DIRECTOR'S NOTES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 95
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 9, 1977
• Content Type: MF

STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A0003000800
ADMINISTRATIVE/INTERNAL USE ONLY
9 May 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
SUBJECT : Director's Note
Executive Registry
DDIA Registry
File ,2-1/71/
I would like to get out the second issue of the Director's
Notes by next Monday. I don't want to lose the momentum.
A. Should we include a reference about contacts
with y Agency or Agency personnel
similar to that as contained in the DDO message to
all Chiefs of Station?
B. Should we recap thr cases? STATINTL
(A.,5TANSFIELD TURNER
Director
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ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
STATINTL
r
UNCLASSIFIED
prov For Rele
EXECVT
SECRET
0081)004-1
TO;
SCRETA,RIAT
outing 'kip
ACTION
INFO
DATE
ANITIAL
1
DCI
X
/
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DDCI
X
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D/DCl/IC
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DDS&T
5-1
DDI
DDA
X
DDO
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8
D/DCl/NI
9
GC
X
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LC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/Pers
14
D/S
15
DTR
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Asst/DCl/
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AO/DCI
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D/EEO
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ES
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,
SUSPENSE
Lay
Date
Remarks:
,
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360 (7 s
Date
300080004-1
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Notes from the Director No. 17
14 December 1977
STATEMENT ON DDO REDUCTION
I have been requested by several committees of Congress to provide background
information on the personnel reduction in the DDO. The statement which I provided
in response to those requests is printed in its entirety below for the information of all
CIA personnel.
Statement by Admiral Stansfield Turner,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Concerning Personnel Reductions in the
Directorate of Operations, CIA
I. Why were the cuts necessary?
Soon after my arrival in the Agency last March, I began to hear that the
Directorate of Operations was overstaffed. It was almost universally perceived
within the Agency that the DDO had excess people, resulting in over manage-
ment and under utilization of talent. Some organizations could tolerate this, but
not an organization like the CIA where we are fortunate to have high-quality,
dedicated and ambitious people. Nor, from a broader standpoint, is it tolerable
to have unnecessary people on the taxpayers' payroll.
At that time the Directorate of Operations was already engaged in a three-
phase restructuring and paring down program. I encouraged and received a
report on their efforts in mid-July.
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Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
II. Determination of the size of the reduction.
The report I received presented a range of opinion as to the extent of the cut
that was necessary. I elected to be conservative and take the smallest number of
positions for elimination that was suggested-820. This does not mean that
either the incumbents of those positions must be released or that 820 people are
going to be declared excess to this Directorate. Normal attrition should greatly
reduce the number whose services will no longer be needed in the Directorate of
Operations. We also must make provision for the continuing hiring of new and
young personnel, to ensure the continuing viability of the service and we also
must ensure that there exists a reasonable promotion opportunity at all levels for
those on duty. To accomplish these latter points I have told the Directorate of
Operations to hire 215 people each year for FY 78 and FY 79. Because of
normal attrition many people will be voluntarily leaving the Operations Direc-
torate and we estimate that over the two-year exercise approximately 300
individuals will actually be involuntarily separated from the Agency. It should
also be noted that nearly 70 percent of the 212 people declared excess so far are
eligible for an immediate retirement annuity. I feel very strongly that, despite
the additional pain it causes us, we cannot afford to neglect either the promotion
opportunity for those already in the organization or the necessity of bringing in
people in approximately equal annual increments at the bottom. We simply must
continue to build a sufficiently attractive career opportunity to attract and retain
the same caliber of people in 1978 as we had in 1977. Parenthetically, I might
say that "at the bottom" is intended to mean just that. I see little prospect for
more than a handful of specialists coming in at middle or upper levels.
III. Timing of the reduction.
Of the alternatives presented to me for phasing the reduction, I opted for
the quickest, which was accomplishable over a two-year period. Given the
changes the last few years have brought to the CIA, I felt it would be better for
morale not to prolong this action. Extending the reduction over a six-year period
might have made it possible to achieve the reduction through attrition alone, but
that would have left an air of uncertainty hanging over the entire organization
for that long period and in the end might not have brought about the reductions
in the right places. In addition, I do not believe I could honestly face your
Committee in its budgetary role and suggest that the Agency should retain such
a considerable number of people in excess of its needs for six years.
On August 8, I announced this intended reduction?first privately to the
employees and then publicly to the media. It was in turn well publicized in and
outside the Agency. I further announced that we would notify those who were
going to be asked to leave in Fiscal Year 1978 not later than the first of
November 1977; that none of those persons would be asked to leave prior to the
first of March 1978. Those being asked to leave in Fiscal Year 1979 would be
notified by 1 June 1978 and not required to leave prior to 1 October 1978.
Between the time I notified CIA employees in August that there would be a
reduction, and the first announcement to individuals on the first of November as
2
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1
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to who would be released, I received no complaints either as to the necessity for
cuts or how they would be effected. Even since the announcement of who would
be released, I have found no one in the Agency who seriously believes that a
reduction is not in order.
IV. Who is to be released?
In deciding how to allocate the reduction across grades and skills, my end
objective has always been to maintain at least as much clandestine intelligence
capability as we possess today. We do not have a surplus of human intelligence
collection capability, hence, there will be no meaningful reduction in overseas
strength or activities, nor appreciable reduction in the size of the officer
operational corps.
V. Method of selecting the individuals.
For those below the supergrade level, the individual's accumulated fitness
reports were the basic determinants of who was to leave. The Agency's periodic
evaluation boards numerically rank individuals within each grade level. These
rankings combined with fitness reports were the basis for a point system. An
explicit explanation of this point system was published for all personnel in the
Operations Directorate in early October. Beyond this mechanical evaluation, a
panel reviewed the calculations and used good judgment in making exceptions
where unique skills needed to be retained. These were rare exceptions, however,
and the rule of the numerical ranking was closely followed.
In June this year we initiated an annual process by which a senior panel
composed of officers at the Executive position level rank all supergrades. The
Director for Operations used these rankings as the basis for his recommenda-
tions on release of supergrades to me. Again, there were exceptions to the
ranking order, but they were rare.
There are two additional points that I would like to make on these
selections:
? As far as I can determine, there was no bias by type of service, agreement
with current management, race or sex in the selection of these individuals.
There were, for example, only 17 women, 4 blacks, and 3 Hispanics in the
total of 212 forced reductions for Fiscal 1978.
? There is no question that we were forced to terminate some very capable
people. The Directorate of Operations has been shrinking continually since
our withdrawal from Vietnam. The majority of the marginal performers
have already been eliminated. There is no way today to reduce further
without asking very competent people to leave. This is unpleasant,
unfortunate, but I believe necessary!
3
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VI. Style of notification.
The method by which notifications were issued to individuals has been
criticized. I regret that individuals may have been offended or felt that their
prior service was not fully appreciated. Such is not the case. Everyone of these
individuals has made sacrifices and many have endured privations and risks for
their country. Being fully cognizant of their past contributions, we are determin-
ing whether any of these 212 people can be relocated in other directorates within
the Agency to fill existing vacancies. Consequently, while individuals have
received a notification that their release has been recommended, we are still
exploring alternative employment possibilities. Until those alternatives have
been exhausted, no final determination on their employment will be made.
I anticipate that 25% of these 212 people will be offered alternative
positions. Additionally, I am personally approaching the chiefs of all the other
intelligence services of our country to ask that they give the residual of these 212
special consideration in their hiring requirements.
Finally, in a few cases, notices went to those who would be able to retire if
permitted to serve a small amount of additional time. In these cases, we have
arranged that no one will be forced to retire before the end of Fiscal Year 1979,
when the program must be complete, if he would qualify for retirement by that
time.
VII. Is there a security risk?
It has been suggested that the departure of sizable numbers of employees
risk their being suborned by enemy intelligence agents. Frankly, I have too much
confidence in their loyalty and dedication to take such a suggestion seriously.
There was no such experience, to the best of my knowledge, under former
Director James Schlesinger in 1973, when 632 employees were separated. Our
unfortunate experiences with former employees violating their secrecy agree-
ment have come entirely from individuals who have left the Agency of their own
volition.
VIII. Next phase of the reduction.
The Fiscal 1979 cut will require approximately the same number of
reductions, perhaps more if attrition does not meet expectations. We intend not
to wait until the first of June and then send out all of the notifications at once
but to commence notification as early as possible. None will be required to
depart before the first of October 1978.
IX. Conclusions.
Many are concerned that this reduction may have hurt the morale of the
Directorate of Operations. There is no question that in the short-term it has. The
long-term objective, however, is quite the reverse; it is to rebuild morale by
4
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ensuring operational efficiency and full utilization of talent. More than that,
morale in the Directorate of Operations will be further strengthened through the
sustained expression of support for its vital activities such as has come from this
Committee and which also must come from a broader range of citizens. We
must lift the pall of suspicion which hangs over the Intelligence Community in
general and the Central Intelligence Agency in particular, which obscures the
exceptional contribution these organizations have made in the past and are
making today.
I would not have encouraged and approved this sizable reduction had I not
thought that in the long run it would strengthen the Directorate of Operations
and the Central Intelligence Agency. We need the capabilities of this Director-
ate as much today as ever. Although new technical means of collection permit us
to extend our collection efforts, they only compliment, they do not supersede
human collectors. Only human collectors can gain access to motives, to
intentions, to thoughts, and plans. They will always be vital to our country's
security.
It would have been much easier for me to have avoided this issue and
attempted to continue over strength until you or the appropriations committees
or the Office of Management and Budget uncovered these excesses and made
the reductions in my behalf. Contrary to media reports, I was not directed to
make these cuts either by the Vice President or David Aaron of the National
Security Council staff as reported in some media. I have talked to neither on the
subject except to keep the Vice President informed of my decisions. In sum, it is
my opinion that I would have been avoiding my duty and would have been
placing short-term considerations ahead of long-term necessities in putting the
cuts off. We simply must build a foundation today for a Central Intelligence
Agency that will be capable of continuing into the indefinite future the STAT I NT L
outstanding performance it has given our country during the past thirty years.
STANSFIELD TURNER
Director
5
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NOTES FROM THE DIRECTOR
STATEMENT ON DDO REDUCTION
I have been requested by several committees of
Congress to provide background information on the
personnel reduction in the DDO. The statement which
provided in response to those requests is printed
in its entirety below for the information of all CIA
personnel.
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Statement by Admiral Stansfield Turner,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Concerning Personnel Reductions in the
Directorate of Operations, CIA
I. Why were the cuts necessary?
'Soon after my arrival in the Agency last March I began
to hear that the Directorate of Operations was overstaffed.
It was almost universally perceived within the Agency that
the DDO had excess people, resulting in over management
and under utilization of talent. Some organizations could
tolerate this, but not an organization like the CIA where
we are fortunate to have high-quality, dedicated and
ambitious people. Nor, from a broader standpoint, is it
tolerable to have unnecessary people on the taxpayers'
payroll.
At that time the Directorate of Operations was already
engaged in a three-phase restructuring and paring down
program. I encouraged and received a report on their
efforts in mid-July.
II. Determination of the size of the reduction.
The report I received presented a range of opinion as to
the extent of the cut that was necessary. I elected to
be conservative and take the smallest number of positions
for elimination that was suggested--820. This does not
mean that either the incumbents of those positions must
be released or that 820 people are going to be declared
excess to this Directorate. Normal attrition should
greatly reduce the number whose services will no longer
be needed in the Directorate of Operations. We also
must make provision for the continuing hiring of new
and young personnel, to ensure the continuing viability
of the service and we also must ensure that there exists
a reasonable promotion opportunity at all levels for
? those on duty. To accomplish these latter points I have
told the Directorate of Operations to hire 215 people
each year for FY 78 and FY 79. Because of normal attri-
tion many people will be voluntarily leaving the Operations
Directorate and we estimate that over the two-year exercise
approximately 300 individuals will actually be involuntarily
separated from the Agency. It should also be noted that
nearly 70 percent of the 212 people declared excess so
far are eligible for an immediate retirement annuity.
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Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
feel vr-ry strongly that, d s7Dite the additional
pain it causes us, we cannot afford': to neglect ?
either the ;7-romotion opporLunity for those already
in the orgnization or the necessity of bringing in
people in ar,proximately equal annual increments at
the bottom. We simply must continue to build a
sufficiently attractive career opportunity to attract
and retain the same caliber of people in 1987 as we
had in 1977. Parenthetically, I might say that "at
the bottom" is intended to mean just that. I see
little prosect for more than a handful of specialists
coming in at middle or upper levels.
III. Timing of the reduction.
Of the alternatives presented to me for phasing
the reduction, I opted for the quickest, which was
accomplishable over a two-year period. Given the
changes the last few years have brought to the CIA,
I felt it would be better for morale not to prolong
this action. Extending the reduction over a six-
year period might have made it possible to achieve
the reduction through attrition alone, but that
would have left an air of uncertainty hanging over
the entire organization for that long period and in
the end might not have brought about the reductions
in the right places. In addition, I do not believe
I could honestly face your Committee in its budgetary
role and suggest that the Agency should retain such
a considerable number of people in excess of its
needs for six years.
On August 8 I announced this intended reduction --
first privately to the employees and then publicly to
the media. It was in turn well publicized in and out-
side the Agency. I further announced that we would
notify those who were going to be asked to leave in
Fiscal Year 1978 not later than the first of November
1977; that none of those persons would be asked to
leave prior to the first of March 1978. Those being
asked to leave in Fiscal Year 1979 would be notified
by 1 June 1978 and not required to leave prior to
1 October 1978.
Between the time 1 notifled CIA emoloyees in
August that there would he a reduction, and the first
announcement to individuals on the first of November
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as to who would be released, I received no complaints
either as to the necessity for cuts or how they would
be effected. Even since the announcement of who
would be released, I have found no one in the Agency
who seriously believes that a reduction is not in
order.
IV. Who is to be released?
In deciding how to allocate the reduction across
grades and skills, my end objective has always been
to maintain at least as much clandestine intelligence
capability as we possess today. We do not have a
surplus of human intelligence collection capability,
hence, there will be no meaningful reduction in
overseas strength or activities, nor appreciable
reduction in the size of the officer operational
corps.
V. Method of selecting the individuals.
For those below the supergrade level, the
individual's accumulated fitness reports were the
basic determinants of who was to leave. The Agency's
periodic evaluation boards numerically rank individ-
uals within each grade level. These rankings
combined with fitness reports were the basis for a
point system. An explicit explanation of this point
system was published for all personnel in the
Operations Directorate in early October. Beyond
this mechanical evaluation, a panel reviewed the
calculations and used good judgment in making
exceptions where unique skills needed to be retained.
These were rare exceptions, however, and the rule of
the numerical ranking was closely followed.
In June this year we initiated an annual process
by which a senior panel composed of officers at the
Executive position level rank all supergrades. The
Director for Operations used these rankings as the
basis for his rec=mendations on release of super-
grades to me. Again, there were exceptions to the
ranking order, but they were rare.
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Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
There are two additional points that I would
like to make on these selections:
0 As far as I can determine, there was no
bias by type of service, agreement with
current management, race or sex in the
selection of these individuals. There
were, for example, only 17 women, 4
blacks, and 3 Hispanics in the total
of 212 forced reductions for Fiscal
1978.
0 There is no question that we were forced
to terminate some very capable people.
The Directorate of Operations has been
shrinking continually since our with- .
drawal from Vietnam. The majority of the
marginal performers have already been
eliminated. There is no way today to
reduce further without asking very
competent people to leave. This is
unpleasant, unfortunate, but I believe
necessary!
VI. Style of notification.
The method by which notifications were issued
to individuals has been criticized. I regret that
individuals may have been offended or felt that
their prior service was not fully appreciated- Such
is not the case. Everyone of these individuals has
made sacrifices and many have endured privations and
risks for their country. Being fully cognizant of
their pastcontributions, we are determining whether
any of these 212 people can be relocated in other
directorates within the Agency to fill existing
vacancies. Consequently, while individuals have
received a notification that their release has been
recommended, we are still exploring alternative
employment possibilities. Until those alternatives
have been exhausted, no final determination on their
employment will be made.
I .anticipate that 257, these 212 people will
be offered alternative positins. Ad,ditionally, I
am personally Etproachin7 te c-,f all the
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other intelligence services of our country to ask
that they give the residual of these 212 special
consideration in their hiring requirements.
Finally, in a few cases, notices went to those
who would be able to retire if permitted to serve a
small amount of additional time. In these cases,
,we have arranged that no one will be forced to
retire before the end of Fiscal Year 1979, when the
program must be complete, if he would qualify for
retirement by that time.
VII. Is there a security risk?
It has been suggested that the departure of
sizable numbers of employees risks their being
suborned by enemy intelligence agents. Frankly,
I have too much confidence in their loyalty and
dedication to take such a suggestion seriously.
There was no such experience, to the best of my
knowledge, under former Director James Schlesinger
in 1973, when 632 employees were separated. Our
unfortunate experiences with former employees
violating their secrecy agreement have come
entirely from individuals who have left the Agency
of their own volition.
VIII. Next phase of the reduction.
? The Fiscal 1979 cut will require approximately
the same number of reductions, perhaps more if
attrition does not meet expectations. We intend
not to wait until the first of June and then send
out all of the notifications at once but to commence
notification as early as possible. None will be
required to depart before the first of October 1978.
)U. Conclusions.
Many are concerned that this reduction may have
hurt the morale of the Directorate of Operations.
There is no question that in the short-term it has.
The long-term objective, however, is Quite the
reverse; it is to rebuild morale by ensuring opera-
tional efficiency and full utilization of talent.
More than that, morale in th-,! Directorate of Opera-
tions will be further strjthned through the
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Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
sustained expression o s,upport?for its vital
activities such as has come from this Committee
and which also must come from a broader range of
Citizens. We must lift the pall of suspicion
which hangs over the Intelligence Community in
general and the Central Intelligence Agency in
particular, which obscures the exceptional con-
tribution these organizations have made in the
past and are making today.
I would not have encouraged and approved this
sizable reduction had I not thought that in the
long run it would strengthen the Directorate of
Operations and the Central Intelligence Agency.
We need the capabilities of this Directorate as
much today as ever. Although new technical means
of collection permit us to extend our collection
efforts, they only compliment, they do not super-
sede human collectors. Only human collectors can
gain access to motives, to intentions, to thoughts,
and plans. They will always be vital to our coun-
try's security.
It would have been much easier for me to have
avoided this issue and attempted to continue over
strength until you or the appropriations committees
or the Office of Management and Budget uncovered
these excesses and made the reductions in my behalf.
Contrary to media reports, I was not directed to
make these cutseither by the Vice President or
David Aaron of the National Security Council staff
as reported in some media. I have talked to neither
on the subject except to keep the Vice President
informed of my decisions. In sum, it is my opinion
that I would have been avoiding my duty and would
have been placing short-term considerations ahead
of long-term necessities in putting the cuts off.
We simply must build a foundation today for a
Central Intelligence Agency that will be capable
of continuing into the indefinite future the put--
standing performance it. has given our country
during the past thirty years.,
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NOTES FROM THE DIRECTOR NO.17
I thought that you might be interested in my statements
provided to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the program
of reduction in the size of the DDO.
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Approved For ReleastpnyMalciW-INFIEC9,0473A000300080004-1
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
on the Reduction in Size of the DUO
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
I. Why were the cuts necessary?
Soon after my arrival in the Agency last March I
began to hear that the Directorate of Operations was
overstaffed. It was almost universally perceived within
the Agency that the DUO had excess people, resulting in
over management and under utilization of talent. Some
organizations could tolerate this, but not an organiza-
tion like the CIA where we are fortunate to have high-
quality, dedicated and ambitious people. Nor, from a
broader standpoint, is it tolerable to have unnecessary
people on the taxpayers' payroll.
At that time the Directorate of Operations was
already engaged in a three-phase restructuring and par-
ing down program. I encouraged and received a report on
their efforts in mid-July.
II. Determination of the size of the reduction.
The report I received presented a range of opinion
as to the extent of the cut that was necessary. . I elected
to be conservative and take the smallest number of posi-
tions for elimination that was suggested--820. This does
not mean that either the incumbents of those positions
must be released or that 820 people are going to be
declared excess to this Directorate because normal attri-
tion should greatly reduce the number whose services will
no longer be needed in the Directorate of Operations. We
also must make provision for the continuing hiring of new
and young personnel, to ensure the continuing viability
of the service and we also must ensure that there exists
a reasonable promotion opportunity at all levels for
those on duty. To accomplish these latter points I have
told the Directorate of Operations to hire 215 people
each year for FY 78 and FY 79. Because attrition cannot
be forecasted with complete accuracy, it is not possible
to say how many people will be involuntarily leaving the
Operations Directorate. We are endeavoring to place in
vacancies that exist elsewhere in the Agency individuals
whose services are no longer needed in the Operations
Directorate. Our best computation leads us to believe
that over the totality of the two-year exercise, approxi-
mately 300 individuals will actually be involuntarily
separated from the Agency. It should also be noted that
nearly 70 percent of the 212 people declared excess to
the Operations Directorate this fiscal year possess an
e iektpt(43,00-FPy Rias% :actIA-FIER8P41147AVQQAMPP90.4-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Presentation to the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
on the Reduction in Size of the DDO
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
30 November 1977
I. Why were the cuts necessary?
Soon after my arrival in the Agency last March
I began to hear that the Directorate of Operations
was overstaffed. It was almost universally perceived
within the Agency that the DDO had excess people,
resulting in over management and under utilization
of talent. Some organizations could tolerate this,
but not an organization like the CIA where we are
fortunate to have high-quality, dedicated and
ambitious people. Nor, from a broader standpoint,
is it tolerable to have unnecessary people on the
taxpayers' payroll.
At that time the Directorate of Operations was
already engaged in a three-phase restructuring and
paring down program. I encouraged and received a
report on their efforts in mid-July.
II. Determination of the size of the reduction.
The report I received presented a range of
opinion as to the extent of the cut that was neces-
sary. I elected to be conservative and take the
smallest number suggested -- 820. To reduce 820
positions we must lose those 820 people. But to
remain at that reduced manning level, yet provide
for the hiring of new blood at the bottom, and pro-
vide a reasonable promotion opportunity throughout
the system, approximately 215 additional people must
be attrited each year. As we plan to phase the basic
820 cut over two fiscal years, the annual planned
attrition of 215 persons per year will add 430 to
that 820 giving a total reduction of 1,250
individuals over this two-year period. The 430 part
of the cut will of course be replaced by new hires.
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I feel very strongly that, despite the additional
pain it causes us, we cannot afford to neglect
either the promotion opportunity for those already
in the organization or the necessity of bringing in
people in approximately equal annual increments at
the bottom. We simply must continue to build a
sufficiently attractive career opportunity to attract
and retain the same caliber of people in 1987 as we
had in 1977. Parenthetically, I might say that "at
the bottom" is intended to mean just that. I see
little prospect for more than a handful of specialists
coming in at middle or upper levels.
III. Timing of the reduction.
Of the alternatives presented to me for phasing
the reduction, I opted for the quickest, which was
accomplishable over a two-year period. Given the
changes the last few years have brought to the CIA,
I felt it would be better for morale not to prolong
this action. Extending the reduction over a six-
year period might have made it possible to achieve
the reduction through attrition alone, but that
would have left an air of uncertainty hanging over
the entire organization for that long period and in
the end might not have brought about the reductions
in the right places. In addition, I do not believe
I could honestly face your Committee in its budgetary
role and suggest that the Agency should retain such
a considerable number of people in excess of its
needs for six years.
On August 8 I announced this intended reduction --
first privately to the employees and then publicly to
the media. It was in turn well publicized in and out-
side the Agency. I further announced that we would
notify those who were going to be asked to leave in
Fiscal Year 1978 not later than the first of November
1977; that none of those persons would be asked to
leave prior to the first of March 1978. Those being
asked to leave in Fiscal Year 1979 would be notified
by 1 June 1978 and not required to leave prior to
1 October 1978.
Between the time I notified CIA employees in
August that there would be a reduction, and the first
announcement to individuals on the first of November
2
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
as to who would be released, I received no complaints
either as to the necessity for cuts or how they would
be effected. Even since the announcement of who
would be released, I have found no one in the Agency
who seriously believes that a reduction is not in
order.
IV. Who is to be released?
In deciding how to allocate the reduction across
grades and skills, my end objective has always been
to maintain at least as much clandestine intelligence
capability as we possess today. We do not have a
surplus of human intelligence collection capability,
hence, there will be no meaningful reduction in
overseas strength or activities, nor appreciable
reduction in the size of the officer operational
corps.
V. Method of selecting the individuals.
For those below the supergrade level, the
individual's accumulated fitness reports were the
basic determinants of who was to leave. The Agency's
periodic evaluation boards numerically rank individ-
uals within each grade level. These rankings
combined with fitness reports were the basis for a
point system. An explicit explanation of this point
system was published for all personnel in the
Operations Directorate in early October. Beyond
this mechanical evaluation, a panel reviewed the
calculations and used good judgment in making
exceptions where unique skills needed to be retained.
These were rare exceptions, however, and the rule of
the numerical ranking was closely followed.
In June this year we initiated an annual process
by which a senior panel composed of officers at the
Executive position level rank all supergrades. The
Director for Operations used these rankings as the
basis for his recommendations on release of super-
grades to me. Again, there were exceptions to the
ranking order, but they were rare.
3
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
There are two additional points that I would
like to make on these selections:
O As far as I can determine, there was no
bias by type of service, agreement with
current management, race or sex in the
selection of these individuals. There
were, for example, only 17 women, 4
blacks, and 3 Hispanics in the total
of 212 forced reductions for Fiscal
1978.
O There is no question that we were forced
to terminate some very capable people.
The Directorate of Operations has been
shrinking continually since our with-
drawal from Vietnam. The majority of the
marginal performers have already been
eliminated. There is no way today to
reduce further without asking very
competent people to leave. This is
unpleasant, unfortunate, but I believe
necessary!
VI. Style of notification.
The method by which notifications were issued
to individuals has been criticized. I regret that
individuals may have been offended or felt that
their prior service was not fully appreciated. Such
is not the case. Everyone of these individuals has
made sacrifices and many have endured privations and
risks for their country. Being fully cognizant of
their past contributions, we are determining whether
any of these 212 people can be relocated in other
directorates within the Agency to fill existing
vacancies. Consequently, while individuals have
received a notification that their release has been
recommended, we are still exploring alternative
employment possibilities. Until those alternatives
have been exhausted, no final determination on their
employment will be made.
I anticipate that 25% of these 212 people will
be offered alternative positions. Additionally, I
am personally approaching the ch4.efs of all the
4
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80- 0473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
other intelligence services of our country to ask
that they give the residual of these 212 special
consideration in their hiring requirements.
Finally, in a few cases, notices went to those
who would be able to retire if permitted to serve a
small amount of additional time. In these cases,
we have arranged that no one will be forced to
retire before the end of Fiscal Year 1979, when the
program must be complete, if he would qualify for
retirement by that time.
VII. Is there a security risk?
It has been suggested that the departure of
sizable numbers of employees risks their being
suborned by enemy intelligence agents. Frankly,
I have too much confidence in their loyalty and
dedication to take such a suggestion seriously.
There was no such experience, to the best of my
knowledge, under former Director James Schlesinger
in 1973, when 632 employees were separated. Our
unfortunate experiences with former employees
violating their secrecy agreement have come
entirely from individuals who have left the Agency
of their own volition.
VIII. Next phase of the reduction.
The Fiscal 1979 cut will require approximately
the same number of reductions, perhaps more if
attrition does not meet expectations. We intend
not to wait until the first of June and then send
out all of the notifications at once but to commence
notification as early as possible. None will be
required to depart before the first of October 1978.
XI. Conclusions.
Many are concerned that this reduction may have
hurt the morale of the Directorate of Operations.
There is no question that in the short-term it has.
The long-term objective, however, is quite the
reverse; it is to rebuild morale by ensuring opera-
tional efficiency and full utilization of talent.
More than that, morale in the Directorate of Opera-
tions will be further strengthened through the
5
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
sustained expression of support for its vital
activities such as has come from this Committee
and which also must come from a broader range of
citizens. We must lift the pall of suspicion
which hangs over the Intelligence Community in
general and the Central Intelligence Agency in
particular, which obscures the exceptional con-
tribution these organizations have made in the
past and are making today.
I would not have encouraged and approved this
sizable reduction had I not thought that in the
long run it would strengthen the Directorate of
Operations and the Central Intelligence Agency.
We need the capabilities of this Directorate as
much today as ever. Although new technical means
of collection permit us to extend our collection
efforts, they only compliment, they do not super-
sede human collectors. Only human collectors can
gain access to motives, to intentions, to thoughts,
and plans. They will always be vital to our coun-
try's security.
It would have been much easier for me to have
avoided this issue and attempted to continue over
strength until you or the appropriations committees
or the Office of Management and Budget uncovered
these excesses and made the reductions in my behalf.
Contrary to media reports, I was not directed to
make these cuts either by the Vice President or
David Aaron of the National Security Council staff
as reported in some media. I have talked to neither
on the subject except to keep the Vice President
informed of my decisions. In sum, it is my opinion
that I would have been avoiding my duty and would
have been placing short-term considerations ahead
of long-term necessities in putting the cuts off.
We simply must build a foundation today for a
Central Intelligence Agency that will be capable
of continuing into the indefinite future the out-
standing performance it has given our country
during the past thirty years.
6
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Presentation to the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
on the Reduction in Size of the DDO
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
30 November 1977
I. Why were the cuts necessary?
Soon after my arrival in the Agency last March
I began to hear that the Directorate of Operations
was overstaffed. It was almost universally perceived
within the Agency that the DDO had excess people,
resulting in over management and under utilization
of talent. Some organizations could tolerate this,
but not an organization like the CIA where we are
fortunate to have high-quality, dedicated and
ambitious people. Nor, from a broader standpoint,
is it tolerable to have unnecessary people on the
taxpayers payroll.
At that time the Directorate of Operations was
already engaged in a three-phase restructuring and
paring down program. I encouraged and received a
report on their efforts in mid-July.
II. Determination of the size of the reduction.
The report I received presented a range of
opinion as to the extent of the cut that was neces-
sary. I elected to be conservative and take the
smallest number suggested -- 820. To reduce 820
positions we must lose those 820 people. But to
remain at that reduced manning level, yet provide
for the hiring of new blood at the bottom, and pro-
vide a reasonable promotion opportunity throughout
the system, approximately 215 additional people must
be attrited each year. As we plan to phase the basic
820 cut over two fiscal years, the annual planned
attrition of 215 persons per year will add 430 to
that 820 giving a total reduction of 1,250
individuals over this two-year period. The 430 part
of the cut will of course be replaced by new hires.
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
I feel very strongly that, despite the additional
pain it causes us, we cannot afford to neglect
either the promotion opportunity for those already
in the organization or the necessity of bringing in
people in approximately equal annual increments at
the bottom. We simply must continue to build a
sufficiently attractive career opportunity to attract
and retain the same caliber of people in 1987 as we
had in 1977. Parenthetically, I might say that "at
the bottom" is intended to mean just that. I see
little prospect for more than a handful of specialists
coming in at middle or upper levels.
III. Timing of the reduction.
Of the alternatives presented to me for phasing
the reduction, I opted for the quickest, which was
accomplishable over a two-year period. Given the
changes the last few years have brought to the CIA,
I felt it would be better for morale not to prolong
this action. Extending the reduction over a six-
year period might have made it possible to achieve
the reduction through attrition alone, but that
would have left an air of uncertainty hanging over
the entire organization for that long period and in
the end might not have brought about the reductions
in the right places. In addition, I do not believe
I could honestly face your Committee in its budgetary
role and suggest that the Agency should retain such
a considerable number of people in excess of its
needs for six years.
On August 8 I announced this intended reduction --
first privately to the employees and then publicly to
the media. It was in turn well publicized in and out-
side the Agency. I further announced that we would
notify those who were going to be asked to leave in
Fiscal Year 1978 not later than the first of November
1977; that none of those persons would be asked to
leave prior to the first of March 1978. Those being
asked to leave in Fiscal Year 1979 would be notified
by 1 June 1978 and not required to leave prior to
1 October 1978.
Between the time I notified CIA employees in
August that there would be a reduction, and the first
announcement to individuals on the first of November
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 .CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
as to who would be released, I received no complaints
either as to the necessity for cuts or how they would
be effected. Even since the announcement of who
would be released, I have found no one in the Agency
who seriously believes that a reduction is not in
order.
IV. Who is to be released?
In deciding how to allocate the reduction across
grades and skills, my end objective has always been
to maintain at least as much clandestine intelligence
capability as we possess today. We do not have a
surplus of human intelligence collection capability,
hence, there will be no meaningful reduction in
overseas strength or activities, nor appreciable
reduction in the size of the officer operational
corps.
V. Method of selecting the individuals.
For those below the supergrade level, the
individual's accumulated fitness reports were the
basic determinants of who was to leave. The Agency's
periodic evaluation boards numerically rank individ-
uals within each grade level. These rankings
combined with fitness reports were the basis for a
point system. An explicit explanation of this point
system was published for all personnel in the
Operations Directorate in early October. Beyond
this mechanical evaluation, a panel reviewed the
calculations and used good judgment in making
exceptions where unique skills needed to be retained
Thesewere rare exceptions, however, and the rule of
the numerical ranking was closely followed.
In June this year we initiated an annual process
by which a senior panel composed of officers at the
Executive position level rank all supergrades. The
Director for Operations used these rankings as the
basis for his recommendations on release of super
grades to me. Again, there were exceptions to the
ranking order, but they were rare.
3
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
There are two additional points that I would
like to make on these selections:
0 As far as I can determine, there was no
bias by type of service, agreement with
current management, race or sex in the
selection of these individuals. There
were, for example, only 17 women, 4
blacks, and 3 Hispanics in the total
of 212 forced reductions for Fiscal
1978.
o There is no question that we were forced
to terminate some very capable people.
The Directorate of Operations has been
shrinking continually since our with?
drawal from Vietnam. The majority of the
marginal performers have already been
eliminated. There is no way today to
reduce further without asking very
competent people to leave. This is
unpleasant, unfortunate, but I believe
necessary!
VI. Style of notification.
The method by which notifications were issued
to individuals has been criticized. I regret that
individuals may have been offended or felt that
their prior service was not fully appreciated. Such
is not the case. Everyone of these individuals has
made sacrifices and many have endured privations and
risks for their country. Being fully cognizant of
their past contributions, we are determining whether
any of these 212 people can be relocated in other
directorates within the Agency to fill existing
vacancies. Consequently, while individuals have
received a notification that their release has been
recommended, we are still exploring alternative
employment possibilities. Until those alternatives
have been exhausted, no final determination on their
employment will be made.
I anticipate that 25% of these 212 people will
be offered alternative positions. Additionally, I
am personally approaching the chiefs of all the
Approved For Release 2001/08/314: CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
other intelligence services of our country to ask
that they give ?the residual of these 212 special
consideration in their hiring requirements.
Finally, in a few cases, notices went to those
who would be able to retire if permitted to serve a
small amount of additional time. In these cases,
we have arranged that no one will be forced to
retire before the end of Fiscal Year 1979, when the
program must be complete, if he would qualify for
retirement by that time.
VII. Is there a security risk?
It has been suggested that the departure of
sizable numbers of employees risks their being
suborned by enemy intelligence agents. Frankly,
I have too much confidence in their loyalty and
dedication to take such a suggestion seriously.
There was no such experience, to the best of my
knowledge, under former Director James Schlesinger
in 1973, when 632 employees were separated. Our
unfortunate experiences with former employees
violating their secrecy agreement have come
entirely from individuals who have left the Agency
of their own volition.
VIII. Next phase of the reduction.
The Fiscal 1979 cut will require approximately
the same number of reductions, perhaps more if
attrition does not meet expectations. We intend
not to wait until the first of June and then send
out all of the notifications at once but to commence
notification as early as possible. None will be
required to depart before the first of October 1978.
XI. Conclusions.
Many are concerned that this reduction may have
hurt the morale of the Directorate of Operations.
There is no question that in the short-term it: has.
The long-term objective, however, is quite the
reverse; it is to rebuild morale by ensuring opera-
tional efficiency and full utilization of talent.
More than that, morale in the Directorate of Opera-
tions will be further strengthened through the
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 :5CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
sustained expression of support for its vital
activities such as has come from this Committee
and which also must come from a broader range of
citizens. We must lift the pall of suspicion
which hangs over the Intelligence Community in
general and the Central Intelligence Agency in
particular, which obscures the exceptional con-
tribution these organizations have made in the
past and are making today.
I would not have encouraged and approved this
sizable reduction had I not thought that in the
long run it would strengthen the Directorate of
Operations and the Central Intelligence Agency.
We need the capabilities of this Directorate as
much today as ever. Although new technical means
of collection permit us to extend our collection
efforts, they only compliment, they do not super-
sede human collectors. Only human collectors can
gain access to motives, to intentions, to thoughts,
and plans. They will always be vital to our couw-
try's security.
It would have been much easier for me to have
avoided this issue and attempted to continue over
strength until you or the appropriations committees
or the Office of Management and Budget uncovered
these excesses and made the reductions in my behalf.
Contrary to media reports, I was not directed to
make these cuts either by the Vice President or
David Aaron of the National Security Council staff
as reported in some media. I have talked to neither
on the subject except to keep the Vice President
informed of my decisions. In sum, it is my opinion
that I would have been avoiding my duty and would
have been placing short-term considerations ahead
of long-term necessities in putting the cuts off.
We simply must build a foundation today for a
Central Intelligence Agency that will be capable
of continuing into the indefinite future the out-
standing performance it has given our country
during the past thirty years.
Approved For Release 2001/08/316. CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
NOTES FROM THE DIRECTOR
STATEMENT ON DDO REDUCTION
I have been requested by several committees of
Congress to provide background information on the
personnel reduction in the DDO. The statement which
I provided in response to those requests is printed
in its entirety below for the information of all CIA
personnel.
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Statement by Admiral Stansfield Turner,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Conceiriing Personnel Reductions in the
Directorate of Operations, CIA
I. Why were the cuts necessary?
Soon after my arrival in the Agency last March I began
to hear that the Directorate of Operations was overstaffed.
It was almost universally perceived within the Agency that
the DDO had excess people, resulting in over management
and under utilization of talent. Some organizations could
tolerate this, but not an organization like the CIA where
we are fortunate to have high-quality, dedicated and
ambitious people. Nor, from a broader standpoint, is it
tolerable to have unnecessary people on the taxpayers'
payroll.
At that time the Directorate of Operations was already
engaged in a three-phase restructuring and paring down
program. I encouraged and received a report on their
efforts in mid-July.
II. Determination of the size of the reduction.
The report I received presented a range of opinion as to
the extent of the cut that was necessary. I elected to
be conservative and take the smallest number of positions
for elimination that was suggested--820. This does not
mean that either the incumbents of those positions must
be released or that 820 people are going to be declared
excess to this Directorate. Normal attrition should
greatly reduce the number whose services will no longer
be needed in the Directorate of Operations. We also
must make provision for the continuing hiring of new
and young personnel, to ensure the continuing viability
of the service and we also must ensure ?that there exists
a reasonable promotion opportunity at all levels for
those on duty. To accomplish these latter points I have
told the Directorate of Operations to hire 215 people
each year for FY 78 and FY 79. Because of normal attri-
tion many people will be voluntarily leaving the Operations
Directorate and we estimate that over the two-year exercise
approximately 300 individuals will actually be involuntarily
separated from the Agency. It should also be noted that
nearly 70 percent of the 212 people declared excess so
far are eligible for an immediate retirement annuity.
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
I feel very strongly that, despite the additional
pain it causes us, we cannot afford to neglect
either the promotion opportunity for those already
in the organization or the necessity of bringing in
people in approximately equal annual increments at
the bottom. We simply must continue to build a
sufficiently attractive career opportunity to attract
and retain the same caliber of people in 1987 as we
had in 1977. Parenthetically, I might say that "at
the bottom" is intended to mean just that. I see
little prospect for more than a handful of specialists
coming in at middle or upper levels.
III. Timipa_2Lth_e__eduction.
Of the alternatives presented to me for phasing
the reduction, I opted for the quickest, which was
accomplishable over a two-year period. Given the
changes the last few years have brought to the CIA,
I felt it would be better for morale not to prolong
this action. Extending the reduction over a six-
year period might have made it possible to achieve
the reduction through attrition alone, but that
would have left an air of uncertainty hanging over
the entire organization for that long period and in
the end might not have brought about the reductions
in the right places. In addition, I do not believe
I could honestly face your Committee in its budgetary
role and suggest that the Agency should retain such
a considerable number of people in excess of its
needs for six years.
On August 8 I announced this intended reduction --
first privately to the employees and then publicly to
the media. It was in turn well publicized in and out-
side the Agency. I further announced that we would
notify those who were going to be asked to leave in
Fiscal Year 1978 not later than the first of November
1977; that none of those persons would be asked to
leave prior to the first of March 1978. Those being
asked to leave in Fiscal Year 1979 would be notified
by 1 June 1978 and not required to leave prior to
1 October 1978.
Between the time I notified CIA employees in
August that there would be a reduction, and the first
announcement to individuals on the first of November
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
as to who would be released, I received no complaints
either as to the necessity for cuts or how they would
be effected. Even since the announcement of who
would be released, I have found no one in the Agency
who seriously believes that a reduction is not in
order.
IV. Who is to be released?
In deciding how to allocate the reduction across
grades and skills, my end objective has always been
to maintain at least as much clandestine intelligence
capability as we possess today. We do not have a
surplus of human intelligence collection capability,
hence, there will be no meaningful reduction in
overseas strength or activities, nor appreciable
reduction in the size of the officer operational
corps.
V. Method of selecting the individuals.
For those below the supergrade level, the
individual's accumulated fitness reports were the
basic determinants of who was to leave. The Agency's
periodic evaluation boards numerically rank individ-
uals within each grade level. These rankings
combined with fitness reports were the basis for a
point system. An explicit explanation of this point
system was published for all personnel in the
Operations Directorate in early October. Beyond
this mechanical evaluation, a panel reviewed the
calculations and used good judgment in making
exceptions where unique skills needed to be retained.
These were rare exceptions, however, and the rule of
the numerical ranking was closely followed.
In June this year we initiated an annual process
by which a senior panel composed of officers at the
Executive position level rank all supergrades. The
Director for Operations used these rankings as the
basis for his recommendations on release of super-
grades to me. Again, there were exceptions to the
ranking order, but they were rare.
Approved For Release 2001/08/31.: CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
There are.two additional points that I. would
like to make on these selections:
0 As far as I can determine, there was no
bias by type of service, agreement with
current management, race or sex in the
selection of these individuals. There
were, for example, only 17 women, 4
blacks, and 3 Hispanics in the total
of 212 forced reductions for Fiscal
1978.
0 There is no question that we were forced
to terminate some very capable people.
The Directorate of Operations has been
shrinking continually since our with-
drawal from Vietnam. The majority of the
marginal performers have already been
eliminated. There is no way today to
reduce further without asking very
competent people to leave. This is
unpleasant, unfortunate, but I believe
necessary!
VI. Style of notification.
The method by which notifications were issued
to individuals has been. criticized. I regret that
individuals may have been offended or felt that
their prior service was not fully appreciated Such
is not the case. Everyone of these individuals has
made sacrifices and many have endured privations and
risks for their country. Being fully cognizant of
their past contributions, we are determining-whether-
any. of these 212 people can be relocated in other
directorates within the Agency to fill existing
vacancies. Consequently, while individuals have
received a notification that their release has been
recommended, we are still exploring alternative
employment possibilities. Until those alternatives
have been exhausted, no final determination on their
employment will be made.
1-anticipate that 251 ci these 212 people will
be offered alternative positions. Additionally, I
am personally approachin the chiefs of all the.
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
other intelligence services of our country to ask
that they give the residual of these 212 special
consideration in their hiring requirements. ?
Finally, in a few cases, notices went to those
who would be able to retire if permitted to serve a
small amount of additional time. In these cases,
we have arranged that no one will be forced to
retire before the end of Fiscal Year 1979, when the
program must be complete, if he would qualify for
retirement by that time.
VII. Is there a security risk?
It has been suggested that the departure of
sizable numbers of employees risks their being
suborned by enemy intelligence agents. Frankly,
I have too much confidence in their loyalty and
dedication to take such a suggestion seriously.
There was no such experience, to the best of my
knowledge, under former Director James Schlesinger
in 1973, when 632 employees were separated. Our
unfortunate experiences with former employees
violating their secrecy agreement have come
entirely from individuals who have left the Agency
of their own volition.
VIII. Next phase of the reduction.
The Fiscal 1979 cut will require approximately
the same number of reductions, perhaps more if
attrition does not meet expectations. We intend
not to wait until the first of June and then send
out all of the notifications at once but to commence
notification as early as possible. None will be
required to depart before the first of October 1978.
XI. Conclusions.
Many are concerned that this reduction may have
hurt the morale of the Directorate of Operations.
There is no question that in the short-term it has.
The long-term objective, however, is quite the
reverse; it is to rebuild morale by ensuring opera-
tional efficiency and full utilization of talent.
More than that, morale in the Directorate of Opera-
tions will be further strengthened through the
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
,)
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
sustained expression of support for its vital.
activities such as haS come from this Committee
and which also must come from a broader range of
citizens. We must lift the pall of suspicion
which hangs over the Intelligence Community in
general and the Central Intelligence Agency in
particular, which obscures the exceptional con-
tribution these organizations have made in the
past and are making today.
I would not have encouraged and approved this
sizable reduction had I not thought that in the
long run it would strengthen the Directorate of
Operations and the Central Intelligence Agency.
We need the capabilities of this Directorate as
much today as ever. Although new technical means
of collection permit us to extend our collection
efforts, they only compliment, they do not super-
sede human collectors. Only human collectors can
gain aceess to motives, to intentions, to thoughts,
and plans. They will always be vital to our coun-
try's security.
It would have been much easier for me to have
avoided this issue and attempted to continue over
strength until you or the appropriations committees
.or the Office of Management and Budget uncovered
these excesses and Made the reductions in my behalf.
Contrary to media reports, I was not directed to
make these cuts either by the Vice President or -
David Aaron of the National Security Council staff
as reported in some media. I have talked to neither
on the subject except to keep the Vice President -
informed of my decisions. In sum, it is my opinion
that I would have been avoiding my duty and would
have been placing short-term considerations ahead.
of long-term necessities in putting the cuts off..
We simply must build a foundation today for a -
Central Intelligence Agency that will be capable
of continuing into the indefinite future the out-
standing performance it has given our country
during the past thirty veers.
Approved For Release 2001/08/31: CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
NOTES FROM THE DIRECTOR
STATEMENT ON DUO REDUCTION
I have been requested by several committees of
Congress to provide background information on the
personnel reduction in the DDO. The statement which
I provided in response to those requests is printed
in its entirety below for the information of all CIA
personnel.
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Statement by Admiral Stansfield Turner,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Concerning Personnel Reductions in the
Directorate of Operations, CIA
I. Why were the cuts necessary?
Soon after my arrival in the Agency last March I began
to hear that the Directorate of Operations was overstaffed.
It was almost universally perceived within the Agency that
the DDO had excess people, resulting in over management
and under utilization of talent. Some organizations could
tolerate this, but not an organization like the CIA where
we are fortunate to have high-quality, dedicated and
ambitious people. Nor, from a broader standpoint, is it
tolerable to have unnecessary people on the taxpayers'
payroll.
At that time the Directorate of Operations was already
engaged in a three-phase restructuring and paring down
program. I encouraged and received a report on their
efforts in mid-July.
II. Determination of the size of the reduction.
The report I received presented a range of opinion as to
the extent of the cut that was necessary. I elected to
be conservative and take the smallest number of positions
for elimination that was suggested--820. This does not
mean that either the incumbents of those positions must
be released or that 820 people are going to be declared
excess to this Directorate. Normal attrition should
greatly reduce the number whose services will no longer
be needed in the Directorate of Operations. We also
must make provision for the continuing hiring of new
and young personnel, to ensure the continuing viability
of the service and we also must ensure that there exists
a reasonable promotion opportunity at all levels for
those on duty. To accomplish these latter points I have
told the Directorate of Operations to hire 215 people
each year for FY 78 and FY 79. Because of normal attri-
tion many people will be voluntarily leaving the Operations
Directorate and we estimate that over the two-year exercise
approximately 300 individuals will actually be involuntarily
separated from the Agency. It should also be noted that
nearly 70 percent of the 212 people declared excess so
far are eligible for an immediate retirement annuity.
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
I feel very strongly that, despite the additional
pain it causes us, we cannot afford to neglect
either the promotion opportunity for those already
in the organization or the necessity of bringing in
people in approximately equal annual increments at
the bottom. We simply must continue to build a
sufficiently attractive career opportunity to attract
and retain the same caliber of people in 1987 as we
had in 1977. Parenthetically, I might say that "at
the bottom" is intended to mean just that. I see
little prospect for more than a handful of specialists
coming in at middle or upper levels.
Timing of the reduction.
Of the alternatives presented to me for phasing
the reduction, I opted for the quickest, which was
accomplishable over a two-year period. Given the
changes the last few years have brought to the CIA,
I felt it would be better for morale not to prolong
this action. Extending the reduction over a six-
year period might have made it possible to achieve
the reduction through attrition alone, but that
would have left an air of uncertainty hanging over
the entire organization for that long period and in
the end might not have brought about the reductions
in the right places. In addition, I do not believe
I could honestly face your Committee in its budgetary
role and suggest that the Agency should retain such
a considerable number of people in excess of its
needs for six years.
On August 8 I announced this intended reduction --
first privately to the employees and then publicly to
the media. It was in turn well publicized in and out-
side the Agency. I further announced that we would
notify those who were going to be asked to leave in
Fiscal Year 1978 not later than the first of November
1977; that none of those persons would be asked to
leave prior to the first of March 1978. Those being
asked to leave in Fiscal Year 1979 would be notified
by 1 June 1978 and not required to leave prior to
1 October 1978.
Between the time I notified CIA employees in
August that there would be a reduction, and the first
announcement to individuals on the first of November
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
as to who would 172 released, I received no complaints
either as to the necessity for cuts or how they would
be effected. Even since the announcement of who
would be released, I-have found no one in the Agency
who seriously believes that a reduction is not in
order.
IV. Who is to be released?
In deciding how to allocate the reduction across
grades and skills, my end objective has always been
to maintain at least as much clandestine intelligence
capability as we possess today. We do not have a
surplus of human intelligence collection capability,
hence, there will be no meaningful reduction in
overseas strength or activities, nor appreciable
reduction in the size of the officer operational
corps.
V. Method of selecting the individuals.
For those below the supergrade level, the
individual's accumulated fitness reports were the
basic determinants of who was to leave. The Agency's
periodic evaluation boards numerically rank individ-
uals within each grade level. These rankings
combined with fitness reports were the basis for a
point system. An explicit explanation of this point
system was published for all personnel in the
Operations Directorate in early October. Beyond
this mechanical evaluation, a panel reviewed the
calculations and used good judgment in making
exceptions where unique skills needed to be retained.
These were rare exceptions, however, and the rule of
the numerical ranking was closely followed.
In June this year we initiated an annual process
by which a senior panel composed of officers at the
Executive position level rank all supergrades. The
Director for Operations used these rankings as the
basis for his recommendations on release of super
grades to me. Again, there were exceptions to the
ranking order, but they were rare.
Approved For Release 2001/08/31: CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
There are two additional points that I would
like to make on these selections:
0 As far as I can determine, there was no
bias by type of service, agreement with
current management, race or sex in the
selection of these individuals. There
were, for example, only 17 women, 4
blacks, and 3 Hispanics in the total
of 212 forced reductions for Fiscal
1978.
0 There is no question that we were forced
to terminate some very capable people.
The Directorate of Operations has been
shrinking continually since our with- .
drawal from Vietnam. The majority of the
marginal performers have already been
eliminated. There is no way today to
reduce further without asking very
competent people to leave. This is
unpleasant, unfortunate, but I believe
necessary!
VI. Style of notification.
The method by which notifications were issued
to individuals has been criticized. I regret that
individuals may have been offended or felt that
their prior service was not fully appreciated. Such
is. not the case. Everyone of these individuals has
made sacrifices and many have endured privations and
risks for their country. Being fully cognizant of
their past contributions, we are determining whether
any of these 212 people .can be relocated in other
directorates within the Agency to fill existing
vacancies. Consequently, while individuals have
received a notification that their release has been
recommended, we are still exploring alternative
employment possibilities. Until those alternatives
have been exhausted, no final 'determination on their
employment will be made.
I .anticipate that 25% o? these 212 people will
be offered alterntive positions. Additionally, I-
am personally approaching Crle chiefs of all the
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
other intelligence services of our country to ask
that they give the residual of these 212 special
consideration in their hiring requirements.
Finally, in a few cases, notices went to those
who would be able to retire if permitted to serve a
small amount of additional time. In these cases,
we have arranged that no one will be forced to
retire before the end of Fiscal Year 1979, when the
program must be complete, if he would qualify for
retirement by that time.
VII. Is there a security risk?
It has been suggested that the departure of
sizable numbers of employees risks their being
suborned by enemy intelligence agents. Frankly,
I have too much confidence in their loyalty and
dedication to take such a suggestion seriously.
There was no such experience, to the best of my
knowledge, under former Director James Schlesinger
in 1973, when 632 employees were separated. Our
unfortunate experiences with former employees
violating their secrecy agreement have come
entirely from individuals who have left the Agency
of their own volition.
VIII. Next phase of the reduction.
The Fiscal 1979 cut will require approximately
the same number of reductions, perhaps more if
attrition does not meet expectations. We intend
not to wait until the first of June and then send
out all of the notifications at once but to commence
notification as early as possible. None will be
required to depart before the first of October 1978.
XI Conclusions.
Many are concerned_ that this reduction may have
hurt the morale of the Directorate of Operations.
There is no question that in the short-term it has.
The long-term objective, however, is quite the
reverse; it is to rebuild morale by ensuring.opera-
tional-efficiency and full utilization of talent.
More than that, morale in the Directorate of Opera-
tions will be .further strer!gthened through the
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
sustained expression of support for its vital
activities such as has come from this Committee
and which also must come from a broader range of
citizens. We must lift the pall of suspicion
which hangs over the Intelligence Community in
general and the Central Intelligence Agency in
particular, which obscures the exceptional con-
tribution these organizations have made in the
past and are making today.
I would not have encouraged and approved this
sizable reduction had I not thought that in the
long run it would strengthen the Directorate of
Operations and the Central Intelligence Agency.
We need the capabilities of this Directorate as
much today as ever. Although new technical means
of collection permit us to extend our collection
efforts, they only compliment, they do not super-
sede human collectors. Only human collectors can
gain access to motives, to intentions, to thoughts,
and plans. They will always be vital to our coun-
try's security.
It would have been much easier for me to have
avoided this issue and attempted to continue over
strength until you or the appropriations committees
.or the Office of Management and Budget uncovered
these excesses and made the reductions in my behalf.
Contrary to media reports, I was not directed to
make these cuts either by the Vice President or
David Aaron of the National Security Council staff
as reported in some media. I have talked to neither
on the subject except to keep the Vice President
informed of my decisions. In sum, it is my opinion
that I would have been avoiding my duty and would
have been placing short-term considerations ahead
of long-term necessities in putting the cuts off.
We simply must build a foundation today for a
Central Intelligence Agency that will he capable
of continuing into the indefinite future the out-
standing performance it has given our country
during the past thirty years..
Approved For Release 2001/08/3f: CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
STATINTL
STATINTL
Approved For ReleastApd/gp/Ng:iscARP0M9473A000300080004-1
7 Dec 1977
NOTE FOR: Jack Blake, A/DDCI
As a follow-up from the HPSCI,
the Director promised to forward certain
unclassified information for use by the
Members in speeches, etc., if they wish.
The Director wants to send the material
to all 13 Members of the Committee.
Enclosed is the proposed letter with the
material to be transmitted. It includes
the statement on the DDO cuts. That
statement represents the efforts of Capt.
111Win coordination with
, and has the final input from the DCI
(as you will recall, he drafted the original
statement). The version with the DCI's
written in comments was received in our
office on 5 December and on the 6th of December
Messrs. Malanick, Hetu and saw me i iM
on the use of that statement or an employee
notice and they indicated they had some con-
cern with the statement in that connection
and I agreed that the employee notice should
not be distributed until after we had made our
transmittal to the HPSCI. (Also, the Director
on the 6th .of December was scheduled to address
this topic before the SSCI. ) I am endeavoring
to find out from Mr. Malanick to what extent
the authorized change in the attached text had
been accomplished via the efforts of himself,
Approvedi1fettReked/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
STATINTL
STATINTL
Approved For ReleastAR1AS/Aiscapleotgilap473A000300080004-1
(cont'd)
I have checked with Tom Latimer,
Staff Director, HPSCI, to be assured that
transmittal of the letter and enclosures
to all Members rather than solely t.pistb#,? n
Chairman would not be offensive to
Thus we are tr ready to transmit and the
options are to wait for the Director's return
on FridayMansmit under your signature;
?Are can simply transmit from this office.
Please advise how we should handle.
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cre 0-(2)14)LtizAk_e. az,N3
AJ2A.)--,4a
LmILO )2,e t-tesc( 2
sscr ,4-6-vyk
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Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-Rli P80-0Q473
2
STATINTL
Approved
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TO:
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
REMARKS:
FROM:
1813ease 41541k8P31 : CIA-RDp8oibrit4nAboo3oc
FORM NO .e),I I REPLACES FORM 36-8
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(47)
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Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
71 to_ tLe tu_ck.
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Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
The Director
Approved For Release 206100ti3tililige1934113P80-00473A000300080004-1
lAtashington. D. C 20505
Honorable Edward P. Boland, Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 2 0515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I was gratified by the extended time provided me by the
Committee last Wednesday. In response to the interest shown in
sharing with. a wider audience information on a variety of topics.
I am enclosing an example of the types of public statements I
have made and unclassified information pertaining to the Agency's
role against international terrorism, illicit narcotics traffic and
the recent personnel reduction in the Operations Directorate of the
Agency. I hope this material is helpful.
Yours sincerely,
STANSFIELD TURNER
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
'
,
K
Pr Approtvad Fon Re beast' aomegai pgaoraq@iiikoWWWWVARVPHe
on Intelligence on the Reduction
in Size of the DDO
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
30 November 1977
*9. Why were the cuts necessary?
Soon after my arrival in the Agency last March
I began to hear that the Directorate of Operations
was over staffed. It was almost universally
perceived within the Agency that the DDO had
excess people, resulting in over management and
under utilization of talent. Some organizations
could tolerate this, but not an organization like
the CIA where we are fortunate to have high-quality,
dedicated and ambitions people. Nor, from a broader
standpoint, is it tolerable to have unnecessary people
on the taxpayers' payroll.
At that time the Directorate of Operations
was already engaged in a three-phase restructuring
and paring down program. I encouraged and received
a report on their efforts in mid-July.
II. Determination of the size of the reduction.
The report I received presented a range of
opinion as to the extent of the cut that was
necessary. I elected to be conservative and take
the smallest number suggested -- 820. To reduce
820 positions we must f.a.x.at lose those 820 people.
But to remain at that reduced manning level,
yet provide for the hiring of new blood at the
bottom, and provide a reasonable promotion
opportunity throughout the system, approximately
215 additional people must be attrited each
year. As we plan to phase the basic 820 cut over
two fiscal years, the annual planned attrition
of 215 persons per year will add 430 to that
820 giving a total reduction of 1,250 individuals
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
-2 -
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
over this two year period. The 430 part of the cut
will of course be replaced by new hires. I feel very
strongly that, despite the additional pain it
causes us, we cannot afford to neglect either
the promotion opportunity for those already in
the organization or the necessity of bringing.
in
in people in approximately equal annual increments
at the bottom. We simply must continue to build a
sufficiently attractive career opportunity to attract
and retain the same caliber of people in 1987 as we had
in 1977. Parenthetically, I might say that "at the
bottom" is intended to mean just that. I see little
prospect for more than a handful of specialists coming
in at middle or upper levels.
Timing of the reduction.
Of the alternatives presented to me for phasing
the reduction, I opted for the quickest, which was
accomplishable over a two year period. Given the
changes the last few years have brought to the CIA,
I felt it would be better for morale not to prolong
this action. Extending the reduction over a
six-year period might have made it possible
to achieve the reduction through attrition alone,
but that would have left an air of uncertainty
hanging over the entire organization for that
long period and in the end might not have brought
about the reductions in the right places. In
addition, I do not believe I could honestly
face your Committee in its budgetary role and
suggest that the Agency should retain such a
considerable number of people in excess of its
needs for six years.
On August 8 I announced this intended reduction --
first privately to the employees and then publicly
to the media. It was in turn well publicized in and
outside the Agency. I further announced that we
would notify those who were going to be asked to
leave in Fiscal Year 1978 not later than the first
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
of November 1977; that none Of those persons
would be asked to leave prior .to the first of
March 1978. Those being asked to leave in
Fiscal Year 1979 would be notified by 1 June
1978 and not required to leave prior to 1
October 1978.
Between the time I notified CIA employees
in August that there would be a reduction, and
the first announcement to individuals on the
first of November as to who would be released,
received no complaints either as to the necessity
for cuts or how they would be effected. Even
since the announcement of who would be released,
I have found no one in the Agency who seriously
believes that shim reduction is not in order.
06
IV. Who is to be released?
In deciding how to allocate the reduction
across grades and skills, my end objective has
always been to maintain at least as much clandestine
intelligence capability as we possess today. We do
not have a surplus of human intelligence collection
capability, hence, there will be no meaningful
reduction in overseas strength or activities, nor
appreciable reductibn in the size of the officer
operational corps.
)Iiireced that
release the first
senior ades. More wo
norma7 re rement and
ten to re eve rathr th
ov r-managem t pr..lem.
indi
ar
uals elect: for
for
me more - om e
be eligible or
at that le would
exacerb
V. Method of selecting the individuals.
For those below the supergrade evel, the
individual's accumulated
reports were
the basic determinants of who was to leave. The
Agency's periodi:c evaluation boards numerically
rank individuals within each grade level. These
rankings combined with reportig*ezir
?eflaza.er
were the basis for a point sys em. An explicit
explanation of this point sysitem was published for
all personnel in the OperatiOns Directorate in
.LANIArAt
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
4
Approved. For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
early October. Beyond this mechanical evaluation,
a panel reviewed the calculations and used good
judgment in making exceptions where unique skills
needed to be retained.
AMMigulAm4mmtiog. These were
however, and the rule of the numerical ranking
was closely followed.
In June this year we initiated an annual
process by which a senior panel composed of officers
at the Executive position level rank all supergrades
The Director for Operations used these rankings
as the basis for his recommendations on release
of supergrades to me. Again, there were exceptions
to the ranking order, but they were rare.
rare exceptions,
There are two additional points that I would
like to make on these selections:
o As far as I can determine, there was
no bias by type of service, agreement
with current management, race or sex
in the selection of these individuals.
There were, for example, only 17 women,
4 blacks, and 3 Hispanics in the total
of 212 forced reductions for Fiscal 1978.
o There is no question that we were forced
to terminate some very capable people.
The Directorate of Operations has been
shrinking continually since our withdrawal
from VietNam. The majority of the marginal
performers have already been eliminated.
There is no way today to reduce further
without asking very competent people to
leave. This is unpleasant, unfortunate,
but I believe necessary!
VI. Style of notification.
The method by.which notifications were issued
to individuals has been criticized. I regret that
individuals may have been offended or felt that their
prior service was not fully appreciated. Such is not
the case. Everyone of these individuals has made
sacrifices and many have endured privations and-risks
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
for their country. Being fully cognizant of their
past contributions, we are determining whether any
of these 212 people can be relocated in other
directorates within the Agency to fill existing
vacancies. Consequently, while individuals koaoe
have received a notification that their release
has been recommended, we are still exploring
alternative employment possibilities. Until
those alternatives have been exhausted, no
final determination on their employment will
be made.
I anticipate that 25% of these 212 people
will be offered alternative positions. Additionally,
I am personally approaching the chiefs of all the
other intelligence services of our country to
ask that they give the residual of these 212
special consideration in their hiring requirements
Finally, in a few cases, notices went to
those who would be able to retire if permitted
to serve a small amount of additional time. In
these cases, we have arranged that no one will
be forced to retire before the end of Fiscal Year
1979, when the program must be complete, if he
would qualify for retirement by that time.
VII. Is there a security risk?
It has been suggested that the departure of
sizable numbers of employees risks their being
suborned by enemy intelligence agents. Frankly,
I have too much confidence in their loyalty and
dedication to take such a suggestion seriously.
There was no such experience, to the best of my
knowledge, under former Director James Schlesinger
in 1973, when 632 employees were separated. Our
unfortunate experiences with former employees
violating their secrecy agreement have come entirely
from .viduals who have left the Agency of their
own rioUtion.
qo
VIII. 1122it_phase of the reduction.
The Fiscal 1979 cut will require approximately
the same number of reductions, perhaps more if attrition
does not meet expectations. We intend not to wait
until the first of June and then send out all of the
notifications at once but to commence notification
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
as early as possible. None will be required to
depart before the first of October 1978.
IX. Conclusions.
Many are concerned that this reduction may have
hurt the morale of the Directorate of Operations.
There is no question that in the short-term it has.
The long-term objective, however, is quite the
reverse; it is t build morale by ensuring
operational eff y and full utilization of
talent. More than that, morale in the Directorate
of Operations will be further strengthened through
the sustained expression of support for its vital
activities such as has come from this Committee and
which also must come from a broader range of citizens.
We must lift the pall of suspicion which hangs over
the Intelligence Community in general and the
Central Intelligence Agency in particular, which
obscures the exceptional contribution these organizations
have made in the past and are making today.
I would not have encouraged and approved this
sizable reduction had I not thought that in the
long run it would strengthen the Directorate of
Operations and the Central Intelligence Agency.
We need the capabilities of this Directorate as
much today as ever. Although new technical means
of collection permit us to extend our collection
efforts, they only compliment, they do not supersede
human collectors. Only human collectors can gain
access to motives, to intentions, to thoughts, and
plans. They will always be vital to our country's
security.
It would have been much easier for me to have
avoided this issue and attempted to continue
over strength until you or the appropriations
committees or the Office of Management and Budget
uncovered these excesses and made the reductions
in my behalf. Contrary to media reports, I was
not directed to make these cuts either by the
Vice President or David Aaron of the National Security
Council staff as reported in some media. I have talked
to neither on the subject except to keep the Vice President
informed of my decisions. In sum, it is my opinion that
I would have been avoiding my duty and would have been placing
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
short term considerations ahead of long-term
necessities in putting the cuts off. We simply
must build a foundation today for a Central
Intelligence Agency that will be capable of
continuing into the indefinite future the
outstanding performance it has given our
country during the past thirty years."
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080004-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80-00473A0003000800041
An American Model of Intelligence
I appreciate your asking me to be with you to
talk about what we are doing in the world of intelligence
to serve you and to serve the country. President
Carter directed a major effort to reshape the intel-
ligence structure of this country back in February.
After six months of scrunity, close study, and consideration
Of many alternatives, in August, the President issued
several directives to change the way the Intelligence
Community is organized. As a result of this, we are
starting to evolve today toward a new model of
intelligence - an American model.
This American model contrasts with the old,
traditional model where intelligence organizations operated
under a cloak of maximum secrecy and with a minimun of
supervision. We hope today to develop a model which
will conform to American standards of ethics and propriety
and at the same time continue to provide senior decision
makers in government with the facts on which they can
base sound decisions. On the one hand it will be more
open as our society is more open; on the other hand
it will be more controlled, with checks and balances much
like those which characterize the rest of our governmental
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process. I thought itmight be of interest to you
today if I discussed some of the actions we're taking
to move toward this new model.
The President's directive of last August
had two fundamental objectives. The first was to
strengthen control over our entire intelligence
apparatus thereby encouraging greater effectiveness.
The second objective was to assure control through
stringent oversight, thereby increasing accountability.
Now let me point out that I am the Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency, but this is only
one of many intelligence agencies of the government.
Intelligence activities also reside in the Department
of Defense, in the Department of State, Treasury, the
FBI, and even the new Department of Energy. But I am
also the Director of Central Intelligence. In that
capacity my task is to coordinate, to bring together
into one effective, harmonious operation, the activities
of all of those intelligence organizations. The
President's reorganization strengthens my hand in that
regard in two very specific ways. As the Director
of Central Intelligence it gave me full authority over
the budgets of all of the intelligence activities I've
enumerated; and secondly, it gave me full authority to
direct their tasking, that is, the day to day operations
of thesitppmgeoll EaretW VW* 0 071100 1C3AfT 4V3IMP IIWKO Welelr
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control the total effort of collecting, analyzing,
and producing intelligence. This is really what
was intended, in my opinion, in the National Security
Act of 1947 which first established the Central Intel-
ligence Agency.
Now some of the media have portrayed this
as the potential creation of a intelligence czar. That
interpretation could only come from a misunderstanding
of the intelligence process itself. Let me
Intelligence activities can be divided into
explain.
two basic
and separate functions. The first is collecting
information. This is the costliest and the riskiest
of our operations. It involves, among other things,
reading foreign newspapers, intercepting broadcasts,
trying to break codes, and recruiting individual in
other countries to spy for us. Here you want good
control. You want to be sure there is a minimum of
overlap because each of these activities are time
consuming and very costly; and you want to be sure
there is a minimum possibility of a gap in what
your collecting because that could be responsible
for another Pearl Harbor. Only centralized control
can ensure the intelligence collection effort is
well coordinated. The second major activity of intelligence
organization is analysis. It is exactly the same as
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what would be called research on a college campus. It
is the analyzing, the estimating, the pulling together
all the little pieces of information that are obtained
by the collectors and trying to put them together to
produce a coherent picture of what another country
is doing, or thinking, or planning. Hopefully this
picture, or analysis, provides the decision-makers,
the policy-makers of our country, a better basis
upon which to make those decisions.
Now let me make it clear, that under this
new reorganization I do not control all the people
who do these analyses. I do control those in the
CIA; however, there is a strong analytic capability
in the Department of Defense and another in the
Department of State. The Department of State specializes
in political analysis with second suit in economics,
The Department of Defense specializes in military analysis
with a second suit in political. The CIA covers the
waterfront. So we have assurance that divergent views
will come forward if they exist. We encourage that.
It is in the interest of each of us in the Intelligence
analysis business to be sure that the decision-makers
don't get just one point of view when several are justified.
Our quest is to see to it that there is competitive,
overlapping analyses. But, should I try to be a
czar; should I try to short-change the descenting or
minority views, there is a Cabinet officer in the
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DeparAPETTreqleM ,2051711/88/16. tCAPARDIDRO-tORMOMOtOrn0t04-1
of State who manage those intelligence analytic operations.
If I were to try to run roughshod over their views
of events, I am sure those Cabinet officers would
not fail to take advantage of the access they have
to the President to ensure their views are brought
forward. So we are not trying to set up a centralized
control over the important interpretive process
but over the collecting process. And, I sincerely
believe that this new organizational arrangement is
going to assure better performance in both collecting
and interpreting intelligence for this country.
The President, the Vice President, and
many other of our top officials have spent much time
working out this new reorganization. I believe
this evidences the keen awareness throughout the top
echelons of our government that good intelligence
is perhaps more important to our country today
than in any time since the creation of the Central
Intelligence Agency thirty years ago.
Thirty years ago we enjoyed absolute military
superiority. Since that time the failure of the Soviets
to make their system grow adequately in areas other than
the military has led them to accent that particular
competition. They have, I believe, achieved a
position of reasonable parity in most areas of the
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military. That parity places greater value on
our intelligence product as an important adjunct
of our military. When you know your enemies potential
and something of his intentions, you can use your
forces to much greater advantage. He doesn't normally
reveal that information outright, but if we can
pick up pieces of information here and there, over
time you can bring Those pieces together to tell you
important things about your enemy. This gives your
military commanders greater leverage in the use of their
forces and the upper hand in any confrontation of
their otherwise equal forces.
Let'; look past the military scene. Thirty
years ago we were also a dominant and independent economic
power. Today we are dependent on other countries in an
economically interdependent world. This growing
interdependence and the impact on our and other national
economies on each other is more and more apparent. Here
too, I believe, we desperately need good intelligence
to make sure that we don't lose our shirt in the
international economic arena.
Politically, thirty years ago we were the
dominant influence in the world. Today even some of
the most underdeveloped, emerging nations insist on
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a totally independent course of action. They go their
own way and refuse to be directed to by the Soviets
or ourselves. Here again, we must be smart. We must
understand other nation's attitudes, cultural imperatives,
and outlooks so that we will not be outmaneuvered in
the process.
At the same time that we are trying to produce
better intelligence in all three of these fields, we
must be careful not to.undermine the principles on
which our country was founded or the standards by which
we live in the process of so doing. Thus, the second
leg of the President's new policy is better oversight.
The cornerstone of all oversight is the keen and regular
participation of both the President and the Vice President
in the intelligence process. I can assure you they are
both very much active participants.
Beyond that there are two intelligence
oversight committees in the Congress. The Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence was formed a-year
and a half ago and has been working closely with the Intelligence
Community. We have a relationship here of closeness
but yet aloofness. Closeness in that I feel very free
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in going to them for help and advice particularly
when I'm involved with other committees of the Congress
and there may be boundaries that are being encroached
upon. But aloofness in that I very definitely report
to them. When they call and want to know what we are
doing and how we're doing it and why, I am answerable
to them, it is a good oversight procedure and it is
working well.
The House of Representatives, last August, set up
a corresponding committee. We are sure that that
relationship will develop as has the one with the Senate.
Beyond this the Intellligence Oversight Board
oversees our activities. Three distinguished Americans,.
former Senator Gore, former Governor Scranton, and
Mr. Thomas Farmer, a lawyer from Washington, are appointed
by the President, with their only task to oversee the
legality and the propriety of our intelligence operations..
They report only to the President. Anyone margo to
them, bypassing me, and say look, that fellow Turner,
or somebody else in the Intelligence Community is doing
something he shouldn't be doing, The Board will look
into it and let the President know whether they think
corrective action is necessary,
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Now let me be perfectly honest with you.
There are risks to this or any oversight process. The
first risk is that timidity may reduce the intelligence
effort. It is easy when acting as overseer not to .
take a risk, not take a chance. But in so doing, we
could fail to do things that could be very important
to the long term benefit of our country. It might
place the avoidance of current risk over the gaining
of long term benefits.
The second risk is the risk of security
leaks. The more you proliferate the number of people
privy to secret or sensitive intelligence operations,
the more danger there is of some inadvertent leak. I
am confident at this time that we are moving to establish
a healthy balance between the degree of oversight which
will ensure proper intelligence activity and the degree
of secrecy by which permit necessary intelligence
operations to be protected. But it will be two or
three years before we shake this process out and
establish just how those relationships are going to
function best. During that time, we are going to
need the understanding and support of the Congress
and that of course means the support and understanding
of the American people.
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Accordingly, we are now reappraising the
traditional outlook toward secrecy, toward relationships
with the public. We are adopting a policy of more
openness, in the hope that we can be more forthright
at the same time as we ensure preservation of that
secrecy which is absolutely fundamental. As a
first step we've tried to be more accessible to the
media. We have appeared on Good MorningAmerica, 60 Minutes
Time magazine. Also we are trying to respond more
candidly to inquiries from the mediae We try to give
substantive, meaningful answers whenever we can, within
the limits of necessary secrecy.
But perhaps of more interest to those of
you who are concerned with international affairs, we
are trying today to share more of the product of the
intelligence effort. More of the analyses, the estimates,
the studies that we do. It is our policy to carefully
examine every study we do, whether it is secret,
top secret, or destroy before reading to determine if
it can be reduced to unclassified form and still be
useful to the public If it can be done, we feel we
have an obligation to print it and publish it. We
are doing that to the maximum extent we can. We hope
they will be of value and perhaps help improve the
general quality and tenor of debate on major issues
effecting our country.
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You may have heard last March of our study
on the world energy outlook. We have recently done
another one on the world steel prospects - whether
there is over-capacity; what the expected demand may
be. We have published studies on the Chinese and
Soviet eneTgy prospects. And, under the egis of
the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, last July
we published one on the outlook for the Soviet economy
itself. Let me describe that very briefly to give
you the flavor of what we think we can put out in
unclassified form.
Previously, the CIA has looked at the Soviet
economy and felt that generally it had the capability
to achieve three things:
1) to sustain the level of military
growth that would permit them to
catch up with us generally;
2) to make improvements, if not
spectacular improvements, in the
quality of life inside the Soviet
Union; and
to sustain enough investment to
carry on a generally. growing economy,
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Our most recent study reexamines these premises and
comes to the conclusion that the outlook for the Soviet
economy is bleaker today than at any time since the
death of Stalin. This is based on our belief that the
Soviets have maintained their levels of productivity
over these many years primarily by infusing large quantities
of labor and capitol. We believe they are coming to
.a dead end here. For example, in the 1960s they had a
very big drop in their birth rate. In the 1980's the
rate of growth of their labor force will drop correspondingly
from about 1.5% to about 0.5%. They will not be able to
find the additional labor to keep up their productivity.
Also, a lot of the growth of their labor force today
is coming from the central Asian areas of the Soviet
Union where there is serious resistance to the idea of
migration to the big cities.
Secondly, their resources are becoming more
scarce. They must reach further into the Siberian wasteland
for minerals. This is more difficult and more costly.
Less petroleum can be brought in than before because
their emphasis in recent years has been on current
production at the expense of developing reserves and
new supplies.
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Now if you look carefully at the Soviet's own
five year development plan, you will see that they themselves
predict they will not be able to infuse the same amount
of capitol or labor as they have in the past. However, they
do conclude that somehow and nonetheless they will increase
productivity. We don't think that is in the cards. We see
no -Sign of increasing efficiency, nor any sign of a willingness
to become less shackled to the economic doctrines which are
fundamental to their growth problem. Instead, we think
that between now and the early 1980's the Soviets are
going to be faced with some difficult pragmatic choices:
(1) There may be a debate over the size
or the amount of investment in their
armed forces. Clearly, this is one
avenue to find labor and capitol.
(2) Another may be over whether they will
continue to fulfill their promises
for the delivery of oil to their
Eastern European satellites. From
exports of 1.6 Mbbl-to E. Europe,
they may have to reduce to something
like 800,000 bbl. That would mean an
incfeased oil bill for E. Europe of
$6-7B/yr in probable 1983 prices.
Will they be able to afford to do
this when it becomes more and more
Ap p rove ifigrflieValst NW MOM ?
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(3)
And third, how will they obtain the
necessary foreign exchange to sustain
the rate of infusion of American and
Western technology which they are
currently depending upon to increase
& improve their economic position?
The Soviet hard currency debt is
$16B and E. Europe's is $24B. Both
are rising rapidly - an annual rate of
$54B/yr. since 1973.
Interestingly, when they face these and other
decisions, there is a high probability that they will
be in the midst of a major leadership change. It could be a
very difficult time for them. It may go very smoothly if they
made the right decisions and are willing to sacrifice other
things; we just can't tell.
One of the important points that comes out of
all this is that we believe as they make these policy decisions,
it will not be remote from you and me, it will be important
to us both. What they do with their armed forces obviously
impacts on what we do with ours. What they do with their oil
inputs to the Eastern European countries and whether that area
remains politically stable is going to have major impact on the
events throughout the European scene. If there is too much
competition for energy because they don't produce what they need
will affect the world supply and price of petroleum. If they
enter tl1opromedfoinftleate2601/08131aDnUfftaPalb0CIAMM00030008006414m us and
others in the West what will be our response? What will be our policy?
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Now let me say that when we produce a study
like this we are not so confident that we present it
as the future revealed. We are merely providing our
best reading of the clues we see. We expect others may
disagree with us. But this too is productive. A good
debate generates a good dialogue on important issues.
When we did the oil study last March, for instance, it was
criticized in the press. We then wrote to the professors,
the oil companies, to think-tanks which had critized
our conclusions and we asked them to detail their
criticisms for us. Those who did we invited to come
into the Agency for a day of discussions with the
authors of the study. A very interesting and stimulating
dialogue resulted from which both sides benefited. We
hope that as more of our studies come off the press,
we will increase our dialogue with the public.
However, let me assure you, while we're on
this subject of openness that we cannot and we will not
open up everything. There clearly must be some secrets
which remain. Some of the information behind the Soviet
oil and economic studies clearly was derived from very
sensitive sources which would dry up if they were revealed.
Thus, it is important to remember that while we move
ahead, increasing a public dialogue and trying to build
public understanding and respect for what we are doing,
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we must also obtain the public's understanding that
a level of secrecy must be preserved.
In short, we're moving in two directions at
once today. On one hand we are opening up more. But,
in that process we expect to protect those secrets which
remain better classified. When too much is classified
it is not respected. The other direction we are moving
is to tighten the barriers of security around what
must be kept secret.
And in so doing, we are trying to develop a
model of intelligence uniquely tailored to this country
which balances an increased emphasis on openness with a
firmer tesblves to preserve that which is truly secret.
The model emphasizes the continued necessity of providing
good information to our policy-makers while at the same time
responding to effective control.
am confident, that although this model is
still evolving, it will guarantee that necessary intel-
ligence operations are carried out only in ways which
will in the long run strengthen our open and free society.
Thank you very much.
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Secrecy and Morality in Intelligence
When I came back to Washington from my overseas assignment
nine months ago, I found myself confronted with what appeared
to be a beleaguered CIA. Beleaguered by several years of
criticism, investigation, and adverse publicity. Yet, as I
grew to know the organization and the people I.realized how
very fortunate I was to come to it at this particular time
in our nation's history. I felt it was a moment of opportunity.
Opportunity first, because I doubt that anywhere else in
the business world or in government will you find more dedicated,
more capable public servants than in the Central Intelligence
Agency and the other associated intelligence organizations in
our country. They have an admirable record and, with this, I
am confident that we have the foundation on which to rebuild
public confidence which is much deserved.
The second way it is a moment of opportunity is because
today, out of the crucible of this period of investigation and
inquiry we are forging a new model of intelligence - an American
model of intelligence. The old, traditional model of intelligence
remarkably unchanged over centuries of history, is one where
intelligence organizations maintained maximum secrecy and operated
with a minimum of supervisory control. Nearly all foreign
intelligence organizations continue to follow this pattern.
The new model we are forging is singularly tailored to the
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outlook, the attitudes, and the standards of our country.
On the one hand, it is open, more open just like OUT society.
On the other hand, there is more supervision, more control, much
like the checks and balances that characterize our entire
governmental process. Let me explain a few of the cardinal
features of this new American model of intelligence.
First - Openness. Today we are attempting to share more with
you, the public of the United States, than ever before. We
are sharing first something about the process of intelligence,
how we go about doing our work. Now, clearly we cannot share
everything. Very often the reason information or how it was
obtained is useful is because it is unsuspected by our potential
adversaries. Publicity would vitiate its usefulness. But at
the same time there is much about intelligence work that need
not be kept secret and which I think both the Intelligence
Community and the public would benefit by discussing openly.
For example, contrary to popular belief, a very large
percentage of our effort is not involved in clandestine spying.
Most of our effort is concentrated on what would be termed
on any university campus, Or in many major corporations, simply
as research. We have thousands of people whose task is to take
bits of information that have been collected - sometimes openly,
sometimes clandestinely - and, much like working on a jigsaw
puzzle, piece them together to make them into a picture.
With this picture they can then provide an evaluation or an
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estimate that will help our nation's decisionmakers better
understand world events, anticipate problems, and make better
decisions on behalf of you and me. This is a very ordinary
but a very challenging task intellectually. It is no way spooky.
Today, in carrying out our new policy of greater openness
we want to share more of the results of this kind of analysis.
Each time we complete a major intelligence study today, we look
it over carefully to see if it can be declassified. Whatever
its classification - Secret, Top Secret, or burn before reading -
we go through it and excise those portions which must reamin
classified. These are clues which in the hands of our enemies
could jeopardize the way we acquired the information, or could
endanger the life of someone who has helped us. Once these
clues are removed, if there is enough substance left to be of
interest and of value to the American public, we publish the
study and make it available, usually through the Government
Printing Office.
You may have heard that in March the CIA issued a report-on
the world energy prospects for the next 10 years or so. In May,
a study was issued on the world steel outlook - available capacity,
prospects for the future. In July, on behalf of the Joint
Economic Committee of Congress, we issued one on the future
prospects of the Soviet economy - a rather startling change from
what had been predicted in the past. Also in July, we issued
a study on international Terrorism which has subsequently been
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t._.
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made available through the Department of Commerce to businesses
operating overseas.
Now, not to exaggerate, the Intelligence Community has,
of course, not been thrown open with all secrets revealed.
Anyone with a cursory understanding of the international system
appreciates that that would be very much to our disadvantage.
Sources would evaporate, the advantage of knowing more about
your adversary than he thinks you know would be lost, and a
foreigner's loyalty to us would assuredly be rewarded with
prison or death.
But there are real advantages to opening up within the
limits of necessary secrecy. Interestingly, I believe it is
going to make it easier to protect important secrets.
Winston Churchill once said, if everything is classified secret,
nothing is secret. Today too much information is classified.
There are also too many people running around who feel they
can take it unto themselves to decide what should be classified
and what should be released. They have released information
which has done irreparable damage to our country.in terms of
damaged national relationships; in terms of expensive, technical
intelligence systems compromised; in terms of lives dedicated to
America and what we stand for, lost. By our releasing as much
information as we can, we can help improve the quality of national
debate on important issues. And, in making that contribution
we also derive a benefit. Greater public exposure of the
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intelligence product, generates discussion and feedback to us
of attitudes toward what we are doing and good constructive
criticism of how-we are doing it. This is important not only
because it decreases the likelihood of misunderstandings - and
much of the criticism of the past derived frdm.misunderstandings -
but-also, everyone of us in authority clearly recognizes that
the intelligence mechanism of the United States must be operated
in ways that are compatible with the ethical and moral standards
of our country. The problem with that, however, is that it is
not always easy to know with certainty what those standards are.
What the country would condone in intelligence operations or
other governmental activities 20 years ago, it may condemn today..
How will the nation look 5, 10, or 20 years from now at what
we are doing today?
Unfortunately, we cannot launch a trial balloon. We can't
take some proposed activity and test it out on 210 million or so
Americans and expect it to remain secret. Often we either do
something secretly., or we just don't do it at all. That places
a particular burden on all of us in the Intelligence Community.
A burden to make difficult judgments as to what things we should
and what things we should not do. The American model that I'm
speaking of establishes controls to help us make these judgments.
Let *le discuss three of those controls.
The first type of control is self-control, or self-regulation.
For instance, today, and for some months, we have been attempting
to write a specific code of operational ethics for the Intelligence
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Community. It hasn't been easy to write something that is
specific enough to give genuine guidance, yet not so specific
as to be totally inhibiting and prevent effectiveness. But the
process of attempting to write such a code has been salutary
for us. It has forced us to think more about ethical issues.
It has forced us to grapple with the subtlties of these issues.
Just as in business, just as in other agencies of government,
ethical issues are seldom all black or all white. But in
examining the many shades of gray, we must ask ourselves exactly
what are the boundaries of our societal standards? To what
lengths should we go to obtain information which would be
useful for the decisionmakers of our country? The answers are
never clear cut. It would be easy for
standards arbitrarily and stay right in
Never do anything that would embarrass
America were it disclosed.
Never
us to simply interpret
the middle-of-the-road.
the United States of
treat people
country differently than we would treat Americans.
and fair in
our dealings with other countries as we
of another
Be as open
believe
all peoples should be treated.
Unquestionably this is how we would hope we
could act. However, in many situations they represent an
unrealistic ideal. We must always remember, that we are an
unusually blessed people, living in an unusually open society.
In an open society like ours an outsider can come in and without
great effort, using only open sources, attain a good grasp of what's
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going on, what our basic purposes are., the directions we are going,
and what we are thinking. He comes; he reads; he looks;
he talks to people; he walks down the street; and he can
easily make an accurate appraisal of what the United States is about.
Unfortunately, as we all know, there are closed societies in
the world today. Closed societies where you can't go and walk down
the street and talk to the people. And, reading the newspapers
is not very informative because they only say what the government
puts in:them. Yet, we have a genuine need to know what is going
on in those societies. I don't think you would want your government
to negotiate a new strategic arms limitation agreement with the
Soviet Union if I could not assure you that we had sonic
chance of feeling the pulse of the Soviet Union's political,
economic, and military motives; if I didn..t think there was a
good chance of knowing whether or not they were abiding by the
terms of such an agreement.
The problem is not limited to the military. Today we are
in a economically interdependent world. What happens to the
economies of the Soviet Union or the United States has ripple
effects around the world. Yet, even here, closed societies of
the communist bloc are not very informative. The pocketbooks of
each one of us here is exposed to dangers of the
economically unsound actions of other countries. We must have
some intelligence capability for anticipating those events, for
getting a feel for the way foreign economies are moving. But
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this too is not easy. Nor is it clear cut how much of that
information is of real value. Nor are the lengths to which we
should go in acquiring that information well-defined. So, we
must look to controls beyond the self-control which T have described.
The second type of control over the Intelligence Community is
in the form of laws and formal regulations. Congress has passed
a number of laws that affect intelligence operations, like, for
example, the law on wiretapping. This spring the Administration ?
went to the Congress with a revision to this wiretapping law
in an effort to better protect the right to privacy of American
citizens and at the same time enable the government to obtain
information that may be crucial to it.
The President himself may issue very specific regulations.
For example, there is a written regulation today prohibiting the
Intelligence Community from counselling, planning, or carrying out
an assassination.
In the next session of Congress, our recent work with
Congressional leaders will culminate in a series of charters being
issued for intelligence agencies. All of the intelligence operations
in the CIA, the Defense Department, and elsewhere in the government,
will have a specific charter which will govern their operations
The third form of control under the American, model of
intelligence is called Oversight. Earlier I mentioned the
impossibility of attempting full public oversight by launching
trial balloons for every secret operation. ledlefally would
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9
like to have full public oversight, it simply is not practical.
The substitute that has been evolving is a surrogate process
of public oversight.
One of the surrogates for the American people is the
President of the United States. Another is the Vice President.
Both these elected officials take a very keen interest in
the intelligence process and operations. I see them both
regularly and they are fully aware of intelligence activities.
Another surrogate is a committee called the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence which has been in existence for
just over a year-and-a-half. This committee is in many
respects a sounding board for us. We go to them with our
problems and they feedback to us with what they feel the
American people want. It is also a check on us. They
hear things, they read things, they call us up, and ask us
to come over and tell them what is happening and why it is
happening. Through the budget process, I keep them informed
of the full range of our activities. It is a very valuable
line of communication between the intelligence agencies and
the people of the United States.
I am very pleased that in August the House of
Representatives elected to establish a corresponding committee.
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10 -
I look forward to having the same point of contact, the same
sounding board in the lower chamber, as we now have in the Senate.
The Intelligence Oversight Board is still another oversight
surrogate. This board is comprised of three distinguished citizens:
former governor Scranton, former Senator Gore, and Tom Farmer of
Washington, D. C., appointed by the President for the sole task
of overseeing the legality and propriety of-:what the'Intelligence
Community is doing. You, any of my employees, anyone who wants,
may write to the Intelligence Oversight Board, and say that fellow
Turner is doing something wrong. If they think there's any
illegality in intelligence operations or that something is being
done improperly, they can go directly to thisAoard. The Board then
makes its own investigation; they may call me in and ask me what
is going on; but they do it independently and report only to
the President of the United States. He then decides if some
action should be taken.
Another form of control is over what is called covert action.
Covert action is not gathering or analyzing intelligence, it is
taking actions intended to influence opinions or events in other
countries without those actions being attributed to the United States
The CIA has been charged by the President over many years as the
only agency in the government that will conduct covert action
and continues to be required to retain that capability. It is
outside the normal ambit of intelligence activities and, as you
can imagine involves a high element of risk. This is where the
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CIA has received the most adverse publicity. In the past, in
Viet Nam for example, there was a good deal of covert activity
being carried out. Today, covert activity is first, on a very,
very, low scale; and second, before any covert effort is undertaken,
it must be cleared by the National Security Council, the
President must then indicate his approval by signature, and I
must then notify eight committees of Congress.
There are some who say that all of this oversight may be
overkill. Let me be candid with you. There are risks in this
process. There is the risk of timidity. The more oversight
over an intelligence operation the less willing individuals
are to take the risks that operation may entail. Maybe too few
risks will be taken for the long term good of our country.
When you sit around a conference table with other members of a
committee, it is easy to say, no, that's too risky, let's not do it.
It is much more difficult to stand alone in a group and say yes,
for the long term needs of the country, we require that information,
we should take that risk.
The second risk is that there may be a security leak.
As you proliferate the number of people with access to information
about intelligence operations .in order to conduct the oversight
process, you run the risk of somebody saying something that
he should not.
In conclusion, you should know that I feel very confident
that today we are beginning to find the balance between the risks
of too much oversight on the one hand and necessary control on
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12 -
the other. There is every good prospect that a relatively
stable balance can be established over these next 2 or 3 years
as we shake down this process and as we mature into this new
American model of intelligence. I believe we will develop
ways of maintaining that necessary level of secrecy while at
the same time conducting intelligence operations only in
ways that will strengthen our open and free society.
Thank you very much. I would be happy to entertain
your questions.
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CIA plays an important role in support of the
Federal programs aimed at the international aspects
of the multi-billion dollar illicit narcotics traf-
ficking conspiracy. From our experience, dating back
to 1969, in collecting information on foreign traf-
ficking, we have gained considerable knowledge about
foreign traffickers, their methods and routes for
transporting drugs and their sources of supply. This
information is collected from a variety of human sources
and technical means; is analyzed by highly skilled intel-
ligence analysts; and is reported either as raw informa-
tion or as finished intelligence reports and studies
to U.S. narcotics policy makers and law enforcement
officials who must have the best information available
in order to devise more effective worldwide narcotics
control programs.
The Agency has assigned a high priority to the
collection of foreign narcotics intelligence informa-
tion. Emphasis is placed on the principal narcotics
producing "countries of Southeast Asia, Latin America
and South Asia. Our overseas installations collect
narcotics information in response to a wide range of
requirements, including but not limited to: crop
estimates, pricing and marketing data, corruption
among foreign officials who may be assisting or
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protecting the traffickers and on the willingness and
ability of foreign governments to control the produc-
tion and movement of drugs abroad. In addition, CIA
collects a considerable amount of data on the foreign
traffickers themselves, on their supporting networks
on the movement of drugs, on methods of concealment
and on clandestine refineries. Much of this informa-
tion is made available to U.S. and foreign law enforce-
ment agencies who can then take appropriate action.
CIA information has made a significant contribution
toward immobilizing foreign trafficking networks
uncovering their hidden supplies of narcotics
dismantling their secret laboratories, and disrupting
the movement of drugs.
With regard to our analytical and scientific
functions, our analysts . . and I am basing this
statement on the evaluations we receive from our
customers such as the White House Office of Drug
Abuse Policy and the office of the Senior Advisor
to the Secretary of State for Narcotics Matters .
produce some of the best, most timely and detailed
narcotics studies and profiles available. We also
publish a regular bi-weekly international narcotics
2
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study that is recognized throughout the Washington
community. Finally, in the scientific area, CIA is
leading the narcotics intelligence community effort
to improve our capability to monitor opium poppy
cultivation.
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The escalation in the number of international terrorist
incidents in the past ten years has focused CIA attention on
this phenomenon. As terrorist groups turned toward interna-
tional targets and hostage situations became common--par-
ticularly the hijacking of airliners--concern increased
throughout the U.S. government. The need to increase CIA
efforts in collecting information and publishing intelli-
gence on terrorism was emphasized by such events as the
series of kidnapings and assassinations of U.S. and other
foreign diplomats in Latin America in the late 1960's and
early 70's, the multiple aircraft hijackings of 1970, the
Tel Aviv airport massacre of 1972, and the attack on the
Israeli Olympic team at Munich in September 1972. The need
for intelligence has been re-emphasized over the past two
years when it became apparent that international terrorist
groups in various parts of the world had forged strong links
and had begun initiating joint operations (for example:
OPEC, December 1975; Entebbe, July 1976; and Mogadiscio,
October 1977).
CIA's objectives in this field are to collect and
analyze information on the plans and capabilities of inter-
national terrorist groups, in order to evaluate their long-
range intentions and to be forewarned of new terrorist
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operations. The purpose in collecting such information is
not to thwart legitimate democratic change within any par-
ticular country, but to monitor terrorist groups that
threaten American personnel and interests or the interests
of friendly third countries. The CIA does not collect
information on domestic terrorism within the U.S. This is
the responsibility of the FBI.
Following the Munich massacre in 1972, the Cabinet Com-
mittee to Combat Terrorism was established by Presidential
order, with the Director of CIAas a member. Since that
time the Working Group of this Committee (which recently
became a Working Group under the NSC/SCC) has been the focal
point for high intensity interdepartmental cooperation in
the effort to counter terrorism. On the intelligence pro-
duction side, CIA analysts have supported efforts to counter
international terrorism with a number of studies, two of
which have been issued in unclassified versions so that the
problem of international terror can be better understood by
all.
We do not view international terrorism as a passing'
phenomenon and believe it will continue to plague the world
for the foreseeable future.
2
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Registry -
Please put in "Notes From the
Director" file. Thanks.
lm
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Ltf
NOTES FROM THE DIRECTOR
STATEMENT ON DDO REDUCTION
I have been requested by several committees of
Congress to provide background information on the
personnel reduction in the DDO. The statement which
I provided in response to those requests is printed
in its entirety below for the information of all CIA
personnel.
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Statement by Admiral Stansfield Turner,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Concerning Personnel Reductions in the
Directorate of Operations, CIA
I. Why were the cuts necessary?
Soon after my arrival in the Agency last March I began
to hear that the Directorate of Operations was overstaffed.
It was almost universally perceived within the Agency that
the DDO had excess people, resulting in over management
and under utilization of talent. Some organizations could
tolerate this, but not an organization like the CIA where
we are fortunate to have high-quality, dedicated and
ambitious people. Nor, from a broader standpoint, is it
tolerable to have unnecessary people on the taxpayers'
payroll.
At that time the Directorate of Operations was already
engaged in a three-phase restructuring and paring down
program. I encouraged and received a report on their
efforts in mid-July.
II. Determination of the size of the reduction.
The report I received presented a range of opinion as to
the extent of the cut that was necessary. I elected to
be conservative and take the smallest number of positions
for elimination that was suggested--820. This does not
mean that either the incumbents of those positions must
be released or that 820 people are going to be declared
excess to this Directorate. Normal attrition should
greatly reduce the number whose services will no longer
be needed in the Directorate of Operations. We also
must make provision for the continuing hiring of new
and young personnel, to ensure the continuing viability
of the service and we also must ensure that there exists
a reasonable promotion opportunity at all levels for
those on duty. To accomplish these latter points I have
told the Directorate of Operations to hire 215 people
each year for FY 78 and FY 79. Because of normal attri-
tion many people will be voluntarily leaving the Operations
Directorate and we estimate that over the two-year exercise
approximately 300 individuals will actually be involuntarily
separated from the Agency. It should also be noted that
nearly 70 percent of the 212 people declared excess so
far are eligible for an immediate retirement annuity.
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I feel very strongly that, despite the additional
pain it causes us, we cannot afford- to neglect ?
either the promotion opportunity for those already
in the organization or the necessity of bringing in
people in approximately equal annual increments at
the bottom. We simply must continue to build a
sufficiently attractive career opportunity to attract
and retain the same caliber of people in 1987 as we
had in 1977. Parenthetically, I might say that "at
the bottom" is intended to mean just that. I see
little prospect for more than a handful of specialists
coming in at middle or upper levels.
III. Timing of the reduction.
Of the alternatives presented to me for phasing
the reduction, I opted for the quickest, which was
accomplishable over a two-year period. Given the
changes the last few years have brought to the CIA,
I felt it would be better for morale not to prolong
this action. Extending the reduction over a six-
year period might have made it possible to achieve
the reduction through attrition alone, but that
would have left an air of uncertainty hanging over
the entire organization for that long period and in
the end might not have brought about the reductions
in the right places. In addition, I do not believe
I could honestly face your Committee in its budgetary
role and suggest that the Agency should retain such
a considerable number of people in excess of its
needs for six years.
On August 8 I announced this intended reduction --
first privately to the employees and then publicly to
the media. It was in turn well publicized in and out-
side the Agency. 1 further announced that we would
notify those who were going to be asked to leave in
Fiscal Year 1978 not later than the first of November
1977; that none of those persons would be asked to
leave prior to the first of March 1978. Those being
asked to leave in Fiscal Year 1979 would be notified
by 1 June 1978 and not required to leave prior to
1 October 1978.
Between the time ,I notified CIA em.Dloyees in
August that there would be a reduction, and the first
announcement to individuals on the first of November
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as to who would be released, I received no complaints
either as to the necessity for cuts or how they would
be effected. Even since the announcement of who -
would be released, I have found no one in the Agency
who seriously believes that a reduction is not in
order.
IV. Who is to be released?
In deciding how to allocate the reduction across
grades and skills, my end objective has always been
to maintain at least as much clandestine intelligence
capability as we possess today. We do not have a
surplus of human intelligence collection capability,
hence, there will be no meaningful reduction in
overseas strength or activities, nor appreciable
reduction in the size of the officer operational
corps.
V. Method of selecting the individuals.
For those below the supergrade level, the
individual's accumulated fitness reports were the
basic determinants of who was to leave. The Agency's
periodic evaluation boards nUmerically rank individ-
uals within each grade level. These rankings
combined with fitness reports were the basis for a
point system. An explicit explanation of this point
system was published for all personnel in the
Operations Directorate in early October. Beyond
this mechanical evaluation, a panel reviewed the
calculations and used good judgment in making
exceptions where unique skills needed to be retained
.These were rare exceptions, however, and the rule of
the numerical ranking was closely followed.
In June this year we initiated an annual process
by which a senior panel composed of officers at the
Executive position level rank 411 supergrades. The
Director for Operations used these rankings as the
basis for his recommendations on release of super-
grades to me. Again, there were exceptions to the
ranking order, but they were rare.
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There are two additional points that I would
like to make on these selections:
0 As far as I can determine, there was no
bias by type of service, agreement with
current management, race or sex in the
selection of these individuals. There
were, for example, only 17 women, 4
blacks, and 3 Hispanics in the total
of 212 forced reductions for Fiscal
1978.
0 There is no question that we were forced
to terminate some very capable people.
The Directorate of Operations has been
shrinking continually since our with- .
drawal from Vietnam. The majority of the
marginal performers have already been
eliminated. There is no way today to
reduce further without asking very
competent people to leave. This is
unpleasant, unfortunate, but I believe
necessary!
VI. Style of notification.
The method by which notifications were issued
to individuals has been criticized. I regret that
individuals may have been offended or felt that
their prior service was not fully appreciated. Such
is not the case. Everyone of these individuals has
made sacrifices and many have endured privations and
risks for their country. Being fully cognizant of
their past contributions, we are determining whether
any of these 212 people can be relocated in other
directorates within the Agency to fill existing
vacancies. Consequently, while individuals have
received a notification that their release has been
recommended, we are still exploring alternative
employment possibilities. Until those alternatives
have been exhausted, no final determination on their
employment will be made.
I -anticipate that 25 of these 212 people will
be offered alternative positions.. Additionally, I
am personally approachin t'ne chiefs of all the
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other intelligence services of our country to ask
that they give the residual of these 212 special
consideration in their hiring requirements.
Finally, in a few cases, notices went to those
who would be able to retire if permitted to serve a
small amount of additional time. In these case,
we have arranged that no one will be forced to
retire before the end of Fiscal Year 1979, when the
program must be complete, if he would qualify for
retirement by that time.
VII. Is there a security risk?
It has been suggested that the departure of
sizable numbers of employees risks their being
suborned by enemy intelligence agents. Frankly,
I have too much confidence in their loyalty and
dedication to take such a suggestion seriously.
There was no such experience, to the best of my
knowledge, under former Director James Schlesinger
in 1973, when 632 employees were separated. Our
unfortunate experiences with former employees
violating their secrecy agreement have come
entirely from individuals who have left the Agency
of their own volition.
VIII. Next phase of the reduction.
The Fiscal 1979 cut will require approximately
the same number of reductions, perhaps more if
attrition does not meet expectations. We intend
not to wait until the first of June and then send
out all of the notifications at once but to commence
notification as early as possible. None will be
required to depart before the first of October 1978.
XI. Conclusions.
Many are concerned that this reduction may have
hurt the morale of the Directorate of Operations.
There is no question that in the short-term it has.
The long-term objective, however, is quite the
reverse; it is to rebuild morale by ensuring opera-
tional efficiency and full utilization of talent.
More than that, morale in the Directorate of Opera-
-tions will be futther st.re:igthened through the
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sustained expression of support for its vital
activities such as has come from this Committee
and which also must come from a broader range of
citizens. We must lift the pall of suspicion
which hangs over the Intelligence Community in
general and the Central Intelligence Agency in
particular, which obscures the exceptional con-
tribution these organizations have made in the
past and are making today.
I would not have encouraged and approved this
sizable reduction had I"not thought that in the
long run it would strengthen the Directorate of
Operations and the Central Intelligence Agency.
We need the capabilities of this Directorate as
much today as ever. Although new technical means
of collection permit us to extend our collection
efforts, they only compliment, they do not super-
sede human collectors. Only human collectors can
gain access to motives, to intentions, to thoughts,
and plans. They will always be vital to our coun-
try's security.
It would have been much easier for me to have
avoided this issue and attempted to continue over
strength until you or the appropriations committees
?or the Office of Management and Budget uncovered
these excesses and made the reductions in my behalf.
Contrary to media reports, I was not directed to
make these cuts either by the Vice President or
David Aaron of the National Security Council staff
as reported in some media. ? I have talked to neither
on the subject except to keep the Vice President
informed of my decisions. In sum, it is my opinion
that I would have been avoiding my duty and would
have been placing short-term considerations ahead
of long-term necessities in putting the cuts off.
We simply must build a foundation today for a
Central Intelligence Agency that will be capable
of continuing into the indefinite future the out-
standing performance it .has given our country
during the past thirty years?
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