THE THREE PILLARS OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01762A000400020004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 16, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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16 May 1972
THE THREE PILLARS OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
Current intelligence has three principal manifestations--
daily publications, weekly publications, and ad hoc memoranda.
Although suggestions are sometimes made to eliminate or
drastically alter one or another of this trio, the chances are
that in some form all will be with us for a long time to come.
Each springs out of the needs of high-level officials and
American reading preferences.
Obviously American policy-makers require daily reports
on any problem, such as Indochina, on which it is vital to
have the latest information and on which daily decisions must
be made. Even on less urgent matters and those not calling
for US action officials want to learn about developments when
they are news. They need a daily. At the same time, Americans
seem to have been conditioned to expect a weekly round-up of
events that makes more generalized sense out of the daily
details and looks ahead a bit. When a policy-maker is seized
of a problem, he will need more intelligence than is carried
in daily and weekly articles; he wants the story laid out
fully and neatly. This calls for a memorandum, which he may
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request or which may be self-initiated by the intuitive
analyst. Enduring problems will call forth a string of
memoranda.
Intelligence writing in any of these forms seeks to
be analytical rather than simply reportorial. That is,
it brings out the significance of a development by answering
the questions that naturally come to mind, providing related
facts and background, and explaining why the event has
occurred and what its consequences are likely to be.
Though the Office of Current Intelligence does many
other things--such as providing briefings, contributing
to National Security Council studies, writing National
Intelligence Surveys--the heart of its business is the
production of dailies, weeklies, and memoranda. The be-
ginning of this activity predates the formation of OCI.
In January 1946 President Truman asked the new Central
Intelligence Group, soon to be renamed the CIA, to provide
him with a daily intelligence summary. He said he had
many reports coming to him from different sources, but he.
needed one compilation that would draw together and evaluate
the most important intelligence. The CIG responded with the
Daily Summary under the editorship of The
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CIA daily, called The Central Intelligence Bulletin for the
past 14 years, has continued in an unbroken line down to
the present, though it has been a product of different
offices in the Agency. Since 1951 it has been produced by
OCI, with the regular collaboration of the Office of
Economic Research, and, in recent years, the Office of
Strategic Research.
A Matter of Definition
President Truman did not specify what he meant by
"important intelligence." It was left to the CIG to make
its own judgment of importance, and to decide what intelli-
gence was, CIG's course was not to adopt a definition of
intelligence and proceed in conformity with it, but to steer
largely by instinct informed by the experience its members
had gained in the intelligence field during World War II.
Later on, newcomers who had not had this experience sought a
precise definition, thereby opening up a discussion which has
been carried on sporadically, but without any great intensity,
to this day.
There is plenty of room for argument and it is not
uncommon to hear someone disparage a piece of information
by saying, "That isn't intelligence!" If pressed, however,
he would probably not be able to say what intelligence is.
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Some practitioners of the art have argued for the clandestine
nature of intelligence. A proper definition, however, must
reflect the way a word has come to be used. In this case, it
must allow for the fact that reports from ambassadors and
attaches, information from travellers, and monitored radio
broadcasts and telecasts, are as much a part of the intelligence
"take" as intercepted communications, overhead imagery, and
agent reports. One hesitates to call press stories "intelli-
gence," but there is no doubt that they are often the factual
basis of finished intelligence, which is normally interpretive.
Not only is it unprofitable to define intelligence by
method of collection but it is also meaningless to limit it in
terms of subject matter, aside from its dealing with things
"foreign." Intelligence can treat political, economic,
sociological or military subjects; it can concern friend, foe,
or neutral, good news or bad, danger or opportunity. Looking
at the record of what CIA has been producing over the years,
we get an ostensive definition of intelligence that is quite
broad, and has been consistently so. The only characteristics
common to all the intelligence reports published over the past
quarter of a century are that they convey foreign information--
i.e., they concern foreign countries, persons, and organiza-
tions--and they have been written by US intelligence officials.
In other words, intelligence is official information on
foreign developments and situations. It may have been acquired
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from public media and, even as interpreted, differ little
from what is known by the man in the street, or it may have
been acquired expensively by elaborate collection methods
and constitute sensitive information known to only a few.
Whatever its subject matter, it ought to be more accurate
and authoritative than non-official writing since it can
draw not only on public information but on a variety of
sources exclusive to the government.
It may be unnecessary to explain the distinctiveness of
the variety of intelligence known as current intelligence.
Nonetheless, the National Security Council has done so to
mark out jurisdictional lines. NSCID No. 3 of 13 January
1948 lays down that current intelligence is "that spot
information or intelligence of all types and forms of
immediate interest and value to operating or policy staffs,
which is used by them usually without the delays incident
to complete evaluation or interpretation." In simpler terms
we could say that current intelligence deals with current
foreign events and is produced promptly. The events in
question may or may not be subjected to more thorough
evaluation later on.
Crises, Threats, and Favorable Developments
From the beginning of the Dail Summar , current
intelligence has logically, instinctively, and unavoidably
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focused on foreign developments of greatest significance to
the US. Its first concern has been with events having an
immediate impact on this country and calling for policy
decisions. The hot issues--the crises--demand treatment.
Prime examples of "must" coverage are wars. Since OCI was
formed, the two wars. in which the US has been involved
have regularly been given prominent coverage in the regular
daily. They have also called forth special dailies of their
own. Sometimes war reports are. eclipsed by pressure tactics
by our antagonists, such as the various Soviet squeeze
plays on Berlin and the attempt to plant missiles in Cuba.
Developments regarding our antagonists' military capabilities,
and,of course)what we can divine of their intentions, are
covered conscientiously. All these are matters directly
affecting US security.
One of the main purposes of the Bulletin is to guard
official Washington against "surprises," particularly of the
unpleasant variety. When the:Bulletin fails, as it has
occasionally, there is a post-mortem to determine the reasons.
Crises do not arise solely over issues of direct security
significance; there are crises in diplomatic and economic
relations between the US and its allies, and between other
countries, with. repercussions on the US. Moreover, intelli-
gence deals as much with non-critical situations as with
crises. It is quite possible that the most important
intelligence is non-critical in nature, even if crisis
reporting tends to hog attention. When the dam has broken,
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officials tend to be caught up by events; their capability
of control is limited. On the other hand, if they can spot
trouble coming in the future, they can plan carefully to meet,
and perhaps, preclude it. It is this kind of "look ahead"
that intelligence should provide.
Officials responsible for the conduct of foreign and
defense policy cannot be adequately served only by information
of a defensive nature, whether it concerns crises or future
problems. For a full understanding of situations, they need
to be informed of developments favorable to US interests and
of opportunities for the US to promote its objectives. This
is an important side of intelligence.
The Wide US Interest
In general, intelligence reporting must cover all
countries and situations where there is a US interest,
This is not in fact a restrictive prescription. Although
it varies enormously in degree, there is a US interest in
every country in the world. This follows from our desire
to avoid the outbreak of wars, which always are a peril to
the international community, to counter the extension of our
antagonists' influence, and to safeguard our economic
interests.
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The developments and situations that each country
regards as most important to itself--usually its current
major issues--are likely to have at least a potential
impact on the country's political stability, economic and
social welfare, defensive capabilities, or foreign policy.
Consequently these issues must always be examined as
possibly reportable subjects. Whether in a particular
case the matter should be reported in an intelligence
publication, and in what level of publication, depends
on the impact it is apt to have on the foreign country,
and then on the US.
A change of government holds the potentiality for
effecting many changes within a country and altering its
relations with the outside world. Consequently either
orderly or sudden changes of government in even the smallest
countries are normally dealt with, and analyzed, in
intelligence publications. Since some changes could have
an adverse effect on US interests, there is always an
attempt to predict coups d'etat.
The Publications
The CIA daily has carried interpretive reporting on
the most important spot developments for 26 years. As the
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main publication for the President, however, the? Bulletin
yielded in 1961 to the new President's Intelligence
Checklist, later renamed the President's Daily Brief.
The PDB is written chiefly on the foundation of the
Bulletin although the form of presentation conforms to
the preferences of the White House.
The weekly and memoranda also have histories going
back before the formation of OCI. The Weekly Review
attempts to look at situations with more perspective
than the Bulletin. Though the writer is limited by space
considerations, he tries to be analytical, clarifying
foreign objectives, identifying trends, making the US
interest clear (at least indirectly) and projecting
judiciously into the near future. The Weekly in the past
year has experienced a considerable face-lifting, marked
not so much by a new prose style as by sprightlier head-
lines, more flexible arrangement of the articles, and
the use of more pictures and imaginative art work.
The adjunct to the Weekly known as the Special Report
is a different creature from a regular weekly article.
Although it is factually up to date, its purpose is not
to relate the most recent developments, but to provide
a broad (though not exhaustive) examination of a current
topic worthy of wide attention.
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Intelligence memoranda follow no set pattern and are
as long as necessary to convey their messages, usually
sharply focused. One of their chief distinctions from
Special Reports is that their dissemination is determined
in each case, rather than being fixed and widespread as
it is for Special Reports. The choice of the memorandum
form, with its selected readers, is usually made for one
or more of the following reasons: the report is not deemed
to be of general interest; it is too long--or even too
short--for a Special Report; it is too highly classified
or too delicate in subject matter; or it is required by
the consumer before a Special Report could be turned out.
The subject matter and focus of finished intelligence
vary according to the intended readers and their presumed
needs, but there is a general similarity in the nature of
all issuances. Whether they have a broad or narrow scope,
are concerned with long-term trends or only with the events
of yesterday, are largely political, economic, or military,
or a mixture, they all deal with foreign developments that
do now, or could potentially, affect US interests.
The Generalist Reader; the Press; US Policies and Interests
Apart from memoranda directed to particular consumers,
current intelligence, following the main line set by its
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beginning as a report to the President, is by and large
written for the generalist among policymakers. The usual
Bulletin item or Weekly article does not carry factual
or analytical material that would be new to people in
other agencies working on the same countries or problems
and normally having the same raw reports, although a
concise, organized presentation may be helpful even t
the.experts. The target readership is principally the top
policymakers, who have to come to grips with each major
problem as it emerges and who in any case want to keep
up with outstanding world developments. Occasionally
objection is made to the proposed publication of a report
on the grounds that the officials handling the question
already have the information. This argument ignores the
fact that there are many high-level generalists who are not
working on that particular matter but who are among our
principal readers.
One of the standard problems for current intelligence
is posed by press coverage. Where the intelligence story
is unknown to the public, there is no difficulty. Also,
if the press is telling an incomplete or inadequate story,
it is obviously desirable for OCI to set things straight.
However, there is apt to be hesitation in those cases where
press coverage is excellent, and let us admit that it often
is. The answer usually lies in the importance of the event
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involved. If the Soviet Party Politburo has met and issued
a pronouncement about US policy in the Middle East, the
fact that the press will have the full story does not
relieve OCI from writing its own piece. Probably the
analyst will have some unique interpretive contribution
to make, but even if this is not the case the assumption
should be that officials will be looking to see whether
OCI, on its all-source basis, confirms the press, corrects
it, or adds something of significance. The touchstone
is whether officials need to be apprised of the development;
if they do, current intelligence has an obligation,
regardless of the press.
Although intelligence should not be written to
defend or criticize policy, effective intelligence reporting
calls for a knowledge of US interests and policies. Without
such knowledge, there is a lack of criteria for the selec-
tion of developments and their meaningful interpretation.
The producers of intelligence do not have to be in personal
agreement with current policies, or indeed have any feeling
about them at all, but their reporting needs to illuminate
foreign reaction to these policies. It is essential that
policymakers get a straight story of how things are working
out so that they can judge whether to continue on course
or take a different tack.
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A Framework for Reporting
In trying to select developments to be reported, or
in attempting as a reader to understand why certain events
are covered in the publications, it is necessary to regard
the events in terms of their impact on the US. Foreign
developments in conformity with American interests and
policies can be regarded as "favorable." Developments
opposed to US interests and policies can be considered
"unfavorable" or "threats." Additionally, there are many
developments that do not necessarily fall into either
category. Some of them, however, are of obvious importance,
and hence are reportable because they are likely to produce
eventual effects that will matter, one way or another, to
this country. The Sino-Soviet border negotiations are an
example. Particular developments in these talks may have
no direct repercussion on US interests, but they will
probably affect the relationship between China and the
USSR, which has great importance for the US.
This approach to criteria of reportability results
in the following framework for all forms of current
intelligence. The examples are drawn from various years.
I. Direct threats to the security of the US or its
personnel abroad.
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Examples:
a. North Vietnamese intensify attacks on US
bases.
b. Soviets test ABM.
c. New terrorist actions planned vs US personnel
in Brazil.
d. China develops thermonuclear weapon.
e. Moscow demands Allies get out of Berlin (1958).
f. Soviets install missiles in Cuba (1962).
II. Indirect threats to US security and threats to
other US interests and policies.
a. Japanese leftists oppose security pact with US.
b. East Germans harrass Berlin traffic.
c. Malta gives Britain deadline for withdrawal.
d. Violence increased along Israeli-Lebanon
border.
e. Chile refuses compensation for takeover of US
copper companies.
f. Challengers drop out of South Vietnam election
campaign.
NATO faces open dispute on the Greek question.
III. Favorable developments for US security, other
interests, and policies.
a. Soviet missile program suffers setback.
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b. China moderates its foreign policy positions.
c. Turkish political crisis eases.
d. Buddhists soften their attitude toward Saigon
government.
e. Left and right extremists are defeated in West
German elections.
f. New Libyan government is cool to Moscow.
IV. Other important developments.
a. Indonesia having success in controlling inflation.
b. Serious friction exists among ruling group in
Algeria.
c. Mujib faces many difficulties as he takes over
in Bangladesh.
d. Honduran president in shaky position.
e. Factional fight continues in Finnish Communist
party.
f. Croat nationalism causing concern to Belgrade.
In selecting material for reporting under this last
category (IV), intelligence producers must guard against a
natural enthusiasm for their subjects which can lead them to
write about events having too slight a bearing on any US
interest. If there is a connection with US interests that
cannot be easily perceived, it should be clarified.
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There is little doubt that this disunited and
contentious world will continue to produce situations demanding
the attention of the US. The business of interpretive reporting
of foreign events therefore seems to have an assured future.
Whether the intelligence message is short and simple, or
long and complicated,. there is a place for it somewhere in
the three types of current intelligence publications.
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