove that we were "slandering" him. even at
Lenin's death, one of the methods of attackinga candidete for
the succession was to imply that he wase foreign Rgeat or un-
consciously eepressed foreign Interests.
14. Protocol wo id normally veuire our expressing,
however coldly, condolences at the death
state. But in this case there IS too much at stake, and proto-
col should be quietly but openly ignored. Josif talln has
been en enemy or his own people (they ere his thiefvfotima,
day after day, In An unending psychological wax', speedup, ab-
stinence, driving into war on their neighbors, unending puree,
concentration camp, setting of each yesinst all). ffe 1015 been
an enemy of ell neighboring peoples, personally directing the
pure** of their leaders. No tRs been the enemy of peece, main-
taining the world In a state of unending partial (cold, some-
times not so *old) war. Our president can not openly rejoice.
But it would be a grievous offense Against the feellnee and the
oonscienee of mankind if he should hypocritically express sor-
row, his own personal sorrow, or sorrow on behalf of our people,
or the Russian people, or Soviet end neighboring peoples, or the
world, Our silence would be noted, mad would contribute to the
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i.e.
t the reiza. ii hated and Should not be continued,
r ends or the Russian people* we can not simultan
ve at the death of their greatest oppressor, and
greatest tyrants in their entire history.
three power levers enumerated above ere not
nstrmments but actual organizations involving each
s of thouseees, even millions of men. And with
nds, yet more millions. Such power levers
can not be oved behind the scenes, silently end surreptitious-
ly. hovr appeals to tee Party machine must appeal to some
traditions, some program, something in the past and preient
and sonethin proposed for the future. whoever ppeals to the
Army, likewise. And to the Everett Police, likewise. This
woad be even more the case insofar as each candidate would
have to appeal to brooder numbers, the entire perty, tha trade
unions, the workers, the peasants, tlee netionelitiee? the
messes. Thus the vents of public life, which iave been plugee
up with concrete will be unstopped. After that, anything can
happen
f we have not made any cardinal mistakesuch as
that of alienating the victims by backing one of their guilty
oppressors or by expressing r gret at the passing of the
chief tyrant, we ean soon beein to play o constructive role
in the eneouragement of those who sr* once more called into
public action. But to do this we must have acted previously
not as conspirators beckine one aspirant to tyranny eesinet
another* but we must have acted as democrats who believe in
the right of the people to control their own destinies. And
we must have acted as friends of the Soviet peoples *maned
the men In the Kremlin.
17. There is a big difference between tie Len .n cult
and the Amain malt which will redound to otz.r adeantaea?
vided we do not fell into the trap of protocol "sympathy_
Lenin opposed the cult- of his person and folend it distasteful,
There was no Leninerad until atter he died* nor any automobile
named after him. The siteiration for hie at his death was math
wider than the. party, ald a spontaneous mess phenomenon. Stain
has exacted the cult of his person, The first Incense was burned
to him on his. birthday in 1920 (When Lenin was still *live* and.
himself rejecting such incenseth hut the cult became a larger
and larger instrument of state- after etalin herded, the peasants
into the state collative.* bound the workers to their jobs, sae
killed the leaders of the party, state* and army. The bloodier.
his deeds* the more he compelled his victims to praise his
nee*. A typical example iabis execution of the geneticist
V 1ov
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Vavilov? and than the exaction from his brother of a le tter
praising "the personal care You give to soviet scientists."
This phenomenon is multiplied by tons of millions, since
overy ono who has a son, or father, or friend, or intL,sto,
in a concentration camp is obliged, daily, to praise the
name of Stalin. :ust as the malt of the "Little Pstht.tr Tsar"
proved artificial after the Tsars troops nod on a peaceful
procession on bloody Sunday, 1905, so the malt of ntelin be-
came odious sifter tho blood purges and concentration camps -
hated on a seal* on which no Tsar was ever hated. Tht,Tefore?
even If 3talin should finnlly come to believe, In his own
death and try to prepare t succession, it Is doubtful if he
could swing at tie mord, popular sr e more widely loved Lenin
owild not acomplith in a time that was cruel and bloody
enough, but mild in comparison with the blood-purge, police
and concentration oamp, rind forced-praise reylmo that suc-
ceeded.
CONCWSI135:
The reasoning above sug,sts
post tioni
1. Pop the present,references In general terms to the
reality of the atrugzle for power, but avoidance of (a) singling
out specific individual as participants in or victims of this
struFgle unless till) facts aro absolutely ostablished, and
(b) any hint that we favor any Individual, clique, or power
instrument.
2. The most important etp we can take on the day It
Is known that Stalin is dead Is that of violating protocol
and remaining ostentatIously silent,?because this Is an un-
usual set it will hsve great resonance and will be Interpreted
as encouragement to democratic forces and absonce of regret at
the passing of a tyrant* It would bo highly desirable to get
agreement
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..8.
er governments of the free world to
3. The Voice of Arer1ca can then_ atop- u the inton-
sity
ts: broadcast* it las been making sgatn t the
stalin imes a;7ainot Stalinist aggreesive Amcor alias
arid st the Stalinist internal reaction and count4r-
u ion. Perts of our Directive which are st preeent
rea'ded as Oremature will than be, or will rapidly- Weems
ripe for implementation. Ar first sharp cozente can_ *one
in the guise of simple re ting of newepaper editorials on
Stalin's sinister atif1.oanee in the: life of his people
his party and his period,
4
Voice can
en before a governmental ency such as the
yenything,such organisations se the FREE
RUSz-slA3 IN IAILLs with normously increased help and f'cil-
ities, and our obvious if carefully restrained aympathy and
aupports can begin appeals to put an end to Leith's clique of
lioa,enants and to establish a free democratic Russia anly
democratic Ruesirns can be used for this purpose lest be
maneuvered Into tho appoarence of supporti;i- a
of the Monarchy or a new personal dictator raid
state. (In this connections the only salutary
tive rumors that we can eircul,ite are thoue of
parts of the elite to the cause of free and
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restoration
talltarian
and construe
defections of
umocratic
Russia,
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illy
t VI
Russia.
0
(.1.00r
Pt.IBP:epp
21 '4Ity. 11451
I
MET
or give people the idea that
aerie an
A SECREI
.4., 4
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2-17-50
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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