BRIEFING MATERIAL FOR MR. R.J. SMITH'S TRIP TO THE FAR EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01762A001000060005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 10, 1968
• Content Type: MF

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10 September 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, OCI
SUBJECT : Briefing Material for Mr. R. J. Smith's
Trip to the Far East
1. Mr. Smith has asked me to request the following
briefing materials for his trip to the Far East at the end of
September.
25X1C
25X1C
A. A talking paper,
the Czech crisis on Soviet relatons with Commu-
on the impact ot
fist countries and with the West.
25X1C
the
impact ot events on prospects for detente and for
US-Soviet relations.) (20-30 minutes) The first
draft for Mr. Smith's review should be ready by
COB 12 September.
B. A talking paper on the situation in Com-
munist China. This will be for general background
use in the course of his travels, and should stress
the political situation with brief general comments
on economic problems.* (2 0-30 minutes) The first
draft for Mr. Smith's review should be ready by
00B 16 September.
25X1C
* This paper may be the one used in the substantive discussion
with Mr. Smith on 16 September. A separate briefing on the
Chinese military situation is being prepared by OSR.
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C. A review of the political-military situation
in Vietnam, with brief treatment of Laos and Cam-
bodia. This will be for general background in the
inevitable discussions along the way. (20-30 minutes)
This draft should be ready for Mr. Smith to review by
COB 13 September.
3. I understand that Mr. Smith has already instructed
on preparation of material on various subjects
which he will look into in Saigon.
These should be 1-2 pages long and should be ready for Mr. Smith
by 23 September.
25X1A
25X1A
5. The final versions of the briefings requested in paragraph
I, above, should be ready by 23 September, so that they may be
about 25 September.
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UNCLASSIFIED 1
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
Director, OCI
2
3
4
5
,-
6
"VACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
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STATINTL STATINTL
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
10 Sept
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kalacluzalsagr 7.
a26.2102416.62=U0
FORM NO.
2-61 z. 037 Use previous editions
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1961 0-587282
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I
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director/OCI
SUBJECT
10 September 1968
: DDI Substantive Discussion on
Political Developments in Communist
China
1. Mr. Smith has requested that OCI prepare a talking
paper on political developments in Communist China to inaugurate
his new program of discussion sessions with substantive analysts.
2. The discussion session will be held in the DDI's office
at 1500 hours on Monday, 16 September.
3. The following officers should be present for the
discussion:
25X1A
Mr. R. J. Smith
- OCI
- OCI
-ONE
- SRS 25X1A
4. It is suggested that the text be available for Mr.
Smith to read on the morning of 16 September, before the
meeting. The paper should review the situation, discuss
significant analytical problems, and provide the basis for
Mr. Smith to lead a general discussion lasting up to an hour.
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I UNCLASSIFIED I I CONFIDENTIAL I r SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
Director/OCT
2
3
4
5
6
./.,?
P"--
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
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STAT I NT L STAT I NT L
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10 Sept
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2-61 ? 237 Use previous editions (40)
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1961 0-597282
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6 September 1968
nr.noRANDum
SMJECT: Background Information for DDI Trip to
Saigon
1. The Phoenix Program: This is an integrated
GVN effort to identify and eliminate the Communist
political infrastructure throughout South Vietnam.
In the course of obtaining information for this pro-
gram, the CVN regularly comes across information of
25X1C value to the national intelligence community in
Washington.
The information 25X1C
acquired through Phoenix on Communist political
infrastructure, political aims and accomplishments
is of great interest to the national intelligence
community and we can use even more of this type of
information.
2. Communist Order of Battle: There still
appear to be ma36Y-3ITYR-CWW-TEween MACV and CIA.
(Weassume OER will provide the DDI with details.)
3. Political Re ortin Both on Communists and
GVN: Station and Embassy report ng has reflected an
acute awareness of the importance of reporting on the
Saigon political situation. Reporting on exactly what
the GVN is accomplishing or its lack of accomplishment
in the countryside, however, is still less complete
and timely than we would like to see. Bits and pieces
come in but we could use a great deal more detail on
this subject.
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We believe that Communist intentions and progress
in regard to theA:ommanIste0---new "liberation committees.'
which are in essence local administration, is of great
importance and should be a key target of our station.
The struggle between the GVN and the Communist for
political control of the people both in the countryside
and the cities is a major area of concern to the national
intelligence community. We appreciate the information
being received currently and hope that the station can
accomplish even more in reporting on this subject.
4. Cambodia as a Supply Funnel for the Communists;
The importance of Cambodia to the Communist efforE-In
South Vietnam is an area that has been the subject of
considerable--although lessening--difference of opinion
between MACV and CIA/Washington intelligence analysts.
MACV tends to stress the importance of Cambodia's role
and CIA (with State and DIA in more or less harness)
tending to downplay its overall impact.
There is no question that Cambodian territory
has become more important to the Communists since late
1965 and the general understanding of this fact has
tended to narrow the gap between MACV and Washington.
The only live issue today concerns the shipment of arms
and ammunition through Cambodia to Communist forces in
South Vietnam. We agree with Saigon that the Communists
are getting, at least, important supplementary amounts
of arms and ammunition through Cambodia. We do not
believe, however, that the amounts can be quantified
with any degree of confidence nor do we accept much of
the "evidence" MACV quotes to support its case.
5. Renorting Responsibilities of MACV and the
Station: We are concerned that certain areas of in-
telligence not fall between chairs. 114-laar.tits
014-Ake,-,,akarty-feeerbe-ef-thrt
tive--goa4r4al-over-t+te-reptritrttolr: We may be getting
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all the pertinent information on the amount and effects
of terrorism, assassination, overrunning of resettlement
hamlets, etc. This type of information, however, is
reported through several different channels, raising
the possibility that there is no real coordination within
the Mission in Saigon and also raising the possibility
that some valuable information simply does not get re-
ported back to the strategic level here in Washington at
all.
G. The Mission of the Research and Analysis Staff:
We are interested in ow e COS v ews the mission and
functioning of the RAS. What contribution does it make
to the station and could it be of more direct assistance
to the DDI mission in Washington? Should there and can
there be a better flow of information between the DDI
at Headquarters and the RAS?
7. We are, of course, deeply interested in the
Station's and in MACV's assessment of the strategic
situation in South Vietnam. In a recent summation of
the situation by General Abrams, it appeared that he
believes a failure on the part of the Communists in their
present offensive effort would mean that they would then
be in an overall weakened strategic posture. We tend to
believe that the Communists are now on the offensive and
that their failure to accomplish much in the present
round of fighting might not mean much of a basic change
in their ability to drag out the conflict should they so
desire.
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of Current Intelligence
SUBJECT: -DIDM Visit to atgon
The Ma might wish to dise OB two items of concern to
both OP R and the Agency if he ets with General Davidson
during his Saigon visit.
1. MACY 4/4.2 has made straIng allegations that the CIA
has thrust itself into the general question of OD and enemy
strengths because of BOZO ugly tottvee. They apparently feel
that because of some discontent with BRIE 14.3, the DCI
persuaded to go to the 'Mite Uc,iee with a set of higher
numbers and that wince that tim we have mounted major efforts
to prove that the till VOA right They also feel that CIA
has no business in making esti tea of enemy strength. I
think it would be very helpful if the 11114 would explain to
General Davidson the background events that brought us into
' this business and also fill the general in on the DCI 'a
obligations to the President as the Director of Central In-
telligence and consequently the agency'e right to be involved
in any intelligence problem that is &matter of national con-
,
cern
??P,
_ ? EL: ..,4>plait 001( ? , Im 1:4 I ? IL,A,.%r...A,tos
? 24 The DDI might also raise with General Davidson the
opening of MACV's doors so that prR personnel could go to
CIC7, CDEC, and the like on extended TDT's for working purposes.
This can be explained SA a desire to make sure our analysts
have exploited all available materials in their research par- .
ticularly when it concerns sensitive estimates. The use of
this device would be beneficial to our research product and,
in addition, would help to build up a meaningful dialogue between
MACY and CIA,' '
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Distribution:
Orig. & 1 .
25X1A,
DD/OER
Addressee
OD/OER
ro/oER
:aje/5001(5 Sept 8
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Economic Research
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18
September 1968
No. 1572/68
The Political Situation in Communist China
I. There has been a new turning point in the
violent course of the Cultural Revolution. A
drive to restore order is in progress, and the
Red Guards--the shock troops of "revolution"--
have been under heavy attack.
A. This past spring and early summer saw
violence in China rise to a new crescendo,
reaching proportions nearly equal to the
bloody summer of 1967.
1. Armed clashes and political infighting
were particularly intense in southern
China.
2. In one province bordering Vietnam the
four principal cities were gutted by
fire and at one period the vital rail line
to Hanoi was disrupted.
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B. The new turn came at the end of July, when
word went out from Peking that violence by
Red Guards or anyone else was to end--by
military intervention if necessary.
1. In most places the army has carried out
these orders with a will, and Red Guard
organizations have been badly mauled.
Many have been destroyed.
2. The more "radical" Red Guard groups
responsive to extremists in Peking have
borne the brunt of the attack.
3. Vigilante groups organized by provincial
military authorities have been cracking
student heads with a vengeance, and
many old scores are being settled by
officials previously under Red Guard attack.
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4. These vigilante groups are composed of
workers and led by army troops. They
have been told that they will occupy
schools and universities "permanently"
to see that students never get out of
line again.
5. The older students, who tended to be
leaders of the Red Guard movement, are
being summarily "graduated," even though
they have had no schooling in more than
two years. Many are being sent to
army-run state farms in remote areas.
We have one credible report that politi-
cal prisoners are being released from
a prison mine to make way for these
so-called "graduates."
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6. It is evident from all this that students--
backbone of the Red Guards--are no lon-
ger being treated as the apple of Mao's
eye or getting his protection.
C. The change in the political climate in late
July made it possible to resume the restora-
tion of administrative machinery in the
provinces. The process of forming new
governments was started in January 1967,
but encountered repeated setbacks, and was
stalled again last spring. Now, however,
all provinces have new "Revolutionary Com-
mittees" to replace the old provincial party
secretariats and government councils.
Three were set up in August and the last
two on 5 September.
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1. Most of the committees, particularly
those set up in the past six months,
are dominated by military officials
who were under radical attack through-
out much of the Cultural Revolution.
D. People's Daily is again talking about re-
building the party.
1. This formidable task, however, has
barely gone beyond the talking stage.
II. These developments follow two and a half years
of the most violent kind of political turmoil,
which at times has brought China to the brink
of anarchy. It has been a bizarre situation
in which the regime has, in effect, been con-
ducting revolution against itself.
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A. The Cultural Revolution had its origin in
a wide range of complex factors, but Mao
Tse-tung unquestionably played a central
role in setting off the upheaval.
1. In the early and mid-1960s, Mao ap-
parently felt himself to be increasingly
at odds with many leading members of
the Chinese regime. This feeling was
partly paranoia, partly justified.
2. Mao believed the Chinese revolution--
his revolution--was running into the
sands. Revolutionary enthusiasm and elan
had been lost.
a. Bureaucratic buck-passing and in-
ertia was growing. Technical ex-
perts were vying with "revolutionary"
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generalists for authority in mak-
ing decisions.
b. The problems of modernizing a huge,
over-populated and backward country were
growing rather than decreasing.
2. Mao's answer to these problems was an
attempt to rekindle the "revolutionary"
fervor that had helped bWing him to
power.
a. He had apparently developed almost
mystic faith in the power of "per-
manent revolution" conducted by
mobilized and indoctrinated masses
and sought by this means to counter-
act growing cynicism and prevent
Soviet-style revisionism from
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infecting China.
B. Many officials and probably some important
members of the regime, however, distrusted
the kind of unrealistic mass enthusiasm
that had led to the disasters of the Great
Leap Forward in the late 1950s.
1. These men resisted by dragging their
feet and interpreting Mao's wishes in
the light of what they themselves re-
garded as sound policy.
2. This apparently convinced Mao that
some of the men in line to succeed him
were selling out the revolution, and
he moved against them in the fall and
winter of 1965.
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C. Mao's initial attack centered on the pro-
paganda apparatus of the party, which he
apparently felt had failed in the task of
maintaining "revolutionary" fervor at a
high pitch.
1. The attack on the propaganda machinery
culminated in the purge of Peng Chen,
a full member of the politburo, in the
spring of 1966.
D. This almost certainly aroused the fears of
other top leaders, and at the same time up-
set the balance of political power at the
apex of authority.
1. They probably reacted defensively,
forming protective alliances.
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2. It seems likely that some of them plot-
ted against the others in an effort to
exploit the situation for their own
advantage.
E. The net effect, in this Byzantine atmosphere,
was to persuade Mao that many of the men
close around him were not to be trusted,
and that the entire party apparatus was
suspect.
1. At the famous August plenum in 1966
the axe fell on Liu Shao-chi--head of
state and number two man in the party.
Other veteran leaders soon fell.
2. Following the plenum Mao and Lin Piao
unleashed the newly formed Red Guards
against the entire party.
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III. Events began to generate their own momentum as
the struggle surged back and forth.
A. Authorities in the provinces sought to
defend themselves against Red Guard acti-
vists sent out from Peking to bring them
down.
1. They organized "Red Guards" of their own
and pitted them against the interlopers.
2. They recruited workers and peasants
with offers of higher wages and a
larger share of state goods--a practice
damned by Peking as "economism."
B. These efforts proved fruitless when the
army was ordered to restore order at the
end of January 1967--suppressing both the
Maoist Red Guards and local groups
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defending the provincial leaders.
1. With their defenses destroyed these
men fell in large numbers during the
period of relative calm in February and
early March.
2. They were supplanted by military of-
ficials who had leading roles in pro-
visional governing bodies set up at
that time.
C. The respite from violent political struggle
proved to be brief and in the spring Mao
and the radicals grouped around him launched
new attacks on "power holders taking the
capitalist road"--the army men and bureau-
crats who had replaced the purged party of-
ficials.
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1. Army leaders in particular were accused
of acting in February to suppress the
Red Guards--the instrument of the ex-
tremists in the Cultural Revolution
Group in Peking.
2. Covert resisetnce on the part of those
under attack merely fed the flames.
By early summer armed clashes between
opposing Red Guard groups had spread
across the country and were growing in
intensity.
D. More open defiance of the radical leaders
in Peking on the part of the Wuhan Military
Region commander in July led to a major
crisis.
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1. Radicals in the capital opened an
across-the-board attack on the entire
military establishment in August a
year ago.
2. This move may have nearly cost the
Maoists the support of the military.
By the end of the month tensions had
reached the breaking point and troubles
were mounting.
E. More moderate elements, with substantial
military backing, apparently forced a
change of course in September. Rampaging
Red Guards were curbed and a number of
other steps were taken toward restoring a
semblance of order.
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1. Steps taken toward the re-establishment
of a viable administrative machine were
fitful at best, however, and frequently
were the result of painful compromise.
2. Although partly curbed, the Red Guards
still enjoyed many special privileges
and clearly remained under a protective
umbrella.
3. This lull was also short-lived. By
November Mao's wife was again making
inflammatory speeches, and troubles
had begun to spread and to grow again.
4. The succeeding winter was a period of
confusion and political statements with
modest steps toward restoration of
administrative order alternating with
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bouts of renewed fighting and politi-
cal savagery.
F. In late April a new purge of the military--
which included the political demise of the
army's acting chief-of-staff--ushered in
a new surge of radical ferment.
1. Political divisions sharpened and the
new provincial administrative organs
appeared on the verge of being under-
cut by renewed agitation.
2. Fighting rapidly spread, particularly
in south China.
IV. Struggle between Peking and the provinces was
the most visible aspect of the political civil
war which has been tearing China. There is also
resistance to Maoist policies at the center--
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conducted behind a facade of unity at the top.
A. "Revolutionary" policies have been resisted
and at times blocked, we believe, by a
loose coalition of leaders in the military
establishment and government machinery for
whom Premier Chou En-lai is the symbolic
if not the actual leader.
1. These men would like to limit the dam-
age done to the economy, administrative
machinery and cohesiveness of the state
by the excesses of the "revolution."
2. Many have themselves been under poster
attack by radical Red Guard factions
aligned with the extremist central
Cultural Revolution Group. They would
like to damp down the "revolution" to
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protect their own positions.
B. These people are "conservative" members
of the establishment seeking to preserve
the gains achieved since 1949. They would
not, however, be candidates for the Union
League Club.
1. All of them are Marxist, all are com-
mitted to preservation of a Communist
government of some sort. Their basic
motivation, however, is probably na-
tionalistic.
2. It seems likely that more and more
people have swung over to the opposi-
tion with each destructive lurch to the
"left" in the course of the Cultural
Revolution.
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C. The damage already done to the political
and economic fabric of China is enormous.
1. The party apparatus, a fundamental in-
strument of control painstakingly built
up during the past three decades, has
been virtually destroyed.
2. Government machinery has been very hard
hit and in some areas of activity is
barely functioning.
3. The army, the only organization left
reasonably intact, has been thrown into
unfamiliar political work for which it
is ill equipped. Although generally
loyal and responsive to orders from
Peking, many units have been deeply in-
volved in divisive political disputes--a
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situation which can only dismay high-
ranking professional officers.
4. Disruptions connected with the Cultural
Revolution have adversely affected the
economy. We cannot be sure exactly
how much damage has been done, but it
seems likely that serious economic
trouble was averted last year only by
an unusually good harvest. The harvest
this year will be mediocre at best.
5. Public probity, once the pride of the
regime, has deteriorated and petty
crime flourishes in every major
Chinese city.
V. It is possible that the steadily worsening
situation has finally welded the opposition
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together and brought its members to the point
of decisive action.
A. This is suggested by the fact that for the
first time a major assault has been made
on the Red Guards, apparently aimed at
destroying them as a political force.
1. The Guards were the shock troops of
the extremists, and virtually their
only instrument for mass political
action.
2. Destroying the Red Guards would, there-
fore, be a logical step before moving
against "revolutionary" Maoist leaders.
B. The history of the Cultural Revolution thus
far, however, dictates caution in announc-
ing the end of it.
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1. Mao Tse-tung and his defense minister
Lin Piao still seem to retain the per-
sonal loyalty of many key military
commanders. As Mao himself is fond of
saying, military support is the funda-
mental source of political power in
China or anywhere else.
2. The army has not been a responsive or
effective instrument for "revolution"
in Mao's eyes, but with few exceptions
army commanders have not been willing
to openly defy the Maoists. It is this
ambivalent position of military men--
they disagree with Mao's policies but
are loyal to the man himself--which
makes Mao dangerous and gives him the
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capability to renew the initiative in
new, untried directions.
3. Twice before Mao has retreated in the
face of stiff opposition in the army
and bureaucracy to his destructive
policies. Each time he soon resumed
the offensive with renewed vigor.
4. The composition of the last two Re-
volutionary Committees--those announced
for Tibet and Sinkiang on 5 September--
seems to indicate that the extremists
around Mao in Peking still possess
the will and strength to frustrate some
of the plans of more moderate elements
within the leadership group.
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a. Both committees contain representa-
tives from opposing factions, who
appear to be as unreconciled as
ever. We think that factional
Lighting is almost certain to per-
sist in these areas. In Tibet, at
least, we already have signs that
rival Red Guard organizations are
still active and unruly.
C. We are waiting for the other shoe to drop in
Peking--the fall of a major figure or
figures associated with currently dis-
credited extremist policies.
1. A significant purge has accompanied
every previous major turn in the Cul-
tural Revolution, and unless or until
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this occurs we are reluctant to write
off the Cultural Revolution as finished.
2. Prime candidates for such a purge would
be key members of the Cultural Revolu-
tion Group: Kang Sheng and Chen po-ta.
VI. Estimates concerning the future course of
events in China, particularly in the short run,
are chancy at best. Our most recent effort to
look ahead for the next year or so begins "the
situation inside Communist China is still
highly fluid and the outlook uncertain."
A. This was written last May and still holds
good. It explains the caution shown by
our analysts at headquarters interpreting
the latest developments.
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1. Evaluation of the current trend toward
moderation makes us think the chances
are improving that the Cultural Revolu-
tion is being closed down.
2. We would be far more confident in this
judgment if we had evidence that Mao
was being removed from a position of
power. Until this happens the potential
for continued instability and renewed
turmoil on a major scale persists.
B. Mao has always been an apostle of violence
and appears to hold an almost mystical be-
lief in the efficacy of revolutionary mass
action.
1.
with Mao
who recently talked
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fascinating man but a dangerous leader.
He commented that Mao seemed to enjoy
setting political fires and then
watching with pleasure the efforts of
others to put them out.
2. This is a simplistic evaluation of a
complex personality. We don't believe
Mao has a pathological love of dis-
order for its own sake. He has a high
tolerance for it, however, and we
think Mao will never be satisfied with
stability achieved at the expense of
his revolutionary programs.
3. In his earlier career Mao demonstrated
the ability to change his strategy to
meet new situations but it seems likely
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he has now lost much of this flexibility.
4. Mao's probable inclination to persist
in a course already set--continued
"revolution"--would no doubt be rein-
forced by the realization that his
time is running out.
C. The chances of repairing the damage done
by the Cultural Revolution and moving ahead
with positive programs of development thus
seem small so long as Mao retains the cap-
ability of influencing the course of events.
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1. Those in the leadership seeking to end
the Cultural Revolution probably re-
cognize this and regard the effective
removal of Mao as an essential step.
2. At this point they are not united,
however, and probably do not have the
support for such a move from the
military establishment, which would
be essential for success.
3. The immediate prospect is thus for a
period of stalemate during which con-
servative elements attempt to restrict
Mao's freedom of action by means short
of eliminating him as a political
force.
4. Such a situation is inherently unstable.
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Unless Mao solves the problem by dying
first, it seems likely that forces in
opposition to him will be under in-
creasing pressure to unite and en-
capsulate the old man as a palace
prisoner--and will have the power to
do so.
VII. The regime which follows the group now at the
top in Peking will be beset with formidable
problems.
A. The first of these will be to end the
political infighting which has plagued the
top leadership ever since the start of the
Cultural Revolution three years ago.
1. We do not know which men will play key
roles in a new regime but it seems
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clear that no candidate with anything
like Mao's charisma is available to
4 impose unity on a group of ambitious
leaders divided by old wounds and un-
settled scores left from the Cultural
Revolution.
2. At best, the kind of collegial leader-
ship which seems likely to evolve will
probably move uncertainly in its ef-
forts to cope with the problems of re-
construction.
B. The new leaders will be severely hampered,
moreover, by the disarray in the machinery
of government.
1. The party has been virtually destroyed
and it will take long and patient work
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to rebuild it as an effective political
instrument.
4 2. The bureaucracy has fared better than
the party but it too has suffered
serious damage and is in need of ex-
tensive repair.
C. Burdened with these problems, the succes-
sors to the present leadership will be at-
tempting to rule a demoralized and possibly
a fractious nation.
1. The relaxation of central authority
which has been a by-product of the
Cultural Revolution seems likely to
cause persistent trouble. Once the
instruments of coercion are back in
operation the people can probably be
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forced back into their pre-revolutionary
subservience but there will be resistance.
2. A more serious problem is the develop-
ment of regional and provincial power
groups pursuing their own ends at the
expense of the center. Regionalism,
always a problem in China, has received
impetus and an opportunity to grow.
D. Ultimately we would expect to see the
emergence of a reasonably effective, united
group of leaders in Peking. They will be
Communists in a broad sense but not Maoist
revolutionaries.
1. The forces of nationalism which brought
Mao and the Communist party to power
in 1949 are still a powerful political
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cement. The new leaders--whoever they
might be--will probably be pragmatic
men motivated strongly by nationalistic
considerations.
2. They will reject Mao's revolutionary
dogma because it has proved irrelevant
to China's problems.
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3
Vietnam:
r.
South Vietnam Political
I. The South Vietnamese government is now enjoying its
longest period of relative stability since the days
of Ngo Dinh Diem.
A. President Thieu has managed the removal of most
of Vice President Ky's chief lieutenants from
key positions with considerable political deftness.
1. Premier Huong appears to be a decided asset
to the Thieu government. He is striving to
give South Vietnam for the first time in years
an honest administration which addresses itself
to some of the major ills such as corruption
and incompetence.
B. Despite the period of political stability and the
relatively able leadership of Thieu and Huong,
enormous problems continue to plague the government.
1. One such problem has been the failure of the
GVN to arouse any substantial degree of popular
enthusiasm or support. This failure is par-
ticularly evident in the countryside.
2. The Communists have been moving rapidly in the
post-Tet period to create local administrations
called "liberation committees" in areas they
control.
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SEGHT
3. Thieu is now somewhat belatedly trying to
develop an effort to generate popular sup-
port for the Saigon government. Thieu,
Huong and others in the leadership have come
to realize that they will be at a distinct
disadvantage vis-a-vis the Communists in any
post-war period of political competition
unless some effective political organization
can be created to unite the non-Communists
in the country.
4. Thus far, however, the Lien Minh, Thieu's
umbrella grouping of political and social
elements which he hopes will be able to
draw eofisiderabtu wilvna govornmAnt,
has been slow to get off the mark.
5. An inner cabinet has been formed by Huong to
lay plans for efforts to gain control of the
people who are now in contested or Communist-
controlled areas once a cease-fire is declared.
C. Another major problem which the Thieu-Huong
administration has been unable to make much of
a dent in is the widespread and entrenched cor-
ruption which pervades virtually every aspect of
official dealings with the people.
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D. Vice President Ky, thus far, has gone along,
albeit grudgingly, with his displacement from
a position of power.
1. He and his supporters are extremely bitter
but they do not seem inclined at this point
to rock the boat by reacting forcefully.
2. Ky, at times, grumbles about the danger of
Thieu agreeing to an accommodation with the
Communists and it is possible that any move
in this direction by President Thieu could
trigger a coup attempt by Ky and his fol-
lowers, although their ability to pull one
off successfully is uncertain.
PrQPident Thi en' attit-ilde tnward peace talks
remains that he is willing to meet with repre-
sentatives of North Vietnam but publicly, at
least, he is opposed to sitting down with the
Liberation Front.
1. In private, however, Thieu gives signs of a
willingness to meet privately and in secret
with representatives of the Viet Cong.
2. The South Vietnamese government is also
somewhat nervous over the US-DRV talks in
Paris but Thieu seems less concerned over
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the danger of a unilateral US move in
these talks than he was earlier.
II. South Vietnam's pacification effort was dealt a
heavy blow by the Communists' Tet offensive.
Although some recovery has been made, the level
of pacification is still not back to its pre-Tet
level.
A. Given the lack of security in the countryside
throughout much of the country, there is little
prospect that major gains will be made over
the next six months at least.
1. One recent example of how difficult it is
to translate our military superiority over
the Communists' main force units into real
gains in pacification came in the recent
fighting around Da Nang.
2, commnninV main and local force npit9 tnnk
a terrible beating and lost great numbers
of men in their efforts to launch an assault
on Da Nang.
3. Despite the setback administered to their
main force units, the Communists were able
during the same period, in the areas around
Da Nang to overrun several relocation hamlets,
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assassinate a number of village chiefs
and local government officials and drive
some RD teams out of their area of opera-
tion.
5. As a result of the difficulties pacifica-
tion faces, the program has been restructured
and the teams pulled back largely into areas
nearby allied bases, urban centers and
defended lines of communications.
III. Military losses sustained by ARVN during the Tet
fighting, placed extraordinary strains upon the
already serious manpower shortage faced by the South
Vietnamese army.
A. Shortly after the Tet offensive, the reserves were
mobilized with all reservists with less than 5
years of active service ordered to report by
15 March.
1. In addition, all males between 18 and 38 were
called to serve in the army. Induction of
19 year olds began on 1 March and 18 year olds
were drafted beginning on 1 May.
2. Males 16-17 and 39-50 will be enlisted in the
civil self-defense forces.
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B. As a result of these call-ups, the strength of
the armed forces was raised by about 120,000
by 30 June.
1. It is anticipated that by the end of the
year the total strength of the ARVN will be
over 800,000.
C. However, the combined effect of the drastic rise
in manpower input for the army and the lack of
adequate exemptions for vital civilian govern-
mental and service functions has adversely affected
certain key administrative operations, particu-
larly at provincial and district levels.
1, Unflex Of; to.nolpLikg, ihp iiVN is rinw si7rempting
to establish certain exemptions which will
P-P0-1-?
aislemPkey governmental and communications
operations functioning adequately.
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Cambodia:
I. Cambodia remains an important asset to the Com-
munists both in terms of a safe haven for their
forces to rest and refit after battles and also
as a supplementary channel for moving arms,
munitions and other war materials into Communist
base areas in South Vietnam.
A.
The Cambodians
rice for North
are an important source of
Vietnamese units encamped along
the Cambodia-South Vietnam border in the
western highlands.
1. Recent interrogations of captured Viet
Cong detainees offer the best evidence
to date that Cambodia is being used to
move arms and ammunition to Communist
' forces in South Vietnam.
B. There is no good evidence that the Cambodian
government is conniving with the Communists in
this traffic but it is clear that some local
Cambodian officials are involved and that others
make no effort to halt the activity.
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Laos:
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The Laotian infiltration and logistics corridor
remains a yital element in the Communists' ability
to pursue the war in South Vietnam.
A. The number of North Vietnamese troops estimated
to be traveling down the infiltration trails
reached unprecedented levels during the last
few months.
1. Some 30,000 infiltrators are believed to
have entered the pipeline during each of
the months of March, April and May. Due
to the fact that it takes between two and
four months for a group to make the trip,
many of those who departed North Vietnam
in the spring are just now arriving in
the south.
2. The level of men entering the infiltration
pipeline declined in June, July and August,
probably because the enemy has rebuilt his
forces to the planned level following the
immense losses suffered in the Tet and May
offenses.
B. The Communist road network through Laos has been
expanded and improved to the extent that the
P"1 F2T
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It-raLlanzialzaar
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. ?
4
,
?
SE' IT
ky.L,
enemy has been able to move substantial amounts
of supplies into Laos even during the current
monsoon months.
1. An average of 11 trucks have been sighted
per day moving into Laos through the Mu
Gia pass during August whereas last year
no such traffic was noted in this key pass
during either July or August.
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