SEMINAR REPORT SYMPOSIUM ON CREATIVITY, CONTROLS, AND ETHICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00630A000300050001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 65
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 30, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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SEMINAR
REPORT
SYMPOSIUM ON CREATIVITY,
25X1 A CONTROLS, AND ETHICS
ni I F~ CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
' Ju
MARCH - 29-30, 1978 TR/SR 78-01
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Gmdfled by 645256
Exempt from General Declauificaion Schad 4.
of E.O. 11652, exenptlon category.
Sec. 58(2)
Automa&o y dsclauifiad on.
date tmpouibb to determine
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SYMPOSIUM ON CREATIVITY,
CONTROLS, AND ETHICS
March 29 - 30 1978 TR/SR 78-01
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Report
Outside Speakers
1.
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2. 8
3. 11
Panel Discussions (first day) 13
Panel Discussions (second day)
Recommendations 45
Appendix A Biodata on Outside Speakers
B List of Participants
C Summary of First Two Seminars
D Recommendations of First Two Seminars
E Program
F Ethics Questionnaire
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INTRODUCTION
The topics of this Symposium are critical issues at
this stage in the development of American intelligence.
They are of concern to policy makers, communications media,
scholars engaged in the study of political processes, and to
the public. They are of vital importance to all members of
the intelligence profession, and particularly to those
within the Central Intelligence Agency.
The discussion of creativity and ethics in the CIA
received a new and formal impetus when Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence E.H. Knoche proposed that a vigorous
examination of these issues be undertaken within the framework
of symposiums with participants from all parts of the Agency.
In late 1976 and again in 1977 such groups of CIA officers
gathered under the auspices of the Center for the Study of
Intelligence to discuss the interaction of controls, ethical
considerations, creativity, and initiative in the Agency.
The present Symposium has sought to extend and complete
that discussion. During the two days of its duration the
participants not only expressed ideas and viewpoints as
intelligence practitioners and professionals, but had the
opportunity also to receive and challenge the views of
scholars who have studied the same fundamental issues outside
of our own institutional confines.
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Setting the tone and defining the mission of the Symposium,
Deputy Director for Administration John F. Blake addressed
the conference early in its deliberations. He noted that
the continuing process of self-examination and internal
assessment of values and discipline has demonstrated the
strength and awareness of the Agency. He urged the Symposium
to provide a final distillation of the discussion of the
topics so that the report of the deliberations can.
be forwarded to the DCI for his comment and be given wide
circulation within the Agency.
In adjourning the Symposium, the chairman commented on
the fine presentations made by the outside speakers, as well
as on the vigor and seriousness of discussions that took
place in the two-day period. He summed up the spirit of the
Symposium with a quotation from John Stuart Mill: "One
person with a belief is a social power equal to ninety nine
who only have interest."
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OUTSIDE SPEAKERS
1.
The keynote speaker of the symposium was
Characterized by
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clarity of thought and understanding of the processes of
intelligence, his presentation made an excellent and challeng-
ing introduction to the subjects to be discussed.
stated his topic as, "Is It Possible
to Devise Useful Guidelines for Clandestine Intelligence
Activities Against Non-U.S. Persons Abroad?" and, at the
outset, declared his answer to be in the affirmative.
Pointing out first that guidelines already exist, he under-
took to offer an analysis of the present need and framework
for them as well as propose the substance that such guidelines
should properly contain.
In general, a set of guidelines should include:
1. Rules (general principles and specific rules);
2. A process for applying the rules;
3. A process for enforcing the application
of the rules; and
4. A process for overseeing the above areas.
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A system of rules certainly exists today and effectively
influences organizational and individual behavior. In
addition, and importantly, there is the element of the
"Personnel System," defined as the overall complex of the
structure, organizational dynamics, and character of the
human society that is the profession of intelligence.
-suggested that it is, above all, through analysis
and understanding of the "Personnel System" that the need
for guidelines should be developed.
In summary, ound that general principles are
not currently adequately articulated, and, in particular,
cited documents such as PRM 11 and S. 2525.
Turning to the framework for guidelines, put
forward two questions of fundamental importance to his
analysis:
1. Why should the United States engage in any
clandestine activities at all?
2. Can actions against foreign nationals abroad
have a negative impact on American values?
On the first question, argued vigorously that
the reality of the world at present renders clandestine
intelligence activites essential to national security and
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likely to become increasingly valuable in the next several
years. He noted that the CIA is not adequately presenting
this argument in public forums. He referred to examples
such as: intelligence activities as a prerequsite of strategic
arms limitation; challenge of transnational terrorism ("Entebbe
situation"); dangers of diversion of nuclear fuel.
answered the second question also in the affirma-
tive, citing several considerations. While the Bill of
Rights does not apply to non-citizens, intelligence operations
cannot be permitted to violate the rights of a foreign
national, while at the same time the United States advocates
human rights as a basic principle of foreign policy. It is
in fact possible for foreign intelligence activities to
undermine U. S. foreign policy objectives. (Chile, while
popularly exploited as a case in point, was an example of
intelligence supporting policy.)
"Moreover,' said, "the power of U.S. example in
the conduct of foreign affairs is greatly underestimated at
home. At the same time, the United States, with its open
democratic system of government, is most vulnerable to the
spread of international lawlessness."
Having considered the need and setting for intelligence
guidelines proposed the following three general
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1. Espionage is an extraordinary remedy;
2. The president and the government should not
undertake actions in secret that could not in principle
be defended to the U.S. public and meet the test of
political viability in the U.S. political arena;
3. Because clandestine activities cannot be
publicly supervised, they must be overseen by a surrogate
process.
Re 1.: In wartime, espionage is not extraordinary;
in "normal times," however, there is a presumption
against clandestinity with the burden of proof resting
on the proponents of clandestine activity.
Re 2.: This is a "democratic presumption" embodied
in the U.S. Constitution, and it poses an institutional
challenge to the accountability process.
Re 3.: The need for a surrogate process of oversight;
since clandestine activity cannot be public--it should
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There are two specific implications of these three
principles:
1. Covert action must be consistent with policy;
2. The President and the Director of Central
Intelligence must defend in public general categories
of clandestine activity (but not specific actions).
cited also a fourth principle, which is being
urged from within the U.S. Government itself, and which he
considers incorrect. This is the "publicity criterion," or:
"Would you be proud of the clandestine activity if it were
made public?" As a general guiding principle, it suffers
from being both too loose ("proud" is a subjective determina-
tion) and too tight (clandestine acivity is secret for the
reason that it should not be made the object of publicity).
In closing, reiterated his opposition to the
unwise course of freezing guidelines through legislation.
He stressed that guidelines, where appropriate, should be
subject to special findings and procedures for waivers (as
many are now). Finally, he urged that internal regulations,
too, should reflect the wisdom of flexibility needed to
carry out the intelligence function consistent with prevailing
policies and conditions.
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According to the Symposium's second speaker, Professor
of the Federal Executive Institute, it would
be a mistake for the Agency's personnel to seek its values
and its satisfactions from outside the Agency and outside of
ourselves. We live today, particularly in the aftermath of
Watergate, in an anti-bureaucratic culture in which the
public views government with hostility and distrust. We
cannot therefore expect to be loved, and in this environment
"must expect to take some heavy hits", especially in an
organization in which we cannot disclose what we are doing
and in which our successes go largely unsung. We must
therefore develop our own internal measuring device, in
which the essence is not how others value us but how we
value what we are doing for ourselves and for our country.
Believing that the United States is "a democracy of
means" rather than "a democracy of ends",
urged that the CIA reflect in its behavior the values in
which it believes, avoiding a "we-they" syndrome in which
the Agency isolates itself from the public, the Congress and
the press. The burden of defending or justifying its
behavior pattern is on the CIA, "the secret entity", which
must demonstrate that its actions contribute more than they
subtract in a free and open society.
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 of how choices are made,"
Pointing out that "values become very much the essence
carry our values with us,
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locked into each individual by the
they are essentially
one years. He described the years from one
period when
as modeling
us, `and the
reaches twenty-
to seven as the
values are imprinted, the years eight to thirteen
years with conduct conditioned by those around
years fourteen to twenty as a socialization
period in which the earlier values are
values change from generation to
of us who matured in
crucible of experience was
brightest young people
a product of different
generally reinforced.
generation. For
forties and fifties, the
military. But the best and
from the sixties and seventies
value perceptions and behavior,
with a different perception of what constitutes
to the United States. In illustration _
cited the Harvard Class of '68 of whom only
entered the military, and none of whom died
(out
of 1400)
concluded by mentioning four major
philosophic tension points which impact on American values:
1. the tension between liberty and equality in a
society based on the concept of liberty (today the traditional
view is widely questioned, as for example, in the work of
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John Rawls, in which the need is stressted for a more fitting
accomodation between the concepts of liberty and equality);
2. the Protestant work ethic versus the rising
psychology of entitlement;
3. the tension between the Hamiltonians and the
Jeffersonians' belief that they govern best who govern
least; and
4. the tensions arising from different perceptions of
the role of the U.S. in the world -- i.e. should the U.S.
intervene in the affairs of others, should it he content to
be a model or should it simply let the rest of the world go
to hell?
These tensions are further exacerbated by the implosive
impact of technology resulting in a collapse of traditional
boundaries. We are, concluded, living in
an era of ambiguity and redefinition in which, if one is to
be creative, one must know the turf on which one stands.
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The final Symposium speaker stressed in his introduction
that he would confine his remarks to his experience in the
ethical issues of military leadership, letting the Symposium
derive whatever general application there might be.
Stating that "management is of the mind, whereas
leadership is of the heart," defined leadership
and professionalism as the product of competence, motivation,
and ethics. In defining the underlying consideration, i.e.,
the function of the military, stated that more
important than the primary objective of "meeting the enemy
and destroying him" was the duty to advise on means of
military defense, to advise civilian superiors on military
means and methods of deterring and avoiding conflict, and to
fight and win only if war cannot be avoided when deterrence
fails.
Such an understanding of its function gives the military
a sense of place in which it can serve with dignity and
pride in the knowledge that it can do the job with some
reasonable expectation of success. This all-important sense
of place, therefore, comes from a "reasonable apprehension
of mission and authority lines."
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Efforts to examine and analyze the military ethic have
been under way for some time. Its essential elements are
duty, honor, and country--vague terms perhaps, but they have
served reasonably well over the years. Honor is more than
honesty and integrity, and duty is more than rules, regulations,
If the military does not have an ethical position, its
credibility with the public and with the Congress is lost,
its vitality and initiative are stifled. Yet,
said that the concept of "zero defects" is absurd, being a
standard which squeezes out the lifeblood of quality personnel
and leads to rewarding the trivial.
Ethics is like a spider web: pick it up and you destroy
it. Ethics must be innate--"a matter of character, a set of
standards applied on duty and in private life." Quoting
Einstein, he said, "Try not to be a man of success but a man
of value." Ethics cannot be taught, and lawyers cannot be
keepers of conscience; "as soon as you appoint an ethics
officer, you have lost the game".
In summary, "If you want to be ethical, get an ethical
boss; if you want ethical subordinates, be an ethical boss."
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PANEL DISCUSSIONS--FIRST DAY
Having decided that there was a definitional problem,
the panel agreed to eliminate the word "security" from the
charge and to address its discussions to "controls" without
limiting itself to "security controls." In general, the
importance and the necessity of controls in an intelligence
organization were uniformly accepted. On that basis, however,
the consensus became somewhat critical of the nature and the
effect of the present-day control situation in the Agency.
The panel concluded that existing controls have a
significant impeding effect on various fundamental areas of
activity, noting in this connection that it is not only
controls but the perceptions of those controls, in the
United States and abroad, that impinge on the effectiveness
of our work. For instance, in the area of recruitment of
foreign nationals, external controls were said to be having
a distinctly deleterious effect. Foreign nationals questioned
our ability to maintain confidential relationships. In a
business which is risky at best, risks become intolerable
when the subjects perceive that controls are so extensive
that knowledge is shared with an excessively large number of
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people. This problem arises not only in connection with the
recruitment of individuals but also in cases of working with
business, academic, and industrial entities; discussion
revealed agreement that commitments we have made in the past
to such individuals and organizations about the confiden-
tiality of our relationships had not been faithfully kept;
as a result, our ability to continue having the benefits of
these relationships has been undermined or destroyed.
Another area in which negative effects were observed is
that of operational activity in which U.S. citizens abroad
may accidentally or incidentally become involved. The
example cited was of an operational activity in a foreign
country in the course of which legitimate electronic sur-
veillance is carried out on a foreigner involved in narcotics
traffic. If in the course of the monitored conversation a
U.S. citizen happens to become a participant, even as he
begins to talk about the manner and location of dropping off
or picking up the narcotics, current controls force the
operative to cease and desist surveillance immediately.
It is fairly easy to criticize existing controls, but
much more difficult to suggest acceptable improvement. In
general, there was agreement that current controls do require
extensive tuning, but the most important thing was to
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provide a capability to obtain exceptions and waivers in a
timely and effective way. There is an easy distinction
that is often made between what is considered an absolutely
evil and wicked lawless search and the perfectly acceptable,
properly warranted search. Yet, the fact is that in
Arlington County a police officer can obtain a search warrant
in about 10 or 15 minutes from a magistrate who is on duty
around the clock. No such easy opportunity is available
to a foreign intelligence agency. In this connection, it
is recommended that the Agency keep records of specific
cases where the rigidity of these controls thwarted effective
and necessary action.
While no specific damage was identified in the area
of security investigations, it was also concluded that both
FOIA and the Privacy Act create enormous problems for the
Agency. The specifics of these problems have been discussed
elsewhere, but the panel reiterated the hope that an adjust-
ment would be made in the provisions of the Freedom of
Information legislation to give some special treatment to
the CIA. The panel recommended that the Agency should start
thinking, planning, and acting without delay to accelerate
this desirable improvement.
In summary., the panel concluded that controls were very
much part of our life and not an entirely undesirable part.
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However, we must be concerned about effectiveness of
intelligence, and we must, therefore, realize that many of
the existing and impending controls have unreasonable and
unworkable aspects. It is of paramount importance that
the Agency should work closely with Congressional oversight
committees to refine these controls and, in particular, to
provide procedural exceptions and provisions for waivers.
An additional point was vigorously discussed after
the conclusion of the panel's report. Many symposium
participants expressed the view that as a result of the
outward flow of information from the Agency through
FOIA channels, as a result of great numbers of books by
former CIA employees that are published with or without
appropriate clearance of the Agency, security consciousness
of our personnel has dropped dramatically. At the very least
there has been a negative effect on the security discipline
of active-duty Agency employees.
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Panel on Creativity and Resources
As a result of informed and vigorous discussion, there
was strong agreement on the Agency's need for more effective
coordination and management of its activities and its products.
The panel reported that consumers increasingly voice the
need for clearer tasking, less duplication of intelligence
activities, and greater responsiveness by operational entities.
Among examples cited in specific support of these
conclusions, was dissatisfaction with the present NIO concept,
which was described as not adequately addressing the problems
of intelligence requirements at the working level. As a
result of this institutional inadequacy, there is an excess
of informal, personal kinds of tasking relationships. NITC
is regarded as a possibly hopeful development, but at this
point it appears to lack any life of its own and has not
established any working relationships.
In addition, dissemination problems are said to exist,
often in cases where intelligence has been collected in
response to specific requirements.
Consumers see an overall lack of coordination between
SIGINT, HUMINT, PHOTINT, and in the collection of economic
intelligence; and internal "squabbles" between CIA and the
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Department of State are seen as damaging to efficient
coordination and production.
The opinion was expressed that vast amounts of money
("millions of dollars") could be saved if this problem were
addressed more effectively. It was agreed that there is
meaning to the word "creativity" in this regard, and that is
what is needed in constructing better tasking mechanisms,
better coordination, better responsiveness to intelligence
needs.
While consumers were reported to be critical of the
present tasking structure, and this critisism was also
expressed by Agency participants, we agreed that it may be
premature to condemn this system, new as it is, because of
our fundamental belief that there must be a more centralized
and coordinated tasking structure.
We were troubled, however, by the strong conclusion
that the "one-agency concept" vigorously fostered by DCI Bush
was virtually dead. The pressures of the last year or so
were said to have driven NFAC and DDO further apart, and we
agreed that there was much less coordination between these
two than there was one year ago.
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It was generally agreed that the cuts made in the DDO
showed a de facto reduction of the clandestine collection
effort, yet with concomitant increases in resources allotted
to, for instance, security staff, FOIA staff, analytical
staff, and some technical areas.
There was agreement with the findings of a House
Appropriations Committee report to the effect that there was
not sufficient coordination between overt and covert col-
lection abroad. There was agreement also with the finding
that a large amount of intelligence now collected covertly
could be collected overtly.
In this connection, we noted the NSC demand for in-
creased political reporting from 30 countries. This il-
lustrates exactly the issue raised in the last paragraph.
The conclusion here was that the Agency possesses finite and
limited resources which can be better utilized in the area
of covert collection, provided the Department of State is
instructed to do its job of political reporting better than
it is doing it now, which is not well enough.
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There was agreement that the Agency fundamentally
accepts the concept of espionage as an extraordinary activity,
but it was stressed that phrase "extra-
ordinary remedy" was inaccurate because of its passive
connotation. Espionage is an "extraordinary instrument," or
whatever phrase describes it adequately as an active rather
than responsive activity. There was agreement that better
quality and increased quantity of analysis are needed at
the present time, but at the same time there is an urgent
need for a clear focus of the ever-increasing capability and
importance of clandestine collection. We were specifically
impressed by what we conceived as a creative opportunity
that exists for applying team approaches involving technical,
clandestine, and analytical components working together for
tasking purposes. It is not something that we consider as
adequately utilized in the Agency. To be sure, the weakening
and virtual abandonment of the one-Agency concept militates
against the possibility of such an approach, but it was
strongly recommended that the Agency try it.
There was a disturbingly large number of instances
cited of restraint on creativity in all directorates:
In DDS&T, there are financial limits, more approval levels,
more paperwork requirements, more constraints in general on
doing things in a new or better way. In NFAC, there are
strong pressures created by ad hoc requirements and by
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reiterated needs for short-focus reports; there are pressures
from the NSC; and there is the inability to isolate analysts
from all of these day-to-day pressures as well as a reluctance
on the part of the analysts themselves to devote a substantial
portion of time and effort to longer-range issues. In the
DDA, there are pressures for conformity, a desire for non-
controversial reporting. In the DDO, restraints on creativity
proceed from ad hoc pressures, from personnel cuts, from a
sense of professional and personal uncertainty, from difficulty
in interpreting new directives, policies, and orders, as
well as pending legislation, operational personnel changes,
and continued impact of a changing social environment.
In a spirited discussion, the panel vigorously agreed
that the Agency is still dealing with. the Congress from
a "culprit" posture. In one of the strongest conclusions of
the session, the panel said that the Agency must speak
forthrightly to both the Executive and the Legislative on
what we perceive our mission and role to be. At the same
time there needs to be a clearer communication to Agency
personnel themselves about our mission and our role. With-
out such clear statements and adequate communication, we are
continuing in a period of uncertainty which is debilitating
in terms of creativity, in terms of morale, and in terms of
energy and esprit de corps.
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Finally, the panel stressed that there is little
problem with ethics compared with the dire problems of
restraining creativity. We do not believe intelligence
people to be an amoral or unethical group; however, there
must be more creativity in reestablishing the intelligence
profession in terms of rebuilding credibility with the
liaison services and allies which are being threatened by
leaks, reports of leaks, FOIA difficulties, litigation, and
continued uncertainty of mission.. Specifically, the panel
came back strongly recommending more creativity in terms of
better coordination, better correlation, and trying team
approaches within the profession rather than structuring
centralized management lines. In summary, the period of
uncertainty within which the Agency and the intelligence
profession is seeking to function effectively is likely to
continue with all of its external pressures; it was concluded,
therefore, that we must act to define our mission and our
objectives and dispel this uncertainty before it saps our
capability and our effectiveness.
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Panel on CIA and the Law
In reference to the first question--namely, the likely
impact of Executive Order 12036--there was general agreement
that, in general, the Executive Order has had relatively
modest impact, principally because the impact on intelligence
activity has largely already occurred as a result of the
events of the last several years, including the investigations,
the press exposes, etc., and is really a consequence of the
general atmosphere which has existed and continues to exist
rather than the actual provisions of the new Executive
Order.
In regard to the proposed legislation, it must be
remembered that S. 2525 is currently a legislative draft,
and although on its face it would have a substantial effect
on intelligence activity, we are still a long way from the
final form of the law which will, of course, determine the
ultimate effect.
In addition, we must remember that whatever effect this
new legislation will have, there is already a very extensive
existing body of law and regulations which provide for
supervision, control, and procedures of intelligence activity.
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There was agreement that recent developments and
interpretations of the law have already had an effect on the
way that intelligence business is conducted. As for adverse
impact on operations as such, it may be too early to evaluate
the effects that may have occurred there. Undoubtedly, in
areas of counterintelligence and foreign recruitment activities
carried out in the United States, there has been a not
iceable impact of recent developments and interpretations of
the law. However, we agree that, because of these recent
developments, there is in CIA a tendency to play safe, to
leave a considerable safety margin, to take fewer initiatives,
and ultimately to restrain creativity and initiative. It
was stressed again, however, that these negative developments
are the result not so much of any specific recent prohibition
as of the environment which has prevailed in the last two or
three years.
At the same time, we must realize that the total effect
the Executive Order is still a long way from being seen;
principally, because there are some questions that have not
been resolved within its framework, and some that have yet
to be asked. For instance, there is a great number of
procedures to be developed under Executive Order 12036, and
these have to be approved by the Attorney General. Some
of these proposals have already been submitted to the Depart-
ment of Justice and others will be submitted soon. Until
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they have been approved and tested, we cannot with certainty
say what their effect will be.
There was agreement that laws already in effect for
some time, ever since Amendment 662, have had a more in-
hibiting effect on the development and execution of covert
action, for instance, than anything that has happened
beginning with the New York Times "exposes" of December
1974. Not least inhibiting is the consideration that any
covert action can--and some might say will--be canceled by
the fact of a single member of Congress being opposed to it,
particularly if he should be inclined to make it pulbic.
There is one other internal consideration which we all
try hard to avoid but which we are realistic enough to
recognize: in many cases, before getting an activity off the
ground, there are many approvals to be obtained, including
legal opinions, and the very fact of having to go through a
process which may be difficult and time consuming is an
inhibiting factor.
There is an interesting difference between Executive
Order 11905 and the new 12036: in the former case, CIA was
not extensively consulted in the drafting of the order, and
problems that had time to arise under the order were frequently
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traceable to that lack of consultation. In the drafting of
12036, CIA was consulted, and therefore, hopefully, problems
of inadvertency are not likely to emerge; on the contrary,
the restrictive provisions in the order were placed there
quite deliberately.
Another area of the law which gives us problems is the
lack of meaningful and adequate provisions for protecting
intelligence sources and methods. This is not a new problem,
and we have been aware of this inadequacy for quite some
time. Nevertheless, it is a real problem, and the absence
of either criminal or civil sanctions on unauthorized
disclosure is a serious defect in the legal framework for
intelligence activities.
Finally, mention must be made again of the Freedom of
Information Act which has already been discussed in another
context. There is a general feeling that the application of
this law to the Agency and the forthright and generous way
in which it has been implemented by the Agency has had a
severe negative impact on our effectiveness. In all candor,
however, we are unable to quantify what this impact has
been, what things that could have happened did not, what
agents have never been recruited, what liaison relationships
could not be effectively pursued.
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Concern for flexibility, or more accurately concern
about inflexibility, is a real one and has been reiterated
in agreement with the reference that was made to it by
Professor Allison. Statutory law does not change quickly,
and it is difficult or impossible at the time of drafting or
enacting to foresee problems arising in the future. Executive
orders, on the other hand, have flexibility in virtue of
relying on Presidential authority for amendment and change.
The Agency is doing its best to participate creatively in
shaping the legislation, we must continue to do so, we must
continue to educate our personnel, and of course we will
carry on our work within whatever statutory framework the
Congress decides to enact.
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Panel on Bureaucracy and Paperwork
The panel reached a rather pessimistic consensus: CIA
today does not have a very impressive report card on the
subject of bureaucracy and paperwork. Before discussing the
topic, the panel tried to find a meaningful definition for
"bureaucracy" in this context, and concluded that "bureaucracy"
would be viewed as "an undesirable style of management."
The agreement was that not only is the situtation bad, but
it can be said to have become worse in all Directorates.
Some of the manifestations are a general tendency
towards defensiveness--defensiveness in responding to
external criticism; defensiveness in the development and
protection of careers; defensiveness in the face of legal
problems. The panel pointed also to a trend for authority
to creep up, both in the sense of management failing to
delegate authority and in the sense of professionals not
prepared to accept responsibility.
A fundamental reason for this undesirable state of
affairs was described as an absence of any real articulation
of what our professional goals are, what our future aims
should be, and even what the larger perspectives of our
activity are. The extensive legislative proposals and
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existing executive orders contribute little beyond restrictive
and prohibitive provisions, resulting in an ever-increasing
need to check out initiative and decisions in terms of
legal, legislative, and similar implications.
This undesirable style of management, it was agreed, is
not productive of innovation; it is not productive of
originality; and it is not productive of creativity. When
at the same time, there is a tendency to centralize personnel
decisions by weakening the Directorate panel system, the
likelihood of improvement cannot be rated very highly.
The panel noted that these negative developments cannot
be entirely attributed to external developments, pressures,
and restriction. To a large extent they present the legacy
of habit and attitude acquired during earlier periods of
fat budgets, large foreign stations, and a general absence
of a need to manage activities with imagination and invent-
iveness.
In the discussion that followed, some participants
argued that the reestablishment of the authority of the
branch chief in the Directorate of Operations was a step
forward, that it was working effectively, and that it
represented a positive trend towards delegation and encouragement
of responsibility below top-management level.
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PANEL DISCUSSIONS --- SECOND DAY
Panel on Review and Criticism
To begin with, the panel did an inventory of the various
review and advisory processes used by the Agency. It was
agreed that the Inspector General's staff had made a tremendous
contribution to the process in terms of handling grievances,
dissent, and similar matters. In addition, much has been
done by the various advisory groups, such as MAG, which
represent junior and middle-grade officers and provide a
direct channel of communication to the management. Finally,
there have been various studies made by outside individuals
and contributions of consultants.
Based on this inventory, the panel came to the conclusion
that enough data and advice has been collected to achieve a
rather complete understanding of the intelligence process,
and the time has come to move from what is essentially a
passive to an active stance. The panel stated that this
symposium has been extremely important in taking an important
step closer to synthesizing what we perceive to be the role
and the mission of the Agency. So far there has not been
any positive effort to develop such a statement and to take
an active role and in informing management that we are
prepared to develop a definition of our mission in the
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Agency. What is needed now is to leave the review structure
the way it is, to thank all the advisory groups that have
been formed to analyze and define our problems and to put
all of the information together to arrive at a description
of our mission. This description should be communicated to
the management for their consideration and final definition
of mission and objectives.
The time has come when the Agency itself must speak
with more clarity and vigor, both internally and externally,
on its own behalf, if we are to regain our sense of mission,
our professional esprit, and our self respect.
Present Agency spokesmen say, in effect, "the Agency
has sinned in the past but it is not sinning now because the
restraints imposed by the Congress and the Executive Order
have put sin beyond its grasp". The psychological effect of
this kind of thinking on the men and women of.the Agency is
subtle, but in the long run devastating. It robs us of
esprit, it denies us any sense of place in the American
scheme of things and leaves us with the feeling that we are
tolerated only because the unruly world in which we live
makes us an unfortunate necessity. Any organization which
is forced to think about itself in those terms will not in
the long term be worthy of the trust and support of the
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American people. If we are perceived to be trustworthy only
because of the application of external restraints, we will
in the future come to measure our work as that which can be
approved by those who restrain us. Ethics and creativity
are meaningless in such a situation, and intelligence becomes
more trouble than it is worth.
Since the leaders of the Intelligence Community have
not made a case for intelligence in a convincing manner, we
are still subjected to ad hoc piecemeal change imposed from
without which will have many unintentioned impacts of a
negative nature. This view was articulated strongly by
and voiced frequently by participants in
the discussion. The draft legislative charter (S. 2525)
lacks any coherent view of intelligence and is largely a
2. 7A patchwork of intended reforms. It is well to remember, as
also noted, that the role of Congressional oversight
is not principally the prevention of wrongdoing, but to
allow the constructive conduct of foreign intelligence
activities. No one can effectively make the case for intel-
ligence except the Intelligence Community itself and this it
has not done.
Perhaps the most crucial point to be made was that we
continue to deal with other elements of the government as
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respected equals, not as suspects, despite more than three
years of investigation and harassment. Our posture toward
Congress, however, has to become more positive -- we are
still in a "culprit-overseer" relationship. Time has come
for us to move into a more collegial phase if the oversight
process is to become more than a field exercise for eager
Congressional staffers who continue to look for evidence of
wrongdoing. A sense of mutual trust must be introduced and
maintained.
There was unanimous agreement that action is necessary
and that urgent action is imperative. It was agreed that a
concrete recommendation to this effect must be made as a
result of the symposium, in accordance with Mr. Blake's
introductory exhortation to that effect.
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Panel on Human Rights
There is definitely a problem created for foreign
intelligence activity, not so much by the human rights issue
as such, but by U.S. policies related to that issue and the
way they are being executed. There is general perception
that this policy discourages interaction or support relation-
ships between our own intelligence services and the intelligence
services in countries in which there are violations of human
rights. A mention was made of at least 25 countries, not
including communist states (to which these comments do not
apply), where potentially this application of the human
rights position would absolutely prohibit any relation
between our government and the host government. There is a
current requirement for chiefs of station in those countries
to report to the chief of liaison services any violations of
human rights that come to their attention. This procedure
certainly places a strain on the working relationship in
those countries. The result of this policy is that the
exchange of information with the liaison services is decreasing
and, apart from the loss of intelligence, we are in fact
less aware of human rights violations and are losing access
to, for instance, information on terrorists and terrorist
activities in those countries. This in turn makes it harder
to carry out our obligations to protect ambassadors and
other U.S. persons and property. .
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In considering ways to overcome the problem in circum-
stances of reduced complete cooperation with host country
services suggestions were made that we should try to improve
penetration of those services unilaterally, and in countries
where our targets are other than the host country targets we
must increase direct operations against such targets.
It was suggested that an approach be made by the DCI to
the President in order to explain our position and to bring
about the application of our human rights policy in such a
way as not to have the negative effect on intelligence
activity. This suggestion was made in part because it
appears in some cases that the CIA alone is singled out as
the government agency which has to undergo changes in accordance
with this policy, for while we are cutting off liaison
relationships, other avenues of cooperation, such as most-
favored-nation status or economic aid, are continuing.
Finally, a recommendation was made that covert action
should be used in positive support of improving the human
rights situation in those countries where there are violations.
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There was some discussion of the fact that the unique
difficulties imposed on intelligence activities by the human
rights policy are of such a nature that they should be
discussed openly, comfortably, and constructively with the
oversight committee of Congress. The point was made in this
connection that this is another area where we have not
developed the confidence to stand up for a legitimate Agency
position on an important issue.
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Panel on Ethics
Vigorous discussion resulted in the finding that some
consciousness-raising activity would be useful to Agency
personnel, but there was no sentiment in favor of producing
guidelines in the form of a canon of ethics. There was in
fact general agreement that perception
of the importance of a general "Personnel System" as the
determinant ethical setting was valid and accurate.
Specific issues were raised bearing on reasons underlying
the need for some kind of ethical guidelines. One of those
was to point out that professions--whether law, medicine, or
real estate--seem to agree on the need for some kind of
cannon of ethics. On the other hand, the question was posed
whether there was a specific element to the profession of
intelligence -- as opposed to the military, diplomacy or
other governmental activities -- that would necessitate a
special code of ethics beyond the extensive body of laws,
executive orders, and regulations which are already in
existence.
In support of the need for ethical guidelines, the
point was raised that in fact things had been done in the
Agency which were wrong in the ethical sense and which
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represented an institutional failure. Speaking of operation
and so forth, there had been of course
those who had protested certain actions at the time, but the
point is that these activities were approved institutionally
and did take place, regardless of any ethical misgivings
that individuals may have had. This is a reminder that
there are considerations beyond the merely operational ones,
and that there is a need, if nothing else, for defining the
framework of espionage as a special profession with special
concerns, or, in words, "an extraordinary
remedy."
These considerations led to a discussion of intelligence
as a part of the system of national security. In this area,
the concepts of self-defense and national survival are the
transcendental ethical. and legal imperatives.
It is interesting to note that a sharp reaction was
expressed to the organizational use of the phrase "dirty
business" in reference to intelligence activities. Those
who objected noted, for example, that there are other agencies
in government which engage in special practices similar to
those employed in some aspects of espionage -- recruitment
of informants, wiretapping, purchase of information, etc.
The others do not use the phrase as frequently as we seem
to do.
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Having agreed that a code of ethics was neither practical
nor desirable, there was considerable discussion of what
might or should be done to develop and maintain ethical
consciousness in the intelligence profession. There was
agreement that there should be a systematic approach to this
activity, through seminars similar to the present one,
through regulations, through presentations on landmark
occasions, and, most important, throughout the Agency's
training activities.
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CONCLUSIONS
1. There is an absence of any authoritative and
thoughtful articulation of what our professional goals are,
what our future aims should be, and even what the larger
perspectives of our activity are. The extensive legislative
proposals and existing executive orders contribute little
beyond restrictive and prohibitive provisions, resulting in
a growing need to check out initiative and decisions in
terms of legal and legislative implications.
2. Present Agency spokesmen say, in effect, that "the
Agency has sinned in the past, but it is not sinning now
because the restraints imposed by the Congress and the
Executive have put sin beyond its grasp". The effect of
this kind of thinking on the men and women of the Agency is
subtle but devastating in the long run. It denies us any
sense of place in the American scheme of things and leaves
us with the conclusion that we are tolerated only because
the unruly world in which we live makes us an unfortunate
necessity. Ethics and creativity are meaningless in such a
situation and intelligence becomes more trouble than it is
worth.
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3. An inventory of the various review and advisory
processes used by the Agency, including the Inspector General,
Management Advisory Groups, and outside consultants and
studies, shows that there is enough information and advice
for a rather complete understanding of the intelligence
process. What is currently required is to develop a statement
of the role and mission of the Central Intelligence Agency.
There must be a transition from a passive to an active
posture on substantive issues, and the Agency itself must
speak with more clarity and vigor, both internally and
externally, on its own behalf.
4. Investigations, sensational publicity, and protracted
and uncertain reorganization have caused the foreign intelligence
establishment to be perceived by the consumer as being in
need of clearer tasking, suffering from duplication of
activities, and less able to be operationally responsive.
5. The outward flow of information from the Agency
through FOIA channels and the growing number of published
writings by former employees, with or without proper Agency
clearance, have had the effect of lowering the security
consciousness and eroding the security discipline of Agency
personnel.
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6. It is not the principles of human rights that
create a problem for foreign intelligence activity, but
United States policies related to that issue and the way in
which they are executed. In simple terms, it appears in
many cases that the CIA is singled out as the government
agency whose operations have to be changed or eliminated to
be consistent with this policy. Thus, in many countries,
where support and cooperation relations with the intelligence
services of the host government are discouraged or prohibited,
other inter-governmental relations, such as trade regulation
or economic aid, are continuing.
7. The most recent developments within the Intelligence
Community, whatever their purpose, have succeeded in emphasizing
the division between analysis and collection. Moreover, the
"one-agency" concept, so vigorously fostered by DCI Bush, is
virtually dead. As a result there is an urgent need for a
more centralized and coordinated tasking structure.
8. Existing external controls, with their attendant
potential for deliberate or accidental publicity, as well as
the perception of these controls among foreign nationals,
have a significant inhibiting effect on various areas of
intelligence activity, such as recruitment of foreign
nationals and effective liaison relationships.
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9. Recent developments and interpretations of the law
have already had an inhibiting effect on the way in which at
least some activities, such as counterintelligence and
foreign recruitment, are carried out, particularly in the
United States. These inhibitions result not so much from
recent prohibitions as from the cumulative impact of the
environment which has prevailed in the last two or three
years. To be realistic, it must be recognized that even
internal considerations, such as the increasing number of
approvals and legal opinions that have to be obtained in
order to mount an intelligence operation, constitute an
inhibition on iniative, boldness, and creativity.
10. "Bureaucracy", defined in this context as "an
undesirable style of management", is on the increase in the
Agency. The most pronounced and disquieting manifestation
of this trend is a general tendency toward defensiveness:
in responding to external criticism, in the development and
protection of careers, and in the face of legal problems of
all kinds. A corollary tendency is for authority to "creep
up", both in the sense of management failing to delegate
authority and in the sense of professionals being reluctant
to accept responsibility.
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11. The period of continuing publicity and frequent
changes at the top as well as the present stage of uncertainty
and reorganization, are seen as exacting a high price in
reduced creativity, morale, and esprit de corps. There is
an absence of definition or understanding of the mission and
role of the CIA. In an overall view, there is little problem
with ethics compared with the hazards introduced by weakened
creativity and spirit.
12. Vigorous and extensive discussion resulted in
unanimous agreement that a written code of ethics was neither
practical nor desirable. The body of laws, regulations,
executive orders, and internal directives provides ample
guidance; beyond that, the personal and professional ethical
norms of each individual must and do make sure that institutional
ethics is more than administrative orthodoxy.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The most urgent and vigorous recommendation of the
Symposium, supported by unanimous consent and call for
prompt action, is for a reaffirmation of the character and
purpose of national foreign intelligence as those in our
profession today and the dedicated officers before us know
them to be. There must be a definition of the role, mission,
and place of foreign intelligence in American government and
in American life. All members of the Agency must participate
in the task, building on what was done during this Symposium
and is collected within this report. It is this reaffirmation
and not a code of ethics that is required. Once formulated
it must remain in our professional consciousness through
internal communication and use in training programs. Specifically,
a drafting board should be set up without delay including
Symposium participants but not limited to them. A statement
of mission is to be drawn up, circulated to all Agency
employees, and in. its final form presented to the Director
of Central Intelligence to be issued and used by his authority.
2. The Agency must acquire a'clear perception of its
role, mission and mandate. On this basis it must communicate
in a forthrightly manner with the executive, the legislative,
and with its own personnel. In particular, the Agency must
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work closely and frankly with congressional oversight committees
to refine existing and impending controls, to change or
remove unreasonable and unworkable provisions, and to develop
procedural exceptions and provisions for waivers which are
essential to flexibility and effectiveness.
3. Despite the virtual abandonment of the "one-
agency" concept, there is an urgent need to apply team
approaches, involving technical, clandestine, and analytical
components, to the tasking process. This way of creative
coordination and correlation of professional skills is urged
as being far superior to structuring centralized management
lines.
4. The Agency should commence without delay preparations
for appropriate action with the Congress and elsewhere
designed to bring about adjustments in the provisions of the
Freedom of Information Act so that full compliance with this
legislation does not continue to result in damage to legitimate
security interests. Provisions and processes of FOIA must
recognize the special problems and unique responsibilities
of an intelligence service.
5. The unique difficulties imposed on foreign intelligence
activities by the articulation and implementation of United
46
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States human rights policies are of such a nature that they
should be discussed frankly and constructively with the
appropriate oversight committee of the Congress. It is
essential that the Agency assume a responsible position on
this important issue and present it to the Congress.
6. The Agency should keep records of specific cases
where rigidity of existing controls thwarted necessary and
effective action, as for instance in cases of search warrants.
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 APPENDIX Approved For Release 201709/WIA-W0-00630A000300050001-2
SUMMARY OF FIRST TWO SEMINARS (TR/SR 77-02)
15 February 1977
In late 1976 and early 1977 two groups of CIA officers
gathered under the auspices of the Center for the Study of
Intelligence in the Office of Training to discuss the impact
of new controls and ethical considerations upon. the climate
of creativity and initiative in the Agency. The first group
was composed of senior officers (in rank and years of expe-
rience) and was charged by the DDCI to consider also aspects
of dissent, awards, and. foreign liaison as they pertained to
the basic issue.
The first group concluded that the new controls and
ethical considerations were not encumbering creativity and
initiative, but singled out other elements viewed as essential
in maintaining and improving a climate for creativity in
CIA. These were: clarifying the aims and goals of CIA, a
reversal of the tendency to "suck up" authority for decision
making to higher and higher levels; preservation of concern
with the long-term impact of proposed programs; conveying a
"style" of leadership which encourages creative initiative
and innovation; improving the climate for responsible dissent;
raising ethical consciousness; and finally, marshalling the
arguments to defend foreign liaison relationships while
examining alternatives.
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The second group, representing a wider cross section of
employee occupations, was composed of somewhat lower ranking
officers, some of whom were considerably more junior in years
of experience. Asked to review the findings and recommendations
of the first group, it identified different issues of prime
importance to a proper climate of creativity in the Agency,
although it basically agreed. with the findings of the first
group. The issues the second group viewed as important
were: improving vertical and cross-Directorate communication;
eliminating the bureaucratic isolation of the offices and
Directorates from one another; clearer and continuing
statements of goals and purposes, of the Agency and the
reasons for them; more feedback to individuals on the value
of their professional efforts; and finally, wide discussion
of aspects of ethical issues, both the ethics of Agency
activities and the ethics of Agency management of people.
Both groups viewed ethical issues as being Agency-wide
concerns not limited to a single Directorate.
Both groups made formal recommendations to assist in
carrying out these views.
2
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 CONFEG-?- ~t
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Recommendations of the Seminar on
Ethics and Creativity in CIA
Held 11 and 12 November 1976
1. To Preserve and Enhance Employee Creativity and Initiative,
the Agency should:
a. take every opportunity to stress that individual
officers should try to exercise their responsi-
bility and authcrity to the fullest, avoiding
unnecessary referrals of minor matters up the
line.
b. take every opportunity to stress the interest in
and receptiveness of management to individual
initiative.
c. continue to stress and develop personnel programs
designed to cut the size of the Agency's work
force, improve its evaluation systems for employees
and provide opportunities for rotational assignments.
d. seek to stem the trend of decision-making authority
to rise to ever-higher levels by a conscious
effort to delegate authority downward, and set a
tone of trust towards the levels to which that
authority has been delegated.
e. take a detached look at the extent to which MBO
and other formal management systems may be inhibiting
creativity.
f. encourage the further development at a component
level of informal "developmental" or "idea" units.
2. In Coping With Criticism of CIA Foreign Liaison Relation-
ships, the Agency should:
a. explicitly develop for use with the critics the
best possible case for maintenance of responsible
liaison.
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b. explicitly request interested Agency officers
to come forward with ideas for new collection
techniques to compensate for any future losses in
liaison information.
c. encourage initiatives designed to modify
objectionable behavior of liaison services.
3. To enhance a CIA Internal Climate that Does not Discourage
Responsible Dissent, Management Throughout the Agency
Should:
a. take every opportunity to maintain an open
decision-making process up and down the line that
truly provides opportunities for pro and con
consideration of issues in a given situation.
b. avoid the creation of further formal mechanisms
for dissent, while seeking to apply, where cir-
cumstances seem appropriate, such techniques as
the A team, B team approach to problems and
issues.*
4. To Enhance Our Ethical Consciousness, the Agency
Should:
a. authorize an explicit, broadly-based effort to
develop an ethical canon, recognizing that this is
a tricky, difficult task, but that the benefits of
the process itself will probably be well worth the
effort.
b. provide explicit opportunities in the training
cycle of the Agency for the discussion and exploration
of ethical problems that arise in all parts of the
Agency.
c. consider the dissemination of an official
statement aimed at our employees delimiting and
explaining the Agency's policies and processes on
covert action.
*This recommendation was supported by a majority; a. minority
believes there should be further formal mechanisms on major
issues.
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Recommendations of the Seminar
Held 17 and 18 January 1977
Creativity
1. In order to foster better communication and break
down the bars of isolation of office-level components:
Senior managers should occasionally attend the
staff meetings of the next lower level to see
that essential concerns are communicated and
placed in the correct context. Staff meetings
should be used for the positive communication
channel they might be.
Decisionmaking should involve all office-level
components across Directorates that will be
affected, not just the action office that will
carry it out.
Interdisciplinary and "Country Team" approaches
should be used on major undertakings of the
Agency to a much greater degree than at present.
The dissemination of information within the Agency
on the degree and nature of response, awards, or
recognition given creative initiatives should be
broadened.
2. In order to foster greater flexibility in response
to creative initiative and bolster management requirements
for a climate of creativity:
Tangible rewards for creative suggestions should
be provided by recognizing the achievement
officially. Cash awards, where clearly appli-
cable should be continued, but other avenues
such as more employee input into rotational
and future assignments as well as increases in
an individual's responsibilities, might be con-
sidered as rewards for outstanding creativity.
Here a distinction is drawn between excellence
in doing one's job and truly creative work that
goes beyond that.
Letters of Instruction and Fitness Reports should
reflect the duty of a supervising officer to
maintain a hospitable climate for creativity
and record the degree of this attained by managers.
Our management training must include some instruc-
tion on how to foster a creative climate among
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subordinates. The DDO "precepts" for job/grade
categories should reflect the requirement for
openness to new and creative ideas as a pre-
requisite for management/grade promotion.
3. To further enhance the climate for creative initiative:
Provide a better articulation of Agency aims
and goals, especially the reasoning behind our
choice of policies and objectives.
Encourage greater efforts at program rationaliza-
tion and justification so that abandoned programs
are definitely identified as such and new programs
become the full focus of attention.
Review the application of MBO to assure that it
is given a fair chance, implemented uniformly,
its concepts disseminated at all levels through
education, and that the real participation and
communication vital to MBO is exercised.
The group endorsed the first seminar recommendation
if on encouraging the further development of
component-level "developmental" or "think" units.
It recommended "Creativity Committees" vertically
organized which would permit the movement of ideas
and solutions developed in such forums through to
action. These would not be "bitch," but rather
suggestion, forums providing an avenue above any
officer's immediate superior for a hearing of a
creative idea without prejudice to one's career.
Awards
Develop ways to channel back statements of
appreciation for work well done once the value
of the effort is evident.
Increase the use of non-cost methods of recognition
for work exceptionally well done, such as medals,
citations, certificates, letters of commendation,
etc.
Continue and expand the present suggestion and
special achievement awards system.
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Foreign Liaison
Review intensively all liaison relationships to
ensure that each is vital to our operations or
collection efforts. This should include a measure
of the amount we are giving and the value of what
is received from the relationships, a measure of
the U.S. policy relationship with the country
involved, and a consideration of U.S. public
opinions about the nature and policies of that
country.
After such a review--aspects of which may already
be under way--a firm defense should be made
wherever the Agency is challenged by external elements
to alter its liaison relationships, especially to
Congress and the National Security Council.
More can and should be done in fostering creative
approaches to alternatives to liaison relation-
ships. We should look now at what we would lose
in a termination or severe curbing of a liaison
relationship and adjust operating directives,
planning, and activities accordingly to cover
that contingency. Our recruiting patterns should
be targeted with possible loss in mind.
Dissent
1. Personal Dissent:
Guidance counseling is the weakest link in this
chain, and it should be improved by better inte-
gration of the full range of Agency assistance
that can be brought to bear, including psychologi-
cal, medical, training, Career Management Group,
and normal office professional career guidance.
The task should not be placed in the hands of
the Office of Personnel because, despite helpful
intentions, OP does not have the kind of knowledge
about the various components that is necessary for
effective guidance counseling.
2. Policy Dissent:
Pre-decisionmaking periods should be delineated
with the factors involved in the decision spelled
out, providing a period of time for thought and
review of the matter by all elements involved
before a formal dissent must be taken.
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Additional formal mechanisms short of appeal to
the IC should be created. (NOTE: As with the
first group, the second was divided, and it was
about equally divided on this point.)
3. Organization/Management Dissent:
Periodic zero-based management review of each
unit's work at unit conferences which would
involve all employees in a reexamination of all
significant facets of organizational methods and
management processes.
The legal guidelines under which the Agency now
operates must be understood by all managers down
to branch level, especially the inter retation
and implementation of E.O. 11905 and
An open forum should be established for Agency
employees to discuss ethical issues such as:
a. legality vs. ethics
b. are there ethical standards that are valid
for all Directorates?
c. impact and implementation of new CIA
constraints and guidelines.
d. individual responsibility vs. blind following
of orders.
e. controversial Agency operations or practices
which have been revealed to the public--
presented in a general, philosophic framework
that CIA employees can understand.
A serious reexamination of the ethical condisera-
tions involved in the handling of people within
the Agency should be undertaken.
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Program
Wednesday, 29 March 1978
0930-1000 Check in
1000-1030 Welcome
1040-1130 Lecture/Discussion:
"A Code of Ethics for
Intelligence"
discusses the problem of a code of
ethics for American intelligence. He notes the need for
such a code. He comments on means of achieving a code
through legislative or executive action and doing this while
continuing effective collection and analysis of foreign
intelligence and, particularly, the initiation of future
programs. He looks at the relationship of government
requirements, of technical difficulties, and of individual
standards. He proposes some structural and administrative
changes which may encourage and support a clear standard of
ethical practice for the intelligence officer.
1130-1230 Lunch
1230-1320 Continuation of Discussion:
"A Code of Ethics for
Intelligence"
1330-1400 Introduction of Participants
and Discussion of Topics
1410-1600 Lecture/Discussion:
"A Personal Ethic and
Company Ethic"
ro essor litical
Science and Contem-
porary Affairs,
Federal Executive
Institute,
Charlottesville)
Virginia
looks at the problem of defining a
persona e Lic as 1 Races a civil servant and, specifically,
an intelligence officer today. Through comment and exchange
with the group, he brings out some of the difficulties and
contradictions encountered in formulating and applying a
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Wednesday, 29 March 1978 (continued)
personal ethic. He looks at the interaction of individual
collective, and institutional ethics. He comments on the
impact on a personal ethic of such factors as: position,
organizational commitment, technological and institutional
change, and interpersonal relationships. He attempts to
alert the participants to an awareness of the need for an
ethical formulation and to stimulate them to grapple with
the problem from a personal and an organizational stand-
point.
1600-1730 Social Hour
1730-1900 Dinner
1900-2100 Group Discussions:
"Creativity and Controls
in CIA"
Thursday, 30 March 1978
0700-0830 Breakfast
0830-0930 Panel Discussion: "The
Questionnaire: Ethics
and Intelligence"
Participants in this Symposium were asked to respond
to a questionnaire on "Ethics and Intelligence" prepared
last year by members of the CIA Senior Seminar. This
questionnaire aims to probe into some of the types of
questions indicative of real life situations. Representatives
of the Office of Research and Development (ORD) have em to ed
computer tabulation to measure these responses.
of ORD, who initiated the Senior Seminar project,
report on the results of the tabulations.
0930-1000 Coffee Hour
1000-1200 "Ethical Issues of
Military Leadership"
International Legal
Studies, U.S. Army
War College, Carlisle,
Pennsylvania
Since ancient times, military literature has treated
the subject of ethics, both'personal and institutional.
Words such as honor, loyalty, obedience, just and unjust
wars all suggest underlying ethical questions. Colonel
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Thursday, 30 March 1978 (continued)
looks at some of the traditional elements of
t e mi. Mary ethic. He observes how military values have
been inculcated and applied and then assesses the situation
as it exists today. He discusses changes made or contemplated
in rules or standards governing personal conduct, relationship
to command and the responsibility of the individual for the
results of his actions or those of his unit.
notes some of the philosophical and disciplinary pro ems
which may result from the reassessment under way and discusses
approaches to handling this problem at institutions such as
the Army War College.
1300-1500 Group Discussion: "Ethics,
Law, Individual Rights and
the Intelligence Profession"
In small groups and then in a collective gathering,
participants will consider various problems facing us in
today's world, including:
a. Ethics and the Intelligence Profession
b. The Law and the Profession
c. Human Rights
d. Mechanisms for Review and Criticism
1500-1600 Conclusion: Questions for
another day.
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APPENDIX F
ETHICS QUESTIONNAIRE
(to follow)
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