CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A001300110001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 7, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
7 October 1952
OCI No. 9394
Copy Noo
Zoo
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports re-
ceived, Comments represent the immediate views of the Office
of Current Intelligence.
STATE, USAF, DIA declassification & release instructions on file
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW,
1. French susceptible to Soviet demands on Austrian treaty: An
25X6 official reported that in a 27 Sep-
tember conversation with a Soviet official the latter argued that
"the Soviet Government was forced to reject the short Austrian
treaty," but that once it was withdrawn, negotiations for a long
draft treaty could be completed quickly.
The American Ambassador believes this conversation indicates
that the USSR is aware that the French are the least enthusiastic
of the Western powers over the short treaty; and that Soviet ef-
forts to obtain its withdrawal will therefore be concentrated on
them. (S Vienna 945, 4 Oct 52)
Comment: Since the Soviet note of 27 September which com-
plete y~ 'rejected Western proposals for an abridged treaty, the
French have appeared willing to accept Soviet insistence upon the
old draft treaty. They apparently assume that the United States
will undertake the financial burdens of Austrian compensation to
the USSR.
20 Soviet refusal to negotiate long-term grain contract seen as
retaliation or British pos tion on rubber exports: T e Britis
Foreign OTfice believes that the Soviet Union a nnegotiated only
a short-term grain contract with Britain at this time because of
Britain's refusal to give firm advance commitments on next year's
rubber exports. The grain contract will expire in January, at
about the same time as British rubber commitments, thus enabling
the USSR to counter British requests for Russian grain with si-
multaneous demands for increased rubber shipments.
Britain has not increased its rubber commitments beyond its
18,000 ton quota for this year. As a result of heavy shipments
early in the year, licenses for rubber exports for the fourth
quarter of 1952 will be far below the level of the first six
months. (C London 1879, 1 Oct 52)
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Comment: The short-term contract, which has been referred to
Moscow or approval, calls for the shipment of 200,000 tons of
grain over a four-month period as compared to the 1951-1952 annual
rate of 1,000,000 tons
SOVIET UNION
3. Status of Ukrainian harvest reported: American Embassy per-
sonnee recently returned to Moscow from-Udessa. report that the
Ukrainian harvest of winter and early spring grain has been com-
pleted. Losses which had been anticipated from flattening of grain
by the weather now seem negligible. Millet, corn and sugar beets
are in the process of being harvested, with a fair crop expected.
Farther north, spring grains remain partially unharvested, while
winter sowings appear satisfactory in all areas.
Speculation over the failure to announce the fulfillment of
compulsory grain deliveries has increased, since activity at most
Ukrainian grain procurement points has ceased and most of the grain
harvest in the southern regions has been successfully completed.
(C Moscow 591, 1 Oct 52)
Comment: It now appears that the Ukrainian .grain crop will
approximate normal yields in spite of the late spring and difficult
harvesting conditions. The protracted delay in announcing the ful-
fillment of compulsory grain deliveries may be due to a decision
to withhold such information until it can be fully publicized at
the current party congress:
4. Interdenominational peace conference held in Sofia: A "na-
tional interdenominational peace conference" was held in Sofia on
5 October. Delegates of all religious denominations in Bulgaria
were present at the meeting, which was convened on the initiative
of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. A "representative of Catholics
in Bulgaria" delivered a speech condemning "the criminal actions
of a group of Catholic priests," and stated that "all honest Cath-
olics in Bulgaria are on the side of peace and will make every
effort to preserve it," (R FBIS Ticker, - 5 Oct 52) STATSPEC
Comment: The Communist-dominated Orthodox Church has for
some time been a useful propaganda instrument in the hands of the
regime. The convention of the interdenominational peace confer-
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ence reflects the success of Bulgarian efforts to usurp control of
other religious groups for similar propaganda purposes.
The policy of cutting off churches from foreign contacts, as
set forth in the 1949 "Law for the Cults," was brought to its cul-
mination on 3 October with the conviction and sentencing in Sofia
of a group of alleged Catholic "spies." A group of Protestant
pastors was similarly convicted and sentenced in 1949.
5. Russians sell 69 former German companies to Hungary: On 3
October the Hungarian press announced the signing o an agreement
between Hungary and the USSR for the sale to Hungary of 69 Soviet
enterprises in that country formerly owned by Germans. Joint Sov-
iet-Hungarian companies, which dominate the key oil, aluminum,
bauxite, shipping and air transport industries, will continue to
operate under former agreements.
The American Legation in Budapest reports that the Soviet Union
had originally seized over 200 German firms and that virtually all
either have now been sold to Hungary or are jointly operated by the
US3R and Hungary.
The Legation believes. that Hungary will have to pay for these
firms by increasing exports to the USSR to offset the end of re-
parations payments next January, ana that it has had to agree to
greater Soviet control over the joint companies. (R Budapest 314,
and 317, 3 Oct 52)
6. Polish troops back in winter quarters: The Polish Army defin-
itely has returned to winter quarters from summer field training
and maneuver areas. American Embassy officials report that the
army is now being put to work on the late harvest, and on such con-
struction projects as railroads, public buildings and communication
lines. (S Warsaw Joint Weeka 92, 3 Oct 52)
Comment: For the second year now, information on the return
of Polish xnits to winter garrison was first available from the
Polish press, highlighting the inability of Western officials in
Poland to secure reliable warning of troop movements.
7. Church episcopate directs Catholics to vote in Polish elections:
The episcopate o t e Catholic Church in Poland has declared in a
public statement that it is a moral duty for Poles to vote in the
forthcoming elections. According to the statement, participation
in the elections will enable Poles to express support for the con-
solidation of internal unity and the safeguarding of peace, and
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also to acknowledge that the common efforts of all citizens are
needed by Poland for reconstruction'and for the defense of Polish
rights to the"recovered territories." In addition, the declaration
states that Poles will be able to express their faith that the
principles of the church-state agreement of April 1950 will be
observed in the work of the new Sejm,
U.S. :Embassy officials in Warsaw comment that this is apparent-
ly another effort of the church to achieve'a modus vivendi with the
state without sacrificing basic principles, They add, however,
that the official Communist newspaper currently continues to attack
Vatican support for German revisionists, (S Warsaw Joint Weeka 92,
3 Oct 52)
Comment: The statement by the episcopate is in accordance
with recent articles in the Polish Catholic press which have ad-
vocated participation in the elections, While Archbishop Wyszynski
has supported the state in non-church matters, he has seriously
opposed recent government measures to undermine the church-state
agreement,
8.
Rumanians reorganize heavy industry administration:
The
Ru-
manian Ministry of Metallurgical and Chemical
Industries
has
been
divided into two new ministries, one for each
rest 110, 3 Oct 52)
industry,
(C Bucha-
Comment: This split follows a similar division of the Ministry
of Petroleum and Coal Industries in late August and copies the Sov-
iet pattern of breaking down economic ministries according to spe-
cific expanding industries. It also reflects the increasing build-
up of Rumanian industry with the aid of other more industrialized
Satellites, In June a joint Rumanian-Hungarian. chemical company
was set up, and in September a joint company was formed with East
Germany for exploiting Rumania's chemical resources,
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9, Soviet aircraft penetrates deep into. Japanese territory:
Radar plots in ica e that two aircraft, presuma y Soviet, on
1 October overflew northeastern Hokkaido, one penetrating to
a depth of 55 miles. This aircraft flew southward as far as
Kushiro in the deepest overflight of Japanese territory yet
noted. The other plane reached the vicinity of the radar
site at Nemuro in a possible test of US tracking capabilities.
(S FEAF INTSUM 829, AX1405C, 3 Oct 52)
Comment: These overflights, together with those of 20
and 2 4ep ember, suggest initiation of a Soviet air recon-
naissance program in the Hokkaido area.
10. Communist jets in combat over eastern Korea: On 4
October Navy conventional ig er- om ers, raiding an
airfield near Hamhung in eastern Korea, were unexpectedly
attacked by four Communist MIG-15's. One US aircraft was
shot down during the 90-second encounter and the enemy jet
departed northward unscathed.
American pilots claim to have heard Chinese-language
radio chatter during the encounter and have stated that the
enemy was under "positive GCI control prior to and during
the attack." (S CINCFE Telecon 6209, 5 Oct; R COMNAVFE
OPINTSUM 1186, 4 Oct 52)
Comment: The brief duration of the encounter, in ad-
dition To pilot reports and observations, supports the belief
that the Communist GCI network, reported in northwestern Korea,
has been expanded to eastern Korea. It is probable that the
enemy jets were from fields in Manchuria.
Although an isolated incident, it is possible that this
attack may be the forerunner of an enemy effort to afford a
degree of air cover to the long, vulnerable, east coast
supply line. Previously UN pilots have had to contend only
with antiaircraft fire in this area.
11. Mongolian troops reported in North Korea:
o have talked w t a Mongo an
officer, reported that 1,200 Mongolian cavalry troops moved
from central Korea to a position near the western front in
late September.
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Firm
Comment: The solidarity of the Communist Far East has
been emp as zed in recent weeks, with Sino-Mongolian relations
given prominence. Although to date Mongolia's part in the
Korean conflict has been minimal, consisting of contributions
of food, clothing and livestock and promises of "assistance,"
it is possible that in line with. recent developments a token
force of Mongol cavalry has been sent to. Korea.
The presence of Mongolian troops in Korea has often been
reported in the past but has not yet been confirmed.
12. Russian article refers to China's first Five-Year Plan:
Excerpts from a Pray a ar c e rod cas by Radio Moscow on
1 October included the statement that the "outlines of. the
first Five Year Plan for the economic and cultural develop-
ment of China are now being. elaborated o itiative of
the Communist Party of China." (R FBIS 3 Oct 52) STATSPEC
Comment: Peiping has not announced an over-all Five
Year PTan r China, although such plans have been prepared
for certain sectors of the economy, for example, the Five
Year Irrigation Plan in the Central-South District. A
comprehensive economic plan in Chira is foreshadowed by the
study now being undertaken of the production capacity of the
country's machine factories.
13. Peiping- Colombo agreement guarantees continued rubber
sales To China: Ra o Peiping announced at the governments
o Ceylon and Communist China signed a trade. agreement in
Peiping on 4 October. China is to ship 80,000 tons of rice
"within a short period" to ease Ceylon's food shortage, and
in return the government of Ceylon guarantees that Peiping
will be able to use the proceeds from its rice exports to
buy rubber on the Ceylon market. (R FBIS 5 Oct 52 )3TATSPEC
Comment: Ceylon, China's principal source of raw
rubber :Tor the past year, has been under pressure from the
United States to stop such traded This agreement will insure
for Communist China continued availability of Ceylonese
rubber.
Communists flood Hong Kong market with China products:
The Crinese CommunlstO, havebeen oo ng Hong Kong with
goods in the past six weeks, and August shipments to the
colony have reached a record high for the year. Hong Kong
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traders are.of the opinion that the Communists have abandoned
their hopes of forcing up world prices and are'now willing to
clear their stocks to obtain foreign exchange. (R Hong Kong
875, Joint Weeka 40, 3 Oct 52)
Comment: Observers from the Communist mainland have
repore a -scarcity of warehouse space to accommodate the
backlog of unshipped cargo. With the end of Peiping's anti-
vices campaign against the bourgeoisie, it was expected that
business would improve and merchants would succeed in moving
their inventories.
15. Nationalists tell mainland guerrillas invasion plans
almost compete : T e Political Department of the Min-Ts-Try
of National Defense, headed by the Generalissimo's elder son
Chiang Ching-kuo, in an open letter to the mainland guerrillas,
declared that preparations for an attack on the mainland are
almost completed.
The Kuomintang's Central Daily News on 22 September said
the Korean hostilities were only part o the global war
against Communism. The possible use. of Nationalist troops
in Korea, therefore, was only a side issue, since they also
had the burden of retaking the China mainland. The article
implied that the troops should be reserved for the counter-
offensive. (C Taipei Joint Weeka 40', 3 Oct 52)
Comment: Chiang Ching-kuo has stated that the Nation-
alists c-an be ready to launch an attack on the mainland in
six months if the United States provides air and naval
support
The failure of the Kuomintang in the past to live up
to its claims of invading'the mainland has reportedly
caused the people there to lose faith.
16. Six foreign Communists present at
Indonesian
conference: national conference of B , n onesia s
ommun s -led and largest labor federation, opened on 27
September for the announced purpose of "consolidating
SOBSI, expanding labor. and national fronts, and tightening
SOBSI-WFTU contacts." Present at the conference were two
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representatives of the WFTU and two Communist leaders each
from the Netherlands and Australia. The American Embassy
comments that the congress probably resulted from pressure
by WFTU headquarters, which has expressed disappointment
over the lack of contact with Indonesia. (C Djakarta 626,
3 Oct 52)
17. Burmese Communists reported expanding activities into
Shan State: a urmese Home Minister stated In par ament
that a state of emergency had been declared in the Shan State
because of insecurity in the area. The American Embassy in
Rangoon has been informed that martial law will probably be
declared in the vicinity of Lashio along the Chinese border
and in the southern part of the Shan State. The Embassy
comments that this action was probably motivated by a com-
bination of rumors that Chinese-trained subversives were
filtering into the Shan State and of army pressure forcing
local Communists northward. (C Rangoon 544, 3 Oct 52)
Comment: The Shan State has heretofore been relatively
peace! I. l owever, the shortage of Government security
forces there has made it an attractive area for penetration
by Communists from both China and lower Burma.
18. Independent home guard reportedly formed in Indian
Kashmir: Kin New e i forwards a report
that at least one home guar attalion was formed in Indian-
held Kashmir between May and Augusta The new guard is com-
posed entirely of Kashmiri Hindus. It is said to be distinct
from the Kashmir militia and the state police, and is not
controlled by the Indian army.
Guard units operate independently along the cease-fire
line between Indian-held and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir
and Indian army commanders resent their activities. The
guard apparently has intelligence contacts in Pakistani
territory. 1 Aug 52)
Comment: Since the Kashmir militia is now controlled
by the :n ian army, the organization of a home guard would
appear to be an unpublicized attempt by Sheikh Abdullah,
who favors the independence of Kashmir, to develop an
indigenous armed force completely independent of Indian
influence.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
19. France is considering alternate solution to Tunisia
asking the Tunisian Government to i caeioathe
present its case to the
High Council of the French Union on condition that if an
agreement is reached, Tunisia will request the Arab-Asian
group to withdraw the case from the UN agenda.
25X6
a previous plan of Auriol's
to settle the question was blocked by Foreign Minister
Schuman on the advice of the Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs . and. Senator Colonna of Tunisia. 25X1A
Comment: Settlement in the High Council would be un-
likely because French colonists in Tunisia will continue to
exert pressure on Paris to make no concessions. It is diffi-
cult to envisage a Tunisian delegation which would be accept-
able both to the colonists and to the nationalists.
20. Moroccan chieftain's visit to UN may be to support France:
of Marrakech, will visit the United States thisvmonthyatetheaata
request of the French Residency General in Rabat as a "spon-
taneous volunteer" witness for the French thesis in the event
of UN discussion about Morocco. 25X1A
Comment: El Glaoui is reportedly a member of a nation-
alist e-Ngation which will attend UN hearings on Arab-Asian
charges of French excesses in Morocco. Another report from
Tangier that El Glaoui had broken with the Residency General
may have been inspired by the French to add credence to any
statements which he is likely to make in support of France.
21, American acceptance of Moroccan entertainment protested:
The French es ency General in Raba strongly protested
the acceptance by American naval personnel of invitations to
luncheon and tea with a prominent Moroccan family residing in
Tangier on the grounds that nationalists will also be present.
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A heavy entertainment schedule has been arranged for the
visiting naval units, and American officials consider the
Moroccan invitation a nonpolitical, goodwill gesture.
(S Tangier 138, 2 Oct 52)
Comment: This protest is reminiscent of the Resident
General"'s denunciation of the American. Consul in Rabat in
October 19.51. At that time the Resident threatened to ask
for the Consul's recall if he continued to see nationalists.
Kenya legislates against tribal secret society: On
1 Octo5er the Kenya legislature approved sweeping emergency
measures aimed at destroying the Mau Mau secret society
which in its. effort to drive European settlers from the
country has been responsible for the murder of at least 20
whites and Africans in this British colony. The Colonial
Office has agreed to these legislative measures and they will
be enforced immediately. They provide for rigid restriction
of the movements of the society's members, control of the
press, registration of non-labor societies, permission for
the legal use of confessions to the police, and a vast
increase in the penalties for sedition. (R FBIS London,
1 Oct 52)
Comment: This native secret society was formed in 1947
to awaken Tie largest tribe in Kenya to the dangers of increased
European landholding. The Mau Mau maintains its secret identity
by oath-taking ceremonies and terrorization of the tribal
population. Since a curfew was imposed by the government in
August, violence against white settlers has increased.
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WESTERN EUROPE
23. East German statements on Rothensee ship-lift reportedly
forbi end as rman waterway-officials have reporte ly been
forbidden to discuss the key Rothensee ship-lift on the Mittelland
Canal with West Germans or the Allies.
This report, together with an earlier East German statement
that repairs on the lift had been completed so that it could be
opened on 28 September, has led HICOG officials to believe that
the lift may be being kept closed for political reasons. (C Bonn
1500, 4 Oct 52)
Comment: Various reports have indicated that the Rothensee
lift, c ose on 1 August 1952, did in fact need repairs, although
the total. work was supposed to take only four weeks.
24. Chuikov note seen as attempt to justify new Berlin harass-
ment . o. is a is in Bonn believe that the recent note
176-m Soviet General Chuikov to the Allied High Commissioners
reflects Soviet concern over Allied charges against the Com-
munist kidnapping of Dr. Linse and was designed to justify both
past and future measures aimed at isolating West Berlin. The
note is seen as also reflecting concern that various anti-
Communist groups in Berlin are effectively hampering Communist
efforts to consolidate control over East Germany.
In demanding that the cited anti-Communist groups be banned
by the Allies, the USSR may also be trying to plant the idea
that Linse might be freed in return, and to take advantage of
certain West German and West Berlin opposition, particularly in
church4circles, to the activities of West Berlin resistance
organizations. (S Bonn 1507, 5 Oct 52)
25, West Germans may not reply to East German unity proposals.
The Les German Bundestag is not cons er ng a direct communi-
cation to the East German government in reply to the unity
proposals brought to Bonn by the Volkskammer delegation on
19 September. American representatives in Bonn state that
although there is some disagreement among the deputies, the
most the Bundestag will do is pass a resolution declaring that
direct negotiations with the puppet East German regime are out
of the question.
The Social Democrats are opposed to such a resolution, pre-
ferring to let the matter die a natural death, (C Bonn 1492,
3 Oct 52)
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Comment: The Volkskammer letter asked the Bundestag to
send a.H egation to Berlin for further unity discussions, and
suggested simultaneous discussions of various items on the
.unity agenda. Elements in the coalition parties were revealed
as welcoming the East German visit to Bonn, but their attitude
toward the proposals has not been clarified.
26. West German Socialists hold aloof from EDC work for "con-
sistenc oug onn coalition leaders are sappo me by
e ecsion of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) not to
participate in the work of the EDC ad hoc assembly, the party's
leaders, including Chairman Ollenhauer admit privately that they
will participate after the EDC treaty goes into effect. They
explain that they must appear consistent in their opposition
to EDC, and are therefore reluctant to help French ratification.
HICOG believes that if European integration plans succeed,
the SPD may decide in a relatively short time to discard its
policy on integration, so that its shift will not come so close
to next year's election as to be embarrassing. On the other
hand, if integration plans seem to be failing, the party may
increase its propaganda against "Little Europe."
As a result of two meetings between Ollenhauer and
Chancellor Adenauer, a "change of atmosphere" is already notice-
able in Bonn. (C Bonn 1493, 3 Oct 52)
27, West German Socialist evidence of French-Soviet talks held
unconvincing: ante or enuer, w o a as ed for t e
ev enc. on which West German Socialist Wehner based his
charges of French-Soviet negotiations to preserve the status
quo in Germany, now states that Wehner has failed to produce
"anything serious" in the way of documentation.
To "support" his charges, Wehner merely referred with
suspicion to contacts of French officials with Soviet repre-
sentatives in Moscow and Berlin, to alleged contacts in
Switzerland, to pro--Soviet remarks of a French labor leader, and
to the Soviet unity notes, which he considers directed mainly
at France. Wehner also noted the continued existence of the
French-Soviet pact of 1944, and his suspicion that the USSR
will relax tension in Europe to make Germany appear the main
danger to France. (S Bonn 1505, 4 Odt 52; C Bonn 1498, 4 Oct
52)
Comment: Wehner's charges seem to spring chiefly from
the Soc al Democratic fear that France will always oppose the
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unification of Germany. French Foreign Minister Schuman has told
Aden.auer that the Frenchmen at the meeting in Switzerland were
Communists.
the political-economic situation in Austria has weakened in the
last year and is in some respects alarming. Mounting discourage-
ment over the stalemated state treaty discussions, friction within
the coalition government, a high foreign trade deficit, and
greater acceptance in some quarters of East-West trade propaganda
are cited as evidence of this deterioration.
Although inflation has been "substantially arrested," these
officials believe that the more immediate and discouraging
problem is the maintenance of "tenuous stabilization" in the face
of the politically difficult problem of unemployment. They are
hopeful that Soviet efforts to exploit this basic instability
will be defeated by unfavorable public reaction to continued
Soviet intervention in Austrian domestic affairs. (C Vienna TOMUS
205, 3 Oct 52)
g year.
American massy and officials in Vienna no now e e t t
Austrian position held "deteriorated" durin last
Comment: Forthcoming national elections are expected to make
decis ve ustrian action in meeting economic problems still more
difficult. The outlook for a noninflationary budget, improved
credit controls, and firm action against restrictive business
practices is still not considered bright.
29. Schuman's vulnerability on Tunisia stressed: Henri Teitgen,
the Popular Repu can lea er in the French National Assembly,
warns that unless Foreign Minister Schuman can demonstrate that
the United States is solidly behind France in the UN on the
Tunisian question, he will probably be forced out of office.
Teitgen, who anticipates a foreign policy debate soon after the
Assembly reconvenes on 7 October, states that without Schuman
the French Government could probably not carry out his European
integration policies, (C Paris 2079, 4 Oct 52)
Comment: In any parliamentary showdown on Schuman's
Tunis an po icy, his critics would probably be joined by opponents
of European integration who are unwilling to tip their hand on
that issue, and by deputies who prefer an oblique attack on
Premier Pinay's economic policies,
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30. Italian Government to crack down on Communists in Sicily:
The Italian Government Initiating a more aggressive po icyy
toward Communists in Sicily. According to a reliable report,
the prefects of Palermo and Trapani will soon be replaced by of-
ficials better equipped to deal, forcefully with subversive ac-
tivities of the extreme left in these provinces.
A number of retired and separated Italian army officers are
allegedly prepared to take over command of the Communist clan-
destine armed groups. (C Palermo 45, 2 Oct 52)
Comment; This is the first indication of government concern
over ommun st clandestine activities in Sicily. The government
may be intending to use the island as a test case in order to
refute charges of the right that it is unable to check Communism.
It has long been known that a considerable number of Italian
army officers of reserve or retired status are pro-Communist in
their sympathies.
Bevan's success at party conference seen benefiting British
Labor mo eratees: The American Embassy in London el eves t Hat
the ong-term effects of the British Labor Party conference may
be good if the moderate leaders now concentrate on educating
the rank and file and working out a constructive policy as an
alternative to Bevanismo The official party leadership has been
"jolted" out of its complacency and will be urged and aided by
trade union leaders to reassert its control of the party. The
Embassy notes that Attlee's seemingly apathetic attitude en-
gendered some resentment among the delegates while both Morrison
and Gaitskell emerged from the conference with added prestige.
For the immediate future, the Embassy considers that the
Bevanites will exert more influence on party policies. However,
if they should gain two or three seats in the opposition's
shadow cabinet, they would probably be forced to assume responsi-
bility for a "coalition" Labor policy. (R London 1984, 4 Oct 52)
32, Bolivian officials do not expect mass disturbances to ac-
company tin nations izat on: After consulting wit Bolivian
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SECRET
government officials and mining technicians, the American Embassy
in La Paz is inclined to discount a rumor that the miners may
attempt-mass seizure of the "big three" tin mines when nation-
alization is announced. Some disturbances are possible,
especially if. the miners are harangued by extremist agitators,
but the government hopes to keep the situation under control,
(C La Paz 108, 2 Oct 52)
Comment: Some extremist labor leaders differ with the
government s view that the tin companies should be compensated
for expropriation of their properties. They would like to
convince the miners that the central labor federation, rather
than the government party, brought about nationalization.
Nationalization is expected shortly after the study com-
mission renders its report on 7 October. President Paz recently
mentioned 20 October as a probable date.
National Directorate of Colombian Liberal Party "recesses":
Following t e ex a on 1 October of D rectors Lleras Restrepa
and ex-President Alfonso Lopez, the Liberal Party's National
Directorate has recessed. (R FBIS - 3 Oct 52)
Comment: The departure of Colombia's two top liberals was
precut.a by the 6 September Conservative mob assault on
their homes, The recess of the Directorate, which leaves no
Liberal Party organization for the Urdaneta administration to
deal with, is further proof of Colombia?s deteriorating political
situation.
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TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
7 October 1952
CIA No. 49827
Copy No.
37
TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT-
TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
(including S/S Cables)
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
TOP SE CR E T
SECURITY INFORMATION
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THIS MA '....4IAL CONTAINS INFORMATION'. AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DET is ?a 3E OF TUB UNITED STATES 7i l Tfi i THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE. LAWS, TITLE; 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF NHTIC H IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROIIBITED BY LAUD.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
25X1 C
1. Indonesian Cabinet crisis reported imminent:
imminent The larger in the country, the Masjumi, has
decided to withdraw support from the Minister of Defense if
he, in turn, refuses to discharge the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces. The National Party, Indonesia's second largest
political organization, is willing to cooperate with the Mas-
umi in its proposed action. 25X1A
1FOR CRITICAL SECURITY REASONS this report is not to
be further transmitted within the United States. or beyond the
borders of the United States without the express permission
of the releasing office.)
Comment: The Defense Ministry was subjected to strong,
leftist-inspired parliamentary criticism in September. During
these attacks, however, neither the Masjumi nor the National
Party joined in the censure of the Minister of Defense.
If the report of the Masjumi decision to withdraw support
from the Defense Minister is true, there is an imminent possi-
bility of a cabinet crisis or even the fall of the cabinet.
However, other information indicates that both the Masjumi and
the National Party hope to avoid a cabinet crisis and will
support the Minister of Defense on a nonconfidence motion
scheduled for 10 October.
2.
Denmark remains firm towards USSR: Hans Hedtoft, chairman
of the Social Democratic Party,
Ambassador that the chairmen of
Denmark, with the exception of
has
all
the
informed the American
political parties in
Communist, support the
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government's intention not to answer the recent Soviet note
for at least a month, The Communists were not consulteda
Hedtoft believes that the Soviet note will help him over-
come opposition within his party to the stationing of NATO
forces in Denmark. (TS S/S Copenhagen 417, 4 Oct 52)
Comment: The Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister informed
the Da=sinister on lOctober that the granting of bases in
Denmark would be considered a "threat to tie security of the
USSR." While the Danish Government has not granted any bases,
it plans to construct airfields to NATO specifications and
is engaged in educating the public as to the need for ul-
timately permitting the stationing of NATO air units in Den-
mark,
2 7 Oct 52
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