PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF 1955 CROP PROSPECTS AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01149A000400130002-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 17, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF 1955 CROP PROSPECTS
AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC
CIA/RR MP-122
17.7u6 1955
WARNII
THIS MATERIAL COMM INFORMATION AFTECTII THE
NATIONAL L FENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS.
793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF
WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED ''PERSON IS
PROHIBITED BY LAW,
DOCUMENT NO.
N HANGE IN CLASS,
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
AUT R
GA'r~! )kVIEWER: 372044
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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F(1 EWOBD
This memorandum is an analysis of the condition of growing crops in
the "lino-Soviet Bloc. It is based on information available as of 1 June
1955. As a qualitative statement, it reflects in a preliminary way the
prospects for the food supply of the Bloc for the consumption year from
1 July 1955 through 30 June 1956. It should be noted that Sino-Soviet
Bloc crops are in the making and that the final outcome will depend on
developments during June and July. Should weather conditions fluctuate,
the rood situation in the Bloc would worsen or improve correspondingly.
After these weather conditions during June and July are known, a further
statement on crop conditions will be issued -- probably in September --
and will be followed later by quantitative production estimates based on
acreage as well as yield.
Pihe memorandum also indicates the general effect that pressures exerted
by current governmental programs and policies may have on agriculture de-
veloxaents in the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
r;'I,ds memorandum has been coordinated with the Department of Agriculture.
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CORTMITS
sue........
I. ?ESR ......
A. General . . . . . . . . . . . ? . .. . . . . . . . . . ? 2
B. Weather and. Crop Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
C. Agricultural Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1 ? General . ? . ? . ? ? ? ? Y f ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 5
2. New Lands program . . . . . . . . . . ? . . ? . . . 7
3. Corn Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Livestock program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
II. European Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A. Weather and Crop Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
19 Albania ? . r r . 12
2. Bulgaria . . . . . . ? . . ? . . . . . . . ? ? ? ? 13
3- Czechoslovakia . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . ? . 14
4. East Germany ? ? . . ? ? ? . . ? ? . .. . . . . . . 15
{5 . Iingary ? . . . . . . ... ? . . . ? . . ? . . . . ? 16
6
~ . Poland ? ? . . . ? ? ? ? ? ? . . ? ? ? . ? . . ? r 17
. Rumania, . . r ? . . ? . . . . . . . . ? . ? . . . . 18
B. Agricultural production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
III. Communist China . . . . ? . . ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Appendix
Source References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
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CIA/RR NP-122
Project 21.744)
PRx7.stMveRy ESTIA'tAR'E Cr 1955 CROP PROSPECTS An AGRiCtUILURAL PROIJJCTION
IN TIM _ SINO-SOVI T flUX'
Sum:M
Crop prospects in the Sino-Soviet Bloc indicate that agricultural pro-
duction in the Bloc will not rise substantially above 1954 levels. Although
the agricultural outlook in the USSR is somewhat more favorable than it was
in Mane of 1954, the European Satellites face another below-normal year of
food availability, and Coanist China?s agricultural production will be no
better than it was in 1954, a year of near starvation in many areas.
In the USSR the failure of the "new course" to raise agricultural pro-
duction led Soviet officials to launch two rather hazardous programs --
the expansion of grain acreages on "new lands," in which both soil and climate
conditions are marginal and the expansion of corn acreages in the Ukraine
and in other areas of the European USSR not well suited for the production
of corn.
The first program involves an increase of about 16 million hectares,
seeded largely to spring wheat and millet. It is probable that this new
acreage will increase 1955 grain production quantitatively above the pre-
war average, but on a per capita basis the grain availability will remain
below that of the prewar base year 1938-39-
The second program raises the corn acreage in 1955 to about 13 million
hectares, substantially more than the 1954 corn acreage. Production from
the additional acreage will increase supplies of grain and fodder somewhat,
but unless weather conditions improve materially during June., July,, and
August, the effect of this increase on the average per capita availability
of meat, milk, and other livestock products during 1955-56 will not be large.
The European Satellites are facing the prospect of another below-normal
harvest for 1955, with no hope of improving food availabilities over the
poor 1954-55 food consumption year. Adverse weather conditions affecting
crop growth are primarily responsible for the unfavorable outlook for agri-
cultural production.
The factors necessary to help alleviate the effects of adverse weather --
improved agrotechnics, mechanization, fertilization, and the peasant's in-
centive to raise agricultural production -- have not materialized under the
"new course." The present policy of continuing to socialize agricultural
production will continue to depress production as it has in the past.
In Co munist China, drought conditions reported throughout most of the
country threaten the harvest of early rice crops in the south and winter
wheat crops in the north. Unless there are above-normal fall harvests in
1955, the planned 6-percent increase in the production of food crops over
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Because the Chinese Communists have failed to meet planned goals of
food production during the first 2 years of the current Five Year Plan
(1953-57), they have found it necessary to revise their 1957 goals down-
ward. An additional plan failure in 1955 probably will result in harsher
rural policies toward the peasant. This will be necessary in order for
the regime to fulfill its industrial and export requirements for agri-
cultural products through increased procurements from the cduntryside.
The Chinese Ccinunist government will continue to expand and consoli-
date its control over the agricultural sector through the continued
organization of Agricultural Producer and Trade and Marketing Cooperatives.
I. USSR.
Unless seriously unfavorable drought conditions develop before
the harvest is completed, the USSR will garner somewhat more grain in
1955 than in 1954. The prospects as of 1 June indicate that small-grain
yields will average higher than those of 1954. There are also indications
of an increase of some 16 million hectares, largely spring wheat and
millet, on "new lands." There has also been an increase of at least 9
million hectares of corn, chiefly to produce silage. The corn crop got
a late start, and conditions for early growth in the Ukraine and the
North Caucasus areas have not been favorable. It is therefore improbable
that the contributions made by corn as grain will add materially to the
advances made by small grains. Although the quantity of grain produced
in the USSR in 1955 may exceed the prewar production of 193$,, it is im-
probable that per capita availability of grain will reach the prewar level.
There has been a small increase in sugar beet acreage, and production of
sugar in 1955 may exceed that of 1954, but the increase will not be
sufficient to affect per capita availability materially.
Cotton has run into difficulties this year. Cold weather has
killed sprouting plants and necessitated considerable replanting in
certain important areas. Danger from insect pests is also reported.
The 1955 cotton production may be expected to be about the same as,
but probably not greater than, that of 1954.
Soviet officials are stressing the need for increase of livestock
numbers and productivity. The corn expansion program is directed toward
this end. The program initiated this year, if successful, cannot be
expected to increase to any material degree the availabilities of meat,
milk, and other livestock products during the 1955-56 consumption year.
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B. Weather and Crop Conditions.
On the basis of information available as of 1 June 1955, Soviet
crop prospects for the current year are Judged to be relatively favorable.
As yet there are no indications of droughts such as plagued the Ukraine
and the Volga area in the summer of 1954. The "new lands" area of West
Siberia and Kazakhstan had favorable fall and winter precipitation, but
the spring rainfall has been somewhat less than that of 1954. The
June-July weather has increased significance this year because of later
development of wheat in the "new lands" area as well as similar late
demands by the corn crop, the acreage of which has been expanded more than
threefold.
In the fall of 1954, most of the USSR had relatively favorable
weather for the sowing and growth of fall-sown grains for harvest in-1955.
There were some areas in the southern Ukraine and the North Caucasus,
however, where rainfall was light -- a continuation of the 1954 simmer
drought. Temperatures were above normal in most areas, the first frosts
coming much later than they did in the fall of 1953. The plan for seeding
fall-sown grains was reported to have been overfulfilled by October 10.
A slight increase in the total acreage of fall-sown grains was also re-
ported.
The precipitation for the winter months was normal or above normal
for almost all areas of the USSR, some of the major grain areas receiving
especially favorable amounts. There have been several recent Soviet press
articles referring to the favorable fall and winter precipitation in por-
tions of the "new lands" areas of Siberia and the Volga. The only winter
kill report to date has come from an observer in Moscow w indicates that
"severe winter kill of fall-sown grains was noted along the route traveled
in the western oblasts of the central, black-soil region. Many fields were
being partly or entirely replanted to spring grains." 9
March precipitation was generally somewhat below normal in the
southern half of the European USSR and in some areas of the region of
grain expansion in West Siberia and northern Kazakhstan. In April the
rainfall in most areas was greater than it had been during the previous
month. Most of the important agricultural areas of the European USSR
received near-normal or above-normal precipitation. In the "new lands"
area of West Siberia and Kazakhstan, wide variations in precipitation
continued through April, and many stations in Kazakhstan reported below-
nor al rainfall. It should be noted, however, that even normal precipita-
tion in this area in March and April is scanty. Rainfall and temperature
in Mey, Ame,and July are far more crucial in determining crop yield
potential.
* Far serjalIF numbered source references, see the Appendix.
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Rainfall data for May are incomplete, but preliminary estimates
indicate relatively light precipitation in some regions of the Ukraine,
the North Caucasus, and the "new lands" area of West Siberia and Northern
Kazakhstan. In early May there were press reports from two regions of
the "new lands" area urging that spring sowing be done promptly because
warm steppe winds were rapidly drying the soil. 2V
Field work in the Transcaucasus this spring began almost a mouth
earlier than in the spring of 1954. / in much of the USE, however,
spring field work was delayed by cold weather. In the cotton-growing
regions of Central Asia the cold weather necessitated some replanting of
cotton, and in the central and northern regions of the European USSR
there were complaints about delays in spring seeding. In May, however,
considerable progress in the sowing program apparently was made. In a
speech at the All-Union Conference of Industrial Workers on 18 May,
Kh rushchev stated: "Despite the fact that spring is late this year,
spring sowing is progressing considerably better than last year. By
May 15 the collective and state farms bad sown 16.31 million more hectares
to grain than by the same date in 1954." 7] Later in the same speech,
Khrushchev commented on the moisture situation: "Climatic conditions in
most districts this year are good, and there is sufficient moisture every-
where. Should no unforeseen circumstances arise -- however, nature often
acts unexpectedly -- there is every reason to expect a good harvest this
year."
During the first half of May, observers in Moscow made a trip
through part of the Ukraine and reported crop conditions "mostly good
to excellent," soil moisture being marginal or slightly submarginal in
the southern Ukraine but not yet causing serious crop damage. Preliminary
indications are that the southern Ukraine received light to moderate rain-
fall during the latter part of May. Preliminary estimates indicate light
rainfall in May for the North Caucasus area, but amy shortage probably was
offset by above-normal rainfall in the previous month of April. In the
"new bands" area of Siberia and Kazakhstan, spring rainfall appears to have
been generally below that of last spring, and there are indications that
in May the rainfall was relatively light in many of the areas of expansion
of spring-wheat and millet.
Considering the USSR as a whole the June and July weather has
assumed. greater importance this year than in previous years because of the
present Soviet crop pattern. The wheat crop in the "'new lands" area passes
through its critical stages of development at a later date than does that
of the traditional wheat areas of the USSR. In addition, corn, the 1955
acreage of which has been increased by more than three times the acreage
of 1954, requires substantial rainfall and warm'weather if it is to develop
satisfactorily.
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Aeg!icult ural Production.
1. General.
During the past 25 years the USSR has been unable to increase
its agricultural production to keep pace with its expanding population.
The present consumption level, in terms of average per capita food avail-
ability, is below that of the later years of the precollectivization period.
Within the last year and a half, Soviet leaders have gambled
on the successful development of two projects; (a) the seeding of crops --
largely spring wheat and millet -- on 28 million to 30 million hectares
(70 a+illion to 75 million acres) of new crop land eastward from the Volga
River and through southern Siberia and northern' Kazakh SSR, where farming
is highly precarious, and (b) in expanding the acreage of corn into areas
not well suited to growing corn and particularly not suited for the pro-
duction of corn as grain. Other crops much better adapted for growing in
the latter area, both for silage and grain, are available.
The USSR is faced with four problems of major food supp],ya
a. Population is increasing at the rate of about 3 mil-
lion a year, and it will require ever increasing amounts of extra food
to feed the populace, even at the present low levels of consumption.
b. The people in the city and country alike -- particu-
larly the rapidly growing numbers of industrial workers -- need more meat,
milk, and butter to maintain a sustained efficiency.,
c. Food supplies withdrawn from stocks during both 1953-54
and 1954-55, when the USSR was forced by poor crop yields to dip into re-
serves to meet home needs, must be replaced.
d. The USSR requires large tonnages of grain for export
to exabange for other types of goods. In the past, Tsarist Russia ex-
porteft as much as 10 million tons of grain a year.
At first glance the tremendous land area of the USSR would not
suggest that lack of land in itself could be a cause of continuing agri-
cultural problems. The crucial point, however, is the fact that climatic
features of one sort or another place critical limitations on the profitable
vse o' a large part of this land mass.
In the US a mountain range intervenes between the best farming
areas and. the western deserts. In the USSR. there is no barrier between
the Asiatic desert and the farm lands of northern Kazakh SSR, West
Siberia, the Volga drainage basin, the North Caucasus,, and the Ukraixne.
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Grain and other crops may flourish in the spring only to be withered by
hot desiccating winds sweeping across the Caspian Sea, up the Volga River,
or north into the region east of the Ural Mountains. Later in the season,
cold air from the Arctic may flow southward, bringing rain or snow at
harvest time into the northern European UM.. West Siberia, and northern
Kazakh SSR. Grain often rots in the field before it can be harvested.
Despite these and other natural limitations on land resources,
it seems certain that the USSR could provide food for many more millions
of people at present levels of consumption and could possibly raise food
consumption, both quantitative and qualitative, to even higher levels.
The failure to attain such goals has been the result of the system under
which Soviet agriculture has been forced to operate, with its attendant
inefficiencies and general policy of complete unconcern for the plight of
the peasant.
The morale of the Soviet peasant is low, and under the collec-
tive farm system there is little incentive for farmers to exert themselves
to more than the minimum of effort. It is difficult to conceive of any
very rapid increase in agricultural production until adequate incentives
have been provided.
The primary incentives at present apply only to the Caamunist
officials who are in control. They live better than their fellows, they
have more privileges, and they enjoy power and prestige of a type.
Beginning in the fall of 1953, the collective farmers were
granted some so-called material incentives, including somewhat higher
prices for produce sold, tax adjustments, the reduction of same delivery
quotas, and money advances during the year, and. -- most recently -- a portion
of the corn crop has been promised as an inducement for proper planting
and harvesting of the crop. To date, however, there appears to have been
no significant change in the peasants' lack of enthusiasm for the col-
lectivized system.
The operation of collective farms theoretically is in the hands
of the collective farmers themselves, but actually there has been a tre-
mendous amount of high-level centralized planning, and the farm operations
have been under the indirect, or even direct, influence of local party
and government officials. In March 1955 a decree was issued call, for
more local initiative and less detailed central direction. In subsequent
months the government has insisted on a swift implementation of this de-
centralized planning program which, on paper at least, delegates greater
responsibility to local officials. This insistence on a rapid shift toward
decentralize4i p1 i has lest to further confusion during a season which
even normally is busy and rather confused.
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In April 1955 a decree was issued which, in effect, called
for the replacement of one-third of the present collective farm chair-
men with workers from the Party, local government offices, and economic
enterprises. The large-scale turnover of-farm chairmen probably is aimed
at removing not only incompetents but also those chairmen not completely
loyal to the present agricultural program. The new chairmen will take
over their new duties after a training period of only 2 to 6 months. Be-
cause many'of the replacements will have primarily urban backgrounds, it
is likely that there will be further organizational confusion, creating
another major hindrance to expanding current agricultural output.
It is true that agriculture in the tEAR has been mechanized,
but although mechanization has released manpower for the development of
industry, it has not as yet given to agriculture the definite benefits
that have been achieved in the US.
2. New Lands Program.
One of the means by which Soviet author ties hope to expand
agricultural output is by extending production on to virgin and abandoned
lands.* Nothing so gigantic in the field of agricultural expansion has
been attempted by the USM or probably by any other nation. This "new
lands" program envisages expanding by 1956 the total Soviet sown area by
about 20 percent, an area larger than the total sown area of Canada.
This new area will be seeded to "grain and other crops." As
much as 90 percent may be in spring wheat, and most of the remainder will
probably be seeded to millet. It does not follow, however, that bread-
grain expansion is the only aim of the program. Although some increase
in the breadgrain area will result, the expansion of the wheat acreage on
the new lands mar permit a decrease of the acreage in breadgrains on the
old lands and permit the expansion of acreage and output of feed grain,
vegetable crops, roughages for livestock, industrial crops, and the like.
In principle, these shifts are rational. If the Soviet goverment could
rely for a large part of its breedgrain procurements on the sparsely popu-
lated areas of Siberia and Kazakhstan, it could ease. its pressure on col-
lective farms in old areas to deliver grain. The government must be aware
that its procurements took too large a share of grain production, that
consequently not enough was left on the farms to feed animals or peasants,
and that often the pressure on supplies was such that not enough remained
for seeding.
-' it s ould be noted that the good lands -- that is,, those lands that
have been found profitable to cultivate -- are already under cultivation.
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Khru.shchev has stated that more grain is needed for better
feeding of the people and animals and for reserves and export. There
can be little difficulty in demonstrating the need for greater production.
The Soviet leaders are placing great reliance on the "new land" program
to satisfy this need.
In this program there is something which is new in degree, if
not in kind, in agricultural policy in the USS1. It must be borne in
mind, however, that in the USSR most of the major pronouncements previously
made about agricultural policy changes have led to little or no substantive
change. This "new lands" program, nevertheless, is being implemented at
a fairly rapid rate with the necessary inputs -- labor, machinery, petro-
leum, and transportation.
Two kinds of statements are frequently made that imply that the
"new lands" program is likely to fail. First, it is argued that two decades
ago much of this land was plowed and seeded without success. Second, it
is stated that the climate fluctuates so greatly around a relatively low
level of moisture availability that crop failure will occur at least 2 years
out of 5. Neither of these statements, granting their validity, is suf-
ficient for a prediction of failure of the present program.
In the last two decades there have been substantial Improve-
ments in power machinery and equipment that make it possible to farm areas
that could not have been farmed earlier. The success of the "new lands"
program, as far as mechanization is concerned, depends on the degree of
effectiveness with which hastily trained mechanics can operate machines
that are unfamiliar and are difficult to keep in adjustment.
The success or failure of the "new lands" program may also
depend more on the average long-term yields that the USSR will consider
acceptable than on fairly frequent crop failures. These new land areas
are a relatively small part of the total cultivated area of the USSR.
If the USSR follows Joseph's Egyptian policy and erects facilities for
storing grain during the "fat" years, it may be possible to maintain
workers in the area despite two or more consecutive years of crop failure --
provided the average long-term yield is high enough.
If this program is maintained, it is bound to make some contri-
bution to the wheat and millet supply of the USSR -- but at a high cost.
Soviet officials may decide thus to augment production even though the
program is highly uneconomical. It may be found that the combined
resources cost of a net yield of 4 centners per hectare (about 6 bushels
per acre) in the new areas may be as high as that of an -centner yield
in the old areas. Khrushchev has been quoted as saying that the "new
lanais" program will break even with average yields no higher than 4.8
centnera per hectare. For official planning purposes, however, yields
of 10 centners per hectare have been used.
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In view of the inputs being placed on the new lands and the
top-level backing the whole program is receiving, it is difficult to be-
lieve that the project will be quickly abandoned or even seriously cur-
tailed in the event of a serious crop failure.
On the basis of preliminary studies, however, it is concluded
that natural limitations, particularly climate, are such as to prevent
the long-run achievement of success for the "new lands" program as cur-
rently anticipated by Soviet leaders.
3. Corn Program.
The Soviet plan calls for an increase in corn acreage from
3.5 million hectares in 1953 to 28 million hectares by 1960. The increase
mounts to 60 million acres, about two-thirds of the total corn acreage of
the US. For the most part, the proposed acreage lies north of the 45th
parallel, similar in latitude to the northern half of Wisconsin, Minnesota,
and northern South Dakota. Hence any expansion will have to occur in an
area where the climate and the soils are relatively unfavorable for corn.
Furthermore, only a snu. l part of the acreage can be relied upon to produce
grain. Kbrushchev proposes to plant almost one-third of the total planned
corn acreage on land formerly sown to other grain crops, mostly oats and
barley. The remainder of the corn is to be planted on land formerly sown
to other fodder crops, root crops, and grasses; on pastures and abandoned
land; and also, presumably, on summer fallow land. There is a strong ability that the replacement of other dv Prob-
ability
effect on total grains by corn will have an adverse
grain production.
con the part c with other grains, corn requires more knowledge and
care e onr the pthe producer and involves a much greater expenditure
: machinery.. and fertilizers. In most countries it has been found
that the risks are less and the rewards greater in producing other grains
on what in the case of the Soviet corn program must; be assumed to be more
or less marginal, lands.
In order to evaluate the corn program, studies on farm manage-
ment covering parts or all of the states of Wisconsin, Minnesota, and the
Dakotas must be made. In this area the production of corn for silage as
well as for grain is important. In the USSR; much of the proposed corn
acreage will be harvested for silage.
In the US as a whole, in recent years, the labor requirements
per acre of corn have been more than three times the labor required per acre
of wheat. In Wisconsin, Minnesota, and the Dakotas the production of corn
for grain required 13 man-hours of labor and 8 tractor.-hours per acre.
Equally if not more important is the fact that corn growers used 14 tons
of man>r'e and 138 pounds of commercial fertilizer per acre. Some areas
also require varying amounts of lime.
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The production of corn for silage required almost 15 man-
hours of labor and 10 tractor-hours per acre. Each acre also received
an average of 15-1/4 tons of manure and 169 pounds of,commercial
fertilizer.
Assuming that soils and climate are similar, the Soviet
corn program, if in operation on a basis comparable with US per-
formance, would require 780 million to 900 million man-hours, draft
power equivalent to 480 million to 600 million tractor-hours, 760 mil-
lion to 830 million metric tons of manure, and 4 million to 5 mii1Lou
tons of cOMMercial fertilizer -- to say nothing of other farm equip-
ment and cribs for storing corn and silos for curing silage.* The avail-
ability of seed corn of any sort is also a real problem, and the develop-
ment and production of sufficient hybrid seed for such an acreage are
tasks that would require many years.
Soviet plans call for 275 centners of silage per hectare.
This is 11. tons per acre, compared with the US average of about 10 tons
and in the north central states of from 5 to 6 tons per acre. It must
be remembered that the latter yields were obtained only through the
generous application of manure and fertilizer, two items which are un-
likely to be available to the Soviet farmer in any appreciable quantities.
Without major inputs of lime, manure, and fertilizer, it is
likely that average Soviet yields of silage corn may be no more than the
anno-imced 1954 state-farm average of only 80 centners per hectare (c/ha)
instead of the present planned 275 c/ha. At 80 c/ha the fodder units per
hectare, according to 1 rushchev'a figures, will be no more than that ob-
tainable from an oat yield of 11.6 c/ha, even considering the full value
of both the oat grain and the straw. Furthermore, the labor, machinery,
and material input for the corn would be significantly greater.
. It is extremely doubtful that within the 1953-60 period the
corn expansion program will produce a significant increment per hectare
above that already being produced on the same land. In fact, it is not
improbable that the whole program will fall into disrepute along with the
previously abandoned projects such as the grass rotation program in dry
* it shouldala also be borne in mind that in, the USM two or three times
as much manpower is required to perform a similar fawn operation as in the
US. This would be especially true in the case of corn because of the lack
of know-how on the part of Soviet farmers unfamiliar with corn culture.
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2, on
4. Livestock Program.
The ultimate goal of the corn program is, of course, to in-
crease livestock production and thereby to increase the supply of meat
and milk. Without an increase in the supply of feedstuffs, the live-
stock program cannot be fulfilled. Even assuming, however, that a
major part of the feed program is carried out, it is difficult to see
how the livestock and meat goals can be achieved.
The plan for pork production, for example, calls for 30
cerrtners per 100 hectares of arable land,, about 27 pounds per acre.
Pork production in the US in 1952 totaled 11.5 billion pounds, with
an arable land or crop acreage of about 409 million acres. This
amounts to an average of about 28 pounds of pork per acre, and in
doing this the US utilized about 90 million acres of the best corn-
groJing land in the world.
11. MEJOnn Satellites.
A. Weather and Croce Conditions.
The European Satellites, as indicated by information available
as of 1 Line 1955, are once more facing the prospects of a below-normal
harvest. This is a result of spring weather conditions unfavorable for
the seeding and development of crops. Rumania is the only European
'Satellite for which the 1955 outlook indicates a slightly better grain
harvest than in 1954 -- primarily the result of an expansion in bread.-
gm-tn acreage.
An early spring would have increased the cultivated area in the
European Satellites, and an increase in spring sawing would have made
up for unfulfilled fall sowing plans for wheat, rye, and barley, but the
opposite Occurred -- a 3- to 4-week delay in starting field operations.
This delay resulted in nonfulfillment of spring planting plans. Cool
weather has prevailed through 1 June, retarding growth and development
of spring crops and delaying harvests. Despite efforts to increase
mechanization and farm labor, only limited success has been registered.
It is likely, therefore, that the shorter harvesting period and the lack
of machines and men to achieve a timely harvest will result in above-
norral harvesting losses and will reduce total production.
The capability of the European Satellites to effect a significant
increase in agricultural production during the next 5 years (through 1960)
is very unlikely under present policies. Although there has been, and
probably will continue to be, a substantial increase in investments devoted
to agriculture as a means of increasing crop yields and animal productivity,
the all-important role of the peasant will determine the effectiveness of
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these investments. Despite an initial liberal approach to collectivize-
tion with the announcement of the "new course," recent speeches indicate
that a shift to pre-"new course" collectivization policy is occurring,
with officials stating that complete socialization is the final objective.
As long as this remains the policy, the peasant will not have the incen-
tive to increase production -- as has been so well proved in the USSR.
Low productivity in agriculture, one of the most important sectors of the
economy, will continue to plague the European Satellite governments for
m=V years to come.
1. Albania.
Agricultural production in Albania in 1955 probably will be
somewhat lower than in 1954, which was a relatively good year.
According to reports by the Ministry of Agriculture, the plans
for sowing grain in the fall of 1954 for harvest in 1955 had been fulfilled
102 percent. 2/ The greater portion of the fall-sown crops is wheat, and
it is estimated that the area sown to wheat in 1955 was approximately
10,000 hectares greater than that of 1954. There are indications, however,
that this increase was made at the expense of the spring-sown crops --
corn and spelt. l0
Reports indicate that in the spring sowing program there have
been failures which can be attributed partially to above-normal dry weather
in the spring and lack of organization on the part of the Machine Tractor
Stations.
Government plans for 1955 call for a 25-percent increase in
wheat production over that of 1954, a 45-percent increase in corn, a 61-
percent increase in cotton, a 102-percent increase in sugar, and a 12-
percent increase in tobacco. 12/ Because there is only a 10-percent
increase envisioned for the tal sawn acreage J over 1954, it is to
be assumed that increases in production are to be achieved by increased
yields.
Under favorable weather conditions a slight increase in wheat
production may be attained in 1955, but corn and industrial crops probably
will remain static or -- if dry weather continues to persist -- may be
less than in 1954.
Plans for 1955 and the projected output for'1960 indicate a
continuing emphasis on agricultural production. The recently announced
investment program for 1955 implied a 35-percent increase over 1954. A
large portion of this increase undoubtedly will go into land reclamation
and irrigation. The long-term outlook for Albania, barring peasant re-
sistance, indicates an increase in the contribution of agriculture to the
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total national income. The strongest factor favoring a dynamic growth is
the reserve of land still available for exploitation. Continued invest-
ments for reclaiming this land and the introduction of new techniques,
education, and acquired skills of mechanized farming could improve the
situation.
2. ari.
There are indications that 1955 agricultural production in
Bulgaria will be somewhat greater than that of 1554. Seeding of grain
crops in the fall of 1954 for harvest in 1955 apparently was completed
in November, about 1 mouth later than planned, 14/ but the winter was
mild and wet, and the early spring condition of-fall-sown crops was good.
Because of an early spring, 1955 field work was advanced,
relative to the some period in 1954. In spite of this, the press has
criticized failures to meet time schedules for the sowing of early-
and medium-ripening grains. Above-normal precipitation during Larch
delayed planned schedules and encouraged weed growth but was favorable
to the development of pastures. Cool weather in early spring and below
normal rainfall during April and Nay possibly retarded rapid growth in
the north, but by June the harvesting of early grain crops was in progress
in the southern part of Bulgaria. ,
Government planning for 1955 indicates an expected gross
production approximately 21.7 percent greater than that of 1954. 16
A larger share of the increase is to result from an expanded livestock
program. Some increase in yields of the major crops is. planned, but
otherwise there has been no indication of a change free the past crop
patterns -- except an expansion of perennial fodder grasses, which is in
line with the current emphasis on expanding the livestock industry.
Planned investments in agriculture during 1955 are expected
to be 50 percent greater than during 1954, with a proportionately larger
share going into the lagging livestock industry and afforestation programs.
Long-term planning in Bulgaria through 1957' shows the greatest
effort being directed toward increasing livestock nu*ers and related
products. Because of the existing low ratio of pasture availabilities to
planned numbers of livestock, modified goals have been projected. The
dynamic planned growth of livestogk numbers is further hampered by the
relatively rigid and inflexible pattern of food and forage crops. With
such limitations,, it is not expected that any areas taken out of food
crops will be able to supply the additional feed :required for carrying
larger numbers of livestock.
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Preliminary production estimates tend to favor a slight in-
crease over 954 grain and potato production and possibly heavier slaughter
weightA for livestock. The situation of industrial crops indicates a
static level of production. Although agricultural production in aria
in 1955 Probably will be greater than in 1954, the planned increasself
21.7 percent is unrealistic:
3. Czechoslovakia.
The present outlook for agriculture in Czechoslovakia for 1955
indicates that production may not be any better than the below-average
Production in 1954. Despite significant increases in agricultural invest-
ments during 1954 and those planned for 1955, weather and peasant apathy
are once again working counter to the desires of the goverment.
The failure of the fall agricultural campaign was well sand
UP by Prime Minister Siroky when he stated on 11 February 1955 that the
farm work in the autumn of 1954 was not completed despite favorable weather
conditions. Sowing of grain in the fall of 1954 for harvest in 1955 was
greatly delayed., and the plan for increasing the acreage of arable land
was not fulfilled. J The failure to fulfill fall work plans is further
confirmed by the fact that, according to the Czechoslovak Minister of
Agriculture, only 67.3 percent of fail sowing operations was completed
by 25 November 1954, the established deadline. / In addition, fall
plowing by the Machine Tractor Stations was fulfilled by only 71.4 per-
cent by 5 December 1954. 2a. Adverse weather during December prevented
further field operations, and both sowing and fall plowing plans were
drastically underfulfilled.
Instead of an early spring to enable.. farmers to increase
spring grain acreage, there was a late spring, which delayed the start
of spring field operations by nearly 30 days. jl As a result, an ab-
normally large amount of work had to be performed in a short period of
time. It is estimated that because of this situation the sowing plans
for grain, potatoes, and sugar beets were not fulfilled.
The entire spring has been characterized by below-normal
temperatures and inadequate sunshine, and the development of spring
planted crops has been retarded. Field observers reported near-freez-
ing temperatures in the northern half of Czechoslovakia and heavy frost
as far south as Roznava as late as 18 Nay. 22
The late spring means that the harvest of field crops will
have to be performed in a shorter period of time, as was the situation
in 1954. In view of inadequate farm mechanization and labor shortages,
high harvesting losses may result.
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Unless exceptionally good weather prevails., the prospects for
any increase in agricultural output, especially of field crops, over the
low 1954 level is unlikely. Planned increases in yields per hectare
of 20 percent for grain and more than 30 percent for oil crops will defi-
nitely not be attained.
in 1955-56, Czechoslovakia, a deficient food country attempting
to increase its level of self-sufficiency as part of the "new course," will
once again be dependent on imports for a significant share of the food
requirements of the urban population. Because of the low agricultural
production in 1954, coupled with insufficient food imports, Czechoslovakia
is closing the consumption year from 1 July 1954 through 30 June 1955 with
a shortage of food supplies.
4. East Germs M.
Present indications are that the 1955 agricultural produc-
tion in East Germany will not exceed, and may be worse thanj, that of
the poor 1954 crop year.
Although rather favorable weather prevailed in East Germany
during the fall of 1954 for the seeding of grains to be harvested in 1955
(winter grains), it is probable that plans were not fulfilled 100 percent
for wheat, barley, or oilseeds. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
announced that as of 6 December the sowing of winter wheat was 93.3 per-
cent completed. 24 No mention of barley was made, which could be inter-
preted as indicating an unsatisfactory condition. It is likely that above-
normal precipitation prevented the seeding of grain any later than 10
December. Seeding of winter rye was claimed to have been fulfilled by
96.5 percent j el of 3 November, and, therefore, the plan probably was
fulfilled. The 1955 plan, however, calls for about 150,000 hectares less
area devoted to rye than was sown in 1954. 26
The mild winter and above-normal precipitation gave winter
grains a good start. Contrary to the situation in 1953-54, when high
losses occurred as a result of winter kill, there was no evidence of
winter kill this year. In March 1955 it was estimated that winter grain
and forage crops looked better than they did a year ago. 27
Above-normal precipitation and below-normal temperatures during
February arch, and April delayed spring field operations by some 3 to 4
weeks. This meant that an above-normal amount of field work had to be
done in a short period -- at a time when the goverrnrent was demanding a
15-percent increase in field crops. 2 It is doubtful that spring planting
plans were fulfilled. One source claimed that only a few Agricultural
Producers Cooperatives fulfilled their spring plans. JOJ
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Another problem in spring planting in East Germany was the
shortage of seed. It is not known how serious the situation was, but
the agricultural press admitted that difficulties, may arise in the plant-
ing of oats, barley, and potatoes.
The weather during May and the first 10 days of June has been
cold. This has delayed both planting and development of spring crops
(particularly vegetables) throughout East Germany. As a result, the en-
tire harvest season will be later than usual, causing an overlap in
harvesting of different crops. With the inadequate mechanization and
labor shortage in agriculture, this could mean high harvesting losses.
Unless there is warm weather and more sunshine, yields of
crops may be less than in 1954. It is believed, however, that total
production of grains will be more than in 1954 because of less loss of
acreage from winter kill in 1955 and good soil moisture reserves. Pro-
duction forecasts for potatoes, sugar beets, oil crops, and the like are
premature at this date, but, assuming normal weather from.l0 June to the
harvest of these crops, production could be expected to approximate 1954
levels. With more normal temperatures and sunshine, yields of forage
crops should be above average.
5. Hungary ,
Agricultural production in Hungary in IL955 probably will be
unsatisfactory even though it will be somewhat larger than in 1954, a
drought year. The outlook for 1955 is less promising than that in any
of the other European Satellites, and the government's planned increase
in production of 7.3 percent over 1954 probably will not be realized. 121
Following in the wake of the serious decline in grain produc-
tion in 1954, the government announced its plan for sowing almost 2 million
hectares in the fall of 1954 for harvest in 1955, an expansion of 300,000
hectares over the previous year. Reports as of March 1955 indicate
serious shortcomings in the fulfillment of this plan, especially in the
private farming sector. L4/ These shortcomings are primarily the result
of poor operation of the Machine Tractor Stations, even though their equip-
ment had been increased during the year.
On the whole, the crops sown in the fall of 1954 weathered the
winter without serious damage. There were some reports of severe freezing,
but apparently the proportion of winter kill was not greater than normal.
A late and wet spring has caused additional delays in field work,
and the sowing of spring fodder crops was reportedly unsatisfactory. In
addition, a shortage of spring wheat seed prevented. the peasants fram fill-
ing gaps left by underfulfiliment of fall sowing plans.
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Field work was hampered by cold weather in March and excessive
rain in April, and the development of both fall- and spring-sown grains
has been retarded by the continuing cold weather persisting throughout
ngary. The below-normal precipitation in May and June has delayed the
developent of corn, particularly.
After the devastating experience in the agricultural sector in
1954, the Hungarian goverment has allocated to agriculture 26.2 percent of
all budgetary investments in 1955. This artificial stimulant comes too
late, however, to offset the depressing effects of the extremes of weather
and the uiderfulfillment of plans because of organizational difficulties.
As of early June, the outlook for the 1955-56 food supply, although slightly
better than that of 195+-55, is unsatisfactory and may become worse.
6. Poland.
Indications are that 1955 agricultural production in Poland
will about approximate that of 195+ and that the 6.2-percent increase
planned for 1955 IV probably will not be achieved.
This generally unfavorable outlook in Poland is, in part, the
result of failure to fulfill the plowing and sowing plans in the fall of
1954 for seeding and harvest in 1955. , f Failure to fulfill these fall
plans, in turn, has increased the workload in the spring, thus reducing
the probability of fulfillment of ambitious spring sowing plans. Over
60 percent (9 million hectares) of Poland's arable land was to be sown
in the spring of 1955, and, in addition, 160,000 hectares of fallow land
were to be put into cultivation. In view of the chronic inefficiencies
of the Machine Tractor Stations -- especially low tractor productivity,
which was largely responsible for the nonfulfillment of plans in the fall
of 1954 -- it seems unlikely that spring sowing operations were fulfilled..
Furthermore, bad weather in March and April delayed sowing operations as
much as 3 weeks, !O and lagging sowing plans were severely criticized in
the Polish press as late as early May. 41
Although favorable weather conditions prevailed throughout
most of May, plant growth was set back in late May and early June by a
cold spell which in!some regions resulted in killing frosts. In many
areas, grains seeded in the fall of 195+ for harvest in 1955 (winter
grains) were underdeveloped, and planting of potatoes was still in progress
in early June. 42 This increased the necessity for favorable weather
conditions throughout June and July to insure a fair crop.
The chief tasks of the Polish agricultural program in 1955
include increasing agricultural production by expanding the sown area
and increasing the yields per acre. Considerable expansion of the
socialist enterprises -- collective. end. state farms -- is also contemplated,
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although goverment hopes of increasing the socialist sector by 3,000 units
annually in 1954-55 are well behind plan. / It is precisely these
socialist enterprises, however, which are the greatest laggards in ful-
filling government plans.
The 1955 agricultural program is to be financed by an alloca-
tion of 12.1 billion zlotys from the Polish budget, an increase of 21.8
percent over the allocation in 1954. 44 As mentioned above, 160,000
hectares of fallow land were to be put into cultivation during 1955 as part
of the government's long-range plans to increase the arable land. Inputs
of fertilizers during spring sowing alone were to increase by 130,000 tons
over 1954. / It is unknown whether or not these inputs were realized,
but general availability of fertilizers should be greater than in 1954
because of expansion of fertilizer production in the newly opened Kedzierzyn
plant and the expansion of the Chorzow and Tarnow plants. 46
Increases in livestock numbers have been noted. Because of
the emphasis on livestock production as well as increased per capita
human grain consumption, 4/ however, Poland has become a grain-deficit
country and has had to resort to imports to supplement domestic production.
In the past 12 months, Poland imported almost 1 million tons of grain from
non-Bloc countries. / In view of present conditions, it seems likely
that grain production in 1955 will be no greater than the 11 million tons
produced in 1954. / In that case, Poland will have to continue to import
grains to support the present livestock development program and to maintain
the present human consumption pattern.
7. Rumania.
Agricultural production in Rumania in 3.955 probably will be
somewhat greater than that of 1954. In the fall of 1954 some 3.4 million
hectares (chiefly wheat and rye) were seeded for the harvest of 1955.
This was approximately 300,000 hectares more than was seeded in 1953 for
harvest in 1954. 50
Because of more favorable weather, a larger amount of field
work was performed during the fall of 1954 than during the fall of 1953
The winter was relatively mild, with conditions about normal, and fall-
sown crops wintered well. Ground moisture was considerably increased by
above-normal precipitation during the fall and winter months.
Spring field work and sowing were delayed, however, because
of cold weather and continuous rains during March and the beginning of
April. / Because of reported better organization of Machine Tractor
Stations and the increase of other farming equipment, a greater part of
the spring work was completed before the end of April. 52 The rapid
development of weeds necessitated extra work in corn fields, but up to
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daze the development of 11 grains was satisfactory. Favorable weather
in May helped the rapid development of wheat, rye, and barley, O/3 and
abundant ground moisture has given a good start to the corn crop.
The announced government program to increase agricultural produc-
tion in 1955 made specific reference to grain production as the most impor-
tant factor in agricultural development. The 1955 plan calls for a grain
production of 10 million metric tons, of which 60 percent is reflected in
the expanded corn program. The 1954 grain crop was estimated at 6 million
metric tons. 54
The acreage of grain has been slightly expanded, and weather
conditions up to June have been favorable. The prospects for the 1955
grain harvest indicate a somewhat better crop than in 1954, but the planned
figure of 10 million metric tons of grain in 1955 is unrealistic.
E. f~gt?icultural Production.
One -important problem that the European Satellites have in common
is their low agricultural production. This problem was brought to the
attention of the world with the announcement of the "new course" policy
measures in the summer and fall of 1953? These announcements stressed
the fact that agricultural, production had not attained prewar. levels and
in some areas was in a state of decline. Two major reasons were given --
directly, the inadequate agricultural investments, and, indirectly, the
collectivization program.
Investments were immediately increased for agriculture, and in-
creases have continued into 1955. The investments have primarily been
channeled into machinery, fertilizer, buildings, and livestock. As in
the past, the socialized sector was favored.
The collectivization program, which temporarily came to a halt in
some countries and was slowed down in others, came to life. Propaganda
and possibly economic pressures are once again being applied in the country-
side in order to increase the membership of the collectives. All of the
European Satellite governments have announced that eventual socialization
of agriculture is the answer to increasing both agricultural production
and procurement of produce.
One incentive which the European Satellite governments thought
might raise agriculturel production and help procure! a larger share of
the production was an increase of the peasants' sup1dy of manufactured
consumer goods. In 1954, production in light industry was emphasized, and
an increase in the supply of consumer goods to the rural areas was realized.
The increase, however, was not enough to effect an increase in either
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production or procurement in 1954. The budgets in 1955 indicate that al-
though agricultural investments will be increased., the investments for
light industry have been curtailed. This will mean a continued shortage.
of incentive consumer goods that might at least cause the peasant to market
a greater share of his production.
On the basis of these facts, it is estimated that no significant
increases in agricultural output (especially livestock) will take place
in the European Satellites during the next 5 years -- to the extent that
prewar levels will be attained -- other than what may result from excellent
weather in any one year.
The Communists have wiled to consider the importance of the human
element in agricultural production. As long as the peasant knows that he
will eventually have to give up his land and join a collective, there is
no incentive for him to make the increased investments in his farm necessary
to raise crop yields and animal productivity. A similar situation prevails
in the socialist sector, where the collective and state farm members do not
have the personal interest in the tending and caring for field crops and
livestock, resulting in lower production than on privately held land.
This has been proved by Soviet experience. Therefore, should there be a
drive toward complete collectivization of the European Satellite farmers,
or at least a reversion to the pre-"new course" collectivization policy,
agricultural production could well decline. In any event, it is estimated
that the European Satellites, in total, will not be able to increase agri-
cultural output at a rate higher than that of the Increase in population
and that they will not attain prewar levels of production by 1960. Under
present Casmminist policies the problem of trying to establish an agri-
cultural production base adequate to meet requirements will be with the
European Satellites long after 1960.
M. Communist China.
Communist China is faced with new agricultural setbacks which threaten
the industrial development and military modernization programs. To counter
these threats and to maintain exports of foodstuffs, the Peiping regime has
been tightening controls over food consumption in both rural and urban areas.
Some open unrest resulting from these measures has been reported.
The production outlook for the early crops being harvested this month
in most of Coaaaunist Cii.na is poor,' but the harvest; will relieve somewhat
the general food. shortage and the starvation prevalent in certain locali-
ties.
The crops sown last winter, which are about to be harvested, normally
constitute about 30 percent of Commaxnist China's annual food output. These
crops have been hit by a series of disasters -- planting problems caused
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by undrained land, / other aftereffects of ]rust summer's disastrous
floods, 56 a severe winter, f and the spring drought which has affected
all of na except Manchuria and the Yangtze Valley. 181
The Chinese Communist press has already conceded that in the North
China plains, a major wheat-producing area, there have been losses to
the wheat crop as a result of the drought. 2/ The drought in the South
China province of Kwangtung is said by Communist sources to have been
the most severe in more than 90 years. The food situation there is
expected to remain critical until after the late summer rice harvests. 611
Meanwhile, thousands of refugees and destitute farmers are reportedly
fleeing to Macao and Hong Kong. ?J2.
As yet there has been no announcement of mitigation of agricultural
taxes in kind or of quotas for peasants' forced sales, both of which are
set on the basis of norms. To combat the condition of general scarcity,
the Chinese Communist government, which controls the distribution of most
of the country's food, has intensified the austerity campaign by reducing
allocations to both rural and urban markets late this spring. / In
recent months, rationing in cities, first adopted on a wide scale last
year, has been extended to more items in more areas. 64 Recently adopted
urban austerity measures appear designed to reduce the food rations of
population groups less favored by the regime.
Another government action taken this spring to cope with agricultural
problems has been the strengthening of the party cadres, the real rulers
of rural China. / This effort to increase Party control over the
peasants probably indicates that immediately after the 1955 fall harvests
there will be stricter procurement policies and a renewed drive for the
development of Agricultural Producers Cooperatives, an elementary form
of collective.
To cope with food riots in the starvation areas and with other manifesta-
tions of hostility, the Chinese Cammmmunist regime apparently has strengthened
security forces in the countryside. Communist control of any appreciable
area, however, apparently has not been seriously endangered.
Because of the disastrous 1954 floods in the Yangtze Valley, China's
"rice-bowl" area, this year's planned exports of rice to Ceylon -- about
300,000 metric tons -- have been coming fram Canton, / despite the
criticial food situation in South China. Rice exports from South China
to Macao 'were increased in late 1954, and exports to Hong Kong were resumed
in early 1955 after an interval of several years. Moreover, Peiping
continues to ship rice to the USSR. Peiping has contracted to buy from
Burma this year 300,000 metric tons of rice, which will offset part of
the Chinese rice exports.
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The Chinese Communists have often publicly expressed their determina-
tion to export foodstuffs to pay for industrial imports. ..2/ They are
expected to try to maintain net exports at the level of previous years.
Peiping has announced a 1955 food t at calling for an increase of
6 percent over last year' a production. 7 This goal may not be reached
unless the fall harvests are larger than normal. As happened in all other
years since the Communists came to power in 1949, food production on a
grain equivalent basis again may fail to reach the average output of the
prewar years from 1931 to 1937.
These failures, reminiscent of the difficulties experienced in the
CS&( during the early years of Soviet economic development, appear to
have been a principal factor behind the acceleration of socialization
and state controls and the adoption of increasingly harsh austerity
policies in Communist China during the past 2 years. The peasant hostil-
ity aroused by the regime's actions is regarded by some observers Di as
constituting a major potential source of instability -- unless, of course,
the regime chooses to moderate its policies at the expense of the current
rate of industrial and military development.
There are no indications, however, that the regime is inclined toward
such a major shift in its planning. Recent official statements indicate
that Peiping now recognizes that the rise in food output during the first
two Five Year Plans (1953-62) will be limited because of the low priority
assigned to allocation of investment resources to the agricultural sector
of the economy. Peiping has clearly abandoned hopes expressed early in
the first Five Year Plan for an increase of as much as 70 percent in food
output by 1962.
Actually, during the first two Five Year Plans the rise in
food output probably will not exceed 9 or 10 percent and may be much
less. 1:41 Estimated population growth during this period will almost
certainly keep pace with the rise in food production. After that it will
be Impossible to maintain an equilibriums without substantial inputs of
fertilizer.
The two principal means of achieving agricultural increases in China --
the application of chemical fertilizer and the opening up of new land with
mechanized equipment -- will not be attempted on a large scale until the
Third Five year Plan (1963-67), according to a March 1955 / report by
the Minister of Agriculture to the State Council.
It is estimated that the supply of chemical fertilizer in Communist
China will rise from about 500,000 metric tons in 1953 to only 1 million
metric tons in 1960. At least 10 million to 15 million metric tons are
needed to achieve significant crop increases. 7/
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A modest plan to expand acreage during the next 5 to 7 years was
recently announced. The plan envisages the addition of only 6 percent
to Communist China's present cultivated acreage.
Meanwhile, Peiping plans to concentrate on expansion of irrigation
and water conservation works as its main effort to expand food output,
and modest increases can be expected from this program. 76
In view of these unfavorable long-range prospects the rising needs
of the regime for foodstuffs are to be met by an accelerated drive to
increase in several ways the regime's control over agricultural output.
These unfavorable agricultural prospects, the drive toward socialized
fang, and other harsh rural policies of the regime have led some
observers to conclude that during the first two Five Year Plans
there is in Communist China a reasonable possibility of a peasant re-
action similar to that of an important portion of the peasants in the
USSR during its first Five Year Plan. Neither, this possibility nor
that of a more open peasant revolt appears to worry the Communist regime,
which has already developed effective security controls in the country-
side.
Unless such a serious reaction occurred, agricultural failures prob-
ably would have no great effect on Peiping's military plans. The worst
food situation in the regime's history occurred in early 1950. At that
time, Communist China was prepared to invade Formosa, and later in the
year the Chinese Communists intervened in Korea. The food situation
remained poor but was slowly recovering in 1951 and early 1952 when
Peiping committed and supplied acme 700,000 Chinese Communist troops
in the. Korean war.
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Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
have the following significances
Source of Information
Doe. - Documentary
A - Completely reliable
B - Usually reliable
C - Fairly reliable
D - Not usually reliable
E - Not reliable
F - Cannot be judged
Information
1 - Confirmed by other sources
2 - Probably true
3 - Possibly true
4 - Doubtful
5 - Probably false
6 - Cannot be judged
"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments
and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a staff
officer; or information extracted from such documents by a staff
officer, all of which may carry the field evaluation "Documentary."
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the
cited document; those designated "BR" are by the author of this report.
No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation
on the cited document.
1. Selma khoo;ywstvo, 14 Oct 54, U. Eval. RR 2.
Bavkhzn a azeta, 17 Oct 54, U. Eva].. RR 2.
2. Pr , 21 Jan 5, U. Eval. RR 2.
3. Selsk a kho etvo, 10 and 11 )Haj 55, U. Eval. RR 2.
4. Army, Moscow. DA 141660, 21 May 55, W KA 21 AGR, C. Eval. RR 2.
5- Pravda, 6 May 55, U. Evan.. RR 2.
Selsk9ye khozyaystvo, 13 MY 55, U. Eva].. RR 2.
6. Seialoe khowaystvo, 16 and 20 Feb 55, U. e1. RR 2.
7. CIAO nIS, 710&W-3chev Talks at Workers Conference," Daily Report
(U3 and Eastern Europe), 19 M MY 55, p. CC-2, U/tom Vzo,
Eva].. RR 2.
8. Ibid.
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10. CIA. FDD, moary ' no o 46 ' 1 Apr 55, p- 1, C. Eval. RR 2.
i" , 367, 31 Jan 55, p. 2, C. Evert. RR 2.
U. CIA. FBIS, Dai y Report (USSR and Eastern Europe).. 20 May 55,
U/OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
12. CIA. FBIS, Daily Report (U and. Eastern Europe)., 11 Apr 55,
U/QFF
13? IbidUSE. Eva].. RR 2
Ibid.
14. CI FBIS, Aai Report (USSR and Eastern Europe), 6 Oct 54,
U/OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
CIA. FBIS, unpublished, no 11753, 14 Oct 54, U/OFF USE.
Eva].. RR 2.
15. CIA. FBIS, Daily Report (XISM and Eastern Europe), 2 dun 55,
U/OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
16. CIA. FDD, Sane, no 438, 1 A Pr 55, p. 4..6, C. Eva].. RR 2.
17. Ibid.
18. State, Prague. Dsp 275, 17 Feb 55, U/OFF USE. Eva].. RR 2.
19. CIA. FDD, 8, no 357, 24 Jan 55, P. 2, C. Eval. RR 2.
20. CIA. FDD, ftmmr-v. no 402, 14 Mar 55, C., Evert. RR 2.
21. U OFF USE0 .Report (USSR and Eastern Europe), 28 Mr 55,
22. State, Prague. Dap 453, 26 May 55, S. Eval. RR 2.
23. Ot Brit, BBC monitoring Service. ?gmusrZ of World Broadcasts,
no 607, 24 Mar 55, p. 16, U. Eva].. RR 2.
24. CIA. FDD, SPUS-m-ary, no 384, 14 Feb 55, C. Eva].. RR 2.
250 CIAO FDD, SummEMr no 348, 18 Jan 55, p. 5, C. Eval. RR 2.
26. CIA. CS, 29 Nov 54, S/[ ONLY. Eval. RR 3.
27. State, $ICO0, Berlin. Dsp 821, 20 Apr 55, U. val. RR 2.
28. CIA. Current Support Memorandum 261, 23 Mar 55, C.
29. State, ffiCO(4, Berlin. Dsp 821, 20 Apr 55, U. Eva].. RR 2.
30. CIA. CS, 9 May 55, S. Eval. RR 2.
31. State, BICOG, Berlin. Dsp 821, 20 Apr 55, U. Eva.].. RR 2.
CIA. CS, 29 Apr 55, info Feb 55, S. Eval. RR 2.
320 CIA. FBIS, Da Report (MM and Eastern Europe), 20 Apr 55,
U/OA'F USE. Eva,].. RR 2.
33. at Brit, Budapest. F~un~arian Press g@;7. no 269, 16 Nov 54,
U. Eva].. RR 2.
34. Gt Brit, BBC bbnitoring Service. Suwma7 of World Broadcasts,
no 595, 10 Feb 55, U. Eva].. RR 2.
35 ? Ibid..
36. CV7 FBIS, Daily Report (USSR and Eastern Europe).. 5 May 55,
U/OFF USE- Eva].. r
37. CIA. FBIB, Report (USSR and Eastern Europe), 3.8 Mar 55,
P. 00-4, U /MT USE . Eva].. RR 2.
38. CIA. FBIS, Deily Re ort (USSR and Eastern Europe)., no 39,
25 Feb 55, p- 00-2, U U /OFF LSE. Eva].. RR 2.
39. Ibid.
40. ate, Warsaw. Dsp 383, 22 Apr 55, C. Eva].. RR 2.
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41. CIA. FBIS, Daily Report (USSR and Eastern Europe), 3 May 55,
P. GO-l, U/?O'F USE. Eval. RR 2.
42. State, Warsaw. Dsp 483, 3 Jun 55, C. Eva].. RR 2.
43. State, Warsaw. Dsp 154, 12 Oct 54, U/OFF USE Eva].. RR 2.
44. CIA. FBIS, Dai Report (USSR and Eastern Europe), no 54,
18 M 9x 55, p. GG-2, OFFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
45. CIA. FBIS, unpublished., no 30195, 19 Jan 55, U/0PT USE.
Eva].. RR 2.
46. Ibid.
47. CIA. FDD, Sui r ary, no 478, 4 MY 55, U/OPT M. Eval. RR 2.
(tr from Norve drogi, Feb 55, U)
48. State, Antwerp. Dsp 382, 3 May 55, U/c'1. Eval. RR 2.
49. CIA. FDD, em am.. no 478, 4 May 55, U/C1T USE. Eva]... ER 2.
(tr from Norve drQgi. Feb 55, U)
50. CIA. IBIS,
RLdU Report (USSR and Eastern Europe), 9 Mar 55,
U/OFF USE Eva]. 2.
51. fit Brit, BBC Monitoring Service. Sunumar of World Broadcasts
no 613, 10 Apr 55, U. Eval. RR 2. `
52. Ibid., no 620, 9 May 55, U. Eva].. RR 2.
53? CU.- PSIS. Dai Re r`t (USSR and Eastern Europe), 26 MY 55,
tr/nom ,a,, ~,..
54. CIA. ORR Project 10.402, Probable Develo cents in the Euro
Satellites throu0b 1957 aR t o 1960 ( ,unpublished , S.
55? CIA. FBIS, Dai wort Far East , 17 Mar 55
U/OFF USE.
,
Eval. HR 2. citing Communist China, State Council. Resolution
on Spring Cultivation, 3 Mar 55, U)
56. Ibid.
57. Ibict.
58. Ate, Hong Kong. Dsp 2356, 28 M 55, JOINT WEEKA 21, C. Eval. RR
Interior, Weather Bureau. Maps, 1954-55, C. Eva].. RR 2-
59. CIA. PSIS, unpublished., Peiping, 2 Jun 55, U. Eval. BR 2.
60. State, Hong Kong. Survey of the China eland ess, no 1046,
12 May 55, info 11 May 55, U. Eva].. RR 3.
61. State, Hong Kong. Dsp 2417, 3 Jun 55, JOIN WEEKA 22,
S. Eval. RR 3-
62 * Ig,&
63. Ibid.
64. E W., Hang Kong. Dap 2418, 3 Jun 55, JOIN2 WEEKA 22,
C. Eval. RR 2.
Amer, Hong Kong. Dsp 2356, 27 May 55, JOINT WEEKA 21,
S. Eval. RR 2.
65. Ibid.
66. ItY, Bong Kong. Dsp 2417, 3 Jun 55, JOINT' WEEKA 22
S. Eva].. RR 2.
67. State, Colombo. Dsp 515, 21. Apr 55, C. val. RR 2.
68. CIA. OCI, Current Intelligence Digest, 3 M kV 55, item 10,
S. Eval. flR 22.
69. CIA. FBIS, Daily Report (Far East), 17 Mar 55,
U/OFF USE. Eval. RR 2. (citing Coemunist China, State
Council. Resolution on Spring Cultivation? 3 Mar 55, U)
3.
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70. Ibid.
71. State, Hong Kong. Dsp 696, 21 Oct 54, U. Eva].. RR 3-
72. Ibid.
73. CIA. FBIS, Dai Report (Far East), 17 Mar 55, U/OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2. citing CotMuniat China, State Council.
Resolution on Spring Cultivation, 3 Mar 51, U)
74. Shen, T.H. Agricultural Resources of China, Ithaca,
Cornell University Press, 1951, p. 38, U. Eval. RR 2.
75. State, Hong Kong. Survey of the China Mainland Press
no 963.. 5 Jan 55, U. Eval. RR 2.
76. CIA. FBIS, D .i Re ort (Far East), 17 Mar 55, U/OF! USE.
Eva].. RR 2. c ing Ccaamamist China, State Council.
Resolution on Spring Cultivation, 3 Mar 55, U)
77. State, Hong Kong. Dsp 696, 21 Oct 54, U/OFF USE. Eval. RR 3.
78. CIA. OCI, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 24 Feb 55,
S. Eva].. RR 3.
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