MEETING WITH COLONEL WHITE, DDS, CIA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80-01240A000100140077-3
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 24, 2000
Sequence Number: 
77
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 13, 1960
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP80-01240A000100140077-3.pdf127.63 KB
Body: 
1+f 1360 meeting kith to e1i t'hite ~, Approved For_Re easj, 200 09/04 :CIA-RL~P 0-01240A000100140077-3 1. To date our audit effort has been directed toward obtaining background information necessary to any exrlnsion of the audit and to attempt to define areas of Comptroller activities that may be sub- jeot to our audit. cc.t.d- r a. We have had4 a l0a four of the five divisions and one of the two staffs in the Comptroller's office. We have also been in frequent contact with the Audit Staff. b. For CIA planning purposes, you are advised that our efforts at CIA have been entirely in this direction. We are not presently engaged in F r ;? voucher audit as was done in the past, atnc, wl do not have any present plans to contiime` a, _;. an audit in the future. Our last voucher auc:it of non-se~.sitive transactions of Fiscal Division was through fiscal year 1957. 2. It presently appears that it will take substantial effort on the part of both CAO and CIA in attempting to effect any increase in the seoFe of our audit. a. Principal difficulty has arisen from the difference between the CIA and GAO interpretations of the restrictions placed on the audit by the Director of Central Intelligence that any GAO audit must remain outside the area of sensitive security of erations. (1) GAO's interpretation was that we would have access to all support activities and that we could examine the organizational structure of the Agency, Agency policies, procedures, and practices, but that any verifications made would be limited to so-called "vouchered expenditures 4. (2) CIA's interpretation was that sensitive security areas includes the adrinistrative activities of the 8upi ort organizations supporting the sensitive activities, that GAO audit will have to remain outside such support activities, and that the Agency regulatory issuances would not be made available to to GAO because they disclose sensitive procedures and activities. odwoument No. Rsrvivw of m=s document by CIA has determined t}a4 1 ru rb anion to declass i =:trrrr,i tion of CIA t,.'x mint remain s ar tie4 at Ts S C , ia4tboriIy: HR 7062 App ro ` d For ale s 1 /9/04 : CIA-RD;80-01240Ab0(1 C~ 1Ci; of CIA interest rr *%- Da'n'- Reviewer 4/13/60 meeti wi h Co~''l W 6ltOAi`: 8 RDP80-01240A000100140077-3 Appi ove For elase 2. b. Broad evaluations do not appear possible at this time - (review and appraisal of internal review mechanisms,; property i rooedures and controls). a. Only about 5 percent of t I CIA expe2xii- tures can be accounted for on any sort of a comprehensive basis. Although 30 percent of total CIA expenditures are against non- sensitive-allotments, over 80 percent of the 3 0 percent. i*- for payroll. 3. It has been difficult to obtain and understand Agency policies and procedures through dis- cussion or through screened instructional matter. It would be helpful to us if: a. The current regulations setting forth Agency organizational structure, Agency policies and procedures could be made available on some systematic basis without substantial holes being created as a result of security screening. b. 'management activity reports could be made available to us regardless of sensitivity so long as they did not detail specific transactions or activities. The reports we have in mind wold be those prepared by the units and divisions say within Logistics to keep the division heads and the Director of Logistics activit"is per- formed. 4. Rt the Office of Logistics may be susceptible to audit on some comprehensive basis, and have made contact with hr. Garrison to initiate a preliminary review of the Office. This will entail initially only the two men presently assigned to the audit. 5. Clearance for additional staff member (s) for audit assignment a. Time required to clear. (prier B clearance reduce this time to any great extent) b. Put in specific staff member for clearance. Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP80-0124OA000100140077-3