(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000500020018-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: November 3, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

Am.
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3 November 1952
25X1A
Excerpts from a paper 411111111111 '91n-naada4one micernialig,1222,1110,1,.
tau to the Solution of the Present grisie vithout
Only by incompetence or malicious intention can I explain the fact that
thelRussian anpertein the Yost ignored these 3 main goals of the Communist
experimenting with Russian guinea pigs*
a. Transformation of the Russian economics into Soviet war
soonomics;
b. Turning Eunsian society into a vast camp of hard labor and
Communist army of world revolution;
c. TransfOrmation of the Russians into docile robots and cannon
fodder for enslavment of the other nations.
The last of these objeotives wasmost difficult to achievo. It is more
easy to destroy an old society than old mentality.
* * *
This gives to us a second major feature of the Communist "society:"
instability e the social-economic groups and flexibility of positions
of strength in the Soviet Union.
* * *
The word, "nachalnik" (chief), has a real sense there.
rulers and ruled is by far more pronounced in the USSR
the Czarist Russia. Yet, we know that one of the main
popular disaontent that led to revolutions of 1905 and
the omnipotency and authoritarianism of "nachablki."
* * *
The precipice between
than it was in
reasons for
1917 was exactly
we will have the following pioture of anti-communist forces in the
today:
A. KhoIkhoz farmers;
B. Majority of industrial workers, especially women;
C. Majority of the army rank and file;
D. Majority of the Soviet white collar workers and intelligenzial
E. Large fraction of the average membership in the CF and CY;
F, Fraction of the regular officer corps;
G. Some of the high Soviet officials;
H. Inmates of the Soviet jails and camps, their relati
those who ever had troubles with the Soviet no;
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and all
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how we can foresee the anti-communistforces during the
of war with America, this war being carried out by
an Operation Killings
A. Fraotiou of the kholkhose farmers;
B, Fraction of white collar workers an intellige la;
C. Fraction of the membership of the CP and CY;
D. some of the Soviet high officials;
E, Txates of the jails and camps, their relatives,
(Conelnsio
the Soviet
sionse
1.
* * *
-his, necessarily short review of the foroa, dividing
we can, as it looks to me, draw following conchs..
Tnion is et1I1 a curious phenomenon, combin very real
cing force with an extreme weakness and vulnerability,
es valid, more than ever, the observation of Kerman
it might change literally "overnight." In other words,
re are in the 11R far more explosive stuff than it was in
czarist Russia on the eve of revolution.
. Telt, with the introiuction of the new Stalinist tactics of merge
ing Communism with Russian nationalism for the benefit of
Communism and its world viatory, the chances for an antieCommuniet
action became more obscure than they aere before the war with
Germany.
In the past it was mainly with the Western support than Communism
was able to keep itself afloat in Russia. It might be that the
possibilities of an antleconnunist chance in the USSR depends
more from the course of the American foreign policy than from an
internal development inside the land of Communist obsourantiSm
and terror.
* * *
1. There are, sesakine theoretically, 4 main types of a possible
revolutionary action In the peace tine Soviet Union, i.e., in a situation
not directly influenced by outside events or pressures
a. Revolutioneevelution;
b. Revolution as a spontaneous outburst of popular malcontent;
0. Revolution as an organised action of some resolute minority
group;
d. Revolution, provoked and supported from abroad.
2. The author immediately rejects the two first types as fully
improbable. * * *
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eve that basic elements of an revolution Llont outside must
4. Political instability of the regime;
b. Economic privations and social insecurity of the popula
c. Acute popular discontent;
d. Revolutionary spirit and traditions of the people;
le. Belief of the popeation in the benevolence of theinto:
vening foreign nation;
f. Possibilities of an influencing of the popu1ation4
g. Possibility of practical assistance from abroad to the
revelutionary action.
* * *
/n my opinion the Russians will trust the W.t only if the West begins
to carry out the following program of action, will show by the deeds
that it is deoidedt
a. To nake a resolute and final break with the policies of seek.
ing maw vivendi and other accomodations with the Communist regime,
the expense of the Russian people;
b. To adopt instead the policies of liberation of the Rue.
elan and other peoples under Communist yoke;
e. To make clear the 4agerloal desire to fight against Commists
only, and do not intervene in the internal affairs of the liberated
Russia, especially in its territorial and minorities problems (under
"Russia" we understand the territory of the SIT as on leptember 1st
19,9? with some rectifications in one or another side.)
* * *
Here are some of the channels through vhih some fresh air usually has
been pouring into a Communist prisons called Soviet Union:
a. Members of the Soviet %reign service and officials who
vent abroad and then returned back;
b. Nbabirs of the Soviet occupational forces in Germaey, etc;
e. German and othe POW's.
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d. People over 40, Who remeaber the life in czarist Russia;
Foreigners visiting USSR (by their eXternsl look)
f. Foreign goods (eonsumption as well as machinery, etc.) Whidh
testify that life is better abroad;
g. Rumors, based an listening to foreign stationS or reading
of the foreign books ani papers (still available through good
friends in a VIP positions), or upon one's own wishful thinking
a very popular source of information in the USSR;
h. Soviet official propaganda, forced to release sore real
vs if in the form of polemics, denials, etc.
* * *
Among the technical possibilities for inf1noing theRussian people
(and also non-.Russian nations of the USSR), I can name, as the first,
preliminary but eonditio qua non steps:
a. Break of diplomatic, trade, and Whatever else form of
relations with the Communist government in the USSR;
b. Proclamation of Stalin and other leading Communists in
Russia and elsewhere as outlowed criminals and enemies of mankind;
0. Explanation to the peoples behind "iron Curtain" of the
reasons -which dictated the Ioestern ostracism of Stalin & CO', and
assurance, in mord and deeds, that it is not directed against
the Russian and other peoples and states, and would be repelled
immediately after the change in the government system would occur.
* * *
04AITO
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