PRELIMINARY REPORT FOR GROUP II (INTELLIGENCE)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000400070025-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2000
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: September 17, 1951
• Content Type: MEMO

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Special Assistant to the Secretary
aZ+'t~ioRisITDU14
C 7ze '
SEP171Q51
To: PSB
Subject: Preliminary Report for Group lI (Intelligence)
Reference; Bork Assignments, Panel S. 30 August 1951
1. OreanimMonfor ta~-talliieacv SuAnort ,Panel B+
sch of the intelligence agencies and the intelligence agencies
combined will be in a position to give intelligence eupport to Panel Bo
The combined support will be in the form of intelligence estimates
which transcend the competence of any one agency, i.e., National Intel<
ligence Estimates coordinated by CIA. The bulk, however. of the intel-
ligence support will probably stem from the resources of the Department
of State intelligence organization, because of the nature of the
intelligence required. However, the Department will be under oblige.--
tion to call upon the other agencies for contributive support where
appropriate, even on estimates which will be forthcoming from the
Department. The Department will also call upon resources outside of
the Government for such private research as will be helpful*
The representation on Panel B from the Departmontes intelligence
organisation, together with the representation from CIA intelligences
will insure the fulfillment of this support herein outlined and these
representatives will be in a position to identify and call upon such
other intelligence representatives as can assist 'Panel B.
preliminary Substantive Intelligence Stapport for .
OIR has undertaken two basic intelligence studies to support the
work of Panel Be
Pro e+ct The comwon and variable aspirations of the peoples
of the Soviet orbit, and the tensions that may be
associated with any conflict between these feelings
and, present Soviet policies. (Preliminary outline
attached, rsannex A)
Pro3~e.c 2. The oom on and variable aspirations of the peoples
of the free worlcd$ excluding the US, and the tensions
that may result from any conflict between these feel-,
Inga and present Western policies or from Soviet P1
exacerbation of these feelings. (Preliminary outline
attached, Annex B)
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State Dept. declassification & release inti utions on file
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Since the psychological planner must be aware of the competition
he faces from the enemy, each of the above two papers will include an
estimate of the capabilities and limitations of the Soviet propaganda
apparatus (domestic and foreign) for exploiting the aspirations and
fears of the peoples in both the Free World and the orbit.
Pr~ o4ect 1 will be coordinated amoig the intelligence agencies as a
!ational Intelligence Estimate. The State Department draft contribution
which will be available to Panel Be-should be ready by September 24.
Pro eat is essentially a State Department paper and should be
available September 28.
3 0 Xature Intel li ence &V rt for Panel So
There are other intelligence studies finished or under way which
should be of use to Panel Be or example,
,errshi : A study in depth, being carried out by a private
group at of the psychology and character of the key
figures in Soviet society, with particular emphasis on
a) vulnerability to psychological pressures, and
b) any predictability of action in response to certain
circumstances;
'? ction studies: Periodic analysis by OIR of foreign
reactions to particular policies or actions.
It is not anticipated that any particularly new or unconventional
intelligence means will be necessary for application to the problems
of Panel Be The fundamental character of the problem, however, requires
a more intensive employment of the means available. For the immediate
work of Panel Be however, a compromise must be struck between the
schedule of Panel B le work and the time required for intensive and
basic research.
It is anticipated that as the work of Groups I and III progresses,
certain questions will arise which intelligence can attempt to answer,
Purthermoreb there will probably be a need to elaborate particular
points raised in the intelligence studies now in production. In order
to be of greatest service to Groups I and III in this regard, a
representative of Group II should, as appropriate, sit in with the
other groups to assist in recognizing and defining those questions
which will require further intelligence.'
SEC _
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This Memorandum has the concurrence of CIA,
Attachments:
ratlines, -nnexes A and Be
Fisher Howe
Deputy
(tJ4 ()
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(Preliminary
version)
PSB Panel ,Projec No. 1
TIIE COMMON AND VARIABLE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLES
OF T1sE SOVIET ORBIT, AND THE TENSIONS THAT MAX BE
ASSOCIATED WITH ANY CONFLICT BETWE 2. THESE PEELINGS
AND PRESENT SOVIET POLICIES.
1. Cohesive Varese In Soviet Society
1. Physical control over individual and masses
a. Police mechanism
be Pbvsical and spiritual isolation of population from outside
world
co Controls over individual
(1) Passport system
(2) Economic restrictions a place of, employment, period of
employment, inability of peasant to sell what and
when he wishes, corvee
(3) Virtual dependence of individual upon state for neces-
sities (food, consumer goods, and housing)
2. Centralized control over political and economic institutions
a. Party
be Government
C. Economy
_(1) Indust77-plant and labor
(2) Agriculture - sovkhoz and kolkhoz
(3) Commerce - domestic and foreign
3 Uniform ideology disseminated under centralized. control
a. Doctrine formulated by topmost leaders
be State monopoly over communications media
(1) Pbyuioal control over media
(2) Pervasiveness of media
(3) Only official doctrine disseminated.
(4) Endless repetition partly overcomes popular skepticism
of official pronouncements
co Cultural activities limited to furthering official doctrine
(1) Arts
(2) Sciences
d. Educational system monopolized by state
e. Theme of monolithic character of regime
(1) "Supported by all" (nationalities, social strata,
and religious groups)
(2) Resulting isolation of individual
fa Universally inspired fear of war and attachment to soil
4e Predominant position of -Great Russians
a. Absolute majority of population
be Union aids distribution
co Privileged position - "first among equals"
(1) State exploitation of tr&dit3yC; e..:, Great Raueian
inferiority complex
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(2) Stimulation of, Great Russian nationalism
5. Trappings of popular participation in regime
a. Central government
be local government
c. Public organizations
6. Announced objectives of regime
a. Standard of living
b. Equality of opportunity for all strata and nationalities
c. freedom and security of individual
do Nationalism
(1) Local national governmental bodies
(2) Encouragement and use of local languages
(3) Approval of some lo=l historical figures
,. Stake of the elite in perpetuating regime
a. Great material rewards
be Identification with regime and fear of punishment with
collapse of government.
II. "
,A Caeea of Tension in Soviet Society
1. Nationalism among Soviet minorities
a. Ukraine
b. Ealtic States
c. Caucasus
do Central Asia
2. Peasant discontent over agricultural policy
ao Collective cultivation of land
b. Collective farm crop delivery system
a. Inability to leave collective
d. Increasing inroads on remaining private operations
e. Harsh labor discipline
f. Party members got best jobs and largest rewards on farms
go Beal and artificial shortage of manpower (women are primary
source of farm labor)
3. Worker dissatisfaction with industrial system
a. Bad working conditions
be Restrictions on movement of labor
c. Harsh labor discipline and penalties for violation
d. Compulsory deductions from pay
e. Trade-unions represent state rather than worker interests
f. Low pay
g. the Stekbanovite speedup system
h. Catting down number of non'work days. (1) Power now than
before ware (2) Abolishing national holidays
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io Constant agitation and meetings at place of employment to
spur production
J. Plant administrative staffs are inflated, jobs are,cusby
4. Persistence of religious feelings
a. Only permiesible form of ideology contrary to official dogma
b. All church organizations state controlled
co Religious groups with special grievances
(l) Ukrainian Uniats
(2) Lithuanian Catholics
(3) Minority groups in Russian Orthodox Church
(4) Moslems
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Extensive And arbitrary police power
a.
b.
C.
d.
m.
Inadequate legal safeguards against police
Os3nipresence of police and informers; universal mutual distrast
among Soviet population
Disparity between crime and punishment
Extent and inhumanity of labor camps
Control over residence and travel
6.
Inter-class frictions
a.
Popular resentment at elite privileges and their perpetuation
(1) High officialdom vs. masses
(2) tarty vs. non-Party
(3) Officer vs* enlisted man
(4) Workers vs. managers and engineers
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Dissatisfaction with standard of living
a. High cost, scarcity, and low quality of necessities
b. Squalid housing conditions
c. Difficulty of putting children through school
d. Contrast with Western standard of living
Popular distrust of official propaganda, hence government C5
integrity
as Disparity between reality and official doctrine
(1) Soviet "freed"
(2) Internal economic conditions
(3) The "oppressed West"
(4) Distorted news of specific events, World War II experience
(5) Disillusionment accompanies maturing
9?
lack of popular participation in government
a. Party monopoly of political power
b. The rigged election, fear of voting against the Party, feeling
of isolation
co lack of popular elections in the Party
d. The fares: 'dictatorship of the proletariat."
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10. Suppression of free intellectual inquiry
a. Impossibility for the artist, writer, newspaperman, scholar
and scientist to express his real thoughts because of the
Party iaanufactured straitjacket:
(1) The Party line
(2) Dictation of subject matter
(3) Danger of venturing. into fields uncharted by the Party
(4) Unpredictable changes in the party line
(5) All-pervasive censorship
(6) Penalty of non-conformity; p rge
(7) Isolation from foreign cultures
U. Great popular fear of war
a. Increased Soviet emphasis on "Just war"
b. Increased attention to war propaganda against the USSR
12. Intea-class frictions
a. Politburo
(1) Struggle for succession
(2) I4alenkov-Zhdanov feud
(3) Direct and implied criticism of Andreyev and Thrushch
b. Struggle among lesser elite groups for power positions
(1) Military vs. Party and Police
(2) Inter-service rivalry
(3) Managerial-administrative elite vs. Party and police
(u) Recent Party members vs* old Party members
(5) Party leadership vs. rank and file Party
(6) Party vs. police
(7) Bureaucrat (Civil Servant) vs. Party and Police
(8) Party idealist ves. Party opportunist
13. Racial and religious animosities
a. Anti-Semitism
be, Anti-Great Russianism
co Aaerbaidahani-Armenian
d. Georgian.-Armenian
o. Catholic-Orthodox
f. 14oelem-Orthodox
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(Preliminary
Tersion)
PbB Panel B Pro ect No. 22
THE COMMON AND VARIABLE ASPIRATIONS OF THE
PEOPLES OF THE FREE WORLD, EXCLUDING THE
US, AND THE TENSIONS THAT MAY RESULT FROM
"Y CONFLICT BETnEEAi THE' ;E M1INGS, AND
PL1ESENT WESTERN POLICIES, OR FROM SOVIET
P EXACERBATION OF THESE FEELINGS.
I. Common aspirations and: fears of the ewes of the free T old.
1. Peace.
2. Security from external aggression.
3. Political independence and status.
4. Economic "elfare and independence.
5. Governments responsive to the citizenry and useful. for
achievement of their aims.
6. Development and preservation of autonomous cultures.
;TI. Aspirations. and fears of pA=cu7tar areas and pro s eaithin the
f'rea pro ] . (In this connection, particular attention should be
paid to those aspirations and fears which will diverge from those
specified under I. above.)
1. Western Europe*
a. Different, economic groups, e.g.p industrial wage earners,
farmers, white collar salaried groups, middle and upper
classes.,
b. Different occupational groups whose significance is out
of proportion to their size and economic position, eog.,
bureaucrats, politicians, and government leaders.
a. Different national groupss Scandinavia, the UK, 'West
Germany, continental Western Europe*
d. Different religious groupss Catholics, Protestants.
:&CRE
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a, Different economic groups: peasants, low income city dwellers,
middle and upper classes -- commercial, professional, and
industrial groups; landlords,
bA Key occupational groups: intellectuals, bureaucrats, poli-
ticians, and government leaders.
i:. Different national groups, particularly bringing out the
distinctions between four groups of countries: (i) industrial
Japan; (ii) Philippines, pre'$ estern Korean, Thailand, and
Nationalist China; (iii) newly independent Indonesia, Burma,
India, and Pakistan; (iv) embattled-Malaya and indo-China.
3o The Near East.
a. Economic groups: peasants, low income city dwellers,
middle and upper classes -- commercial, professional, and
industrial groups; landlords.
b. Key occupational groups: intellectuals, politicians,
bureaucrats, and government leaders.
c. Different national and religious groups, bringing out
especially the distinctions between attitudes in Turkey,
the Arab states, and Israel.
1.A
Africa*
a.
b.
Economic groups*
Occupational groups:
intellectuals, political leaderse
c,
Different racial groups,, bringing out particularly the
different attitudes of the native and European populations,,
5, Latin America*
a. Economic groups: peasants, low income city dwellers,
middle and upper classes -- commercial, nrofescional, and
industrial groups; landlords.
bo Occupational groups: intellectuals, politicians, bureau-
crati3, and government leaders.
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III. Conflict and d ive .
1. To what extent are these aspirations and fears described under
I and 2p above, channeled by existing US and other Western
policies into drives that support US aims?
2. To what extent are these aspirations and fears so adversely
affected by existing US and other D+estern policies, and/or
so exacerbated by Soviet psychological warfare, as to create
conflicts between US and free world attitudes which can be
exploited by the USSR?
?LqRET
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