CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A001100130001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 14, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
CURRENT4INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
14 July 1952
OCI No. 6439
Copy Nob
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports re-
ceived. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office
of Current Intelligence.
State Dept. review completed RETURN T WNW S1, RECORDS (TH
IMMEDIATELY WE USE
SECRET . JOB ` Box- 1
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS, 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
Xo Stalemate developing over repatriation of Venezuelan and
Czech missions-. The zec oregn n s ry has rejected t e
Venezuelan `cemand for the simultaneous departure of the
Venezuelan mission from Prague and the remaining Czech diplomatic
staff from Caracas, and continues to insist on the prior de-
parture of the Czech staff from Venezuela.
The American Embassy in Prague suggests that in order to
prevent a stalemate and the possibility of the matter being
brought before the UN, Venezuela inform Czechoslovakia that
the Czech staff will leave Caracas on a certain date and that
Venezuela expects comparable facilities to be granted its
staff. The Embassy believes that the Czechs would be agreeable
to such a solution. (S Prague 22, 10 July 52)
Comment-. The Venezuelan Government broke relations with
Czechos ova is on 21 June. The major part of the Czech Lega-
tion departed from Caracas on 25 June, leaving Minister
Vladimir Khek and two staff members.
Czechoslovakia's intransigence on the question'of the
order of departure of the two diplomatic missions is believed
to stem from its anger at the Venezuelan break and its fear
of the possibility of the defection of Khek, a non-Communist
professional diplomat who has been stationed in Caracas since
before the Czech Communist coup, Two other important Czech
diplomatic representatives in Latin America have defected since
March,
EASTERN EUROPE
2, Czechoslovakia and Poland pattern economic planning more
closely on Soviet model-. resa ent ierut o Po an an !.e'
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State Planning Office in Czechoslovakia have both initiated
action to introduce new methods of planning economic develop-
ments to accord with Soviet experience and practice. The
Czech Government will exercise detailed planning and accounting
.supervision over individual enterprises to insure that investment and capital development take place only in those economic
sectors specified by government planners. In Poland the use
and distribution of material resources will be controlled cen-
trally, and in both countries more workers and university
student a trained in tec d engineering fields.
STAT (It FBIS 9 July P2; FBIS 20?24 June 52)
Comment. The to Satellites which are industrially most
produces ve are . introducing more exti.cme economic controls in
an effort to ensure that all labor and raw material resources
are utilized for fulfillment of state plans. Increased em-
phasis is expected either on armaments production in these
countries, or on the increased production of such items for
export to the USSR as agricultural, engineering and transporta-
tion equipment which would free Soviet industrial resources
for armaments production and research for new types of mill-
tarry end items
3. Soviet cleric reportedly rejected as candidate for
Bulgarian a r arc ate. ccor ng to a; repor emanat ng from
We renc Lega ton 1n Sofia, Metropolitan Nikolai visited
Sofia during June as the Kremlin-chosen candidate for election
to a restored Bulgarian Patriarchate. The Metropolitan is
reported to have met united opposition on the part of hostile
Bulgarian bishops, who were able to effect the rejection of
Nikolai?s candidacy. (S Athens 103, 9 July 52)
Comment: Nikolai, Metropolitan of Krutitsy and Kolomna9
visits u garia during May and June. A leading member of the
World Peace Council, he was received with considerable acclaim
upon his arrival in Sofia.
There have been persistent rumors that the Exarchate in
Bulgaria will soon be raised to a Patriarchate, presumably by
ukase from Patriarch Alexei in Moscow. Although the choice
of a Bulgarian cleric for this office would appear to be a
more promising, and certainly a more diplomatic, maneuver, it
is noteworthy that in 1951 another Russian, Boris, was ele-
vated to the post of Archbishop.of Berlin and Exarch of Western
Europe,
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STAT
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4. Increased leniency reportedly being shown political
French reports in bcate that increased leniency ^isdbeing shown
toward political prisoners in Bulgaria. Included among several,
reported to have been released from long term imprisonment are
General Truneki and his staff, and General Georgiev, (S Athens
103, 9 July 02)
Comment: General Slavcho Trunski, formerly Commander of
the T-ir rmy, and General Zdravko Georgiev, believed to be
a former Chief of Bulgarian Military Intelligence, were re-
portedly arrested during the summer of 1951.
If true, this report might further reflect a move toward
the recall aqd reinstatement to active duty of Bulgarian Army
officers of doubtful political reliability, a policy possibly
necessitated by increased demands on the part of the expanding
Bulgarian military for competent; and experienced leaders.
5o Budapest speculates whether Soviet Ambassador Kiselev
will be rep ace by a Russian atc eimano T e appointments
o Soviet m asst ors Lavrentiev to Buc artist and Bogomolov
to Prague have aroused speculation in Budapest that the ab-
sence of Ambassador Kiselev since the end of June may forecast
his replacement by a Russian hatchetmano (C Budapest 25, 10
July 52)
Comment: Such speculation naturally would arise in Buda-
pest because of the diplomatic shifts at Prague and Bucharest,
this tension that has existed since mid-May, and the recurring
rumors of purges of important personalities. Kiselev was ap-
pointed to his present post in .1949. He had been consul gener-
al in New York, political representative to the Austrian Federal
Government and chief of the Balkan Section in the Soviet Foreign
Office. It is possible that he might be transferred from Buda-
pest in the normal course of events, since he has been there
almost three years.
6. Hungarian party newspaper calls for militant leadership
in agricu ureo arty act vis s w o have snub a "nonpar,y
acTivlsts" were condemned by the Hungarian official party organ
on 9 July, The article belabored the smugness of party members
who ignored the recent directive of the Central Committee urging
closer cooperation between party organizations and the working
masses and thereby allowed village priests a d kulaks to assume
leadership in the villages. (R FBIS 10 July 52) STAT
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Comment: The Hungarian Party Central Committee on 27-28
June demanded a return to militant communism and the present
article appears to apply the new line to agriculture. As in
other Orbit countries, the new policy may take, the form of a
return to the National Front, headed by the party, "vanguard"
of the worker-peasant alliance, against an enemy that the
present article clearly identifies with the clergy and kulakso
The US Legation in Budapest believes that the new line
may foreshadow a speed-up of collectivization after the harvest,
in contrast to. the more moderate policy that has prevailed
since the winter of 1950-510
7, Poles expected to press Austria for strategic items: The
Polish Trade Delegation,: schedule to arrive in Vienna in mid-
July, is expected to exert strong pressure to secure strategic
items from the Austrians. According to the American. Embassy
in Vienna, the Poles have already threatened to take economic
countermeasures if the Austrians do not agree to send List I
items agreed to previous to the Battle Act, The Poles are es-
pecially interested in E-type ball bearings and aluminum.
(13 Vienna 85 and 98, 9 and 10 July 52)
Comment: Austria is expected to remain faithful to her
commitments -to COCOM, and to continue to refuse to deliver em-
bargoed bearings to the Poles.
For some time Orbit countries, especially Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, and Hungary, have been attempting to circumvent COCOM
in an effort to procure such critical items as ball bearings,
aluminum and ferro-chrome from the West.
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FAR EAST
9. Major Japanese labor federation probably to
postpone
affiliation T e conven ions o f eemajorunions
rnem ers o e enera Council of Trade Unions (Sohyo), have
in the past 60 days declined to affiliate with ICFTU, according
to Ambassador Murphy in Tokyo. It presently appears that
Sohyoos executive board will propose and the national conven-
tion will adopt a recommendation that unions not presently
affiliated with ICFTU take favorable action by 31 May 1953.
At that time Sohyo will affiliate without further action pro-
viding two thirds of the member unions are affiliated.
A principal argument of opposition forces, the Ambassador
reports, has been that too close an alliance would increase
the possibilities of war. (C Tokyo 142, 11 July 52)
Comment: Sohyo, which is closely affiliated with the
neutra any=minded left-wing Socialists, has been wrangling over
ICFTU membership for more than a year, but it had been expected
to join at its national convention later this month.
There has been speculation that failure to affiliate
would cause some national industrial unions to split away from
Soh.yo, Japan's largest labor federation, and form a new
organization.
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25X1
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25X1
X1
Peiping allegedly planning major military move in late
July.25X1
stating that the Peiping regime will make
a major move in the near future, and thnt
be completed in late July.
25X1
Comment.
man recently asserted that Peiping had been ordered by Moscow 25X1
to be ready for world war by autumn. Neither 25X1
known source of information except 25X1
According to an report, the USSR and Communist
China are to reach a na decision" on the Korean cease-fire
talks before 20 July. There is no reliable evidence, however,
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that the Chinese Communists are planning a military venture
in any direction during July.
13, Heavy pork shipments from China to USSR reportedly for
military use: -East China 25X1
stateca TFat the Chinese Communist authorities are shipping
slaughtered hogs to the USSR in refrigerator cars. According
tol the hogs are being used in the manu-
facture of canned foods as part of Soviet."war preparations."
(R Hong Kong 70, Joint Weeka 28, 11 July 52)
Comment: Since the observations were made in China rather
than inert a USSR, the report that the hog shipments are in-
tended for the Soviet war stockpile must be evaluated as second
hand. The fact that large shipments have begun, however, is
unquestioned. The Chinese themselves have announced a large
hog procurement program in East China, declaring that shipments
to the Soviet Union in late March and early April averaged
more than 2,000 head daily.
14. Chinese increase purchases from Hong Kong and Macao: The
Level o ommun st pure has ng n Hong Kong and continues
to rise, with strategic metals and pharmaceuticals high on the
priority list. Recorded exports from Hong Kong to Communist
China jumped from 28 million. Hong Kong dollars in May to 44
million in June, the highest figure this year. (R Hong Kong
70, Joint Weeka 28, 11 July 52)
Comment: The resumption of buying by merchants from the
Chinese ma nland has been encouraged by the cessation of
Peiping's campaign against the bourgeoisie. The buying, how-
ever, is still on a far lower scale than it was in 1951. Hong
Kong's June exports to China were less than a third of the
corresponding figure for 19510
15, Chinese Communists push economic development of Sinkiang:
Sinkiang rovince, or er ng on the i.n China's nor west,
is humming with economic activity, according to a report
25X1C The road
into Sinkiang from China proper is reportedly congested with
truck convoys transporting both men and equipment. Construc-
tion within the province is said to be going on day and night
as the Communists build new roads, install new equipment, and
pipe natural gas to newly constructed plants, (CI )
25X1A
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Comment-I
in 1951 alleged that Peiping had drafted a three-year plan for
Sinkiang which provided for the construction of an iron and
steel mill, textile mills, a motor vehicle factory, pharmaceu-
tical plants, arsenals and other installations. Other reports
have cited the movement of thousand of unemployed persons and
political prisoners for forced labor service in Sinkiang.
Russian participation in the economic development of
Sinkiang is assured through the Sino-Soviet joint stock com-
panies organized to exploit the petroleum, uranium, and other
mineral resources of the area.
16. Foreign Office advises delay on plan for British trade
group in Mina; Representatives o several British rms in
ong ong an Shanghai have requested permission from Chinese
Communist authorities to visit Peiping to discuss plans for a
British trading group to supplant.the individual firms now
seeking to withdraw from China. The British businessmen have
reportedly prepared detailed plans for the new agency, which
was first suggested by Foreign Secretary Eden, and want a
British official to act as its head.
In London on 9 July, however, the Foreign Office told the
China Association, representing British interests in China,
that the British Government would withhold official support
of such a group until after a Korean settlement and the estab-
lishment of normal relations with China; it advised delay in
negotiations with Peiping by private British interests until
after firm arrangements for withdrawal are completed. (S
London 179, 10 July 52)
Comment: Eden's original suggestion in the House of
Commons was evidently intended as an illustration of his
assurance that Britain stands ready to trade with the Peiping
regime at any time, rather than as a practical proposal for
immediate adoption.
17, New "total war" organization formed in Indochina- The
American Embassy has in irec y learned o the formation of a
French-Vietnamese organization for "total war," to be directed
by French military authorities. The organization is composed
of five committees charged with mobilizing human, economic, and
psychological resources, public works and transportation, and
civilian defense,
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The Embassy, while expressing "disappointment" at not
being informed earlier of this important development, comments
that the cooperation necessary to make the scheme work is a
possibility under the new Tam government. (S Saigon 73,
10 July 52)
Comment: This organization should increase the efficiency
of the mi ary effort; but it does run directly counter to
Vietnamese aspirations for greater autonomy. It could have
far-reaching significance in the maintenance of French control
over a wide range of political, military, economic and social
activities in Vietnam.
.The American Embassy is apparently still not receiving
full and timely information from the French.
18, Thailand may seek closer ties with other Asian countries:
The Thai Government press fears that e United toes is
veering toward isolationism and has suggested that Asian
countries league for their own defense, since they cannot rely
on the United Nations alone for protection against aggression.
The American Embassy in Bangkok comments that Thailand
may be seeking to improve its relations with other Asian
nations as an alternative to a Pacific Pact, which the Thai
believe is unfeasible without active American participation.
(C Bangkok 58, 10 July 52)
Comment: This is the latest indication that Thailand is
considering -a retreat from its pro-Western orientation in
favor of closer cooperation with the neutralist states of
South Asia,
19,
American Embassy repeats warning against cutting Burma
aid: The American m asst' in Rangoon repeats its warning of
list month that the contemplated reduction in American aid
to Burma will create a "most unfortunate political situation
for the Technical Cooperation Administration." (R Rangoon
51, 10 July 52)
Comment: American aid to the Burmese Government has been
criticize y the Communists, Karen nationalists, and a part
of the independent press.
Many Burmese officials, who have been led to believe that
this aid will be provided on an increasing scale, have come to
regard it as an important prop of their regime.
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20, BW campaign setback in Burma: The Soviet veto of the
American proposa or an investigation of Communist charges
of the use of bacteriological warfare weapons in Korea has
been the subject of vigorous editorials in the Burmese press
calling upon the USSR "to put up or shut up." (R Rangoon
50, 10 July 52)
Comment: While the pW campaign has not been successful
in Burma, this is the first significant instance in which it
has been derided, Burmese officials, however, continue to
hang back from 'issuing an official repudiation.
21, Maraghi Pasha may succeed Sirry as Egyptian Prime Minister:
25X1C ng arou
must eventually accept either a return o the Ward arty or a
dictatorial regime headed by ex-Minister of the Interior
Maraghi Pasha. Maraghi would undertake to neutralize the Wafd
in three years of rule without Parliament.
25X1C believes that Farouk will
probably choose Maraghi as Prime Minister if the Sirry govern-
ment falls. 25X1A
Comment: Maraghi, considered a strong, independent figure,
was freq"T ugly mentioned as the probable successor to Hilaii
Pasha, Sirry's predecessor. He was responsible for the effective
reorganization of the police force aster the January riots.
22, New Egyptian Prime Minister to confer with Sudanese
leader: Egyptian Prime Minister Sirry Pasha has nv a El
MENU-, the leader of the pro-independence Sudanese Umma Party,
to Cairo as an official guest of the Egyptian Government. El
Ma.hdi is expected to arrive on 22 July at the head of a large
delegation of tribal chiefs and party leaders who are advocates
of Sudanese independence. (S Cairo 57, 10 July 52)
Comment: This is the first evidence that Sirry Pasha will
renew g ian-Sudanese talks in an effort to obtain Sudanese
acceptance of Farouk's title of "King of the Sudanio" El Mahdi,
who himself has aspired to this title, has not yet indicated
his reaction to the first Egyptian-Sudanese talks last month.
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WESTERN EUROPE
23. East German Alert Police re ortedl receives 74 Soviet tanks:
25X1 a total of tan s
being transported from the Soviet Union to East Germany on 15,
18 and 24 June. American representatives in Munich believe that
these tanks have been delivered to East German Alert Police units.
25X1A
Comment: This is the first I (report in some time of 25X1
.the receipt of tanks by Alert Police units, although an issue of
Soviet weapons to three units in May has been confirmed. It is
believed that for the past year the Alert Police has had 90 tanks
for training purposes.
24. Allied position in Berlin seen deteriorating: American of-
ficials in or in state that the July dnapping of a West
Berlin jurist focuses attention on the fundamental weakness of
the Allied position there. Local means for retaliating against
such incidents are extremely limited, and there are no adequate
defenses against the over-all Soviet harassment campaign.
The officials believe that the Western position in Berlin
will probably deteriorate gradually unless the problem is treated
as a global one, with countermeasures taken in places where the
Allies have the advantage. They suggest that the Orbit may be
particularly vulnerable to economic retaliation such as the block-
ing of accounts maintained in Western banks. (C Berlin 62,
10 July 52)
25e Trend continues in West Germany toward approval of treaties:
Public opinion polls conducted by American officials in mid-June
reveal that although most West Germans consider that the Bonn-
Paris treaties reduce the chances of German unification, the
trend toward a favorable evaluation of the treaties continues,
particularly among the wealthy and better-educated. A majority
is aware that the new political status will mean a defense contri-
bution to the EDC, and this is the most frequently criticized
feature of the treaties. Nevertheless, ratification is expected
by a solid majority.
A small minority has been disturbed by the recent Communist
pressure campaign. Most people foresee trouble in Berlin; in
the event of another blockade, half of those polled want the
West to use more forceful measures than in 1949.
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A large majority favors a four-power conference on German
problems, although most of them do not expect tangible results.
(C Bonn 155 and 157, 11 July 52)
2P.. French firm seeking radar for Polish ship: The British
delegate to COCO'u as informed that bo y that, although firms
in his country had rejected a French firm's order for radar equip-
ment for installation in a Polish ship at Le Havre, the British
Government was concerned that this equipment would be secured
elsewhere.
The French delegate, who stated that the vessel was probably
the Wisconsin, said that if the radar equipment were bought else-
where and unloaded in the harbor, French authorities could not
intervene. If the equipment entered French customs, however,
an export license would be required before it could be installed
on the Wisconsin. (S Paris 254, 10 July 52)
Comment: Except for direction finders, radar equipment is
on the International List I. The suggestion that Poland
may be able to secure such equipment points up the weakness of
COCOM controls over transit trade.
The Wisconsin, a French ship, was recently sold to Poland.
2 Russia ma
b
y
e seeking to expand Danube traffic: The Soviet-
Hungarian s Ypp ng company, esz art, w c since 1946 has oper-
ated without Austrian authorization on the Danube between Vienna
and the Hungarian border, has reportedly approached the Austrian
Government for an official tr
d
a
e license, Since some Austrian
officials fear that granting the license might prejudice chances
for an Austrian peace treaty, no action has yet been taken. If
the government decides to grant the license, it will reportedly
seek guarantees of ual -rights for Austrian shipping in Hun-
garian waters. 25X1
Comment: The Hungarian request, together with recent Soviet.
offers to-the Austrians to relax long-standing obstructions to
Austrian shipping on the river, may portend a general effort on
the part of the Orbit to increase the volume of Danube traffic.
The Soviet offers may have been designed in part to make the
Austrian Government more receptive to the Soviet-Hungarian
company's application,
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28,
Last January Meszhart sought permission to operate on the
Danube within the US occupation zone in Germany. After American
and German officials insisted that the USSR must first admit
German vessels to the Soviet occupation zone in Austria, the
question was dropped.
occupation restricts interzonal movement of Austrian
charge that this violation of freedom of movement guaranteed by
the Allied Control Agreement is designed to keep local unemploy-
ment figures artificially high.
Meanwhile, the official Soviet newspaper in Austr-.a has
denounced the alleged recruitment in the Soviet Zone of unemployed
Austrians for work in "West Austrian armaments industry. (U
Vienna 105, 10 July 52; R FBIS Vienna, 11 July 52)
Comment: Unemployment in all of Austria is running con-
sideraBTy move last year?s levels, and the allegation that the
unemployed are now being conscripted for rearmament would provide
an initial propaganda line for Austrian peace partisans setting
the stage for the World Peace Council meeting scheduled for
Vienna in December. Communist propaganda has frequently charged
that unemployment in Austria is a result of American emphasis
on raw materials production to the exclusion of Austria's
finishing industries.
.nos ructea by the local Soviet. command not to offer unemployed
Austrian workers jobs outside the Soviet Zone. The Socialists
unemployed: The Wiener eusta t la or office has reports y een
29. Unification of Portuguese Air Force becomes law: The Portu-
guese Army an Navy r .rtes were united by of icial decree
under an Undersecretariat of State for Aeronautics, effective
1 July 1952, According to the Minister of Defense, the new
cabinet post, which ranks with the Ministries of Army and Navy,
will go to the present Undersecretary of the Army, Major Horacio
Jose de Sa Viana, Corps of Engineers, and not to General Alfredo
Cintra, Chief of Staff of the Army Air Force, who had confidently
expected the appointment. (C Madrid, Joint Weeka 27, 3 July 52)
Comment: The Defense Minister may have decided to name
Sa Viana, a trusted aide who was not a member of either air force,
in order to retain firm control over the new undersecretariat
without the hindrance of further bickering and jealousies between
Army and Navy air personnels
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Despite Cintra?s competence and experience, his chances for
elevation to cabinet rank may have been prejudiced by President
Craveiro Lopes' well-known antipathy toward him. Moreover, the
general has manifested a decided unfriendliness toward Americans
LATIN AMERICA
30. Attempt to assassinate Peron may be made soon: An attempt to
assassinate rest en eron s e ng p anne and ma be carried
out at any time, 25X1C
The oortune time for such an attempt, according to the
25X10 would be during the confusion following Senora de
e:ron's death, which is expected momentarily. 25X1A
25X1A
25X1
Comment: Numerous small groups have been plotting Peron's
assass nat on, and he lives in daily fear that his extreme security
precautions might not be effective.
Peron and his controlled press have constantly harangued the
public to, be on the alert for a US-directed plot to assassinate
him and bring about chaos in the country. Hence the blame for any
Uprising as already been laid on the American doorstep. It has
been reported that Peron now believes these charges.
31, Argentine Government reportedly endorsed bombing of US 25X10
o . x
25X10 te bombing of A e US Information Service Lincoln Library
was the work of the Nationalists backed by the Argentine Government.
25X10 states that action on the matter to be taken by
e Argentine Government will depend on the official United States
attitude. If a strong protest is made, an investigation of the
bombing and a lessening of anti-US attacks will follow; otherwise,
similar and more serious incidents,involving American citizens,
can be expected. (C Buenos Aires 25, 10 July 52)
Comment: The Argentine Foreign Office has not communicated
with or expressed regret to the US Embassy concerning the bombing
of the library.
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TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT
14 .July 1952
CIA No. 49730
Copy No.46
TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
(including S/S Cables)
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
TOP SE CR E T
SECURITY INFORMATION
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS., TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
1. Communists in Burma reportedly striving for alliance
of all insurgents: The present policy of the Burma CoRm-unist
Party is to form an alliance among all insurgents, including
the Karens 25X1C
25X1C a ieves that a Karen-Communist merger would not
necessarily result in. the overthrow of the government, but 25X1
that it would severely strain the Burmese armed forces.
25X1A 5X1
Comment: As the Karen position becomes increasingly
desperate, and as older, pro-West leaders are replaced by
younger ones, the Communist offers for an alliance are be-
coming increasingly appealing.
2. De Gasperi refuses to withdraw Trieste appointment:
Italian Premier de Gasperi has told the British and American
Ambassadors "with some asperity" that despite their repre-
sentations he cannot withdraw the appointment of De Castro
as Italian Political Adviser for Trieste. The ambassadors
had told the Premier that the appointment might prejudice
Italian-Yugoslav negotiations on Trieste, and had pointed
to adverse Yugoslav press comment on De Castro's nationalist
connections. De Gasperi replied that De Castro could be re-
moved if he did not do the "competent, responsible job"
expected of him.
1 14 July 52
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De Gasperi referred again to the importance of the Trieste
issue in the coming national elections. Asserting that he did
not have the strength to "stand up against failure" to solve
the problem, he emphasized its "bearing on the Italian rat-
ification of EDCO" (S S/S Rome 155, 11 July 52)
Comment: Recent Italian appointments in Trieste have
shown tl he effects of extreme nationalist pressure on the De
Gasperi government.
Although the Italian Parliament is expected to ratify
the EDC treaty in the fall after.some debate, US observers
believe that this increasing nationalist pressure will
jeopardize the next Italian Government's cooperation with US
policies.
2 14 July 52.
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 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146AO01100130001-6
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146AO01100130001-6